THEME 12 SECURITY. PW2003/PITG/06-023P/T DOC/ printed on recycled paper

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1 THEME 12 SECURITY 12.1 Provide an analysis by a competent authority, of the general risks connected with the Olympic territory. Specify the authority which has provided the following analysis. Fire (buildings, industry, forests) Intrusion into Olympic facilities Civil disobedience Crime Technological risks to services essential to the Olympic Games Traffic Natural catastrophes (earthquake, flood, volcano, hurricane, etc.) Other catastrophes (chemical, biological, nuclear, plane crash, serious land accident, etc.) Terrorism Major traffic accident, including tunnels The following information is provided by a competent authority consisting of a joint task force comprised of senior representatives from the major public safety agencies in Southern California, including: Los Angeles Police and Fire Departments; Los Angeles County Sheriffs and Fire Departments; Long Beach Police and Fire Departments; and Los Angeles City and County Offices of Emergency Preparedness. Los Angeles has created one of the most active counterterrorist police departments in the country, often reacting to overseas attacks with its own contingency planning. Wall Street Journal, December 29, 2006, Page 1. Fire (buildings, industry, forests) Fire prevention and detection devices have been in use for decades in Southern California to greatly reduce the risk from structure fire. New construction must pass stringent safety regulations. Public safety personnel may access any structure to conduct inspections, rescue efforts, and apply resources to mitigate any fire. All venues are subject to brush clearance restriction protocols and are reachable by fire apparatus. Intrusion into Olympic facilities Many proposed venue sites regularly host large sporting/related events that attract large numbers of spectators. Spectators are safely and efficiently guided to and admitted into these facilities through the use of professional queuing and ticketing systems, procedures and personnel. Most venues use information technology to manage access, thereby reducing the chance of fraudulent ticketing. Attempted intrusion is rarely problematic or requires law enforcement intervention. A separate ticketing process, employing the latest technology, will be deployed specifically for the Olympic Games, making counterfeiting virtually impossible. Civil disobedience General strikes and human rights demonstrations are a rarity in Southern California. The risk from civil disobedience is greatly mitigated by coordinated, multi-agency, multi-discipline response utilizing modern and appropriate techniques and equipment, applied in tandem with universal respect for human rights. Crime Crime is not a major risk factor for sporting event participants or spectators. Utilizing sophisticated and professional policing techniques and methods, Southern California law enforcement agencies excel in crime prevention, response and investigation. Proactive deployment assists these efforts. Crime in both the City and County of Los Angeles dropped for the fifth consecutive year in Indeed, Los Angeles has the second lowest rate of major crime of any PW2003/PITG/06-023P/T DOC/ printed on recycled paper

2 large city (over 1 million population) in the U.S. Four of the top 15 safest cities in the country are located in Southern California. Technological risks to services essential to the Olympic Games (refers to communications infrastructure failures) The Region has a well-developed and stable information technology infrastructure. Cable, satellite, DSL, and wireless (WiFi) Internet access are ubiquitous, robust and often redundant, thus failing rarely. Regional law enforcement developed and deployed a proprietary microwave communications system allowing for full interoperability across all agencies and common frequencies. The system has already been in service for several years and provides for both voice and data communications for all land, air and marine units, even if power is lost across the Region. Traffic The heaviest traffic in Southern California is often relegated to commuter and highway lanes. It is well managed by the Department of Transportation s Traffic Coordination Center. Routine aircraft surveillance and automated remote intersection control compliment active traffic and parking enforcement. A separate traffic management plan will be developed for the Olympic Games (see Theme 14). Natural catastrophes (chemical, biological, nuclear, plane crash, serious land accident, etc) Recognizing historical regional seismic instability, emergency management professionals have created a dynamic and effective mutual aid network. Southern California s public safety personnel are internationally-respected for their response to catastrophic events through continuous preplanning, training, and consequence management exercises. Biological or chemical accidents are rare, and the region s only nuclear reactor is over 60 miles south of Los Angeles. Terrorism Regional law enforcement/public safety agencies have taken proactive steps in reducing the fear and incidence of terrorism in the past five years. More than $125 million has been invested in the region in technology, equipment, training, planning simulations since While Los Angeles could be considered a potential target of international terrorism, the risks are mitigated through participation in the Federal Joint Terrorism Task Force, the sharing of information through the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center, and the implementation of internationally regarded programs. The Department of Homeland Security rated Los Angeles an 11 (out of 12 ) in a recently published national study of the capabilities of 75 major U.S. cities to communicate across disciplines and jurisdictional lines. Major traffic accidents, including in tunnels Many traffic accidents are prevented and injuries mitigated through traffic enforcement and the mandatory use of safety devices. There are relatively few tunnels of significant length in Los Angeles and surrounding communities, thereby reducing the chance of serious tunnel accidents or blockages Provide an analysis, by a competent authority, of the situation with respect to any risks posed by activist minorities (religious, political, ethnic, etc.) or terrorist groups in the country or region. The following analysis was completed by the same group that responded to Los Angeles and surrounding communities are relatively modern and have few legacy issues - religious, political, or ethnic. Truly multi-cultural, the Region has many diverse ethnic communities and moderate socio-economic stratification. Lacking the historical local perspective, most newcomers and immigrants choose to focus their energy on increasing their own economic potential, rather than re-igniting or continuing historical feuds. PW2003/PITG/06-023P/T DOC/ printed on recycled paper

