IPv6 Performance. Geoff Huston APNIC Labs February 2015
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1 IPv6 Performance Geoff Huston APNIC Labs February 2015 #apricot
2 What are we looking at: How reliable are IPv6 connections? How fast are IPv6 connections? #apricot
3 What are we looking at: How reliable are IPv6 connections? How fast are IPv6 connections? #apricot
4 The Measurement Technique Embed a script in an online ad Have the script generate a set of URLs to fetch Examine the packets seen at the server to determine reliability and RTT #apricot
5 Measurement Count #apricot
6 Measurement Count #apricot
7 Measurement Count Log Count #apricot
8 What are we looking at: How reliable are IPv6 connections? How fast are IPv6 connections? #apricot
9 Let s dive into Naked SINs! Y #apricot
10 Connection Failure Outbound SYN client server Busted SYN ACK Return path #apricot
11 Compare two data sets The first data set has been collected across 2011 Teredo and 6to4 were still active as IPv6 mechanisms Little in the way of other IPv6 services The second data set has been collected across 2015/ Missing comparative IPv4 data for the period September October L #apricot
12 Measuring Failure #apricot
13 Relative Connection Failure Rates #apricot
14 Relative Connection Failure Rates And why is the V4 relative failure rate dropping over time? #apricot
15 What is going on with IPv4? #apricot
16 What is going on with IPv4? The failure rate for V4 decreases as the volume of experiments increases which implies that the number of naked SYNs being sent to the servers is not related to the number of tests being performed. Aside from residual IPv4 failures in the image fetch due to device resets, connection dropouts, etc, the bulk of the recorded failures here is probably attributable to bots doing all-of-address scanning on port 80 or maybe not! #apricot
17 What is going on with IPv4? Syn attacks? #apricot
18 What about IPv6? Local Miredo Relay Failures Why is the base failure rate of all IPv6 connections sitting at 40%? This is amazingly bad! #apricot
19 V6 Failure Rate by Address Type Teredo All V6 Average 6 to 4 Unicast #apricot
20 6to4 Failure is Local Failure 6to4 failure appears to be related to two factors: 1. The client s site has a protocol 41 firewall filter rule for incoming traffic (this is possibly more prevalent in AsiaPac than in Europe) 2. Load / delay / reliability issues in the server s chosen outbound 6to4 relay (noted in the data gathered at the US server) Even so, the 10% to 20% connection failure rate for 6to4 is unacceptably high! #apricot
21 V6 Unicast Failures January March 2012: 110,761 successful V6 connecting endpoints 6,227 failures That s a failure rate of 5.3%! 7 clients used fe80:: link local addresses 7 clients used fc00:/7 ULA source addresses 2 clients used fec0::/16 deprecated site local addresses 16 clients used 1f02:d9fc::/16 Nobody used 3ffe::/16 prefixes! #apricot
22 Data Set 2: Connection Failure in 2015/ January 2015 January 40,359,805 IPv6 endpoints 1,361,256 Failure rate (3.37%) #apricot
23 Daily IPv6 Failures #apricot
24 Daily IPv6 Failures RIP Flash! HTML5 + TLS + Mobile Devices #apricot
25 6to4 7,693,849 6to4 endpoints 19% of all IPv6 used 6to4 9% failure rate within the set of 6to4 connections #apricot
26 Daily IPv6 Failures #apricot
27 Daily IPv6 Failures 6to4 failure rate has improved from 15%-20% in 2011 to 9% in 2015 Teredo has all but disappeared Unicast failure rate is between 1.5% and 4% in 2015 Current unicast failure rate is 2% #apricot
28 Killing off 6to4 Proportion of IPv6 connections using a 6to4 address #apricot
29 IPv6 Failures Sep 2015 Jan 20,872,173 unique IPv6 Addresses 464,344 failing IPv6 addresses 142,362 6to4 addresses 138 teredo addresses 68 fe80:: local scope addresses 834 unallocated addresses 1,244 unannounced addresses 319,698 addresses from unicast allocated routed space 216,620 unique /64s #apricot
30 Origin AS s with High IPv6 Failure Rates AS Failure Samples AS Name Rate AS % 374 Centros Culturales de Mexico, A.C.,MX AS % 222 ARPINET Arpinet LLC,AM AS % 1,374 DRUKNET-AS DrukNet ISP,BT AS % 763 TULANE - Tulane University,US AS % 692 BLICNET-AS Blicnet d.o.o.,ba AS % 762 TELECOLUMBUS Tele Columbus AG,DE AS % 109 ITGATE IT.Gate S.p.A.,IT AS % 101 QUICKPACKET - QuickPacket, LLC,US AS % 119 SLTINT-AS-AP Sri Lanka Telecom Internet,LK AS % 265 UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE SAO CARLOS,BR AS % 60,228 Mediacom Communications Corp,US AS % 163 SKYMESH-AS-AP SkyMesh Pty Ltd,AU AS % 571 WEST-NET-WEST - Utah Education Network,US AS % 985 TPA TELECOMUNICACOES LTDA,BR AS % 488 TEREDONN-AS-AP SkyMesh Pty Ltd,AU AS % 256 NETNAM-AS-AP Netnam Company,VN AS % 1,341 CILNET Comunicacao e Informatica LTDA.,BR AS % 126 MONKEYBRAINS - Monkey Brains,US AS % 248 BIZNET-AS-AP BIZNET NETWORKS,ID AS % 155 UTHSC-H - The University of Texas Health #apricot
