Making Peace Work: Bridging The Gap Between Hopes and Deeds

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1 The Atkin Paper Series Making Peace Work: Bridging The Gap Between Hopes and Deeds Manar Rachwani January 2010

2 About the Atkin Paper Series Thanks to the generosity of the Atkin Foundation, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) offers young leaders from Israel and the Arab world the opportunity to come to London for a period of four months. The purpose of the fellowship is to provide young leaders from Israel and the Arab world with an opportunity to develop their ideas on how to further peace and understanding in the Middle East through research, debate and constructive dialogue in a neutral political environment. The end result is a policy paper that will provide a deeper understanding and a new perspective on a specific topic or event. Editor Dr. Peter R. Neumann Director International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), King s College London Editor Dr Ahron Bregman King s College London Editorial Assistant Katie Rothman Project Manager, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), King s College London To order hardcopies or contact the editor, please write to mail@icsr.info. All papers in the Atkin Paper Series can be downloaded free of charge at

3 About Manar Rachwani Manar Rachwani joined ICSR as an Atkin Research Fellow for Winter He holds a Masters degree in Political Science from Al al Bayt University of Jordan (1999), and B.A in Law from the University of Jordan (1995). In addition to his work as a researcher, Manar has worked as Managing Editor of Art and Culture at Al Ghad Daily Newspaper based in Jordan, and Director of the Research Department at Al Arab Daily Newspaper based in Qatar. Manar s areas of interest include Democracy, Human Rights, and Economic Reform. In addition to his articles in Arabic newspapers, he has published several studies on various issues in the Arab World, including, among others, Structural Adjustment Policies and Political Stability in Jordan ; Particularity Creation and Human Rights in the Arab World and Economic Reform and Democratization in the Arab World. Summary In his paper Making Peace Work: Bridging The Gap Between Hopes and Deeds, Manar Rachwani addresses what seems to be a paradox within Arab attitudes towards peace with Israel, represented in announced desires for peace combined with contradictable deeds on the ground. The core of this paradox, according to Rachwani, is embodied in the perception of peace by the Arab peoples, which is supposed to be comprehensive. Nevertheless, Rachwani argues that a real warm peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved on merely political level. Such peace requires broad reforms on local levels in Arab countries. Also, political progress towards peace should go hand in hand with normalisation to create mutual trust on the both sides of the conflicts. 1

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5 Making Peace Work: Bridging The Gap Between Hopes and Deeds By Manar Rachwani Following Egyptian President Anwar Al Sadat s visit to Jerusalem in 1977, many Arab leaders and indeed their publics came to believe that negotiations were the only way forward in trying to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. This view took root in the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991, which almost all Arab countries attended and which later, in 1994, led to the signing of a peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. Much like the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the Jordanian-Israeli treaty was based on the principle of Land for Peace, which required Israel s withdrawal from Arab territories occupied in 1967 in exchange for Arab recognition of Israel s right to live in peace in the region, in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. This resolution, issued on 22 November 1967, called for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force, in addition calling for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem. 1 In line with the Israeli-Egyptian treaty, Israel has withdrawn from all Egyptian territories, with arrangements made that led to the creation of Demilitarized Zones (DMZs) in the Sinai Peninsula. The same can be said about the Jordanian case, which was also based on land swaps and the long-term lease of Jordanian land to Israel. However, it is obvious that Israel has never managed to achieve real peace, 1 The difference between the English and French versions of this resolution triggered different interpretations by Israel and the Arab countries. While the French text called for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the territories occupied in the recent conflict, the English text read as territories occupied.... 3

