Immigration and political trust Brainstorming meeting report

Transcription

1 Immigration and political trust Brainstorming meeting report London, 21 September 2010 On 21 September 2010 Policy Network held a brainstorming meeting to launch its new research initiative, Immigration and political trust, supported by the Barrow Cadbury Trust. The meeting brought together academics, experts and policymakers to discuss the relationship between immigration and political trust and to contribute ideas on how to take the project forward over the next 12 months. Policy Network s new research initiative is exploring how immigration relates to trust in politics. It examines the high levels of concern about immigration and the problems this poses for politics and policymakers, including for progressives, in order to develop policy proposals. Understanding political trust is especially important at a time when we are witnessing a decline in trust in political institutions and in politicians as a class in most European countries. It is also important for political parties to understand how relative trust in different political figures or political parties is an important factor in electoral outcomes. Does immigration affect political trust? A Policy Network paper by Lauren McLaren of the University of Nottingham provided the starting point for discussion of a topic which has until now received relatively little academic attention. Studies have previously focused on how immigration and diversity affect levels of social trust and have paid less attention to how immigration might influence the trust that citizens have in their politicians and political institutions. In the paper entitled Cause for concern? The impact of immigration on political trust, Lauren McLaren uses four rounds of the European Social Survey to explore the relationship between public attitudes to immigration and public attitudes to politicians and political institutions. She controls for other possible factors that could affect levels of political trust, including characteristics of individuals such as social capital and where they place themselves on a left-right political spectrum, as well as national-level conditions such as levels of migration and economic circumstances. The paper finds that if citizens perception of the effects of immigration is negative, they are less trusting of the political system. That is, concern about immigration is one of the causes of political distrust (other significant variables are dissatisfaction with the economy and levels of interpersonal trust). Interestingly, actual levels of immigration may be unrelated, or even negatively related, to concern about immigration, indicating that negative perceptions are a result of other factors than numbers of immigrants. The paper also finds that where governance is of good quality and where policies make it easier for immigrants to become fully functioning members of the polity, the connection between concern about immigration and political distrust is even stronger.

2 Difficulties in analysing the relationship Measuring the impact of immigration on political trust is difficult and Lauren McLaren s paper presents an important first study of this relationship. At the meeting some questions were raised about the best methods of measurement and analysis for studying the relationship. It was pointed out that one study focusing on Spain and using the same European Social Survey did not find a relationship between attitudes towards immigration and political trust. Several contributors suggested it would be beneficial to distinguish between countries with different trends in political trust and to distinguish between countries with different levels of immigration (see also below on international comparisons). It was suggested that it might also be preferable to use indicators for citizen concern that are more likely to fluctuate over time, as otherwise what is being measured might not be concern but rather something else, some kind of structural trait like ethnocentrism (and thus the question would be whether ethnocentric people tend to be more distrusting). It was highlighted that there was close alignment of answers to the three questions on immigration concern in the European Social Survey, suggesting each might not be an independent assessment of the effects of immigration but rather the product of a person s general attitude. It was also pointed out that in terms of looking at change over time, in the UK there was a lot of change in attitudes to immigration and race during the 1990s and that would not be covered by the European Social Survey, which started in It was also suggested that we should consider the limits of using social surveys alone. It was proposed that there are potential insights to be gained from using other methods, such as ethnographic research. Ethnographic research in communities might come up with a richer picture, especially regarding local interventions. Why focus on immigration? There has been a decline in political trust in the UK. British Social Attitudes surveys show that trends in political trust are clearly related to events for example, trust increases after elections and decreases after scandals such as the Tory sleaze scandal of the 1980s or the MPs expenses scandal more recently. Lauren McLaren s research suggests that concern about the economy has a greater effect on political trust than concern about immigration. Thus it is clear that there are many factors affecting levels of political trust, by no means only immigration. Indeed, immigration in some countries may play no role at all: it was pointed out that there has been a severe decline in levels of political trust in some Eastern European countries where immigration is not an issue. So why focus on immigration? The conclusion we can draw from Lauren McLaren s research is that public concern about immigration has consequences for the political system. Negative perceptions of immigration are found to be related to distrust in politics. There was widespread agreement among participants that public concern about immigration is increasingly important for politics and there is a need to understand why it is such a salient topic with the public and how to react. The project looks at the question of how concern about immigration weakens political trust in order to formulate the appropriate policy responses. It seeks to provide solutions for how to manage public concern in relation to immigration policy, an area in which there is still much uncertainty among progressives.

