NATA appreciates the opportunity to comment on the recent proposal on Part 145 Repair Station Regulations.

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1 April 13, 2007 Docket Management Facility U. S. Department of Transportation 400 Seventh Street, SW Nassaf Building Room PL-401 Washington, DC RE: DOCKET NO. FAA ; 14 CFR 145 REPAIR STATION; PROPOSED RULE The National Air Transportation Association (NATA), the voice of aviation business, is the public policy group representing the interests of aviation businesses before Congress, federal agencies and state governments. NATA's 2,000 member companies own, operate and service aircraft. These companies provide for the needs of the traveling public by offering services and products to aircraft operators and others such as fuel sales, aircraft maintenance, parts sales, storage, rental, airline servicing, flight training, Part 135 ondemand air charter, fractional aircraft program management and scheduled commuter operations in smaller aircraft. NATA members are a vital link in the aviation industry providing services to the general public, airlines, general aviation and the military. NATA appreciates the opportunity to comment on the recent proposal on Part 145 Repair Station Regulations. It is the opinion of the members of the NATA Aircraft Maintenance and System Technology Committee that any clarifications, changes or interpretations based on these comments or the comments of other contributors must be defined through regulation and supported by explanations included in revisions to the relevant preamble. In recent history, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has written several regulations with little depth in both the regulatory language and the related preamble. In some instances, the FAA indicated in answers to comments that an issue would be further explained in guidance and has attempted to expand on the true requirements of the rule through internal guidance and advisory material. This is not an appropriate response to comments to a NPRM. This practice has caused two serious and costly issues, as follows: This practice has caused a lack of standardization and stability. This practice has significant financial implications. Some examples are; The recent change in longstanding policy regarding eligibility of aircraft to operate under a FAR (a)(1) program (Although this is based on an old regulation, recent policy contradicting longstanding policy and we believe regulation, has changed the interpretation ); The FAR 145 training program, which is still being debated at each CHDO. In one case, a training program was accepted at three locations without question and denied at one other, with concerns that it did not meet some extraneous portions of the FAA Order.

2 The recent interpretation of the term maintenance regarding cabin entertainment equipment. In a FAA memo, it is stated that repair of cabin entertainment equipment is not considered maintenance. This conflicts with Part 1 and 43 and now this proposed regulation and preamble indicating that cabin entertainment equipment falls under the proposed Avionics rating. If not maintenance, it would not fall within any rating. Industry cannot afford to spend money on personnel, equipment, processes, etc. without regulatory stability. Also, redefining or changing the legal interpretation through guidance circumvents the requirement of the NPRM process and industry s right to comment on proposed changes. Further, the financial impact evaluation required of the FAA when proposing to revise a regulation is inaccurate when the interpretation of the proposed regulation is altered by guidance. We agree with the proposed revision to (b) clarifying the fact that having tooling onsite for the purpose of certification would not be necessary, if the repair station has the tools available by contract. The ambiguity of the current rule creates a significant cost with no added safety value. Proposed (a)(4) and (b) indicate that articles must be listed by manufacturer and the type, make, model, etc. We agree with the intent but believe the manufacturer and make to be the same. Including both is not necessary and may add confusion. Proposed (a)(2) states that an aircraft rated repair station may not perform maintenance, preventive maintenance and alterations on articles that require a powerplant, propeller or avionics rating. Proposed (d) defines an avionics rating and lists aircraft electrical and electronic systems and other electrical or electronic components. These are systems and components that have always been repaired by airframe rated repair stations and this must continue under the proposed aircraft rating. The same would be true for relevant components under a powerplant rating. We believe this to be the intent, as is vaguely indicated in the preamble, reference FR, page 70259, but further clarification is required as these systems and components have also been included in the avionics rating. The aircraft rating must go beyond the power distribution systems indicated in the above referenced preamble. Holders of an aircraft or powerplant rating have had and must continue to have electrical expertise to perform their work and this would continue to ensure they are capable of performing this work. An avionics rating was originally in place because the expertise to repair instruments, navigation and communication equipment might require somewhat different skills. This is less true today with so many aircraft systems being electrically controlled. Although we believe including electrical equipment as part of an avionics rating is appropriate, removing those systems/components from the airframe and/or powerplant rating is not. A cabin entertainment system is one example of systems (or components thereof) that must continue to be part of an aircraft rating.

