Copyright by John H. Gill, July All rights reserved. FUENTES DE OÑORO 1811: THE FRENCH ORDER OF BATTLE

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1 Copyright by John H. Gill, July FUENTES DE OÑORO 1811: THE FRENCH ORDER OF BATTLE One of the most option rich and close run battles of the Peninsula War, Fuentes de Oñoro has many interesting features (tactics, terrain, timing, etc.). In attempting to replicate it (as the present author is doing for a Victory Point Games Napoleon 20 series board game), however, one immediately encounters problems with the French order of battle. The organization and strength of the Allied (Anglo-Portuguese) main army is fairly straightforward, even if one includes all the normal caveats regarding order of battle; Oman (vol. IV) provides a detailed and comprehensive troop list with strengths that is reproduced here for completeness with some minor corrections. Even the Spanish guerrillas are fairly well recorded (approximately 1,000 foot and 600 lancers under Don Julián Sanchez). On the French side, however, the researcher is daunted by the lack of a thorough, easily accessible modern study founded on archival materials. The superb monograph by Jean Sarramon (published in the Carnet de la Sabretache in 1962) is difficult for American researchers to locate and unfortunately does not include a comprehensive ordre de bataille. This article is intended to provide the results of the author s research into this complex topic by examining the principal published sources and adding a key piece of archival material. The major published sources for the French forces are three (in chronological order of publication): Jean Baptiste Koch, Mémoires d André Masséna (vol. VII), Paris, 1848 (reprinted 1967). This includes reprints of what Koch claims are the 1 May 1811 Situation for the Army of Portugal (which does not include Drouet d Erlon s 9 th Corps) and an ordre de bataille for the army for 3-5 May (including 9 th Corps and elements of the Army of the North under Marshal Bessières). The former is presented as the routine report submitted by every major formation at the beginning and middle of each month; the latter is a depiction of how the army was actually organized and deployed for the battle. However, in some details these two putative documents are not internally consistent with one another. Sir Charles Oman s monumental A History of the Peninsular War (vol. IV), London, 1911 (reprinted 1996) gives a detailed French order of battle. Jean Sarramon, Campagne de Fuentes de Oñoro, Carnet de la Sabretache, Confusion arises because these three sources disagree on the Army of Portugal s order of battle and especially on its strength during the campaign. Although Koch includes the purported archival material noted above as appendices, Oman, who cites documents in the French War Archives and National Archives (military reports are to be found in both) as his authorities, claims that he could not verify Koch s order of battle and strength data. Sarramon, on the other hand, states that Oman s figures are misleading, perhaps including detached and sick troops as well as those present under arms on the battlefield. Sarramon s unprecedented and thorough research into the French military archives makes his calculations particularly persuasive, and it thus seems that Oman indeed presents an inflated strength for the French in the battle. Indeed, Sarramon provides the best overall strength figures. Unfortunately for those interested in order of battle details, he does not offer the relevant Situations (for the Army of Portugal, 9 th Corps, or the elements of the Army of the North that fought in the battle), so one is left only with summary figures for infantry, cavalry and guns (with no detail on weight of cannon or number of howitzers). His account also seems to include small discrepancies that complicate the discrepancies among all three sources. In other words, there is no one single best published answer to the structure and strength of the Army of Portugal during this brief but intriguing campaign from 2 to 11 May 1811.