3 Growing concern about immigration Looking at trends in attitudes towards immigration, Ipsos MORI data shows that immigration is a more significant issue for the public in Europe than the rest of the world, and more significant for the public in the UK than the rest of Europe. There has been a considerable shift in UK public attitudes over the past 13 years: in 1997 immigration was barely an issue for the public whereas now it is among the top three most important issues. At present around two thirds of people are dissatisfied with how the government has handled immigration. Traditionally concern was present among lower socio-economic groups; now there is more concern among the middle class as well. According to Ipsos MORI, in the UK only a minority (9%) think immigration should be stopped altogether but a majority (65%) think laws should be much tougher. In terms of the priority that should be given to different groups, there is most support for people facing persecution (60%), followed by people with needed skills (49%), foreign students (43%) and tourists (41%). Support is low for family reunion and low-skilled migrants. There are mixed feelings on immigration from the new EU member states, with significant numbers thinking they should not be allowed to come and work in Britain. Notably there is as tough a stance on this as on non-eu immigration. Regarding integration policies, there is strong support for immigrants being made to learn English and being given lessons about the British way of life. Concern is not based on personal experience of immigration Not all participants agreed that concern about immigration is not based on levels of immigration. It was argued that in the UK numbers were low until the 1990s and concern was low and then both increased dramatically. Other participants considered that there was a link but a complicated one and one that needs to be disentangled (including from ongoing ethnocentric attitudes). What was clearer was that concern does not appear to be related to direct personal experience of immigration. Ipsos MORI data shows that concern does not stem from being personally affected: while 70% of people think immigration is a problem, the majority do not think it is an issue in their local area and those living in more ethnically diverse areas have more positive attitudes. It was suggested that it would be interesting to look further at particular cities with high levels of diversity as well as areas where people perceive not diversity but local majorities of particular immigrant groups. Research by the Institute for Public Policy Research has also found that attitudes are mostly not based on lived experience and that concern about effects is talked about in national terms. This echoes Lauren McLaren s argument that levels of immigration do not seem to determine levels of concern. This again raises the question, however, of whether in trying to measure concern about immigration we may in fact be measuring ethnocentrism or racism. It was pointed out that diversity does not seem to be the cause of more negative attitudes, as exemplified by the case of Poland. Poland is one of the most homogenous countries in Europe (with only 0.2% of the population having foreign citizenship) and yet 80% of people there say immigration is not good for the country. Another interesting example is Spain, where a substantial increase in numbers of immigrants has not led to growing levels of intolerance. Understanding the relationship: identity politics There are different ways to understand the relationship between concern about immigration and political trust. On the one hand, there are theoretical explanations which focus on how immigration may change the

4 political community and in some way undermine the traditional relationship citizens have to their political institutions. This explanation emphasises the impact of immigration on perceptions of shared national identity, values and cultural ties. In her paper, Lauren McLaren puts forward some theoretical explanations for the causal link between concern about immigration and declining political trust that are based on an understanding of the construction of the modern European nation state. If European democratic political systems and systems of redistribution have traditionally been built based on cultural connections, a perceived weakening of these cultural connections because of immigration is likely to weaken attachment to the political system. The proposition is that perceptions of immigration may lead to feelings of disunity with fellow citizens and also with the elites in the community, thus creating problems for citizens willingness to support the existence of a group of individuals who can engage in policymaking. It is suggested in the paper that citizens may not be able to adapt their understandings of national identity to reconcile them with the incorporation of newcomers. One question here is whether internal migration within a state may have similar effects on identity or whether there is something specific about national identity. Another question concerns whether there might be different attitudes towards different migrant groups in relation to national identity (see the debates about Muslims in Europe). These kinds of approaches focus on how immigration unsettles fixed notions of identity. One view of the causal relationship in these kinds of identity-based approaches is that governments are seen not to protect identity and are blamed. Lauren McLaren s research suggests that this sense of blame stretches beyond politicians or governments to affect how citizens view other political institutions as well. The question arose of how notions of identity and citizenship change. The International Social Survey 2003 was mentioned for its work on national identity and the changing views people have of the ethnic versus civic components of national identity. How does interpersonal trust come in? These identity-based explanations raise questions about the role of interpersonal, or social, trust and its link to political trust. Does the causal explanation outlined above imply that immigration leads to diversity, which weakens interpersonal trust, which in turn weakens political trust? Lauren McLaren finds that lower levels of interpersonal trust correspond to lower levels of political trust but does not test the causal relationship. In general the research on the relationship between interpersonal and political trust is unclear, with differing conclusions about the connection in different studies of different countries. There is clearly more to explore here. In addition, we might also consider looking at interpersonal trust from another angle: how it affects attitudes to immigration. A study of Spanish attitudes was mentioned, which finds that attitudes to immigration depend on levels of interpersonal trust. An alternative explanation: performance politics While the explanations outlined above focus on immigration and identity politics, other explanations look more at concern about immigration policy than concern about immigration per se or its perceived effects. This latter approach is concerned with what might be termed performance politics. Many participants highlighted that there is little public confidence in immigration policy, focusing on the gap in the area of immigration between what the public expect and what policymakers achieve. These explanations consider

