BSI-DSZ-CC For. Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Hyper-V, Release from. Microsoft Corporation

Transcription

1 BSI-DSZ-CC For Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Hyper-V, Release from Microsoft Corporation

2 BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach , D Bonn Phone +49 (0) , Fax +49 (0) , Infoline +49 (0) Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.6

3 BSI-DSZ-CC Server Applications: Virtualization Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Hyper-V, Release from PP Conformance: Functionality: Assurance: Microsoft Corporation None Product specific Security Target Common Criteria Part 2 conformant Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3 Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. Bonn, 6 February 2012 For the Federal Office for Information Security Bernd Kowalski Head of Department L.S. Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Godesberger Allee D Bonn - Postfach D Bonn Phone +49 (0) Fax +49 (0) Infoline +49 (0)

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5 BSI-DSZ-CC Certification Report Preliminary Remarks Under the BSIG 1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products. Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor. A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria. The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself. The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results. The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user. 1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p / 38

6 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC Contents A Certification Specifications of the Certification Procedure Recognition Agreements European Recognition of ITSEC/CC Certificates (SOGIS-MRA) International Recognition of CC Certificates (CCRA) Performance of Evaluation and Certification Validity of the Certification Result Publication...11 B Certification Results Executive Summary Identification of the TOE Security Policy Assumptions and Clarification of Scope Architectural Information Documentation IT Product Testing Developer Testing Test configuration Testing approach Test results Test coverage Test depth Conclusion Evaluator Testing Effort TOE Test Configuration Evaluator Tests Summary of Evaluator Test Results Evaluator Penetration Testing Evaluated Configuration Results of the Evaluation CC specific results Results of cryptographic assessment Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE Security Target / 38

7 BSI-DSZ-CC Certification Report 12 Definitions Acronyms Glossary Bibliography...24 C Excerpts from the Criteria...26 D Annexes / 38

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9 BSI-DSZ-CC Certification Report A Certification 1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following: BSIG 2 BSI Certification Ordinance 3 BSI Schedule of Costs 4 Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior) DIN EN standard BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3] Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version [1] Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2] BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4] 2 Recognition Agreements In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed. 2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC Certificates (SOGIS-MRA) The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical domains only. The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined. It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp.e3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement. As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and 2 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p / 38

10 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC the United Kingdom.Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found at The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above. 2.2 International Recognition of CC Certificates (CCRA) An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC. As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above. 3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings. The product Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Hyper-V, Release has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ- CC Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC were re-used. The evaluation of the product Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Hyper-V, Release was conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 16 January The atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF) 6 recognised by the certification body of BSI. For this certification procedure the applicant is: Microsoft Corporation. The product was developed by: Microsoft Corporation. The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI. 4 Validity of the Certification Result This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed, 6 Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility 10 / 38

11 BSI-DSZ-CC Certification Report the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following report and in the Security Target. For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report. The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis. 5 Publication The product Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Hyper-V, Release has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI- Infoline Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer 7 of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above. 7 Microsoft Corporation One Microsoft Way Redmond, WA USA 11 / 38

12 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC B Certification Results The following results represent a summary of the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation, the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body. 12 / 38

13 BSI-DSZ-CC Certification Report 1 Executive Summary The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Microsoft Hyper-V R2 virtualization part of the Windows Server 2008 R2 product. Hyper-V R2 allows the definition of partitions that have separate address spaces where they can load an operating system and applications operating on top of this operating system. The TOE consists of the Microsoft Server 2008 R2 with Hyper-V R2 and the hypervisor being enabled. An operating system within such a partition has access to virtualized peripheral devices where access to those devices is controlled by Hyper-V R2. An operating system may either access devices using the same I/O related instructions as on a real system or it may use a specific interface offered by Hyper-V R2 (called the VMBus) to communicate with Hyper-V R2 for access to peripheral devices. In the first case the operating system can only access the devices virtualized by Hyper-V R2. When using the VMBus defined interface, an operating system in a guest partition needs to install enlightenments that set up the VMBus communication and use the synthetic devices accessible via VMBus. Note that the enlightenments within a guest operating system is part of the TOE, but not part of the TSF. The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified Protection Profile. The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3. The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6] chapter 6.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant. The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functionalities: Hyper-V provides the following primary security functionality: Access control between partitions and virtualized resources Auditing of security critical events detected by Hyper-V Object reuse for all resources managed by Hyper-V Management of the Hyper-V configuration including the configuration of the partitions Maximum quota for defined resources assigned to partitions (CPU time, memory, disk storage) In addition the root partition provides the following security functionality within the Server 2008 parts: Identification and authentication of administrative users Management and protection of the audit trail Access control of administrative users to management objects Access control to files and devices used 13 / 38