2 Copyright by John H. Gill, July Nonetheless, by combining the Situation des Troupes Composant l Armée de Portugal for 1 May 1811 (kindly provided by Scott Bowden from the French War Archives, Carton C7/28) with Sarramon s summary data and Koch s details for the cavalry supplied by the Army of the North, one can achieve a reliable view of Massena s army as he approached the battle on 3 5 May. A word of caution is in order, however, as the data presented below does not necessarily reflect all possible detachments Massena may have made when he departed Ciudad Rodrigo on 2 May. The notes following each corps entry will cover known major detachments, but there may have been others. Despite the many questions, it is thus possible to arrive at reasonable conclusions for Massena s Army of Portugal at Fuentes de Oñoro and the following material is designed to help the modern gamer refight this fascinating engagement. It provides the French order of battle based on the archival Situation supplemented by the three principal published sources, showing similarities and deviations, giving detailed strength figures where available, and offering suggestions on which might be most accurate. For a general overview of the strategic situation and combat action, see Oman (vol. IV), Fortescue (vol. VIII), René Chartrand s Osprey book, and especially Sarramon. Bibliographical details on these and other sources reviewed in preparing this order of battle list are found at the end following a set of observations concerning the French forces. Orders of Battle for The Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro 3 5 May 1809 ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ARMY Arthur, Baron Douro of Wellesley PRESENT UNIT BATTALIONS IN ARMS RATINGS Cavalry: Lt. Gen. Stapleton Cotton Brigade: Maj. Gen. Slade 1st Dragoons 388 V/E 14th Light Dragoons 378 R/E Brigade: Lt. Col. Arendtschildt 16th Light Dragoons 362 R/E 1st Hussars, KGL 414 R/E Portuguese Brigade: Brig. Gen. Barbaçena 4th Line 104 S/A 10th Line 208 S/A Total Cavalry: 1,854 1st Division: Lt. Gen. Spencer Brigade: Col. Stopford I/3rd Guards V/E I/Coldstream Guards V/E Company 5/60thFoot 44 R/E Brigade: Maj. Gen. Nightingall II/24th Foot R/E II/42nd Foot, the Black Watch V/E I/79th Foot R/E Company 5/60thFoot 36 R/E E/D

3 Copyright by John H. Gill, July Brigade: Maj. Gen. Howard I/50th Foot R/E I/71st Foot R/E I/92nd Foot R/E Company 3/95thFoot 76 V/E Brigade: Maj. Gen. Löwe 1st Line Battalion, KGL R/E 2nd Line Battalion, KGL R/E 5th Line Battalion, KGL R/E 7th Line Battalion, KGL R/E two light companies 86 R/E Total Infantry: 7,565 3rd Division: Maj. Gen. Picton Brigade: Col. Mackinnon I/45th Foot R/E 74th Regiment R/E I/88th Foot V/E Three companies 5/60thFoot 183 R/E Brigade: Maj. Gen. Colville II/5th Foot R/E II/83rd Foot R/E II/88th Foot R/E 94th Regiment R/E Company 3/95thFoot 76 R/E Portuguese Brigade: Col. Power 9th Line R/A 21st Line R/A Total Infantry: 5,480 5th Division: Maj. Gen. Erskine Brigade: Brig. Gen. Hay III/1st Foot R/E I/9th Foot R/E II/38th Foot R/E Company Brunswick Oels 69 R/E Brigade: Maj. Gen. Dunlop I/4th Foot R/E II/30th Foot R/E III/44th Foot R/E Company Brunswick Oels 68 R/E Portuguese Brigade: Brig. Gen. Spry 3rd Line R/A 15th Line R/A 8th Caçadores R/E Total Infantry: 5,158 6th Division: Maj. Gen. Campbell Brigade: Col. Hulse I/11th Foot R/E II/53rd Foot R/E I/61st Foot R/E Company 5/60th Foot 48 R/E Brigade: Col. Burne [2nd Foot detached to Pack s brigade R/E] I/36th Foot R/E

