Key Terms and Concepts. Learning Objectives. Upon completion of this module, you should be able to: 1. Define different concepts of security

Transcription

1 Module 11 Security UNIVERSITY OF THE ARCTIC Developed by Lassi Heininen, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, Finland Key Terms and Concepts security: hard, soft, and civil stability and peace, instability and tension the military and military technology, including the nuclear weapons system the categorization of nuclear involvement geopolitics, including the technology models of geopolitics and maritime strategy arms control, disarmament, and confidence-building measures risk and threat, nuclear accidents and environmental threats, and conflicts power and influence, war and violence Learning Objectives Upon completion of this module, you should be able to: 1. Define different concepts of security 2. Define power and influence, and risk and threat 3. Compare and contrast power and influence with risk and threat 4. List the military presence and activities (including, for example, the C3I system and the categorization of nuclear involvement) in the Circumpolar North 5. List and describe the main arms control and confidence-building measures in the North 6. List different kinds of nuclear and other military accidents, in the context of the nuclear problem of the North 7. Describe the relationship between the military and the environment, and that between the military and northern Indigenous peoples and give some examples of conflicts between the military and the environment or northern peoples Bachelor of Circumpolar Studies

2 8. Describe and recognize the so-called forces of continuity and those of change, and name some of the main challenges for the future of security in the North 9. Recognize and describe some aspects of the three different concepts of security in your region Module Readings Read the Overview and Lecture for Module 11, then read the assigned readings from the Reading File given below. Reading 31: Tony Samstag, Security and Defence Issues Relating to the Arctic Region: A Norwegian Perspective Reading 32: Lassi Heininen, The Military and the Environment: An Arctic Case Reading 33: Alexander A. Sergounin, Russian Policy towards the BEAR: from Hard to Soft Security Overview The main aims of this module are to introduce different concepts of security and to give an overview the military presence, especially that of the nuclear weapons systems in the Circumpolar North in the beginning of the twentyfirst century. First, the module defines security, discusses the different concepts of security, and describes the categorization of nuclear involvement. Second, it describes and explains both the current state of the security and military-political situation of the Circumpolar North and the change that has taken place since the early 1990s. During the Cold War period, the Circumpolar North was primarily a security area and a military front, but is now emerging from this period of high tension and confrontation toward a phase of international co-operation. Third, the module identifies and describes the so-called forces of continuity and those of change from the point of view of the different concepts of security. Fourth, it describes the relations between the military and the environment in the North, and describes the nuclear problem in the Barents Sea region. Finally, the module lists and describes of the main challenges of security in the North. Lecture Introduction For nearly the whole of the twentieth century, from the end of the First World War until the end of the Cold War, the Arctic was in a process of 220 Contemporary Issues in the Circumpolar World 2

3 militarization. The region transformed, first into a military flank, and then the military front of the Cold War. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Cold War and the confrontation and tension between two major nuclear powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, ended. Although there is less tension and more stability in the Circumpolar North, security is still a relevant topic and important field of politics, and a particularly sensitive one from the point of view of the unified states. Security policy and the military are not on the agendas of many new forums of international co-operation, such as the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, and the real disarmament process has not dealt with the Arctic, at least not yet. In assessing the current geopolitical and security-political situation in the Circumpolar North, there are several factors to consider. First, and most significant, is the collapse of both the socialistic bloc and the Soviet Union, particularly in the context of the success of Western integration resulting in NATO and the European Union (EU). Second, in the politics of the West, one of the main objectives is peace and security through co-operation and integration instead of confrontation. That ideal can perhaps be best achieved through the integration of the Russian Federation and the other New Independent States into the European economy, and not only the Central Eastern European countries. Third, because of the globalized world economy and globalization in general, the importance of the military and military power has decreased compared with economic and cultural affairs. Economic competition has become more intense while, at the same time, global phenomena such as international terrorism have increased the need for cohesion among the industrial countries of the world. Different Concepts of Security This module deals with the importance of security, security policy, the state of international co-operation, and the relations between security and international co-operation. The future of security (meaning mostly traditional security) can include three scenarios: divided, partly divided, and non-divided, depending how security is defined (narrowly or comprehensively) (Nokkala 2002). When dealing with security, especially in the Arctic, it is necessary to ask: Whose security, and what kind of security? (Griffiths 1993; Heininen 1992, 55 56). Therefore, this module defines security and discusses risk and conflict and three different concepts of security: traditional, environmental, and civil security. Security in this module means either traditional security and the security policy of the unified states, or environmental security (i.e., the environmental effects of the military). Civil security is also discussed from the point of view of both citizens (e.g., northern Indigenous peoples) and regions, but not phenomena such as citizens rights, family violence, or gender relations. Bachelor of Circumpolar Studies