14 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC Management of users and access control In addition Hyper-V provides the following architectural properties: TSF protection against tampering from guest partitions and network devices Separation between the guest partitions Reference mediation for access of guest partitions to protected resources (including virtualized devices) Non-bypassability of the reference mediation Maintaining the separation mechanism provided by the underlying hardware when virtualizing resources and devices or responding to hypervisor calls for a guest partition. For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] chapter 7.2. The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The evaluated configuration is based on Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Standard and Hyper-V Server 2008 R2 with Hotfixes KB977894, KB and KB installed. For details refer to chapter 8. The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. 2 Identification of the TOE The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called: Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Hyper-V, Release / 38

15 BSI-DSZ-CC Certification Report The following table outlines the TOE deliverables: No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery 1.a SW Microsoft Hyper-V Server 2008 R Download OR 1.b SW Windows Server 2008 R2 (with the Hyper-V Role installed) DVD 2 SW All patches specifically identified in [10]. (See next entry.) Not applicable Download 3 DOC Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 Hyper-V Evaluated Configuration Guide [10] 2.11 Download 4 DOC Hyper-V Security Guide [11] 1.0 Download Table 1: Deliverables of the TOE The TOE comes as part of Windows Server 2008 R2 as well as of Hyper-V Server 2008 R2. The latter is a specifically labelled as a functional subset of Windows Server 2008 R2 called a "ServerCore" installation, which also provides the TOE. The TOE is delivered via downloads from the Microsoft web server and via physical delivery. It consists of the ISO image for Hyper-V Server 2008 R2 and a DVD providing Windows Server 2008R2. To ensure the integrity of the evaluation specific guidance, which also contains the checksums for the installation media, the user must send an to wincc@microsoft.com and request the Evaluated Configuration Guide for Hyper-V. The user will then receive an S/MIME signed with the requested information so that the integrity of the TOE can be verified. The operational TOE, when installed following the instructions in [10], provides the following version information when the command systeminfo is executed: Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2, Version (DVD-Version) OR Microsoft Hyper-V Server, Version (Download-Version) 3 Security Policy The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The TOE will ensure that subjects within a partition gain only authorized access to exported resources assigned to the partition. The TOE will provide the capability to generate audit records for security relevant auditable events. The TOE will ensure that only authorized subjects are allowed to access TSF data. The TOE will provide functions that allow administrators to setup and configure the TOE such that it is started in a secure state where all the other security objectives are enforced. The TOE will provide all the functions necessary to support the administrative users and authorized subjects in their management of the TOE security functions and configuration data, and restrict these functions from use by unauthorized subjects. 15 / 38

16 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC The TOE will ensure that any information contained in a protected resource is not released to subjects when the resource is reallocated. The TOE will provide mechanisms that enforce constraints on the allocation of TOE resources. The TOE will provide mechanisms to protect each guest partition from unauthorized interference by other guest partitions. The TOE will preserve the hardware separation functions within a partition such that software within the partition is able to implement its own policy for separation in the same way as it would be when executing directly on the underlying hardware. The TOE will preserve the integrity of a partitions data, the integrity of a partitions privileges and security attributes, and the overall context the partition is operated in when the running partition is migrated from one instance of the TOE to another one. The TOE will prohibit live migration if the source and destination instance of the TOE are not sufficiently compatible to provide the identical operational environment to the partition on both the source and the destination instance of the TOE. 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance: Physical security, underlying hardware mechanisms for separation and virtualization without side-effects, trained administrators, trusted users directly using the TOE, protected remote administration, trusted remote administration IT products, protection of physical network against attacks, trusted root partition, partition users are equipped with rights corresponding to partition data and confidentiality and integrity of data during live migration. Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter Architectural Information The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Microsoft Hyper-V R2 virtualization part of the Server 2008R2 product. Hyper-V R2 allows the definition of partitions that have separate address spaces where they can load an operating system and applications operating on top of this operating system. The TOE consists of the Microsoft Server 2008 R2 Server Core with Hyper-V R2 and the hypervisor being enabled. An operating system within such a partition has access to virtualized peripheral devices where access to those devices is controlled by Hyper-V R2. An operating system may either access devices using the same I/O related instructions as on a real system or it may use a specific interface offered by Hyper-V R2 (called the VMBus) to communicate with Hyper-V R2 for access to peripheral devices. In the first case the operating system can only access the devices virtualized by Hyper-V R2. When using the VMBus defined interface, an operating system in a guest partition needs to install enlightenments that set up the VMBus communication and use the synthetic devices accessible via VMBus. Note that the enlightenments within a guest operating system is part of the TOE, but not part of the TSF. 16 / 38