4 Copyright by John H. Gill, July Portuguese Brigade: Col. Madden 8th Line R/A 12th Line 2 1,222 R/A Total Infantry: 5,250 [4,692 if 2nd Foot is deducted] 7th Division: Maj. Gen. Houston Brigade: Maj. Gen. Sontag II/51st Foot R/E 85th Foot R/E Chasseurs Britanniques R/A Brunswick Oels, eight companies R/E Portuguese Brigade: Brig. Gen. Doyle 7th Line R/A 19th Line 2 1,026 R/A 2nd Caçadores R/E Total Infantry: 4,590 Light Division: Maj. Gen. Craufurd Brigade: Lt. Col. Beckwith I/43rd Foot V/E I/95th Foot (four companies) 354 V/E II/95th Foot (one company) 76 V/E 3rd Caçadores R/E Brigade: Col. Drummond I/52nd Foot V/E II/52nd Foot V/E I/95th Foot (four companies) 357 V/E 1st Caçadores R/E Total Infantry: 3,815 Note: Oman lists the Light Division s Portuguese separately, this structure follows Chartrand and Fletcher (likewise drawing on Fletcher to correct Oman s designations of 95 th Rifles battalions). Unattached Portuguese Brigade: Col. Ashworth 6th Line R/A 18th Line 2 1,130 R/A 6th Caçadores R/E Total Infantry: 2,539 Artillery: 42 x 6-pdrs and 6 x 9-pdrs Bull s Troop, RHA Ross s Troop, RHA Lawson s Company, RA Thompson s Company, RA De Sequera s Battery, 2 nd Portuguese Artillery De Preto s Battery, 1 st Portuguese Artillery De Rozziere s Battery, 1 st Portuguese Artillery Rosado s Battery, 2 nd Portuguese Artillery Attached: Spanish irregulars under Don Julián Sanchez: approximately 1,000 foot and 600 lancers. Blockading Almeida: Pack s Portuguese Brigade: 1st Line 2 R/A 16th Line 2 R/A 4th Caçadores 1 R/E attached: 2nd Regiment of Foot (British) R/E two guns

5 Copyright by John H. Gill, July FRENCH ARMY OF PORTUGAL Marshal Andre Massena Format Notes: Koch gives two tables for the Army of Portugal at Fuentes de Oñoro: (a) what he claims is the 1 May 1811 army strength report (called a Situation ) and (b) the ordre de bataille for 3/5 May. In other words, he claims to present both the official strength return and the way the troops were organized on the day of battle ( task organization ). Sarramon only gives summary figures. The data from the actual 1 May 1811 Situation (from the Archives de la Guerre) are given after Sarramon. Note that these differ markedly from Koch in most cases. o Detached indicates troops separated from their parent unit for all with more than 100 officers/men detached; location of most detached troops follows: A (Almeida), S (Salamanca), CR (Ciudad Rodrigo), o Z (Zamora). These troops are not included in the final totals. Note that figures for guns are totals available. However, the army did not have enough horses/equipment to transport all of its field pieces, thus the difference between total numbers from the Situation and the numbers on the field from Sarramon. Battalion and squadron designations are given in Roman