ANOTHER VIEWPOINT (AVP 18, February 1989) 3845 Buffalo Rd., Auburn, CA SECULARISM: A MISSING FORCE IN MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS. Elias H.

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1 ANOTHER VIEWPOINT (AVP 18, February 1989) 3845 Buffalo Rd., Auburn, CA SECULARISM: A MISSING FORCE IN MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS Elias H. Tuma The Middle East has been known for its religions, strong religious belief of the people, and confessionalism or theocratic character of the states in the region. However, it is little admitted or recognized that confessionalism and state theocracy have been obstacles in the way of economic development, stability, and modernism. To pretend that confessionalism, as opposed to state secularism or separation of church from state, can be reconciled with the objectives and expectations of the people in the Middle East region has no doubt been self deceiving. Confessionalism has never been easy to reconcile with strong nationalism, national unity, a unified market, political stability, efficient or rapid economic development, or peace and security, which are the main objectives of the Middle East countries. Observations of the last few decades suggest that most of these objectives remain unfulfilled. It is true that other obstacles have stood in the way, but confessionalism cannot be ruled out as one of the major obstacles to the realization of these objectives. Confessionalism at the level of the community or the nation means applying one's religious beliefs to all aspects of society and failure to separate "church from state". In this sense confessionalism dictates separatism between one religious group and another within the same country or nation. It also infringes on the ability of the segmented society to fulfill goals that require national unity and cooperation. Even a cursory look at the prevailing conditions in 1

2 the Middle East should be sufficient to illustrate the harm that confessionalism has inflicted on groups and nations of the region. National unity demands cooperation of all the citizens in the name of the nation and willingness to sacrifice personal goals for collective ones. The adoption and enforcement of a state religion have tended to obstruct the development of a strong nationalist and unified state. Protecting a minority religion in a confessional state has rarely succeeded in reconciling nationalism with confessionalism. Egypt, among the Middle Eastern states, has probably been the most successful but still not successful enough to remove conflict between its different religious communities, the Christian Coptic minority and the Muslim majority, and thereby solidify national sentiments. In fact, solidarity is not evident within the Muslim community itself, given the various sections, interpretations, and degrees of fundamentalism within Islam in Egypt and elsewhere. Worse situations exist in Sudan, Lebanon, Iran, and Israel. The Sudan has lost hundreds of thousands of people killed by civil war and starvation, and is now threatened with partition between north and south because of confessionalism. The adoption of Islam as state religion and the Shari'a law as state law by the North is in contradiction with the rights of citizens to freedom of belief and expression, rights expected by the Christian minority in the South. Lebanon has been shattered: Christians fight Christians, Muslims fight Muslims, and factions within each denomination or sect fight each other. Few people retain hope that Lebanon can be put together again, at least in part because of the predominance of confessionalism in the life of the Lebanese. Iran has just concluded a war that had resulted from the revived confessionalism and the fundamentalism of its leaders. 2

3 Israel at one time seemed immune to factionalism within the Jewish community, but it never was immune to the conflict implicit in the confessionalism of Arabs and Jews. Unity within the Jewish community has now been shattered: the attempt to promote freedom of religion and apply secularism to the affairs of state has been undermined by increasing Orthodoxy and fundamentalism among the Jews within and outside the country. It is possible in all these cases to blame the schism on political aspirations, foreign intervention, poverty and inequality of income and wealth distribution. Yet, even when all these factors have been accounted for, confessionalism as an holistic concept of faith that applies to all aspects of life stands out as the most serious obstacle to nationalism, national unity, and solidarity in the region. The resulting political instability and disunity have left their impact on the societies, the economies, the international relations, and the futures of the individual countries in the Middle East, as well as on the region as a whole. Social relations have been undermined because of discrimination against or in favor of religious minorities. Claims to the contrary notwithstanding, it is easy to show that religious minorities enjoy certain benefits in some countries and disbenefits in others, whether in holding public office, representation in government, or access to domestic and international economic opportunities. Social disunity has been accompanied by market and economic disunity which have negatively affected the process of economic development within the individual countries and in the region at large. The inequality of development in Lebanon since independence can easily be identified with religious divisions within the country. The inequality of development between Lebanon and other Arab countries has often been associated with differences in religious affiliation. 3

4 Confessionalism and adoption of a state religion have also been costly in countries which are homogeneous in belief but exclusive toward other religions. The Arabian Peninsula countries, which had excluded non-muslims for many years, may have delayed their own development because of their dependence on the expertise and human capital of non-muslim outsiders. Even today, such exclusion is practiced widely though in a modified form. Another serious negative effect of confessionalism may be observed in the contradiction which arises from attempts to advance science, technology, and economic development. Religious and religiously-oriented systems of education tend to be traditional, conformist, and little conducive to creativity and independent thinking. The Shari'a rules on finance, investment, inheritance, and public trusts were most helpful when all parties with whom Muslims transacted behaved according to those same rules and principles. However, times have changed, expectations have changed, and the business parties have changed. Most of these changes have been in favor of secularism or the separation of religion from the affairs of state and the economy. Yet the Middle East countries continue to practice confessionalism in an old-fashioned way. It is evident, also, that the secular countries, whether in the East or the West, have been more successful in advancing science and technology and developing their economies than the confessional countries have been; the gap between the two seems to be growing rather than contracting. Secular countries have produced many more serious thinkers, inventors, and innovators than non-secular countries. They have elevated the quality of life for their people far above the levels achieved by the confessional countries. It is ironic that confessional countries which enjoy relatively high standards of living 4

5 have achieved those standards by depending on knowledge, capital, and expertise imported from secular countries. Probably the most serious economic cost of confessionalism is the loss of efficiency in the use of resources for economic development. This loss may be observed in at least three different areas: wasteful expenditure on confessionally induced wars, civil or otherwise; destruction of human and material capital because of conflict; and exclusion of or discrimination against certain groups from efficient use of their abilities in the economy. Women, for example, who form more than half of the population and of the potential labor force in many of these countries have faced serious handicaps in realizing their potential. They have been excluded or discriminated against in the name of religion and tradition, which reinforce each other. The cost to the national economy because of this exclusion has not been measured but it is undoubtedly immense. These observations and arguments strongly suggest the need for the countries of the Middle East to reconsider their commitment to confessionalism in light of their own objectives and expectations. Reconsideration of confessionalism and emphasis on secularism at the national and community levels do not mean a compromise of religion or faith. On the contrary, reassessment may lead to a deeper religious commitment by the individual as a personal experience and by free choice. Such renewed commitment would be a relationship between the individual and the deity. All other matters, however, would then be conducted according to secular rules, reason, efficiency, and in cooperation with others in the nation, regardless of religious faith or denomination. Both theory and history suggest that secularism may be an indispensable bridge in the affairs of the Middle East. Secularism would eliminate or at least 5

6 reduce most of the sources of internal and intraregional conflict, smooth the way for better relations with countries outside the region, and facilitate more efficient use of the human and material resources the countries of the Middle East have at their disposal. Elias H. Tuma is a professor at the University of California, Davis. These views are those of the author and do not implicate the University in any way. AVP is a non-profit, non-partisan monthly forum for constructive ideas, published by Elias H.Tuma. Original contributions and commentary are welcome. AVP may be reproduced and distributed freely; mention of AVP would be appreciated. Lori Aoun and John Tuma are Assistant Editors. 6

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