Hunting Vulnerabilities with Graph Databases
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1 Hunting Vulnerabilities with Graph Databases Fabian fabs Yamaguchi Nico Golde (Qualcomm) INBOT 14 GEORG-AUGUST-UNIVERSITÄT GÖTTINGEN
2 CVE : qeth buffer overflow in snmp ioctl 2
3 CVE : qeth buffer overflow in snmp ioctl First arg of copy_from_user propagates to third arg of memcpy without being checked. 3
4 CVE : qeth buffer overflow in snmp ioctl Goal: make searching for bugs as easy as talking about them. 4
5 Building a Bug Search Engine» It s only really useful it it s generic enough to express lots of different kinds of bugs» We want to be able to query the database for» What the code looks like (syntax)» Statement execution order (control flow)» How data flows through the program (data flow)» Long story short: We built it, let s talk about it. 5
6 How compilers analyze syntax: ASTs 6
7 How compilers analyze control flow 7
8 How compilers analyze data flow: dependence graphs 8
9 Merge: Code Property Graphs 9
10 Graph databases! Big Data! Cloud-era!» Designed to store social networks 10 From:
11 GraphDBs: Not limited to storage of useless crap» You can store code property graphs in graph databases 11
12 Overview of the System (Joern) Source Code Robust Parser Query Response 12
13 Querying the Database: Sending in the Gremlin» Imperative language to traverse graphs by Marko Rodriguez» Turing complete, embedded groovy» Feels functional» Runs on top of Blueprints» Traversals» Find starting nodes using an index» Describe how to walk the graph from the starting node by chaining elementary traversals ( pipes )» Return all nodes reached 13
14 Gremlin Chaining Pipes» A pipe maps sets of nodes to new sets of nodes» Pipes are chained to describe traversals in the graph» Chained pipes can be encapsulated in custom pipes 14 From:
15 >> g.v(1).out( knows ).name vadas, josh >> g.v(1).out( knows ).filter{ it.age > 30}.name josh >> g.v(1).out().loop(1){ it.loops < 2}.name ripple Gremlin in a Nuttshell 15
16 Custom steps Basis for code analysis with Gremlin Gremlin.defineStep( twohopsaway, [Vertex,Pipe], { _().out().out() }) >> g.v(1).twohopsaway().name ripple 16
17 Steps for code analysis: python-joern» Start node selection:» getargs, getparameters, getassignments» Elementary AST-steps» children(), parents(), ithchild(), astnodes()» Node-specific utility steps for ASTs» calltoithargument(), assignmenttolval(),» Data flow and control flow steps» sources(), definitions(), unsanitized(), paths()» A language for bug description 17
18 Simple example: multiplications inside args to malloc $ echo "getarguments('malloc', '0').astNodes().filter{it.type == 'MultiplicativeExpression'}.code lookup.py -g» Syntax-only:» Get all first arguments to malloc» Get all nodes of trees rooted at these (astnodes)» Select only multiplicative expressions» Get rid of sizeof» Pipe to lookup.py of joern-tools 18
19 Building block for tainting The unsanitized pipe» It s possible to build very complex pipes» Inject arbitrary groovy code into the DB!» Meet the pipe unsanitized(sanitizers)» All CFG paths from sources to a sink where» A symbol is propagated from source to sink (data flow)» (No node on the path re-define the symbol)» No node on the path matches a sanitizer-description 19
20 Determining symbols used and possible sources Gremlin.defineStep('unsanitized', [Vertex, Pipe], { sanitizer, src = { [1]._() }-> _().sideeffect{ dst = it; }.uses().sideeffect{ symbol = it.code }.transform{ dst.producers([symbol]) }.scatter().transform{ cfgpaths(symbol, sanitizer, it, dst.statements().tolist()[0] ) }.scatter().firstelem() })» What this query does» Determine symbols used by a statement» Determine producers of that symbol» Return first element of cfgpaths for (producer,symbol) 20
21 Determine CFG paths with a functional program cfgpaths = { symbol, sanitizer, src, dst -> _cfgpaths(symbol, sanitizer, src, dst, [:], []) } Object.metaClass._cfgPaths = {symbol, sanitizer, curnode, dst, visited, path -> if(curnode == dst) return [path + curnode] as Set if( ( path!= [] ) && isterminationnode(symbol, sanitizer, curnode, visited)) return [] as Set def X = [] as Set; def x; def children = curnode._().out(cfg_edge).tolist() for(child in children){ def curnodeid = curnode.tostring() x = _cfgpaths(symbol, sanitizer, child, dst, visited + [ (curnodeid) : (visited.get(curnodeid, 0) + 1)], path + curnode) X += x } X } 21
22 Functional feel cfgpaths = { symbol, sanitizer, src, dst -> _cfgpaths(symbol, sanitizer, src, dst, [:], []) } Object.metaClass._cfgPaths = {symbol, sanitizer, curnode, dst, visited, path -> if(curnode == dst) return [path + curnode] as Set if( ( path!= [] ) && isterminationnode(symbol, sanitizer, curnode, visited)) return [] as Set def children = curnode._().out(cfg_edge).tolist() for(child in children){ def curnodeid = curnode.tostring() } X } X += _cfgpaths(symbol, sanitizer, child, dst, visited + [ (curnodeid) : (visited.get(curnodeid, 0) + 1)], path + curnode) 22
23 Taking Joern for a spin on the Linux Kernel» Crafted queries for four different types of vulnerabilities» Buffer overflows» Zero-byte allocation» Memory mapping bugs» Memory disclosure» Let s take a look at the buffer overflow examples 23
24 Query for buffer overflows in write handlers (Joern 0.2) query1 = getfunctionastsbyname('*_write*').getarguments('(copy_from_user OR memcpy)', '2').sideEffect{ paramname = 'c(ou)?nt'; }.filter{ it.code.matches(paramname) }.unsanitized( { it._().or( _().ischeck('.*' + paramname + '.*'), _().codecontains('.*alloc.*' + paramname + '.*'), _().codecontains('.*min.*') )} ).param( '.*c(ou)?nt.*' ).locations() 24
25 Query for qeth-style buffer overflows (Joern 0.2) query2 = getarguments('(copy_from_user OR memcpy)', '2').filter{!it.argToCall().toList()[0].code.matches('.*(sizeof min).*') }.sideeffect{ argument = it.code; } /* store argument */.sideeffect{ dstid = it.statements().tolist()[0].id; } /* store id of sink */.unsanitized({ it._().or( _().ischeck('.*' + Pattern.quote(argument) + '.*'), _().codecontains('.*alloc.*' + Pattern.quote(argument) + '.*'), _().codecontains('.*min.*') ) }, { it._().filter{ it.code.contains('copy_from_user')} } ).filter{ it.id!= dstid } /* filter flows from node to self */.locations() 25
26 Profit: Seven 0-days in eleven hits Running queries 1 and 2 26
27 Search queries for four different types of bugs» 18 zero-days, acknowledged /fixed by developers 27
28 Thank you! Questions?» Tool:» Fabian Yamaguchi» 28
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