numerals. For reasons of space E/D ratings are not shown, see the Lasalle rules. All figures combine officers and men. UNIT (BATTALIONS) KOCH OMAN SARRAMON SITUATION 2e Corps: GD Reynier 1st Division: GD Merle Brigade: GB Sarrut 2nd Léger (I, II, III) 1,482 1, [detached 330 (S/Z)] 36th Ligne (I, II, III) 1,269 1,650 1,199 Brigade: 4th Léger (I, II, III) 1,365 1,374 1,271 2nd Division: GD Heudelet 1 st Brigade: (this was Foy s brigade, but he had not yet returned from Paris) [not Godard as in Oman] 17th Léger (I, II, III) 1,010 1, th Ligne (I, II, III) 1,311 1,078 1,100 2 nd Brigade: GB Arnaud 31st Léger (I, II, III) 1,781 1,583 1,583 47th Ligne (I, II, III) 1,616 1,606 1,606 Cavalry Brigade: GB Soult 320 1st Hussars (I, II, III) (336) nd Chasseurs (I, II) (342) th Dragoons (I, II) (344) Chasseurs Hanovriens (171) - - unidentified squadron Total infantry: 9,831 10,382 c. 8,000 8,588 Total cavalry: Total artillery on the field at FdO: 8 pieces Total artillery assigned to corps: 12 (4 x 8-pdr, 6 x 4-pdr, 2 x hwtzr) Notes: a. The cavalry figures under Koch are in parentheses because Koch does not include Soult s cavalry brigade in the 3/5 May ordre de bataille, the numbers are taken from his 1 May strength report. Oman and the archival 1 May Situation include the

6 Copyright by John H. Gill, July French regiments but do not list the Hanoverians. b. According to Sarramon, an unidentified battalion of 2 nd Division (probably c. 500 men) was left behind to garrison two towns on the far northern flank. 6e Corps: GD Loison (previously Ney, awaiting Marmont) 1st Division: GD Marchand Brigade: GB Maucune 6th Léger (I, II, IV) 1,120 1,245 1,334 [detached 250 (A/S)] 69th Ligne (I, II, III, IV) 1,209 1,591 1,710 [detached 73 (S)] Brigade: GB Marcognet [not Chemineau as in Oman] 39th Ligne (I, II, III, IV) 1,063 1,339 1,539 [detached 51 (S)] 76th Ligne (I, II, III, IV) 1,405 1,697 1,702 [detached 204 (S)] 2nd Division: GD Mermet Brigade: GB Labassée 25th Léger (I, II, IV) 1,393 1,867 1,505 [detached 464 (A/S/CR)] 27th Ligne (I, II, III, IV) 1,425 1,820 1,551 [detached 393 (A/S/CR)] Brigade: GB Bardet (Oman gives Taupin) 50th Ligne (I, II, IV) 1,212 1,413 1,327 [detached 193 (A/S/CR)] 59th Ligne (I, II, III, IV) 1,550 1,602 1,738 [detached 212 (A/S/CR)] 3rd Division: GB Ferey (formerly Loison) Brigade: GB Simon 32 nd Léger (II) nd Ligne (IV, VI) 863 1, [detached 292 (various)] Légion du Midi Légion Hanovrienne Brigade: GB Ferey 26th Ligne (IV, V, VI) 616 1, [detached 134 (various)] 66th Ligne (IV, V, VI) 804 1,370 1,236 [detached 184 (various)] Cavalry Brigade: GB Lamotte 3rd Hussars (I, II, III) (119) [detached 361 (various)] 15th Chasseurs (I, II, III) (186) [detached 363 (various)] unidentified squadron Total infantry: 14,413 16,806 c. 16,000 16,466 Total cavalry: Total artillery on the field at FdO: 12 pieces Total artillery assigned to corps: 17 (6 x 8-pdr, 5 x 4-pdr, 6 x hwtzr) Notes: a. V/82nd Ligne (528 to 576 officers/men) was the principal infantry component of the Almeida garrison under GB Brenier; this was in addition to the 292 detached above, so the total detached from the regiment was more than 800.

