Peace and Conflict Analysis (CA) Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA)

Transcription

1 Division Governance and Democracy PCA Peace and Conflict Analysis (CA) Peace and Conflict-Relatet Relevance Assessment Risk Management Peace and Conflict-Related Impact Monitoring Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA) A methodological framework for the conflict- and peace-oriented alignment of development programmes

2

3 Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA) A methodological framework for the conflict- and peace-oriented alignment of development programmes Eschborn, 2008

4 Published by: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH P.O. Box Eschborn, Germany T F E [email protected] Internet: Division Governance and Democracy Sector Programme Peace and Security Responsible: Gabriele Kruk Author: Manuela Leonhardt, Kai Leonhardt, Christian Strehlein Contact at the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development: Division 210 Editing: Christoph Bleis, Juliane Kolsdorf Layout: Miriam Gamper, dko-design, Essen, Germany Print: PT Druckpartner Engels GmbH, Mönchengladbach, Germany Eschborn, 2008

5 Our Organisation The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH is an international cooperation enterprise for sustainable development with worldwide operations. It provides viable, forward-looking solutions for political, economic, ecological and social development in a globalised world. Working under difficult conditions, GTZ promotes complex reforms and change processes. Its corporate objective is to improve people s living conditions on a sustainable basis. Our Clients GTZ is a federal enterprise based in Eschborn near Frankfurt am Main. It was founded in 1975 as a company under private law. The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) is its major client. The company also operates on behalf of other German ministries, partner-country governments and international clients, such as the European Commission, the United Nations and the World Bank, as well as on behalf of private enterprises. GTZ works on a public-benefit basis. Any surpluses generated are channelled back into its own international cooperation projects for sustainable development. GTZ Worldwide Operations In almost 130 countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Eastern European countries in transition and the New Independent States (NIS), GTZ employs some 9,300 staff; around 8,200 of these are national personnel in partner countries. GTZ maintains its own offices in 67 countries. Some 1,000 people are employed at Head Office in Eschborn near Frankfurt am Main. In addition, around 350 people work for supraregional projects based at various locations within Germany. June 2008

6

7 Introduction Peace and Conflict Assessment PCA Element 1a: Element 2: Element 3: Element 4: Introduction Peace and Conflict Analysis (CA) Element 1b: Peacebuilding Needs (PBN) Peace and Conflict- Related Relevance Assessment Risk Management Peace and Conflict- Related Impact Monitoring

8 Introduction List of Acronyms and Abbreviations AKUF Working Group on the Causes of War AURA BMZ CA CPR Network DAC DC DFID DNH ECHA FC FES FriEnt GIGA GTZ HPG KfW NGO O+R OECD PBN PCA PCIA RTC SDC SIDA SSR TC UN UNDP UNHCR USAID VENRO Development-Policy Framework for Contracts and Cooperation German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development Peace and Conflict Analysis Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network Development Assistance Committee Development Cooperation Department for International Development (GB) Do No Harm Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (UN) Financial Cooperation Friedrich Ebert Foundation Working Group on Development and Peace German Institute of Global and Area Studies (formerly the German Overseas Institute) Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit Humanitarian Policy Group Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau Non-Governmental Organisation Orientation and Rules (GTZ) Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Peacebuilding Needs Peace and Conflict Assessment Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Responding to Conflict Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency Security Sector Reform Technical Cooperation United Nations United Nations Development Programme United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United States Agency for International Development Association of German Development Non-Governmental Organisations