3 Proposed should include some standard timeframe for issuance of a certificate, once application with appropriate data is properly submitted. In one instance a member was informed that their application for a certificate would not be considered for at least two years. Although the applicant went as far as Washington for assistance in expediting the issuance, or at least the review of our application, the said timeframe turned out to be accurate. The preamble in the FR, page states that both a propeller rating and an aircraft rating would be required to install a different (than listed in the aircraft TC) propeller on an aircraft, by STC. We believe this example to be inaccurate and that the installation of a non standard propeller though an STC would be an alteration to the aircraft and only an aircraft rating should be required. Further, this statement would set an inappropriate precedent for similar work and should be removed. In an instance when an alteration to the propeller is required before/at installation, certainly a propeller rating would be required unless a propeller rated repair station had already performed that alteration. Proposed (b) should include a statement allowing exemptions under some circumstances. Although not clearly defined, FAA has been allowing for maintenance docks or similar facilities in appropriate instances. One example would be an airframe rated repair station that might perform only interior work on an aircraft that is too large to fit in a repair station hangar (with that limitation being indicated on the OPS Specs). Much of the preparatory work would be done within the facilities and during repair, removal, fitting and installation; the fuselage would protect the aircraft, personnel, etc., with regard to the work being performed. Since the revised regulation took affect in January of 2004, there have been disagreements regarding the ability to make these allowances and therefore a lack of standardization. If the aircraft, personnel, etc. are protected with regard to the work being performed, there is no need for the expense of building/leasing a hangar that might make growing that portion of the business financially impractical. There is discussion in the preamble regarding this issue on a temporary basis, but the option of a permanent operation in circumstances as indicated above should be included. Proposed (a)(2) indicates submitting a manual acceptable to the FAA. Would this be the CHDO of the managing repair station? Is the centralized maintenance unit (CMU) that the FAA has been working on now in effect? Industry has long struggled with satellites beyond the CHDO of the parent repair station and trying to operate under the same policies and procedures through different FSDOs. This should be solidified at this time, clearly defining the ability to operate satellite repair stations under one CHDO. Proposed (d) states Ensure it has a sufficient number of employees with the training, knowledge and experience... All previous wording stated Training or knowledge and experience. There is a significant difference in the intent. The FAA had never required training or experience to be documented until the recent Part 145 requirement for a training program. Many Airframe and Powerplant Mechanics (A&Ps) and repair stations have never documented that training or experience. We cannot limit our ability to fully utilize those highly experienced personnel because the FAA has never

4 required them or their employers to document training. Further, the current 145 training program is performance based. That is, the requirement is to fill voids in training to ensure capability, not to train highly qualified and capable people for the purpose of filling boxes. The proposed language contradicts that thinking and will be very costly with no improvement on safety. We must go back to the current language of Training or knowledge and experience. Proposed (b) and subsequent subparagraphs Most of the items listed in this proposal are business issues that are not the FAA s responsibility, nor should they have the authority to regulate, and should be removed. Further, they will create some serious issues as listed below. The current paragraph (b) must remain and the proposed paragraph (b) must be reidentified as paragraph (c). The current paragraph (b) is essential to our business and to safety. Repair stations must be allowed to continue to perform maintenance on a recurring (non-continuous) basis to ensure aircraft may be repaired wherever they may fail. The FAA does not have the manpower and 24 hour coverage to support aviation safety needs, through current paragraph (a) without the current paragraph (b). Safety will be severely affected as operators will have no options other than very costly grounding of aircraft (not considered in the cost analysis of the rule change) deferring items that would otherwise be repaired or worse, operate with discrepant items. Proposed paragraph (b)(2)(i) should be removed as it is already stated in the current paragraph (b). After re-identifying the proposed paragraph (b) to (c), the only requirement that would be appropriate to include in the new paragraph (c) would be to notify the FAA of the intent to work outside of the repair station s domicile country before or as the work is taking place. This would allow the FAA to audit the work if they chose to. This is the extent of the FAA s authority and purpose. Any further requirements will interfere with timely repair and adversely affect safety as well as our business, with no increase in safety. Proposed (a)(2) and (e) must clearly indicate that failing to follow the quality system procedures in itself would be a regulatory failure, if all other regulations were otherwise met. Without this understanding, repair stations will not include procedures that exceed the regulatory requirements. If the regulatory bar is raised when we raise our company standards, we will have no choice but to have our regulated quality system (minimum standard) and our true quality system that the FAA would not be privy to. The distinct contradiction in having a regulated quality system is that the regulations are and can only be a minimum standard and a quality system should be an effort to raise the standard. Proposed (b)(3) must include a timeframe that the reports must be kept. That timeframe should only be until the next audit is performed and the previous audit findings are reviewed for repetitive failures. These audit findings could be a liability in the event of a civil lawsuit. Companies or individuals are often named in a lawsuit that have