7 Copyright by John H. Gill, July b. The cavalry figures under Koch are in parentheses because Koch does not include Lamotte s cavalry brigade in the 3/5 May ordre de bataille, the numbers are taken from his version of his 1 May strength report. Oman and the archival 1 May Situation include both regiments. c. Oman places Ménard and Taupin as brigade commanders under Heudelet, but these two gentlemen were commanding brigades in Clauzel s 1 st Division of 8 th Corps along with GB Roch Godart. d. The structure above follows the 1 May 1811 Situation; Koch reverses the brigade assignments of the 26th and 86th Ligne. e. 6th Corps seems to have had four 3-pounders on hand as well, but did not even deign to count these in its strength report. 8e Corps: GD Junot 2nd Division: GD Solignac Brigade: GB Gratien 15th Ligne (I, II, III) 846 1, [detached 236 (CR)] 65th Ligne (I, II, III, IV) 1,483 1,563 1,894 [detached 118 (CR)] Brigade: GB Thomières 86th Ligne (I, II, III, IV) 1,263 1,500 1,292 [detached 405 (CR)] Irish Regiment (II) Prussian Regiment (I) unidentified squadron Total infantry: 4,820 4,700 c. 3,700 4,454 Total cavalry: Total artillery on the field at FdO: 4 guns/hwtzrs Total artillery assigned to corps: 12 (10 x 4-pdr, 2 x hwtzr) Notes: a. Two French battalions were left at Ciudad Rodrigo along with the Prussian battalion (526 officers/men). One of these battalions was IV/15 th Ligne (592 officers/men; this is in addition to the 236 detached as noted above for a total of more than 800 detached from the regiment); the other was likely IV/86 th, however, it may have been III/65 th (or possibly both). IV/15 th Ligne escorted the resupply convoy (apparently joined later by an additional 1,200 men from 9 th Corps). b. 1st Division (Clauzel, 3,073 officers/men) was guarding communications. The corps cavalry brigade (1,051 officers/men) was slated to join Marshal Soult s Army of the South. c. The structure above follows the 1 May Situation and Koch. Oman switches the brigades for 65 th (to Thomières) and 86 th Ligne (to Gratien). d. In the tabular portion of the 1 May Situation, this is listed as the Left Division (Gauche), but the relevant correspondence (even in the Situation s narrative section) uses the numeral. 9e Corps: GD Drouet d Erlon 1st Division: GD Claparède (GB Vichery) 2nd Light Demi-Brigade: IV/54th Ligne (1) IV/21st Léger (1) IV/28th Léger (1) th Line Demi-Brigade: Col. Bonnaire IV/40th Ligne (1) IV/63rd Ligne (1) IV/88th Ligne (1) th Line Demi-Brigade: IV/64th Ligne (1) IV/100th Ligne (1) IV/103rd Ligne (1)

8 Copyright by John H. Gill, July nd Division: GD Conroux (GB Gérard) 1st Brigade: 3rd Light Demi-Brigade: IV/9th Léger (1) IV/16th Léger (1) IV/27th Léger (1) nd Brigade: 1st Line Demi-Brigade: Col. Chabert IV/8th Ligne (1) IV/24th Ligne (1) IV/45th Ligne (1) nd Line Demi-Brigade: Col. Aulard IV/94th Ligne (1) IV/95th Ligne (1) IV/96th Ligne (1) Cavalry Brigade: GB Fournier 7th Chasseurs (III, IV) th Chasseurs (III, IV) th Chasseurs (III, IV) 242 Total infantry: 9,171 10,304 (7,195) c. 6,000 Total cavalry: Total artillery: 6 guns/howitzers Note: a. Some sources refer to the demi-brigades as provisional demi-brigades or provisional regiments. These were holdovers from the original organization of the Army of Germany s 2 nd Corps in 1808 when Napoleon was looking for an echelon of command between battalion and brigade to group these disparate battalions: the demi-brigades were thus the temporary functional equivalents of regiments. b. Generals Vichery and Gérard were the lone brigadiers in their divisions (not uncommon in French practice). Some sources list Gérard as commanding 1 st Brigade in Conroux s division. c. Koch lists 7 th Demi-Brigade as 17 th and 9 th Léger as 3 rd Léger these are likely typographic errors. d. Koch does not list IV/27 th Léger. The fact that 9 th Corps was not considered formally part of the Army of Portugal (it does not appear in the 1 May Situation, for example) likely explains this discrepancy and the previous typos. e. Sarramon gives 7,195 for 9 th Corps based on its 20 April strength report but deducts some 