17 BSI-DSZ-CC Certification Report The TOE offers separation of partitions, controls access of partitions to resources like virtual hard disks or virtual network adapter, allows the definition of roles for the management of the TOE and enforces a role-based management policy, allows auditing of security critical events,authenticates administrative users in the root partition, and enforces quota for CPU time for partitions. The TOE also offers live migration of partitions from one instance of the TOE to another instance, provided the underlying platforms of both instances of the TOE satisfy the compatibility criteria required for live migration. Live migration will neither allow a partition to increase its privileges nor undermine the security of any of the two instances of the TOE involved in the migration. The TOE can be used to consolidate several physical servers based on Intel s x86 architecture onto one machine. The TOE allows the definition of so called partitions. Each instantiation of the TOE has one dedicated partition, called the root partition, and a variable number of so called guest partitions. Resources accessed by guest partitions are virtualized by the TOE, i.e. the TOE performs a translation of the virtual resource accesses by a guest partition onto the real resources available to the TOE. Such resources include virtual CPUs, main memory, virtual hard disks, virtual network adapters, virtual CD/DVD drives or floppy disk drives as well as virtual video adapter and virtual mouse and keyboard. The root partition is used for support of the resource virtualization and for TOE management activities. Each guest partition can take over the tasks of one physical server. Each guest will have its own operating system installed and is restricted by the TOE to the use of the resources that are assigned to the partition. The assignment of resources to partitions is performed by administrative roles defined in the root partition. The TOE allows separating each guest partition from others with a comparable degree as if they were executing on separate physical servers. 6 Documentation The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 1 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target. Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed. 7 IT Product Testing 7.1 Developer Testing The evaluator examined the information provided by the sponsor and determined the following: Test configuration The test results provided by the developer were obtained from the following test environments. Manual test cases: Hardware: HP DL365 G5 (AMD, x64), Dell 2950 III (INTEL, x64) Software base setup: as outlined in the evaluated configuration guide 17 / 38

18 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC VM setup: specification of the initial virtual machines that are set up to perform the testing, including a reference to the operating systems and their functionality hosted by these virtual machines. WTT test cases: Hardware: Intel x64 / AMD x64 Software: " amd64fre.win7_rtm (for Intel 64bit and AMD64bit machines)" Testing approach The testing is based on the use of several different test suites covering different aspects of the TOE functionality. Several test cases are manual test cases. The instructions provided with these test cases outline the step-by-step actions to be performed by the tester. Each step explains how an interface is to be invoked to initialize the system, how to stimulate the functionality to be tested, and how to observe and interpret, if necessary, the result. Automated test cases are provided with instructions on how to set up the initial test conditions to bring the test system into a state that fulfills all assumptions of the test cases. In addition,the test plan documentation provides instructions on how to start the automated test cases. The automated test cases check the obtained result with the expected result and return the status information whether the test failed or passed to the calling framework. This framework records the individual results for the tester to review. During the assessment of the TOE design, the evaluator identified that the TOE functionality is provided through a comparatively small number of external interfaces. Specifically, the security functions of access control implemented with the virtualization stack and the Hypervisor could potentially be tested with one test case by simply defining and successfully starting a virtual machine hosting an operating system. However, the access control functionality of the TOE is about granting a virtual machine access to its assigned resources and about prohibiting any other access to other resources. However, testing the latter functionality about denying access is a difficult task because in theory, all potential allowed input variables to interfaces and all potential system states would need to be tested to validate that access denial is enforced. As such testing is not feasible due to the number of such states and input values (and also considering the fact that some states may not be defined and therefore the behavior is unknown), the developer performed fuzz testing which tries to cover as many states and input variables as possible. These fuzz tests use random input variables to invoke TOE interfaces. They validate that they cannot smash the Hypervisor or parts of the virtualization stack. Therefore, these fuzz tests are considered part of the functional verification testing of the TOE. In addition to the fuzz based test approach, the developer employs "classic" tests that cover the whole software stack by means of integration tests as well as unit based tests for the hypervisor. Finally the management interfaces (WMI) are tested functionally Test results The test results provided by the developer were obtained on the hardware platforms listed above. 18 / 38