4 Traditional, Environmental, and Civil Security The unified-state system emphasizes security and national interests. Power, including the military, is a useful tool to guarantee national security. Competition and even conflicts between states are natural in the anarchy of international order, but international co-operation is needed for special purposes, as was the case in the Second World War, for example. Another example is the establishment of NATO in 1949 to contain the expansion of socialism in Europe. Behind such international organizations are traditional state-centred hegemonic policies and national interests and influence according to the principle of new realism (Waltz 1990). International law provides the legal framework for relations between unified states, and between them and inter-governmental organization (IGOs). National borders are the outer edge of national sovereignty and the starting point for international law. Traditional geopolitics, as portrayed by Halford J. Mackinder, for example, and especially the technology models of geopolitics, may be used to define geographical regions such as the Arctic from the point of view of geography, technology, and military power (Heininen 1991). Geostrategy and geopolitics have relevant meanings even today. The so-called technology models of geopolitics opened the Arctic to the nuclear-oriented maritime strategies of the United States and the Soviet Union. Nuclear arms, nuclear energy, and other technical innovations form the technical means by which humans relate to the physical environment (Till 1987, 25). That is, the new arms technology for example nuclear energy, missile and radar technology made it possible to use of the Arctic for military purposes. In international relations, the technology model of geopolitics is generally related to military power and is thus an instrument of hegemonic politics. Traditional Security The international system is still largely based on the unified-state system, and unified states emphasize national sovereignty, including national borders and interests. International co-operation is mostly a function of intergovernmental economic, political, and military unions. For example, the border between the EU and the Russian Federation is one of the best defined and most controlled in Europe, while the borders between individual EU countries are barely visible. Hegemony and force, including military power, are the main means to establish and maintain sovereignty and national interests, and force has also been used to defend human rights against ethnic and other violence. Traditional security falls under the category of high politics, that is, security policy and military policy. For example, the purpose of the common European policy on security and defence is to develop the EU s military and non-military crisis-management capability, including troops. 222 Contemporary Issues in the Circumpolar World 2

5 Traditional, weapon-orientated security is important to the growth or modernization of unified states, to fulfill the needs of the centres of nationstates, and to control national borders. This is also the case in the Circumpolar North. Security and security policy in the North is still largely determined by state centres outside the region, such as Moscow, Washington, and Brussels, and not by actors inside the regions. Northern residents are excluded from security policy planning because of the problematic and sensitive nature of security policy and because of the international nature of competition and disputes over the natural resources of the northern seas, such as the shelf of the Barents Sea. The traditional concept of security is less conspicuous in the new geopolitics, which takes into consideration the low politics, such as environmental and social issues. This broader concept of security is present both in discourse and practice. The situation, however, is not always clear. Although security policy is excluded from international organizations, such as the Arctic Council, the EU s Northern Dimension, and the Barents Euro- Arctic Region (BEAR), these international frameworks are for security and stabilization (according to the concept of a security community by Karl Deutch), and the peace project is a new containment policy of the West. How problematic this kind of selected agenda of co-operation will be to the current and future co-operation in the BEAR context is difficult to say. In any case, it is both interesting and challenging because international cooperation built in this superimposed way is vulnerable to changes within the international system. For example, a potential East-West or NATO-Russia conflict would have serious and overriding consequences for agreements reached by organizations such as the BEAR. Environmental Security Apart from military security, comprehensive security, or everyday security at an individual level deals with practical issues of health, social, and economic conditions (Nokkala 2002). Today, this extended concept of security is widely accepted and used, especially when issues of foreign policy and cross-border co-operation are being discussed. This is quite natural because security is an attractive concept that appeals to basic human instincts everyone wants to be secure. Nuclear safety is an acute and challenging topic of the current discourse on security, especially when extended definitions of security are used, which would include the notion of environmental security. An extended definition of security is based on the idea that there are a vast number of threats to national security, besides traditional military threats, such as nuclear accidents, crime across national borders, and international terrorism (Buzan 1991). Since the late 1980s, many citizens of the northern regions have been worried about their security and about the security of the North. In the early 1990s, the Nordic governments began to express concern about nuclear waste, mostly from Russia. In the 1970s, Canada, passed the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA). For the citizens of the Nordic countries, Bachelor of Circumpolar Studies

6 the environment is one of the main incentives to improve international collaboration. Perceived threats from nuclear activities, covering the whole spectrum from accidents on nuclear submarines to nuclear power plant emissions, are still real in the European North. For that reason, these countries consider themselves as stakeholders in the international nuclear negotiations process, although, in most cases, they are outside the formal negotiations. For Russians the situation is more complex. For example, decreasing the risk of nuclear problems in the Kola Peninsula is in the interests of Murmansk in attracting foreign investment to the oil and gas industry of the Barents Sea. Lectures on eco-catastrophes and nuclear accidents in Murmansk indicate a threat of nuclear accidents to the citizens, but without polls and investigations it is difficult to know a general attitude among the people of the Murmansk Region. Do they take the nuclear problem as a threat, or a risk? (Heininen 1999) In the area of international co-operation, as in the above-mentioned BEAR co-operation, the problem arises that security is, in practice, broader than the traditional concept of security. Therefore, some elements of low politics, for example, environmental protection to deal with contamination from military sources, may cross over to become a part of high politics. To include high politics in the existing organization is a complicated challenge. From the point of view of the unified states, the BEAR is seen as a part of the European integration and co-operation policies led by the EU, and as a peace project by the Western democracies. This indicates that, in the BEAR, the fights between the unified states in the 1990s have changed into economic competition and co-operation. The states have succeeded in decreasing international tensions and the possibility of war between states. Security, including alternative security, stability, and sustainable development are the main aims of the BEAR and of the EU s Northern Dimension. Thus, although security policy is officially excluded from these new international organizations, they do deal with certain aspects of traditional security. Topics such as nuclear safety and the clean up of decommissioned nuclear submarines will measure the real will of the member states of the BEAR for multilateral co-operation for environmental protection. It is either a good reason for real international co-operation, or a potential conflict of interests. Civil Security At present, there is no potential for international conflicts between the West and Russia that would justify the current military presence, and both security and political tension, and the military presence, have decreased since the end of the Cold War. The threats and security matters are now different, and include such issues as the gap in living standards between the Nordic countries and Russia, environmental problems, different political systems, and cultural differences. However, discussion on security in the region and on security from the point of view of citizens and their rights, has 224 Contemporary Issues in the Circumpolar World 2

