Spécication et analyse formelle des politiques de sécurité dans le cloud computing

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Spécication et analyse formelle des politiques de sécurité dans le cloud computing Asma GUESMI, Patrice CLEMENTE, Frédéric LOULERGUE, Pascal BERTHOMÉ Laboratoire d'informatique Fondamentale

1 Spécication et analyse formelle des politiques de sécurité dans le cloud computing Asma GUESMI, Patrice CLEMENTE, Frédéric LOULERGUE, Pascal BERTHOMÉ Laboratoire d'informatique Fondamentale d'orléans (LIFO) Université d'orléans, INSA Centre-Val de Loire SEC Premier atelier sur la Sécurité dans les clouds June 30, 2015 Asma GUESMI (LIFO) Cloud Security Broker June 30, / 11

d'orléans (LIFO) Université d'orléans, INSA Centre-Val de Loire SEC2 2015 - Premier atelier sur

2 Outline 1 Introduction Context 2 Contribution General Process Requirements specication using Alloy Alloy example 3 Conclusion Asma GUESMI (LIFO) Cloud Security Broker June 30, / 11

Alloy Alloy example 3 Conclusion Asma GUESMI

3 Introduction Context Problematic & Motivation Cloud brokers negotiate only service and resources requirements Cloud brokers do not consider security requirements Contribution 1 The customer can specify the requirements for the resources to deploy in the cloud 2 Formal verication of the cloud systems and the security policies 3 Using the Alloy language for the requirements specication 4 Using Alloy analyzer to check the satisability of security and access control properties Asma GUESMI (LIFO) Cloud Security Broker June 30, / 11

Formal verication of the cloud systems and the security policies 3 Using the Alloy language for the requirements specication 4 Using

4 General Process Customer User Interface Requirements Editing Model description Resources Functional properties nonfunctional properties Placement configurations Visioning Java Alloy API text2alloy Alloy2text Sys req Counter Example Placement not found Placement found Analyzing the system req Broker Consistent system req Placement Phase 1 Match functional req Phase 2 Match nonfunctional req Placement found Offers Offers Provider Provider Deployment confirmation Deployment Figure: The workow of the broker application Asma GUESMI (LIFO) Cloud Security Broker June 30, / 11

req Broker Consistent system req Placement Phase 1 Match functional req Phase 2 Match nonfunctional req Placement found Offers Offers Provider

5 Requirements specication using Alloy Requirements specication The model: virtual machines (vms), storage nodes Functional requirements (cpu, ram and storage) Non-functional requirements (security, usage and access control) Asma GUESMI (LIFO) Cloud Security Broker June 30, / 11

(cpu, ram and storage) Non-functional requirements (security, usage

6 Requirements specication using Alloy Non-fonctional requirements I Usage properties Collaboration, Concurrence, Isolation The customer species the type of relations between resources Collaborating vms should be related by information ows Concurrent vms should not be related by information ows Security Properties Condentiality, Integrity, Privilege separation, Placement constraints Concurrent vms should be allocated on dierent clusters, and should not be related by information ows Collaborating vms should reside the same cluster, and should be related by information ows Asma GUESMI (LIFO) Cloud Security Broker June 30, / 11

Condentiality, Integrity, Privilege separation, Placement constraints Concurrent vms should be allocated on dierent clusters, and should not be related by

7 Requirements specication using Alloy Non-fonctional requirements II Access Control Specify rules to manage how nal users can access to the client resources A user having the visitor status cannot write a comment on a document A user cannot access to two concurrent vms Asma GUESMI (LIFO) Cloud Security Broker June 30, / 11

having the visitor status cannot write a comment on a document A user cannot

8 Requirements specication using Alloy Formal verication Using Alloy analyzer for the automatic syntactic and semantic verication Detection conicts in the description Verication of the consistency of the customer's system Verication of the satisability of security properties Alloy returns a counter-example when a specication is not satised Alloy places the resources in cloud providers, in a way that fullls all customer requirements Asma GUESMI (LIFO) Cloud Security Broker June 30, / 11

satisability of security properties Alloy returns a counter-example when a specication is not satised Alloy places the

9 Alloy example Alloy example I Security property There is no information that ows into or outside all isolated vms s i g Customer {vms : some VM} s i g VM{ a t t r i b u t e s : s e t A t t r i b u t e } s i g A t t r i b u t e {} a b s t r a c t one s i g D i r F l o w s {vm_flow : s e t VM >VM } a b s t r a c t one s i g I s o l a t i o n { i s o l a t e d : s e t VM} p r e d fact_vm_flow_isol { a l l v i :VM no v j : VM v i i n I s o l a t i o n. i s o l a t e d && ( v i >v j i n D i r F l o w s. vm_flow v j >v i i n D i r F l o w s. vm_flow )} c h e c k { f act_vm_flow_isol } Asma GUESMI (LIFO) Cloud Security Broker June 30, / 11

$g I s o l a t i o n { i s o l a t e d : s e t VM} p r e d fact_vm_flow_isol { a l l v i :VM no v j : VM v i i n I s o l a t i o n.$

10 Alloy example Alloy example II Asma GUESMI (LIFO) Cloud Security Broker June 30, / 11

11 Conclusion Conclusion 1 Describe a general process for cloud brokering considering security [1, 2] 2 Use formal language to describe complex cloud systems, and to express ne grained security requirements 3 Using formal methods to place resources in the cloud 4 Using formal methods to analyze complex cloud systems, to check their consistency and the satisability of security policies. Asma GUESMI (LIFO) Cloud Security Broker June 30, / 11

methods to place resources in the cloud 4 Using formal methods to analyze complex cloud systems, to check their

12 References Asma Guesmi and Patrice Clemente. Access control and security properties requirements specication for clouds' seclas. In Cloud Computing Technology and Science (CloudCom), 2013 IEEE 5th International Conference on, volume 1, pages IEEE, Asma Guesmi, Patrice Clemente, Frédéric Loulergue, and Pascal Berthomé. Cloud resources placement based on functional and non-functional requirements. In SECRYPT Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Security and Cryptography, Colmar, France, July, Asma GUESMI (LIFO) Cloud Security Broker June 30, / 11

Asma Guesmi, Patrice Clemente, Frédéric Loulergue, and Pascal Berthomé. Cloud resources placement based on functional and non-functional requirements.

Security Challenges & Opportunities in Software Defined Networks (SDN)

Security Challenges & Opportunities in Software Defined Networks (SDN) June 30 th, 2015 SEC2 2015 Premier atelier sur la sécurité dans les Clouds Nizar KHEIR Cyber Security Researcher Orange Labs Products