EURASIAN UNIVERSITIES UNION

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1 EURASIAN UNIVERSITIES UNION Academic JOURNAL Winter ISSN: Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015 Istanbul/Turkey

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3 CONCESSIONNAIRE ON BEHALF EURAS Dr. Mustafa AYDIN Eurasian Universities Union President EDITOR IN CHIEF Muzaffer BACA Eurasian Universities Union EDITORIAL BOARD Kurban Kurbanmagamedov, The Institute Of Moscow State Open University, Dagestan Saimat Salmanova, The Institute Of Moscow State Open University, Dagestan Firuz Demir Yaşamış, American University in Emirates, UAE Anastas Angjeli, Mediterranean University Of Albania, Albania Fabio L. Grassi, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy Zeynep Banu Dalaman, Istanbul Aydin University, Turkey Sulo Haderi, Mediterranean University Of Albania, Albania Mahdieh Aghazadehkhoei, İstanbul Aydın University, Turkey Tabagari Sergo, David Tvildiani Medical University, Georgia Aurelian A.Bondrea, Spuri Haret University, Romania Özüm Sezin Uzun, Istanbul Aydin University, Turkey Georgescu Stefan, Andrei Saguna University, Romania Filiz Katman, Istanbul Aydin University, Turkey Agron Beka, European Collage Juridica, Kosovo Judit Hidasi, Budapest Business School, Hungary Ibrahim Gashi, University of Prishtina, Kosovo Zafer Aslan, Istanbul Aydın University, Turkey Kürşat Güleş, Selçuk University, Turkey Avdi Smajljaj, Epoka University, Albania Ateş Uslu, Istanbul University, Turkey Faisal Aftab, Bahria University, Pakistan Bekir Çınar, Epoka University, Albania

4 EDITORIAL OFFICE Euras Secretariat EURAS TEAM Dr. Mustafa AYDIN, President Muzaffer BACA, General Secretary Han TEZKANLI, General Coordinator İpek ÇALIŞIR, Communication Coordinator Miraç ŞAHIN, Project Coordinator DESIGN The Visual Design Department of Istanbul Aydin University PUBLISHER Eurasian Universities Union (EURAS) ISSN: ADDRESS Beşyol Mah. Inönü Caddesi No: 38 Sefaköy, Küçükçekmece Istanbul / TURKEY Tel: Fax: Website: Academic Journal is an international peer reviewed journal published quarterly. The opinions, thoughts, postulations or proposals within articles are but reflections of authors do not, in any way, represent those of Eurasian Universities Union.

5 CONTENT Editorial Muzaffer BACA Youth Gangs: Not Just an American Phenomenon Prof.Dr.Finn-Aage ESBENSEN Arbitration Conflict Resolution in Antiquity (500 Bc- 350bc) Adil CALAP - Özcan ERDOĞAN Quantum Jumps in Renewable Energy Technologies Prof.Dr.Hayrettin KILIÇ The Arab Spring Balance of Power in Middle East Marian ZIDARU-Stefan GEORGESCU Clustering G-20 Countries Using Euclidian Method Fuzzy Logic Esra DEMİR - Çiğdem ÖZARI Iran s Foreign Policy Approach Towards Central Asia Caucasus Mahdieh AGHAZADEH Unpacking Crime Over Life Course: Causes of Offending in a High Risk Sample of Women Lee Ann SLOCUM - Sally S. SIMPSON Students Social Mobility in Dialogue of Education Culture in Modern University Leila Munirova

6 Dr. Mustafa AYDIN The President of Eurasian Universities Union

7 EURASIAN UNIVERSITIES UNION ACTIVITIES IMPACT ON THE REGION IS OBVIOUS Eurasian Universities Union, established in 2008, managed to promote intellectual capacity of region contributed by best for educational capacity building. By networking more than 80 prominent universities all over region we managed to transfer knowledge best practices between member universities benefit m from experiences that ir partners benefited. By organizing regional conferences as in Dubai, Bucharest, Baku Komrat we managed to draw attention of international stakeholders on education to issues related with se regions mobilize m for better results. Through students academicians exchanges, cultural interaction between members was highest priority it helped for strengning bilateral relations promoting peace in our region. Involving prominent leaders to Leaders Conferences programs we launched helped very much to introduce regional strategic importance to World. Our publications, conferences projects will be a step forward to intensify our activities in more areas as transforming EURAS to a regional play maker on educational capacity building development. Main targets of new re-scheduling must be promotion of peace dialogue in region through universities whom we are encouraging to take part in a more actively way for settlement of issues as democratization, human rights, worldwide regional peace, environment cultural sustainability. Eurasian Universities Union proved its capacity on such structuring invites all members to mobilize ir academic network student s capacity for more accurate concentrated to regional issues campaigns. The region, hosting 2/3 of World population must have a more powerful voice, at least on academic sphere, for world events submit its opinion intellectual treasure to influence se events for brooder benefit of humankind eliminate in-equalities on worldwide extend. We do believe that EURAS Journal will continue to be a platform to submit research academic papers of our academicians to world intellectual circles prove once again that we academicians of Eurasian Region are capable to generate projects programs not only affecting our region but on worldwide basis. Dr. Mustafa AYDIN EURAS President

8 THE GREAT GREEK PHILOSOPHER DEMOCRITUS SAYS (What we Think We Become)...It is reality of life. If you don t dream you can t develop yourself or contribute to humanity. Eurasian Universities Union was our dream for years. It was for developments prosperity of nations that lost great race of development in 20th Century. When launched EURAS founding members were just seven, from Turkey, Azerbaijan, Romania Moldova. WE organized our last General Assembly on 7th November 2014 members are 84.. Our prominent new members as La Sapienza University from Italy, a University operating for centuries have increased our capacity for contributing to academic capacity of EURAS. We have new members from all over Eurasia as from Afghanistan, Philippines, South Korea, UK or far east Asian territories. We became a very powerful family with a strong voice concerning regional issues settlements we are offering through our scientific academic infrastructure. Through conferences we are organizing on regional basis we are focused to influence 8 Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015

9 public opinion for better solutions involvement. By launching a new member status-observer member, we started to involve United Nations, World Bank, European Union, OSCE or international organizations to activities of Eurasian universities Union. That integrated EURAS in a more powerful way to World agendas. As an example we organized Conference about (Security of Europe Turkey Role) toger with OSCE in Istanbul. For Year 2015, we will focus mostly on regional issues in Balkans, Caucasus Central Asia. In this framework conferences about Balkan interests are organized in Tirana, Belgrade Istanbul. This year we are planning Annual Youth Festival of EURAS in a member country we are waiting for cidate member s to inform us about ir plans involvement capacity. As EURAS What we thought we become.. It is now turn of our members with ir great ideas proposals to develop our activities capacity EURAS General Secretariat is keen to implement m With my best regards Muzaffer BACA Secretary General Volume:3, No:1, Winter

10 Youth Gangs: Not Just an American Phenomenon Prof.Dr.Finn-Aage Esbensen Department of Criminology Criminal Justice University of Missouri-St. Louis ABSTRACT Gang research has a long history in United States gangs are often portrayed as an American problem. Much of gang literature gang lore would lead one to believe that stereotypical gang is organized, hierarchical, territorial, racially/ethnically homogeneous that gang members are male, members of racial/ethnic minority groups concentrated in economically socially marginalized neighborhoods. These stereotypes have contributed to a belief that gangs are not found in a number of communities in USA or in or countries. The truth of matter is that gangs come in many shapes sizes gang members represent communities in which y reside. A relatively recent emergence of comparative multi-method research conducted as part of Eurogang Program of Research suggests that gangs not only exist throughout world but that y are remarkably similar in terms of gang gang member characteristics. Youth Gangs: Not Just an American Phenomenon Gang research in United States of America can be traced back to seminal work by Thrasher (1927). Over ensuing years, most gang research has relied on case studies (including ethnographies, in depth studies of individuals /or groups) that have provided rich, descriptive accounts of gang members gangs. More recently, largely stimulated by work of Walter Miller in 1970s, gang researchers drew from law enforcement data to address extent nature of gangs associated illegal activity. Journalists mass media have also been intrigued with gangs have introduced general population to gangs (including gangs of American Wild West, such as Jesse James gang in Midwest Hole in Wall Gang featuring Butch Cassidy Sundance Kid but also including more current images introduced in films such as Colors in Gangsta Rap videos). Many of ethnographic contemporary journalistic accounts have focused on gangs in traditional gang cities including Chicago, Los Angeles, New York City. These various sources of information have contributed to a 10 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

11 stereotypical image of gangs gang members: members are generally viewed as males of racial/ethnic minority status residing in impoverished urban settings (see, for example, work of Esbensen Tusinski, 2007). One over-riding notion is that se gangs are an American phenomenon that does not exist in or nations. The past 25+ years have witnessed a shift in gang research. Survey methodology, including cross-sectional longitudinal studies utilizing in-person interviews of youth in general samples, self-administered questionnaires completed by students in school, interviews with incarcerated samples, has been incorporated into study of gangs. Findings from se research projects have challenges stereotypical picture of gangs gang members (Esbensen Huizinga, 1993; Esbensen Winfree, 1998; Fagan, 1989; Thornberry et al., 1993). While gang research has a long history tradition in USA, re is a lack of consensus about what constitutes a gang or a gang member. These definitional issues have received considerable attention (for a review of definitional debate, consult Curry et al., 2014; Klein Maxson, 2006). One common refrain used by law enforcement representatives defies definition relies on description: if it walks like a duck, talks like a duck, looks like a duck; it s a duck. This approach of relying upon physical characteristics of potential gang members may have some utility but caution must be urged. True, some gangs gang members have denotable characteristics such as favoring one color (often blue or red), specific tattoos h signals to identify members, wearing specific clothing. But, with dissemination of culture language through mass media social media, such clothing styles, tattoos, or gang symbols have been adopted by non-gang youth. So, while it may look like a duck, it may not be a duck. This reliance upon descriptive characteristics could well result in an over-identification of youth as gang involved. A better approach to defining gangs gang members is required. One potential definition is provided by US Department of Justice. DOJ developed a working definition of a gang as a group or association of three or more persons who may have a common identifying sign, symbol, or name who are involved in criminal activity which creates an atmosphere of fear intimidation (GAO, 2009). This definition continues to rely on descriptive characteristics, which could be used to identify sports teams such as Swiss National Football team. The inclusion of involvement in criminal activity creates an atmosphere of fear intimidation begins to narrow scope of interest but may still include groups that would not or should not be considered gangs. This is a rar important issue given introduction of 2 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

12 enhanced sentencing guidelines for gang-involved crimes /or crimes committed by gang members. Being identified as a gang member can result in many more years in prison. With such real-world consequences, it is essential that label of gang member be correctly applied. I will return to this topic later in this chapter. As mentioned above, re has been continues to be debate about how to define gangs gang membership. Researchers in American context have adopted self-nomination method. Similar to self-reported delinquency, researcher relies upon study participant to indicate wher or not y are a gang member. This self-nomination technique (also used by law enforcement) has proven to be particularly robust, especially in American gang research (see, for example, Esbensen et al. 2001). However, how well does such an approach work in different languages different cultures? Gangs Outside of USA During 1990s gangs gang culture proliferated. At same time USA experienced a drastic increase in youth violence, drug sales, overall homicide rate. Some suggest that se two phenomena were inter-related that gangs were involved with distribution of crack cocaine that this drug trade was particularly violent (see, for instance, volume by Blumstein Wallman, 2000). Two Los Angeles-based gangs, Bloods Crips, contributed to notion that gangs were establishing satellite sets while creating a national drug crime distribution network. Gangsta rap was widely disseminated music videos popularized gangster look (e.g., wearing specific colors, wearing a hat in a certain manner, hanging a bana out of your pocket, sagging your pants, etc.) leading to impression that gangs were developing everywhere. The question raised by se wannabes was wher y were real gangs gang members or simply imitating this American phenomenon. By mid- to late 1990s, gang research in United States had exped beyond traditional gang cities found that gangs gang-involved youth were found in a variety of settings, including large urban areas, suburbs small cities, even in rural areas (e.g., Egley et al., 2004; Esbensen Peterson Lynskey, 2001). Several researchers wondered if or countries, especially within Europe, were experiencing this same emergence or identification of gangs (e.g., Klein et al., 2001). In an attempt to address this question, a group of approximately 50 researchers policy makers from USA throughout Europe convened a workshop in In course of this three-day meeting, it became clear that in order to answer this question, re would be 3 12 Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015

13 a need for agreement on a definition as well as more systematic research. Some European researchers commented: we don t have gangs like you do in US. This was an interesting observation because it highlighted extent to which those individuals were responding to stereotypical image of gangs presented in media not empirical reality that not all gangs are large, hierarchical, organized, territorial. This initial meeting in Germany led to formation of Eurogang Program of Research which has produced a number of research instruments (Weerman et al., 2009) as well as four volumes describing gang research in Europe United States as well as several comparative research projects (e.g., Decker Weerman, 2005; Esbensen Maxson, 2012; van Gemert et al. 2008; Klein et al., 2001). Over course of four years (five meetings numerous telephone exchanges), this group of researchers agreed on a nominal definition of gangs: a street gang is any durable, street-oriented youth group whose involvement in illegal activities is part of its group identity. This definition incorporates following defining elements of a gang. The group must consist of 1) 3 or more people, 2) who are mostly between ages of years of age, 3) spend a lot of time in public places, 4) been in existence for more than 3 months,, importantly, 5) accept actually participate in illegal activity. One objective of this definition was to define key elements of a gang rar than description of characteristics. Early research conducted by se international scholars tended to be qualitative accounts similar to those produced by American ethnographers studying gangs. These case studies tended to mirror findings from American qualitative research that had been traditionally conducted in single sites (usually New York, Chicago, Los Angeles but also including St. Louis) confirmed impression that gangs were disproportionately male immigrant groups. Some examples of se studies follow. In Nerls, van Gemert (2001) described a Moroccan gang thusly: Of 24 members all are Moroccan with exception of a Dutch, a Surinamese, a Dutch Philippine boy three non-moroccan boys are Moroccanized. Mares (2001) described group he studied in Manchester, UK as (a)bout 80 percent of gang members are of ethnic descent, mostly Afro-Caribbean. Lien s (2001) description of Oslo gangs furr highlights ethnic status of members: Immigrant gangs, both homogeneous multiethnic, represent a new phenomenon that has emerged during eighties. The most famous of se is a gang composed of Pakistani youths called Young Guns. came to attention of media through a series of fights with or gangs, among m a Pakistani group called Killers, a Filipino gang called Outsiders. 4 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

14 In addition to agreeing on a common definition, Eurogang Program of Research also encouraged researchers to adopt instruments that had been developed for use in multi-method, multi-site studies (Weerman et al., 2009). The importance of multiple methods research is underscored by ethnographic studies that, like ir American counterparts, focused attention on males racial/ethnic minorities. To what extent were se studies representative of gangs in those countries? The quotes from qualitative research highlight similarity to media generated picture. However, a growing body of research finds that gang members are representative of communities from which y hail (Esbensen Carson, 2012). As survey studies have moved beyond traditional gang cities out of high-risk neighborhoods included wider representation of youth, emerging picture is not consistent with stereotypical picture painted by media or even that depicted in qualitative research. For example, studies have increasingly identified girls in gangs, ranging from around 25% to 50% with norm being more in 33% range. Studies in USA, UK, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Germany, Nerls ( recently also in China Trinidad Tobago) consistently report that girls account for one quarter to one-half of all youth gang members (Bendixen et al., 2005; Esbensen Weerman, 2005; Gatti et al., 2011; Huizinga Schumann, 2001; Pedersen Lindstadt, 2012; Pyrooz et al., 2012; Weerman, 2012). These largely school-based surveys conducted in numerous nations during past decade also cast doubt on notion that gangs consist primarily of immigrant or minority youth. Klein concluded that While both scholars practitioners often specify gang differences according to ethnic backgrounds or neighborhood (community) characteristics, my own experience a good deal of research suggest that group processes trump ethnicity neighborhood (2012:296). In ir comparison of gang-involved youth in Nerls USA, Esbensen Weerman (2005), for instance, found native born Dutch to be proportionately represented in youth gangs. In addition to sex ethnic background of gang members relative to non-gang members, various studies utilizing Eurogang definition have reported presence of youth gangs in all nations studied. The prevalence rates vary but generally hover between five 10 percent of youth being classified as gang involved. The International Self-Report Delinquency study was conducted in 30 nations across globe. They report gang prevalence rates ranging from a low of 0.4 to a high of 16.8 percent (Gatti et al., 2011; Haymoz et al., 2013). Clearly American phenomenon of youth gangs is not exclusively domain of American setting. Gangs Delinquent Behavior 5 14 Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015

15 The prevalence rates vary but generally hover between five 10 percent of youth being classified as gang involved. The International Self-Report Delinquency study was conducted in 30 nations across globe. They report gang prevalence rates ranging from a low of 0.4 to a high of 16.8 percent (Gatti et al., 2011; Haymoz et al., 2013). Clearly American phenomenon of youth gangs is not exclusively domain of American setting. Gangs Delinquent Behavior 5 One of reasons that gangs are of interest to researchers practitioners is that y commit a disproportionate amount of crime. You will recall from Eurogang definition that a defining element of that definition was that it was okay to commit illegal acts that doing so was part of group identity. Some might argue that this aspect of definition makes it tautological to say that gang members are more delinquent than non-gang members. Two points are relevant: 1) difference in offending rates exist even when involvement in illegal behavior is not part of definition (e.g., Esbensen et al., 2001) 2) order of magnitude in differences in offending rates is such that it cannot be attributed solely to definitional issues. Several studies have found that gang boys girls commit approximately four times as many offenses as ir non-gang counterparts but ratio increases with severity of offending (Esbensen Weerman, 2005; Huizinga Schumann, 2001; Pedersen Lindstadt, 2012). In American context, two large studies reported that gang members in those samples, while accounting for a minority of sample, accounted for more than 75 percent of violent offenses (Huizinga et al., 2003; Thornberry, 1998). It is important to note that gang girls are also engaged in delinquent activity of gang; y are not just affiliates who st by while boys fight. One factor that has been related to levels of offending by gang members is sex composition of gangs. To date, only studies in US Nerls have examined this feature but results were similar. First, a minority of gangs are exclusively male or female. The relative distribution of girls boys in gangs seem to influence group dynamics, including delinquency. Female offending is higher among girls who are in majority male gangs rar than sexbalanced gangs. Likewise, boys in sex balanced gangs commit fewer crimes than those in majority male gangs (e.g., Peterson et al., 2001; Peterson Carson, 2012; Weerman, 2012). Gang Member Stability The gang effect With introduction of longitudinal studies including gang involved youth, researchers have been able to examine a number of issues associated with gang membership. For example, what are risk factors contributing to joining a gang? What are consequences of leaving gang? Are youth delinquent prior to joining gang or does gang facilitate delinquent involvement? While cross-sectional studies of youth can provide a lot of information provide a snapshot of ir lives, longitudinal studies allow for examining changes stability over time. Two early panel studies (that is, following same individuals across time) highlighted fact that gangs enhance youths involvement in crime. While gang members had slightly higher rates of delinquency prior to joining gang, those rates skyrocketed during time youth was in gang n declined 6 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

16 upon leaving gang (Esbensen Huizinga, 1993; Thornberry et al., 1993). Since publication of se findings, y have been replicated in or panel studies conducted in US (Battin et al., 1998; Gordon et al., 2004; Melde Esbensen, 2011, 2013, 2014; Peterson et al., 2004; Thornberry et al., 2003), Canada (Gatti et al., 2005), Norway (Bendixen et al., 2005). In addition to identification of enhancement effect, se studies highlighted fact that gang membership is a relatively transient experience for most gang youth. Contrary to media generated myth that once in a gang, in a gang for life or blood in, blood out, most gang youth were members of gang for less than one year (Esbensen Huizinga, 1993; Thornberry et al. 1993, 2003). Risk Factors On important question is: why do youth join gangs? In preceding sections of this chapter, it has been noted that gangs are found in a variety of settings in all nations studied. These gang youth are representative of larger adolescent population majority of youth who join a gang, remain in gang for a relatively short period of time. Are youth who join gangs in some way different from those youth who do not? To answer this question, researchers have examined risk factors that may be predictive of gang joining. To date, most of this research has been conducted in USA but re is a growing body of research in Europe that suggests that risk factors as similar across different national contexts (e.g., Bendixen et al., 2004; Esbensen Weerman, 2005; Pedersen Lindstadt, 2012) Risk factors are generally categorized into five different domains: neighborhood, family, school, peers, individual. To date, risk factors in all five domains have been linked to gang joining youth are at greater risk more risk factors y possess across different domains (see, for example, Esbensen et al., 2010). Risk factor research is hindered by fact that different researchers employ different measures of similar concepts but an important finding is that regardless of how risk factors are operationalized, y tend to produce same or similar results. In ir comparative research, Esbensen Weerman (2005) examined factors associated with gang membership in a sample of students from USA anor from Nerls. To measure parental monitoring Dutch students responded to following three questions: 1) At home, I have to do what my parents say; 2) I know what is what is not allowed for me at home; 3) My parents know where I go to outside home. In contrast, American students responded to following four questions: 1) When I go someplace, I leave a note for my parents or call m to 7 16 Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015

17 tell m where I am; 2) My parents know where I am when I am not at home or at school; 3) I know how to get in touch with my parents if y are not at home; 4) My parents know who I am with if I am not at home. In spite of se different measures, concept of parental monitoring is identified as a risk factor in both samples. Or risk factors that have very similar patterns in two studies include: peer delinquency peer pressure, parental attachment, school commitment, impulsivity, risk seeking, moral attitudes. To date, similar risk factors have been identified in studies conducted in USA, Nerls, Denmark, Canada, China. Summary In this brief chapter I have addressed several mes related to phenomenon of youth gangs. First, definition matters: just because it walks like a duck, looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, doesn t mean it s a duck. It is important to have defining elements that move beyond sheer description of a gang. In American context, self-definition works well. For comparative research, however, a common definition that identifies key characteristics that distinguish gangs from or groups is necessary. The Eurogang Program of Research provides one definition that has received considerable support ( Just as definition matters, so too does research methodology. Single methods can provide important information but researchers will benefit from incorporating multiple methods. Such an approach will provide, for instance, a broad overview of gang situation using school-based surveys while obtaining more nuanced contextual information by incorporating ethnographic /or expert surveys. While history of gang research has tended to report on single-method, single-site research, it is important for understing youth gang problem to include not only mixed/multiple methods but to include multiple sites within nations across nations. To date, studies have suggested considerable robustness consistency in nature extent of gang problem. Prevalence rates, when using a common definition, indicate gangs exist to varying degrees in all nations studied. Interestingly, especially given stereotypes, girls account for a sizable percentage (generally around 30 35%) of gang members. And, based on relatively recent research, or stereotypical depictions of youth gangs are called into question: 1) Gangs are not solely a minority or immigrant problem; 2) Gangs are found outside of economically distressed urban areas; 3) A common set of risk factors appear to be associated with gang membership; 4) Involvement in delinquent behavior especially violence is closely associated with gang joining; 8 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

18 5) Gang membership is a transitory stage in adolescence that is, average youth belongs to gang for less than one year. Much has been learned with respect to youth gangs during past two decades. Continued collaboration expansion of research to more countries will help to establish if youth gang phenomenon transcends all national boundaries or if cultural societal differences persist. To date, emerging comparative research holds promise, as we move forward, perhaps this comparative approach will be successful in identifying strategies to reduce prevalence negative consequences of youth gangs. REFERENCES 1. Battin, Sara R., Karl G. Hill, Robert D. Abbott, Richard F. Catalano, J. David Hawkins. (1998). The Contribution of Gang Membership to Delinquency beyond Delinquent Friends. Criminology 36: Bendixen, Mons, Inger M. Endresen, Dan Olweus. (2006). Joining Leaving Gangs. 3. Selection Facilitation Effects on Self-Reported Antisocial Behaviour in Early Adolescence. 4. European Journal of Criminology 3: Blumstein, Albert Joel Wallman. (2000). The crime drop in America. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 6. Curry, G, David, Scott H. Decker, David C. Pyrooz (2014). Confronting Gangs; Crime Community, 3 rd edition, New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 7. Decker, Scott H. Frank M. Weerman (2005), European Street Gangs Troublesome Youth Groups. Alta Mira Press. 8. Egley, Arlen, Jr., James C. Howell, Aline K. Major. (2004). Recent patterns in gang problems in United States: Results from National Youth Gang Survey. Pp in Finn-Aage Esbensen, Stephen G. Tibbetts, Larry Gaines (eds.) American Youth Gangs at Millennium. Long grove, IL: Wavel Press. 9. Esbensen, Finn-Aage Dena Carson. (2012). Who Are Gangsters?: An examination of age, race/ethnicity, sex, immigration status of self-reported gang members in a seven city study of American youth. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 28: Esbensen, Finn-Aage David Huizinga (1993). Gangs, drugs, delinquency in a sample of urban youth. Criminology 31: Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015

19 11. Esbensen, Finn-Aage Cheryl L. Maxson. (2012), Youth Gangs in International Perspective: Results from Eurogang Program of Research. New York, NY: Springer. 12. Esbensen, Finn-Aage Dana Peterson Lynskey. (2001). Youth Gang Members in a School Survey. Pp in Malcolm Klein, Hans-Jurgen Kerner, Cheryl Maxson, Elmar Weitekamp (eds.) The Eurogang Paradox: Street Gangs Youth Groups in U.S. Europe. Amsterdam: Kluwer Press. 13. Esbensen, Finn-Aage, Dana Peterson, Terrance J. Taylor, Adrienne Freng. (2010). Youth Violence: Sex Race Differences in Offending, Victimization, Gang Membership. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 14. Esbensen, Finn-Aage Karin Tusinski. (2007). Youth gangs in print media. Journal of Crime Popular Culture 14: Esbensen, Finn-Aage Frank M. Weerman. (2005). A Cross-National Comparison of Youth Gangs Troublesome Youth Groups in United States Nerls. European Journal of Criminology 2: Esbensen, Finn-Aage L. Thomas Winfree, Jr. (1998). Race Gender Differences between Gang Nongang Youth: Results from a multisite survey. Justice Quarterly 15: Esbensen, Finn-Aage, L. Thomas Winfree, Jr., Ni He, Terrance J. Taylor. (2001). Youth Gangs Definitional Issues: When is a gang a gang, why does it matter? Crime Delinquency 47: Fagan, Jeffrey. (1989). The social organization of drug use drug dealing among urban gangs. Criminology 27: Gatti, Uberto, Srine Haymoz, H. Schadee. (2011). Deviant Youth Groups in 30 Countries: Results from second international self-report delinquency study. International Criminal Justice Review 16: Gatti, Uberto, Tremblay, R. E., Vitaro, F., & McDuff, P. (2005). Youth Gangs, Delinquency Drug Use: A Test of Selection, Facilitation, Enhancement Hyposes. Journal of Child Psychology Psychiatry 46: van Gemert, Frank. (2001). Crips in Orange: Gangs groups in Nerls. Pp in Malcolm Klein, Hans-Jurgen Kerner, Cheryl Maxson, Elmar Weitekamp (eds.) The Eurogang Paradox: Street Gangs Youth Groups in U.S. Europe. Amsterdam: Kluwer Press. 22. van Gemert, Frank, Dana Peterson, Inger-Lise Lien. (2008). Youth Gangs, Migration, Ethnicity. Willan Publishing. 10 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

20 23. Gordon, Rachel A., Benjamin B. Lahey, Eriko Kawai, Rolf Loeber, Magda Stouthamer- Loeber, David P. Farrington. (2004). Antisocial Behavior Youth Gang Membership: Selection socialization. Criminology 42: Haymoz, Srine, Cheryl L. Maxson, Martin Killias. (2014). Street Gang Participation in Europe: A comparison of correlates. European Journal of Criminology 11: Huizinga, David Karl F. Schumann, (2001). Gang Membership in Bremen Denver: Comparative longitudinal data. Pp in M.W. Klein, H.-J. Kerner, C.L. Maxson, E.G.M Weitekamp (eds.) The Eurogang Paradox: Street gangs youth groups in U.S. Europe. Dordrecht, Nerls: Kluwer Academic Publishing. 26. Huizinga, David, Anne W. Weiher, Rachelle Espirutu, Finn-Aage Esbensen. (2003). Delinquency Crime: Some highlights from Denver Youth Survey. Pages in Terence P. Thornberry Marvin D. Krohn (eds.) Taking Stock of Delinquency: An overview of findings from contemporary longitudinal studies. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers. 27. Klein, Malcolm W. (2012). The Next Decade of Eurogang Program Research. Pages in Finn-Aage Esbensen Cheryl L. Maxson (eds.) Youth Gangs in International Perspective: Results from Eurogang Program of Research. New York: Springer. 28. Klein, Malcolm W., Hans-Juergen Kerner, Cheryl L. Maxson, Elmar G.W. Weitekamp (2001), The Eurogang Paradox: Street Gangs Youth Groups in U.S. Europe. Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 29. Klein, Malcolm W. Cheryl L. Maxson. 2006). Street gang patterns policies. New York City, NY: Oxford University Press. 30. Lien, Inger-Lise. (2001). The Concept of Honor, Conflict Violent Behavior among Youths in Oslo. Pp in Malcolm Klein, Hans-Jurgen Kerner, Cheryl Maxson, Elmar Weitekamp (eds.) The Eurogang Paradox: Street Gangs Youth Groups in U.S. Europe. Amsterdam: Kluwer Press. 31. Mares, Dennis, (2001). Gangstas or Lager Louts? Working class street gangs in Manchester. Pp in Malcolm Klein, Hans-Jurgen Kerner, Cheryl Maxson, Elmar Weitekamp (eds.) The Eurogang Paradox: Street Gangs Youth Groups in U.S. Europe. Amsterdam: Kluwer Press. 32. Melde, Chris Finn-Aage Esbensen. (2011). Gang Membership as a Turning Point in Life Course. Criminology 49: Volume:3, No:1, Winter

21 33. Melde, Chris Finn-Aage Esbensen. (2013). Gangs Violence: Disentangling impact of gang membership on level nature of offending. Journal of Quantitative Criminology 29: Melde, Chris Finn-Aage Esbensen. (2014). "The Relative Impact of Gang Status Transitions: Identifying mechanisms of change in delinquency." Journal of Research in Crime Delinquency 51: Pedersen, Maria Libak Jonas Markus Lindstad. (2012). The Danish Gang-Joining Project: Methodological Issues Preliminary Results. Pp in Finn-Aage Esbensen Cheryl L. Maxson (eds.) Youth Gangs in International Perspective: Results from Eurogang Program of Research. New York: Springer. 36. Peterson, Dana, Dena C. Carson. (2012). The Sex Composition of Groups Youths Delinquency: A Comparison of Gang Non-gang Peer Groups. Pp in Finn-Aage Esbensen Cheryl L. Maxson (eds.) Youth Gangs in International Perspective: Results from Eurogang Program of Research. New York: Springer. 37. Peterson, Dana, Jody Miller, Finn-Aage Esbensen. (2001). The Impact of Sex Composition on Gang Member Attitudes Behavior. Criminology 39: Peterson, Dana, Terrance J. Taylor, Finn-Aage Esbensen. (2004). Gang Membership Violent Victimization. Justice Quarterly 21: Pyrooz, David C., Andrew M. Fox, Charles M. Katz, Scott H. Decker. (2012). Gang Organization, Offending, Victimization: A Cross-National Comparison. Pp in Finn-Aage Esbensen Cheryl L. Maxson (eds.) Youth Gangs in International Perspective: Results from Eurogang Program of Research. New York: Springer. 40. Thornberry, Terence P. (1998). Membership in Youth Gangs Involvement in Serious Violent Offending. Pp in Rolf Loeber David P. Farrington (eds.) Serious Violent Juvenile Offenders: Risk factors successful interventions. Thous Oaks, CA:Sage. 41. Thornberry, Terence P., Marvin D. Krohn, Alan J. Lizotte, Deborah Chard-Wierschem. (1993). The role of juvenile gangs in facilitating delinquent behavior. Journal or Research in Crime Delinquency 30: Thornberry, Terence P., Marvin D. Krohn, Alan J. Lizotte, Carolyn A. Smith, Kimberly Tobin. (2003). Gangs Delinquency in Developmental Perspective. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 43. Thrasher, Frederic. (1927). The gang: A study of 1,313 gangs in Chicago. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 12 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

22 44. Weerman, Frank M. (2012). Are Correlates Effects of Gang Membership Sex- Specific? Troublesome Youth Gangs Delinquency Among Dutch Girls. Pp in Finn-Aage Esbensen Cheryl L. Maxson (eds.) Youth Gangs in International Perspective: Results from Eurogang Program of Research. New York: Springer. 45. Weerman, Frank M., Cheryl L. Maxson, Finn-Aage Esbensen, Judith Aldridge, Juanjo Medina, & Frank van Gemert. (2009). Eurogang Program Manual: Background, development, use of Eurogang instruments in multi-site, multi-method comparative research. St. Louis, MO: University of Missouri-St. Louis. 22 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