5 that there is a perceived policy failure. Here we see that the relationship could also work the other way around: declining trust in politics and policymaking may cause rising concern about immigration. These explanations appear to be supported by Ipsos MORI data on the reasons that people cite for why they are concerned about immigration. Community tensions and perceived lack of integration are not primary reasons found in polling, and a perceived threat to a person s own way of life is less significant a reason than the perceived burden on public services and pressure on jobs. Overall Ipsos MORI conclude that concern is based in large part on a perceived lack of control in the area of immigration policy and there is an ongoing concern about the number of immigrants coming in, with views hardening on numbers especially among the middle class (C1s) and under 30s (the importance of looking at differences in attitudes between generations was also touched upon by other participants, including in relation to the hypothesis that contact with immigrants changes attitudes). Recent research by IPPR backs up the importance of perceptions of control, concluding that public concern centres on whether the government is in control of immigration. It was suggested at the meeting that what people want is a stable system, with criteria that they can have confidence in and that are successfully implemented. It was argued that in the UK, the managed migration agenda was an attempt to recognise this by generating targets against which politicians asked to be judged. The idea of an immigration cap may also be seen as an attempt to convey control. So are the public concerned about immigration because governments have failed to display that they are and can be in control in this area? Significant here is the issue that several participants raised of whether policymakers are able to deliver in the area of immigration policy. To what extent is it possible for governments to be in control of migration flows (including EU migration and irregular immigration flows) in an age of globalisation? Some suggest there are important questions to be asked about governments promising a lot when they actually have little control over borders. Bringing in other policy areas Some participants raised the idea that public confidence in immigration policy may be unlike public confidence in any other policy area because people experience it as something that is done to them a very distant part of policymaking that the state does to people. This may raise questions about the process of policymaking and public involvement in it. For example, would it be possible for there to be more partnerships with communities or with universities in making policy? On the other hand, it was argued that immigration could be seen as a policy area like any other about which governments are in trouble with public opinion. The government, it was pointed out, got on the wrong side of public opinion on managing the economy as well and sought to reverse this. Along this view, there are other policy areas that the government can learn from in terms of how trust is engendered and how it can evaporate. It was also suggested that it may be important to look at how immigration policy interacts with other policies, for example in relation to the labour market. The example of EU enlargement was highlighted, in which there was a big, unanticipated change which politicians did not forecast and which therefore happened without the necessary social preparation for its consequences. Related to this is the question of whether concern about immigration might in any case be little more than a proxy or smokescreen for other policy issues. If the concerns are about pressure on public services, housing

6 or jobs and wages, might concern need to be met by policy responses in these areas rather than by immigration or integration policies per se? It was suggested that it is essential to understand the sense people have that immigration is creating conditions that are unfair. The question of the relationship between domestic inequality and immigration was raised in this context and so was the issue of whether immigration poses a particular kind of problem for the left. It was argued that it may be valuable to look at whether we are seeing a fracturing of the coalition between the liberal middle class, the white working class and immigrant communities. The media If anti-immigration attitudes are not simply the result of levels of immigration, how do we understand what drives attitudes? Some contributors suggested that what we need to understand is why ethnocentrism is so salient and many participants focussed on the need to ask how immigration becomes an issue on the political agenda. Why, for example, did immigration become politicised in the Netherlands at a time when immigration dropped? To answer this, it was argued, we need to look at the role of the media, political entrepreneurs, particularly far-right parties, and the electoral system. Many people suggested that the media is an important driver of public opinion on immigration. Studies have shown that amount and importantly tone of immigration coverage is related to public concern about immigration. These links are reflected in polling studies in the UK, where the media is very politicised: according to Ipsos MORI, newspaper readership is more closely related to attitudes to immigration than attitudes to any other issue. Almost half of Daily Mail and Daily Express readers think immigration is a big issue compared to one in five Guardian readers. (The question was raised: how will this change with changing patterns of media consumption, especially among younger generations?) Mass media may be a significant actor in the politicisation of issues such as immigration, for example by providing bias in the relationship between real-world immigration levels and public immigration concerns. It was pointed out that the amount of media coverage about immigration does not relate to numbers but to other events such as terror attacks. If immigration is politicised in this way, it becomes more important in evaluations of politicians or political institutions. The far-right and political discourse Lauren McLaren s research results suggest that the impact of concern about immigration on political distrust is not necessarily stoked by the far right. Others suggested that the far right has a significant role in the relationship between attitudes to immigration and trust in politics. This role might be viewed in terms of mobilising anti-immigrant or anti-system attitudes. One contribution put forward the possibility that the relationship could also work the other way around: far right parties are popular because they link issues to anti-establishment positions. Far-right support is a growing concern for progressives in Europe. It was suggested that in the UK a lot more people are concerned about immigration than will vote for far-right parties, partly because of the nature of the political system. But this should not deflect from the need for progressives in the UK to find ways to redress concern about immigration so as not to find themselves exposed in this area. It was argued that it is very important to look at how politicians react to politicised anti-immigrant public opinion and to the far right. We need to analyse the character of mainstream political discourse on immigration, including looking at how a more populist discourse has been employed by some mainstream