7 hardly started. Such terms as civil (or civic) security and civility have been launched to replace the old-style security thinking and to decrease the influence of outside forces on the North (e.g. Griffiths 1993; Heininen and Lassinantti 1999). Some contributors to the security debate, however, argue that the concept of security carries such a heavy militaristic, nationalist, and ideological burden that it is even dangerous to label non-military issues as security issues (Deudney 1999). The main risk lies in applying the traditional means of providing security to new kind of threats. Conventional security institutions armies and the police are not very practical for securing people and states against new threats. To the contrary, armies are likely to produce these threats themselves, as was the case in the Kursk accident (Heininen and Häyrynen 2002). Consequently, it could be argued that nuclear security, understood as a part of comprehensive security, is a particularly complicated question. Usually, nuclear issues have to do with both military and civil securities. In the whole Arctic region, especially in the Russian North, there can be no clear dividing line between military and civilian issues. Nuclear activities cover the whole spectrum from use in medicine to nuclear warheads and, especially the management of waste, involves so many stakeholders and so many partly conflicting interests that a simple labelling of topics and priorities would lead to an oversimplification of the issues. Therefore, it is necessary to understand all aspects of security as parts of the same agenda in international negotiations. For example, the management of environmental risks cannot be separated from infrastructure development of economic conditions (Heininen and Segerståhl 2001). The Cold War period brought the high-tech and sophisticated military presence of the super-powers to the Circumpolar North, and it also brought other unified states. Since that time, potential, and, in some cases actual, conflicts of interest have existed between military elements and the Arctic environment and between the military and northern peoples. The basic reason is in the concept of traditional security, which must be understood as a relevant part of the growth-orientated modernization process. Security achieved by the military is, first of all, for the interests of the centers of unified states, not the peripheries, to gain control over large peripheries, natural resources, and borders. Military presence and action in peacetime is one of the ways unified states use their power in sparsely populated regions. Relations Between the Military and the Environment: Risk and Conflict The effects of the military on the quality of the environment was not much known or discussed in the Cold War period, although it was relevant in the Circumpolar North. In the 1980s, environmental organizations and the Nordic Saami Council began to show concern and it made a statement on Bachelor of Circumpolar Studies

8 the nuclear problem. Not only was there public concern and civilian activities, but researchers took an interest in environmental risks and influences of the military (Greenpeace 1987; Heininen 1992; see also A Relationship between the Military and the Environment, below). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, the issue and the challenge is how to tackle the environmental problems caused by the military in the past, such as old nuclear submarines, former missile and radar bases, used nuclear reactor fuel, and other radioactive waste. Figure 1: Arms Buildup in the Arctic Rim Based on the above-mentioned relationship, we must deal with both a risk and a threat. Nuclear affairs, either nuclear power for civilian purposes or nuclear weapons, always include risks, risk for the environment and for people. The fundamental difference between nuclear environmental risks and other types of environmental risks is that, as a rule, non-nuclear risks are 226 Contemporary Issues in the Circumpolar World 2

9 caused by activities within the industrial, agricultural, or urban systems, without any significant security dimensions. We must also deal with conflicts. In international relations, when we speak about conflicts, we usually mean either international or regional conflicts, and even armed conflict or war; the most extreme form of conflict. These conflicts on different levels are either inter-state conflicts, where the actors are nations, internal conflicts (civil wars) or state-formation conflicts between armed and organized opposition or tribes. Now the Cold War and the traditional East-West tension are officially over. In the Arctic, we can find different kinds of competition and potential for conflict, or conflicts of interest. For our purposes, conflict refers to inconsistencies in the motions, sentiments, purposes, or claims of entities. Competition is usually distinguished from conflict, but it is also a type of opposition (Wright 1980). A conflict of interests in the North can take many form, such as a conflict of interest between the military and the northern ecosystem, or that of between military activities and the everyday life of northern Indigenous people (Osherenko and Young 1989; Heininen 1992). From the World Wars to the Turn of the Twenty-first Century The twentieth century meant the first real hot wars in the Circumpolar North. This was the case especially in the European North, where the road from the Murmann legion to the Escorts to Murmansk included Englishmen fighting in the First World War for White Russian generals in the Kola Peninsula, and one of the main fronts of the Second World War between Germany and the Soviet Union. Fighting in the Barents Sea and the North Calotte was particularly fierce due to the high strategic value of the European North; for example, Kirkenes and Murmansk were among the most heavily bombed towns of the Second World War. In the Cold War period, covering the time since the end of the 1940s until the early 1990s, the Circumpolar North was divided into parts where NATO and the Warsaw Pact were rivals and enemies. Both military blocs had their own military, political, and economic integration, and therefore, there was competition between them. The Arctic as a Military Theatre The Arctic as a military theatre of the Cold War meant both the presence and activities of the military, especially the categorization of nuclear weapons (Heininen 1994). Indeed, in the Cold War period, the political actors with real power in the Circumpolar North were the United States and the Soviet Union with their navies. Other political actors with an influence Bachelor of Circumpolar Studies

