Report on FY2001 Evaluation of Public-Key Cryptographic Techniques
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1 CRYPTREC April 2001 March 2002 Report on FY2001 Evaluation of Public-Key Cryptographic Techniques April 16, 2002 Tsutomu Matsumoto Chair of Public-Key Cryptography Sub-Committee CRYPTREC Evaluation Committee
2 Tasks2 Specific Evaluation Signature Schemes Listed for Japanese Electronic Signature Law SSL/TLS Research 1. How RSA schemes are used in the Protocol 2. Survey of Vulnerability of the Protocol General Evaluation --- for Use in Electronic Government Follow-up Deep Evaluation Newly Submitted Schemes 1. Screening in FY Deep Evaluation in FY 2002 for Selected Targets
3 Evaluated Public-Key Schemes Security Basis Function Signature Target of Specific Evaluation with respect to Electronic Signature Law Confidentiality Key Agreement or Distribution ESIGN RSA-PKCS#1 v1.5 RSA-PSS EPOC-2 HIME(R) RSA-OAEP Target of Screening Others: COCK System, CVCRT, MKS (Elliptic Curve) Discrete Logarithm DSA ECDSA(ANSI X9.62) ECDSA in SEC1 OK-ECDSA ECIES in SEC1 DH ECDH in SEC1 OK-ECDH PSEC-KEM Lattice NTRU Targets in Follow-up Phase
4 Requirement to a Public-Key Cryptographic Scheme for the Use in Electronic Government Complete Specification of the scheme including Parameter Selecting Method is available. Consensus based on Sufficient Evidence is available that the scheme is Currently Secure enough and will be Kept Secure in 10 years. Widely Used Schemes - must have Empirical Evidence on Security - preferably have Provable Security Young Schemes - must have Provable Security under reasonable assumption
5 Method of Evaluation Screening Based on the submitted documents Examination of Completeness of Submission Implementability by third parties Security or Performance is superior to those in the FY2000 list Specific OR Deep OR Follow-up Evaluation Whole Scheme Special Decompose the targets into several sub-targets Synthesize the evaluation results for the sub-targets Security Basis: Factoring, Discrete Log,
6 Human Resources CRYPTREC Evaluation Committee Public-Key Cryptography Sub-Committee Members A Number of Anonymous External Experts An Expert means a team consisting of one or more World Class Cryptographers
7 Public-Key Cryptography Sub-Committee Seigo ARITA (NEC Corporation) Jun KOGURE (Fujitsu Laboratories Ltd.) Tsutomu MATSUMOTO (Chair, Yokohama National University) Natsume MATSUZAKI (Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.,Ltd.) Kazuo OHTA (The University of Electro-Communications) Yasuyuki SAKAI (Mitsubishi Electric Corporation) Atsushi SHIMBO (Toshiba Corporation) Hiroki SHIZUYA (Tohoku University) Seiichi SUSAKI (Hitachi, Ltd.) Hajime WATANABE (National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology)
8 Number of External Experts for Screening Target Overseas Domestic Total OK-ECDSA HIME ( R ) NTRU OK-ECDH PSEC-KEM 1 2 3
9 Number of External Experts for Deep Evaluation of Computational Intractability Target Overseas Domestic Total - Experimental Study Survey Special Type Factors Discrete Logarithm Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm 2-2
10 Number of External Experts for Deep Evaluation of Schemes Target Overseas Domestic Total DSA ECDSA ESIGN ESIGN(Electronic Signature Law), TSH-ESIGN RSA RSA-PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-PSS, RSA-OAEP EPOC
11 Number of External Experts for Research of SSL/TLS Target Overseas Domestic Total How RSA schemes are used Vulnerability of the Protocol - 2 2
12 Evaluated Public-Key Schemes Security Basis Function Signature Target of Specific Evaluation with respect to Electronic Signature Law Confidentiality Key Agreement or Distribution ESIGN RSA-PKCS#1 v1.5 RSA-PSS EPOC-2 HIME(R) RSA-OAEP Target of Screening Others: COCK System, CVCRT, MKS (Elliptic Curve) Discrete Logarithm DSA ECDSA(ANSI X9.62) ECDSA in SEC1 OK-ECDSA ECIES in SEC1 DH ECDH in SEC1 OK-ECDH PSEC-KEM Lattice NTRU Targets in Follow-up Phase
13 Result on In 2001, Factoring Problem of n = pq is secure if p = q and n is 1024 or more. In 2001, Factoring Problem of n = ppq is secure if p = q and n is 1024 or more. The condition n = 1024 gives different margins for n = pq and n =ppq. Transition of security of is estimated.
14 Result on Discrete Logarithm In 2001, Discrete Logarithm Problem in subgroup of order q of a multiplicative group of finite field Fp (p: prime) is secure if p is 1024 bit or more and q is 160 bit or more. Transition of security of Discrete Logarithm is estimated.