6 by which I mean not only the official termination of the state of war but also, and perhaps even more important, the normalisation of relations on all levels with her former enemies. Although Arab public opinion surveys over the years show only a minority opposes the two-state solution (i.e., the recognition of Israeli and Palestinian states, which means acknowledging Israel s right to exist peacefully in the Middle East), the existing peace between Israel and Egypt and between Israel and Jordan is still a cold peace at best. 2 In both cases, apart from strict official cooperation at the governmental level with Israel, mainly on security issues, the main characteristic at the public level is a lack of any normal relations between the Israelis on one side and the Egyptians and the Jordanians on the other. 3 In fact, many indicators of hostility towards Israel can be found at this level in both Egypt and Jordan. Strikingly, years after the signing of the peace treaties, instead of making some progress toward more normal and stable relations, coldness has started to penetrate the official level itself in Jordan, which was known as a big defender of peace at both the public and governmental levels. On the eve of the 15th anniversary of the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, King Abdullah II described the relationship between the two countries as getting colder. 4 Against this background, this paper will focus on what seems to be a paradox within Arab attitudes toward peace with Israel: namely, if the Arabs are eager to achieve genuine peace with Israel, as was expressed in the peace treaties that have been signed as well as the positive results of public opinion surveys, then how can the lack of deeds translating this desire into reality be explained? From Cold Peace to Colder Peace In assessing the effectiveness of any peace accord, we can borrow Benjamin Miller s model to distinguish between three main types or levels of peace, which consequently imply different tendencies towards renewing regional conflict or war: cold peace, normal peace, and warm peace. 5 Cold peace constitutes the first indispensably step to putting an end to a conflict; however, due to its being a governmental peace rather than peace between peoples, the danger of a return to the use of force still looms in the background. This vulnerability to conflict or war can be decreased in the next phase by moving to a higher degree of normal peace based on relations beyond that of governments. These relations could then evolve into extensive transnational relations and a high degree of regional interdependence, 2 The percentage opposing the two-state solution amounted to 25% in 2009, 19% in 2008, and 29% in Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at University of Maryland/Zogby International, Arab Public Opinion Surveys. Available at: surveys/surveys 3 See for example: Prince Zeid Ra ad Al Hussein (Jordan s ambassador to the United States) interview with Middle East Bulletin, 27 October Available at: middleeastprogress.org/2009/10/the-viewfrom-amman 4 King Abdullah II interview with Akiva Eldar of Haaretz, 9 October Available at: ( kingabdullah.jo/main.php?main_page=0&lang_hmka1=1) 5 Benjamin Miller, When and How Regions Become Peaceful: Potential Theoretical Pathways to Peace, International Studies Review (2005) 7, pp

7 leading to a warm peace where war is no longer thinkable, whatever the international or regional developments. 6 Table 1 Ideal Types of Regional Peace Cold Peace Normal Peace Warm Peace Main issues in conflict Mitigated, but not fully resolved Resolved Resolved or transcended (rendered irrelevant) Channels of communication Only Intergovernmental Mostly intergovernmental; beginning of development of transnational ties Intergovernmental plus highly developed transnational ties Contingency plans for war Possibility of return to war Still present Possible Absent Present Possible Unthinkable Source: Benjamin Miller, When and How Regions Become Peaceful: Potential Theoretical Pathways to Peace, International Studies Review (2005) 7, p.232. Looking at the relations between Israel on one side and Egypt and Jordan on the other, according to many indicators on different levels, it would be safe to say that the existing peace is in a lower position than cold peace. Besides the continuous demonstrations against Israel, the most important indicator of hostility can be found in the powerful anti-normalisation campaigns against Israel in Jordan and Egypt. These maintain strong relationships with similar entities in almost all other Arab countries and aim to prevent any voluntary relations with Israel and any of its institutions, whether political, economic, cultural, or social. A notable aspect of this campaign, which explains its growing influence, is the diversity among the groups and individuals who run and support it. These groups include political parties with different ideologies and attitudes (e.g., Islamists, leftists, nationalists), professional associations, academics, and prominent former officials (two former prime ministers, for example, in the case of Jordan). Those who have relations with Israel, on any level, usually keep it secret as it is still considered a scandal. 6 Ibid., p