10 were NATO (as an IGO) and Canada and Norway as NATO member states and real Arctic states. Since the 1960s, the Arctic and northern seas have been relevant in the military strategies of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Arctic in general, and especially the northern waters, are regions whose military use is dictated by geostrategy and by technology. Military use proceeded and, in the 1980s, northern seas and the Arctic Ocean, ceased to be peripheries in security and military activities and became fronts: the Arctic became a military theatre (Miller, 1989; Heininen 1991, 29 58). The Cold War and East-West tension brought the high-tech and sophisticated military presence of the two super-powers, and the other Arctic states, to the Circumpolar North. In the 1980s, both the Soviet Union and the United States produced more and more sophisticated arms systems, especially nuclear arms, and deployed them in northern waters where military presence and activities became intense. Especially the ice-free reaches of the Barents, Norwegian, and Greenlandic seas were heavily militarized in the 1980s. This was very well illustrated in Stanley Kubrick s visionary, satirical movie Dr. Strangelove or: How I learned to stop worrying and love the bomb, from the 1960s. The general development of technology after the Second World War was used very much for the arms race. Missile technology, new radar systems, nuclear arms and energy, and other modern technical innovations have made it possible to use weapons like nuclear submarines in icy waters, such as the Soviet Typhoon class, the American Los Angeles class, and Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C3I) systems. Military presence and action in the Circumpolar North were diverse since the end of 1980s, as the inventory of nuclear arms facilities shows: there are naval bases, airfields and radar stations, modern nuclear-powered and - armed strategic submarines (SSBNs), nuclear attack submarines (SSNs), C3I systems, and areas for military tests and maneuvers as illustrated the following case studies. Case 1: Naval Bases in the Kola Peninsula The Kola Peninsula and the Barents Sea Rim have the greatest concentrations of nuclear weapons, reactors, and facilities in the Russian Federation and the largest concentration of military and industrial activities and facilities in the Circumpolar North. According to an inventory, all elements of nuclear involvement, except provision of uranium, are present on the Kola Peninsula and in the nearby waters (Fry 1983; Heininen 1991). The high number of nuclear reactors present on and along the Kola Peninsula exceeds by far the concentration in any other region of the world: there are 178 nuclear reactors in submarines in operation, and about Contemporary Issues in the Circumpolar World 2

11 reactors either have been decommissioned or are waiting to be decommissioned. There are also nuclear weapons test ranges and storage areas for nuclear waste. Nuclear waste has been dumped into the Barents and Kara Seas during the last three decades by the Northern Navy and by the Murmansk Shipping Company, which are based on the Kola Peninsula. Case 2: DEW Line and US Bases in Keflavik and Thule Partly based on its military presence in the Second World War, the United States established several air and other military bases and radar stations in the North. The Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line stretched from Alaska to Baffin Island and the North-American Air Defence (NORAD) system from Alaska into Greenland were built to detect Soviet bombers and missiles approaching from Eurasia over the North Pole. Bases and airfields were also established outside North America in the North Atlantic: at Thule in Greenland, Keflavik in Iceland, and airfields and radar stations in northern Norway. During the Second World War, the United States established an air base in Keflavik because of the geostrategic position of Iceland in the middle of North Atlantic. Since then, and in spite of the independence of Iceland and the resistance of the Icelandic peace movement, is has served as an important air base for the United States and NATO. The Thule US air base was founded in 1953 on Inuit land through an agreement of the governments of the United States and Denmark. Because of that, the Inuit were displaced from the area of about 3,000 km 2 to another place in Greenland. The Thule base and a US military base in the Faeroes are the result of a secret military agreement between the Danish government and the United States (Brösted and Faegteborg, 1985). There was a serious nuclear accident in 1968 near the air base at Thule. An American B-52 bomber lost three of its four hydrogen bombs and the radioactive material burned and spread onto snow and ice and into the water (Shaun 1990). Case 3: A Nuclear Submarine in the Arctic Ocean: Something under a Surface A strategic or attack nuclear-powered and nuclear-weapon-equipped submarine in the sea is a heroic picture, but also an everyday routine of the Cold War in northern seas. One of the most relevant elements of the nuclear weapons system in the North are these submarines, which hide under the ice pack of the Arctic Ocean and have the capability of so-called revenge strikes. These kinds of military activities and manoeuvres have resulted in nuclear accidents, including the sinking of submarines and collisions of submarines and surface vessels. Such an accident involved a Komsomolets (or Mike) Bachelor of Circumpolar Studies