19 BSI-DSZ-CC Certification Report As described in the testing approach, the test results of all the automated tests are collected for review by the tester. These test logs indicate whether the test passed or failed. The test results of the manual tests have been recorded by the developer and those results have been presented separately. All test results from all tested platforms show that the expected test results are identical to the actual test results. Failure were examined by the evaluator, who determines that the failure did not happen in the execution of the test case but in the cleanup phase of the test Test coverage A mapping provided by the developer shows that the tests cover all individual TSFI identified for the TOE. The evaluator analyzed the mapping and identified that significant details of the TSFI have been tested with the developer's test suites Test depth The evaluator's analysis of the test suites shows that all TSF subsystems and all SFRenforcing modules are covered with tests. In addition, the analysis also verified that the different security-relevant functions provided by a subsystem or module are covered with tests. Not all of the internal interfaces mentioned in the TOE design could be covered by direct test cases. The evaluator assessment shows that those interfaces are covered with indirect tests. The evaluator was able to trace the testing of those internal interfaces to test cases based on the test description Conclusion The evaluator has verified that developer testing was performed on hardware conformant to the ST. The evaluator was able to follow and fully understand the developer testing approach by using the information provided by the developer. The evaluator analyzed the developer testing coverage and the depth of the testing by reviewing all test cases. The evaluator found the testing of the TSF to be extensive and covering the TSFI as identified in the functional specification. The evaluator reviewed the test results provided by the developer and found them to be consistent with the test plan. 7.2 Evaluator Testing Effort While performing independent evaluator tests, the evaluator determined the following: TOE Test Configuration The evaluator independently installed the test systems according to the documentation in the CC guidance and the test plan. As assessed in the evaluation report on the administrator guidance,the CC guidance is consistent with the ST. Hence, the evaluator concludes that the evaluator s configuration is consistent with the ST. Testing was executed on the following test systems: 19 / 38

20 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC HP DL365 G5 (with AMD x64 processor) Dell 2950 III (with Intel x64 processor). Software setup: as outlined in the evaluated configuration guide Evaluator Tests The developer devised additional test cases based on the following reasons identified during the evaluation of the TOE design and the developer testing: The evaluator devised new tests. Considering the test approach and the number of tests the developer used to validate the Hypervisor and the virtualization functionality provided by the virtualization stack,the evaluator concentrated more on the administrative interfaces where the coverage by developer tests is not as large as for the virtualization functionality. As already identified in other work units, the evaluator considers the fact that much of the TOE functionality is visible only through a limited set of externally visible interfaces. Thus, many of the virtualization functions can already be triggered by a limited number of tests executed from the root partition. This means, that the evaluator focuses his testing activities on the root partition. The evaluator created several test cases for testing a limited number of functional aspects where the developer test cases were not considered to be broad enough by the evaluator. During the evaluator's review of the test cases provided by the developer, the evaluator gained confidence in the developer testing effort and the depth of test coverage in the developer supplied test cases. The analysis has shown a very wide coverage of the TSF, therefore the evaluator devised only a small number of test cases Summary of Evaluator Test Results The evaluator testing effort consists of three parts. The first one is the observation of the developer test execution, and the second is the execution of the tests created by the evaluator,this includes, three, the re-run of automated developer tests with variations chosen by the evaluator. The developer test results matched the expected results of those test cases. In addition to running the tests that were provided by the developer, the evaluator decided to run the following additional test cases on the provided test systems as defined: Remote Management Authentication for Hyper-V Management Partition Ids AzMan based Authorization Integration Testing All tests passed successfully. 7.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing The evaluator took the following approach to derive penetration tests for the TOE: First the evaluator checked common sources for vulnerabilities of the Windows Server 2008 R2 operating system in general and the Hypervisor: 20 / 38