1,200 who were assigned to guard the resupply convoy to arrive at a total of c. 6,000 on the field of battle. f. Fournier s brigade may have been assigned to cavalry reserve as early as March g. The location of IV/17 th Léger is unclear. According to its regimental history, the battalion Léger remained with Claparède s division until approximately 12 May when it was added to its parent regiment during the army s reorganization. It is not noted, however, in Koch or Oman. Reserve Cavalry: GD Montbrun [structure per Oman] Cavalry Brigade: GB Cavrois 3rd Dragoons 93 10th Dragoons th Dragoons 230 Cavalry Brigade: GB Ornano 6th Dragoons th Dragoons th Dragoons 222 Total cavalry: 1,187 1,187 Reserve Cavalry: GD Montbrun [structure per Koch and 1 May 1811 Situation] Cavalry Brigade: GB Lorcet 3rd Dragoons (I, II, III, IV) [detached 316 (various)]

9 Copyright by John H. Gill, July th Dragoons (I, II, III, IV) [detached 266 (various)] Cavalry Brigade: GB Cavrois 10th Dragoons (I, II, III, IV) [detached 81 (various)] 11th Dragoons (I, II, III, IV) [detached 350 (various)] Cavalry Brigade: Col. Ornano (from 25 th Dragoons in place of GB Gardane) 15th Dragoons (I, II, III, IV) [detached 108 (various)] 25th Dragoons (I, II, III, IV) [detached 76 (various)] Total 2,034 2,545 Total artillery assigned to corps: - 6 (4 x 4-pdr, 2 x hwtzr) Reserve Cavalry: GD Montbrun [Koch, 3 May Ordre de Bataille ] Cavalry Reserve: GD Montbrun 650 Cavalry Brigade: GB Fournier 800 Army of the North: Marshal Bessières Guard Cavalry Brigade: GB Lepic 800 Chevau-Légers-Lanciers 370 Chasseurs-à-Cheval 235 Mamelukes 79 Grenadiers-à-Cheval 197 Cavalry Brigade: GB Watier th Chasseurs th Chasseurs th Chasseurs 200 5th Hussars 172 Total cavalry: 1,500 1,665 1,665 Total artillery: 6 guns/howitzers Notes: a. The cavalry situation is very confused and the archival Situation is the most reliable source as far as the Army of Portugal s troops are concerned (that is, not including Fournier, Lepic, or Watier). Oman seems to be in error as far as organization is concerned. Koch inexplicably gives Montbrun more than 2,000 horse in his 1 May Situation but only 650 in the 3/5 May ordre de bataille. Koch s rounded estimates for Fournier and Bessières are more or less in agreement with Oman, but he does not identify several squadrons and leaves Soult s and Lamotte s regiments/squadrons missing as compared with his 1 May Situation. The upshot is that Koch seems to underestimate the overall French cavalry strength in his ordre de bataille. b. As noted above Fournier s brigade may have been assigned from 9 th Corps to Montbrun s Cavalry Reserve in March 1811, but it did not submit a strength report in time for the 1 May Situation. Guarding Communications 1st Division/8 th Corps: GD Clauzel Brigade: GB Ménard IV/19th Ligne IV/25th Ligne IV/28th Ligne IV/36th Ligne Brigade: GB Taupin IV/15th Léger IV/46th Ligne

10 Copyright by John H. Gill, July IV/75th Ligne Brigade: GB Roch Godart 22nd Ligne (I, II, III, IV) 1,127 1,808 Cavalry: 1 st Provisional Dragoons nd Provisional Dragoons rd Provisional Dragoons 328 Notes: a. Although this division did not participate in the campaign, it is included here for completeness and to provide gamers with options for their own scenarios. b. Koch makes a typographic error in listing 34 th Ligne rather than 36 th. c. The histories of the 46 th Ligne and 15 th Léger (90 th Ligne) state that these battalions participated in the Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro (the former with 8 th Corps, the latter under 6 th Corps), but these claims are likely erroneous. d. According to its regimental history, IV/36th Ligne was dissolved in April 1811: its personnel fed into the first three battalions (2 nd Corps) and cadres sent back to France to reform. It seems, however, that the change did not take effect until May after the battle. e. The dragoon brigade had been ordered to join Marshal Soult s Army of the South. f. In the tabular portion of the 1 May Situation, this is listed as the Right Division (Droite), but the relevant correspondence (even in the Situation s