23 ARBITRATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN ANTIQUITY (500 BC- 350BC) Adil CALAP 1 & Özcan ERDOĞAN 2 Abstract The common objective of temple of Apollo at Delphi 3 is associated with that of United Nations by some Constructivists in International Relations. Delphi external relations of city states on both sides of Aegean Sea in age of Antiquity between 500 BC 350 BC are analyzed wher institutions of Antiquity were capable of forming resolution of conflicts on basis of mutually agreed recognized rules, customs norms. Anor objective of study reveals a cardinal fact that city states within context of slavery were function of slavery system created by Persian Empire. The relative independence of slavery city-states owns ir historical existence to requirements of slavery dependent on Persian strategies. The versatile relations of temple of Apollo at Delphi with city-states are revealed that y were not strong enough to set incentives for forum rules in organizing certain constructive cooperation common institutions among city-states prior to during Peloponnesian wars (490 BC- 404 BC). Optimal approaches to analysis of dispute prevention dispute settlement process particularly focusing on Peloponnesian wars may require distinguishing various categories of external political military disputes in accordance with ir underlying conflicts of interests. Although some significant contributions by Constructivist Paradigm to international relations ory are appreciated, re is in Constructivism an idea that needs profoundly criticizing. There is a claim, a point of view which this study opposes. In that respect this study concludes that Delphi was permanently structurally incapable of carrying out a negotiation arbitration approach to conflict resolution. The role of Delphi was rar a key justifying role than direct arbitration 1 Senior Lecturer, Responsible for lecturing on courses in English, Department of International Relations, Karadeniz Technical University. 2 Dr, Civil Service Chief Inspector, Interior Ministry Inspection Board, Ankara, Turkey 3 Delphi was one of most important ancient religious temples devoted to god Apollo. The site was settled in late Bronze Age ( BC) but took on its religious importance from around 800 BC. The original name of temple was Pytho after snake which Apollo was believed to have killed re. Located near Gulf of Corinth, temple was home to famous oracle of Apollo which gave cryptic predictions guidance to representatives of citystates including individuals. In 191 BC Delphi came under Roman control. For furr information please see: Hornblower, S. The Oxford Classical Dictionary. OUP, (Oxford, 2012). 14 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

24 negotiation role. Conflicting judgments invite -re-evaluation of Constructivist oretical approach to city-state relations in Antiquity. Key Words: Delphi, slavery, conflict Resolution, arbitration, Constructivism, Persians, Peloponnesian Wars, Anians, Spartans. 1.1 Introduction Promoting historical consistency between contemporary international institutions such as United Nations temple of Apollo at Delphi in Antiquity is required to consider historically distinctive natures of structures in which international dispute settlement proceedings partake. But this research study rar discusses characteristics of Delphi than compare it to United Nations in terms of conflict resolution 4. This study aspires to make it clear that possible explanation of Delphi s existing structure was not on basis that it had been run by incompetent people that a change in morale performance would have solved problem of slavery. The inadequacy in arbitration amoral approaches in context of moral purpose was much more fundamental. Subsequently, aim of argument seeks to state that international structure for conflict resolution posited by Constructivism in regard to Antiquity seems to be fragmented in its real image. It explicitly points out why Delphi was but an insufficient institution to account for relations based on her arbitrating role. The external relations between city states during Peloponnesian war become starting point of enquiry. It will be also argued that behavior of Anian city state 5 with respect to her interests drawing gains from slavery was only able to find its meaning in existence of a continual war. Thus identifying Anian city state with a major actor in pursuit of regulating power politics for 4 The word conflict resolution is a method by which arbitration litigation processes can be critically involved in facilitating peaceful ending of conflict. For furr information, please see: Bercovitch, Jacob Jackson, Richard, Conflict Resolution in Twenty-first Century: Principles, Methods, Approaches, (University of Michigan Press, 2009) 5 Anian city state experienced its most glorious times during 5th century BC before during reign of Pericles. Throughout this period Golden Age of Anian city- state, Parnon was build. Arts, Science, Philosophy, Drama, developed to ir highest point. The outbreak of Peloponnesian war between Anians including her allies Sparta alongside with her allies put an end to this glory. For furr information, please see: Meier C., Ans: a portrait of city in its Golden Age, translated by R. R. Kimber (New York, 1998). 24 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

25 sake of her democratic system may be utterly misleading. Anian city state was manifestly a dominant element in slavery system 6. Meanwhile, discussion is extended to point at which Anian city state is identified as a power that inevitably eventually gave rise to a counterstructure which had been seeking out its basis of support element of cohesion in fragmented part of traditional social forces within penetrating context of slavery. To introduce term arbitration recognized by most of members of system with reference to Delphi obscures important difference between Antiquity 21 st century, structurally different kinds of periods. Despite fact that Delphi s obedience to most powerful city-states seems evident, this study accepts that Delphi was a respectable institution, comming a wide measure of consent among city states, was able to provide some benefits to city states up to before emergence of slavery period anyway. However, that sort of influence attributed to Delphi seems to have faded away before dawn of slavery era. Subsequently, consent wore thin as city states unevenly began to be dragged into a slavery system in which element of force violence became predominant, it was in core of slavery system that challenge to Anian power first became manifest. 7 At core was a ruthless competition among slavery city states represented as sudden eruptions of symptoms between Anians ors including Megara while at periphery was a constant fear of disintegration annihilation represented by Sparta city state 8. Anor goal of study attempts to disclose a fact that city states within context of slavery had emerged as an inevitable function of slavery system under expansive influence of Persian Empire. The argument is extended to a point at which structure network of city states in connection to temple of Apollo at Delphi had transformed into meeting need of slavery which was being monitored by Persians. Since main issue was wher or not Delphi became an ineffective instrument into hs of variable powers or wher she had moral purpose as insisted by Constructivists, two important question which are raised in that study are: 1) what were mechanisms forming resolution of conflicts in that particular historical structure? And 2) what forms of state external relations had existed within that particular historical structure? 6 Please see: Chaniotis, Angelos, Ancient World At War, (Blackwell Publishing, 2005) 7 Please see: Chaniotis, Angelos, Ancient World At War, (Blackwell Publishing, 2005) 8 Please see: Meier, Christian, The Greek Discovery of Politics, (Cambridge, 1990) 16 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

26 The analysis of this study would also seek to include some explanatory discussions to questions raised above. In that case this essay will try to demonstrate that actions of Delphi for conflict resolutions were constrained manipulated by need of slavery system. At this point, it will be explained that it is preferable for Constructivism to revert to a distorted terminology attributed to Aristotle in order to justify ir statement. This study will try to underst both what is this Greek city states that so draw oretical studies in IR what oretical studies in IR find re. Do y reconfirm claims of constructivists? Do Greek city states persist a metaphor for imaginable realm in which concepts of Constructivism have been placed? Can we read all documents of city-states as accounts or witnesses of actual international relations? Under pressure of such questions, ancient city-states may offer this essay a chance to revision concepts of constructivists. By stepping back into city states, into what is factual historical, this paper will seek to analyze nonfactual ahistorical predicaments of constructivism. 2.1 Constructivism a Network of Institutions as Arbitrators in Antiquity Constructivists regard period of Greek city-states as manifestation of Hobbesian nature of international relations; primordial period of international relations dominated by anarchy, insecurity, constant possibility of war among states. 9 For instance, Alexer Wendt claims that Judging from violence high death rate of states in past it seems clear that world politics has often been Hobbesian. 10 By this statement he also means that functions roles of Greek city-states in essence are similar to those of modern states. But, in that discourse he spots only one problem which is about ignoring important differences in systemic context. However, he argues that those important differences could be overcome provided structure is conceptualized in cultural terms 11. Subsequently through that angle of view, he suggests that any valid transhistorical generalizations become possible. 9 For Furr Information please see: Strauss, Leo, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, (The University of Chicago Press, 1963) 10 Alexer Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p Ibid., p Volume:3, No:1, Winter

27 For Constructivists it is only through interaction of state agents that structure of international system is produced, reproduced, sometimes transformed. 12 That is, without interaction of state agents we could not mention of any change or transformation in structure of international system. In anor word, structure of international system, patterns of cooperation, changes transformation in structure of IR are all reduced to interactions of state agents. Due to such an abstraction, y return to Greek city states in order to seek nature genesis of contemporary fundamental institutions. That is, y isolate sociology from history, summarize that romness governs IR. For in its most simplistic form, Constructivists invent a fundamental institution of third-party arbitration to support ir claims about patterns of cooperation. Delphi is considered an interstate organization which is thought to have been produced by interactions of Greek city-states agents. Did Delphi really an interstate organization resemble United Nations? In his writing, moral codes, including those which attempt simplification of universality are lateralization of Aristotle s thoughts. As a consequence, this study sets out to de-moralize moral codes from moralistic fallacy of constructivism which reads Peloponnesian war in terms of good bad, right wrong. This requires fiction of a fixed subject (arbitration), choosers (city-states), fixer (oracles at Delphi). This moralistic fallacy is central to myth of institution, a kind of identification projection, source of heroic behavior which was essential for sustaining slavery of city states Constructivism City States To constructivists, Greek city-states are usually a universal stard against which all events are measured. For example, as a constructivist Christian Reus-Smit says that The ancient Greek system of city-states occupies a special place in study of international relations. It sts as one of great analogues of modern state system, a familiar world of independent states in which eternal varieties of international politics are thought to have appeared in ir most rudimentary essential form. 13 In that context, Constructivists try to be highlighting historically existence of patterns of cooperation by means of an international institutions as ir intellectual efforts are placed upon thrashing out differences between distinct periods of history. Like Alexer Wendt, Christian 12 Alexer Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of The State, (Princeton University Press, 1999), p Volume:3, No:1, Winter

28 Reus-Smit as anor constructivist thinker follows suit as well. By such a reductionist method, one may witness that structure functions of Greek city-states are subjected to an imagined transhistorical generalization. Therefore, Christian Reus-Smit may be seen as complying with principle of Alexer Wendt, namely conceptualizing structure roles of ancient citystates in cultural terms, but implicitly in distorted ones. Like modern states, Greek city-states are believed by Constructivists to have established a network of institutions to facilitate cooperation, negotiations, arbitrations. They are imagined to have favored practice of third party arbitration in absence of experiencing contractual international law multilateralism. They argue that Greek city-states were bound toger by Oracles at Delphi similar to a constitutional structure by which state is thought to gain her social identity. Arbitration was core fundamental institution, but it was nested within a web of lesser institutions. says Christian Reus, The oracle at Delphi periodic Olympic festivals are best known, yet least important politically The Oracle was paramount religious institution in ancient Greece, it often issued political advice to city-states Delphi exerted greater political influence through anor type of interstate institution The Archaic Background of Delphi In archaic Greece ( BC) among city-states treaties alliances including arbitration were useful tools to avoid violent resolution conflicts. Cities would appoint arbitrators to settle intercity conflicts 15. A group of men would st above conflicting parties; enjoy an independent third position acting as mediators to all concerned 16. The highest religious authority oracle of Apollo in Delphi promoted principles of moderation even in warfare 17. The effectiveness of Delphi over city-states might have happened to have materialized at a time when re was almost no trade within among cities in which division of labor including divided function role of city states was very low 18. Among native people was also hostility toward any kind of trade trading relations. For instance exportation of oil which was only exported product in Attica at time was secured by law issued by Solon (658 BC- 538BC) who was an Anian politician, lawmaker poet. This law is inscribed upon first of 14 Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of The State, (Princeton University Press, 1999), p Please see: Aeger, S. L. Interstate Arbitration in Greek World, (Berkeley, 1996) 16 Meier, Christian, The Greek Discovery of Politics, (Cambridge, 1990), p Ibid. p Please see: Aeger, S. L. Interstate Arbitration in Greek World, (Berkeley, 1996) 28 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

29 his tables, so that re seems to be some evidence for tradition that export of figs was prohibited in ancient times. 19 Likewise, Thucydides suggests that in former times re was no mercantile traffic. 20 There were no any structures which could have a tradition of containing tolerating any sort of commerce except enforced intervention by law itself until slavery became a complicated relatively accepted system. By n, in absence of a well-developed mercantile traffic, Delphi would be thought to have experienced its golden era 21. The existence of commercial relations at primitive levels between city states might furnish Delphi as great institution of arbitration. However, due to eventual developments of trade including a complex development in slavery associated with division of labor induced by expansion of Persian slavery system slowly growing appearance of polarization between cities country, Delphi may seem to have begun to effectively lose its traditional identity respected cultural position The Persians, City-States Delphi In antiquity, old practices methods occurred prior to slavery period always co-existed alongside emerging slavery. The development in distribution of slavery among city-states was uneven: The coastal area of European side of Aegean Sea had devolved into slavery markets by Persians; people living in Asia minor appeared to have been sold out as slaves, import export of whom were organized by city-states under guidance of Persian Empire 23. The growing power of city-states enlarged slave markets existed were product function of Persians. The inls in Asia Minor used to serve as mechanism that would produce slaves who were considered rebels revolting against Persian rule. 24 Relatively after two centuries during which time mode of slave production seems to have settled down with its own specific contradictory institutions conflicts, when we arrived at period of Pericles in Ans (461 BC-429 BC), Delphi had already been transformed into an instrument into hs of cities as vassal of eir Ans or Sparta or Corinth. It was no longer a common 19 Plutarch, The Rise Fall of Ans, (Penguin Books, 1964), p Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harvard University Press, 2003), p.5 21 Please see: Aeger, S. L. Interstate Arbitration in Greek World, (Berkeley, 1996) 22 Please see: Meier, Christian, The Greek Discovery of Politics, (Cambridge, 1990) 23 Please see: The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005) 24 Please see: Chaniotis, Angelos, Ancient World At War, (Blackwell Publishing, 2005) 20 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

30 respectable religious institution, had already lost her impartiality, but seems to have turned into an instrument being controlled by interests of unstable nature of alignments of cities. The Development of slavery competition for process of enslaving people transformed nature of relationships among city-states in Greece under pressure of Persian Empire. The instinct for slavery gave way to fear anxiety for annihilation within each state. Military balance had mixed with unrest unsettled feelings about wher ir city-states would resume surviving ruthless enslaving conditions 25. The persistence of fear for enslavement was so deep acute that it lasted centuries. One could observe deep irrational anxiety of city states forty years after end of Peloponnesian War (432 BC- 404 BC). For example, with strategy of enslaving Peloponnesians, Corinthians had designed anor war against both Spartans Anians. But to form an alliance with Argos, Corinthians had employed some fears of enslavement about Argos, convinced m of intention of Anians Spartans, hence successfully drove Argos to war 26. Empirical evidence shows that such fear about enslavement had been an essential provocation to move city-states to major wars. 4.2 The Persian Aims in 490s BC Delphi s Misjudgment The Delian League was formed late in 478 BC 27. In aftermath of success of Greek navies revolt of city states, in BC defeated Persians moved along coast restoring order in city after city in Asia Minor with fleet army moving toger 28. It had ensured that victory of city states on European side against Persians could have been prevented from spreading over Minor Asia. Through city-states in Minor Asia, did Persians would aim at controlling functioning structure of slavery trade in city-states on European continent side of Aegean Sea. A similar strategy by Persians had been applied in 469 BC. The goal of resumption of Persian Empire over city-states in Greece was reduced to a commitment to maintaining slavery trades within across city states. The perceptual change in politics actual adjustments to economic development solidified in strategy diplomacy of Persians. The 25 Please see: Meier, Christian, The Greek Discovery of Politics, (Cambridge, 1990) 26 Kagan, Donald, The Peloponnesian War, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005), p Please see: Chaniotis, Angelos, Ancient World At War, (Blackwell Publishing, 2005) 28 The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005), p Volume:3, No:1, Winter

31 Persians began applying a strategy in which y decided to see wher y could secure by diplomacy something of what y had not been able to secure by force 29. The Persians purposes were twofold. They sought to secure undisputed control over all of Asia. Secondly y wanted a settled order within Greece that would occasion m least trouble. 30 Since trouble had come from naval power, y would be best served by enforcing a system that required city states to be autonomous. But autonomy would not flourish to be left to itself. When Persians agent city states would fail to keep control over rest of city states, Persians would did intervene 31. The ending of Peloponnesian wars explicitly refers to that reality. Those who did not accept such a condition would have to be coerced by joint action. The peace of Thebes in 366 illustrates this 32. In 367 Thebans had sought to institute a Persians peace with mselves leading power, that is, peace alliance. By mid-fifth century city states in Greece was polarized due to competition for slavery. Two power blocks appeared to emerge, led by Ans Sparta 33. Those seeking to remain neutral were viewed with suspicion by both block members 34. This polarization made arbitration consequently peaceful resolution of conflicts almost impossible 35. Arbitration between two power blocks was unable to work since re had been no superior institution or agency that had sufficient authority to be recognized by both power blocks members. In addition prevailing political culture would encourage violent conflict resolution rar than peaceful resolution 36. The arbitration clause in Thirty Years Treaty of 446 BC between two 29 Ibid., p Please see: The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005) 31 Ibid., p (Xen. Hell ) 33 Sparta as a city state grew strong to become dominant military l-power in ancient Greece around 650 BC. Sparta led campaign as leader of combined city-states forces during Greco-Persian Wars at beginning of fifth century. Between BC, Sparta was enemy of Anian city-state throughout Peloponnesian War Sparta with financial aid of Persians emerged victorious. 34 years after victory of Spartans, Thebes receiving financial support of Persians ended Sparta s role in 371 BC. For furr information, please see: Cartledge Paul, Sparta Lakonia: A Regional History 1300 to 362 BC (2 ed.), (Oxford: Routledge, 2002) 34 Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harward University Press, 2003), Please see: Hackett, Sir John, gen. ed. Warfare in Ancient World. New York: Sidgwick & Jackson, Kagan, Donald, On Origins of War Preservation of Peace, (New York, 1995), ch.1 22 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

32 power blocks failed to come into effect just before eruption of Peloponnesian war in 432 BC. 37 The intervention of Persians in affairs of Greek city states had profoundly transformed structure of city states in which function role of Delphi appears significantly paralyzed changed. Such changes led city-states to solidify ir gains through more effective institutions. The search for securing ir gains through slavery happened to have polarized relations between city-states Persian Empire. That kind of polarization leading to revolts temporary alliances seems to harden position of Persians in a broader region. In that sense, Persian aim in 490s BC was rar to begin incorporation of mainl Greece within Empire. At beginning of fifth century BC, namely around 480 BC, Sparta Ans including or city states were allied to each or against Persian Empire. As soon as city-states on European continent knew that Greece was to be invaded, y took effective action to unite. Delphi clearly expected city-states in Greece to be largely overrun, issued dire oracles 38. Delphi clearly believed Persians to defeat united front of city-states. However, in BC Persians failed to win over city-states. The power of Persians was confined to Asia 39. And dire prediction of Delphi s oracle had proved wrong. 5.1 Peloponnesian Wars In aftermath of defeat of Persian Empire, as happened before war, Spartans had been preoccupied with population of ir neighbor city, called Messenia that had been enslaved by Spartans. As slave owners l oriented power, Spartans were concerned with maintaining status quo. They were unwilling to commit ir forces too extensively overseas 40. Anians took over Spartans leadership, confederacy of Anians ir allies, later known as Delian League, came into existence. 41 The purpose of Delian League was supposed to be mutual protection against Persia. The autonomy of all member city states would be respected; ir representatives took an oath of loyalty to League- an oath which was permanently binding Ibid., ch.1 Kagan, Donald, The Peloponnesian War, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005), 38 Heredotus, The History, translated by David Grene, (Colombia University Press, 1988)., Ibid. 40 Michael Grant, The Classical Greeks, (Phoenix Press, 1988), p Ibid., p Ibid., p Volume:3, No:1, Winter

33 The taxes by each member city states were being pooled in isl of Delos; but, Anians moved treasury to Ans (454 BC), claiming monopoly over accumulated taxes due to ir increasing naval power. They relied on trading slaves sea oriented slave owned commercial characteristic of ir city state. Ans was rar an expansionist power. This expansionist behavior may be related to exploitation of fears of small city states through Delian League. It had consolidated her control over her allies under pretext of mutual protection against Persians. On Peloponnesian peninsula, Spartans her allies established anor League in order to deal with growing power of Ans its allies. 43 Due to needs caused by slavery, Ans began to use Delian League's navy for its own interests. The behavior of Ans had been frequently challenged by less powerful members of League. The first Peloponnesian War between two camps broke out in 461 BC ended in 445 BC. That war was sealed off by a treaty that ensures peace for 30 years. The treaty had been brokered by rulers of both Spartans Anians. No involvement of Delphi was present for settlement. That is, in process of negotiation between two camps, Delphi was not an instrument for conflict settlement, but certain individuals from both Anians Spartans for resolving issue of first Peloponnesian war. That peace agreement did not last long; second Peloponnesian War broke out in 431 BC which led to a catastrophe, engulfing at least 120 city states toger, driving all those city-states into a very brutal cruel war The Second Peloponnesian War Thucydides states that cause of second Peloponnesian war was result of growth of power of Ans worries fears it caused in Sparta her allies. Spartans worried about growing power of Ans, but y were also fearful that ir slaves could have revolted in case y got engaged in war 44. Ans Spartans were slave states; going to war may have provided opportunities for slaves to revolt. The possibility of such revolts were refraining both power from entering into a devastating war. Meanwhile, one of slavery city states called Corinth, who as rivals were competing with Ans, considered assumed that due to fear of Ans about slave revolts, Ans could have avoided entering war. Overriding that belief, Corinth harnessed a revolt in a city state called Epidamnus on periphery to empower her position against Ans. In contrary to what Corinth calculated Ans advocated opposing groups in that city against supporters of 43 Kagan, Donald, The Peloponnesian War, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005), p Kagan, Donald, The Outbreak of Peloponnesian War (Cornell University Press, 1969), p Volume:3, No:1, Winter

34 Corinth decided to go to war in 431 BC 45. By 431 BC, Ans' heavy-hed control of Delian League helped prompt outbreak of Peloponnesian. 46 Before Anian offensive, Corinthians turned to Spartans for manpower. In order for Corinthians to ally with Sparta against ir enemy, y successfully exploited Spartans fear about enslavement by Anians. They had used threat of secession prospect of an alliance with Sparta. 47 In 431, second Peloponnesian war broke out, a war in which most of city states took part. 48 The second Peloponnesian war ended with defeat of Ans her allies in 404 BC. The resultant end of war developments after war proved that none of city states in reality won war but only Persians who used to control consequences of war by her financial assistance without involvement of military power Peloponnesian Wars Persians Once Peloponnesian wars began, seeking Persian aid was an obvious way for Spartans her allies to counter Ans naval financial superiority. The Spartans sent ir ambassadors to Persians to seek help of Persian King 50. Anians sought to encourage Persians to maintain his neutrality 51. The Peloponnesians people needed money to man large fleets, embassies to Persia sought Persian gold. But Persian King gave nothing 52. In a prolonged war, basic aim of Persians was to see her formal clients rivals weakened through war. The Spartans had entered war with a proclamation that y were freeing Greece 53. They meant freedom from Anian rule, freedom from enslavement process. The envoy with message 45 G. E. M. De Ste. Croix, The Origins of Peloponnesian War (Cornell University Press), 1972, p Toivo Koivukoski (eds.): Enduring Empire. Ancient Lessons for Global Politics. (London 2009) 47 Kagan Donald, The Peloponessian War, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005), p W. A Hurtley, H. C. Darby, A Short History of Greece, (Cambridge University Press), p For furr information on involvement of Persians in Peloponessian War, please see: Xenophon, Hellenica, Books 1-4, Translated by L. Brownson, (Harward University Press, 2003). 50 Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harward University Press, 2003), 2.7.I 51 The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005), p Ibid., p Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harward University Press, 2003), I Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015

35 was captured sent to Ans. Ans counter-embassy was turned back by news of Persian King 54. In first decade of war, Persians had distanced mselves from conflicting parties, expecting m to weaken one anor so that her domination in region would come into existence. However, after Sicilian campaign 55 Ans were believed to collapse in 413 BC. In next two years Anians confronted uprisings upheavals at home 56. Predictions that Anians could collapse turned out to be premature. The rest of Peloponnesian war was powerfully shaped by Persian Empire. 57 Anians had become a weak city state; but it was evident that Spartans ir allies could not win without building a fleet defeating Ans at sea. This could be done only by gaining financial military support of Persians. The Anians, too, needed money to rebuild ir fleet. After war in Sicily, attention shifted eastward, to king of Persia satraps of his western provinces. 58 In BC it was certainly case that Persian help for Sparta was less than generous in effect enabled Ans to continue war. Persians played city states off against each or 59. The reason why Persia did not exploit Ans s preoccupation in early years of Peloponnesian war was that Persian state saw it was to Persia s advantage to fight it out. It was an obvious strategy. From 411 BC to end of war Persian King declined to intervene despite pleas of his son Cyrus 60. Then came change. In 407 BC Cyrus came down as commer to conduct with Spartans war against Ans 61. In 406 BC Anians made an approach to Cyrus after Spartan envoy declared that y had secured all y wanted from Persian king Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harward University Press, 2003), Sicilian campaign of Anians in 415 BC ended in defeat of Ans. Ans met total destruction,-ir army, ir ships everything were destroyed. For furr information, please see: 55 Kagan, Donald, The Peloponessian War, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005), p Kagan, Donald, The Peloponessian War, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005),, p Ibid. P Ibid.,p Please see: Hackett, Sir John, gen. ed. Warfare in Ancient World. New York: Sidgwick & Jackson, Cawkwell, George, The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia, (Oxford University Press, 2005), p Xenophon, Hellenica, Translated by Carleton L. Browson, Harward University Press, I Xenophon, Hellenica, Translated by Carleton L. Browson, Harward University Press,I Volume:3, No:1, Winter

36 The Anian embassy had been turned down. Cyrus provided money necessary for maintenance of Peloponnesian fleet 63. Cyrus said to leader of Spartans, Lyser, that if funds provided by Persian King ran out he would use his own money 64. Similarly, battle in 406 BC was a fearful disaster for Peloponnesian fleet. Without support of Cyrus, Sparta might have given up struggle. The Persian King had lack of enthusiasm for final defeat of Ans; he did not want to send naval force which he had withdrawn in 411 BC. Cyrus told Lyser not to fight a sea- battle unless he has a far greater number of ships 65. Because, for defeat of Ans, an overwhelming naval force had seemed essential. The Persians were reluctant to allow Spartans her allies to finalize war. The real proof of Persian King s lack of enthusiasm for final defeat of Ans is provided by his failure to send again naval force which he had withdrawn in 411 BC. 66 Although Sparta was financially supported by Persians for preparing path leading to demise of Anians, Persian Empire remained suspicious about intention of Sparta after war. If Anians were thrown out of Asia, Spartans having liberated city states of mainl Greece would not leave city states of Asia to mercy of Persians Function of Delphi in Peloponnesian Wars What was function of Delphi in seeking a resettlement to war? It may be noticed that Delphi was not taken into account as a serious institution that could have brokered conflict resolution. The events to formulation execution of settlement between city-states may unfold role function of certain individuals dynamics of period on basis of creating stability through balance of power. In 404 BC, Anians accepted ir defeat. Anians could not postpone peace negotiations since pressure of hunger became intolerable. But, who was responsible for conflict resolution? Delphi? Not at all. Theramenes, as an Anian general, was held responsible by Anians for negotiations conflict resolution. Delphi is not mentioned of as an arbitrator between Ans Sparta her allies. Theramenes proposed to seek out Lyser, leader of Sparta; because 63 Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harward University Press, 2003), Xenophon, Hellenica, Translated by Carleton L. Browson, Harward University Press, Ibid., The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005), p The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005), p Volume:3, No:1, Winter

37 Sparta her allies meant to destroy Ans its people. Anians voted him full powers to negotiate peace. Theramenes found Lyser at Samos stayed with him re for three months. 68 He made significant progress in long discussion with Lyser, had been in a position to achieve a more satisfactory peace. The Spartans agreed to a settlement that left Ans intact its people alive free. Anians was given an opportunity to remain autonomous. The reason for long discussion with Lyser was that Spartans tried to counter argument of Corinthians Thebans. Because, Spartan allies proposed that city be levelled countryside left a posture for sheep. 69 Their purpose was to become a hegemonic power in slavery, accordingly y wanted to enslave Anian people. However, Sparta in considering expansion of both Corinthians Thebes felt threatened in future, decided to form a balance between Ans her allies mainly Corinth Thebe 70. The existence of Sparta was made dependent on balance between se city-states as it was so just before outbreak of Peloponnesian wars. The conflict resolution, negotiation between Ans Sparta with her allies took hold due to basic concerns of Sparta s historical structure rar than intervention of Delphi according to some ethical values concerns. Meanwhile, efforts of Sparta to counterbalance her close alliances with restoration of Ans also would st to overlap with interests of Persian Empire. Persians did not let Spartans crush utterly Ans. Ans was left free to get on with reestablishment of her power. Anians revived financial institutions of Fifth century Empire Persia had been faced with return of Anian power 71. In that respect Persians accepted Spartan s offer, Persians made Sparta counterbalance Ans. After final defeat of Anians in 404 BC, Spartans decided to extend ir power to city- states of Asia which were under control of Persians 72. Maintaining control over politics of cities of mainl Greece seeking to liberate cities of Asia from Persians control were inconsistent too much for Sparta to manage. The Spartan army had been obliged to abon Asiatic cities. The naval victory of Persian fleet in 394 BC set seal on it all. 68 Kagan Donald, The Peloponessian War, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005), p Plutarch, Lyser, Kagan Donald, The Peloponessian War, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005), p The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005), Ibid., p Ibid., p Volume:3, No:1, Winter

38 There would be no question of negotiations between Sparta Persia. The Persians would arrange things entirely to ir own satisfactions. They aboned claim to cities of Asia y accepted that all isls rest of cities of Greece should be autonomous 73. In 386 BC Persians peace settled business. The Persian peace kept Greeks out of Asia autonomous city-states until king of Macedon took charge of Greece The misperceived Function of Delphi by Constructivism in Peloponnesian Wars Delphi used to tend to think of conflicts in terms of an aggressor a victim. The aggressor was party who would set conflict motion. They tended to think that aggressor had a certain objective to be reached victim s objective was to resist aggressor. 75 This was simplistic view of a conflict. The aggressor was in wrong must have been resisted. It may have been that aggressor s objective would offer special benefits to him; maybe that objective might not disadvantage victim 76. They failed to look beyond first stated objectives; y were unable to look beyond simple label of aggressor victim. In spite of a qualitative change in function of Delphi from impartiality to partiality due to distribution of power among city states shaped by slavery, constructivists, regardless of historical differentiation, consider that as ir principle institutional practice, city-states are considered to have adopted arbitration for which Delphi is imagined as a main organization. Constructivists go furr by claiming that only ancient city-states embraced decision of a third party with more commitment consistency in history. The prevailing conception of moral purpose of state, argues Christian Reus-Smit, which defined legitimate statehood in ancient Greece, entailed a distinctive understing of procedural justice, an understing embodied in practice of interstate arbitration. 77 In order to verify, acknowledge prove his proposition he insists that Aristotle was a self-empiricist. 78 All his propositions have been depended on wher Aristotle 79 was a self-empiricist. 73 Xenophon, Hellenica, Translated by Carleton L. Browson, Harward University Press, The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia, George Cawkwell, (Oxford University Press, 2005), p Please see: Aeger, S. L. Interstate Arbitration in Greek World, (Berkeley, 1996) 76 Please See: Ibid. 77 Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of The State, (Princeton University Press, 1999), p Ibid., p Aristotle was born in 384 BC in Stagirus, a seaport on coast of Thrase died in 322 BC. Aristotle joined Anian Academy to study under Plato, attended Plato s lectures for twenty years. Plato.orized that ultimate reality is 38 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

39 That said, he finds it very easy ethically to reduce Aristotle s ethical political writings to reflection of essence of social political world in which Peloponnesian wars took place. For instance, when Aristotle says proper function of man consists in an activity of soul in conformity with a rational principle 80, political implication of that statement is directly linked to that of ancient Greek people. It is not considered that it was a generalization of proper function of man in accordance with Aristotle s doctrine, but actualized proper function of Greek people. And Aristotle s rational principle concerning with expression of reason as perception of good evil, just unjust is again linked by Constructivists to articulation of moral claims of ancient Greek people. He argues that moral purpose of ancient Greek city-states thus lay in cultivation of bios politikos, a form of communal life characterized by rational pursuit of justice through action speech The Role of Friendship Instead of Delphi for Conflict Resolution With contribution of three cases, space of questioning is extended to moral purpose of city-states. Before outbreak of second Peloponnesian war, in 446 BC Euboeans Peloponnesian states concerted an uprising against Ans while Attica was sieged by Spartan army. Pericles 82 decided to avoid an engagement with Spartan army commed by Pleistoanax; instead he sought to resolve it through negotiation. Pericles took note of fact that Pleistoanax was a very young man that among his advisers he relied mainly on Cleridas, whom ephors had sent out with him on account of king s youth to act as his tutor adviser. Pericles opened secret negotiations with Cleridas soon succeeded in corrupting him with bribes prevailing on him to withdraw Peloponnesian army from Attica. 83 In here Pericles openly violates so-called rational principles, ending conflict by means of bribery without interference of any Oracle issued at Delphi, or a third party arbitration. only knowable through reason reflection, he located it in ideas or eternal forms. Aristotle differed from his teacher, orizing that ultimate reality is knowable through experience, residing in physical objects, his writings were often based on first-h observation as well as on his doctrine. For furr information, please see: Richard Sorabji, ed. Aristotle Transformed (London, 1990) 80 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book I.8, Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of The State, (Princeton University Press, 1999), p Pericles ( BC) was one of most influential statesman general of Anian army during so called Golden Age of Anian city-state. Pericles converted Delian League into an influential powerful Anian city state, led his countrymen during first two years of Peloponnesian War until he died of plague. The period from 461 to 429 BC is known as Age of Pericles. For furr information, please see: Aird, Hamish (2004). Pericles: The Rise Fall of Anian Democracy. The Rosen Publishing Group. 30 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