8 Although anti-normalisation endeavours are directed mainly at the public levels individuals, companies, and institutions a byproduct of the campaign s successful effort can be seen in the cold peace with Israel at the official/governmental level in both countries. In this context, an important indicator is the fact that President Hosni Mubarak, as well as the late King Hussein and his successor King Abdullah II, have refrained from visiting Israel, with the exception of Mubarak and Hussein s attendance at the funeral of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in Another important indicator is the negative media coverage of Israel in Jordan and Egypt, 7 mainly by Al Jazeera, which is regarded as the most important media outlet in the Arab world. 8 The importance of the Al Jazeera indicator comes not only from its influence, but also from the fact that it is based in Qatar and funded by the Qatari government, which established quasi-normal diplomatic relations with Israel in 1996 by opening an Israeli trade office in Doha. Finally, while these indicators of hostility and a cold peace at the governmental level feed public attitudes toward Israel, we can argue that the same indicators are a reflection of existing attitudes among ordinary people. Public opinion surveys in six Arab countries (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates) show that the vast majority see Israel as the most threatening state, which helps explain the high popularity of Hezbollah and Hamas, who deny Israel s right to exist. 9 The Dividends of Peace As land was the main, if not the only, reason behind the start of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948 (or perhaps since the Balfour Declaration in 1917), it is reasonable to assume that the return of occupied Arab territories was the only motive behind the Arabs acceptance of peace with Israel. Thus, normal or warm peace would compensate Israel for its withdrawal from the occupied territories, in compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, or the principle of Land for Peace. Although this is true, another incentive, no less important, made it vital for the Arabs to pursue peace: economic benefits. This incentive was clear in the Egyptian case as well as the Jordanian and played a crucial role in selling the peace treaties to the public in both countries. Years before his visit to Jerusalem, Egyptian President Anwar Al Sadat launched a new economic policy: the Infitah (open door), based mainly on the achievement 7 On Jordanian media coverage of Israel after peace, see Gadi Wolfsfeld, Rami Khouri, and Yoram Peri, News About the Other in Jordan and Israel: Does Peace Make a Difference?, Political Communication, Vol. 19, No. 2, (2002), pp ; Shlomo Gazit, Israel and Egypt: What Went Wrong?, Strategic Assessment, Vol. 12, No.1 (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies/Tel Aviv University, 2009) p In a 2009 public opinion poll 55% of those polled mentioned Al Jazeera as their first choice for international news. See: Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at University of Maryland/ Zogby International, Arab Public Opinion Survey Available at: surveys/surveys 9 Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at University of Maryland/Zogby International, Arab Public Opinion Surveys. Available at: surveys/surveys 6

9 of regional stability through a negotiated settlement. 10 As a result of four wars with Israel and one war in Yemen, in addition to internal factors related mainly to a dramatic increase in population, Egypt was heading towards serious social dilemmas, represented by the rise of poverty and the expected high rate of unemployment. In spite of food subsidies, the World Bank estimated that about 19% of the urban population and 27% of urban households, and 25% of the rural population and 35% of rural households were below the absolute poverty line in 1975, which explained the bread riots that erupted in 1977 after the reduction of food subsidies. 11 President Sadat used economic incentives to justify his pursuit of peace with Israel publicly, and domestic public opinion was reoriented to expect that the economic rewards of peace would compensate for the sacrifices made by two generations of Egyptians. 12 In the case of Jordan, economic incentives were even more obviously one of the most important factors behind the signing of the peace accord with Israel. On the eve of the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, Jordan was facing a serious financial crisis that had already led to riots and disturbances in 1989, mainly in the southern part of the country which has always been considered the stronghold of the regime. After a decade of growth, gross domestic product (GDP) on average declined in to -1.2% from an average of 9.9% in the period , which led to the devaluation of the Jordanian currency and consequently a rise in prices of goods in general, including some basic goods. 13 The burden of the economic crisis of 1989 increased after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the war that followed. As King Hussein refused to join the international coalition against Iraq in 1991, Jordan lost one of its most valuable sources of funds: external transfers in the form of workers remittances (as a result of the return of more than 200,000 Jordanians from many Arab Gulf countries) and international grants from the same countries. 14 These developments led to a deterioration of almost all economic and social indicators; unemployment increased to 18.8% in 1993 (vs. 5.2% in 1982/1983) and absolute poverty increased to 19.8% in 1993/94 (vs. 3% in 1986/87). 15 In this context we can understand why Jordan insisted, according to Fayez Al Tarawneh (then Ambassador to Washington and one of the leading negotiators with Israel), on signing a detailed treaty providing for peace, security, and the 10 Heba Handoussa and Nemat Shafik, The Economic Peace: The Egyptian Case, in Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrick, and Elias Tuma eds., The Economics of Middle East Peace: Views from the Region (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), p World Bank, Egypt: Economic Management in a Period of Transition (Baltimore: World Bank, 1980), pp Heba Handoussa and Nemat Shafik, op. cit., pp World Bank, Jordan: Consolidating Economic Adjustment and Establishing the Base for Sustainable Growth, Vol.1 (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1994), p Department of Statistics, Jordan, Ahsan Mansur, Social Aspects of the Adjustment Program: Strengthening the Social Safety Net, in Edward Maciejewski and Ahsan Mansur, eds., Jordan: Strategy for Adjustment and Growth (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1996), p. 68; World Bank and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Poverty Assessment Report (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1994). 7

