6. Exkurs: Theorie des Föderalismus

Transcription

1 6. Exkurs: Theorie des Föderalismus 64

2 Originalliteratur Tiebout, Charles M. (1956). A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, Journal of Political Economy 64(5):

3 Tiebout (1956) (...) the Musgrave-Samuelson analysis, which is valid for federal expenditures, need not apply to local expenditures. Definition: a public good is one which should be produced, but for which there is no feasible method of charging the consumers. Extent of local expenditures. Consider for a moment the case of the city resident about to move to the suburbs. What variables will influence his choice of a municipality? 66

4 Tiebout (1956) The consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods. Given these revenue and expenditure patterns, the consumer-voter moves to that community whose local government best satisfies his set of preferences. The greater the number of communities and the greater the variance among them, the closer the consumer will come to fully realizing his preference position. 67

5 Tiebout (1956) Assumptions 1 to 7. Each city manager now has a certain demand for n local public goods. In supplying these goods, he and m 1 other city managers may be considered as going to a national market and bidding for the appropriate units of service of each kind: (...) In the limit, (...), this total demand will approximate the demand that represents the true preferences of the consumer-voters - that is, the demand they would reveal, if they were forced, somehow, to state their true preferences. 68

6 Tiebout (1956) A comparison model: this may reduce the solution of the problem of allocating public goods to the trite one of making each person his own municipal government. Just as the consumer may be visualized as walking to a private market place to buy his goods, the prices of which are set, we place him in the position of walking to a community where the prices (taxes) of community services are set. (...) Spatial mobility provides the local public-goods counterpart to the private market s shopping trip. 69

7 Originalliteratur James M. Buchanan (1995): Federalism As an Ideal Political Order and Objective for Constitutional Reform, Publius 25(2):

8 Buchanan (1995) Under the standard assumptions that dominated analysis before the public choice revolution, politics is modeled as the activity of a benevolently despotic and monolithic authority that seeks always and everywhere to promote the public interest, (...). If this romantic image of politics is discarded and replaced by the empirical reality of politics, any increase in the relative size of the politicized sector of an economy must carry with it an increase in the potential of exploitation. (p. 20) 71

9 Buchanan (1995) (...) understanding of why and how the market, as the alternative to political process, does not also expose the citizen-participant to comparable exploitation. The categorical difference between market and political interaction lies in the continuing presence of an effective exit option in market relationships and in its absence in politics. To the extent that the individual participant in market exchange has available effective alternatives that may be chosen at relatively low cost, any exchange is necessarily voluntary. (p. 20) 72

10 Buchanan (1995) The principle of federalism emerges directly from the market analogy. (...) Analogously to the market, persons retain an exit option; at relatively low cost, at least some persons can shift among the separate political jurisdictions. (...) The federalized structure, through the forces of interstate competition, effectively limits the power of the separate political units to extract surplus value from the citizenry. (p. 21) 73

11 Buchanan (1995) Principles of Competitive Federalism USA in European integration. Conclusion: The United States prospered mightily in the nineteenth century, despite the wall of protectionism that sheltered its internal markets. It did so because political authority, generally, was held in check by a constitutional structure that did contain basic elements of competitive federalism. (p. 27) 74

12 Literaturhinweise Barry R. Weingast (1995): The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 11(1): Robin Boadway & Jean-François Tremblay (im Erscheinen): Reassessment of the Tiebout Model, Journal of Public Economics. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingalis (2003): Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists, Princeton University Press. Vor allem Kapitel