narrative section) uses the numeral. OBSERVATIONS ON THE FRENCH ARMY OF PORTUGAL ORGANIZATIONAL BACKGROUNDS: o 2 nd Corps was a slightly modified version of the old 2 nd Corps of the Army of Spain (corps commander was initially Marshal Soult, later Heudelet). The corps had shed 15 th Ligne (from 1 st Division) and 86 th Ligne (from 2 nd Division) to 8 th Corps in 1810 when Massena s Army of Portugal was formed, but was otherwise little changed in senior commanders or in its assigned infantry and light cavalry regiments (a previously attached dragoon division under Lahoussaye was reassigned). o 6 th Corps was founded on the two infantry divisions of Marshal Ney s old 6 th Corps of the Grande Armée, sent to Spain after the Grande Armée was dissolved in October Loison s division, on the other hand, only joined 6 th Corps in March 1810; it was based on the old 3 rd Division of 2 nd Corps (formerly 3 rd Division/8 th Corps, then 4 th Division/2 nd Corps) combined with some additional elements. By May 1811, Loison was acting corps commander as Massena had relieved Ney (an action that caused no little rancor in the corps); Marmont, en route to assume command of 6 th Corps, arrived on 10 May. o o 8 th Corps was largely comprised of units that had been formed for rear area security duties in Germany during the 1809 Franco-Austrian war (mostly fourth battalions plus the rebuilt 65 th Ligne). Placed under Junot in June 1809 and designated 8 th Corps late that summer (with 22 nd Ligne), it had marched to Spain where several additional units were added to its roster (15 th and 86 th Ligne, one battalion of 15 th Léger, Irish, Prussians). 9 th Corps had been 2 nd Corps of the Army of Germany during the 1809 Franco-Austrian war. Composed of fourth battalions from a host of regiments in response to the urgent requirement to put men in the field against Austria, it was sent to Spain and rebranded as 9 th Corps under GD Drouet d Erlon. It was essentially a holding formation for its fourth battalions until they could be merged with their home regiments. Those battalions whose parent regiments were part of the Army of Portugal, for example, joined their parent regiments on 27 April 1811 just before the brief Fuentes de Oñoro campaign (6th Léger, 25th Léger, 27th, 39th, 59th, 69th, 76th Ligne). When diverted to assist the Army of Portugal, the corps was en route to the south to join Marshal Soult s Army of the South where its remaining battalions were to be integrated into their parent regiments as well. UNIT COHESION & EXPERIENCE: Considering the organizational histories outlined above, most of the formations in the Army of Portugal could be considered solid and experienced in terms of unit cohesion. Some of the fourth battalions in 8 th Corps might be viewed as exceptions, but even they had been together since June 1809 and had marched across half of Germany and from thence to Portugal to participate in Massena s ill fated campaign. These factors weigh even more heavily in the case of 9 th Corps: although cobbled together from loose battalions filled with raw conscripts in late 1808 and early 1809 for the Army of Germany, these men had since

11 Copyright by John H. Gill, July marched from Germany to Vienna and from Vienna to Portugal, fighting in some of the epoch s most vicious battles at Ebelsberg, Aspern-Essling, and Wagram along the way. MATERIAL CONDITION: The material condition of the Army of Portugal was generally poor. The army had suffered severely during the debilitating campaign in Portugal and its recovery, while remarkable and real, was by no means complete. Vehicles of all sorts were in short supply but the greatest deficiency was horses (and the requisite harness). For instance, although Army of Portugal officers were annoyed that Bessières chose to arrive only with himself, 1,700 cavalry and a lone battery, they were delighted that he brought a number of gun teams so the army could enter this brief campaign with a respectable, if minimal, quantity of artillery. Indeed, Jean Jacques Pelet, one of Massena s senior staff officers, recorded that the army used