9 Table of Contents 1. Political and Conceptual Framework Conditions Conflict sensitivity the new guiding principle for development cooperation in conflict countries The BMZ Sector Strategy for Crisis Prevention The C marker classification system 12 Introduction 2. Introduction to the PCA Method What is new about PCA? What is PCA at country portfolio level? What is PCA at project/programme level? Practical Implementation of PCA How is PCA implemented at country portfolio level? How is PCA implemented at project/programme level? Conducting a full PCA Selective integration of PCA into the steering instruments of development cooperation ("toolbox principle") 24 Annexes Annex 1: Overview of the Peace and Conflict Assessment 26 Annex 2: Minimum Standards for PCAs in C0, C1 and C2 Projects/Programmes 27 Annex 3: Glossary 33 Annex 4: Bibliography and Further Reading 39 Index of boxes, tables and figures Box 1: What is conflict sensitivity? 10 Box 2: How can conflict sensitivity be achieved? 10 Box 3: The C markers 12 Box 4: Criteria for conflict-sensitive project design 12 Box 5: Country portfolio and PCA 15 Box 6: Implementing a full PCA: areas of application 22 Box 7: Selective integration of PCA into DC steering instruments in the following areas of application: 24 Table 1: Minimum standards for TC and FC projects/programmes (see Annex 2 for detailed description) 17 Table 2: Phases of portfolio adjustment and PCA 20 Table 3: Selective integration of PCA into DC steering instruments 24 Fig. 1: Peace and Conflict Assessment 14 Fig. 2: PCA at country portfolio level 16 Fig. 3: PCA in the implementation phases of a project/programme 18 Fig. 4: Implementation of PCA at country portfolio level 19 Fig. 5: Implementing PCA at project/programme level 21 Fig. 6: Steps in the process of implementing a PCA 23

10 Introduction 1. Political and Conceptual Framework Conditions 1.1. Conflict sensitivity the new guiding principle for development cooperation in conflict countries Conflicts are a key theme of development-policy practice. Development cooperation (DC) promotes change processes that are oriented toward the political goals of poverty alleviation, human rights, good governance and a social market economy (see the development-policy principles of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, BMZ). Processes of this kind entail a redistribution of power and resources, which can generate resistance amongst those who lose out from these reforms. Sometimes DC stirs up expectations that it cannot satisfy for everyone, creating competition over access to its resources. Such conflicts in the immediate DC environment may be necessary and unavoidable. Yet they take on a particularly explosive force when they affect overarching social, ethnic or political conflicts in the partner country. This applies in particular to countries where conflicts have already turned violent or are about to do so. When violent conflicts escalate, the civilian population inevitably takes sides. By working with certain groups within society and thus also with parties to the conflict, DC itself becomes an actor in the conflict. A situation of this kind requires development organisations to remain particularly sensitive to the possible impacts of their work on the respective peace or conflict situation. This sensitivity is termed the do no harm -principle (DNH), which has gained international recognition. Box 1: What is conflict sensitivity? "Conflict sensitivity means taking into account the two-way influence that exists between the conflict and measures taken, with the goal of avoiding any negative, conflict-aggravating impacts, and strengthening positive, deescalating and peace-promoting impacts." (BMZ Sector Strategy for Crisis Prevention 2005) This does not mean that DC should avoid supporting change processes. In conflict situations in particular, changes that help achieve BMZ's development-policy objectives are often especially important to help overcome the root causes of conflicts and open the existing institutions to a democratic reconciliation of interests. Conflict sensitivity rather calls for an increased awareness of the conflicting interests that go hand in hand with such changes, and a proactive way of dealing with these. Box 2: How can conflict sensitivity be achieved? The individuals responsible for the implementation and political steering of DC measures and their partners recognise the conflictuality (or the areas of conflict) in the DC context, the potentials for escalation of the conflict, and the possible reciprocal effects of their own (DC) activities with violent conflicts on other levels supraordinate to the level of intervention (e.g. the national level). monitor and reflect on their own behaviour and the role that they have consciously or unconsciously adopted in the conflict, i.e. the impacts of their own work on the conflict context and the consequences of the conflict context for their own work. respond sensitively to the conflict situation, i.e. in such a way as to help prevent violence and build peace, on the basis of a detailed understanding of the causes and basic features of the conflict, and a review of their own options for action and impacts. Source: supplemented after SDC