12 class nuclear submarine with a twin nuclear reactor and two warheads on board in the Norwegian Sea in This accident is one of more than twenty such naval accidents involving either nuclear-armed and or nuclearpowered submarines or war ships in northern seas. Between 1945 and 1988 there have been 212 nuclear accidents in major navies (Arkin and Handler 1989). In these circumstances, the relationship between the environment and the military is a concrete thing. The risk of a nuclear accident and radioactive contamination in the North Atlantic has been a real threat and cause for an anxiety to Icelanders and the Icelandic government since the middle of 1980s. The concern centres around possible environmental effects on the fishery, an industry of great importance to the economy of the country. Strategic nuclear submarines, either from the US Navy or the Russian Navy, that were once the most important tool to maintain military power over the oceans, have become severe environmental risks, either in operation or in dock waiting to be decommissioned (Heininen 1996). This is very much the case in the Barents Sea region where the largest number of nuclear weapons, reactors, and facilities in the Russian Federation, and the whole Circumpolar North, are concentrated. In the near future, the possible continued thinning of the ice in the Arctic Ocean could mean more utilization of natural resources, such as fish, more traffic in the two passages of the Arctic Ocean, and increased military patrols. Further, this could mean conflicts in the context of national sovereignty, such as that of Canada s sovereignty claim over the Arctic Archipelago. Case 4: Maritime Strategies in the Norwegian Sea A clearly visible outcome of the general tension between East and West in the North has been the offensive maritime strategy that the United States adopted in the first part of the 1980s in the Arctic and northern seas. The naval competition of the super-powers in the 1980s, before the collapse of the Soviet Union, was actually the final act of the Cold War. It took place mostly in the North Atlantic and other northern waters with equipment such as the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS). At the end of 1980s, the Soviet Union, in accordance with its military doctrine of sufficient defence, decreased naval incursions in seas far away from her own coast. There is still a struggle in Russia between the forces of continuity those who would maintain nuclear weapons and geostrategic elements like the naval and air bases in the Kola Peninsula, and the forces of change those who welcome the end of the Cold War, arms control, and the new military doctrine of Russia (Miller 1992). The most relevant element of the forces of continuity are nuclear weapons, especially SSBNs. 230 Contemporary Issues in the Circumpolar World 2

13 Case 5: Nuclear Tests in Novaya Zemlja The Soviet Union did much of its nuclear testing on Novaja Zemlja. Between 1957 and 1991 there have been a total of 132 nuclear tests, 77 to 86 of them in the atmosphere. In the middle of the1950s, the Soviet Army started to build two nuclear test areas on Novaja Zemlja, even though the Nenets people lived, fished, and hunted along the coasts of the Barents and Kara Seas, as well as on the islands. Since then, the Nenets have been prohibited from living or hunting in Novaja Zemlja. We know that radioactivity from nuclear tests done in the atmosphere is forming even today and is the greatest source of radioactive contamination of the oceans. Radioactivity from these tests is found in the sediments of the ocean bottom. There is also some evidence of radioactive contamination from underground nuclear tests because of earthquakes. In 1992, the president of Russia, Boris Jeltsin, signed a decision to make the test area the official, and only, nuclear test site in the Russian Federation. Case 6: Low Level Flights in Goose Bay Military tests and manoeuvres in the northern regions increased considerably in the 1980s, and the trend continued in the 1990s. The area around Nitassinan, in Labrador, Canada, is used as an area for low-level, military training flights, but also a land where Innu people used to live. Yearly, four NATO countries did thousands of low-level flights there at a height of only 30 to 75 m, at near maximum speed. In 1991, there were 7,700 low-level flights. Harmful effects included noise, sonic booms, aircraft emissions, and microwaves, as well as the risk of accidents and crashes (Lloyd 1989). All in all, the above-mentioned cases are examples of the militarization of the Circumpolar North in the Cod War period, and they also indicate competition and even conflicts of interest between both the military and the northern ecosystem on one hand, and the everyday life of the northern Indigenous peoples and other northerners on the other. Arms Control and Confidence-building Measures, and the End of the Cold War Period In spite of the arms race, competition, and tension between the two superpowers in the Cold War, there were also arms-control process, arms control treaties, and confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) between the United States and the Soviet Union. Among them are, for example, global treaties such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) 1 and 2, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) I in 1991, and START II in 1993, following the Bachelor of Circumpolar Studies