5 nothing to do with the situation that brought about that said lawsuit. Minor discrepancies, whether they are safety related or not, could be exploited in a court of law. The audit findings have no value once they are reviewed against a later audit report and must then be disposable. Proposed (b)(9) requires procedures for establishing and maintaining proficiency of inspection personnel. This is already included in the required FAA approved training program per existing , with specific reference thereto in paragraph (b). This proposed paragraph should be removed for simplicity and to avoid duplicated effort and costs. Proposed (c) requires the quality system evaluations and corrective action plans to be available to the FAA. This was a big concern of the ARAC and must be removed. Repair stations must have protection from involuntary self-disclosure, the ability to decide if there was truly a regulatory failure and then decide whether to self disclose. It is critical that we do not waste time discussing minor discrepancies and especially involuntarily feeding information to the FAA to be filed and perhaps used in civil issues. Without this protection the FAA will not meet its intent of having industry find, document and correct discrepancies internally and quickly. Repair stations will have no choice but to be cautious in what they document and how they document it. This is not necessarily due to concerns about FAA retribution, but due to previously mentioned civil liability issues. Proposed (d) states that a repair station may only list articles that are within the scope of the ratings of its certificate. We agree with this, but the section listed in the following bullet confuses the issue. This NPRM lists ratings such as aircraft and powerplant. That should mean that a repair station with an aircraft rating could list any aircraft after performing (and confirming capability) on that aircraft. The example of a powerplant rating appears appropriate by using classes. Proposed (d)(1)(i) indicates that an aircraft rated repair station could only add aircraft to its capability list that are within the type listed in its rating. The rating is an aircraft rating. Adding types to the rating would cause confusion, complexity and the possibility of error, without any safety benefit. Listing some aircraft on the OPS Specs or certificate and others on a capability list does nothing to support safety. Further, a repair station with the ability to perform a self-evaluation within a type is just as capable of performing that same evaluation of itself, relative to any type aircraft. If the FAA wants to narrow the focus of the rating, we would have no objection to categories that make some sense without confusion such as piston engine, turboprop and turbine powered aircraft. This might be similar to the proposed class rating indicated in the proposed 145(d)(1)(ii). Although we see no need for these classes within an aircraft rating, they at least would not add to confusion and there is some reasoning behind the differences in aircraft. The only instance where it might be appropriate to list an aircraft on the certificate or OPS Specs would if there was a specific limitation to only that aircraft, such as Boeing 737 series Interior repair/alteration only

6 Proposed (d)(1)(ii) indicates that a powerplant rated repair station could only add powerplants to its capability list that are within the class listed in its rating. Because a repair station with the ability to perform a self-evaluation within a class would also be capable of performing that evaluation outside of that class, we do not see the need for these class ratings, but do not have any specific objection to these ratings. Proposed (d)(2) should include the period of time the self-evaluation report must be retained. One year should be an appropriate period that would allow the FAA sufficient time to review the documentation, should they so choose. Proposed (a)(1) should not include those functions a repair station might contract to a certificated person. When very busy, a repair station may contract any function, including many that it normally performs in-house. Further, indicating a function on the list gives no indication of how much work is contracted, as functions on the list might be contracted very occasionally or very often. Since we have the authority to contract any functions, indicating that on the list would have to be acceptable. This means the list would state any functions which would make it of no value. FAA must accept this fact and of course has the authority to review any work records, should it choose to. Proposed (a)(2) should not include the type of certificate and rating of repair stations. Since industry uses various software programs which are heavily integrated into its business and accounting functions, all of which allowing different information to be included, sometimes with limited field size, this could cause considerable cost in purchasing new software and integrating it into our current systems. Also, since this information is readily available through FAA websites such as there is no value in duplicating effort. This adds to administrative costs while adding no safety value. The preamble in the FR, page 70266, states because the rule requires repair stations to use the data, tools, test apparatus and equipment recommended by the manufacturer. This statement is incorrect and contradicts many regulations including portions of and (c) for example. This statement may set an inappropriate precedent and must be removed from the preamble. One additional serious concern is the ever-widening difference in costs between operating a repair station and as an Airframe and Powerplant (A&P) mechanic or group/company of A&P mechanics. Although an A&P mechanic might not have a need for written manuals/procedures for many of the requirements of Part 145, if the procedures are required to ensure safety, all should have to meet the requirements of the procedures themselves. In past communications, the FAA has stated that FAR already ensures that A&P mechanics meet safety needs and compliance with these procedures. If that were true, there would be no need to add them to Part 145 or any other Part. Part 43 is the appropriate Part to include additional procedures and requirements, not Part 145. Part 145 should only include the need to document these procedures. The fact that air carriers are required to provide additional oversight of repair stations similar to the oversight they must provide to A&P mechanics causes duplicated managerial

7 oversight while contracting to repair stations (repair stations already have a comprehensive managerial oversight system). Coupling this to the significant additional costs of operating a repair station is causing more air carriers and repair stations to question the value of a repair station. More and more reputable companies are starting to operate maintenance facilities without a repair station certificate rather than incur the expense of a repair station. Similarly, more and more air carriers and other operators are choosing to utilize the services of A&P mechanics rather than incur the additional cost of contracting to a repair station, with questionable improvement in safety. It is critical that the FAA reviews this issue and includes all procedures that are required to ensure safety in Part 43, rather than Part 145. If this does not happen, the FAA will be responsible for a possible lowered level of safety by continuing to force the growing use of independent A&P mechanics. Again, although A&P mechanics should and must continue to have the authority to perform this work, there is an equal need for safety and any procedures that are needed to insure safety must be common and indicated in Part 43, not Part 145. NATA appreciates the opportunity to present these comments. NATA looks forward to continuing to work with the FAA and the members of the maintenance, repair and overhaul sector of the aviation industry to continuously improve safety both on the ground and in the air. Sincerely, Stan Mackiewicz Representative, Government and Industry Affairs National Air Transportation Association 4226 King Street Alexandria, VA 22302