40 In anor example, in 457 B.C when Anians under rule of Pericles was about to be defeated by Spartans who invaded district of Tanagra, Cimon, who was overthrown from power of Ana, ostracized sent to exile by Pericles had been brought back after Pericles proposed decree to recall him. Thereupon, Cimon returned from exile negotiated a peace between two cities, for Spartans were as well disposed towards him as y were hostile to Pericles. 84 As a former leader of Aristocrat party in Ans advocating an alliance with Sparta, Cimon brokered a peace deal with ir enemy. Again we could not see influence of Delphi or any kind of a third party except contribution of a friendship close connection between Cimon as an Anian Spartan king to a peaceful settlement. That is, peace between city-states is usually brokered by certain individuals rar than by Delphi. Furrmore, Delphi was held in check by bribery that Spartans had bribed priestess at Delphi constantly to answer Lacedaemonians 85, whenever y came to consult oracle. 86 As concerns arbitration, role of Delphi appears to have highlighted need for justification of aggression offensive much more effective than need for mediation arbitration. Delphi was never designed for task of arbitration; but she was called upon to perform that task because re was no or way of justifying decision on war 87. It may have been that structure might have been adequate at one time during proslavery period, but changes in structure relations of city states appeared to make Delphi inadequate. The nature of task had profoundly changed. Conflict resolution during slavery period had been very different from what it used to be for proslavery period. 7.1 Misjudgment of Morality of City-states by Constructivism Christian Reus-Smit also refuses to accept that so-called institution was arranged as an instrument of power conflicts. In that sense he insists that institution does not appear to have been reduced simply to an instrument of imperial power. The practice undoubtedly contributed to internal stability of imperial leagues, thus serving hegemonic interests. Hegemony seldom acted as 83 Plutarch, The Rise Fall of Ans, (Penguin Books, 1964), p Ibid., p In classical period, sourn Peloponnese under Spartan control was commonly called Laceonian (l). The territory was also referred to as Lacedaemonians Nigel M. Kennel, Spartans, (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), p.4 86 Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, Books V-VI, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harward University Press, 2003), p Please see: Aeger, S. L. Interstate Arbitration in Greek World, (Berkeley, 1996) 40 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

41 arbitrators, though, re is little evidence to suggest that decision were consistently slanted in ir favor. If y had been, willingness of or states to submit to arbitration would surely have vanned, leading to institution s steady erosion, which did not occur 88 Again we observe anor false generalization. For hegemony frequently would act as arbitrators instead of allowing any third party like Delphi to resolve matters, numerous events of which are indicated in writings of Thucydides. Furr, we also see Delphi advising not only on peace settlement but on waging war as well 89. For instance, when Ana tried to dominate over or city-states by means of warships internal uprisings in 439 BC, Lacedaemonians decided to retaliate against Anian military power. Therefore, when Delphi was under influence of Sparta, The Lacedaemonians mselves, n, had decided that treaty had been broken that Anians were in wrong, sending to Delphi y asked god if it would be advisable for m to go to war. The god answered m, as it is said, that if y warred with all ir might, victory would be irs, said that he himself would help m, wher invoked or uninvoked. 90 As seen in Thucydides, Delphi seems to have promised that gods would come to aid of Lacedaemonians should y have gone to war against Anians. The Spartans consulted oracle of Apollo at Delphi 91. What seems so important is an explanation that Apollo offered to assist Spartans her allies in war 92. Delphi had taken side of Sparta its allies. In 430 BC, plague broke out in Ans. Thucydides claims that events were in accord with it 93. It is said that ancient people believed that re was a connection between plague Delphic Apollo s explicit promise of support to Sparta. 94 In opinion of people of Sparta her allies, Apollo had punished Anians since y were in wrong side. Apollo had been assisting Peloponnesian League against Anians her allies; Delphi simply had decided to back lead m. Delphi was believed to motivate opposing city states against cruelty of Anians. Any neutral arbitration role of Delphi was ruled out by declaration above. Delphi harnesses values of traditionally accepted religion to persuade Spartans to go to war against 88 Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of The State, (Princeton University Press, 1999), p Please see: Hackett, Sir John, gen. ed. Warfare in Ancient World. New York: Sidgwick & Jackson, Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harward University Press, 2003), p Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harward University Press, 2003), Ibid., Ibid., Please see: Palagia, Olga, Editor, Art in Ans During Peloponessian War, (Cambridge University Press) 32 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

42 Anians. In addition, in that statement were provocations that were not meant as truth. It also exposes ir traditional pattern in a way that self-righteous attitude of Delphi had to justify whatever y regard as truths in ir pattern of perceptions 95. That kind of expression may be extended to point at which Delphi could be discarded as an arbitrator for conflict resolution. What it means for constructivist is institution s steady erosion which is regarded as an unacceptable episode for him. He wants to show how relationships between city-states should be instead of trying to demonstrate how Greek city-states were. And should be disguised by saying This is how relationships between ancient city-states really are; here is ir basic nature; this is what it is to be inter-state relations. What does not fit in becomes entirely excluded. It is almost impossible to consider Apollo Temple in Delphi Peace loving under certain conditions in which supported party by Delphi sees solution in resorting to violence. So much was fact. One last detail of story Thucydides tells us may solidify meaning function of Delphi among cities. In around 422 B.C when Ans was defeated by Spartans, y had been enforced to accept articles mainly concerning Delphi. The contents of article reveal that Ans had been killing Spartans who were in fear trying to consult Delphi; that temple of Apollo at Delphi lost its independence, was being run conducted by Ans; that Ans abolished ir court of justice; that system of taxation belonging to Delphi had been constantly submitted to Ans Close Relations between Justification of War Delphi What was function role of Delphi? Was it serving a right cause on basis of brokering peaceful resolutions? Its role functions could be made much clearer provided focus was placed upon rejection of binding arbitration or binding agreements. Attempts to avoid war were frequently linked with efforts to ensure justice of one s cause thus to secure support of gods if war proved inevitable 97. In Peloponnesian war, Anians her allies believed that y had justice gods on ir side because y had offered arbitration Sparta her allies refused it 98. In contrary to Anians her allies belief, Spartans her allies could maintain that y had justice 95 Please see: Aeger, S. L. Interstate Arbitration in Greek World, (Berkeley, 1996) 96 Ibid., Books V-VI, P Please see: Hackett, Sir John, gen. ed. Warfare in Ancient World. New York: Sidgwick & Jackson, Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harvard University Press, 2003), , Volume:3, No:1, Winter

43 gods on ir side; because y considered that Ans had been first to break peace treaty 99. What y most sought in any war was a justification which needed rectifying by Delphi or by similar religious institutions. The function role of Delphi had been confined to a requirement that would meet justification of war decision action. Reus Smith, who believes Delphi to be a negotiator arbitrator, neglects even to mention Anian consultation of major oracular shrines at Dudona, Siwah before Sicilian expedition. 100 Delphi was not mere religious institution that would monopolize justification of course of war in accordance with interest of powers that predominates temple of Apollo in Delphi, Or places such as Dudona Siwah should have been taken into account as alternatives to Delphi. 101 The functions role of those places were same as Delphi. Whilst Delphi was under control of Spartans her allies, Dudona Siwah stood to serve need for Anians her allies in justifying ir disposition in war. But, those interstate religious institutions would be recorded to play a role as neir arbitrators nor negotiators on behalf of parties involved in war. 8.2 Delphi Or Oracle Centers Ancient people believed plague to be imposed upon Anians due to an oracle by Apollo, because Anians were considered unjust sinful. 102 If Apollo was assisting Spartans, what could be done to counter this event? In 430 BC, Anian naval expedition decides to capture Epidaurus in order to seize control of sanctuary of healing god Asclepius. The Anians imported Asclepius cult from Epidaurus to Ans in 420 BC 103. To counter situation indicated by Delphi Ans set up anor temple to creating oracle beneficial to Anians. Delphic Apollo may have stated that he would assist Spartans her allies at outset of war. But Anians would seek to win Apollo s support in appeasing Delian Apollo. The need to turn to Delian Apollo was most important explanation for decision in 426/25 BC to purify sacred isl of Delos (Apollo s birthplace). The primary Anian motive for purification was to win good will of Apollo. 104 It seems that Anian motive was rar religious than politics. Because, re had been a second outbreak of 99 Ibid., , Please see: Palagia, Olga, Editor, Art in Ans During Peloponessian War, (Cambridge University Press) 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid. 34 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

44 plague in BC which had lasted almost a year 105. In 422 BC Anians expelled living Delians as well. Diodorus adds a political explanation 106. Anians accuses Delians of secret treaty negotiations with Spartans. Religious political motives were consistent, y reinforce each or 107. On eve of Sicilian expedition Anians consulted three of most authoritative oracles: The oracle of Zeus at Siwah in Libya 108, oracle of Apollo at Delphi 109, oracle of Zeus at Dodona in Epirus 110. The Anian leader general Cimon consulted Zeus in 451 BC 111, Dodona served as a suitable alternative to Delphi. There was nothing wrong in consulting those oracles including Delphi. They used to consult more than one oracle on same issue. Hence, Delphi was not in a position to play an important part in conflict resolution at all. The temple in Delphi had grave disadvantages when it came to conflict resolution. Its idiom was very simple: What its party (sometimes Sparta, sometimes Ana) supported was automatically right. What or part supported was automatically wrong nonsense 112. Matter could not be decided on ir merits because city loyalty its power must have come first. Therefore prevailing thinking idiom was inadequate dangerous argument mode. Instead of constructive mediation arbitration role re was attack defence parading of righteousness. It follows that performance was not directed to resolving conflicts at all but to making an impression on condemned city states. Such practices explicitly demonstrate that Delphi had been transformed into a conflict performance arena. In opposing oracles in Delphi, Anians basically had attempted to revive oldest oracle centers in order to meet need for justification of ir position in war. The oracle of Zeus at Siwah in Libya, oracle of Zeus at Dodona in Epirus had been reconstructed under conditions of Peloponnesian wars. Anian her ally s leaderships had been able now to tell ir own people that gods/goddesses were backing m against Sparta her allies that y were not alone in ir struggle that ir cause was fair, just truthful. 105 Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harward University Press, 2003), Diodorus Siculus, translated by C. H. Oldfar, The Library of History, (Harvard University Press, 1967), Ibid Plutarch (1960). The Rise Fall of Ans: Nine Greek Lives. Ian Scott-Kilvert, trans. Baltimore: Penguin 109 Ibid. 110 Please see: Palagia, Olga, Editor, Art in Ans During Peloponessian War, (Cambridge University Press 111 Plutarch (1960). The Rise Fall of Ans: Nine Greek Lives. Ian Scott-Kilvert, trans. Baltimore: Penguin Bo 112 Please see: Aeger, S. L. Interstate Arbitration in Greek World, (Berkeley, 1996) 44 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

45 8.3 Justice Moral Purpose of City-states Was so-called rational pursuit of justice related to moral purpose of ancient Greek citystates? Concept of justice has a specific historical content depending on economic formation, on economic social structures, on particular phase of cultural development. Outside of se concrete historical definitions, this category is devoid of content formal. What does justice of ancient people have in common with modern international law? What is re in common between justice of ancient city-states justice of international law preached by United Nations? What about economic motives in which calculation of interest had been mixed with consideration of injustice? Did Greek city-states act in way of considering rational principle formulated by Aristotle when y were at war against each or? Was re really a distinctive understing of procedural justice shared by m in negotiations? Reus considers Greek city-states on basis of moral purpose by relying on Aristotle s writings, contemplates a form of communal life that envelopes city-states, thus rationalizes it through so-called rational pursuit of justice. His suggestion lacks any sort of criteria or rational basis. For Aristotle seems to refute Reus without great efforts by articulating most of ancient people, citizens of city-states, as loyal to despotic rulers. In ancient period, Most people s seem to think that despotic rule is statesmanship, are not ashamed to practice towards ors treatment which y declare to be unjust detrimental for mselves; for in ir own internal affairs y dem just government, yet in ir relations with or peoples y pay no attention to justice. 113 says Aristotle. In practice one may see implementation of Aristotle s statement in policy of Sparta. Plutarch indicates that it is characteristic of Spartans to give priority to ir country s interests; justice, as y see it underst it, is only whatever y believe will advance Sparta 114 As seen in Aristotle s statement, re was no rational pursuit of justice among citystates. 9.1 Aristotle s Definition Constructivism In Aristotle s definition, we cannot see any kind of moral purpose of any city-state in connection to one anor. On contrary, in order for a state to experience a peaceful environment, Aristotle recommends a single state in isolation alternative to existing ones. As for individual happiness, for happiness of state in relation to her neighbors Aristotle suggests self-sufficiency: 113 Aristotle, Politics, translated by H. Rackham, (Harvard University Press, 1998), p Plutarch, On Sparta, translated by Richard J. A. Talbert, (Penguin Books, 1988), p Volume:3, No:1, Winter

46 Moreover it is possible even for a single state in isolation to be happy, that is one that is well governed, in as much as it is conceivable that a state might be carried on somewhere in isolation, enjoying good laws, in such a state system of constitution will not be framed for purpose of war or of overpowering its enemies. 115 It is outside scope of this study to discuss wher self-sufficiency or dependency or both is a necessary condition for self-determining, however it may be plainly seen that Aristotle s idealization of a state in peace had never existed into practice, but only an idealized concept for Aristotle s doctrine to provide a valid concrete reference system for constitution of a state by making generalization of practical internal external conditions of n ancient societies. In anor word, peace was merely possible between states provided y would have been isolated from each or. That is, coexistence of m for Aristotle was very manifestation of possible war. Like a classical moralist, Aristotle did not seem aware that he was living in antiquity; but, constructivists miss his moral values, underplaying his data, overrating his doctrine as evidence of empirical facts. Aristotle s definition of a city-state considered in a peaceful environment exposes a cruel fact that state of city states in relation to each or was constantly state of war so long as city states would coexist toger. That kind of specific historical reality sts against claims by Constructivists. 9.2 Aristotle s Morality That of Ancient People Could one convincingly refer to point that ancient people aimed at looking good to m? The relationships between m gods may be referred to as functional. It means re may have been no love in affection as long as love itself is characterized in terms of utility. In order to make it clear one may need to turn to Aristotle s reasoning. As Aristotle argues friendships, he considers concern regarding state of utility: Hence in a friendship based on utility or on pleasure men love ir friend for ir own good or ir own pleasure, not as being person loved, but as useful or agreeable. And refore se friendships are based on accident, since friend is not loved for what he is, but as affording some benefit or pleasure as case may be. 116 By accident, Aristotle means that utility is not a permanent quality; it differs at different times. 117 Such a description may be applied to relationship between ancient people ir gods goddesses. When particular conditions of loyalty to gods have passed away, relation is 115 Ibid., p Aristotle, Nichomeian Ethics, p Ibid., p Volume:3, No:1, Winter

47 dissolved, having existed merely as a means to that end. 118 The loyalty of ancient people to any particular god or goddess is easily broken off, shifting from one god/goddess to or depending on need expectation of/from particular event. The functionality of m has nothing to do with any kind of morality. In that respect, morality imposed upon ancient people remains merely a projection with which constructivists identify mselves. However, in harsh brute reality of antiquity one may witness something different in contrast to what is expected of. Briefly, systematic approach of Aristotle brings him inevitably face to face with many maverick problems similar to problem like wher a state in isolation for happiness of her citizens for sake of avoiding war was possible. Aristotle spends a long time thrashing out paradoxes. Despite difficulties of resolving paradoxes, Aristotle sticks to a belief system by which he manages to touch on a dimension of science which differentiates from reflection of mind of ancient people. But, poverty of constructivists needs to interpret Aristotle s belief system as empirical work. Unfortunately, Constructivists may not notice that moralism of Constructivism plagues sociology history, which tends to be both normative descriptive since Constructivists have carried metaphor of institution of international law back in history to Thucydides Oracles of Apollo temple at Delphi. In brief, moralist Aristotle had explained what a moral state had to do. But, Anians, Spartans, rest of Greek world had not done it by not acting throughout ir social political lives according to strictest ideals of Aristotle s virtue. Aristotle s ethics, as a whole, consisted partly of observation partly of doctrine. He appears to have used his observations to bring fact in to feed his ruminations about moral values. So it may be stated that brute facts of ancient city-states are frequently deliberately bypassed among constructivists as well to ignore certain questions. But, ir explanations do not remove brute fact that cultural, politics, economics religious issues 119 of ancient slave societies were not that of modern world. 9.3 The Question of Morality in Slavery Societies In ineffective disqualified institution of Delphi, What kind of morality, on which arbitration was supposed to be based, does Christian Reus mention of in regard to Oracle of Apollo? 118 Please see: Chaniotis, Angelos, Ancient World At War, (Blackwell Publishing, 2005) 119 For furr information of devision of labour please see Piero Sraffa, Editor, The Works Correspondence of David Ricardo, Cambridge University Press, Volume:3, No:1, Winter

48 Was it a morality of Hermes where cheating belongs, of Ares where raging destruction belongs, of Dionysus where victimization belongs? 120 The necessity that shapes norm of gods gives a necessity to each of ir imaginable positions prevents any single one from overstepping limits conditioned by slave labor system presented by images mselves. The function role of Delphi is unfortunately assumed to have carried out certain tasks towards peace conflict resolution although in practice principles of Delphic perspective could not be expected to have gone beyond myth itself were not general rule for all conduct conflict between city-states 121. There was no place oracles at Delphi could have stood beyond reach of myths which involved m in ir positions according to interests of dominant city. By considering morals as claims of imaginal arbitration, morality itself becomes imaginable. In daily life of antiquity, morality had been rooted in gods/goddesses images gods/goddesses images were moral powers. These images reminded m that y were not alone in ir brutal experience of life; in ir choices decisions y were reflecting mythic stances of gods/ goddesses. But moralities were not designated to implement justice; because y were not willing to apply justice. Displays of indifference to justice were a means of self-preservation for Anians for rest of city-states, who found mselves without prospects exposed constantly to brutal forces of so-called fate. The consciousness of Anians had been consumed by regarding superior mselves to ors. It was a needed preconception in justifying slavery as a defence mechanism. Meanwhile, that form of defence mechanism had generated reproduced its own moral values through power politics which were justified reflected in moral values mselves. The archetypal viewpoint of mythological stance of gods/goddesses was supposed to have attempted to shift focus of Greeks from question of good evil toger 122. Subsequently one may easily claim that Greeks had not looked to myths morally, but looked at moralities mythically. For more effectively justice is hidden in society, more zealously it is sought in divine good 123. What it may mean is that for any action y were not concerned with morality, but with interpretation of event in regard to respective gods/goddesses according to ir desire conditions, etc. Mythical understing conjures forces that are not personal, not rational, perhaps not altoger human. Such an understing thus becomes crucial since myths 120 Please see Homer, The Iliad, The Odyssey, translated by Robert Fitzgerald, (Oxford University Press, 1984) 121 Please see: Aeger, S. L. Interstate Arbitration in Greek World, (Berkeley, 1996) 122 Please see: Nigel, M. Kennel, Spartans, (Wiley- Blackwell, Ibid. 48 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

49 set unruly imagination on course; that is, y were rapeutic. And why? Because y were thought to have spoken truth as long as justification was at stake Conclusion The Constructivism may be really complacent about Delphi s existing structure; because y believe Delphi to be an excellent institution. However, Delphi in reality had not been designed for conflict resolution. The Delphi was not capable of carrying out functions attributed to it by Constructivism. The group of city states had organized into a structure that seems to have directed activities of city states in a very devastating destructive way in which design of Delphi was conceptualized towards making contributions to ends of war. In such a vital period conflict resolution had never been in sight. In addition, political authority religious institutions were inseparable in city-states life. 124 The ancient population of city-states would regard religious motives as mere pretext for pragmatic political actions. The potential manipulators would harness gods as powerful tools. Both Spartans Anians including rest of city-states employed religion as a political weapon. They also believed gods mselves were taking an active role in war that support of gods could be eir won or lost by human actions. The increasing complexity of slavery world inevitably invalidated Delphi, forcing it to misperceive misjudge events. Delphi lacks key qualities as an arbitrator; because as a third party Delphi appears to look at situation from eir party or than from third party angle. That is, Delphi as a third party with no impartiality was like judge or negotiator. It was not a body on basis of being a creative impartial designer that could have been expected to be approaching things independently of judge partial negotiator. Delphi did not have structures necessary for resolution of conflicts. The Structures of Delphi had been designed for proslavery period. It had been inadequate, incompetence ill will for existing slavery city states. It is revealed that Delphi organization could not perform third party role in design of conflicts. Its historical nature rules that role out due to historically different periods. Briefly Delphi 124 Please see Palagia, Olga, Edt., Art in Ans During Peloponessian War, Cambridge University Press 40 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

50 did not appear to have provided a structure to carry out a reasonable approach to conflict resolution. It shows a remarkable lack of vision outdated capacity. What is more dangerous is belief on part of Delphi that an inadequate structure is thought to be adequate. That belief completely blocks search for a better understing of Antiquity. When Reus Smith seems to be no longer able to deny existence of fragmentary autonomous systems no longer able to deal with actual contemporary international relations, n re arises fantasy of returning to Greek city states system. For return to Greek city states system offers a way of coping when main institutions of international system cannot hold things fall apart. A return to Greek city states has been an ideological response to challenge of breakdown; it offers a model of disintegrated integration. Briefly, ancient world was a world plagued by constant war without presence of independent reliable third parties as arbitrators. The analysis of some certain events demonstrates that Delphi s city states methods of solving major disputes conflicts had been crude primitive, inadequate destructive. Instead of resolving conflicts in a constructive manner; attempt efforts in general led to a furr chaos messy events. REFERENCES 1. Aeger, S. L. Interstate Arbitration in Greek World, (Berkeley, 1996); 2. Alexer Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 3. Aird, Hamish (2004). Pericles: The Rise Fall of Anian Democracy, (The Rosen Publishing Group, 2004); 4. Aristotle, Politics, translated by H. Rackham, (Harvard University Press, 1998); 5. Bercovitch, Jacob Jackson, Richard, Conflict Resolution in Twenty-first Century: Principles, Methods, Approaches, (University of Michigan Press, 2009); 6. Cartledge Paul, Sparta Lakonia: A Regional History 1300 to 362 BC (2 ed.), 7. (Oxford: Routledge, 2002); 8. Cawkwell, George, The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia, (Oxford University Press, 2005); 9. Chaniotis, Angelos, Ancient World at War, (Blackwell Publishing, 2005); 10. Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of The State, (Princeton University Press, 1999); 50 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

51 11. Diodorus Siculus, translated by C. H. Oldfar, The Library of History, (Harvard University Press, 1967) 12. Green, Peter, The Greco-Persian Wars. (University of California Press, 1996) 13. Hackett, Sir John, gen. ed. Warfare in Ancient World. (New York: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1989); 14. Heredotus, The History, translated by David Grene, (Colombia University Press, 1988); 15. Homer, The Iliad, The Odyssey, translated by Robert Fitzgerald, (Oxford University Press, 1984); 16. Hornblower, S. The Oxford Classical Dictionary. OUP, (Oxford, 2012); 17. Grant, Michael, The Classical Greeks, (Phoenix Press, 1988), 18. Kagan Donald, On Origins of War Preservation of Peace, (New York, 1995); 19. Kagan, Donald, The Peloponnesian War, (HarperCollins Publisher, 2005); 20. Kagan, Donald, The Outbreak of Peloponnesian War (Cornell University Press, 1969); 21. M. Kennel, Nigel, Spartans, (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); 22. Meier, Christian, The Greek Discovery of Politics, (Cambridge, 1990); 23. Meier Christian., Ans: a portrait of city in its Golden Age, translated by R. R. Kimber (New York, 1998); 24. Palagia, Olga, Editor, Art in Ans During Peloponessian War, (Cambridge University Press); 25. Plutarch (1960). The Rise Fall of Ans: Nine Greek Lives. Ian Scott-Kilvert, trans. Baltimore: Penguin; 26. Plutarch, On Sparta, translated by Richard J. A. Talbert, (Penguin Books, 1988); 27. Plutarch, Lives, Bernadotte Perrin, trans. (Harward University Press, 2006); 28. Sage, Michael M. Warfare in Ancient Greece: a Sourcebook. (London: Routledge, 1996); 29. Strauss, Leo, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, (The University of Chicago Press, 1963); 30. Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, Books 1-2, translated by C.F. Smith, (Harward University Press, 2003); 31. Toivo Koivukoski (eds.): Enduring Empire. Ancient Lessons for Global Politics. (London 2009); 32. Xenophon, Hellenica, Translated by Carleton L. Browson, (Harward University Press, 2003). 33. W. A Hurtley, H. C. Darby, A Short History of Greece, (Cambridge University Press), 42 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

52 READING RESOURCES Adcock, Sir Frank D. J. Mosley. Diplomacy in Ancient Greece. London: Thames Hudson, 1975; Cargill, J. The Second Anian League: Alliance or Empire? Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1981; Cartledge, Paul. Agesilaos Crisis of Sparta. London: Duckworth, Casson, Lionel. The Ancient Mariners. Sea Farers Sea Fighters of Ancient Times. 2nd Edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991; Ferrill, Arr. The Origins of War : from Stone Age to Alexer Great. New York: Thames Hudson, 1985; Karavites, Peter. Capitulations Greek Interstate Relations: The Reflection of Humanistic Ideals in Political Events. Hypomnemata, hft. 71. Goettingen: Venhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982; Thomsen, Rudi. Eisphora: A Study of Direct Taxation in Ancient Ans. Copenagen: Gyldendalske Boghel, 1964; Torr, Cecil. The Ancient Ships. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1897; reprint ed., Chicago: Argonaut, 1964; W. G. Forrest, A History of Sparta, (Paperbacks, 2002). 52 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

53 .QUANTUM JUMPS IN THE RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES. Prof.Dr.Hayrettin Kilic, Istanbul Aydin University Fossil Fuels Resources Are Finite, Renewable Energy Resources Last Indefinitely Introduction: As we enter new millennium, population explosion, increasing worldwide energy dems rapid climate change are now threatening our fragile environment as at no or time in known history. There is an urgent need for research education to focus on complex direct link between energy environment for continuing promotion of transference of renewable energy technology its infrastructure development from developed to developing countries. Within framework of this global view, energy environmental policy issues can no longer be viewed in isolation. National security, climate change energy economics are convergent rationales that provide a global platform for scientists politicians alike; scientific measured data on atmospheric changes reflects facts, but still open to interpretation from special interest groups. For millions of years, prior to industrial revolution, carbon dioxide concentration in our atmosphere was about parts per million (ppm), but in last 200 hundred years concentration has significantly increased to 380 ppm. According to United States Energy Information Administration (EIA); World energy-related annual carbon dioxide emissions rise from 30.2 billion metric tons in 2008 to 35.2 billion metric tons in billion metric tons in 2035, an increase of 43 percent over projection period. (U.S. EIA. (2010a) EIA-860.). In last hundred years, world population increased from 1.6 billion to 7.1 billion, consumption of commercial energy increased by more than 100 times levels in early 1900 s. If world economy exps to meet aspirations of countries around globe, dem for energy in this century is likely to increase substantially even if strenuous efforts are made to increase efficiency of fossil fuel utilization. According to global energy dem scenario, EIA. (2010a) adopted for this century, world marketed energy consumption [is expected to grow] by 53 percent from 2008 to 2035 global electricity production would double by year 2025 more than triple by If existing energy trends continue as predicted reserves could supply only petroleum needs for years, natural gas for years, coal for 200 years uranium for 40 years. By contrast, renewable energy resources, including biomass, hydro, geormal, solar, 44 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

54 wind, ocean rmal, wave tidal action, are naturally replenishing. They are virtually inexhaustible in duration, not susceptible to geo-political conflicts. Based on current financial, technological, political constraints, energy resource distribution diversification must be based on exploiting implementing existing energy sources with focus on renewable energy supporting infrastructure. Knowledge of how energy is used is essential in understing importance of improving energy efficiency alleviating wide range of energy related environmental problems. Industrialized nations have an important role to play in providing commercially viable alternative technologies, implanting new, sustainable, more efficient energy policies generating innovative financial mechanism to overcome inadequate, inefficient energy supplies widespread lack of efficient modern energy infrastructure. Energy is lost at every stage of production, distribution use. In general, two thirds of potential energy in fossil fuels is lost to incomplete inefficient energy extraction, largely wasted in rmal heat generation. New technologies, such as fuel cells or renewables aim to boost energy conversion to approximately 2/3 of total available energy. However, adapting newer technologies in general does not mean improving energy efficiency, proper energy management practices can minimize energy waste. Until recently, investment in energy efficiency was not a priority. Developing nations focused on increasing supply quickly not managing supplies to maximize service. The use of more efficient appliances processes could result in energy savings of as much as 50% over life time of equipment, according US Office of Technology Assessment; on supply side, a 50% increase in power plant efficiency decrease in transmission loss of about 6% is possible obtainable with current technologies know-how. With 20% increase in end use efficiency, se efforts could cut electricity generation needs by more than 40%, leading to tremendous capital investments savings dramatically reducing need to utilize dirty carbon heavy sources of energy, such as coal risky nuclear energy. Although, some of renewable energy resources,especially wind, solar, are subject to limited amount of energy per unit time, y are for most part immune to geopolitical uncertainties, it is difficult to block sun from a resource competitor or plug geormal resources stop/redirect wind running rivers. Of all renewable energy resources, solar is by far most abundant. At any given time, 162,000 terawatts of solar energy reaches earth; 1 hour of sunlight could oretically provide all of world population energy needs for 1 year. Wind power solar radiation has no national boundaries cannot be manipulated by radical regimes corporations, at least not for foreseeable future. During development of wind power technology, between Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015

55 capital cost of wind power dropped by a factor of about four, solar photovoltaic energy cost decreased by a factor of more than ten. The installed global renewable energy capacity has more than quadrupled between Every year an assessment or updated projections for international energy trends for first half of 21 st century is published by U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Although se projections do not incorporate geopolitical fluctuations regional armed conflicts that might affect energy markets, it provides most valuable data for past energy production-consumption as well as future projections to energy policy makers analysts, both in government in private sector. The Objective of this paper is to convey latest projections appearing in International Energy Outlook, DOE/EIA- IEO-2011 Reference case which are not predictions of what will happen, but what may happen given specific assumptions methodologies used for any particular scenario. The IEO 2011 Reference case projections or data presented in this article is based on business-as-usual trend scenarios, as well as known technological demographic world population trends. In order to place renewable energy in future spectrum of existing energy resources, it is imperative to point out latest IEO (2011) findings for global energy trends over first half of this century. The world marketed energy consumption [is expected to grow] by 53 percent from 2008 to Total world energy use [is expected to rise] from 505 quadrillion British rmal units (Btu) in 2008 to 619 quadrillion Btu in quadrillion Btu in Much of growth in energy consumption occurs in countries outside Organization for Economic Cooperation Development (non-oecd nations), where dem is driven by strong long-term economic growth. In reference case, energy use in non-oecd nations increases by 85 percent, as compared with an increase of 18 percent for OECD economies Due to rapid increase in energy consumption among developing world, it is clear that an effective, encouraging innovative financing tools need to be developed for renewable energy industry to invest in developing world. Renewable energy sources are proven to be more sustainable against to future energy volatility, which serve as an inspiration for investors. In fact, in last two decades, private investment in renewable energy grew rapidly in part to impressive new advances in renewable energy technologies, steady decrease in levelized cost (LCOE), shown in figure 1 below. 46 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

56 Figure 1 For instant, from 2004 to 2008, global private-sector investment in solar energy increased by more than a factor of 25. These investments set foundation for rapid expansion of industry in According to US-DOE SunShot initiative reports Compound Global Annual Growth rate (CAGR) for renewable energy source between for renewable energy is given in following table 1. (REN21 Renewables 2011 Global Status Report). Table 1: Renewable Energy CAGR Wind 27.1% Solar Photovoltaic 39.8% Concentrated Solar Power 10.3% Geormal 3.2% Biomass 5.3% Hydro 17.6 Renewable energy-generation is also inherently safer than fossil fuel, which minimize environmental risks liability for investors local communities. Previously projected LCOE global grow show that 16% 34% of PV wind market by 2012 is already accomplished. Total global renewable energy investment in 2005 of $2.5 billion marked a 256% increase over $702 million of investment in In 2008, global private-sector investment in solar energy 56 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

57 technology reached to $16 billion. In same time period, global average Photo-voltaic (PV) module prices dropped 23% from $4.75/W in 1998 to $3.65/W in (NREL (LCOE, is ratio of an electricity-generation systems amortized lifetime costs including installed cost plus lifetime Operation maintenance cost to system's lifetime electricity generation) Development: Overview of global renewable energy resources electric energy An important characteristic of renewable energy is that re is no point price of cost of fuel. A single price for renewable energy does not exist but rar a price of interval or range, depending on type of renewable resources. In past few decades, wind solar were considered intermittent electricity generating technologies useful only when resources are available. However, new-innovative energy storage methods such as pumped hydro, Figure 2 Figure 2 compressed air, advance batteries, rmal storage are being developed to store excess power reuse it. During down times in Europe more than 5 percent in Japan more than 10 percent of excess renewable energy is stored. In US about 20 gigawatts of energy is stored annually using pumped hydro technique. Although capital costs of solar power are higher than or energy resources, wind has lowest capital investment requirements. Government policies or 48 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

58 incentives often provide primary economic motivation for construction of renewable generation facilities. Over last 25 years cost of generating electricity from utility-scale wind systems has dropped by more than 80 percent. Figure 2 (DOE/EIA ) shows that, once wind or solar power plants are built ir operating costs generally are much lower than operating costs for fossil fuelfired power plants, most importantly y are almost free of market manipulations. In addition, many developed countries, particularly those in Europe USA, have government policies that include, feed-in tariffs (FITs), tax incentives, market share quotas, design to encourage construction of such renewable electricity facilities. Renewable energy is fastest-growing source of electricity generation, including hydropower, renewable energy accounts for 21% of all annual global electricity generation. Wind power capacity has developed very rapidly in recent years, on average approximately by 30% per year during last 10 years. Thus, at present, total wind power capacity is doubled every three years According to IEO 2011 Reference case, (table 2). Total generation from renewable resources increases by 3.1 percent annually, renewable share of world electricity generation is expected to grow from 19 percent in 2008 to 23 percent in 2035, if this trend continues into future, 4.6 trillion kilowatt hours of new renewable generation added over projection period. It is important to point out that IEO 2011 projections for renewable energy sources include only marketed renewables. Non-marketed (noncommercial) biomass from plant animal resources is not included in projections, off-grid renewables produced consumed at site, such as off-grid (PV) panels are not included. Table 2: Worldwide Renewable Electricity Generation as a Percent of Total Generation Renewab Year Hydro Solar PV Bio mass Wind Geo rmal All Renewab les Renewab le (excl. Hydro) le Generati on (excl. Hydro) Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015