14 collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991, and treaties for Europe, such as the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) in 1987 and the Treaty of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). It is possible to interpret that the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE currently the OSCE), these arms control agreements, and the development of gas pipelines from western Siberia into Central Europe, brought the common interests of Western bloc and the Eastern bloc of Europe into focus. Also, slogans such as The Baltic Sea Sea of Peace and proposals for security building and arms control in North Europe and northern seas, according to the principles of the OSCE, help to generate pan-european cooperation. Among the initiatives are President Urho Kekkonen s (President of Finland from 1956 to 1982) proposal for a Nuclear-Free Norden, which created a big debate inside the Nordic states, and the Murmansk speech by President Gorbachev of Russia in October 1987, with six proposals on arms control and nuclear disarmament, as well as proposals for peaceful international co-operation in the Arctic. The West did not, however, interpret the proposals in the right spirit and, instead of giving a positive response, suspected that the proposals for arms control were one-sided (Scrivener 1989). The geopolitical situation of North Europe started to change as early as the 1980s and the Murmansk speech, as a part of glasnost and perestroika of the Soviet Union, was one indicator of the coming change and encouraged several proposals and activities for international co-operation in the Arctic, such as the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). Finally, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War was over, and a transition period started. With the end of the Cold War came a euphoria of peace and friendship between the West and Russia, which the slogans Common European Home and Nuclear Free World and the Paris Statement of the OSCE indicated. Not only slogans but deeds, such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), signed in 1996, heralded the new era. The CTBT is usually considered (though also challenged) an important step toward the goal of a de-nuclearized world. It includes elements of arms control and a nonproliferation measure; an essential prerequisite for nuclear disarmament. Although the Russian Duma has ratified the CTBT, the US Congress has not. At end of the Cold War, the geopolitical situation of Europe started to change, first slowly and then dramatically. It was not only the end of hostilities, but lack of money for arms, that brought a decrease in the total number of submarines, warships, and nuclear weapons, affecting the whole Circumpolar North. Both the Russian Federation and the United States did some unilateral arms control and disarmament. It was especially the European North that changed dramatically. What was once primarily a security area and a military theatre evolved into a new kind of region with new actors and interests (see Module 10: New External Political Structures). For example, North Norway lost its strategic 232 Contemporary Issues in the Circumpolar World 2

15 importance and it is no longer a military front of NATO, and the Russian military in the Kola Peninsula is no longer considered to be as great a threat as it was in the Cold War period. However, the military importance of the North remains high for Norway and NATO (Nokkala 2002). Forces of Continuity, and Those of Change The Cold War period and the traditional East-West tension are officially over, armament has decreased, and arms control has turned towards real disarmament, at least concerning nuclear weapons. Global and European security is in transition. Many of the old structures, like the nuclear weapon system and the military arsenal, are still in use, however, and a part of the current military structure. The nuclear weapon system is still the backbone of the military of both the United States (about 7000 warheads) and Russia (about 6000). The legacy of the Cold War period also exists partly in some external political organizations such as NATO, the EU, and the OSCE. Thus, in spite of the renaissance of regional co-operation and new external structures such as the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), these old structures are attractive enough to expand beyond the former Iron Curtain and dominate international politics, and even the discussion of international relations. Security and security policy are still largely structured according to the concept of traditional security guaranteed by the military, which leads to the question: Have we changed the way we think about war? The Gulf War, the Bosnian air campaign, the Kosovo war, and especially the Afghanistan war of , supported the idea that bombing works, supported by advanced technical equipment, like global-positioning systems, laser guidance, smart bombs, and so on. But, although we are in a new era of international relations, how fundamental the changes really are is still in question. Does high-tech war represent a fundamental change, or is it merely a tactical shift in the conduct of conventional war. It is not yet clear how the nuclear weapons systems and the new military doctrines of both the Russian Federation and the United States will affect security. In spite of the decrease in the amount of armaments, the Circumpolar North is still of great strategic importance. Naval forces are still strategically important and will likely be permanently present as part of strategic military-based security. The geostrategic position of the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea is important for the Russian Federation and the United States. For Russia, the naval bases in the Kola Peninsula are even more important in a relative sense than for the Soviet Union, and the US Navy continues patrolling close to Russian waters in the Barents Sea (Nokkala 2002). Worldwide disarmament actually progressed more in the last years of the Cold War than in the post-cold War period (Gorbachev 2001). There is Bachelor of Circumpolar Studies

16 little real evidence of disarmament in the Arctic and northern seas, even though the military presence has decreased. There are rumours (in American newspapers) that both the United States and Russia might restart underground nuclear tests in order to test existing nuclear warheads, in spite of the CTBT. Global and European security arrangements and security structures are in transition, but steps toward the goal of disarmament have been modest, and even arms control measures made in the Cold War era have been made ineffective by the nuclear capability of India, Pakistan, and other middle powers. Also, the disarmament process between the United States and Russia has encountered obstacles on both sides, including NATO expansion and the US plan for a ballistic missile defence system (contrary to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty). This apparent contradiction is due to competition, typical in transition periods, between the forces of continuity and the forces of change. The forces of continuity support arms technology, and particularly quality of technology over quantity of arms (one of the basic reasons why the military is present in the Arctic). The forces of change see new kinds of threats, like a lack of border security, armed conflict within the former Soviet Union or civil wars in the Russian Federation, and global and regional environmental degradation, including that caused by peacetime military activities. Traditional Power I: NATO Just after the Cold War, the West gave its moral and financial support to the Central Eastern European Countries and the newly independent states through initiatives, such as the Tacis Programme. (The Tacis Programme was launched by the EC in 1991 to provide grant-financed technical assistance to 13 countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia with the aim of enhancing the transition process in those countries.) The West also promised to enlarge its institutions, first the EU and NATO, to take new member states from Eastern Europe. The West has had difficulties implementing its promises quickly, and several so-called waiting rooms of NATO, such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the Partnership for Peace, and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council have been established. There has been strong support in Eastern Europe for a rapid NATO enlargement, with an emphasis that it should be a political project rather than a slow, bureaucratic process. Behind this haste is a sense of a lack of security. The first new member states, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, were taken into NATO in 1999, and the enlargement processes of the EU and NATO are still in progress. Russia has reacted to NATO expansion mostly due to the situation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. NATO enlargement into these states, and beyond the red line of the former Soviet Union, is seen as the only threat to Nordic-Russian relations. It does not to coincide with the security interests of Russia and could be taken as a provocation (Foreign Policy 2000). There are, among the Russians, the feeling that the West is hostile 234 Contemporary Issues in the Circumpolar World 2