10 prospect of cooperative relations, which was followed the next year by the signing of nineteen technical agreements, covering such fields as tourism, cultural exchanges, telecommunications, the environment, and health. 16 Strikingly, the economic benefits of peace expected by Egypt and Jordan matched the Israeli desire for extensive cooperation at this level. From the Israeli point of view, the economic benefits of peace, mainly through regional cooperation, played a crucial role at the political level. In Israeli President Shimon Peres words, A new Middle East which is supposed to emerge after peace in the region cannot be established on a political basis alone. If we define change as erecting a few new signs and marking off old borders, very little will have been gained, and certainly none of it will last. The unrest will not abate, because the reasons underlying it are more economic and social than they are political. 17 In other words, regional cooperation on different levels constitutes the best way to make the achieved peace accords permanent, prevent them from being jeopardised by circumstantial changes and, as a result, legitimise Israel s existence in the middle of the Arab world. What Went Wrong? Contrary to the high expectations, the outcomes of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty were frustrating in almost every aspect apart from ending the state of war between the two countries. Such frustration was extremely obvious in the case of mutual cooperation that would have consolidated the infant peace and made it a first step towards a comprehensive peace in the region as a whole. Instead of enjoying the economic rewards of peace, Egypt paid a very high price for what was considered then, in the Arab world, a unilateral step and a betrayal of Arab rights. The Arab countries reaction to President Sadat s peace initiative was to boycott Egypt and freeze her membership in the Arab League. As a result, Arab aid and private investment capital immediately dried up, Arab markets were effectively closed to Egyptian-based enterprises, tourist flows from Arab countries dwindled, and large investors pulled out of numerous major joint venture projects in tourism, manufacturing, the free zones, and defense. 18 On the bilateral level between Egypt and Israel, the regional developments and incidents that followed the signing of the peace treaty made cooperation between the two parties almost impossible on any level, and almost froze relations at the governmental level. The first important development took place just before Israel s complete withdrawal from the Sinai. On 30 July 1980, the Knesset passed what was called the Jerusalem Law, declaring the city, including the eastern part occupied in 1967, as the capital of Israel. Another development came a few days after the return of the Sinai to Egypt. In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon and occupied an 16 Fayez Tarawneh, The Middle East Peace Process from the Jordanian Perspective, (speech to the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP), 7 November 1996), American Foreign Policy Interest, February Shimon Peres (with Arye Naor), The New Middle East (New York: Henry Holt, 1993), p Heba Handoussa and Nemat Shafik, op.cit., pp