7 politicians in some countries. Also significant are strategies to de-politicise immigration. It was argued that in the UK the managed migration agenda can be seen as an attempt to present immigration in technocratic, de-politicised terms. It was suggested that this approach may have been rational but it also created dangers by making it easy for actors to contradict the government s agenda and easy for the space to be filled by political entrepreneurs on the far-right. It was suggested that it is important to look at different depoliticising forces and actors, such as local community groups. Regarding policy responses to concern about immigration, it was suggested that an interesting parallel to consider in looking at concern about immigration may be policies to combat fear of crime: combating fear of crime is understood to require a different set of policies to combating crime itself. What is the value of international comparisons? The European Social Survey provides a good source of data for cross-national comparisons. Studies can compare countries with different immigration and integration policies, levels of immigration, levels of concern and levels of political trust. Comparisons may help us to understand why in some contexts immigration becomes a politicised issue whereas in others it does not as well as to learn lessons from other countries. Understanding the experiences of different countries is also essential in considering the management of free movement at the EU level as well as patterns of non-eu migration to Europe. In making comparisons, a number of issues may need to be considered. Conditions are different in different European states in respect of the timing of immigration flows, levels of immigration and emigration, the capacity of labour markets to absorb immigrants as well as the characteristics of immigrant workers, including levels of education. Different sets of public policies must be considered in the management of immigration, in education, in health and in labour markets. It was also suggested that political disaffection in different countries may have a distinctive nature and that political trust may depend on the expectations that citizens have within their particular environment. These aspects highlight the need to understand the historical context and historical conditions in each country. The example of Belgium was given: in Belgium the same levels of distrust and ethnocentrism are present in the Flemish-speaking and French-speaking regions, but for historical reasons one region has an extreme right party and the other does not. Historical context is also important in trying to understand whether the phenomena we are studying are particular to Europe. Some offered the view that there is something distinctive about European conceptions of national identity that help to explain the levels of public concern over immigration and immigration policy. Others saw valuable insights in looking to other countries and their historical development. For example, Canada was put forward as an interesting example of a state that has been successful in expanding the concept of national identity and coming to a broader concept of the nation state, but doing so in certain conditions that include control at the border. Upcoming activity The meeting clearly brought out the salience of immigration as a political issue and the presence of increasing levels of concern in European countries over immigration. The public has little trust in government s handling of immigration policy and this appears to affect levels of trust in politics in general, and possibly in parties of the left in particular.

8 The political problem is a complex one and one that progressive parties have no clear answer to. On the one hand, there are pressures for immigration and for the economic benefits it produces, especially in ageing societies. There may also be limits to the control that governments can and do have over borders and moving people in an age of globalisation and mobility and in conditions of extreme international inequality. On the other hand, governments have to manage concerns among the public about the effects of immigration, mediated and mobilised by the media and far-right political actors. Concerns are perceived in terms of conditions such as pressure on jobs, wages and public services (with important questions about which groups feel this pressure most). But concerns are also perceived in terms of cultural identity and threats to national community. This concern about the effects leads to calls for greater control. How should mainstream progressive parties respond? Policy Network s project is going to look at problems of trust and credibility in relation to immigration and consider through a series of seminars and publications how policies can restore public confidence in relation to immigration. The debates that took place during the brainstorming meeting will be used to help Policy Network in shaping the project. Anita Hurrell Policy researcher ahurrell@policy-network.net Policy Network