Darknet and Black Hole Monitoring a Journey into Typographic Errors
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1 Darknet and Black Hole Monitoring a Journey into Typographic Errors Alexandre Dulaunoy CIRCL - TLP:WHITE Team CIRCL - Team Restena 12 May Honeynet Project Workshop
2 Motivation and background IP darkspace or black hole is Routable non-used address space of an ISP (Internet Service Provider), incoming traffic is unidirectional and unsolicited. Is there any traffic in those darkspaces? If yes, what and why does it arrive there? And on purpose or by mischance? What s the security impact? What are the security recommendations? 2 of 19
3 Origin of traffic in the black hole Attackers (and researchers) scan networks to find vulnerable systems (e.g. SSH brute-force) Backscatter traffic (e.g. from spoofed DoS) Self-replicating code using network as a vector (e.g. conficker, residual worms) Badly configured devices especially embedded devices (e.g. printers, server, routers) Our IP-darkspace is especially suited for spelling errors from the RFC1918 (private networks) address space 3 of 19
4 Why is there traffic Typing/Spelling errors with RFC1918 networks While typing an IP address, different error categories might emerge: Hit wrong key 192.x.z.y 193.x.y.z 172.x.y.z 152.x.y.z Omission of number 192.x.y.z 12.x.y.z Doubling of keys 10.a.b.c 100.a.b.c 4 of 19
5 Research activities related to spelling errors Spelling errors apply to text but also network configuration 34% omissions of 1 character Example: Network Netork 23% of all errors happen on 3rd position of a word Example: Text Test) 94% spellings errors are single errors in word And do not reappear References Pollock J. J. and Zamora A., Collection and characterization of spelling errors in scientific and scholarly text. J. Amer. Soc. Inf. Sci. 34, 1, 51 58, Kukich K., Techniques for automatically correcting words in text. ACM Comput. Surv. 24, 4, , of 19
6 IP-Darkspace: Data Collection Implementation tcpdump socat (SSL/TLS) socat (SSL/TLS) tcpdump file:sensorid/yy-mm-dd file:sensorid/yy-mm-dd... processor Minimal sensor collecting IP-Darkspace networks (close to RFC1918 address space) Raw pcap are captured with the full payload Netbeacon a developed to ensure consistent packet capture a 6 of 19
7 Dataset collected and statistics From until Today (still active) Nearly 200 gigabytes of compressed raw pcap collected Constant stream of packets from two /22 network blocks no day/night profile. Some peaks at 800kbit/s (e.g. often TCP RST from backscatter traffic but also from typographic errors) 7 of 19
8 General observations A large part of traffic is coming from badly configured devices (RFC1918 spelling errors) Printers, embedded devices, routers or even server. Trying to do name resolution on non-existing DNS servers, NTP or sending syslog messages. Even if the black hole is passive, payload of stateless UDP packets or even TCP (due to asymmetric routing on misspelled network) datagrams are present Internal network scanning and reconnaissance tool (e.g. internal network enumeration) 8 of 19
9 Observation per AS Traffic seen in the darknet N Frequency ASN Occurrences of activities matching the proportion of hosts in a country. Chinese great-wall is not filtering leaked packets. 9 of 19
10 Network reconnaissance (and potential misuse): DNS 3684 _msdcs.<companyname>.local time.euro.apple.com 104 time.euro.apple.com.<mylocaldomain> 122 ocsp.tcs.terena.org ocsp.<variousca> DNS queries to an incorrect nameserver could lead to major misuse A single typo in a list of 3 nameservers is usually unnoticed 10 of 19
11 A/V Statistics from Misconfigured Resolvers KASPERSKY AVAST KASPERSKY-LABS SYMANTEC MCAFEE SYMANTECLIVEUPDATE TRENDMICRO BITDEFENDER AVG COMODO SOPHOSXL SOPHOS F-SECURE DRWEB PANDASECURITY PANDADOMAINADVISOR KINGSOFT SYMANTECCLOUD PANDASOFTWARE CLAMAV SYMANTECMAIL AVGMOBILATION RISING KASPERSKYLABS FORTINET MCAFEESECURE NPROTECT NORMAN PANDA AVGCLOUD BAIDU PANDAAPP GDATASECURITY NPROTECT2 MALWAREBYTES MCAFEEMOBILESECURITY MCAFEEASAP AVGTHREATLABS AVGATE PANDAPOST BITDEFENDER-ES 11 of 19