31 Origin AS s with Zero Failure Rates AS Fail Rate Samples AS Name AS % 2,149 UIOWA-AS - University of Iowa,US AS % 1,548 PSWITCH-HK PACSWITCH GLOBAL IP NETWORK,HK AS % 1,188 CHEB-AS JSC "ER-Telecom Holding",RU AS % 1,179 FOXTEL-AS-AP Foxtel Management Pty Ltd,AU AS % 1,179 AS-ENECOM Energia Communications,Inc.,JP AS % 936 ARDINVEST Ardinvest LTD,UA AS % 816 ASN-SEVERTTK TransTeleCom,RU AS % 734 SPRINTLINK - Sprint,US AS % 717 RYAZAN-AS JSC "ER-Telecom Holding",RU AS % 656 RMH-14 - Rackspace Hosting,US AS % 651 YAR-AS JSC "ER-Telecom Holding",RU AS % 625 RACKSPACE - Rackspace Hosting,US AS % 623 YAHOO-US - Yahoo,US AS % 606 DEPAUL - Depaul University,US AS % 604 TVER-AS JSC "ER-Telecom Holding",RU AS % 481 ASN-MGTS-USPD OJS Moscow city telephone network,ru AS % 426 CDC-LMB1 - Continuum Data Centers, LLC.,US AS % 392 WESTHOST - WestHost, Inc.,US AS % 391 YANDEX Yandex LLC,RU AS % 372 EPICSYS - Epic Systems Corporation,US #apricot
32 What about IPv4 Connection Failures? 2011: failure rate 0.2% #apricot
33 What about IPv4 Connection Failures? 2011: failure rate 0.2% 2015: 446,414,857 IPv4 endpoints 1,166,332Connection Failures (0.26%) #apricot
34 IPv4 Connection Failure Missing PCAP data #apricot
35 Comparison #apricot
36 Comparison: Unicast #apricot
37 Comparison: Unicast #apricot
38 Comparison Ratio: Unicast #apricot
39 It s still not good! IPv6 Unicast Failure rate: 1.6% (falling) IPv4 Failure rate: 0.2% (steady) #apricot
40 What are we looking at: How reliable are IPv6 connections? How fast are IPv6 connections? #apricot
41 Why SYNs? Every TCP session starts with a SYN handshake It s typically a kernel level operation, which means that there is little in the way of application level interaction with the SYN exchange On the downside there is only a single sample point per measurement #apricot
42 Generating a comparative RTT profile For each successful connection couplet (IPv4 and IPv4) from the same endpoint, gather the pair of RTT measurements from the SYN-ACK exchanges Use the server s web logs to associate a couplet of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses Use the packet dumps to collect RTT information from the SYN-ACK Exchange Plot the difference in RTT in buckets #apricot
43 2012 Data #apricot
44 2012 Data Number of samples (log scale) IPv6 is faster Unicast 6 to 4 IPv6 is slower Teredo #apricot RTT Difference (in fractions of a second)
45 December 2015/January Number of samples (log scale) Unicast IPv6 is faster IPv6 is slower #apricot RTT Difference
46 December 2015/January Number of samples (log scale) IPv6 is faster 6to4 IPv6 is slower #apricot RTT Difference
47 December 2015/January Number of samples (log scale) IPv6 is faster IPv6 is slower #apricot RTT Difference
48 2015/6 RTT Data CDF Proportion of samples IPv6 is faster Unicast IPv6 is slower 6 to 4 #apricot RTT Difference (millisecs)
49 2015/6 RTT Data CDF Proportion of samples IPv6 is faster Unicast IPv6 is slower 6 to 4 RTT Difference (milliseconds) #apricot
50 2015/6 RTT Data CDF Proportion of samples IPv6 is faster Unicast 13% of samples unicast IPv6 is more than 10 msec faster than IPv4 IPv6 is slower 32% of samples unicast IPv6 is more than 10 msec slower than IPv4 6 to 4 Zero point is 0.44 RTT Difference (milliseconds) #apricot
51 Is IPv6 as good as IPv4? #apricot
52 Is IPv6 as good as IPv4? Is IPv6 as fast as IPv4? Basically, yes IPv6 is faster about half of the time For 65% of unicast cases, IPv6 is within 10ms RTT of IPv4 So they perform at much the same rate But that s just for unicast IPv6 The use of 6to4 makes this a whole lot worse! #apricot
53 Is IPv6 as good as IPv4? Is IPv6 as robust as IPv4? IPv4 connection reliability currently sits at 0.2% The base failure rate of Unicast V6 connection attempts at 1.8% of the total V6 unicast connections is not brilliant. 6to4 is still terrible! It could be better. It could be a whole lot better! #apricot
54 Is IPv6 as good as IPv4? If you can establish a connection, then IPv4 and IPv6 appear to have comparable RTT measurements across most of the Internet But the odds of establishing that connection are still weighted in favour of IPv4! #apricot
55 That s it! #apricot
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