3 While lacking indigenous populations of significance, or oppressed cultural or ethnic minorities, Los Angeles is the home to many undocumented workers and immigrants. These immigrants are sometimes the targets of political anti-immigrant rhetoric. On occasion, activists have organized pro-immigrant rights marches and demonstrations. These demonstrations have a benign affect on public safety and are generally structured, organized, and peaceful. As a multi-cultural City and region, there are representatives from hundreds of countries and ethnic groups present. While there is always the potential for persons of ill repute to integrate themselves within these communities to disrupt them or conduct terrorist acts, it is not of substantial or unmanageable risk. With proper community involvement and outreach, potential terrorists and other criminals are detected and arrested. Domestic terrorism in the region has been limited to small actions of property damage. Specify the measures envisaged for preventing acts of terrorism by international groups. By participating in the Joint Terrorism Task Force, the Joint Regional Intelligence Center, and other collaborative working groups, intelligence from various sources can be analyzed and subsequently synthesized into predictive intelligence. Combined with an active collection effort and situational awareness campaign, an active picture of the potentialities can be developed. Leveraging local, regional and national resources, law enforcement, in cooperation with the international community, can identify potential terrorists and effectively monitor and disrupt their activities. This leveraging can be assisted via the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program which is already in significant use across the region. This force multiplier extends the capabilities of the intelligence apparatus across the spectrum of law enforcement, firefighter, and healthcare. Understanding the regional nuances while maintaining a global perspective, public safety can assist in prevention of terrorism through the identification of vulnerabilities and the physical hardening of potential targets. Utilizing information technologies, profiles of venues can be used for rapid response and incident mitigation Security Organizations Identify the public and private organizations that will be involved with security during the Olympic Games. Security for the 2016 Olympic Games will be addressed as a unified regional effort involving federal, state and local emergency response agencies, private security companies and nongovernment organizations. The agencies and entities involved will have an operational or supporting role in the security effort. They include: PW2003/PITG/06-023P/T DOC/ printed on recycled paper

4 Operational Agencies: LOCAL Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) Los Angeles City Department of Transportation (LADOT) Los Angeles World Airport Police Department (LAWAPD) Los Angeles County Sheriff s Department (LACSD) Los Angeles County Fire Department (LACFD) Los Angeles Public Health Department (LAPHD) Long Beach Police Department (LBPD) Long Beach Fire Department (LBFD) Anaheim Police Department (APD Anaheim Fire Department (AFD) Orange County Sheriff s Department (OCFD) Orange County Fire Department (OCFD) Pasadena Police Department (PPD) Pasadena Fire Department (PFD) STATE California Highway Patrol (CHP) California Department of Transportation (CALTRANS) California National Guard (CNG) FEDERAL Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) United States Secret Service (USSS) United States Department of State, Office of Diplomatic Security (USDSODS) Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) Bureau of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Bureau of Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) United States Coast Guard (USCG) Transportation Safety Agency (TSA) SUPPORTING AGENCIES Los Angeles City Emergency Preparedness Department (LAEPD) Los Angeles County Office of Emergency Management (LACoOEM) California Office of Homeland Security (COHS) California Office of Emergency Services (COES) American Red Cross United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA) NON-GOVERNMENTAL Private Security Identify what the specific responsibilities of each will be and how they will be integrated and coordinated, both amongst themselves and with the OCOG, throughout planning and operations. The responsibilities of each identified organization will be based upon specific need and intelligence. The period leading up to and following the Olympic Games will be managed in four phases. Planning Phase: Preparation Phase: Operational Phase: Recovery Phase: Formal announcement of the 2016 Olympic Games through the Opening Ceremony. Six months prior to Opening Ceremony. Two weeks prior to Opening Ceremony until two weeks after the Closing Ceremony. Four weeks after the Closing Ceremony. PW2003/PITG/06-023P/T DOC/ printed on recycled paper