15 Result on Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm In 2001, except for particular classes of elliptic curves, Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem is secure if the order of the base point has a prime factor of 160 bit or more. Transition of security of Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm is estimated.
16 Result on Schemes (1) No problems in the use of Electronic Government are currently observed for these schemes with appropriate parameters and auxiliary functions. Security Basis Function Signature Use of MD5 is not recommended. RSA-PKCS#1 v1.5 RSA-PSS (Elliptic Curve) Discrete Logarithm DSA ECDSA (ANSI X9.62) ECDSA in SEC1 Lattice Confidentiality Key Agreement or Distribution RSA-OAEP Adding RSA-PSS to the List for Electronic Signature Law should be examined. DH ECDH in SEC1
17 Result on Schemes (2) ESIGN is currently not recommended for the use in Electronic Government. Security Basis Function (Elliptic Curve) Discrete Logarithm Lattice Signature ESIGN Confidentiality Key Agreement or Distribution ESIGN(Listed for Electronic Signature Law) has a flaw in the specification of signature verification procedure and contains parameters permitting signature forgery. Example: e = 8 and n = 2048 with SHA-1 Change of the List for Electronic Signature Law with respect to ESIGN should be examined.
18 Result on Schemes (3) ECIES in SEC1 is currently not recommended for the use in Electronic Government. Security Basis Function Signature Some security problem has emerged. (Elliptic Curve) Discrete Logarithm Lattice Confidentiality ECIES in SEC1 Key Agreement or Distribution
19 Result on Schemes (4) EPOC-2 is not recommended for the use in Electronic Government. Security Basis Function Signature Confidentiality EPOC-2 (Elliptic Curve) Discrete Logarithm Claimed proof of EPOC-2 s provable security was found to be wrong. Lattice Key Agreement or Distribution
20 Result on Schemes (5) Decision on the use of HIME(R) in Electronic Government cannot be made without deep evaluation. Security Basis Function (Elliptic Curve) Discrete Logarithm Lattice Signature Claimed proof of HIME(R) s provable security is not confirmed. Confidentiality HIME(R) Key Agreement or Distribution
21 Result on Schemes (6) Decision on the use of PSEC-KEM in Electronic Government needs further examination since the technique Key Encapsulation Mechanism is relatively young. Security Basis Function (Elliptic Curve) Discrete Logarithm Lattice Signature Confidentiality Claimed proof of PSEC-KEM s provable security as a KEM seems correct. Key Agreement or Distribution PSEC-KEM
22 Result on Schemes (7) NTRU, OK-ECDSA, and OK-ECDH are not recommended for the use in Electronic Government. Security Basis Function Signature (Elliptic Curve) Discrete Logarithm Young but No proof of Provable Security is given. Lattice Confidentiality Key Agreement or Distribution Young but the status on Provable Security is the same as ECDSA Young but the status on Provable Security is the same as ECDH OK-ECDSA NTRU Resistance against Side Channel Attacks is not sufficiently confirmed by the contents of the self evaluation report. OK-ECDH
23 Result on Other Schemes COCK System, CVCRT, and MKS are not recommended for the use in Electronic Government. Security Basis Function (Elliptic Curve) Discrete Logarithm Lattice Signature Confidentiality Key Agreement or Distribution Screening of these schemes was terminated earlier Others: COCK System, CVCRT, MKS
24 Survey of RSA in SSL/TLS Key distribution and signature protocols of SSL/TLS using RSA schemes are basic and simple enough to avoid almost protocol failures. RSA schemes in SSL/TLS have no problems if appropriate parameters and auxiliary functions are adopted.
25 FY2001 Conclusion I Schemes in the Follow-up Phase Security Basis Function (Elliptic Curve) Discrete Logarithm Lattice Signature DSA RSA-PKCS#1 v1.5 ECDSA(ANSI X9.62) RSA-PSS ECDSA in SEC1 Confidentiality RSA-OAEP Key Agreement or Distribution DH ECDH in SEC1
26 FY2001 Conclusion II Candidate Targets of FY2002 Evaluation Security Basis Function (Elliptic Curve) Discrete Logarithm Lattice Signature ESIGN Confidentiality ECIES in SEC1 HIME(R) Key Agreement or Distribution PSEC-KEM
27 FY2002 Plan of Public-Key Cryptography Sub-Committee Mission 1 Drafting The List of Recommended Public-Key Cryptographic Schemes for Electronic Government. Mission 2 Following-up The Electronic Signature Schemes Listed for Electronic Signature Law. Mission 3 Others
28 Thanks to All who Supported and Gave Pressures including Applicants to CRYPTREC Call for Submission, Anonymous External Experts, Observers from Kasumigaseki and Ichigaya, Members and Staffs of Public-Key Cryptography Sub-Committee, Symmetric-Key Cryptography Sub-Committee, CRYPTREC Evaluation Committee, and CRYPTREC Advisory Committee.
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