11 Arab capital for the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Egyptian response was to recall its ambassador to Israel and wait eleven years before appointing a new one. Though the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was doomed to remain merely a governmental peace, the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty arrived in a completely different context, which could be considered the heyday of peace in the modern Middle East. This treaty was the result of the international Madrid Peace Conference that brought all the parties, including Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians, to start direct negotiations with Israel, aimed at achieving a comprehensive peace. More important, the Jordanian-Israeli treaty was signed only after the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were officially signed on 13 September 1993 in Washington, D.C. These accords created the Palestinian Authority (PA) and laid the foundations for a Palestinian state; more important, they enjoyed high support among ordinary Palestinians in the occupied territories. According to public opinion polls in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, approval of the 1994 Gaza-Jericho First Agreement which granted the Palestinians self-rule in the Gaza Strip and Jericho area as a first step towards the establishment of a Palestinian state within five years ranged between 64.9% and 68.6% (with higher approval in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank). 19 This exceptional regional environment was accompanied by the unique bilateral relations between Jordan and Israel dating back decades before the signing of the peace treaty in Because of this both parties, the Jordanians as well as the Israelis, were expecting no less than a warm peace based on bilateral cooperation at all levels, which could be a model for the region as a whole. In his speech on 19 June 1996 at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Marwan Mu asher, Jordan s then Minister of Information and former inaugural ambassador to Israel, described the Jordanian-Israeli peace model as unique to the region If this model is to succeed and become the norm within the region, it is imperative to broaden the framework. Cooperation will bring benefits not only to Jordan but also to the entire Middle East, creating a region of stability, prosperity, and interdependence. 20 A few months later, the same view was expressed by Dan Meridor, then the Israeli Minister of Finance from the Likud party, who emphasised that Israel and Jordan can be a model for peace throughout the entire region, specifically for the Palestinians. There is a ripe opportunity for the citizens of both Israel and Jordan to realise the benefits of peace, because Jordanian society has made itself more open to peace Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Public Opinion Poll #1: The Palestinian-Israeli Agreement: Gaza-Jericho First, September 1993, available at: cprspolls/94/poll1. Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, Public Opinion Poll No. 3 On Palestinian Attitudes on PLO - Israel Agreement, September 1993, available at: publicpoll/results/1993/no3 20 Marwan Mu asher, Jordan and the Peace Process, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 19 June Available at: 21 Dan Meridor, Israel: Economics, Politics, and Peace, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 11 October Available at: 9

12 Unfortunately, in spite of all the positive elements that encouraged the possibility of a peace between Jordan and Israel that would go beyond governmental relations, the ultimate outcomes were frustrating. The failure to meet the expectations of prosperity in an era of peace prevailed as the main feature of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty. After fifteen years of peaceful relations, no single joint-development project has taken place, including the projects that were mentioned in the peace treaty regarding the Rift Valley (Article 20) and Aqaba and Eilat (Article 23). According to Oded Eran, the Israeli Ambassador to Jordan from 1997 to 2000, despite [Prime Minister Yitzhak] Rabin s explicit directive, the idea of building a joint airport, with Aqaba as its base, has expired. The idea of moving most of the Eilat airport activities to the Aqaba airport has never even been examined. Expensive coastal real estate, which could have been developed and leveraged to generate income, now serves as a parking lot for cars from the Far East. 22 Actually, Jordan tried from the very beginning to draw attention to the poor performance on cooperation in reference to the peace treaty. In a speech in 1999, Rima Khalaf-Hunaidi, then Jordan s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Planning, said that peace with Israel was supposed to generate an unparalleled expansion in economic activity. It was expected to lead to a sizable increase in per capita income and a significant improvement in the standards of living of the average Jordanian. The translation of the peace dividend was an improved quality of life and a brighter tomorrow. But the results, according to the Jordanian minister, do not look as good as even what the most modest scenario had portrayed. Since 1996, the standard of living in Jordan progressively deteriorated, as real growth rates dropped from an average of 10% during the period , to 5.6% in 1995, and then to a mere 1.5% during the period , a rate which is well below the natural population growth rate. 23 The only exception to this grim picture was supposed to be what are called the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs), which entitle goods jointly produced by Israel and Jordan to enter the United States duty free. By producing tangible economic benefits, QIZs were expected to enhance support for the Middle East peace process at the public level. 24 On the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty some Western researchers suggested that the QIZs were the main reason behind the creation of thousands of new jobs in Jordan since 1996, as well as 22 Oded Eran, Look eastward, Haaretz, 26 October Available at: spages/ Rima Khalaf-Hunaidi, Peace in the Middle East and the Jordanian Economy, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 30 September Available at: templatec07.php?cid= Mary Jane Bolle, Alfred B. Prados, and Jeremy M. Sharp, Qualifying Industrial Zones in Jordan and Egypt, CRS Report for Congress, 5 July Available at: crs/rs22002.pdf. (Egypt concluded an agreement with Israel on QIZs by the end of 2004). 10