17 toward Russia and might try to harm or even attack it, so Russia has opposed the enlargement of NATO. Russia has not, however, protested against EU enlargement nor against EU plans to create its own security policy and military for crisis management. In response to Western encroachments into the former Soviet sphere, political alliances have been created, such as the strategic partnership between Russia and Ukraine, the Kiev-Moscow Pact, the Collective Security Council of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and a new, rapid-action military troop to fight against terrorism and extremists in Central Asia. Russia is also strengthening its military power in some areas: a ballistic Topol-M-missile to respond to new geopolitical realities, both external and internal threats, military manoeuvres, such as the testing of a new missile technology; and redeployment of tactical nuclear warheads. All in all, the Baltic Sea region is no longer as strategically important to Russia because the real problems are elsewhere. The Baltic regional governments, with the exception of Russia, argue that NATO membership for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania will increase stability generally in the Baltic Sea region and North Europe. Finland and Sweden are not members of NATO and it does not appear that they will apply for NATO membership in the near future. Finland is militarily non-aligned and Sweden is neutral, but the situation is under discussion and, therefore, in a transition. NATO has adopted a new strategic concept, especially since the September 11th terrorist attacks. This includes the expansion of military actions outside the geographical areas of its member states, but with the permission of the UN, and involvement in regional and ethnic conflicts, massive arms buildups, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and terrorism. In this context NATO can be seen as an instrument of the Western peace policy, guaranteeing stability and security in Europe. It is argued that NATO has transformed from a military union into a political alliance, and is open to countries preferring peace and partnership. It remains a question whether the institutional and structural changes, such as the NATO enlargement, should be proceeded by the principles of new realism; that is, through functional and regional co-operative frameworks, such as the Baltic Sea States and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. How can the West maintain and increase stability, and create a strategic partnership and a spirit of new community if, at the same time, the United States continues the nuclear arms race with the National Missile Defence plan? Finally, the most fundamental question is: could the Russian Federation join the Western organizations? Traditional Power II: National Missile Defence A part of the US nuclear weapons strategy, and an example of traditional military power based on nuclear weapons systems, is the US National Missile Defence program. President Bush, in 2001, began the development Bachelor of Circumpolar Studies

18 of a large missile defence system in co-operation with US allies, and, at the same time, announced a decrease in the number of its nuclear warheads. Tests have been done since 1999 by the so-called killer vehicle above the Pacific Ocean to test the practicality of a missile-against-missile defence. In rhetoric the main idea of the National Missile Defence program is to build a large national ballistic missile defence capability to protect the territory of the United States, and its forces abroad, from ballistic missile attacks from the so-called rogue countries, such as Iraq, and North Korea. The National Missile Defence program will use both satellites and radar stations to find and attack missiles and destroy them. Behind the National Missile Defence program is the Strategic Defence Initiative, initiated by President Reagan, with his idea to build a defence shield in space. Estimates of the total cost of the National Missile Defence program is about US$300 billion, with the costs of a single test at about US$100 million. The National Missile Defence program has direct and strong connections with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, signed between the USSR and the United States in 1972, and with negotiations between the United States and Russia since then. Russia opposes the National Missile Defence program because it would, in Russia s view, effectively end the stability achieved by mutual nuclear deterrence. Russia believes the system would nullify the offensive and retaliatory capacity of other countries, allowing the United States to attack other countries with impunity. Russia has warned the United States that the National Missile Defence program will restart the nuclear arms race, and that it will build new atomic weapons to counter what is sees as a major threat (The Globe and Mail, October 19, 1999). Russia argues that the theory of nuclear deterrence still makes sense, and that second-strike capacity is the best strategy to stabilize the world. It sees the ABM Treaty as the core of the whole network of nuclear arms control, with the benefits of transparency and mutual confidence in the nuclear control system. The Bush government argues that the ABM Treaty is a relic and would become a tombstone to the United States, because it represents the past and is a hindrance to the National Missile Defence program system. The United States backed out of the ABM Treaty unilaterally in December The National Missile Defence program is not only an issue between these two states, but also between the United States and China, and even between the United States and its European allies, who also believe that it would stimulate a new arms race. The National Missile Defence program affects the Circumpolar North in that it would introduce a new re-militarization of the North and reactions by Russia. There is potential for new military tests by the United States and Russia in the northern peripheries and use of the US air and radar bases in the Circumpolar North. Russia conducted two missile tests in November 1999 in response to US plans for the National Missile Defence program, one in South Russia and another from the Barents Sea into Kamtcatha (Kamchatka). 236 Contemporary Issues in the Circumpolar World 2