12 Certificate Revocation and Queries from Misconfigured Resolvers The increase of 5% in late 2013 might be due to certificate requirements update (e.g. key size, hashing algorithm updates) A lot of software assumes a certificate to be valid when OCSP or CRL are not accessibles OCSP/CRL Requests Queries Sources Frequency Month 12 of 19
13 Software Updates/Queries from Misconfigured Resolvers Discovering software usage (and vulnerabilities) can be easily done with passive reconnaissance Are the software update process ensuring the integrity of the updates? Update Requests Apple Product Requests Queries Sources Queries Sources Frequency Frequency Month Month 13 of 19
14 Network Reconnaissance - How To Build Smart DNS Brute-Forcer ASTTF.NET ASUEGYI.INFO ASUS1025C DEFAULT DELICIOUS.COM DELL DELL1400 DELL DELL7777 DELL-PC DELLPOP3 HELP.163.COM HP CLIENT1 MACBOOKAIR-CAD7 MACBOOK-B5BA66 MACBOOKPRO-5357 MAIL.AFT20.COM S3.QHIMG.COM SERVERWEB SERVEUR SERVICE.QQ.COM SMTP.163.COM And many more of 19
15 Network Reconnaissance: NetBios Machine Types (1 week) 23 Browser Server 4 Client? 1 Client? M <ACTIVE> 21 Domain Controller 1 Domain Controller M <ACTIVE> 11 Master Browser 1 NameType=0x00 Workstation 1 NameType=0x20 Server 105 Server 26 Unknown 1 Unknown <GROUP> B <ACTIVE> 5 Unknown <GROUP> M <ACTIVE> 1322 Workstation 1 Workstation M <ACTIVE> 15 of 19
16 Printer syslog to the world or how to tell to the world your printer status :00:42 SYSLOG lpr.error printer: offline or intervention needed :51: SYSLOG lpr.error printer: paper out :14: SYSLOG lpr.error printer: paper jam Printers are just an example out of many syslog messages from various devices Information leaked could be used by attackers to gain more information or improve targeted attacks 16 of 19
17 How to configure your router (without security) Enable command logging and send the logs to a random syslog server Aug 13 10:11:51 M6000-G5 command-log:[10:11: VtyNo: vty1 UserName: XXX IP: XXX ReturnCode: 1 CMDLine: show subscriber interface gei-0/2/1/12.60 Aug 13 10:46:05 M6000-G5 command-log:[10:46: VtyNo: vty2 UserName: XXX IP: XXX ReturnCode: 1 CMDLine: conf t ] Aug 13 10:46:10 M6000-G5 command-log:[10:46: VtyNo: vty2 UserName: XXX IP: XXX ReturnCode: 1 CMD Line: aaa-authentication-template 1100 ]... We will let you guess the sensitive part afterwards of 19
18 Misconfigured network interception in Iran for 2 hours? On April 08, 2013, a peak of ICMP time exceeded in-transit were received during 2 hours IP sources allocated in Iran with a nice distribution among Iranian Internet providers 12:29: IP > a.b.100.1: ICMP time exceeded in - transit, length 36 12:29: IP > a.b.100.1: ICMP time exceeded in - transit, length 36 12:29: IP > a.b.100.1: ICMP time exceeded in - transit, length 36 12:29: IP > a.b.100.1: ICMP time exceeded in - transit, length 36 12:29: IP > a.b.100.1: ICMP time exceeded in - transit, length 36 12:29: IP > a.b.100.1: ICMP time exceeded in - transit, length 36 12:29: IP > a.b.100.1: ICMP time exceeded in - transit, length 36 12:29: IP > a.b.100.1: ICMP time exceeded in - transit, length 36 12:29: IP > a.b.100.1: ICMP time exceeded in - transit, length 36 12:29: IP > a.b.100.1: ICMP time exceeded in - transit, length 36 12:29: IP > a.b.100.1: ICMP time exceeded in - transit, length 36 12:29: IP > a.b.100.1: ICMP time exceeded in - transit, length 36 12:29: IP > a.b.100.1: ICMP time exceeded in - transit, length 36 12:29: IP > a.b.100.1: ICMP time exceeded in - transit, length 36 12:29: IP > a.b.100.1: ICMP time exceeded in - transit, length 36 12:29: IP > a.b.100.1: ICMP time exceeded in - transit, length of 19
19 Conclusions Security recommendations Default routing/nat to Internet in operational network is evil Use fully qualified domain names (resolver search list is evil too) Double check syslog exports via UDP (e.g. information leakage is easy) Verify any default configuration with SNMP (e.g. enable by default on some embedded devices) Offensive usage? What does it happen if a malicious ISP responds to misspelled RFC1918 addresses? (e.g. DNS/NTP requests, software update or proxy request) Some research projects on this topic? Contact us 19 of 19
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