13 increasing economic growth. Because of this, Jordanian-Israeli cooperation could be a regional model to be followed. 25 But Jordanian and American data, as well as data from the International Labor Organization (ILO), suggest a different story. While enterprises in the QIZs can, according to the governing regulations, employ up to 30% non-jordanian workers in the first year to allow for rapid startup, this percentage was at its best around 50%, and up to 75.5% in Most important, Jordanian workers in QIZs complained about the low wages. 26 Under such unpleasant conditions, it became easy for the proponents of anti-normalisation to portray the QIZs as an example of Israeli exploitation of Jordanian workers and the Jordanian infrastructure, especially as the Israeli investments in the QIZs in Jordan, according to the most recent study, constituted about 0.3% of the total volume, as Israeli inputs were still required in order to enter the American market duty free. 27 The Postponed Peace Beyond joint projects, peace dividends are expected to include an increase in the inflow of foreign investment, a greater ability to accommodate domestic capital, and a better position on competitiveness in the global market as a result of the significant decrease in the costs of production in comparison with the previous high-risk situation generated by the conflict. However, such benefits are possible only in the case of a comprehensive peace that ends the conflict. Here we should remember that both President Sadat and King Hussein considered their peace treaties with Israel a step in the effort to achieve a comprehensive peace. Thus, the persistence of conflict between Israel and the Palestinians not only prevents Egypt and Jordan from materialising these benefits, but also made both countries pay an additional price for peace. While Egypt was boycotted for almost a decade by all Arab countries in response to signing a peace treaty with Israel, Jordan s exports to Arab countries came under high scrutiny in the name of fighting normalisation with Israel. Jordan was accused of secretly facilitating the export of Israeli products to Arab countries in compliance with Article (7) of the Jordanian- Israeli peace treaty, which calls for cooperation to terminate economic boycotts 25 David Makovsky, Peace Pays Off for Jordan: Benefits of pact with Israel suggest a regional model, Los Angeles Times, 31 January Available at: articles.latimes.com/2003/jan/31/opinion/ oe-makovsky31. Michael Herzog, A Decade of Israeli-Jordanian Peace: An Untold Economic Success Story, Peace Watch #478, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 29 October Jordan Human Development Report 2004: Building Sustainable Livelihood, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the United Nations Development Program (Amman: 2004), pp Mary Jane Bolle, Alfred B. Prados, and Jeremy M. Sharp, Qualifying Industrial Zones in Jordan and Egypt, CRS Report for Congress, 5 July Available at: Mutayyam al-o ran, The First Decade of the Jordanian-Israeli Peace-Building Experience: A Story of Jordanian Challenges ( ), Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2006), p. 86. Taleb Awad, Qualifying Industrial Zones in Jordan: Performance, Economic Impact, and Future Horizons (Amman: University of Jordan, 2009), p. 9 (In Arabic). 27 Taleb Awad, Qualifying Industrial Zones in Jordan, op. cit., p

14 directed at the other Party, and to co-operate in terminating boycotts against either Party by third parties. These facts highlight the importance of a comprehensive peace. We can argue that such a peace constitutes the only path toward a warm peace. The first element in justifying this argument is embodied in the fact that when the majority of the Arab world expresses its support for peace, it refers to the comprehensive peace that is based on an Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied in the 1967 war including East Jerusalem. This definition is a normal reflection of the centrality of the Palestinian question in the Arab world. According to Shibley Telhami, Palestine remains a central issue for most Arabs. Thus, increasing Sunni-Shiite tensions do not change the fact that the Arab- Israeli issue remains the prism through which most Arabs view the world. Graphic 1 The importance of Palestine Among Non-Palestinian Arabs ( ) IMPORTANCE OF PALESTINE AMOUNG NON-PALESTINIAN ARABS How important is the issue of Palestine in your priorities? (respondents who answered most important or top three ) 6-COUNTRY TOTAL 89% 86% 73% 73% 69% 73% Source: Shibley Telhami, Does the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict still Matter?: Analyzing Arab Public Perceptions (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2008) p. 6. This becomes even more clear in the case of Jordan, where 50% of the population is of Palestinian origin -- which explains why 100% put Palestine among the most important or top three priorities. 12