5 Planning Phase An Olympic Security Planning Committee (OSPC) will be coordinated jointly by the Los Angeles Police and Fire Departments. The OSPC will consist of executive-level representatives from the OCOG and each Operational and Supporting Agency. The OSPC will provide direction to working groups established to address specific components of the planning process. Planning Work Groups Organization Venue Security Venue Specific Law and Fire Representatives, FBI Olympic Village Security LAPD, LAFD, LASD, LACFD, FBI Athlete Transportation LAPD, LAFD, LASD, LACFD, CHP, FBI Diplomatic/VIP Security LAPD, LAFD, LASD, LACFD, CHP, FBI, USSS, US Department of State Diplomatic Security, Private Security Disaster Response LAPD, LAFD, LASD, LACFD, CHP, CNG, FEMA, LAEPD, LACOEM, COES Special Operations LAPD, LAFD, LASD, LACFD, CHP, FBI, ATF, USCG Intelligence LAPD, LAFD, LASD, LACFD, CHP, FBI, USSS, US Department of State Diplomatic Security, Private Security Airport/Port Security LAPD, LAFD, LA Port Police, LAWAPD, LBPD, LBFD, ICE, CBP, USCG, TSA, DHS Preparation Phase An Olympics Preparation Task Force (OPTF) will be established to coordinate and implement pre-olympic Game changes to routine operations in Olympic-impacted venues. The OPTF staff will be a primary assignment for designated personnel from each of the Operational and Supporting Agencies. The OPTF will receive direction from the OSPC based upon the input of the working groups. Mission Crime Suppression Operations Physical Security Inspection Traffic Plan Implementation Community Education Organization Venue Specific Law Enforcement Venue Specific Fire, Law Enforcement, Private Security, FBI Venue Specific Fire, Law Enforcement, CHP, LADOT, CALTRANS Venue Specific Fire, Law Enforcement, LAEPD, LACoOEM Operational Phase The region developed and implemented the Incident Command System (ICS). The ICS has been an integral part of fire operations since the 1970s and an all-discipline response system in California since The merits of the system were recognized by the Department of Homeland Security in 2005 and adopted as the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The Operations Phase will be managed according to NIMS. Security operations for each venue will be managed by the Unified Incident Command Post (UICP). The various Incident Command Posts under the UICP will be under the control of an Area Command. Overall operations will be coordinated through a Multi-Agency Coordination Center. The National Response Plan, which governs how federal agencies respond to incidents of national significance, will also be implemented. A Joint Field Office (JFO) will be established to coordinate federal resources. The JFO will report to the Regional Emergency Operations Center and provide support to the Olympic Games Operations staff. PW2003/PITG/06-023P/T DOC/ printed on recycled paper

6 Recovery Phase Recovery operations will commence as venues are deactivated following competition. They will ensure that all impacted venues and the surrounding communities are returned to normal and that all appropriate documentation and after-action reports are completed Identify any existing organisations that will not be involved in Olympic Games security. None 12.4 How will the Intelligence Services be involved? It is envisioned that the Intelligence Services will work seamlessly within the NIMS. In the NIMS framework, the Intelligence Services will be represented in the Plans and Intelligence Section. From Plans and Intelligence, pertinent information will be shared with the other sections and the Incident Commander. International, federal, state, regional and local intelligence services will share their information through the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC). Pertinent intelligence affecting any aspect of the Olympic Games will be channeled to the responsible operational component through the incident management system and the Joint Operations Center. The JIC will maintain a liaison or be co-located with the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC). The JRIC is the center point for intelligence sharing in the seven-county region surrounding Los Angeles. With one exception (preliminary football matches), all events will take place in this region. Intelligence information from all sources (official, intelligence community, crime reports, citizen calls, open source media) and all disciplines of public safety, is gathered, collated, analyzed, and disseminated appropriately. Appropriate components within the JRIC would lead the intelligence mission for the region, directing strategic and tactical intelligence efforts. Through situational awareness and analysis, the JRIC would look for indicators and warnings of potential terrorism targeting the Olympic Games. Other components would coordinate emergency response information, intelligence liaison, and public out-reach campaigns. Actionable intelligence would be immediately disseminated at the appropriate level. Important strategic analysis will be disseminated to regional decision-makers for policy choices and required responses, if any. Tactical information and current intelligence would be disseminated to appropriate investigative units for investigative efforts and possible disruption of any acts of terrorism. This information would be shared using the best information technology available. Informational bulletins concerning the ongoing operation of the Olympic Games would be shared with all of public safety agencies (law, fire, and health) through the use of the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Program. Specially trained and vetted persons representing all levels of public safety would be tasked with providing such information. Additionally, these TLOs would seek and collect pertinent field information and report the information immediately back to the JRIC for further analysis. This two-way flow of intelligence, directed by the JRIC with the mission of disrupting any potential acts of terrorism, and protecting the Olympic Family, athletes and spectators, will be the focus of the intelligence services. PW2003/PITG/06-023P/T DOC/ printed on recycled paper