59 (MM kwh) % 0.0% 1.2% 0.3% 0.3% 18.7% 1.9% 274, % 0.0% 1.3% 0.4% 0.3% 19.3% 2.1% 304, % 0.0% 1.2% 0.5% 0.3% 19.2% 2.1% 324, % 0.0% 1.2% 0.7% 0.3% 20.2% 2.2% 348, % 0.0% 1.1% 0.8% 0.3% 19.5% 2.2% 371, % 0.0% 1.2% 0.9% 0.3% 19.4% 2.5% 427, % 0.1% 1.2% 1.1% 0.3% 19.4% 2.7% 485, % 0.1% 1.3% 1.3% 0.3% 20.3% 2.9% 552, % 0.1% 1.3% 1.7% 0.3% 21.1% 3.4% 642, % 0.1% 1.3% 2.1% 0.3% 21.7% 3.9% 766, % 0.3% 1.4% 2.5% 0.3% 22.3% 4.6% 932,590 The production of power is single most important factor for calculating cost per generated unit of power. The cost of conventional electricity production is determined by three components, fuel cost, operating & maintenance costs Capital cost. However, due to steady decline of capital cost of global renewable electricity installations (excluding hydropower) renewable resources have more than quadrupled from (table.3). Including hydropower, renewable energy accounts for 21% of all global electricity generation; without hydropower, renewable energy accounts for 3.8% of global generation. In general, energy market projections are subject to much uncertainty. Many of events that shape fossil fuel energy markets are control by energy corporations cannot be anticipated. Although, renewable portfolio stards including official definition of feed in tariff applicable to renewable energy source may be different in different countries, wind solar energy are not subject to much uncertainty y are fastest growing renewable energy technologies worldwide. Wind produced electrical energy grew by a factor of 11 solar PV electrical generation grew by a factor of more than 28 between In 1980 s cost of wind power was 30 cents/kwh, currently in certain locations cost of wind electricity is about 5 cents/kwh. 50 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

60 Table 3: World Renewable Cumulative Electricity Capacity Percent Increase from Previous Year :( U.S Global Renewable Energy Development September 2011) Year Hydro Solar PV CSP Wind Geot herm al Biomass Renewable (excl. Hydro) All Renewa bles % 22% 0% 31% 0% 6% 11% 1% % 29% 0% 33% 0% 8% 15% 6% % 33% 0% 29% 2% 0% 11% 3% % 25% 0% 29% 9% -3% 11% 9% % 33% 0% 20% 0% 0% 10% 1% % 38% 0% 23% 4% 13% 18% 4% % 32% 0% 25% 3% 7% 17% 4% % 5% 5% 27% 0% 6% 17% 10% % 71% 14% 29% 4% 4% 22% 6% % 62% 22% 31% 7% 4% 25% 7% % 90% 83% 25% 3% 15% 27% 8% Most renewable energy growth in OECD countries comes from non-hydroelectric sources, especially wind, solar biomass. Global interest in advanced water power such as tidal, river ocean current, ocean wave energy is beginning to grow; with many prototype projects particularly proof-of-mechanism studies are in testing stages. Given historical current social-economic geopolitical realized scenarios, global fossil fuel prices will continue to increase over time. Generating electricity from fossil fuels has proven to be highly vulnerable to not only price changes but also political changes. For developing countries, we need to translate se global concerns into action, effective innovative financing needs to be developed for encouraging renewable energy industry to invest in developing countries. Hydroelectric: Strong growth in hydroelectric generation, primarily from mid- to large-scale power plants, is expected in China, India, Brazil, Turkey a number of nations in Souast Asia, including Malaysia Vietnam. In non-oecd countries, hydroelectric power is expected to be predominant source of renewable electricity growth, if trend that continues in this century, an 60 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

61 estimate of 4.6 trillion kilowatt hours of new renewable generation will be added over projection period, 2.5 trillion kilowatt hours (55 percent) of which will be produced by hydroelectric power Wind: Worldwide, wind energy is one of fastest growing renewable energy technologies, between , wind energy generation worldwide increased by a factor of 11. According to IEO 2011 figures, contribution of wind energy has grown constantly over past decade, from 18 giga watts of net installed capacity at end of 2000 to 121 giga watts at end of 2008, 1.3 trillion kilowatt hours electrical energy produce by wind power plants. As of 2010, countries with major wind energy installed capacity are indicated in table 4. USA MW Canada MW Denmark MW U.K MW France MW Spain Germany MW MW Italy MW India China MW MW Table 4: (Sources: GWEC Global Wind 2010 Report, REN21, GWEC, LBNL 59). Growth rates for wind-powered generation also are high in non-oecd countries. The most substantial additions to electricity supply generated from wind power are expected for China. In 2010, China surpassed United States as world leader in cumulative installed wind capacity, with more than 42 GW installed. 52 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

62 Solar: Solar power technologies were not historically cost-effective; y were considered a niche source of renewable energy. However, with advances in technology, solar power can be economical where electricity prices are especially high, where peak load pricing occurs, or where government incentives are available. In Europe, generous feed-in tariffs, which obligate retail utilities to purchase electricity from renewable producers, have been responsible for Solar Bubble driving down price of solar panels in Europe. Following table 5. Shows solar energy installed capacity of major industrial countries (2010). USA MW Czech Rep MW Italy MW Japan MW China 893 MW Germany MW France MW Spain MW Table 5: (Source: SEIA/GTM, GTM, EPIA). The global PV market has accelerated over past decade, with PV shipments averaging 53% annual growth reaching 17 gigawatts (GW) in 2010, bringing cumulative shipments to about 40 GW in The market share for crystalline-silicon PV was 95%, compared with 5% for thin-film PV. By end of 2010, thin-film technology accounted for 13% of global PV shipments (3% a-si, 8% CdTe, 2% CIGS). Figure 3 below shows that annual PV Cell/Module shipment (GW/Year), that China Taiwan are market leaders with nearly 60% of global PV cell production combined. Source; (DOE-SunShot Vision Study February 2012) 62 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

63 Figure 3: Annual PV Cell/Module Shipments (GW/Year) Concentrating Solar Power (CSP): Globally, most suitable sites for CSP plants are arid ls within 35 north south of equator. By December 2010, global CSP capacity increased to about 1,300 MW. Most of capacity additions during were in Spain, at end of 2010, Spain accounted for about 57% of all global CSP capacity. Parabolic trough technology accounted for about 96% of global CSP capacity at end of 2010; tower technology accounted for 3%. (NREL. (2011a). Concentrating Solar Power Plants by Country) Geormal: As a base-load source of energy, geormal is distinct from or renewables such as wind solar, because it can provide consistent electricity. Global Geormal Electricity Capacity is steadily increasing, as of 2009 following table 6 shows major geormal power plants that are in operation in all continentals. (IEO 2011) Table 6: Icel 575 MW U.S MW Japan 536 MW Italy 843 MW Mexico 958 MW Philippines MW Indonesia MW 54 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

64 Or Renewable Fuels: Ethanol, corn ethanol production continues to exp rapidly in Or Renewable Fuels: Ethanol, corn ethanol production continues to exp rapidly in United Or Renewable States. Between Fuels: Ethanol, 2000 corn 2010, ethanol production production increased continues nearly to exp 8 times. rapidly Ethanol in Or United Renewable States. Between Fuels: Ethanol, 2000 corn 2010, ethanol production production increased continues nearly to exp 8 times. rapidly Ethanol in production United States. grew Between nearly 19% 2000 in , to reach production 13,000 million increased gallons nearly per 8 year. times. Ethanol Ethanol has United production States. grew Between nearly 19% 2000 in , to reach production 13,000 million increased gallons nearly per 8 year. times. Ethanol Ethanol has steadily production increased grew nearly its percentage 19% in 2010 of to overall reach gasoline 13,000 million pool, gallons was 9.4% per year. in Ethanol In 2010, has production steadily increased grew nearly its percentage 19% in 2010 of to overall reach gasoline 13,000 million pool, gallons was 9.4% per year. in Ethanol In 2010, has steadily United increased States produced its percentage 56.5% of of overall world s gasoline ethanol, pool, followed was by 9.4% Brazil in at 30.1%, In 2010, steadily United increased States produced its percentage 56.5% of of overall world s gasoline ethanol, pool, followed was by 9.4% Brazil in at 30.1%, In 2010, European United Union States at produced 5.1%, China 56.5% at 2.4%, of world s ethanol, followed by Brazil at 30.1%, European United Union States at produced 5.1%, China 56.5% at 2.4%, of world s ethanol, followed by Brazil at 30.1%, European Union at 5.1%, China at 2.4%, European Union at 5.1%, China at 2.4%, Global Ethanol Production; Top three Countries (2010) Ethanol Production (millions of Global Ethanol Production; Top three Countries (2010) Ethanol Production (millions of Global gallons/year) Ethanol is Production; Canada: 357; Top EU: three 1,177; Countries United (2010) States: Ethanol 13,000; Production China: 54. (millions Biodiesel of Global gallons/year) Ethanol is Production; Canada: 357; Top EU: three 1,177; Countries United (2010) States: Ethanol 13,000; Production China: 54. (millions Biodiesel of gallons/year) production globally is Canada: grew 357; more EU: than 1,177; 14% in United 2010; States: Germany 13,000; leads China: world 54. in Biodiesel biodiesel gallons/year) production globally is Canada: grew 357; more EU: than 1,177; 14% in United 2010; States: Germany 13,000; leads China: world 54. in Biodiesel biodiesel production, globally followed grew by Brazil, more than Argentina 14% in 2010; France. Germany Biodiesel leads has world exped in biodiesel from a production, globally followed grew by Brazil, more than Argentina 14% in 2010; France. Germany Biodiesel leads has world exped in biodiesel from a production, relatively small followed production by Brazil, base in Argentina 2000, to a total France. U.S. production Biodiesel of has 315 exped million gallons from in a production, relatively small followed production by Brazil, base in Argentina 2000, to a total France. U.S. production Biodiesel of has 315 exped million gallons from in a relatively However, small production biodiesel is base still in a small 2000, percentage to a total U.S. of production alternative of fuel 315 pool million in gallons U.S., as in relatively However, small production biodiesel is base still in a small 2000, percentage to a total U.S. of production alternative of fuel 315 pool million in gallons U.S., as in over 40 However, times more biodiesel ethanol is was still produced a small percentage in Biodiesel of alternative production fuel in pool U.S. in in U.S., 2010 as is over 40 However, times more biodiesel ethanol is was still produced a small percentage in Biodiesel of alternative production fuel in pool U.S. in in U.S., 2010 as is over 63 times 40 times what more it was ethanol in was There produced are over in 1, stationary Biodiesel production fuel cell (hydrogen) in U.S. installations 2010 is over 63 times 40 times what more it was ethanol in was There produced are over in 1, stationary Biodiesel production fuel cell (hydrogen) in U.S. installations 2010 is 63 worldwide, times what 22 it of was which in are greater There are than over 1 MW 1,000 in stationary capacity. fuel (Renewable cell (hydrogen) Fuels installations Association 63 worldwide, times what 22 it of was which in are greater There are than over 1 MW 1,000 in stationary capacity. fuel (Renewable cell (hydrogen) Fuels installations Association worldwide, (RFA), Ethanol of which Industry are greater Outlook). than 1 MW in capacity. (Renewable Fuels Association worldwide, (RFA), Ethanol of which Industry are greater Outlook). than 1 MW in capacity. (Renewable Fuels Association (RFA), 2011 Ethanol Industry Outlook). (RFA), 2011 Ethanol Industry Outlook). Geo-political renewable energy trends Geo-political renewable energy trends Geo-political World net electricity renewable generation energy increases trends by 84 percent in IEO2011 Reference case, from Geo-political World net electricity renewable generation energy increases trends by 84 percent in IEO2011 Reference case, from 19.1 World trillion net electricity kilowatt generation hours in 2008 increases to 25.5 by trillion 84 percent kilowatt in hours IEO2011 in 2020 Reference 35.2 case, trillion from World 19.1 trillion net electricity kilowatt generation hours in 2008 increases to 25.5 by trillion 84 percent kilowatt in hours IEO2011 in 2020 Reference 35.2 case, trillion from kilowatt 19.1 trillion hours kilowatt in hours It is in clear 2008 that to electricity 25.5 trillion is kilowatt world s hours fastest-growing 2020 form 35.2 of trillion enduse kilowatt energy hours consumption, in It as is it clear has been that electricity for past is several world s decades. fastest-growing In Reference form case, of end- net 19.1 kilowatt trillion hours kilowatt in hours It is in clear 2008 that to electricity 25.5 trillion is kilowatt world s hours fastest-growing 2020 form 35.2 of trillion enduse energy hours consumption, in It as is it clear has been that electricity for past is several world s decades. fastest-growing In Reference form case, of end- net kilowatt electricity use energy generation consumption, worldwide as it has rises been by for 2.3 percent past several per year decades. on average In from Reference 2008 case, to 2035, net use electricity energy generation consumption, worldwide as it has rises been by for 2.3 percent past several per year decades. on average In from Reference 2008 case, to 2035, net while electricity total generation world energy worldwide dem rises grows by 2.3 by percent 1.6 percent year per on year. average The strongest from 2008 growth to 2035, in electricity while total generation world energy worldwide dem rises grows by 2.3 by percent 1.6 percent year per on year. average The strongest from 2008 growth to 2035, in electricity while total generation world energy is projected dem for grows non- OECD by 1.6 countries. percent per Non-OECD year. The electricity strongest generation growth in while electricity total generation world energy is projected dem for grows non- OECD by 1.6 countries. percent per Non-OECD year. The electricity strongest generation growth in increases electricity by generation an average is projected annual rate for of non- 3.3 percent OECD countries. in Reference Non-OECD case which electricity is almost generation twice electricity increases by generation an average is projected annual rate for of non- 3.3 percent OECD countries. in Reference Non-OECD case which electricity is almost generation twice increases increase by an rate average for OECD annual countries. rate of 3.3 However percent in most Reference of se case predictions which is are almost based twice on increases increase by an rate average for OECD annual countries. rate of 3.3 However percent in most Reference of se case predictions which is are almost based twice on business increase usual rate for OECD did not countries. include However externalities most of such se as; predictions water supply, are l based use, on business increase usual rate for OECD did not countries. include However externalities most of such se as; predictions water supply, are l based use, on wildlife, business as resource usual availability, did not include reliability, externalities rmal pollution, such as; water water pollution, supply, l nuclear use, business wildlife, as resource usual availability, did not include reliability, externalities rmal pollution, such as; water water pollution, supply, l nuclear use, proliferation, wildlife, resource geo-politic availability, fluctuations reliability,. rmal pollution, water pollution, nuclear wildlife, proliferation, resource geo-politic availability, fluctuations reliability,. rmal pollution, water pollution, nuclear proliferation, geo-politic fluctuations. proliferation, geo-politic fluctuations. North America; Canada has plentiful of renewable energy resources, generates North America; Canada has plentiful of renewable energy resources, generates North significant America; part of Canada its electricity has plentiful from hydropower of renewable dams, energy also resources, has fastest generates growing North significant America; part of Canada its electricity has plentiful from hydropower of renewable dams, energy also resources, has fastest generates growing significant part of its electricity from hydropower 55 dams, also has fastest growing significant part of its electricity from hydropower 55 dams, also has fastest growing 64 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

65 renewable energy companies. In United Sates, investment in renewable energy has grown renewable energy companies. In United Sates, investment in renewable energy has grown renewable dramatically energy in companies. past decade, In United in 2010 Sates, annual investment reached renewable more energy than $28 has billion. grown dramatically in past decade, in 2010 annual investment reached more than $28 billion. In dramatically 2010 in in United past decade, States, wind in 2010 solar annual photovoltaic investment (PV) reached were more two than of $28 billion. fastest In 2010 in United States, wind solar photovoltaic (PV) were two of fastest growing In 2010 generation in United technologies. States, wind In 2010, solar cumulative photovoltaic wind capacity (PV) were increased two of by 15% fastest growing generation technologies. In 2010, cumulative wind capacity increased by 15% cumulative growing generation solar PV technologies. capacity grew In 71% 2010, from cumulative previous wind capacity year. U.S. increased venture by capital 15% cumulative solar PV capacity grew 71% from previous year. U.S. venture capital private cumulative equity solar investment PV capacity in solar grew technology 71% from companies previous has year. increased U.S. from venture $40 capital million in private equity investment in solar technology companies has increased from $40 million in 2001 private to equity more than investment $1.7 billion in solar in technology companies has increased from $40 million in 2001 to more than $1.7 billion in to more than $1.7 billion in Europe: Renewable energy is OECD Europe s fastest-growing source of electricity Europe: Renewable energy is OECD Europe s fastest-growing source of electricity generation. Europe: Renewable As indicated energy in Reference is OECD case, Europe s renewable fastest-growing energy growth source is expected of electricity to be 2.5 generation. As indicated in Reference case, renewable energy growth is expected to be 2.5 percent generation. per As year indicated through in 2035; Reference where majority case, renewable of this growth energy is growth almost is entirely expected from to be wind 2.5 percent per year through 2035; where majority of this growth is almost entirely from wind percent solar. per OECD year through Europe s 2035; leading where position majority worldwide of this in growth wind power is almost capacity entirely is maintained from wind solar. OECD Europe s leading position worldwide in wind power capacity is maintained through solar. 2035, OECD with Europe s growth leading wind position generation worldwide averaging in 6.4 wind percent power per capacity year, for is maintained example, through 2035, with growth in wind generation averaging 6.4 percent per year, for example, a small through nation 2035, Denmark with growth has in one wind of generation world largest averaging wind 6.4 farms. percent Strong per year, growth for in example, offshore a small nation Denmark has one of world largest wind farms. Strong growth in offshore small wind capacity nation Denmark is underway, has one with of 883 megawatts world largest added wind to farms. grid in Strong 2010, growth representing offshore 51- wind capacity is underway, with 883 megawatts added to grid in 2010, representing a 51- wind percent capacity increase is over underway, amount with 883 of capacity megawatts added added in to grid Germany in 2010, is representing leader of Solar a 51- percent increase over amount of capacity added in Germany is leader of Solar percent photovoltaic increase accounting over amount 47 (1.328 of capacity MW) of added world in market Germany installation is in leader of Spain Solar photovoltaic accounting % 47 (1.328 MW) of world market installation in Spain photovoltaic Italy have accounting largest % installed 47 (1.328 PV MW) capacity of in Europe. world market (European installation Photovoltaic in Industry Spain Italy have largest installed PV capacity in Europe. (European Photovoltaic Industry Association Italy have (EPIA) largest Global installed Market PV Outlook capacity for in Photovoltaic Europe. (European until 2015,) Photovoltaic Industry Association (EPIA) Global Market Outlook for Photovoltaic until 2015,) Association (EPIA) Global Market Outlook for Photovoltaic until 2015,) Or Non-OECD Europe Eurasia: Although hydroelectric projects dominate Or Non-OECD Europe Eurasia: Although hydroelectric projects dominate Or renewable Non-OECD energy mix Europe in non-oecd Eurasia: Asia, Although generation hydroelectric from no hydroelectric projects dominate renewable renewable energy mix in non-oecd Asia, generation from no hydroelectric renewable renewable energy sources, energy especially mix in wind, non-oecd is expected Asia, to generation grow significantly. from no In hydroelectric IEO2011 renewable Reference energy sources, especially wind, is expected to grow significantly. In IEO2011 Reference energy case, electricity sources, especially generation wind, from is wind expected plants to in grow China significantly. is expected In to grow IEO2011 by 14.2 Reference percent case, electricity generation from wind plants in China is expected to grow by 14.2 percent case, per year, electricity from 12 generation billion kilowatt-hours from wind plants in 2008 in China to 447 is billion expected kilowatt-hours to grow by in percent In per year, from 12 billion kilowatt-hours in 2008 to 447 billion kilowatt-hours in In per addition, year, from government 12 billion policies kilowatt-hours in China in 2008 India to 447 are billion encouraging kilowatt-hours growth in of solar In addition, government policies in China India are encouraging growth of solar generation. addition, government Under its policies Golden in Sun China program, India Chinese are encouraging Ministry of Finance growth plans of solar to generation. Under its Golden Sun program, Chinese Ministry of Finance plans to generation. subsidize 50 Under percent its of Golden construction Sun program, costs for grid-connected Chinese Ministry solar plants. of Finance plans to subsidize 50 percent of construction costs for grid-connected solar plants. subsidize India s National 50 percent Solar of Mission, construction launched costs in for November grid-connected 2009, aims solar to plants. have 20 gig watts of India s National Solar Mission, launched in November 2009, aims to have 20 gig watts of India s installed National solar capacity Solar Mission, (both PV launched solar in rmal) November by 2020, 2009, 100 aims gig to watts have by , gig watts 200 of installed solar capacity (both PV solar rmal) by 2020, 100 gig watts by 2030, 200 installed gig watts solar by capacity Australia (both PV New solar Zeal, rmal) as by region, 2020, rely 100 on gig coal watts for by about 2030, 66 percent 200 gig watts by Australia New Zeal, as a region, rely on coal for about 66 percent gig of electricity watts by generation, Australia based largely New Zeal, on Australia s as a region, rich rely Renewable on coal for generation about 66 in percent nonof electricity generation, based largely on Australia s rich Renewable generation in nonof OECD electricity Europe generation, Eurasia, based almost largely entirely on Australia s from hydropower rich Renewable facilities, generation increases in by non- an OECD Europe Eurasia, almost entirely from hydropower facilities, increases by an OECD average Europe of 1.9 percent Eurasia, per year. almost entirely from hydropower facilities, increases by an average of 1.9 percent per year. average of 1.9 percent per year Volume:3, No:1, Winter

66 After Fukushima nuclear accident, 52 of 54 nuclear reactors in Japan are still shut down. Soon after accident, Prime Minister Naoto Kan stated that plan to increase nuclear power share of country s electricity supply, from about 26 percent at present to 50 percent by 2030, will have to be set aside. Instead, Japanese government plans to pursue anaggressive expansion of renewable energy capacity, especially solar power from which electricity generation increases by 11.5 percent per year from 2008 to 2035, making solar power Japan s fastest-growing source of renewable energy. Central South America: Electricity generation in Central South America is shown to increase by 2.4 percent per year in IEO2011 Reference case, from 1.0 trillion Kilowatthours in 2008 to 1.9 trillion kilowatt-hours in The electricity generation in Central South America is dominated by hydroelectric power, which accounted for nearly two-thirds of region s total net electricity generation in However, first steps of wind development are now taking place in Brazil. In fact, hydropower ProviIn, as of December 2009, held its first supply tender exclusively for wind farms. At event, 1.8 gig watts of capacity were purchased, for development by mid In IEO2011 Reference case, wind power generation in Brazil is expected to grow by 10.8 percent per year, from 530 million kilowatt-hours in 2008 to 8,508 million kilowatt-hours in Africa: Dem for electricity in Africa grows at an average annual rate of 3.0 percent in IEO2011 Reference case. Fossil-fuel-fired generation supplied 81 percent of region s total electricity in 2008, reliance on fossil fuels is expected to continue through Generation from hydropower or marketed renewable energy sources is expected to grow relatively slowly in Africa. The region s consumption of marketed renewable energy is expected to grow by 2.9 percent per year from 2008 to Discussion recommendations The last 100 years of international energy markets experience show that fossil fuel energy markets are complex, influenced by uneven distribution of global energy production consumption. In addition, national international regulations, limitations on producer consumer market behavior during times of global regional conflicts show that difficulties are political not necessarily technological. In light of latest geopolitical developments in Middle East North Africa, existing energy market projections are 66 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

67 subject to much more uncertainties than ever before. As a result, energy prices swings will not be in response to small changes in dem anymore, but many of future unforeseen geopolitical events that may shape fossil fuel energy markets that are rom cannot be anticipated Global logic dictates that energy diversification has to be based on exping existing energy sources with a special focus on exploiting renewable energy sources. Although countries haves different often conflicting goals interests in every step of energy policies production, y all converged on unquestionable fact that, in this century, difficulties involved with energy policies are driven by geo- political uncertainties. Therefore, generating electricity from fossil fuels nuclear energy is highly vulnerable to fuel cost which has been subject to political/external manipulations. To establish a fair comparison of different electricity production activities in this century, all internal external costs to society need to be taken into account as well. Hence, it is important to identify external effects of different energy systems to minimize ir social costs. Uncertainties relating to future fossil fuel prices imply a considerable risk for future generation costs of conventional power plants. The non-reversible environmental social costs of fossil fuel power nuclear energy systems make se technologies less competitive in comparison with renewable energy as externalities are included. In fact that, Prof. Mark Z. Jacobson at Department of Civil Environmental Engineering, Stanford University, California USA, conducted a most comprehensive research project in which 11 different externalities-categories considered in evaluating existing energy resources which are; The electric power sources considered here include solar photovoltaics (PV),Concentrated solar power (CSP), wind turbines, geormal power plants, hydroelectric power plants, wave devices, tidal turbines, nuclear power plants, coal power plants fitted with carbon capture storage (CCS) technology. The two liquid fuel options considered are corn-e85 (85% ethanol; 15% gasoline) cellulosic-e85. The major purpose of this research was to provide quantitative information to policy makers investors about most effective solutions to problems associated with climate change externalities so that better decisions about clean energy policies can be provided. This review evaluates ranks 12 combinations of electric power fuel sources from 58 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

68 among 9 electric power sources, 2 liquid fuel sources, 3 vehicle technologies, with respect to ir ability to address climate, air pollution, energy problems simultaneously. The review also evaluates impacts of each on water supply, l use, wildlife, resource availability, rmal pollution, water chemical pollution, nuclear proliferation, under nutrition. Wind-BEVs performed best in seven out of 11 categories, including mortality, climate-relevant emissions, footprint, water consumption, effects on wildlife, rmal pollution, water chemical pollution. Costs are not examined since policy decisions should be based on ability of a technology to address a problem rar than costs (e.g., U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 prohibit use of cost as a basis for determining regulations required to meet air pollution stards) because costs of new technologies will change over time, particularly as y are used on a large scale. Similarly, costs of existing fossil fuels are generally increasing, making it difficult to estimate competitiveness of new technologies in short or long term. The findings of this important research, ranked wind solar power as best energy sources in 21 st century, ranking is summarized as follows; In sum, use of wind, CSP, geormal, tidal, solar, wave, hydroelectric to provide electricity for BEVs HFCVs result in most benefit least impact among options considered. Coal-CCS nuclear provide less benefit with greater negative impacts. The biofuel options provide no certain benefit result in significant negative impacts. Because sufficient clean natural resources (e.g., wind, sunlight, hot water, ocean energy, gravitational energy) exists to power all energy for world, results here suggest that diversion of attention to less efficient or non-efficient options represents an opportunity cost that delays solutions to climate air pollution health problems. Mark Z. Jacobson, Review of Solutions to Global 1 Warming, Air Pollution, Energy Security. Energy Environ. Sci., 2009, doi: /b809990C Nuclear energy climate change: Based on a review of 103 new old lifecycle studies of nuclear energy, Dr. Jacobson estimates that mean lifecycle emissions of nuclear reactors as 40 g CO2 per kwh, range appears to be low but within reason. Nuclear power plant emissions include those due to uranium mining, enrichment, transport waste disposal 68 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

69 gravitational energy) exists to power all energy for world, results here suggest that diversion of attention to less efficient or non-efficient options represents an opportunity cost that delays solutions to climate air pollution health problems. Mark Z. Jacobson, Review of Solutions to Global 1 Warming, Air Pollution, Energy Security. Energy Environ. Sci., 2009, doi: /b809990C Nuclear energy climate change: Based on a review of 103 new old lifecycle studies of nuclear energy, Dr. Jacobson estimates that mean lifecycle emissions of nuclear reactors as 40 g CO2 per kwh, range appears to be low but within reason. Nuclear power plant emissions include those due to uranium mining, enrichment, transport waste disposal as well as those due to construction, operation, 59 decommissioning of reactors. We estimate lifecycle emissions of new nuclear power plants as 9 70 g CO2e kwh_1, with lower number from an industry estimate 49 upper number slightly above average of 66 g CO2e kwh Nuclear energy nuclear weapons: The Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been signed by 190 countries. Here, we detail link between nuclear energy nuclear weapons estimate emissions of nuclear explosions attributable to nuclear energy. The primary limitation to building a nuclear weapon is availability of purified fissionable fuel (highly-enriched uranium or plutonium). Worldwide, nine countries have known nuclear weapons stockpiles (US, Russia, UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea). In addition, Iran is pursuing uranium enrichment, 32 or countries have sufficient fissionable material to produce weapons. However Among 42 countries with fissionable material, 22 have facilities as part of ir civilian nuclear energy program, eir to produce highly-enriched uranium or to separate plutonium, facilities in 13 countries are active. Thus, ability of states to produce nuclear weapons today follows directly from ir ability to produce nuclear power. In fact, producing material for a weapon requires merely operating a civilian nuclear power plant toger with a sophisticated plutonium separation facility. Finally, in last 100 years, production, distribution, use of fossil fuels nuclear energy not only caused irreversible global climate changes, depletion of ozone layer, polluted l oceans, but also replaced national borders, created regional wars, forced migrations of many indigenes people. By contrast, renewable energy resources, including biomass, hydro, geormal, solar, wind, is naturally replenishing. They are virtually inexhaustible in duration; internal costs such as fuel are practically unchanged during ir life time, not susceptible to geo-political conflicts. Volume:3, No:1, Winter

70 THE ARAB SPRING AND THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE THE ARAB SPRING AND THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE THE ARAB SPRING AND THE EAST BALANCE OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE THE ARAB SPRING AND THE EAST BALANCE OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST EAST Marian Zidaru, Ştefan Georgescu Marian Zidaru, Ştefan Georgescu Marian Zidaru, Ştefan Georgescu The series of protests demonstrations across Marian Middle Zidaru, East Ştefan North Georgescu Africa The series of protests demonstrations across Middle East North Africa has become The series known of as protests "Arab demonstrations Spring". As of across November Middle 2011, governments East North have Africa been has become The series known of as protests "Arab demonstrations Spring". As of across November Middle 2011, governments East North have Africa been has overthrown become in known three as countries: "Arab Tunisia, Spring". Egypt As of Libya. November The 2011, geopolitical governments implications have of been has overthrown become in known three countries: as "Arab Tunisia, Spring". Egypt As of Libya. November The geopolitical 2011, governments implications have of been overthrown protests have in three drawn countries: global attention. Tunisia, Egypt This article Libya. analyzes The geopolitical possible implications evolution in of overthrown protests have in three drawn countries: global attention. Tunisia, Egypt This article Libya. analyzes The geopolitical possible implications evolution in of protests regional have balance drawn of power global of attention. Middle This East article North analyzes Africa. possible evolution in protests regional balance have drawn of power global of attention. Middle This East article North analyzes Africa. possible evolution in regional balance of power of Middle East North Africa. regional Key words: balance Arab of Spring, power Middle of Middle East, balance East of North power Africa. Key words: Arab Spring, Middle East, balance of power Key words: Arab Spring, Middle East, balance of power Key words: Due Arab to its Spring, important Middle geopolitical East, balance location of power (linking Asian, African European Due to its important geopolitical location (linking Asian, African European continents) Due to its to important its diversified geopolitical rich natural location resources (linking Asian, indigenous African inhabitants European of continents) Due to its to important its diversified geopolitical rich natural location resources (linking Asian, indigenous African inhabitants European of continents) Middle Eastern to region its diversified had been subjected rich natural to multi-forms resources of indigenous colonial campaigns inhabitants since of continents) Middle Eastern region to its diversified had been subjected rich natural to multi-forms resources of indigenous colonial campaigns inhabitants since of Middle beginning Eastern of ancient region times. had These been subjected inhabitants to were multi-forms subjected of to colonial ruthless campaigns military occupations, since Middle beginning Eastern of ancient region times. had These been subjected inhabitants to were multi-forms subjected of to colonial ruthless military campaigns occupations, since beginning genocides, of persecutions, ancient times. oppressions, These inhabitants enslavements, were subjected ethnic to ruthless cleansing. military Yet occupations, people beginning genocides, of persecutions, ancient times. oppressions, These inhabitants enslavements, were subjected ethnic to ruthless cleansing. military Yet occupations, people genocides, never surrendered persecutions, nor gave oppressions, up. They struggled enslavements, for ir freedom ethnic cleansing. independence Yet people fought genocides, never surrendered persecutions, nor gave oppressions, up. They struggled enslavements, for ir freedom ethnic cleansing. independence Yet people fought never all colonial surrendered powers nor one gave after up. They or. struggled Since for ir beginning freedom of 2011 independence we are witnessing fought ir never all colonial surrendered powers nor one gave after up. They or. struggled Since for ir beginning freedom of 2011 independence we are witnessing fought ir all latest colonial regionally-sweeping powers one after fight against or. Since local ruling beginning regimes of that 2011 are we subservient are witnessing to foreign ir all latest colonial regionally-sweeping powers one after fight against or. Since local ruling beginning regimes of that 2011 are we subservient are witnessing to foreign ir latest powers. regionally-sweeping This has become fight known against as local Arab ruling Spring. regimes Unfortunately, that are subservient like all ir to previous foreign latest powers. regionally-sweeping This has become known fight against as local Arab ruling Spring. regimes Unfortunately, that are subservient like all ir to previous foreign powers. struggles, This re has is become a poisonous known snake as in Arab background, Spring. Unfortunately, which covertly like all is ir directing previous powers. struggles, This re has is become a poisonous known snake as in Arab background, Spring. Unfortunately, which covertly like all is ir directing previous struggles, orchestrating re this is Arab a poisonous Spring to snake reap its in fruits for background, itself 1 which covertly is directing orchestrating this Arab Spring to reap its fruits for itself 1. struggles, re is a poisonous snake in background,. which covertly is directing orchestrating this Arab Spring to reap its fruits for itself 1. orchestrating Many this analysts Arab Spring believe to reap dramatic its fruits changes for itself that 1. global international system is Many analysts believe dramatic changes that global international system is undergoing Many now analysts are a believe continuation dramatic of a long-term changes reconfiguration that global of international world that system started is undergoing Many now analysts are a believe continuation dramatic of a long-term changes reconfiguration that global of international world that system started is undergoing back now 1980s. are a The continuation process is of spreading a long-term along reconfiguration a top-down of pattern world that gradually started back undergoing now 1980s. are a The continuation process is of spreading a long-term along reconfiguration a top-down of pattern world that gradually started back embracing increasingly 1980s. The more process regions. is However, spreading it along is highly a top-down likely that pattern re are also gradually changes embracing back increasingly 1980s. The more process regions. is However, spreading it along is highly a top-down likely that pattern re are also gradually changes embracing working along increasingly bottom-up more regions. model However, influencing it is highly entire likely global that re international are also changes system, working embracing along increasingly bottom-up more regions. model However, influencing it is highly entire likely global that re international are also changes system, working which is along manifest in bottom-up turbulent model events occurring influencing various entire places global 2 international system, which working is manifest along in bottom-up turbulent model events occurring influencing various entire places global 2.. international system, which is manifest in turbulent events occurring in various places 2. which is The manifest structure in of turbulent Middle Eastern events military occurring forces in various suggests places that 2. Arab revolt is likely The structure of Middle Eastern military forces suggests that Arab revolt is likely to be met The with structure repeated of Middle violence Eastern bloodshed military forces potentially suggests that civil war Arab in revolt countries is likely with to be met The with structure repeated of Middle violence Eastern bloodshed military forces potentially suggests that civil war Arab in revolt countries is likely with to be met with repeated violence bloodshed potentially civil war in countries with to be met with repeated violence bloodshed potentially civil war in countries with 1 1 Dr. Elias Akleh, The Snake behind Arab Spring Dr. Elias Akleh, The Snake behind Arab Spring 1 behind--arab-spring/ behind--arab-spring/ Dr. Elias Akleh, The Snake behind Arab Spring Dr. Elias Akleh, The Snake behind Arab Spring Volume:3, 2 behind--arab-spring/ No:1, Winter