oxen to tow its guns from Ciudad Rodrigo to the prospective battlefield in order to spare the horses. The lack of horses and harness explains why the total number of available guns for the Army of Portugal (not including 9th Corps or Bessières miserly contribution) was 51, but the total of pieces on the battlefield was only 24 from the actual Army of Portugal (plus six each from 9th Corps and the Army of the North for 36). MORALE & LEADERSHIP: French troop morale (including junior and mid grade officers) seems to have been generally good to excellent despite the enervating and discouraging campaign in Portugal. Some British participants claimed that in several instances the French did not seem to press their attacks with their usual élan, but these seem to have been aberrations, not the norm at Fuentes de Oñoro. Other British claim that some of the French cavalry seemed inebriated on 5 May during Massena s surprise flanking maneuver. Regardless of the accuracy of these observations by their opponents, the true morale problem on the French side was among the senior officers. Many of the divisional generals and most or all of the corps commanders were disgruntled, sullen, obdurate and largely uncooperative. The confusion created by Bessières s presence on the field only compounded existing frictions. Furthermore, Massena failed to place himself at the key point at the critical juncture of the fighting on the 5 th ; that is, he was not at the hinge of his army on his left flank either (1) to press the advance while he had the initiative and his flanking move had opened fleeting opportunities, or (2) to ensure that Loison and Junot aimed their infantry towards the left (i.e., the British right rear) rather than (torpidly and hesitantly) towards Fuentes de Oñoro. FRENCH PERCEPTIONS: The French officers believed that they were outnumbered in the Fuentes de Oñoro campaign. Although it is possible that such statements were after the fact justifications, they seem genuine and likely contributed to inhibiting Massena, his staff and subordinates from being too adventurous (beyond the bold flanking move on 5 May). Additionally, it seems reasonable to speculate that Massena s experience at Bussaco in September 1810 made him reluctant to venture a major advance against the British left across the steep, difficult terrain along the Dos Casas River west of Alameda; as he should have done at Bussaco, he thus ought for a way to outflank Wellington.

12 Copyright by John H. Gill, July PRINCIPAL SOURCES CONSULTED Situation des Troupes Composant l Armée de Portugal, 1 May 1811, Archives de la Guerre, Carton C7/28 (courtesy of Scott Bowden). Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War, vol. IV. John Fortescue, History of the British Army, vol. VIII. Réne Chartrand, Fuentes de Oñoro, Ian Fletcher, Wellington s Regiments, R. J. Tennant, Wellington s Worst Scrape, First Empire, No. 106, May/June Massena s Report, 7 May 1811, Journal de l Empire, 23 May Jean-Jacques Pelet, Notice sur la Campagne de Portugal en 1810 et 1811, in Victoires, Conquêtes, Désastres, Revers et Guerres Civiles des Français, de 1792 à 1815, vol. XXI. Jean Baptiste Koch, Mémoires de Massena, vol. VII. Marbot, Memoirs, vol. II. Parquin, Napoleon s Army, vol. II. Andre Delagrave, Campagne de l Armée Française en Portugal dans les Années 1810 et 1811, José Gómez de Arteche y Moro, Guerra de la Independencia, vol. X. Guingret, Relation Historique et Militaire de la Campagne de Portugal, Aperçu Nouveau sur les Campagne des Français en Portugal, Drouet d Erlon, Vie Militaire. Frédéric Berjaud, Le 13e Chasseurs à Cheval en 1811, Tradition, No. 244, Jean Sarramon, Campagne de Fuentes de Oñoro, Carnet de la Sabretache, Histories of the following regiments: o Infantry: 2 nd Léger, 8 th, 15 th, 24 th, 26 th, 36 th, 39 th, 40 th, 63 rd, 65 th, 64 th, 69 th, 79 th (4 th Léger), 81 st (6 th Léger), 82 nd, 84 th (9 th Léger), 86 th, 90 th (15 th Léger), 92 nd (17 th Léger), 95 th, 96 th (21 st Léger), 103 rd de Ligne o Chasseurs: 12 th, 13 th, 15 th, 20 th o Dragoons: 3 rd, 11 th, 15 th, 25 th o 3 rd Hussars