7 12.5 Within the structure of the OCOG, will there be a department responsible for security matters? As described in the response to , the OSPC is responsible for security matters. Exhibit provides an organization and key responsibilities of the OSPC. Response to question describes the primary security functions and which organizations will work for specific security missions. What will its functions and responsibilities be vis-à-vis the organisations identified in Q 12.3? 12.6 Provide organizational charts of Olympic Games security for the following: Organisation of the general and operational planning phases Organisation of the implementation phase Exhibit PW2003/PITG/06-023P/T DOC/ printed on recycled paper

8 Exhibit PW2003/PITG/06-023P/T DOC/ printed on recycled paper

9 Exhibit PW2003/PITG/06-023P/T DOC/ printed on recycled paper

10 12.7 Provide estimates of the available police and emergency services human resources in the region and city. The bulk of the law enforcement, fire, emergency medical services, public health and other relevant services will be provided by the cities and counties of Los Angeles, Orange, Long Beach and Carson. Together these agencies regularly deploy the following human and physical assets: National Guard More than 20,000 Law Enforcement Officers More than 27,500, with over 3,000 reserve officers, speaking more than 50 languages. Fire Fighters More than 10,200, including emergency medical services personnel. Dignitary Protection A dedicated unit of over 400 officers specifically trained by the U.S. Secret Service in protection methods. Hazardous Materials (substantial HazMat) Teams More than 16. SWAT Teams Two full-time, plus dozens of fully trained officers available on an emergency basis. Bomb Squads - Two full-time, plus dozens of fully trained officers available on an emergency basis. Air Support The largest municipal air fleet in the country, including more than 42 fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. Trauma Centers Eleven facilities, along with more than 70 receiving hospitals with emergency rooms. Urban Search and Rescue Teams Twenty-one Type 1 teams in Los Angeles County. Disaster Relief FEMA has two 70-person teams pre-deployed in Southern California and 36,000 civilians are fully trained in the Community Emergency Response Program Will it be possible to use the resources of the Armed Forces in the Olympic Games security operation and, if so, in what capacity? The United States Armed Forces will play a limited operational role in the Olympic Games due to constitutional restrictions on the use of military forces in domestic operations. The California National Guard, a state militia, can and will be deployed Provide an estimate of the total human resources that would be used in the operational implementation of security during the Olympic Games, specifying by staff type (e.g., police, emergency services, Armed Forces, volunteers, contract security, etc.) What proportion of these will come from another region and will need varying degrees of logistical support? Actual deployment of resources during the Games will be based upon need including projected attendance and intelligence reports. Events, such as the Opening and Closing Ceremonies, will be staffed at five (5) security personnel for every 1,000 attendees. Other events will be staffed based on projected attendance estimates. PW2003/PITG/06-023P/T DOC/ printed on recycled paper

11 Law Enforcement Agency City/County of Los Angeles Regional Total Law Enforcement 3,500 1,500 5,000 Fire/Emergency Medical Services 1, ,500 Military (National Guard) Private Security 3,000 3,000 Total 7,500 2,750 10,250 It is estimated that 85% of resources will be provided locally/regionally, with the remainder coming externally (federal agencies) Does legislation permit a single management structure that will be effective whatever the origin of the human and technical resources that are used, and without functional or territorial restrictions? The NIMS was created to standardize the nationwide response of federal, state, local and tribal governments, private sector, and non-governmental organizations in the preparation of, response to, and recovery from domestic incidents regardless of cause, size, or complexity, including acts of catastrophic terrorism. In preparation for the Olympic Games, NIMS will provide a doctrine, a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes that require the effective, efficient, and collaborative efforts of all government agencies at all levels of incident management systems to adhere to established protocols delineated in NIMS. NIMS is based upon the California Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS), which was adopted 20 years ago by the fire service and 10 years ago by the law enforcement community. The SEMS is an extremely effective, emergency incident management tool and provides a five-level emergency response organization (State, regional, operational area, local government, and field) that can be activated as needed to assist in multi-agency and multijurisdiction emergencies. The City of Los Angeles is responsible for the field and local government levels of SEMS for emergencies that occur within the City. Los Angeles County is responsible for the operational area level, and the State of California, Office of Emergency Services is responsible for the regional and State emergency response levels. Under SEMS, all responding agencies function as an integrated team to facilitate the flow of information within and between the different organizational levels. Like NIMS, the SEMS is designed to coordinate the response of agencies, which includes rapid mobilization and tracking of resources. Los Angeles has adopted and will integrate the NIMS model into the City s Emergency Operations Master Plan and Procedures Manual. PW2003/PITG/06-023P/T DOC/ printed on recycled paper