15 Graphic 2 The Importance of Palestine Among Jordanians ( ) IMPORTANCE OF PALESTINE AMOUNG NON-PALESTINIAN ARABS How important is the issue of Palestine in your priorities? (respondents who answered most important or top three ) JORDAN 100% 92% 94% 85% 85% Source: Shibley Telhami, Does the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict still Matter?: Analyzing Arab Public Perceptions (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2008) p. 7. This centrality also explains the popularity and power of anti-normalisation campaigns, and why they have become an umbrella for political parties with different ideologies and attitudes. Peace the Panacea? However, a comprehensive peace is not a sufficient requisite for normal and peaceful relations in the region. While some would blame Israel for the existing state of partial peace, it is still true that there are many obstacles on the other side within the Arab world which would prevent regional cooperation even under a situation of comprehensive peace. Consequently, these obstacles would keep any peace cold, unable to go beyond relations between governments to relations between peoples. The best example of such obstacles appeared in the regional economic summits in Casablanca, Amman, and Doha between 1994 and 1996 as part of the comprehensive peace process in the region. During that era, the Israelis were enthusiastic about the regional cooperation that was supposed to be the hallmark of the New Middle East, while almost all Arab countries were suspicious of such cooperation. For many observers, Israeli interest in regional cooperation created an image in the Arab world that in the era of peace Israel aimed to dominate the Arab world through economic means instead of military means. This image was reinforced by Israel s overbearing presence at the first summit in Casablanca; Israeli proposals for joint projects at all three regional summits; and most important, statements by Israeli officials that gave Israel 13

16 a position of leadership as the heart of the New Middle East. Shimon Peres, the godfather of the New Middle East, was quoted as saying at the Casablanca Summit that Egypt led the Arabs for 40 years and brought them to the abyss; you will see the region s economic situation improve when Israel takes the rein of leadership in the Middle East. 28 But from another perspective, Arab suspicion and fear are nothing less than an implicit confession of the development gap, speaking broadly, between the Arab countries and Israel, which gives the latter supremacy within the region. Because of that, the admission of Israel into this pre-industrial region, armed with its vast economic and military superiority over the combination of its neighbours, threatens to transform the Middle East from a multipolar system into a hegemonic one. 29 This highlights the importance of internal reform, in its wider meaning, in the Arab world as another prerequisite for true warm peace in the region. The required internal reform does not involve merely economic and educational reforms that would make regional cooperation possible on the base of equality; political reform is an integral part of any successful reform, at every level and in every area. Political reform in itself was among the expected gains of peace at the public level. For decades the Arab-Israeli conflict was misused by almost all Arab countries to prevent any kind of political reform and accountability, under the slogan No sound is higher than the sound of the battle [with Israel]. Thus, the end of the state of war with Israel (or what we can call the pretext ), even through bilateral agreements, was supposed to lead to more openness at the political level, if not to a real democratisation process. Unfortunately, the results on the ground, in both Egypt and Jordan, were completely different. Since 1981, after the assassination of President Anwar Al Sadat, Egypt has been ruled by emergency law, aimed at marginalising and sidelining the opposition. In Jordan, which witnessed an impressive parliamentary election in 1989, the years that followed the signing of the peace treaty with Israel in 1994 were accompanied by a deterioration of political and civil freedoms, which people and politicians (mainly from the opposition) linked to the signing of the Jordanian- Israeli peace treaty. In the words of Bassam Haddadin, then a Jordanian member of parliament, whenever progress was made in the negotiation process, the government had tightened its grip on the opposition and limited participation in the decision making process to the smallest circles and sometimes to a few individuals. 30 The lack of political freedom contributes significantly to the failure to feel the benefits of peace on an economic level, or to create the proper environment for regional cooperation. 28 For full discussion, see: Laura Drake, Arab-Israeli Relations in a New Middle East Order, in J. W. Wright, Jr., ed., The Political Economy of Middle East Peace: The impact of competing trade agendas (London: Routledge, 1999), pp Laura Drake, Arab-Israeli Relations in a New Middle East Order, op. cit., p Paul L. Scham and Russell E. Lucas, Normalization and Anti Normalization in Jordan: The Public Debate, Israel Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2003), p