19 The Thule Radar Base will be a part of the National Missile Defence program. The Greenland Home Rule Government, especially Prime Minister Motzfedlt, and public opinion in Greenland are skeptical, bordering on hostile to return to the atmosphere of the Cold War period (International Herald Tribune, Sept. 19, 2000; Schultz-Lorentsen 2001). However, Denmark is a NATO country and has a bilateral agreement with the United States on Thule. The National Missile Defence program also concerns Alaska because President Bush has sanctioned a test area there. There is also some indication that the new radar station for satellites outside Vardö, Norway, would be part of the missile defence plan. Russia has asked that the radar station be put to joint use. In an case, many experts are skeptical of the National Missile Defence program. Some argue that a weapon system, by its nature, cannot be only defensive. Others attack the concept on technical grounds, claiming that it will only be effective against relatively small attacks, not a massive attack by a country such as Russia, because it is not a shield to protect the whole nation, or that it would not function well against less-developed missiles (i.e., the missile threats of the rogue countries), because of their erratic and unpredictable flight paths. Finally, if the National Missile Defence program is an answer: What is the question? Or, as American scientist James Pike put it, the National Missile Defence program is a weapon, which does not work, and which has been targeted into a threat which does not exit (Zakaria 2001; Landau 2001). Indeed, would the National Missile Defence program protect against the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001? A Relationship Between the Military and the Environment Social scientist Johan Galtung emphasized, in the beginning of the 1980s, the keen relationship between the environment and the military. It is an error to think that there is little or no relation between the degradation of the environment and security matters (Galtung 1982; see also Westing 1988). In general, and on a global scale, there are relevant links, relations, and contradictions between the military and the environment that can be seen in the routine activities of armies. They have many elements: armies use the air, water, and land worldwide about 0.5 to one per cent of all the land; they need natural resources, such as copper, nickel, and lead; armies use energy, especially oil; and armies are both normal (pollution caused by regular human activities) and special polluters (toxic and radioactive waste), but are protected polluters in that they generally operate outside environmental legislation. The environmental effects and risks are similar all over the world, but the Arctic and the sub-arctic lands and seas are particularly vulnerable. As mentioned earlier, military presence and routine action takes many forms in the region, including garrisons, bases and airfields, manoeuvres and patrols, different kinds of weapons and weapon systems, and nuclear and missile Bachelor of Circumpolar Studies

20 tests and low-level flights. Even in peacetime, the effects of military presence to the environment and indigenous peoples can be actual, like pollution, or potential, like risks of nuclear accidents. For more details about the relationship between the military and the environment see Heininen 1992 and At the start of nuclear weapons testing on Novaya Zemlya in 1957, there was already a growing awareness about radioactive contamination of the environment among scientist and authorities dealing with radiation protection issues. The public reaction, however, never became particularly strong, and worries about possible contamination of food products or health effects never progressed to widespread public concern. The accident of the Mike-class nuclear submarine in April of 1989, is an example of the risk in the Cold War period to northern seas. According to several international studies, the radioactive release would, in theory, cause significant disturbances to marine life. The revelation of substantial radioactive releases from nuclear facilities along the River Ob in Siberia increased concern about environmental pollution, particularly in the Kara and Barents Seas, and the Chernobyl incident brought nuclear contamination sharply into public focus. There are arguments against environmental concern. Some argue that the environmental effects of the military is no longer a relevant issue because military activities in the Arctic and northern seas are decreasing, or that there is so much space and land in the North that military testing and training has little overall effect, and even that, in some cases, the ownership of some areas by armies has prevented environmental degradation. Some argue that it is difficult, or even impossible, to show any dramatic evidence of pollution that would affect the Arctic ecosystem, or that there are much bigger environmental challenges and problems like oil-drilling, longdistance air and sea pollution, traffic, and local industrial pollution that are more damaging than military activities. The relations between the military and the northern indigenous peoples is also relevant. There are examples, such as Canada s efforts to force Inuit people to move to the Arctic Archipelago to support Canadian sovereignty claims; pollution from the equipment of the DEW line near the residences of the Eskimo people in Alaska; and plans to build a radar station in the reindeer herding area on the top of Litmurinvaara in Inari, Finland. In dealing with these relations, there are two arguments: first, that in the North there is space enough for both the traditional uses of northern Indigenous peoples and the needs of armies; second, that armies have brought development to northern Indigenous peoples, and other people who are living in the North, including employment, needed services, tax revenues, and flight routes inside the northern peripheries. Some Indigenous groups support military defence by NATO, and believe that they should have at least some representation in national defence decision-making (Jull 1990). Also, the majority of the Home Rule Government of Greenland is in favour of NATO because Greenland is seen as part of the NATO alliance (Fægteborg 1989). 238 Contemporary Issues in the Circumpolar World 2