71 competing military forces. That raises prospect of a decade of instability strife in a competing military forces. That raises prospect of decade of instability strife in competing military forces. That raises prospect of a decade of instability strife in a geo-strategically crucial part of world geo-strategically crucial part of world geo-strategically crucial part of world As of November 2011, governments have been overthrown in three countries. As of November 2011, governments have been overthrown in three countries. As of November 2011, governments have been overthrown in three countries. Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on 14 January following Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on 14 January following Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on 14 January following Tunisian revolution protests. In Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak resigned on 11 February Tunisian revolution protests. In Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak resigned on 11 February Tunisian revolution protests. In Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak resigned on 11 February 2011 after 18 days of massive protests, ending his 30-year presidency. The Libyan leader 2011 after 18 days of massive protests, ending his 30-year presidency. The Libyan leader 2011 after 18 days of massive protests, ending his 30-year presidency. The Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown on 23 August 2011, after National Transitional Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown on 23 August 2011, after National Transitional Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown on 23 August 2011, after National Transitional Council (NTC) took control of Bab al-azizia. He was killed on 20 October 2011, in his Council (NTC) took control of Bab al-azizia. He was killed on 20 October 2011, in his Council (NTC) took control of Bab al-azizia. He was killed on 20 October 2011, in his hometown of Sirte after NTC took control of city. hometown of Sirte after NTC took control of city. hometown of Sirte after NTC took control of city. During this period of regional unrest, several leaders announced ir intentions to step During this period of regional unrest, several leaders announced ir intentions to step During this period of regional unrest, several leaders announced ir intentions to step down at end of ir current terms. Sudanese President Omar al-bashir announced that he down at end of ir current terms. Sudanese President Omar al-bashir announced that he down at end of ir current terms. Sudanese President Omar al-bashir announced that he would not seek re-election in 2015 would not seek re-election in 2015 would not seek re-election in , as did Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-maliki, whose term as did Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-maliki, whose term, as did Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-maliki, whose term ends in 2014, although re have been increasingly violent demonstrations deming his ends in 2014, although re have been increasingly violent demonstrations deming his ends in 2014, although re have been increasingly violent demonstrations deming his immediate resignation immediate resignation immediate resignation Protests in Jordan have also caused sacking of two successive Protests in Jordan have also caused sacking of two successive. Protests in Jordan have also caused sacking of two successive governments by King Abdullah governments by King Abdullah governments by King Abdullah Anor leader, President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen, Anor leader, President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen,. Anor leader, President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen, announced on 23 April that he would step down within 30 days in exchange for immunity, a announced on 23 April that he would step down within 30 days in exchange for immunity, announced on 23 April that he would step down within 30 days in exchange for immunity, a deal Yemeni opposition informally accepted on 26 April; Saleh n reneged on deal, deal Yemeni opposition informally accepted on 26 April; Saleh n reneged on deal, deal Yemeni opposition informally accepted on 26 April; Saleh n reneged on deal, prolonging Yemeni uprising prolonging Yemeni uprising prolonging Yemeni uprising The Arab Spring novelty lies in spontaneous secular The Arab Spring novelty lies in spontaneous secular. The Arab Spring novelty lies in spontaneous secular mass movement of young people, mostly educated liberal, which was not instigated by mass movement of young people, mostly educated liberal, which was not instigated by mass movement of young people, mostly educated liberal, which was not instigated by external influences. This was especially evident in Egypt Tunisia. At same time, a few external influences. This was especially evident in Egypt Tunisia. At same time, few external influences. This was especially evident in Egypt Tunisia. At same time, a few similarities are not a basis for equating what happened in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, similarities are not basis for equating what happened in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, similarities are not a basis for equating what happened in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain or countries. In some cases it was revolutionary movement of youth Bahrain or countries. In some cases it was revolutionary movement of youth Bahrain or countries. In some cases it was revolutionary movement of youth middle class, in or situations it was activity of insurgent tribes, in still or middle class, in or situations it was activity of insurgent tribes, in still or middle class, in or situations it was activity of insurgent tribes, in still or cases it was a revolt of a religious section, etc cases it was revolt of religious section, etc cases it was a revolt of a religious section, etc The geopolitical implications of protests have drawn global attention The geopolitical implications of protests have drawn global attention The geopolitical implications of protests have drawn global attention While While. While everyone was worrying about collapse of balance of power in region with everyone was worrying about collapse of balance of power in region with everyone was worrying about collapse of balance of power in region with "Party: Bashir is not sting for re-election". Gulf Times. 22 February Retrieved 22 February "Party: Bashir is not sting for re-election". Gulf Times. 22 February Retrieved 22 February "Party: "Iraq PM Bashir plans is no not re-election". sting for Voice re-election". of Russia. Gulf 5 February Times February Retrieved Retrieved February February "Iraq PM plans no re-election". Voice of Russia. February Retrieved 27 February "Iraq "Jordan PM king plans appoints no re-election". new PM, Voice government of Russia. quits". 5 February Reuters February Retrieved Retrieved February February "Jordan king appoints new PM, government quits". Reuters. February Retrieved February "Jordan Almasmari, king Hakim appoints (26 new April PM, 2011). government "Yemen quits". Protesters Reuters. Accept 1 February Deal". The Wall Retrieved Street Journal. 2 February Retrieved April Almasmari, Hakim (26 April 2011). "Yemen Protesters Accept Deal". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 27 April Almasmari, Hakim (26 April 2011). "Yemen Protesters Accept Deal". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 27 April AFP January 2011 (28 January 1986). "Unrest across Arab world". Vancouver Sun. Canada. Retrieved 9 AFP 27 January 2011 (28 January 1986). "Unrest across Arab world". Vancouver Sun. Canada. Retrieved 29 AFP January 27 January (28 January 1986). "Unrest across Arab world". Vancouver Sun. Canada. Retrieved 29 January January Volume:3, No:1, Winter

72 fear that Iran were acquiring a bomb, Arab Spring is already breaking balance, albeit with or results, making future of Middle East increasingly uncertain. Even fear that Iran were acquiring a bomb, Arab Spring is already breaking balance, albeit Assad regime in Syria that was regarded as an anti-us anti-israel advocate, seemed to with or results, making future of Middle East increasingly uncertain. Even have contributed to maintenance of stability up until now. On Naqba Day of this year, Assad regime in Syria that was regarded as an anti-us anti-israel advocate, seemed to Syria hoped to send a strong message to West by allowing Palestinian activists have contributed to maintenance of stability up until now. On Naqba Day of this year, refugees to enter Golan Heights. This had never happened under Assad regime it Syria hoped to send a strong message to West by allowing Palestinian activists implies that fall of Bashar may have serious consequences for Israel. The stable order in refugees to enter Golan Heights. This had never happened under Assad regime it Middle East that was taken for granted by West is starting to falter, is now implies that fall of Bashar may have serious consequences for Israel. The stable order in revealing its limits. In terms of realism, Arab Spring will bring serious security issues to Middle East that was taken for granted by West is starting to falter, is now Israel would, at some point, convince Jewish State that y would have to make revealing its limits. In terms of realism, Arab Spring will bring serious security issues to peace with Arab states if y wish to survival. In terms of liberalism, it was a gesture that Israel would, at some point, convince Jewish State that y would have to make US will support Arab people s pursuit of self-determination peace with Arab states if y wish to survival. In terms of liberalism, 10. it was a gesture that US will support Arab people s pursuit of self-determination 10. In contrast to climatic spring, Arab Spring did not end with beginning of summer. The main difficulty in predicting its consequences is lack of clarity about layout of In contrast to climatic spring, Arab Spring did not end with beginning of summer. new regimes in Arab countries affected by popular unrest. One can consider three possible The main difficulty in predicting its consequences is lack of clarity about layout of scenarios here: new regimes in Arab countries affected by popular unrest. One can consider three possible scenarios here: a democratic regime; an Islamic regime; a democratic regime; a new quite possibly military dictatorship. an Islamic regime; a new quite possibly military dictatorship. Theoretically, re is a fourth scenario, albeit rar improbable but not entirely impossible, that implies uncontrollability chaos. We need to scrutinize fact that Theoretically, re is a fourth scenario, albeit rar improbable but not entirely Arab monarchies have in all evidence withstood onslaught of protest-motivated activism, impossible, that implies uncontrollability chaos. We need to scrutinize fact that which simultaneously victimized Arab republics with democratic institutions that are rar Arab monarchies have in all evidence withstood onslaught of protest-motivated activism, formal are strictly controlled by authoritarian regimes. The essence of matter is which simultaneously victimized Arab republics with democratic institutions that are rar larger than financial economic capabilities of monarchies, as y differ from one formal are strictly controlled by authoritarian regimes. The essence of matter is place to anor. The factor of legitimacy plays a tangible role in this case. A full-fledged larger than financial economic capabilities of monarchies, as y differ from one monarchical regime has more legitimacy than a republic that does not hold democratic place to anor. The factor of legitimacy plays tangible role in this case. A full-fledged elections, which legitimize state power. Along with this, some monarchical regimes are less monarchical regime has more legitimacy than a republic that does not hold democratic authoritarian than republics ruled by dictators. In this respect we can compare Jordanian elections, which legitimize state power. Along with this, some monarchical regimes are less authoritarian than republics ruled by dictators. In this respect we can compare Jordanian Volume:3, No:1, Winter

73 Moroccan monarchy with republics like Muammar Gadhafi's Libya, Al Assad's Syria Moroccan monarchy with republics like Muammar Gadhafi's Libya, Al Assad's Syria Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Anor obvious result is unprecedented strengning of two countries located on Anor obvious result is unprecedented strengning of two countries located on outskirts of Middle East Iran especially Turkey. Turkey under Prime Minister Recep outskirts of Middle East Iran especially Turkey. Turkey under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose enlightened Justice Development Party was once again reelected Tayyip Erdogan, whose enlightened Justice Development Party was once again reelected on June 12, 2011, wants to unite Islamic European values has scored significant on June 12, 2011, wants to unite Islamic European values has scored significant successes in economic development. It is often said that Turkey is turning into a model for successes in economic development. It is often said that Turkey is turning into model for countries like Tunisia particularly Egypt. At same time, new elites re have countries like Tunisia particularly Egypt. At same time, new elites re have undertaken a thorough scrutiny of post-communist experience of Central European undertaken thorough scrutiny of post-communist experience of Central European East European countries. East European countries. Israel, has conclusively established itself as a dominant military power, but critical Israel, has conclusively established itself as dominant military power, but critical situation in Middle East conflict voids this advantage of value in many ways. The world situation in Middle East conflict voids this advantage of value in many ways. The world community has failed to assess in full recent rehearsals, including a test by Syrians of community has failed to assess in full recent rehearsals, including test by Syrians of a peaceful assault against border with Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (a similar peaceful assault against border with Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (a similar attempt was made from Lebanese territory). One of top leaders in Palestinian attempt was made from Lebanese territory). One of top leaders in Palestinian resistance movement told that Palestinians can mobilize up to 500,000 people if y find resistance movement told that Palestinians can mobilize up to 500,000 people if y find it necessary to stage a peaceful breakthrough march. These angry young men will not even it necessary to stage peaceful breakthrough march. These angry young men will not even be armed with sticks or stones, as y are not supposed to commit acts of violence against be armed with sticks or stones, as y are not supposed to commit acts of violence against Israelis. Israelis. Quite unexpectedly for West democratic revolutions have swept Arab world, a Quite unexpectedly for West democratic revolutions have swept Arab world, region West thought would never change where it had long buried idea of region West thought would never change where it had long buried idea of exporting democracy. The educated liberal youth became main actors in events in exporting democracy. The educated liberal youth became main actors in events in Tunisia Egypt. The West interprets results as its own victory something that has Tunisia Egypt. The West interprets results as its own victory something that has reaffirmed attractiveness of liberal democratic values, which previously caused resentment reaffirmed attractiveness of liberal democratic values, which previously caused resentment in East, Western model of society on whole 11 in East, Western model of society on whole 11. It has started allocating sizeable,. It has started allocating sizeable, albeit insufficient, resources to support Arab countries where democratic regimes might take albeit insufficient, resources to support Arab countries where democratic regimes might take root. The U.S. understs that se regimes may show strong anti-israeli anti-american root. The U.S. understs that se regimes may show strong anti-israeli anti-american sentiment in ir policies. In addition, Islamic political forces will have to play a crucial role sentiment in ir policies. In addition, Islamic political forces will have to play crucial role in se transforming societies, although no one will venture to predict degree of that in se transforming societies, although no one will venture to predict degree of that Vitaly Naumkin, Moving From Bottom Up Back Down Again Vitaly Naumkin, Moving From Bottom Up Back Down Again accesed August accesed August Volume:3, No:1, Winter

74 influence even for short term. For example in Egypt, Muslim Brorhood comes in power influence even for short term. For example in Egypt, Muslim Brorhood comes in power influence through free even election. for short Anor term. example For example is situation in Egypt, from Muslim Syria Brorhood Iraq in comes which in Islamic power through free election. Anor example is situation from Syria Iraq in which Islamic through political free forces election. have strong Anor position. example is situation from Syria Iraq in which Islamic political forces have strong position. political forces have strong position. The considerable rise of Islamic factor embodies one more vector of influence of The considerable rise of Islamic factor embodies one more vector of influence of events The considerable in Arab rise world of on Islamic transformation factor embodies of one global more vector international of influence system. of events in Arab world on transformation of global international system. Naturally, events this in will Arab have an world immediate on impact transformation on European of Union global countries, international as it will system. fuel Naturally, this will have an immediate impact on European Union countries, as it will fuel Naturally, additional migration this will have from an immediate Middle East impact North on European Africa. Immigration Union countries, is already as it a will serious fuel additional migration from Middle East North Africa. Immigration is already serious additional problem for migration Europe, from since it Middle is transforming East well-shaped North Africa. European Immigration institutions is already such a serious as problem for Europe, since it is transforming well-shaped European institutions such as Schengen problem for zone Europe, since overall it is atmosphere transforming of European well-shaped politics. European It is enough institutions to take such a look as at Schengen zone overall atmosphere of European politics. It is enough to take look at Schengen results zone of elections overall in one EU atmosphere country of after European anor politics. where It is dem enough for to take populist a look antiimmigrant results parties of elections is growing. one EU country after anor where dem for populist anti- at results of elections in one EU country after anor where dem for populist antiimmigrant parties is growing. immigrant parties is growing. It cannot be ruled out that a kind of dichotomy between traditional authoritarian It cannot be ruled out that kind of dichotomy between traditional authoritarian monarchies It cannot new be ruled democratic out that regimes a kind espousing of dichotomy values between close to traditional Western ones, authoritarian although monarchies new democratic regimes espousing values close to Western ones, although monarchies not always friendly new to democratic m, will regimes appear in espousing Arab values world if close this to scenario Western is enacted. ones, although There not always friendly to m, will appear in Arab world if this scenario is enacted. There not will always likely be friendly a showdown to m, between will appear two development in Arab world tendencies. if this One scenario of m is enacted. is secularism There will likely be showdown between two development tendencies. One of m is secularism will with likely an Islamic be a face; showdown or between is Islamic two clericalism development tendencies. One of m is secularism with an Islamic face; or is Islamic clericalism with an Islamic face; or is Islamic clericalism 12. Syria, Iran Balance of Power in Middle East. Syria, Iran Balance of Power in Middle East. Syria, Iran Balance of Power in Middle East. We are now moving toward a reckoning with consequences of American troops We are now moving toward reckoning with consequences of American troops withdrawal We from are now Iraq. moving The reckoning toward a concerns reckoning with potential consequences for a massive of shift American in balance troops withdrawal from Iraq. The reckoning concerns potential for massive shift in balance withdrawal of power in from Iraq. region, The with reckoning Iran moving concerns from potential a fairly marginal for a massive power shift to in potentially balance a of power in region, with Iran moving from fairly marginal power to potentially of dominant power in power. region, As with process Iran moving unfolds, from a United fairly marginal States power Israel to potentially are making a dominant power. As process unfolds, United States Israel are making dominant countermoves. power. Questions As remain process wher unfolds, se countermoves United States will stabilize Israel are region making countermoves. Questions remain wher se countermoves will stabilize region countermoves. wher or how Questions far Iran remain will go wher in its se response. countermoves Iran has been will stabilize preparing for region U.S. wher or how far Iran will go in its response. Iran has been preparing for U.S. wher withdrawal. or While how far it is Iran unreasonable will go in simply its response. to say that Iran has will been dominate preparing Iraq, it for is fair to U.S. say withdrawal. While it is unreasonable simply to say that Iran will dominate Iraq, it is fair to say withdrawal. Tehran will While have tremendous it is unreasonable influence simply in Baghdad to say that to Iran point will dominate of being Iraq, able it to is block fair to Iraqi say Tehran will have tremendous influence in Baghdad to point of being able to block Iraqi Tehran initiatives will Iran have opposes. tremendous This influence will in Baghdad increase to as point U.S. withdrawal of being able concludes to block Iraqi it initiatives Iran opposes. This influence will increase as U.S. withdrawal concludes it initiatives becomes clear Iran opposes. re will This be no influence sudden will reversal increase as withdrawal U.S. withdrawal policy. Iraqi concludes politicians' becomes clear re will be no sudden reversal in withdrawal policy. Iraqi politicians' becomes calculus must clear account re will for be no nearness sudden reversal of Iranian in power withdrawal policy. increasing Iraqi distance politicians' calculus must account for nearness of Iranian power increasing distance calculus irrelevance must of account American for power. nearness Resisting of Iranian under power se conditions increasing likely would distance prove irrelevance of American power. Resisting Iran under se conditions likely would prove irrelevance ineffective of American dangerous. power. Some, Resisting like Iran Kurds, under believe se y conditions have guarantees likely would from prove ineffective dangerous. Some, like Kurds, believe y have guarantees from ineffective dangerous. Some, like Kurds, believe y have guarantees from Ibidem, Ibidem, 74 Volume:3, 12 Ibidem, No:1, Winter

75 Americans that substantial investment in Kurdish oil by American companies means those commitments will be honored. A look at map, however, shows how difficult it would be for United States to do so. The Baghdad regime has arrested Sunni leaders while Shia, not all of whom are pro-iranian by any means, knows price of overenthusiastic resistance. The situation in Syria complicates all of this. The minority Alawite sect has dominated Syrian government since 1970, when current president's far - who headed Syrian air force - staged a coup. The Alawites are a heterodox Muslim sect related to a Shiite offshoot make up about 7 percent of country's population, which is mostly Sunni. The new Alawite government was secular, socialist built around military. When Islam rose as a political force in Arab world, Syrians -- alienated from Sadat regime in Egypt -- saw Iran as a bulwark. The Iranian Islamist regime gave Syrian secular regime immunity against Shiite fundamentalists in Lebanon. The Iranians also gave Syria support in Lebanon, more important, in its suppression of Syria's Sunni majority. Syria Iran were particularly aligned in Lebanon. In early 1980s, after Khomeini revolution, Iranians sought to increase ir influence in Islamic world by supporting radical Shiite forces. Hezbollah was one of se. Syria had invaded Lebanon in 1975 on behalf of Christians opposed Palestine Liberation Organization. Syria regarded Lebanon as historically part of Syria, sought to assert its influence over it. Via Iran, Hezbollah became an instrument of Syrian power in Lebanon. Iran Syria, refore, entered a long-term if not altoger stable alliance that has lasted to this day. In current unrest in Syria, Saudis Turks in addition to Americans all have been hostile to regime of President Bashar al Assad. Iran is one country that on whole has remained supportive of current Syrian government. There is good reason for this. Prior to uprising, precise relationship between Syria Iran was variable. Syria was able to act autonomously in its dealings with Iran Iran's proxies in Lebanon. While an important backer of groups like Hezbollah, al Assad regime in many ways checked Hezbollah's power in Lebanon, with Syrians playing dominant role re. The Syrian uprising has put al Assad regime on defensive, however, making it more interested in a firm, stable relationship with Iran. Damascus finds itself isolated in Sunni world, with Turkey Arab League against it. Iran - intriguingly, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-maliki - has constituted al Assad's exterior support. Volume:3, No:1, Winter

76 Thus far al Assad has resisted his enemies. Though some mid- to low-ranking Sunnis have defected, his military remains largely intact; this is because Alawites control key units. Events in Libya drove home to an embattled Syrian leadership -- even to some of its adversaries within military -- consequences of losing. The military has held toger, an unarmed or poorly armed populace, no matter how large, cannot defeat an intact military force. The key for those who would see al Assad fall is to divide military. If al Assad survives - at moment, wishful thinking by outsiders aside, he is surviving - Iran will be big winner. If Iraq falls under substantial Iranian influence, al Assad regime - isolated from most countries but supported by Tehran - survives in Syria, n Iran could emerge with a sphere of influence stretching from western Afghanistan to Mediterranean ( latter via Hezbollah). Achieving this would not require deploying Iranian conventional forces - al Assad's survival alone would suffice. However, prospect of a Syrian regime beholden to Iran would open up possibility of westward deployment of Iranian forces, that possibility alone would have significant repercussions. Consider map were this sphere of influence to exist. The norrn borders of Saudi Arabia Jordan would about this sphere, as would Turkey's sourn border. It remains unclear, of course, just how well Iran could manage this sphere what type of force it could project into it. Maps alone will not provide an understing of problem. But y do point to problem. And problem is potential - not certain - creation of a block under Iranian influence that would cut through a huge swath of strategic territory. It should be remembered that in addition to Iran's covert network of militant proxies, Iran's conventional forces are substantial. While y could not confront U.S. armored divisions survive, re are no U.S. armored divisions on ground between Iran Lebanon. Iran's ability to bring sufficient force to bear in such a sphere increases risks to Saudis in particular. Iran's goal is to increase risk such that Saudi Arabia would calculate that accommodation is more prudent than resistance. Changing map can help achieve this. It follows that those frightened by this prospect - United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia Turkey - would seek to stymie it. At present, place to block it no longer is Iraq, where Iran already has upper h. Instead, it is Syria. And key move in Syria is to do everything possible to bring about al Assad's overthrow. 76 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

77 Until recently, most significant opposition activity appeared to be outside of Syria, with much of resistance reported in media coming from externally based opposition groups. Until The recently, degree of effective most significant opposition opposition was never activity clear. appeared Certainly, to be outside Sunni of majority Syria, with opposes much of hates resistance al Assad reported regime. in But media opposition coming from emotion externally do not based bring opposition down a groups. regime consisting The degree of men of effective fighting opposition for ir lives. was And never it wasn't clear. clear Certainly, that resistance Sunni majority was as opposes strong as outside hates propaga al Assad claimed. regime. But opposition emotion do not bring down a regime consisting of men fighting for ir lives. And it wasn't clear that resistance was as It is interesting that an apparent increase in activity from armed activists - or strong as outside propaga claimed. introduction of new forces -occurred at same time relations between Iran on one side United It is States interesting Israel that an on apparent or increase were deteriorating. in activity from The deterioration armed activists began - or with introduction charges that of an new Iranian forces covert -occurred operation to same assassinate time relations Saudi between ambassador Iran on to one side United States United had been States uncovered, Israel followed on or by allegations were deteriorating. by Bahraini The deterioration government began of Iranian with charges operatives that organizing Iranian attacks covert in operation Bahrain. to It assassinate proceeded to an Saudi International ambassador Atomic Energy United States Agency had report been on uncovered, Iran's progress followed toward by a allegations nuclear device, by followed Bahraini by government Nov. 19 of explosion Iranian operatives an Iranian organizing missile facility attacks in that Bahrain. Israelis It proceeded have not-so-quietly to an International hinted was Atomic ir Energy work. Agency Wher report any of on se Iran's are progress true, toward psychological a nuclear pressure device, on followed Iran is building by Nov. appears 19 explosion to be orchestrated an Iranian 13. missile facility that Israelis have not-so-quietly hinted was ir work. Wher any of se are true, psychological pressure on Iran is building appears to be The US orchestrated 13 France, particularly, had pushed for many harsh sanctions against Syria. through UN. But y could not obtain a military interference under excuse of protecting The Syrian US citizens, France, as particularly, was done in had Libya, pushed because for many of harsh Russian sanctions Chinese against Syria veto through threat. So UN. Arab But League y was could pushed not obtain to play a pressuring military interference active role under in Syria. The excuse Syrian of protecting government Syrian had accepted citizens, as was Arab done League in Libya, plan. The because oppositional of Russian Syrian National Chinese Council veto threat. rejected So plan Arab League intensified was its pushed violence to against play pressuring Syrian active army role inviting Syria. harsh The retaliation. Syrian government So Arab had League accepted suspended Arab Syria s League membership plan. The oppositional threatened Syrian economic National political Council rejected sanctions. It plan has become intensified obvious its that violence Syrian against oppositional Syrian army groups inviting are divided harsh retaliation. have So different Arab aspirations League some suspended of m Syria s are conflicting membership confusing. threatened This economic division confusion political sanctions. are due to It has background become obvious of each oppositional that Syrian group. oppositional The genuine groups oppositional are divided groups reject have different any foreign aspirations interference some fearing of m are same conflicting fate of Libya, confusing. seek This drastic division reform confusion through are dialogue due to 14. background of each oppositional group. The genuine oppositional groups reject any foreign interference fearing same fate of Libya, seek drastic reform through dialogue Dr. Elias Akleh, The Snake Behind Arab Spring Dr. Elias Akleh, The Snake Behind Arab Spring Volume:3, No:1, Winter

78 Israel Israel Position. Position. Israel Position. Israel surrounded Israel surrounded by by a newly newly unstable unstable Arab Arab world world confronting confronting a Palestinian Palestinian Israel surrounded by a newly unstable Arab world confronting a Palestinian march march toward toward statehood faces statehood faces uncertainty uncertainty on on every every front. front. If If Israeli-Palestinian Israeli-Palestinian peace peace march toward statehood faces uncertainty on every front. If Israeli-Palestinian peace process process were were in in better better shape shape it it had had bold bold Palestinian Palestinian Israeli Israeli leaders leaders willing willing able able to to process were in better shape it had bold Palestinian Israeli leaders willing find find common common ground, ground, it it would would help help to to relieve relieve some some of of impending impending pressure. pressure. But But it it doesn t. doesn t. able to find common ground, it would help to relieve some of impending pressure. But it doesn t. Weak Weak leaders, leaders, big big gaps gaps on on core core issues issues a Palestinian Palestinian Noah s Noah s Ark, Ark, in in which which Weak leaders, big gaps on core issues a Palestinian Noah s Ark, in which Palestinian Palestinian national national movement movement has has two two of of everything everything (prime (prime ministers, ministers, constitutions, constitutions, security security Palestinian national movement has two of everything (prime ministers, constitutions, security services), services), will will pose pose huge huge challenges challenges to to a breakthrough breakthrough agreement. agreement. America, America, now now fighting fighting services), will pose huge challenges to a breakthrough agreement. America, now fighting three three wars, wars, burdened burdened with with or or priorities priorities election election politics, politics, won t won t be be able able to to redeem redeem an an three wars, burdened with or priorities election politics, won t be able to redeem agreement agreement neir neir side side is is willing willing able able to to pay pay for. for. The The Jews Jews will will keep keep ir ir state, state, but but an agreement neir side is willing or able to pay for. The Jews will region region in in which which y y live live will never never let let m m completely completely enjoy enjoy it it keep ir state, but region in which y live will never let m completely enjoy it 15. Of Of all all players players in in this this game, game, Israel's Israel's position position is is most most complex. complex. Israel Israel has has had had a decent, Of all players this game, Israel's position is most complex. Israel has decent, albeit albeit covert, covert, working working relationship relationship with with Syrians Syrians going going back back to to ir ir mutual mutual had a decent, hostility albeit covert, working relationship with Syrians going back to ir mutual hostility toward toward Yasser Yasser Arafat. Arafat. For For Israel, Israel, Syria Syria has has been been devil devil y y know. know. The The idea idea of of a hostility Sunni toward Yasser Arafat. For Israel, Syria has been devil y know. The idea of Sunni government government controlled controlled by by Muslim Muslim Brorhood Brorhood on on ir ir norastern norastern frontier frontier was was a Sunni frightening; government controlled by Muslim Brorhood on ir norastern frontier was frightening; y y preferred preferred al al Assad. Assad. But But given given shift shift in in regional regional balance balance of of power, power, frightening; Israeli y preferred al Assad. But given shift in regional balance of power, Israeli view view is is also also changing. changing. The The Sunni Sunni Islamist Islamist threat threat has has weakened weakened in in past past decade decade Israeli relative view is also changing. The Sunni Islamist threat has weakened in past decade relative to to Iranian Iranian Shiite Shiite threat. threat. Playing Playing things things forward, forward, threat threat of of a hostile hostile Sunni Sunni force force relative in to Iranian Shiite threat. Playing things forward, threat of a hostile Sunni in Syria Syria is is less less worrisome worrisome than than an an emboldened emboldened Iranian Iranian presence presence on on Israel's Israel's norrn norrn frontier. frontier. force in This Syria is less worrisome than an emboldened Iranian presence on Israel's norrn frontier. This explains explains why why architects architects of of Israel's Israel's foreign foreign policy, policy, such such as as Defense Defense Minister Minister Ehud Ehud This Barak, explains why architects of Israel's foreign policy, such as Defense Minister Barak, have have been been saying saying that that we we are are seeing seeing acceleration acceleration toward toward end end of of regime. regime. Ehud Barak, Regardless have been saying that we are seeing acceleration toward end of regime. Regardless of of its its preferred preferred outcome, outcome, Israel Israel cannot cannot influence influence events events inside inside Syria. Syria. Instead, Instead, Israel Israel Regardless is of its preferred outcome, Israel cannot influence events inside Syria. Instead, Israel is adjusting adjusting to to a reality reality where where threat threat of of Iran Iran reshaping reshaping politics politics of of region region has has is become adjusting to a reality become paramount paramount where threat of Iran reshaping politics of region has become paramount 16. Israel s Israel s first first strategic strategic priority priority has has always always been been remains remains security its security its physical, physical, Israel s first strategic priority has always been remains security its physical, material material social social well-being. well-being. In In current current set set of of crises crises in in Middle Middle East, East, Israel Israel will will need need material social well-being. In current set of crises in Middle East, Israel will need to to look look at at three three things: things: One, One, it it must must find find right right tone tone content content for for its its relationship relationship with with its its to look at three things: One, it must find right tone content for its relationship with two two peace peace partners, partners, Egypt Egypt Jordan. Jordan. Two, Two, immediate immediate challenges challenges with with both both Lebanon Lebanon its two peace partners, Egypt Jordan. Two, challenges with both Lebanon Syria Syria are are quite quite severe. severe. Lebanon Lebanon has has most most immediate immediate destabilizing destabilizing potential. potential. Israel Israel can can Syria are quite severe. has most immediate destabilizing potential. neir neir find find partners partners in in Lebanon, Lebanon, nor nor an an opening opening for for diplomacy. diplomacy. In In minuet minuet that that Israel Israel can neir find partners in Lebanon, nor an opening for diplomacy. In minuet that Israel Volume:3, No:1, Winter