17 In considering the dividends of peace, studies concentrate mainly on the benefits of the decrease in military expenditure after peace and the possible reallocation of resources for developmental goals. In the case of the Middle East, before the Madrid Peace Conference, the region as a whole has been shown to account for the highest relative allocation of resources to military expenditures among all developing-country regions. For the period , military expenditure (excluding expenditures funded by foreign assistance), accounted for 10.1% of GDP, almost twice the average of 5.3% for developing countries as a group. 31 While we can see a significant decrease in military expenditures in the Egyptian case, as a percentage of GDP over the period (6.9% in 1988 vs. 2.5% in 2007), military expenditures in Jordan stand at almost the same high level since the signing of the peace treaty with Israel (6.7% in 1994 vs. 6.2% in 2007). 32 But regardless of the trend in military expenditures, regional and internal instabilities suggest that any decrease in military expenditures does not mean necessarily more resources for productive civilian projects. The greater possibility in this regard is that more resources are allocated for (internal) security goals, in response to the growing influence of extremist Islamic groups, like Al Qaeda. Of course, many would argue that the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict explains the power of these groups, which use the Palestinian question to rally people around them and justify their attacks. But while this is true in part, the real support for fundamentalism stems from the lack of political reform in the Arab world in general. Conclusion: Peace is Comprehensive This paper aimed to address and explain what seems to be a paradox within Arab attitudes toward peace with Israel, represented by announced desires for peace combined with contradictory deeds on the ground. We can say, on the basis of the above discussion, that the core of this paradox is embodied in the perception of peace by the Arab peoples. At the public level, peace with Israel is supposed to be comprehensive, which includes different dimensions. In explaining the meaning of comprehensive peace, it is definitely true that one of the most important attributes of this peace is represented by a just solution for all the problems resulting from the Arab-Israeli conflict, with special concern for the Palestinian question. As discussed earlier, the Palestinian issue still constitutes, after more than six decades of conflict, the central issue for the vast majority in the Arab world. Thus, any normalisation of relations with Israel that could lead to a warm peace would seem under the existing conditions characterised by the occupation of the Palestinian territories as a step at the expense of the Palestinian right to an independent state, and also at the expense of the Palestinian refugees right to 31 Said El-Naggar and Mohamed El-Erian, The Economic Implications of a Comprehensive Peace in the Middle East, in Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrick, and Elias Tuma eds., The Economics of Middle East Peace: Views from the Region (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), p Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure Database: milexdata.sipri.org/. 15

18 a just solution for their misery. This explains why the anti-normalisation campaign that was able to attract a couple of hundred people in Jordan in 1994 has become so powerful and such a natural response to what is happening in the occupied territories. 33 Also, according to the same public perception, the comprehensive peace should involve another dimension beyond the arena of political relations with Israel, to include a wide range of benefits internally as direct or indirect outcomes of peace. As economic and social difficulties represent the most urgent problems in the Arab world, it becomes well understood why significant attention is paid to the economic benefits of comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Nevertheless, another important outcome of peace that is expected by Arab publics is political reform, which was sacrificed by many regimes in the Arab world in the name of prioritising the war with Israel. This dimension of comprehensive peace reveals that a lasting warm peace is not merely a regional issue but strongly connected to internal reforms in the Arab world as only after domestic leaders begin to be held accountable for their state s welfare can regional economic interdependence, and the peace... associated with it, be realized. 34 It is crucial to emphasise the mutual relations between these two dimensions, especially in the case of the Middle East, and the need to tackle the two at the same time. The political process that aims for the termination of the state of war and finding a just solution for the Palestinian question encourages the normalisation of relations with Israel at the public level. Consequently, a higher degree of normalisation could enhance the feeling of security and make any concessions regarding land an accepted price for peace and the ensuing prosperity. Making progress on these two dimensions regional and local would lead to the creation of a vested interest in peace for ordinary people and raise the possibility of taking this peace from the governmental level of a mere cold peace to a warm peace based on popular interaction between the societies in the region, including the Israelis. 33 Danishai Kornbluth, Jordan and the Anti-Normalization Campaign, , Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.14, No.3 (Autumn 2002), p Amichai Kilchevsky, Jeffrey Cason and Kirsten Wandschneider, Peace and Economic Interdependence in the Middle East, The World Economy (2007), p

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20 About ICSR ICSR is a unique partnership of King s College London, the University of Pennsylvania, the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (Israel), and the Regional Centre for Conflict Prevention Amman (Jordan). Its aim is to counter the growth of radicalisation and political violence by bringing together knowledge and leadership. For more information, see