79 Hezbollah dance all time, Israel has to define what its red lines really are what it should do if y re crossed. The issue is very much deterrence. With Syria, questions of diplomacy always lurk. The defense establishment continues to believe Syrian track should be given priority, but political echelon disagrees because of Syria s relationship with Iran. Natan Sharansky argues that you can t make peace with dictators, but despite what happened in Egypt, wher or not or government is democratic can t be basis for negotiations. In real world, re are things you can t control, so you consider if your opponent is stable, if you can trust him, if an agreement is likely to last for a long time. Israel has gotten 30 years of peace with Egypt, so it is not sure it s such a bad thing if it can get that with Syria. Israel could use new developments in region to its advantage against Iran, first foremost by restarting peace negotiations with Palestinians stopping settlement activity. This would seriously boost Israel s position with new government of Egypt, whom Iran is trying to court, complicate Iran s efforts to boost its position in or countries such as Lebanon by presenting itself as leader of what it calls resistance movement. Most important, it would make it difficult for Iranian government to use Palestinian-Israeli card to distract attention from internal troubles. The current regime s loss of legitimacy would be magnified, which would also decrease Iran s influence abroad. Even if re were peace with Palestinians, Iran would not recognize Israel, but it would have to face a very bleak reality in which it was weakened. Peace would also mean that Israel would find it easier to become part of an anti-iran nuclear camp in region. As we saw from WikiLeaks, countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia even Bahrain are as much, if not more, against Iran s nuclear aspirations as Israel is. But y are not willing to join Israel s camp because y don t agree with Israel s current strategy toward Palestinians. For Iran s leadership, peace between Israel Palestinians is a nightmare that Israel can deliver on a silver plate, through FedEx, flying through Turkey. It s important for Israel to have some regional partners in predominantly Muslim Middle East to legitimize notion that peace with Israel is okay. It s a mistake for Israel to treat Turkey as a newly Islamist country. With eight to nine percent economic growth exping ties with its neighbors, Turkey has increasingly become a regional power, offering a significant alternative probably a long-term strategic rival to Iran. The Mavi Marmara [flotilla] incident was a bigger deal than it needed to be; Israel went out of its way to insult Turkish ambassador in 10 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

80 Jerusalem, it needs to find a way to undo some damage, even if it means apologizing for flotilla affair offering compensation to families. Turks are angry, particularly at Netanyahu administration, but y don t call Israel s existence into question. Israel must take Turkey seriously it ll be around for long term. You never know when it s going to come in hy. One day Israel might want to pass a message to Iran or Hezbollah or Hamas through a trusted friend. Right now, Israel doesn t have that, even though United States. One thing Israel can do to bring Turkey back into a constructive role, to reduce Iran s sway in region to curb Hezbollah s clout would be to make a concerted effort to get an Israeli- Syrian peace deal going, assuming circumstances in Syria make that possible. Syria wants Turkey to mediate. The deal is 90 percent done y just have to go back to 2000 negotiations reopen that chapter. Most of it is in writing. But Israel will need to swallow hard give up Golan Heights 17. Iran is, of course, used to psychological campaigns. We continue to believe that while Iran might be close to a nuclear device that could explode underground under carefully controlled conditions; its ability to create a stable, robust nuclear weapon that could function outside a laboratory setting (which is what an underground test is) is a ways off. This includes being able to load a fragile experimental system on a delivery vehicle expecting it to explode. It might even be intercepted create a casus belli for a counterstrike. The main Iranian threat is not nuclear 18. It might become so, but even without nuclear weapons, Iran remains a threat. Ahmadinejad's administration has been dogged by allegations of a fraudulent election, which hed him a second four-year term in office in Iran has also been hit by a wave of sanctions by US European Union over its nuclear programme, which many Western states suspect is intended to make an atomic bomb 19. The Oil Monarchy Position. Saudi Arabia is most important oil-rich country. There were it s most repressive, extremist, strongest center of Islamic fundamentalism, missionaries who spread ultra-radical Islamism from jihads so on. But y re obedient, y re reliable, so y can do what y like. There was a planned protest in Saudi Arabia. The police presence was so overwhelming intimidating that literally nobody even was willing to show up in Syria, Iran Balance of Power in Middle East Middle- East- Syria- Iran- - - Balance- of- Power- in- - Middle- East- SFOR.h Volume:3, No:1, Winter

81 streets of Riyadh. The same in Kuwait. There was a small demonstration, very quickly streets crushed. of Actually, Riyadh. The most same interesting Kuwait. case There in many was a respects small demonstration, is Bahrain. Bahrain very is quickly quite crushed. important Actually, for two reasons. most One interesting reason, which case in has many been respects reported, is is Bahrain. that it s Bahrain home is port quite of important U.S. Fifth for two Fleet, reasons. major One military reason, force which in has region been reported, 20. The US is that has it s possibly home port largest of marine/air U.S. Fifth force Fleet, base in major Bahrain, military where force in Fifth Fleet region provides 20. The support US has to possibly all war ships largest of marine/air US Naval Forces force base Central in Bahrain, Comm where (USNACENT) Fifth Fleet to provides patrol support Persian to Gulf all war ships Indian of US Ocean Naval 21. Anor Forces Central more fundamental Comm reason (USNACENT) is that Bahrain to patrol is about Persian 70 percent Gulf Shiite, Indian it s Ocean right across 21. Anor causeway more fundamental from eastern reason Saudi is that Arabia, Bahrain which is about also 70 is percent majority Shiite, Shiite it s right happens across to be where causeway most from of Saudi eastern oil Saudi is. Saudi Arabia, Arabia, which of course, also is majority is main Shiite energy happens resource, to has be been where since most of '40s. Saudi By curious oil is. accident Saudi Arabia, of history of course, geography, is main world's energy resource, major energy has been resources since are located '40s. By pretty curious much accident in Shiite of history regions. They re geography, a minority world's in major Middle energy East, but resources y happen are located to be where pretty much oil is, in right Shiite around regions. They re norrn a part minority of in Gulf. Middle That s eastern East, but Saudi y Arabia, happen sourn to be where Iraq oil southwestern is, right around Iran. And norrn re s part been of a concern Gulf. That s among eastern planners Saudi for a Arabia, long time sourn that re Iraq might southwestern be a move towards Iran. And some re s sort of been tacit a concern alliance among in se planners Shiite regions for a long moving time towards that re independence might be a move controlling towards some sort bulk of of tacit alliance world s in oil. se That s Shiite obviously regions intolerable. moving towards So, going independence back to Bahrain, controlling re was an uprising, bulk of tent world s city in oil. central That s obviously square, like intolerable. Tahrir Square. So, going The back Saudi-led to Bahrain, military re forces was invaded an uprising, Bahrain, tent giving city in central security square, forces like re Tahrir opportunity Square. The to Saudi-led crush it violently, military forces destroyed invaded Bahrain, tent city, giving even destroyed security forces Pearl, re which is opportunity symbol to of crush Bahrain; it violently, invaded destroyed major hospital tent city, complex, even destroyed threw out Pearl, patients which is doctors; symbol been of Bahrain; regularly, invaded every day, major arresting hospital human complex, rights threw activists, out torturing patients m, occasionally doctors; a sort been of a regularly, pat on every wrist, day, but nothing arresting much human 22. To rights keep activists, status torturing quo in m, Bahrain occasionally Obama s a administration sort of a pat on encouraged wrist, but Gulf nothing States much to 22. send To keep Peninsula status Shield quo in Force Bahrain to Bahrain Obama s to crush administration demonstrators. encouraged Saudi Gulf Arabia, States Qatar to send UAE were Peninsula happy Shield to oblige Force to Bahrain send ir to crush troops to demonstrators. Bahrain 23. That s Saudi very Arabia, much Qatar Carors UAE principle. were happy If to actions oblige correspond send to ir American troops to strategic Bahrain 23. That s economic very objectives, much that s Carors OK. principle. America can If actions have elegant correspond rhetoric, to but American what matters strategic are facts 24 economic. objectives, that s OK. America can have elegant rhetoric, but what matters are facts Noam Chomsky: "The U.S. Its Allies Will Do Anything to Prevent Democracy in Arab World us its Dr. Noam Elias Chomsky: Akleh, The "The Snake U.S. Behind Its Allies Arab Will Spring Do Anything to Prevent Democracy Arab World us its Dr. Noam Elias Chomsky: Akleh, The "The Snake U.S. Behind Its Allies Arab Will Spring Do Anything to Prevent Democracy Arab World us its Dr. Noam Elias Chomsky: Akleh, The "The Snake U.S. Behind Its Allies Arab Will Spring Do Anything to Prevent Democracy Arab World us its Dr. Noam Elias Chomsky: Akleh, The "The Snake U.S. Behind Its Allies Arab Will Spring Do Anything to Prevent Democracy Arab World us its 24 Noam Chomsky: "The U.S. Its Allies Will Do Anything to Prevent Democracy in Arab World us its Volume:3, No:1, Winter

82 USA USA Position Position USA USA Position Position USA The The current current Position escalation escalation originated originated in in American American decision decision to to withdraw withdraw from from Iraq Iraq was was intensified intensified The The current current by by escalation escalation events events in in originated originated Syria. Syria. If If Iran Iran in in aboned aboned American American its its decision decision nuclear nuclear program program to to withdraw withdraw tomorrow, tomorrow, from from Iraq Iraq situation situation was was intensified intensified The current escalation originated in American decision to withdraw from Iraq was would would remain remain by by events events as as complex. complex. in in Syria. Syria. Iran Iran If If has has Iran Iran aboned aboned upper upper h, h, its its nuclear nuclear United United program program States, States, tomorrow, tomorrow, Israel, Israel, Turkey Turkey situation situation intensified would by events Syria. If Iran aboned its nuclear program tomorrow, situation Saudi Saudi would Arabia Arabia remain remain all all as as are are complex. complex. looking looking Iran Iran at at how how has has to to turn turn upper upper h, h, tables. tables. United United States, States, Israel, Israel, Turkey Turkey would Saudi Saudi Arabia Arabia remain all all as are are complex. looking looking Iran at at how how has to to turn turn upper h, tables. tables. United States, Israel, Turkey Saudi Arabia At At this this all point, point, are looking y y appear appear at how to to be be to turn following following tables. a two-pronged two-pronged strategy: strategy: Increase Increase pressure pressure on on Iran Iran to to make make At At this this it it point, point, recalculate recalculate y y appear appear its its vulnerability, vulnerability, to to be be following following bring bring a two-pronged two-pronged down down Syrian Syrian strategy: strategy: government government Increase Increase pressure pressure to to limit limit on on Iran Iran At this point, y appear to be following a two-pronged strategy: Increase pressure on consequences consequences to to make make it it of of recalculate recalculate Iranian Iranian influence influence its its vulnerability, vulnerability, in in Iraq. Iraq. Wher Wher bring bring down down Syrian Syrian regime regime Syrian Syrian can can government government be be brought brought to to limit limit down down is is Iran consequences consequences to make it recalculate its vulnerability, bring down Syrian government to limit problematic. problematic. Libya's Libya's of of Iranian Iranian Moammar Moammar influence influence Gadhafi Gadhafi in in Iraq. Iraq. would would Wher Wher have have survived survived Syrian Syrian regime regime if if NATO NATO can can be be hadn't hadn't brought brought intervened. intervened. down down is is consequences problematic. problematic. of Iranian influence in Iraq. Wher Syrian regime can be brought down is NATO NATO could could Libya's Libya's intervene intervene Moammar Moammar in in Syria, Syria, Gadhafi Gadhafi but but Syria Syria would would is is more more have have complex complex survived survived than than if if Libya. Libya. NATO NATO Moreover, Moreover, hadn't hadn't intervened. intervened. a second second problematic. NATO Libya's Moammar Gadhafi would have survived if NATO hadn't intervened. NATO NATO could could attack attack intervene intervene on on an an Arab Arab in in Syria, Syria, state state designed designed but but Syria Syria to to is is change change more more complex complex its its government government than than Libya. Libya. would would Moreover, Moreover, have have unintended unintended a second second NATO NATO could intervene in Syria, but Syria is more complex than Libya. Moreover, a second consequences, consequences, attack attack on on no no an an matter matter Arab Arab how how state state much much designed designed Arabs Arabs to to change change fear fear its its government government Iranians Iranians at at would would moment. moment. have have unintended unintended Wars Wars are are NATO consequences, consequences, attack on an Arab state designed to change its government would have unintended unpredictable; unpredictable; y y no no matter matter are are not not how how first first much much option. option. Arabs Arabs Therefore Therefore fear fear likely likely Iranians Iranians solution solution at at is is moment. moment. covert covert support support Wars Wars are are for for consequences, unpredictable; unpredictable; no matter how much Arabs fear Iranians at moment. Wars are Sunni Sunni opposition opposition y y are are funneled funneled not not first first through through option. option. Lebanon Lebanon Therefore Therefore possibly possibly likely likely Turkey Turkey solution solution is is covert covert Jordan. Jordan. support support It It will will for for be be unpredictable; y are not first option. Therefore likely solution is covert support for interesting interesting Sunni Sunni opposition opposition to to see see if if funneled funneled Turks Turks through through participate. participate. Lebanon Lebanon Far Far more more interesting interesting possibly possibly Turkey Turkey will will be be seeing seeing Jordan. Jordan. wher wher It It will will this this be be interesting interesting Sunni opposition funneled through Lebanon possibly Turkey Jordan. It will be works. works. Syrian Syrian to to see see intelligence intelligence if if Turks Turks has has participate. participate. penetrated penetrated Far Far its its more more Sunni Sunni interesting interesting opposition opposition will will effectively effectively be be seeing seeing for for wher wher decades. decades. this this interesting works. works. to see if Turks participate. Far more interesting will be seeing wher this Mounting Mounting Syrian Syrian a secret secret intelligence intelligence campaign campaign has has against against penetrated penetrated regime regime its its Sunni Sunni would would opposition opposition be be difficult, difficult, effectively effectively its its success success for for decades. decades. by by no no works. Mounting Mounting Syrian secret intelligence campaign has against penetrated regime its Sunni would opposition be difficult, effectively its success for decades. by no means means assured. assured. a secret Still, Still, campaign that that is is against next next move. move. regime But But it it is is would not not be last last difficult, move. move. To To put put its Iran Iran success back back into into by no its its Mounting means means assured. a secret Still, campaign that is against next move. regime But it is would not be last difficult, move. To put its Iran success back into by no its box, box, something something assured. Still, must must that be be done done is about about next move. Iraqi Iraqi But political political is not situation. situation. last move. Given Given To put U.S. U.S. Iran back withdrawal, withdrawal, into its means box, box, something assured. Still, must that be done is about next move. Iraqi But political is not situation. last move. Given To put U.S. Iran back withdrawal, into its Washington Washington something has has must little little be influence influence done about re. re. All All Iraqi of of political relationships relationships situation. Given United United States States U.S. withdrawal, built built were were box, Washington Washington something has must little be influence done about re. All Iraqi of political relationships situation. Given United States U.S. withdrawal, built were predicated predicated on on has American American little influence power power protecting protecting re. All of relationships. relationships. With With United Americans Americans States built gone, gone, were Washington predicated predicated on has American little influence power protecting re. All of relationships. With United Americans States built gone, were foundation foundation on of of American those those relationships relationships power protecting dissolves. dissolves. And And relationships. even even with with Syria, Syria, With Americans balance balance of of gone, power power is is predicated foundation foundation on of American those relationships power protecting dissolves. And relationships. even with Syria, With Americans balance of gone, power is shifting shifting of those relationships dissolves. And even with Syria, balance of power is foundation shifting shifting of those relationships dissolves. And even with Syria, balance of power is shifting 25 In In. Noam Noam Chomsky Chomsky opinion opinion U.S. U.S. its its allies allies will will do do anything anything y y can can to to prevent prevent auntic In Noam Chomsky opinion U.S. its allies will do anything y can to prevent auntic In democracy democracy Noam Chomsky in in Arab Arab opinion world. world. U.S. The The reason reason its is is allies that that will across across do anything region, region, y an an overwhelming overwhelming can to prevent auntic majority auntic In democracy Noam Chomsky in Arab opinion world. U.S. The reason its is allies that will across do anything region, y an overwhelming can to prevent majority of of democracy population population in Arab regards regards world. United United The reason States States is that as as across main main threat threat region, to to an ir ir overwhelming interests. interests. In In auntic majority fact, majority of democracy population in Arab regards world. United The reason States is that as across main threat region, to an ir overwhelming interests. In fact, opposition opposition of population to to U.S. U.S. policy policy regards is is so so high high United that that a States considerable considerable as main majority majority threat think think to ir region region interests. would would In majority fact, opposition of population to U.S. policy regards is so high United that States considerable as main majority threat think to ir region interests. would In be fact, be more more opposition secure secure if if to Iran Iran U.S. had had policy nuclear nuclear is so weapons. weapons. high that In In a considerable Egypt, Egypt, most most majority important important think country, country, region that s that s would fact, be percent. be more opposition secure if to Iran U.S. had policy nuclear is so weapons. high that In a considerable Egypt, most majority important think country, region that s would 80 percent. more Similar Similar secure if figures figures Iran had elsewhere. elsewhere. nuclear weapons. There There are are In some some Egypt, in in region region most important who who regard regard country, Iran Iran as as that s a threat threat 80 be percent. percent. more Similar Similar secure if figures figures Iran had elsewhere. elsewhere. nuclear weapons. There There are are In some some Egypt, in in region region most important who who regard regard country, Iran Iran as as that s a threat threat 80 percent. Similar figures elsewhere. There are some in region who regard Iran as a threat Syria, Iran Balance of Power in Middle East Middle- East- 25 Syria, Iran Balance of Power in Middle East Middle- East- Syria- Iran- - - Balance- of- Power- in- - Middle- East- SFOR.h 25 Syria- Iran- - - Balance- of- Power- in- - Middle- East- SFOR.h Syria, in Middle- East- Syria, in Middle- East- 25 Syria- Iran- - - Balance- of- Power- in- - Middle- East- SFOR.h Syria- Iran- - - Balance- of- Power- in- - Middle- East- SFOR.h Syria, in Middle- East Syria- Iran- - - Balance- of- Power- in- - Middle- East- SFOR.h 82 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

83 about 10 percent. So, U.S. its allies are not going to want governments which are responsive to will of people. If that happens, not only will U.S. not control region, but it will be thrown out. It is obviously an intolerable result. As long as y can control ir populations, fine. They can have campaigns of hatred; American friendly dictators about will 10 percent. keep m So, under U.S. control. its That s allies are reaction not going not to just want of governments diplomatic which service are in responsive State Department to will or of of people. media If who that reported happens, this, not but only also will of U.S. general not intellectual control region, community. but it In will fact, be coverage thrown out. of se It is polls obviously is precisely an intolerable zero result. United As long States, as y literally. can control There are ir a few populations, comments fine. Engl, They can but have very campaigns little. It of just hatred; doesn t American matter what friendly dictators population will thinks, keep as m long under as y re control. under That s control 26 reaction. not just of diplomatic service in State Department or of media who reported this, but also of general intellectual community. The United In fact, States coverage has three of se choices. polls Accept is precisely evolution zero in United try to States, live with literally. what There emerges. are Attempt a few to comments make a deal in Engl, with Iran - but a very very painful little. It just costly doesn t one. Or matter go to what war. The population first assumes thinks, Washington long can as y re live with under what control emerges. 26. The second depends on wher Iran is interested in dealing with United States. The third depends on having enough power to wage a The war United to absorb States Iran's has three retaliatory choices. strikes, Accept particularly evolution in Strait try of to Hormuz. live with All what are dubious, emerges. so Attempt toppling make al Assad a deal is critical. with Iran It - changes a very painful game costly one. momentum. Or go to But war. even The first that is assumes enormously Washington difficult can live laden with with what risks. emerges. The second depends on wher Iran is interested in dealing with United States. The third depends on having enough power to wage a The war 2011 to global absorb international Iran's retaliatory system strikes, has not particularly only demonstrated in Strait its of unpreparedness Hormuz. All are to dubious, promptly so react toppling to changes al Assad that is no critical. one could It changes have predicted, game but on top momentum. of that re But is even its that insufficient is enormously governability. difficult Given laden with conditions risks. of increasing divergence uncertainty, common claims about formation of a global government comprising leading international The 2011 players global are international utopian. The system use of military has not only force, demonstrated including in its unpreparedness form that has not to promptly received a react mate to changes from international that no one institutions, could have predicted, did not disappear but on top into of that past re after is its insufficient George W. Bush governability. administration Given had bowed conditions out. Today of increasing more than divergence ever unconventional uncertainty, threats common to international claims security, about such formation as religious of extremism, a global terrorism, government drug comprising trafficking leading international possibility of players new regional are utopian. outbursts The of use instability, of military remain force, quite including pressing 27. form that has not received a mate from international institutions, did not disappear into past after George W. Bush administration had bowed out. Today more than ever unconventional threats to international security, such as religious extremism, terrorism, drug trafficking possibility of new regional outbursts of instability, remain quite pressing Noam Chomsky: "The U.S. Its Allies Will Do Anything to Prevent Democracy in Arab World us its Noam Chomsky: "The U.S. Its Allies Will Do Anything to Prevent Democracy in Arab World us its 27 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

84 We are now in final act of Iraq, it is even more painful than imagined. Laying this alongside European crisis makes idea of a systemic crisis in global system very real 28. Islamic State of Iraq Syria "[ISIS have] probably eclipsed Al-Qaeda, which for all intents purposes, started with a big bang on September 11th sort of went downhill," noted Ed Blanche, a terrorism expert, in an interview with Al Arabiya News, adding that ISIS has learnt a lot from al-qaeda movement. Reportedly, ISIS was formed in 2004 as a branch of al-qaeda, however, it evolved into a self-sufficient organization soon after. Since beginning of Arab Spring radical movement has strengned exped significantly. According to Al Arabiya, in late 2013 tensions arose between al-qaeda chief Ayman al-zawahiri ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-baghdadi. Eventually, al-qaeda cut off all relations with ISIS in February Meanwhile US intelligence officials have reported that ISIS militants are demonstrating "good" governing skills in conquered regions. Apparently, Islamic State has adopted Hezbollah's strategy, "devoting considerable human financial resources toward keeping essential services like electricity, water, sewage functioning in ir territory," Foreign Policy notes. Moreover, extremists are improving region's infrastructure by building new roads, opening hospitals initiating small-business programs, media outlet stresses. At same time ISIS is enforcing harsh inhuman laws, murdering Christians, Shia representatives of or religious minorities because of ir beliefs. ISIS have a state-building agenda an understing of importance of effective governance," underscored David Kilcullen, a counterinsurgency expert, as quoted by Foreign Policy. On or h, movement may soon face serious obstacles, some experts claim. While ISIS is enjoying increasing support from radical Sunnis, its "l-grabbing" strategy may considerably decelerate its growth, deems David Mack, a former US ambassador. ISIS is a Sunni militant group, which had been fighting in Syria until recently, led an attack on western norrn regions of Iraq. ISIS militants captured Mosul, capital of norrn Iraqi province of Manawa, a part of Salah al-din province, including its administrative center, city of Tikrit or territories. The militants also announced ir intention to march 28 Syria, Iran Balance of Power in Middle East Middle- East- Syria- Iran- - - Balance- of- Power- in- - Middle- East- SFOR.h 84 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

85 on Baghdad. Recently ISIS declared Caliphate in captured territory renamed itself as "Islamic State" 29. Islamic State militants are carrying out "a wave of ethnic cleansing" against minorities in on Baghdad. Recently ISIS declared Caliphate in captured territory renamed itself as norrn Iraq. ISIS allied Sunni rebels have seized large swas of Iraq Syria. "Islamic State" 29. Thouss of people have been killed, majority of m civilians, more than a million have Islamic been State forced militants to flee are ir carrying homes out in recent "a wave months. of ethnic At least cleansing" 1,000 members against of minorities Yazidi in faith norrn are Iraq. thought ISIS to have allied been Sunni killed rebels in recent have weeks, seized with large close swas to 2,750 of Iraq kidnapped Syria. or enslaved. Thouss Following of people an have ISIS been attack killed, on an Iraqi majority air force of m base civilians, near city of more Tikrit, than more a million than 1,500 have been young forced soldiers to flee went ir missing; homes many in recent bodies months. were subsequently At least 1,000 found members in of Dijla Yazidi River. At faith least are 650 thought male inmates to have of been Badouch killed Prison in recent in Mosul weeks, were with murdered close to by 2,750 ISIS; kidnapped witnesses say or inmates enslaved. claiming Following to an be ISIS Sunni attack were on transported Iraqi air force away, base while near Shia city or of members Tikrit, more of or than religious 1,500 young soldiers ethnic communities went missing; were many ordered bodies were into ditches subsequently shot. found The in mainly Dijla Yazidi River. village At least of 650 Cotcho, male inmates south of of Sinjar, Badouch was Prison attacked in Mosul by ISIS were fighters; murdered survivors by ISIS; say witnesses at least 100 say men inmates were claiming killed, to be hundreds Sunni of were women transported children away, were while abducted Shia 30 or. In members Iraq, of United or religious States has several ethnic advantages communities that could were make ordered airstrikes into ditches against shot. Islamic The State mainly reasonably Yazidi village effective, of including Cotcho, south reliable of Sinjar, Kurdish was allies, attacked by chance ISIS fighters; of sting survivors up U.S.-trained say at least Iraqi 100 defense men were forces, killed, intelligence hundreds assets, of U.S. women special operators children were on abducted ground, 30. In at Iraq, least a chance United to States forge has a political several advantages reconciliation that in could Baghdad make that airstrikes might ease against disaffection Islamic State alienation reasonably of Iraqi effective, Sunnis including on which reliable ISIS now Kurdish feeds. allies, Syria has none chance of of se. sting And none up U.S.-trained are soon coming, Iraqi even defense if forces, United intelligence States gets assets, serious U.S. special about operators training on equipping ground, those at elusive least a chance Syrian moderates to forge a political or creating reconciliation an entirely in new Baghdad military that force. might Syria ease has always disaffection been a witches' alienation brew of Iraqi negatives. Sunnis And on it's which tough ISIS to see now that feeds. changing Syria now, has none even of with se. a belated And none more are soon focused coming, U.S. even effort if to provide United weapons States gets serious support about to training moderate rebels. equipping Just look those at elusive a few Syrian of moderates obstacles to or consistent creating an support: entirely a new dizzying military array force. of Syria divided has always dysfunctional been a witches' rebel brew groups, of negatives. external backers And it's whose tough motives to see that are changing diametrically now, opposed even with (see: a belated Saudi Arabia more focused Qatar), U.S. effort a Free to Syrian provide Army weapons that in words support of to Monkey moderate Cage's rebels. Marc Just Lynch look was at a always few of more obstacles to consistent support: a dizzying array of divided dysfunctional rebel groups, external backers whose motives are diametrically opposed (see: Saudi Arabia Qatar), a Free Syrian Army that in words of Monkey Cage's Marc Lynch was always more 29 Islamic State Growing Larger Than Al-Qaeda Ever Thought They Could - Experts rianovosti04.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e1196%2egy0ao050ku%2e13h0 30 Iraq crisis: Islamic State accused of ethnic cleansing 29 Islamic State Growing Larger Than Al-Qaeda Ever Thought 16 They Could - Experts rianovosti04.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e1196%2egy0ao050ku%2e13h0 30 Iraq crisis: Islamic State accused of ethnic cleansing Volume:3, No:1, Winter

86 fiction than reality. This lscape has fueled Islamic State's rise has simultaneously limited effectiveness of outside intervention, including airstrikes 31. fiction than reality. This lscape has fueled Islamic State's rise has simultaneously limited Nine effectiveness NATO states, of outside including intervention, US, including Australia airstrikesbegan 31. discussions on 5 th September 2014, at NATO Summit in Wales, to form a military coalition to fight ISIS. The Nine NATO states, including US, Australia began discussions on 5 th meeting stopped short of committing to supply boots on ground but discussed or September 2014, at NATO Summit in Wales, to form a military coalition to fight ISIS. The military options including coordinated air strikes greater efforts to train support meeting stopped short of committing to supply boots on ground but discussed or Iraqi forces where necessary 32. military options including coordinated air strikes greater efforts to train support Iraqi forces where necessary 32. CONCLUSIONS CONCLUSIONS The Arab Spring was a historic moment in politics of Middle East but its long-term impact remains unpredictable. With decline in popular influence of Marxism statedriven agendas for revolutions from above, re has been a shift away from political The Arab Spring was a historic moment in politics of Middle East but its long-term impact remains unpredictable. With decline in popular influence of Marxism statedriven agendas for revolutions from above, re has been a shift away from political mobilization designed to push for social transformation. The dems for full citizenship, for recognition of individual political rights, were a powerful unifying. The internationally mobilization designed to push for social transformation. The dems for full citizenship, for dominant cliché of an Arab Spring revolutionary was a young, network-savvy, college recognition of individual political rights, were a powerful unifying. The internationally educated member of middle class me across Arab revolutions. The demonstration dominant cliché of an Arab Spring revolutionary was a young, network-savvy, college effect which drove protest from Tunisia into Libya Egypt n on into Gulf was educated member of middle class me across Arab revolutions. The demonstration powered by an older form of technology, satellite television. Al Jazeera was heralded as effect which drove protest from Tunisia into Libya Egypt n on into Gulf was revolutionary when it launched in However, its long-terms effects may if anything has powered by an older form of technology, satellite television. Al Jazeera was heralded as been more influential. Broadly comparable to Sawat al-arab radio station under Nasser, revolutionary when it launched in However, its long-terms effects may if anything has Al Jazeera or Arab satellite stations played a key role in recreating a region-wide Arab been more influential. Broadly comparable to Sawat al-arab radio station under Nasser, public sphere, which amplified demonstration effect of Ben Ali s departure. Al Jazeera or Arab satellite stations played a key role in recreating a region-wide Arab public The events sphere, of which Arab amplified Spring have demonstration given hope to effect millions of Ben of people Ali s departure. across Middle East beyond that meaningful political change for better is a distinct possibility. Those said, The events of Arab Spring have given hope to millions of people across Middle East of all Arab countries effected by this wave of political protest, only two, Egypt beyond that meaningful political change for better is a distinct possibility. Those said, Tunisia, are now in what looks like political transitions to a more representative form of of all Arab countries effected by this wave of political protest, only two, Egypt government. Two more, Syria Libya, were driven into civil war with Yemen also showing Tunisia, are now in what looks like political transitions to a more representative form of government. Two more, Syria Libya, were driven into civil war with Yemen also showing 31 Aron Arab Miller, The Islamic State s home-field advantage, 32 Sam Jones, feabdc0.html?ftcamp=crm/ /201495/nbe/WorldNews/product&siteedition=intl#axzz3CX2k5iVo Aron Arab Miller, The Islamic State s home-field advantage, 32 Sam Jones, 86 Volume:3, 00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=crm/ /201495/nbe/WorldNews/product&siteedition=intl#axzz3CX2k5iVo No:1, Winter

87 some signs of following m. The rest of countries of Middle East retain ruling some elites y signs had of following before m. Arab Spring The rest started. of countries of Middle East retain ruling elites y had before Arab Spring started. The balance of power in this region suffered a little change. The basis for U.S. dominance in The region balance rested of power on both in this capacity region (i.e., suffered military a little power) change. legitimacy. The basis for As U.S. for legitimacy, dominance in past region several rested presidential on both administrations capacity (i.e., military have tried power) to gain legitimacy. buy-in of As Arab for legitimacy, states for U.S. past hegemony several because presidential that would administrations bring greater have security tried to gain a resolution buy-in of Arab core states dispute for U.S. in hegemony region because Arab-Israeli that would conflict. bring greater The U.S. security has not fulfilled a resolution se of promises, core dispute in fact, in region U.S. wars in Arab-Israeli region have conflict. eroded The support. U.S. has Instead, not fulfilled United se States promises, today is in widely fact, seen U.S. in wars Middle in East region as enabling have eroded an Israeli support. national Instead, security United doctrine States that requires today is regional widely seen hegemony in for Middle Israel East well as enabling as United an Israeli States, national with security means doctrine of permanent that requires occupation regional hegemony freedom for for Israel as to well use as military United force States, unilaterally with means disproportionately. of permanent occupation freedom for Israel to use military force unilaterally disproportionately. References: References: 1. AFP 27 January 2011 (28 January 1986). "Unrest across Arab world". Vancouver 1. AFP Sun. Canada. 27 January Retrieved 2011 (28 29 January 1986) "Unrest across Arab world". Vancouver 2. Sun. Almasmari, Canada. Hakim Retrieved (26 April 29 January 2011) "Yemen Protesters Accept Deal". The Wall Street 2. Almasmari, Journal. Retrieved Hakim 27 (26 April ). "Yemen Protesters Accept Deal". The Wall Street 3. Journal. "Arab Spring Retrieved Who 27 lost April Egypt?" The Economist. 1 March Retrieved 9 March 3. "Arab Spring Who lost Egypt?". The Economist. 1 March Retrieved 9 March "Democracy's hard spring". The Economist. 10 March "Democracy's Noueihed, Lin hard (19 January spring". 2011). The Economist. "Peddler's 10 martyrdom March launched Tunisia's 5. Noueihed, revolution". Lin Reuters. (19 January UK. Retrieved 2011). "Peddler's 1 February martyrdom launched Tunisia's 6. revolution". Dr. Elias Akleh, Reuters. "The UK. Snake Retrieved behind 1 February Arab Spring" Elias Akleh, "The Snake Arab Spring" spring/ 6. Dr. 7. palestine.com/2011/11/-snake-behind--arab- "Iraq PM plans no re-election". Voice of Russia. 5 February spring/ Retrieved "Iraq February PM plans no re-election". Voice of Russia. 5 February Retrieved February cite_ref- 46"Jordan king appoints new 8. PM, government quits". Reuters. 1 February cite_ref- 46"Jordan Retrieved 2 February king appoints new 9. PM, Miller, government Aaron. "What quits". Is Israel s Reuters. Next 1 February Move in New Retrieved Middle 2 February East?". Moment Miller, Magazine. Aaron. Moment "What Magazine. Is Israel s Retrieved Next Move 5/6/2011 in New Middle East?". Moment Magazine. Moment Magazine. Retrieved 5/6/ Volume:3, No:1, Winter

88 10. Noam Chomsky: "The U.S. Its Allies Will Do Anything to Prevent Democracy in Arab World" us its "Party: Bashir is not sting for re-election". Gulf Times. 22 February Retrieved 22 February Syria, Iran Balance of Power in Middle East of-powerin--middle-east-sfor.h 12. "The Arab awakening reaches Syria". The Economist. 13. White, Gregory (13 February 2011). "Bahrain Now Bracing For Its Own Day Of Rage After Giving Every Family $2,660 Fails". Business Insider. Retrieved 13 February us its Again Volume:3, No:1, Winter

89 Clustering G-20 Countries using Euclidian Method Fuzzy Logic Clustering G-20 Countries using Euclidian Method Fuzzy Logic Esra DEMİR Student, Istanbul Aydın University, Istanbul, Turkey Beşyol Mah.Inönü Cad.No: 38, Sefaköy-Küçükçekmece Esra / İSTANBUL DEMİR Student, Tel: Istanbul Aydın University, Fax: Istanbul, Turkey Beşyol Mah.Inönü Cad.No: 38, Sefaköy-Küçükçekmece / İSTANBUL Tel: Fax: Çiğdem ÖZARI Assistant Prof Economics Finance, Faculty of Economics Administrative Science Istanbul Aydın University, Çiğdem Istanbul, ÖZARI Turkey Assistant Prof Economics Beşyol Mah.Inönü Finance, Faculty Cad.No: of 38, Economics Sefaköy-Küçükçekmece Administrative / İSTANBUL Science Istanbul Aydın University, [email protected] Istanbul, Turkey Beşyol Mah.Inönü Cad.No: Tel: , Sefaköy-Küçükçekmece Fax: / İSTANBUL [email protected] Tel: Fax: Abstract In this study, we cluster G-20 countries with Euclidean distance with parameters: gross domestic Abstract product per capita (GDP-PC), IMPORT (%GDP), EXPORT (%GDP), Human Development In this study, Index we (HDI), cluster OPENNESS G-20 countries with Technology Euclidean distance (TECH). with These parameters: are leading gross parameters domestic product that indicates per capita development (GDP-PC), of countries. IMPORT We (%GDP), use data EXPORT between (%GDP), years 1996 Human Development Our aim Index is to (HDI), cluster OPENNESS G-20 countries with Technology similar macroeconomic (TECH). These properties are leading compare parameters m that regarding indicates to development relations of between countries. various We use clusters data using between fuzzy algorithms. years Our aim is to cluster G-20 countries with similar macroeconomic properties Keyword: compare m Clustering, regarding Fuzzy to Logic, relations G-20, between HDI. various clusters using fuzzy algorithms. Keyword: Clustering, Fuzzy Logic, G-20, HDI. 1. Introduction The Group of Twenty (G-20) is made up of finance ministers central bank governors 1. Introduction of nineteen countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, France, The United Group Kingdom, of Twenty India, (G-20) Indonesia, is made Italy, up of Japan, finance Korea, ministers Mexico, Russian, central Saudi bank Arabia, governors Turkey, of nineteen United States, countries: South Argentina, Africa. The Australia, European Brazil, Union, Canada, who is represented China, Germany, by rotating France, council United presidency Kingdom, India, Indonesia, European Central Italy, Japan, Bank, is Korea, 20 Mexico, th member Russian, of G-20. Saudi G-20 was Arabia, established Turkey, United in 1999, States, in South wake Africa. of The 1997 European Asian financial Union, who crisis, is represented to bring toger by major rotating advanced council presidency emerging economies European to Central stabilize Bank, global is 20 financial th member market. of G-20. Since G-20 its inception, was established G-20 in holds 1999, annual in Finance wake Ministers of 1997 Asian Central financial Bank Governors' crisis, to bring Meetings toger discusses major advanced measures to emerging promote economies financial to stability stabilize of world global financial to achieve market. a sustainable Since its economic inception, growth G-20 holds development. annual Finance G-20 Ministers brings toger Central important Bank Governors' industrial Meetings emerging market discusses countries measures from to promote all regions of financial world. stability All member of world countries represent to achieve approximately a sustainable ninety economic per growth cent of global development. gross national G-20 product, brings toger eighty per important cent of industrial world trade 1 as emerging well as two-thirds market countries of from world's all population. regions of G-20's world. economic All member weight countries broad represent membership approximately gives it a ninety high per degree cent of of legitimacy global gross national influence product, over eighty management per cent of of world global trade economy 1 as well as two-thirds financial system. of world's population. G-20's economic weight broad membership gives it a high degree of legitimacy influence over management of global economy financial 1 Including European system. Union intra-trade 1 1 Including European Union intra-trade Volume:3, No:1, Winter

90 All nineteen members are among top twenty eight economies as measured in gross domestic product (GDP) at nominal prices in a list published by IMF 2 for The countries All that nineteen are not members included are as among membership top in twenty G-20 are eight Switzerl, economies Taiwan as measured Norway. in gross Spain, domestic Nerls, product (GDP) Belgium, at nominal Sweden, prices Pol in a list Austria, published which by are included IMF 2 for only as part The of countries European that are Union not as included last as membership of G-20. in G-20 Even are though Switzerl, some of Taiwan se countries Norway. as Norway, Spain, Nerls, Sweden have Belgium, higher rank Sweden, than Pol some members Austria, of G-20. which are included only as part of European Union as last member of G-20. Even though some of se countries as Norway, Our Sweden main have goal is higher to determine rank than effectiveness some members of se of G-20. countries, find a parameter to distinguish countries when use a general formula or ory. Our main goal is to determine effectiveness of se countries, find a parameter to distinguish countries when use a general formula or ory. 2. CLUSTERING 2. CLUSTERING Various definitions of a cluster can be formulated, depending on objective of clustering. Generally, one may accept view that a cluster is a group of objects that are more similar Various to definitions one anor of than a cluster to members can be of or formulated, clustersdepending 3. The term on similarity objective should of clustering. be understood Generally, as mamatical one may accept similarity, view measured that a in cluster some is well-defined a group of sense. objects In that metric are more spaces, similar similarity to one is anor often defined than to by members means of a or distance clusters norm. 3. The Distance term similarity can be measured should be among understood data as vectors mamatical mselves, similarity, or as a measured distance from in some a data well-defined vector to some sense. prototypical In metric spaces, object of similarity cluster. is often The prototypes defined by are means usually of a not distance known norm. beforeh, Distance can are be sought measured by among clustering algorithms data vectors simultaneously mselves, or with as a distance partitioning from of a data data. vector The to prototypes some prototypical may be object vectors of of cluster. same dimension The prototypes as are data usually objects, not but known y can beforeh, also defined are as sought higherlevel geometrical algorithms objects, simultaneously such as linear with or nonlinear partitioning subspaces of or data. functions. The prototypes may be by clustering vectors of same dimension as data objects, but y can also be defined as higherlevel geometrical In our study, objects, we cluster such as G-20 linear countries or nonlinear with subspaces Euclidean or distance functions. 4 with parameters: gross domestic product per capita (GDP-PC), IMPORT (%GDP), EXPORT (%GDP), Human Development In our Index study, (HDI) we cluster 5, OPENNESS G-20 countries 6, Technology with Euclidean (TECH). distance We use 4 with data parameters: between years gross 1996 domestic product 7 per capita (GDP-PC), IMPORT (%GDP), EXPORT (%GDP), Human Development Index (HDI) 5, OPENNESS 6, Technology (TECH). We use data between years 1996 When we cluster 7 G-20 countries with Euclidean distance with parameters defined above, we have obtained five clusters. Table illustrates statistical information of five When clusters we cluster which G-20 constructed countries with with Euclidean parameters distance GDP-PC, with IMPORT, parameters EXPORT, defined above, OPENNESS, we have HDI obtained TECH. five clusters. Table illustrates statistical information of five clusters which constructed with parameters GDP-PC, IMPORT, EXPORT, OPENNESS, HDI TECH. 2 International Monetary Fund 3 Bezdek 1981; Jain Dubes International Euclidean distance Monetary d(x, Fund y) =!!!! (x! y! )! 35 Bezdek Human Development 1981; Jain Index Dubes The ratio of Import plus Export of Euclidean distance d(x, y) =!!! country over GDP 7! (x! y! ) 5 Human Development Index 6 The ratio of Import plus Export of country over GDP Volume:3, No:1, Winter

91 Table 1.1 Statistical Informations of Clusters EXPORT GDP-PC IMPORT Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 1 29,4696 7, , , ,5406 5, ,3065 7, , , ,2796 5, ,5552 2, , , ,7954 2, ,0977 5, , , ,3299 4, , , , , ,5743 4,4148 Combined 25, , , , ,5395 8,0794 Table 1.2: Statistical Informations of Clusters OPENNESS HDI TECH Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 1 0, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Combined 0, , , , , , When we cluster G-20 countries, some countries are in same cluster with hundred percentages. Table 1.3 gives information about countries which belong to a cluster with hundred percentages. Table 1.3: Countries Belong to Cluster with 100% CLUSTERS COUNTRIES Cluster 1 Australia Cluster 2 China, Russian Cluster 3 Cluster 4 USA, Japan Brazil, Indonesia Cluster 5 3 Korea, India South Africa, Saudi Arabia, However, some countries belong to clusters with different percentages. In or words, y are between clusters y are countries which are not stable with respect to clustering variables. Table 1.4, give information for countries which are between clusters. Table 1.4 indicates countries which are between Cluster 1 Cluster 2. Volume:3, No:1, Winter Table 1.4: Between Clusters 1&2 COUNTRIES CLUSTER 1 CLUSTER 2

92 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Brazil, Indonesia South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Korea, India However, some countries belong to clusters with different percentages. In or words, y are between clusters y are countries which are not stable with respect to clustering variables. Table 1.4, give information for countries which are between clusters. Table 1.4 indicates countries which are between Cluster 1 Cluster 2. Table 1.4: Between Clusters 1&2 COUNTRIES CLUSTER 1 CLUSTER 2 Germany 91.7% 8.3% France 92.3% 7.7% United Kingdom 92.3% 7.7% Italy 92.3% 7.7% Canada 92.3% 7.7% Table 1.5 indicates countries which are between Cluster 2 Cluster 5. Table 1.5: Between Clusters 2&5 COUNTRIES CLUSTER 2 CLUSTER 5 Mexico 8.3% 91.7% Turkey 8.3% 91.7% Table 1.6 indicates countries which are between Cluster 2 Cluster 4. Table 1.6: Between Clusters 2&4 COUNTRIES CLUSTER 2 CLUSTER 4 Argentina 8.3% 91.7% 3. FUZZY MODELING In computational world, re are two areas of logic: crisp logic fuzzy logic. The mamatical modeling of fuzzy concepts was presented by Zadeh 8 in Zadeh's contention is that meaning unnatural language a matter of degree. In literature, re are 8 Fuzzy Sets, Information Control 4 92 Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015

93 two kinds of justification for fuzzy system ory: (1) The real world is too complicated for precise two kinds descriptions of justification to be obtained; for fuzzy refore system ory: approximations (1) The real must world be introduced is too complicated in order to for obtain precise a reasonable, descriptions yet to trackable be obtained; model. refore (2) As approximations people tend to must technology be introduced information order to areas, obtain human a reasonable, knowledge yet in trackable a systematic model. manner (2) As people acts in tend cognitive to technology model of engineering information systems. areas, human knowledge in a systematic manner acts in cognitive model of engineering systems. A fuzzy set is represented by a membership function defined on universe of discourse. A The fuzzy universe set is of represented discourse is by a space membership where function fuzzy variables defined are on estimated. universe The of membership discourse. The function universe gives of discourse grade or is degree space of membership where fuzzy function variables within are estimated. set of any The element membership of function universe gives of discourse. grade In or degree this study; of membership we have six function fuzzy variables within (as set input of any variables) element of which are universe GDP of per discourse. capita, IMPORT, In this study; EXPORT, we have OPENNESS, six fuzzy HDI, variables TECH (as(also input parameters variables) for which clustering are GDP model). per capita, They IMPORT, can be seen EXPORT, as indicators OPENNESS, that can HDI, separate TECH (also countries parameters of G-20 for clustering five (result model). of clustering They can model). be seen In or as indicators words, we that have can six separate inputs each countries input, of we G-20 have in five five membership (result of clustering functions model). that two In of or m words, are trapezoids we have six inputs three of m each are input, triangles. we have The five trapezoid membership membership functions that functions two of represent m are trapezoids that variable three is of "extremely m are good" triangles. or "extremely The trapezoid bad". The membership triangle membership functions represent functions that represent variable that is variable "extremely is "bad", good" "good" or "extremely or "normal". bad". In addition, The triangle "normal" membership means functions variable represent value is nearly that average variable is "good" "bad", "good" means or greater "normal". than average In addition, plus "normal" one stard means deviation. variable "Bad" value means is nearly variable average values "good" are between means average greater than average minus plus one stard deviation. "Extremely "Bad" means good" means variable that values variable are between values average are greater average than minus average stard plus deviation. one stard "Extremely deviation. good" "Extremely means that bad" means variable that values variable are greater values than are smaller average than plus average one stard plus one stard deviation. deviation. "Extremely bad" means that variable values are smaller than average plus one stard deviation. We characterize each membership function by estimating border points. First, we have obtained We characterize statistical each values membership such as expected function by value, estimating maximum, border minimum, points. stard First, we deviation have obtained of each statistical input variables. values By such using as se expected values, value, we have maximum, decided minimum, borders of stard each membership deviation of function. each input Table variables. 2.1 represents By using se basic values, statistics we have of decided each variable borders (input of each & output). membership function. Table 2.1 represents basic statistics of each variable (input & output). Table 2.1: Range of Variables Table 2.1: Range of Variables MAX MIN MEAN ST.DEV GDP MAX MIN 6.01 MEAN 9.07 ST.DEV 1.31 GDP IMPORT IMPORT EXPORT EXPORT OPENNESS OPENNESS HDI HDI TECH TECH For next step of modeling, we need to define rules of model. In general for fuzzy For process; next if we step have of six modeling, input variables we need to five define membership rules of functions, model. we In have general 5 6 rules. for fuzzy process; if we have six input variables five membership functions, we have 5 6 rules. At least four input variables must be Extremely Bad to make output variable Extremely At Bad. least four We define input similar variables rules must with be respect Extremely to properties Bad to of make input variables. output variable Extremely Bad. We define similar rules with respect to properties of input variables. 5 5 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

94 We group input variables create three different fuzzy systems to find final output variable. GDP, IMPORT EXPORT variables forms first fuzzy system with same membership functions. OPENNESS HDI form second fuzzy system. The output of first fuzzy system output of second fuzzy system with TECH variable form third fuzzy system. The following table shows weights of countries belonging to five membership function between Table 2.2. Weights of Countries Countrıes Ex.bad Bad Normal Good Ex.good Argentina 0 0,15 0,77 0 0,08 Australia 0 0 0,15 0,77 0,08 Brazil 0,46 0,46 0 0,08 0 Canada ,38 0,62 China 0 0 0,62 0,23 0,15 Germany ,31 0,69 France ,54 0,46 United ,46 0,54 Kingdom India 0,85 0,08 0 0,08 0 Indonesia 0,15 0,69 0 0,08 0,08 Italy 0 0 0,38 0,54 0,08 Japan ,38 0,62 Korea 0 0 0,38 0,46 0,15 Mexico 0 0,31 0,62 0 0,08 Russian 0 0,31 0,62 0 0,08 94 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

95 Saudi Arabia 0 0,31 0,23 0 0,46 Turkey 0,08 0,54 0,31 0 0,08 United States ,54 0,46 South Arfica 0,31 0,38 0, The first row of Table 2.2 shows that Argentina belongs to NORMAL cluster for ten years, belongs to BAD cluster two years belongs to EX GOOD cluster for only one year for in range of Conclusion In this study, we cluster G-20 countries with parameters such as gross domestic product per capita (GDP-PC), IMPORT (%GDP), EXPORT (%GDP), Human Development Index (HDI), OPENNESS Technology (TECH) we found five different clusters some countries are between clusters. We can use se parameters (probabilities) when we want to differ countries in any study. One of most important discoveries in clustering analysis presents those G-20 countries can distinguish. References [1] Çakmak Zeki, Validity problem in Clustering Consideration of Results, Dumlupınar University, Journal of Social Science, Vol:3, November, 1999, pp [2] Haack S., Do we need fuzzy logic? International Journal of Man-Mach. Studies, Vol. 11, 1979, pp [3] J.F. Baldwin, E.H. Mamdani B.R. Gaines, Fuzzy Logic Fuzzy Reasoning in Fuzzy Reasoning Its Applications, London, Academic Press. [4] Masatoshi Sakawa, Fuzzy Sets Interactive Multi Objective Optimization, Newyork, Plenum Press, 1993, s. 36. [5] Mordia, K.V, J.T Biby J.M, Multivariate Analysis, Academic Press, London, [6] Patrick J.F Groenen, Uzay Kaymaky, Joost Van Rosmalen, Fuzzy Clustering with Minkowski Distance Functions, [7] Shu-Jen Chen, Chin-Lai Hwang, in collaboration with Frank P. Hwang, Fuzzy Multiple Attribute Decision Making, Germany, 1992, Springer-Verlag, s. 42. [8] Tormod Naes Bjorn Helge Mevik, The Flexibility of Fuzzy Clustering Illustrated by Examples; Journal of Chemo-metrics, [9] Van Raan F.J., Fatal attraction: Conceptual methodological problems in ranking of universities by bibliometric methods, Scientometrics, Vol 62, No.1, [10] Zadeh L.A., Fuzzy Sets Info. & Ctl, Vol Pp [11] Zadeh L.A., Fuzzy Algorithms Info. & Ctl, Vol Pp Volume:3, No:1, Winter

96 IRAN S FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH TOWARDS THE CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Mahdieh AGHAZADEH ABSTRACT: Regional cooperation is becoming important worldwide. After dissolution of Soviet Union acknowledging independence of 12 remaining republics, attention of many countries drew in this region. Neverless, Iran, as a country which has cultural historical ties with this region, also as a bridge between llocked central Asian countries Persian Gulf, is not using its strategic geopolitical situation as part of its foreign policy with focus on Central Asia Caucasus. While keeping its ties with Russia, Iran should acknowledge use its capacity to increase its bilateral relations with Central Asia Caucasus countries. It important to mention that by having an active role in Central Asia, Iran can increases its regional power. KEY WORDS: Iran s foreign policy, Central Asia Caucasus, Geopolitics, Regional Cooperation, International Relations. INTRODUCTION Iran s foreign policy in Central Asia Caucasus could be explained as policies to encounter western influence accommodate its own interest in region (Vatanka Scholar, 2012); However, Iran was not much successful in later. In order to counter western influence, Iran followed cooperative policy with Russia. Although Iran received support of Russia for important issues like Iran s nuclear program, but more active role for Iran in region is needed. Iran should balance its relation with Russia as well as gaining a foothold in Central Asia Caucasus with offering more cultural expansion economic incentives. This study provides an analytical view for answering question of what has been Iran s foreign policy approach toward Central Asia Caucasus what it should be in future. This is important because of growing importance of regional cooperation s in world. In order to answer this question, paper has been designed in four parts: first, Iran s cultural approach in her foreign policy toward Central Asia Caucasus has given. In second part political approach in third part economic approach has been evaluated. Finally, in last part conclusions are presented. 96 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

97 CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL APPROACH After dissolution of Soviet Union acknowledging independence of 12 remaining republics, attention of many countries drew in this strategic region. Central Asia include five countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kirgizstan Tajikistan which bordered with Russia from North, Iran Afghanistan from South, Caspian Sea from west China from East. Modern Day Central Asia was a great part of ancient Transoxiana, region between Amu Darya Syr Darya rivers. Transoxiana was one of satrapies of Achaemenid dynasty of Persia under name Sogdiana (Abolhassan Shirazi, pp ). According to Takmil Homayoun, from ethnic view, Arians have habituated in part of Transoxiana, but later y became under influence of Turks. At time being, except Tajiks that mostly talk in Persian language have Arian ethnic, Cultural linguistic characteristics of rest of region is similar as Turks (Takmil Homayoun, 1992, p.33). Iran has strong ethnic cultural ties with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan Uzbekistan. However, relations with Azerbaijan Uzbekistan are tough. Tajikistan has tenacious historically connections with Iran; official language of country is Tajik which is a dialect of Persian language. Hence, Iran has a possibility of developing pan-iranian tendencies in Tajikistan. According to Efegil A. Stone, Iran contributes to bringing to power a pro-iranian party in Tajikistan (Ertan Stone, 2010, p.358). Turkmenistan has been part of ancient Iran in past. Therefore, re is a cultural interconnectivity among Iranians Turkmens as well. But n despite having linguistic ties with Iranian Azeri s, Azerbaijan links with Iran is inappropriate. Because of potential threat of separatist tendencies among Iranian Azeri minorities, Iran is not favored with strong cultural ties with Azerbaijan. Furrmore, mostly pan-turkish people of Azerbaijan are somewhat hostile toward Iran (Ertan Stone, 2010, p.357). Uzbekistan official relations with Iran are also tense, but cultural ties cannot be disregarded. There are still a group of Persian speaking people living in Samark Bukhara two cities as cradle of Iranian civilization where today belongs to Uzbekistan. Atayi Shibani have summarized Iran s Cultural interests in Central Asia Caucasus as following: first, revival of Islam in region reinforcement of close 2 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

98 cultural ties with each of countries; Second, revival of Persian language among region especially in Tajikistan Uzbekistan; Third, maintaining preserving manuscripts historical remnants of ancient Iran in region; last cooperation in closing Iran s region s identity (Atayi Shibani, 2011, p.144). POLITICAL APPROACH After collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, re was a vacuum of power among new established countries in this region. The United States, as a single super power after cold war, as well as some neighbor countries like Iran Turkey tried to fill this vacuum. Although Iran had set a relatively good relation with most of Central Asian Caucasus countries, but country s foreign policy in this region can be explained as countering influence of U.S. competing with Turkey. Both Turkey Iran are trying to increase ir influence in region; however, turkey is enjoying western support as well. In her paper Turkish Iranian interests policies in South Caucasus, Evanthia Balla has well explained trends of Iranian-Turkish competition cooperation in Caucasus. She states that Armenia has developed strong political economic ties with Iran while Azerbaijan Georgia seeks to reinforce ir links with Turkey west (Evanthia, 2013). In addition, Bahram Amir Ahmadian has described Iranian close relation with Armenia as a trump card which has been frequently played in political game between west east (Amir Ahmadian, 2013). Iran has established its close relation with Armenia to confront pan-turk tendencies. Iran s supports for Armenia in Nagorno- Karabakh conflict resulted to loss of relations with Azerbaijan. In addition, supporting Armenia implicitly raised Iranian-Turkish contest, considering Turkey as a main supporter of Azerbaijan. Armenia is not only having close ties with Iran, but also with Russia. In order to naturalize American influence in region, Russia intensified its ties with Iran Armenia (Sharashenizade, 2011, p.3). Iran, on or h, emphasize on Russia s role for regions security stability. In addition, Russia was among few countries which supported Iran s nuclear program. Therefore, Iran s policy in region seldom contradicts with those of Russians. Thus, according to Svante E. Cornell, Iran s influence in region is limited because Iran follows a defensive position (E. Cornell, 2003, p.6). In or words, due 98 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

99 to Russia s desire to have more influence in Caucasus, Iran s overall engagement has decreased in Central Asia Caucasus (Alterman, et al. 2013, p.13). However, this situation can be changed due to recent Iranian-western positive negotiations over Iranian nuclear program ongoing improvement on country s relation with west. Iranian foreign policy in Central Asia has realistic policy trends as it has in Caucasus. Since Islamic revolution in 1979 idea of Exporting Islamic Revolution articulated by revolution leader- Ayatollah Khomeini, neighboring countries were alarmed by threat of political Islam. After cold war independency of Central Asian countries, fear of political Islam hindered ir relation with Iran. In addition, since 11/9 war on terrorism, U.S. became politically military involved in region. This brought about new republican s direct engagement against terrorism issue. For instant, Uzbekistan asked for U.S. security in exchange for full cooperation (E. Cornell A. Spector, 2002, pp ). Consequently, given se points, Iran s regional role has been faded. Same as in Caucasus, Turkey s involvement in Central Asia has been presented in U.S. agenda. According to Daniel Pipes Patrick Clawson, President George H. W. Bush called Turkey as a model for Central Asian newly independent republics. By large, this policy has been continued on years after. However, Turkey has much more geographically culturally limitation in Central Asia than in Caucasus (Pipes Clawson, 1992, p.9). All of which encourages Iran to work harder to enhance its image abroad so that it could have more indirect influence in Central Asia Caucasus as being a model for m instead of Turkish model. Again, recent proceedings in Iran s nuclear negotiation with west should be one more reason for country to use this opportunity set its regional st in accordance with its real great potentials. ECONOMIC APPROACH Economic situation of Central Asia is worse in compare with time it was under communism. According to CIA world Fact book, All 5 countries GDP has declined in comparison with what it was 90s. The practical approach to bring m off from this situation would be finding ways to induce Central Asian states to open ir borders to each or to outside world (Maynes, 2003, pp.2-4). Therefore, Iran s role could be bold in this regard. Iran has a special geopolitical situation as being a crossroads of transit routes from 4 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

100 Central Asia Caucasus to Persian Gulf Middle East. Llocked central Asian Central Asia Caucasus to Persian Gulf Middle East. Llocked central Asian Countries can merely access to sea through l of ir neighbors. Hence, because of Countries can merely access to sea through l of ir neighbors. Hence, because of its convenient geopolitical location, Iran is best country that can provide direct link its convenient geopolitical location, Iran is best country that can provide direct link between five central Asian countries outside world. between five central Asian countries outside world. In addition, according to Muhammad Javed, Iran s possession of huge oil gas In addition, according to Muhammad Javed, Iran s possession of huge oil gas resources is anor advantage to cooperate with Central Asia Caucasus countries. Iran resources is anor advantage to cooperate with Central Asia Caucasus countries. Iran has technical know-how in oil gas industry which is a great context for cooperation. has technical know-how in oil gas industry which is a great context for cooperation. Furrmore, region is a potential market for Iranian goods. Hence, re is a wide range Furrmore, region is a potential market for Iranian goods. Hence, re is a wide range of economic cooperation fields among Iran, Central Asia Caucasus in energy sector, of economic cooperation fields among Iran, Central Asia Caucasus in energy sector, infrastructure provision, trade commerce (Javed, 2002, pp ). infrastructure provision, trade commerce (Javed, 2002, pp ). While Iran has considerable advantages for Central Asian Caucasus countries, While Iran has considerable advantages for Central Asian Caucasus countries, it was not successful to accomplish an effective foreign policy to cooperate properly with this it was not successful to accomplish an effective foreign policy to cooperate properly with this region. A more proactive stpoint is suggested for Iran s approach toward Central Asia by region. A more proactive stpoint is suggested for Iran s approach toward Central Asia by applying policy of making trust, avoiding ambitious goals, economic development applying policy of making trust, avoiding ambitious goals, economic development giving investment incentives for Iranian businessmen s to do more investment in Central giving investment incentives for Iranian businessmen s to do more investment in Central Asia. In addition, cooperation with Central Asia Caucasus countries should increase in Asia. In addition, cooperation with Central Asia Caucasus countries should increase in Economic cooperation Organization (ECO) framework. The organizations were founded on Economic cooperation Organization (ECO) framework. The organizations were founded on 1985 by Turkey, Iran Pakistan have its headquarters in Tehran-Iran. ECO aims to 1985 by Turkey, Iran Pakistan have its headquarters in Tehran-Iran. ECO aims to meet sustainable socio-economic development for people of region. 1 Iran should play a meet sustainable socio-economic development for people of region. 1 Iran should play a dominant role in providing incentives to move region to an open market environment in dominant role in providing incentives to move region to an open market environment in which welcomes more trade less trade tariffs barriers. which welcomes more trade less trade tariffs barriers. CONCLUSIONS CONCLUSIONS Although dissolution of Soviet Union has ended competition among great powers Although dissolution of Soviet Union has ended competition among great powers but it created a new room for competition among regional powers. It is true that number of but it created a new room for competition among regional powers. It is true that number of regional powers interested in Central Asia Caucasus geopolitical advantages, but it should regional powers interested in Central Asia Caucasus geopolitical advantages, but it should note that Iran has an especial st comparing with ors. Neverless, countries have note that Iran has an especial st comparing with ors. Neverless, countries have not used its great economic geopolitical potential as well as strengn cultural links in not used its great economic geopolitical potential as well as strengn cultural links in her relation with Central Asia Caucasus countries. It is time to try to have a more her relation with Central Asia Caucasus countries. It is time to try to have a more active role for Iran in region instead of having defensive st against foreign influence. It active role for Iran in region instead of having defensive st against foreign influence. It 1 Economic Cooperation Organization s official website, 1 Economic Economic Cooperation Cooperation Organization s Organization s official official website, website, Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015

101 should be note that achieving Iran s goals in Central Asia Caucasus will not be should possible be if note Iran that undermine achieving its Iran s good relation goals in with Central Russia. Asia Hence, Iran Caucasus should will balance not its be possible policies toward if Iran both undermine keeping its its good close ties relation with with Russia Russia. increase Hence, its Iran overall should engagement balance its in policies region. toward Economic both keeping incentives its close would ties be with first Russia step in increase this regard: its overall giving engagement Central Asian in region. Caucasus Economic countries incentives more would opportunities be to first enjoy step Iran s in this great regard: geopolitical giving Central situation Asian as a transit way Caucasus for ir countries products. more The opportunities regional bridge to enjoy perspective Iran s great in Iran s geopolitical foreign situation policy as can a transit increases way Iran s for ir regional products. power The both regional in bridge Central perspective Asia, Caucasus in Iran s foreign Middle policy East can increases regions. In Iran s addition, regional Iran should power improve both in country s Central Asia, economic Caucasus basis as its groundwork Middle East for regions. being an In exclusive addition, model Iran should in region. improve With country s doing this, economic Central Asian basis countries as its groundwork would show for being ir interest an exclusive to cooperate model in more region. with Iran With mselves. doing this, Central Furrmore, Asian recent countries proceedings would show in ir Iran s interest nuclear to negotiation cooperate with more with west Iran should mselves. be one more Furrmore, reason for recent country proceedings to use this in Iran s opportunity nuclear negotiation set its regional with st west in accordance should be one with more its real reason great for potentials. country to use this opportunity set its regional st in accordance with its real great potentials. REFERENCES REFERENCES Books Books Alterman, Jon B, et al. The Turkey, Russia, Iran Nexus. Washington DC: Center for Strategic Alterman, International Jon B, Studies, et al. November The Turkey, Russia, Iran Nexus. Washington DC: Center for Strategic Javed, International Muhammad. Studies, The November emergence of Central Asian Republics ir impact on South Javed, West Muhammad. Asia -Turkey, The Iran, emergence Pakistan. of Pakistan: Central Pakistan Asian Republics Research Repository, ir impact on South Maleki, West Asia Abbas. -Turkey, Iran. Iran, in Pakistan. New Pakistan: Silk Roads: Pakistan Transport Research Repository, Trade in Greater Central Maleki, Asia. Edited Abbas. by S. Iran. Frederick in Starr, New Silk Roads: Washington Transport DC: Central Trade Asia-Caucasus in Greater Central Institute Asia. Silk Edited Road by Studies S. Frederick Program, Starr, Washington DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, Journal Articles Journal Abolhassan Articles Shirazi, Habibollah. Developing relation between Iran Central Asia Abolhassan Caucasus: Shirazi, offering Habibollah. strategies. Joghrafia Developing va Tosee relation (2005): between Iran Central Asia Atayi, Caucasus: Farhad offering Azam strategies. Shibani. Joghrafia Iran va Tosee Russia s (2005): cooperation Competition mes Atayi, in Farhad Central Asia Azam in Geopolitical Shibani. Iran frame. Central Russia s Eurasian cooperation Studies, Vol.04, Competition No.08 mes (2011): in Central Asia in Geopolitical frame. Central Eurasian Studies, Vol.04, No.08 (2011): Balla, Evanthia. Turkish Iranian interests policies in South Caucasus. Norwegian Balla, Peacebuilding Evanthia. Turkish Recourse Center Iranian (April interests 2013). policies in South Caucasus. Norwegian E. Cornell, Peacebuilding Svante Recourse Regine Center A. (April Spector. 2013). Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremist. E. Cornell, The Washington Svante Quaterly, Regine Vol.25, A. No.1 Spector. (2002): Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremist. The Washington Quaterly, Vol.25, 6 No.1 (2002): Volume:3, No:1, Winter

102 E.Cornell, Svante. Regional Politics in Central Asia: Changing Roles of Iran, Turkey, Pakistan China. SARPA Foundation (2003): Efegil, Ertan Leonard A. Stone. Iran s Interest in Central Asia: A Contemporary Assessment. Central Asian Survey, Vol.20, No.3 (2010): Laruelle, Marlene. Israel Central Asia: Opportunities Limits for Partnership in a Post-Arab Spring World. The German Marshal Found of United States (July 2012). Maynes, Charles William. America Discovers Central Asia. Foreign Affairs (April 2003). Payrouse, Sebastien Sadykzhan Ibraimov. Iran s Central Asia Temptations. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 10 (2010). Peyrouse, Sebastien. The Iranian Nuclear Crisis as Seen from Central Asia, The German Marshal Found of United States (April 2012). Pipes, Daniel Patrick Clawson. Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbors. Foreign Affairs (1992). Sadegh-Zadeh, Kaweh. Iran s Strategy in South Caucasus. Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol.2, No.1 (2008). Sharashenizade, Tornike. The Role of Iran in South Caucasus. Caucasus Analytical Digest, No.30 (October 2011). Takmil Homayoun, Naser. A review of Asia learning about Central Asia. Motaleate Asiyaye Markazi va Ghafghaz (1992). Tazmini, Ghoncheh, The Islamic Revival in Central Asia: a Potent Force or a Misconception, Central Asian Survey, Vol.20, No.1 (2001): Vatanka, Alex Adjunct Scholar, Iranian Influence in South Caucasus Surrounding Region, Middle East Institute, Vol. 10 (2012). Online Recourses Amir Ahmadian, Bahram. Iran s Opportunities Challenges in Caucasus. Iran Review, July 06, Accessed December 03, Challe nges_in_caucasus.htm. Economic Cooperation Organization s official website, Volume:3, No:1, Winter

103 Unpacking Crime over Life Course: Causes of Offending in a High Risk Sample of Women 1 Lee Ann Slocum, University of Missouri St. Louis Sally S. Simpson, University of Maryl, College, Park Unpacking Crime over Life Course: Causes of Offending in a High Risk Sample of Women Unpacking Crime over Life Course: Causes of Offending in a High Risk Sample of ABSTRACT 1 Women 1 Researchers have consistently identified a Lee direct Ann relationship Slocum, University between childhood of Missouri victimization St. Louis adult offending. Less is known Sally about S. Lee how Simpson, Ann this Slocum, early University victimization University of Maryl, operates of Missouri College, toger St. Louis Park with later life experiences to influence offending Sally S. Simpson, substance University use in of adulthood. Maryl, In College, this research, Park ABSTRACT we first examine independent effects of recent negative life experiences (exposure to Researchers severe ABSTRACT stress, have dangerous consistently neighborhood identified conditions, a direct relationship interpersonal between conflict, childhood victimization) victimization childhood Researchers adult offending. victimization have consistently Less adult known identified offending about a direct how this relationship drug early use. victimization We between n assess childhood operates wher toger victimization drug with use later serves adult life as experiences offending. a link between to Less influence is known stressful offending about how traumatic this substance early life victimization use experiences in adulthood. operates In or toger this research, types with of we offending. later first life experiences examine These questions to independent influence are offending addressed effects of using recent substance data negative from use in a life adulthood. multi-site experiences study In this (exposure called research, to severe Women s we first stress, examine Experiences dangerous independent with neighborhood Violence effects Project, conditions, of recent which interpersonal negative examines life conflict, experiences personal, victimization) situational, (exposure to childhood community-level severe stress, victimization dangerous factors on neighborhood that adult are offending associated conditions, drug with interpersonal use. women s We n conflict, assess violent victimization) wher offending drug use serves victimization. childhood as victimization a link We find between that on adult both stressful recent offending negative traumatic drug experiences use. life We experiences n childhood assess wher victimization or types drug use are of offending. associated serves as with a These link increased questions between offending stressful are addressed drug traumatic using use in data adulthood. life from experiences a Moreover, multi-site re study or is called types evidence of Women s that offending. drug use Experiences These mediates questions both with Violence are long- addressed Project, short-term using which data effects examines from of strain a multi-site personal, non-violent study situational, offending. called community-level This Women s work Experiences highlights factors with need that Violence for are researchers Project, associated which to with study examines women s causes personal, violent of offending situational, offending within victimization. context community-level of personal We factors find histories that that both recent are to recognize associated negative that experiences with effects women s of childhood violent victimization experiences offending can are associated carry victimization. over into with We adulthood. increased find that offending both recent negative drug use experiences in adulthood. Moreover, childhood re victimization is evidence are that associated drug use with mediates increased both offending long- short-term drug use in effects adulthood. of strain Moreover, on non-violent re is offending. evidence This that drug work use highlights mediates both need long- for researchers short-term to study effects of causes strain on of non-violent offending within offending. Introduction context This work of personal highlights histories need for to researchers recognize that to study effects causes of childhood of offending experiences within can Traditionally, carry context over of into personal study adulthood. histories of crime has to been recognize synonymous that with effects of study childhood of men. experiences However in can last carry thirty over years, into adulthood. re has been a growing interest in understing female offending. The work I am presenting today explores this issue by examining how women s life experiences, both Introduction as children adults, shape ir involvement in criminal behavior drug use. We are Introduction Traditionally, particularly interested study of crime in has influence been synonymous of traumatic with study stressful of men. experiences, However in like victimization. Traditionally, last thirty years, re study has of crime been has a growing been synonymous interest in understing with study of female men. offending. However in The work last thirty I am years, presenting re today has been explores a growing this issue interest by examining understing how women s female life offending. experiences, The In both work as I United am children presenting States adults, over today explores shape last ir 30 this years involvement issue by number examining criminal of women how behavior women s involved life in drug experiences, use. criminal We justice both are particularly as system children has interested surged. adults, From in shape 1980 ir influence to involvement 2011, of traumatic in number criminal of behavior women stressful in experiences, prison drug increased use. like We almost are victimization. particularly 600 percent interested (Phillips, in 2012) influence in 2012, of traumatic over 200,000 stressful women were experiences, incarcerated like (Carson victimization. Golinelli, 2013). While number of men in prison also increased dramatically during In United this period, States over increase last for 30 women years is nearly number 1.5 of times women that involved for men in (637% criminal versus 419%) In justice United (Phillips, system States has 2012). surged. over From last years to 2011, number number of women of women involved prison in increased criminal almost justice system 600 percent has surged. (Phillips, From 2012) 1980 to in 2011, 2012, over number 200,000 of women women in were prison incarcerated increased (Carson almost 600 percent Golinelli, (Phillips, 2013). While 2012) number in 2012, of men over in 200,000 prison also women increased were dramatically incarcerated (Carson during this period, Golinelli, 2013). increase While for women number is nearly of men 1.5 in times prison that also for increased men (637% dramatically versus during 419%) (Phillips, this period, 2012). increase for women is nearly 1.5 times that for men (637% versus 419%) (Phillips, 2012). 1 This research was supported by a grant from National Consortium on Violence Research (NCOVR) to professors Julie Horney, Sally Simpson, Rosemary Gartner, Cace Kruttschnitt. 1 Volume:3, No:1, Winter This research was supported by a grant from National Consortium on Violence Research (NCOVR) to 1 professors This research Julie was Horney, supported Sally by Simpson, a grant Rosemary from National Gartner, Consortium Cace on Kruttschnitt. Violence Research (NCOVR) to professors Julie Horney, Sally Simpson, Rosemary Gartner, Cace Kruttschnitt. 1

104 2 Research indicates that two mes figure prominently into lives of crime-involved women. The first me is victimization. Almost half of female offenders in United States reported that y had been victim of physical or sexual abuse, a higher rate of victimization than observed in general population (Ekstr, 1999). Like female offenders, male offenders have high rates of childhood victimization (Widom, 1989; Widom Maxfield, 2001), but re is some evidence that physical sexual abuse may be particularly salient for females who commit crime. For example, girls are more likely to link ir delinquent behavior to childhood abuse than boys (Belknap Holsinger, 2006). A second defining factor of female offenders in United States is ir high rates of drug use. Approximately 60 percent of women in state prisons jails reported using drugs in month prior to ir arrest approximately half reported using drugs on a daily basis (Greenfeld Snell, 1999). While substance abuse is prevalent among all offenders, women incarcerated in state prisons report higher levels of use compared to ir male counterparts, regardless of how drug use is measured (Greenfeld Snell, 1999). Improving outcomes for women offenders begins by targeting ir history of victimization drug use. But to do so, we need to underst mechanisms through which se factors interact to influence offending. The purpose of this study is to examine how women s experiences in childhood adulthood interact to influence ir levels patterns of offending drug use. We divide se experiences into two categories based on when y occurred. First we examine carryover effects of early childhood experiences, which we call distal factors. Given high rates of abuse reported by female offenders, we focus on childhood victimization. However, adult experiences also matter; even serious offenders do not spend all ir time engaging in crime. Much offending is intermittent current life circumstances influence wher a women is offending at a particular time in her life. We call se recent circumstances that influence movement into out of offending proximal causes y can include things like periods of unemployment or living with a male partner. Unlike distal factors, which are expected to have an enduring effect on problem behavior, effects of proximal factors are immediate short-lived. In this work, proximal factors we focus on include short-term changes in exposure to stressful life experiences (including negative life events, victimization, interpersonal conflict, living in unsafe neighborhoods). Finally, we also explore wher drug use serves as a link between stressful traumatic life experiences or types of offending. Before I describe this research, it is important to discuss why we think victimization stressful life experiences should affect offending drug use. 104 Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015

105 3 The link between women s victimization in childhood ir adult offending has been explained by pathways perspective. The pathways perspective describes various developmental processes through which negative consequences of abuse accumulate over time (Brennan et al., 2012; Daly, 1994; Simpson, Yahner, Dugan, 2008). In one path, link between childhood victimization adult offending is alienation from parents support y provide. Girls who are abused are more likely to run away from ir homes at an early age. These girls develop mental health problems like depression, y use drugs to help m deal with se issues. In adulthood, y support mselves ir drug habit through offending. Or women end up offending in adulthood because childhood victimization causes m to have difficulty controlling ir emotions behavior. These girls respond to abuse by acting out in school engaging in delinquency. Over time, y develop an aggressive demeanor which eventually leads to offending. While pathways perspective focuses on enduring impact of childhood victimization, or ories, like General Strain Theory (GST), are concerned with more immediate effects of negative life experiences. The essence of GST is that when individuals experience strain, which is defined as being treated in an unjust manner, it generates negative emotions (Agnew, 1992). Some people cope with se negative emotions using illicit means. For example, victim of violence may feel anger or fear y may try to get rid of se negative emotions by using drugs or retaliating against ir attacker. One main difference between GST pathways perspective is that GST tends to focus on immediate impact of stressors. For example, GST would predict that women should be more likely to offend use drugs in months when y experience strain (Slocum, Simpson, Smith, 2005). Not all strains are equally likely to results in offending. Strains that are most criminogenic tend to be severe, chronic, clustered toger in time include things like violent victimization, chronic interpersonal conflict, living in unsafe neighborhood (Agnew 1992, 2001). Drawing on se two perspectives, this research explores several interrelated questions. First, as hyposized by pathways perspective, are women who were victimized in childhood more likely to offend use drugs compared to those who were not victimized? Second, in accordance with GST, during months in which a woman is exposed to stressors, is she more likely to offend or use drugs relative to months when she is not exposed to stressors? Finally, what is role of substance use in explaining link between victimization/or stressful life experiences offending? Volume:3, No:1, Winter

106 METHODS / DATA We address se questions with survey data collected from a diverse sample of female inmates who were interviewed in United States Canada. These interviews were conducted as part of Women s Experiences with Violence (WEV) project, which uses mixed-methods to document neighborhood, personal, situational contingencies surrounding women s violent victimization offending. The survey covered a wide range of topics including women s background early life experiences such as victimization in childhood. We also collected data on women s recent life experiences. These data were gared using a life event calendar, which was used to collect information on each of 36 months before respondents current incarceration period (see Morris Slocum, 2010). We asked about monthly changes in life circumstances like living arrangements employment. We also asked m to report month-to-month changes in offending, substance use, neighborhood conditions severe stressors. In addition, women were asked to identify months in which y experienced violent victimization or serious interpersonal conflicts. These data allow us to examine short-term interplay between stressful life experiences that occurred early later in life offending over time. SAMPLE In this study we used data from 695 incarcerated or jailed women who collectively provided information about more than 20,000 months of ir lives immediately prior to ir confinement. They had been charged with a wide variety of offenses, but predominant charges were related to drugs or alcohol. Although we cannot generalize our findings to all women, or even all incarcerated women, our data allows us to explore interplay between child abuse, recent stressors offending for female offenders. This could not be done with a sample taken from general population due to low base rates. The sample is racially diverse. 46% of women self-identified as black, 40% as white, 10% as Native American, while remaining 4% identified mselves as some or race or ethnicity. The age of respondents ranged from 18 to 62 women were on average 34 years of age. 106 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

107 VARIABLES We studied women s monthly involvement in three types of illegal behavior. Violent offending includes things like robbery physical attacks. Non-violent offending is comprised of behaviors like ft drug dealing. Finally, regular drug use measures wher respondent reported that she used serious drugs on at least a weekly basis. The women reported engaging in violence in approximately 6 percent of ir months on street (5.6%). As expected, women in our sample were far more likely to engage in non-violent crime, than to use violence. The women reporting engaging in non-violent crime in half of months in which y were on street (50%), most commonly involvement in drug trade (31% of street-months), followed by property crime (18% of street-months) prostitution (15% of street-months). Regular, serious drug use is equally as prevalent (46% of street-months). We include measures of three different types of childhood victimization: Sexual, physical psychological. Sexual victimization was least prevalent: 25 percent of sample reported experiencing some form of sexual victimization before 6 th grade. Physical psychological aggression was more common, occurring in 33 percent 40 percent of sample, respectively. And finally, we have four measures that capture women s exposure to recent stressors. Our first measure captures number of different stressful life experiences respondents reported in a given month. Our second variable measures unsafe neighborhood conditions. This is a three item scale with higher values indicating respondent perceived her community as more dangerous. We include measures of victimization interpersonal conflict because y are considered to be particularly criminogenic. Victimization is a count of number of times respondent reported being victim of violence in month. However, not all serious interpersonal conflict results in violence, so we also capture near violence, or incidents in which respondent thought violence was likely to occur, but for some reason it did not. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS We analyze our data using multilevel analysis. This technique allow us to simultaneously examine differences in offending between women as well as how a woman s level of offending changes over time. In our models, we control for a wide-range of variables that have been linked to offending including, race, age, employment, participation in treatment. Volume:3, No:1, Winter

108 Our first set of analyses explored carryover effects of childhood victimization on adult offending. We find that victimization in childhood exerts a significant influence on offending even in adulthood. The long-term negative effects of sexual abuse are especially pervasive; women who were sexually victimized were more likely to engage in all three types of illegal behaviors that we studied. Additional analyses indicated that relationship between sexual abuse non-violent offending is explained by drug use. This suggests women who were abused in childhood are more likely to use drugs in adulthood. In turn y engage in nonviolent crime, like drug dealing, in order to fund ir drug habit. We also found that women who were exposed to more severe physical abuse were more likely to engage in violence. Psychological abuse has no effect on any of types of offending we looked at. Next we explored wher short-term changes in exposure to stressors are related to women s movement in out of offending. We find that recent life experience also matter. Women are more likely to offend use drugs in months when y experience stressors, but certain stressors are related to certain types of offending. For example, violence is related only to negative life events, while property crime is more likely when women live in unsafe neighborhoods experience repeated interpersonal conflict. Drug use is linked to all three of se types of stressors. Once again, we see that drug use mediates relationship between two types of stressors (stressful life experiences, interpersonal conflict) offending, suggesting that women in our sample are likely to cope with stress by using drugs money to buy drugs is obtained through illegal means. DISCUSSION Consistent with our expectations, our study shows that deleterious consequences of childhood victimization especially sexual victimization carry over into adulthood. This form of abuse was associated with higher levels of both violent non-violent offending substance use. The results suggest that, consistent with a pathways perspective, sexual abuse creates long term mental health issues women may self-medicate with drugs. In turn drugs create an economic imperative that leads women to engage in nonviolent crime, like ft, prostitution, drug dealing, to fund ir habit. The effect of sexual victimization on violence, however, cannot be explained by drug use. The mechanism linking this form of victimization to violence in adulthood is likely inability to regulate emotions reactions to stress (Daly s harmed harming pathway, 1994) or deficient social processing such as a bias toward attributing hostile intentions to ors (Dodge, Bates, Pettit, 1990). We also found that women who were physically victimized in childhood were more violent as adults, but this form of abuse was not related to or types of offending. This suggests that effects of physical abuse may operate through a different pathway than sexual victimization, such early aggressive behavior or alcohol use (Widom, Schuck, White, 2006). 108 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

109 Above beyond childhood experiences, exposure to stressors in adulthood can account for women moving in out crime. Once again, drug use plays a central role in explaining short-term changes in offending. Drug use is related to widest variety of stressors. Moreover it mediates effect of stress on non-violent offending. These results suggest that programs that seek to reduce women s offending should address ir early victimization experiences. Ideally, childhood victimization should be identified early youth should receive help in dealing with negative consequences of this experience. In addition, teaching women pro-social strategies for managing stressors y encounter in ir daily lives, including interpersonal conflict, may also help to reduce ir involvement in drug use offending. Coping skills training has been identified as a successful strategy for reducing likelihood an inmate will re-offend after release (Lipsey Wilson, 1998). These coping skills could be behavioral, cognitive, or emotional in nature (Agnew, 1992). For example, female inmates could be taught problem solving skills that would help m to take prosocial actions directed at reducing source of ir stress. This form of behavioral coping has generally been found to be effective at reducing negative emotions that might lead to crime. REFERENCES Agnew, Robert. (1992). Foundation for a general strain ory of crime delinquency. Criminology 30: Agnew, Robert. (2001). Building on foundation of general strain ory: Specifying types of strain most likely to lead to crime delinquency. Journal of Research in Crime Delinquency 38: Agnew, Robert, (2006). Pressured into Crime: An Overview of General Strain Theory. Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing Company. Belknap, Joanne, Kristi Holsinger. (2006). The gendered nature of risk factors for delinquency. Feminist Criminology 1: Brennan, Tim, Markus Breitenbach, William Dieterich, Emily J. Salisbury, Patricia Van Voorhis. (2012). Women s pathways to serious habitual crime: A person-centered analysis incorporating gender responsive factors. Criminal Justice Behavior 39: Carson, E Ann., Daniela Golinelli. (2013). Prisoners in 2012: Trends in Admissions Releases, Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Volume:3, No:1, Winter

110 8 Daly, K. (1994). Gender, Crime, Punishment. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Dodge, Kenneth A., John E. Bates, Gregory S. Pettit. (1990). Mechanisms in cycle of violence. Science 250: Greenfeld, Lawrence A., Tracy L. Snell. (1999). Women Offenders. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Lipsey, Mark W., David B. Wilson. (1998). Effective intervention for serious juvenile offenders: A synsis of research. In Serious Violent Juvenile Offenders: Risk Factors Successful Interventions, Rolf Loeber, David P. Farrington (Eds.), Thous Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Morris, Nancy A., Lee Ann Slocum. (2010). The validity of self-reported prevalence, frequency, timing of arrest: An evaluation of data collected using a life event calendar. Journal of Research in Crime Delinquency 47: Phillips, Susan D. (2012). Fact Sheet: Incarcerated Women. The Sentencing Project. Accessed online Simpson, Sally S., Jennifer L. Yahner, Laura Dugan. (2008). Understing women's pathways to jail: Analyzing lives of incarcerated women. Australian & New Zeal Journal of Criminology 41: Slocum, Lee Ann, Sally S. Simpson, Douglas A. Smith. (2005). Strained lives crime: Examining intra- individual variation in strain offending in a sample of incarcerated women. Criminology 43: Teague, Rosie, Paul Mazerolle, Margot Legosz, Jennifer Serson. (2008). Linking childhood exposure to physical abuse adult offending: Examining mediating factors gendered relationships. Justice Quarterly 25: Widom, Cathy Spatz. (1989). Child abuse, neglect, violent criminal behavior. Criminology 27: Widom, Cathy Spatz, Amie M. Schuck, Helene Raskin White. (2006). An examination of pathways from childhood victimization to violence: The role of early aggression problematic alcohol use. Violence Victims 21: Volume:3, No:1, Winter 2015

111 Students Social Mobility in Dialogue of Education Culture in Modern University. Students Social Mobility in Dialogue of Education Culture in Modern Students Social Mobility in Dialogue University. of Education Culture in Modern Leila Munirova University. Education Department, UNESCO chair, Leila Munirova M.Akmullah Bashkir State Pedagogical Education Department, UNESCO Leila Munirova University chair, M.Akmullah Education Bashkir Department, State Pedagogical UNESCO University chair, M.Akmullah Bashkir State Pedagogical University Abstract Abstract The paper analyzes problem of student mobility within dialogue of cultures Abstract education in Bashkortostan within UNESCO evaluation in structure of modern The paper analyzes problem of student mobility within dialogue of cultures The pedagogical education paper in analyzes university, Bashkortostan ory problem within of technology student UNESCO mobility of social evaluation within mobility in dialogue in higher structure of cultures educational of modern education community. pedagogical in Bashkir university, Bashkortostan State Pedagogical ory within University technology UNESCO named of evaluation after social mobility in M. Akmullah in structure is working higher educational of modern to community. pedagogical coordinate Bashkir university, UNESCO State ory movement, Pedagogical transnational technology University of education named social after mobility in universities M. Akmullah in higher is educational schools of working to coordinate community. Bashkortostan Bashkir in UNESCO State context movement, Pedagogical of mechanisms transnational University for integration named education after social in M. universities Akmullah educational is working activities. schools of to Bashkortostan coordinate The papers focus in UNESCO is on border-crossing cultural research of social mobility process in context movement, of mechanisms transnational for integration education social in universities educational schools activities. of Bashkortostan modern university, globally open to students youth from all areas in large field of The papers focus in is on context border-crossing of mechanisms cultural for integration research of social social educational mobility process activities. in The global education cultural diversity. modern papers university, focus is globally on border-crossing open to students cultural research youth from of all areas social in mobility large process field of in global modern Keywords: education university, modern globally university cultural open diversity. to students youth from all areas in large field of,social mobility, cultural diversity, cross-cultural management, global education cultural diversity. higher education, educational environment, comparative education, professional competences, Keywords: modern university,social mobility, cultural diversity, cross-cultural management, cultural studies as interdisciplinary transnational currents, implementation evaluation higher Keywords: education, modern educational university environment,,social mobility, comparative cultural diversity, education, cross-cultural professional competences, management, of educational programmes of UNESCO. cultural higher education, studies as educational interdisciplinary environment, transnational comparative currents, education, implementation professional competences, evaluation of cultural educational studies programmes as interdisciplinary of UNESCO. transnational currents, implementation evaluation of educational programmes of UNESCO. Introduction Introduction Modern education is characterized by development, integration of social mobility Introduction in dialogue of cultures of East West. Cultural educational environment of higher Modern education is characterized by development, integration of social mobility education in dialogue Modern requires of education appropriate cultures is of characterized solutions East West. by to Cultural ensure development, aunticity educational integration of Bashkir environment of social education of mobility higher necessary education in dialogue to enter requires of cultures national appropriate of East education solutions West. in to Cultural general ensure aunticity educational context of environment European trends of Bashkir education of higher of globalization. necessary education to requires Bashkir enter appropriate State Pedagogical national solutions University education to in ensure named general aunticity after M. Akmullah is working to context of of European Bashkir education trends of coordinate UNESCO's education in universities schools of Bashkortostan, to promote globalization. necessary to enter Bashkir State national Pedagogical education University in general named after context M. Akmullah of European is working trends of to coordinate globalization. UNESCO's Bashkir State education Pedagogical in universities University named schools after of M. Bashkortostan, Akmullah is to working promote to coordinate UNESCO's education in universities 1 schools of Bashkortostan, to promote Volume:3, No:1, Winter

112 UNESCO programmes within dialogue of cultures, cross-border cooperation in multicultural diversity of youth activity. Solidarity multiculturalism in Republic of Bashkortostan is studied as ethno social portrait of modern youth in collaboration with International Organization TURKSOY as strengning developing cooperation in education, culture sport of Turkic-speaking countries promotion of ethnic education through intercultural dialogue. [1] The study of ethno social portrait of modern youth of Bashkortostan supports integration of scientific research, improving system of establishing internal external relationships in science, education, culture arts, media, communication, sports tourism. Particular attention is paid to formation of civic consciousness, culture, peace ethnic harmony, which is illuminated by solidarity multiculturalism of modern youth in Republic of Bashkortostan. [3] The aim of our investigation is development of social mobility of students in context of Cultures Education. More specific objectives of project are following: - Training future teacher in knowledge of UNESCO movement transnational education in modern Pedagogical University; - Development socialization social skills among youth, awareness of similarities differences in social problems in different European Asian countries; - The academic social mobility, professors, postgraduates students exchanges so that to make university a region of peace, cooperation, prosperity harmony; - Inviting private-lecturers leading scientists for presenting master classes within transnational education of sport culture; - carrying out joint scientific conferences, workshops seminars, develop mutual exchanges cooperation in fields of culture, art, education, science, technologies, health, tourism, sport or social humanitarian spheres; - organizing panel discussions seminars of UNESCO within context Ethno cultural education: historical traditions cultural features ; 112 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

113 - providing organizational technical support of realization joint scientific, projects, maintaining global regional stability through academic research, policy consultation, professional training, cultural communication; - Initiating International Festivals of languages peoples Historical memory in dialogue of cultures ",creating favorable conditions for studying languages cultures; - Creating tourist regional routes Etnosocialisation of young people in multicultural learning community ; - Development realization of joint students educational programs, UNESCO actions on youth for , innovative youth-led youth-oriented projects; - Organizing Summer schools International Youth Days within transnational education; - Carrying out Olympic sessions in dialogue of cultures global education of East West; - Organizing Web-seminars, on-lines conferences, Intel-programs, e-learning, mobilepedagogy weeks, SMART schools within project Youth in modern learning community ; - Expressing potential interest to support specific action projects with private public sector partners Youth social inclusion: civic engagement, dialogue skills development, youth-moderated interactive debates; - Establishment Capacity-building workshops offered in fields of competence of UNESCO (communication, education, culture, sciences) notably placing an accent on developing projects; - Exchanging sharing of know-how of experiences of young women men from different backgrounds, career paths from all EURAS countries regions of world; - Interaction through numerous capacity-building sessions, plenary discussions, workshops on modern university topics, as well as one-to-one coaching mentoring made available by partners. The oretical methodological basis of study is anthropological, cultural, systematic, comparative competitive approaches to comparative education. Comparative pedagogy reveals positive negative aspects of international teaching experience, methods forms of mutual enrichment of national cultures in 3 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

114 teaching innovative educational activities. Theoretical methodological basis for comparative studies are specific historical, cultural, ethno-psychological, civilizational approaches to comparative education educational ory practice in various countries regions (D. Badarch, N.V. Bondarevskaya, B. L. Wulfson, A.N. Dzhurinsky, V.P. Lapchinskaya, Z.A. Malkova, N.D. Nikrov; Yearbook of Education (Columbia University), International Yearbook Training Education, International Journal of Teachers (Germany), Comparative Education, The world of education ( Le Monde Education ), Review of Comparative Education ).[2] The implementation of comparative approach promotes students' understing laws of development global educational research, strategies trends of teacher education in modern world. This helps students to master ways of implementing research position in ir professional activities as improvement of quality assurance system of higher education. The innovative constructions allow creating comparative studies in framework of modern pedagogical university as a center for integration of science education, international cooperation in modern world global society in context of grant policy, cultural exchanges, programmes of UNESCO, IREX, Fulbright, DAAD, Work Travel, International Exhibitions Education Abroad, SALTO-Youth programmes. [4] The realization of comparative approach promotes students' professional competence. Theoretical methodological basis for comparative studies are specific historical, cultural, ethno-psychological, civilizational approaches to comparative education cross-cultural management (educational ory practice in various countries regions, UNESCO-UNITWIN chairs, a network of UNESCO Associated Schools, Education for All, Bologna Process). The UNESCO center "Social mobility of students within dialogue of cultures in global education" coordinates UNESCO education in universities schools of Bashkortostan, including best practices of UNESCO in educational 114 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

115 activities of universities, schools adapting best cross-cultural programmes relevant to challenges of UNESCO National Education. [5] The UNESCO movement in Pedagogical University is positioned in following transnational context: 1. Education as promotion of UNESCO movement for middle high schools of Bashkortostan within dialogue of cultures, inter-university cooperation of UNESCO Chairs, UNESCO Associated Schools Network, achievement Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), a program "Education for all, participation in Bologna process, European education, European Credit Transfer System (ECTS), integration of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Center of Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies. 2.Science as participation in scientific researches, international programmes of UNESCO, grants, projects, conferences forums in development of international national mobility. The organization of international conferences, festivals, forums in universe of EURAS, TURKSOY as Turkic-speaking education cooperation, nomination of Youth Unity of Bashkortostan such as "UNESCO international Education in modern school of Republic of Bashkortostan", "Socio-cultural adaptation of Turkish-speaking students in educational environment of modern university." 3.Culture as a research investigation of socio-cultural portrait of future teachers in regional educational environment, individual trajectories of social adaptation of migrant students, study of problems of ethnic culture intercultural communication, youth subculture, ethno-socialization of young people in education of Republic of Bashkortostan (TURKSOY, Ministry of Culture of Bashkortostan, House of Peoples' Friendship of Republic of Bashkortostan, The National Assembly - Kurultai). Sharing historical cultural heritage in international cultural exchange programmes of UNESCO in Turkic world, education activities of TURKSOY House of Friendship of Peoples in Bashkortostan, AIESEC, international exhibition "Education abroad" international cultural 5 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

116 festivals, international drama festivals of Turkic-speaking peoples "Tuganlyk", musical creativity of Turkic youth "Ural-mono, Ural-Batyr". 4. Sport tourism as a great process of socialization within national sports educational environment, Olympic education, inclusive education, museum ethnographic tourism, mountain, water, skiing tourism, sport culture festivals (Ministry of Youth Policy, Sport Tourism). Identification of high school as an international sport, cultural entertainment tourism center, development a common strategy of cooperation in dialogue of culture sport. 5. Information communication as integration of media-communicative education within UNESCO Global MIL Assessment Framework, creation of electronic textbooks educational portals, web-sites of sustainable society development (The Youth Unity of Russia Bashkortostan), publication of books, articles in dialogue of cultures civilizations of East West, participation in comparative education webinars. The simulation of social mobility within competent format of culture sport provides following typology of competences: Cognitive competences: The main regularities of formation development of education culture in modern world; The object subject of Comparative Education as a science; The pedagogical works in comparative pedagogy, pedagogical patterns models; The innovative model of learning in foreign countries, criteria for international accreditation of quality of educational programs; Rating of international cultural educational centers in Russia, Bashkortostan abroad; 116 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

117 Social competences: Describing main trajectories of world education culture in global, regional national levels; Determining value of international experience within education system in Russia Bashkortostan; Designing educational process on modern cross-cultural concepts of foreign countries. Personal competences: Research positions in professional improvement of quality assurance system of higher education; A system of methods modalities for innovative educational cultural processes in context of transforming functions of Comparative Education. The center organizes teacher training courses " The UNESCO movement in modern rural schools in context of main issues in modern education cultures in context of international UNESCO development "Trends in development of UNESCO education in modern world", "Multicultural education, world culture education", "Human Rights in Education", "UNESCO world education in different countries", activities of scientific educational resource center of UNESCO in M. Akmullah Bashkir State Pedagogical University. The university pays a special attention to development of tolerance which requires study of individual student's social portrait of Turkic-speaking students in modern schools of Bashkortostan. The projects involve comparative analysis of adaptation in Russia foreign higher education in Republic of Bashkortostan in dialogue of cultures civilizations of East West. [6] The center cooperates with leading universities in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kaliningrad, Kazan, Yekaterinburg, Yakutsk implementing innovative projects of UNESCO in network of universities UNESCO Chairs of EURAS countries in 7 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

118 sphere of education to provide innovative high school renovation improvement of educational policy. The particular attention is paid to formation of civic consciousness, world culture interethnic harmony, which is illuminated by media (participation in TV programs All Ufa, radio programmes "Yuldash"). The socio-pedagogical project "Solidarity, memory, identity" serves as realization of civic engagement, integration in a multicultural society, social mobility, youth ethno-socialization in a multicultural educational environment (school principals, leaders of rural communities, heads of rural cultural houses, directors of museums), as well as transferring a scientific knowledge of cultural educational institutions. [7] Students, undergraduates postgraduates of Bashkir State Pedagogical University named after M. Akmullah have an opportunity to take part in conferences, round tables, workshops on social academic mobility in structure of teacher competent approach to education. The innovative models allow doing comparative studies within framework of modern pedagogical university as a center of integration within science, education, culture, arts sports as well as international cooperation in modern world learning society. Also comparative studies are held in context of grant policy international cultural exchange programmes of UNESCO EURAS, education within activities of TURKSOY, House of Friendship of Peoples transnational organizations. There were published following monographs: "Methodology of ethnopedagogy" (Prof. Gayazov A.), "Comparative Education", "Training of a professional competence of future teachers in educational environment of modern university", "UNESCO within Education Cultures in Modern Pedagogical University", "International academic mobility programmes Associated UNESCO schools» also some articles on UNESCO problems in context of modern education culture.[8] Conclusion: The paper focuses on methodology, ory technology of cross-cultural management in education, ethnic religious tolerance intercultural dialogue 118 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

119 strengning of ethnic cultural unity of peoples of Bashkortostan. There are organized projects, programmes in integration of festivals in modern Education, Culture Sport (creating social mobility of students in dialogue of cultures sport, a personality socialization in sport - educational environment ("Professional competence of future teacher in educational environment of university," "Comparative Education in dialogue of cultures peoples of world "," Social Portrait of modern Turkic-speaking youth )) so that to share best practice examples instigate youth debates on intercultural diversity in UNESCO EURAS learning community. References: [1]A.Gayazov, The construction of "Education through life" innovative development of modern educational system, Education: Tradition Innovation, no.1, pp.31-36, [2]D. Johnson, R. Johnson, Cooperative Learning in Classroom. Learning toger alone: Cooperative, competitive, individualistic learning.boston: Allyn & Bacon. Johnson Holubec, [3]R.Munirov, Local Studies as a School Subject. Ufa, Vagant, [4]L.Munirova, Academic Student Mobility within Dialogue of Cultures Sport Education in Bashkortostan, in Proceedings of 2nd INTERNATIONAL HIGHER EDUCATION CONGRESS: YOK-2011, May21-23, 2011, Istanbul, Turkey, 2011.pp [5]L. Munirova, A. Rainis, Academic mobility of students in dialogue of culture sport, in Proceedings of international scientific conference Academic Mobility: Challenges Prospects :May19-21, 2011, St. Petersburg, Russia, 2011.pp [6]L. Munirova, A. Rainis, Ethnic tolerance of Turkic students in sports educational environment of university, in Proceedings of 2nd International 9 Volume:3, No:1, Winter

120 Forum "Strategy for interaction of educational institutions employers" Parliamentary Assembly of States - members of Commonwealth of Independent States: November 25-27, Saint-Petersburg State University of Service economy. Sheffield Hallam University (UK), 2011.pp [7]L. Munirova, A. Rainis, Social Portrait of physical culture teachers in modern rural school, in Proceedings of 2nd International Congress Modern problems of physical training education : 27-29,2011, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Kaliningrad,Russia, 2011.pp [8]Overcoming Inequality: Why Governance Matters, EFA Global Monitoring Report. OXFORD University Press: UNESCO Publishing, France Volume:3, No:1, Winter