11 1.2. The BMZ Sector Strategy for Crisis Prevention In 2007 open violent conflicts existed in 17 cooperation countries of German DC, and a heightened or acute need for prevention existed in a further 37 countries. These figures are based on an assessment carried out by the German Institute of Global and Area Studies in Hamburg (GIGA; formerly known as the German Overseas Institute) and BMZ, which is updated annually. This means that roughly half of all German DC cooperation countries display conflict potentials. For these countries, in 2005 BMZ published its "Sector Strategy for Crisis Prevention, Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding in German Development Cooperation", which made the conflict-sensitive design of development projects/programmes a binding requirement for all implementing organisations of German development cooperation. This sector strategy supplements the German government's Action Plan "Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding" (2004), which was adopted by all ministries, and defines peacebuilding as a cross-cutting issue of German development cooperation. It contains binding development-policy directives for the planning, implementation and steering of German national development cooperation in conflict countries. Introduction The BMZ sector strategy lays down three orientations for peacebuilding in DC: DC plays a part in reducing the structural or root causes of conflicts, and helps prevent them escalating to a full-blown crisis at an early stage. DC promotes mechanisms of peaceful conflict transformation, and supports civil society and state actors in non-violent conflict transformation. DC helps build peace once violent conflicts have been ended. The sector strategy makes the BMZ crisis early warning system the starting point for the conflict-sensitive classification of DC. The analytical basis of this crisis early warning system is formed by an annually updated assessment of conflict potentials carried out in all cooperation countries by GIGA. Using a specially developed list of indicators the countries are analysed and, in close consultation with the BMZ country divisions, are each assigned using a traffic-light colour coding system to one of the categories "low need for prevention" (countries shaded green), "heightened need for prevention" (countries shaded yellow) or "acute need for prevention and post-conflict" (countries shaded red) on an overview graphic. Information on the classification of a specific country and underlying country analysis is available on request from the responsible BMZ country division. While for countries with a "low need for prevention" (the "green countries") a conflict-sensitive design of DC activities remains desirable and voluntary, the sector strategy stipulates that DC programmes in all countries with a "heightened" or "acute need for prevention" (the "yellow and red countries") must be designed on a conflict-sensitive basis. This applies both at the level of the overall country portfolio (e.g. definition of priority areas and priority area strategies), and at the level of the individual projects/programmes of the country concerned. At both levels it is necessary to establish a) to what extent there is a need to adjust existing measures to make them more conflict-sensitive, and b) whether and if so how conflict transformation and peacebuilding can be supported through additional targeted measures. To assess the conflict-sensitivity of German DC activities in conflict countries, and where necessary make appropriate adjustments, the BMZ sector strategy prescribes a specific methodology: the Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA). This includes the following steps: 1) peace and conflict analysis and assessment of peacebuilding needs (PBN), 2) peace and conflict-related relevance assessment of an existing or planned portfolio, 3) conflict-sensitive risk management for DC measures, and 4) peace and conflict-related impact monitoring. Depending on the context, a PCA can be carried out at country level and/or at project/programme level. At country level the result of a PCA is the review (and adjustment) of the definition of priority areas, and/or of the strategies of existing priority areas. At project/programme level the conduct of a PCA is documented by the assignment of a conflict marker (C marker see below). 11

12 Introduction 1.3. The C marker classification system By analogy with other classification systems of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the BMZ sector strategy classifies all projects of Technical and Financial Cooperation (TC/ FC) implemented in countries with a "heightened or acute need for prevention" (i.e. the "yellow and red countries") into one of the following three categories (see box 3). These classifications are documented in the offers and progress review reports submitted to the BMZ by the implementing organisations. Box 3: The C markers The C markers reflect the strategic and conflict-sensitive design of DC measures, and are assigned to all projects/programmes in conflict or post-conflict countries with a heightened or acute need for prevention as per the BMZ crisis early warning system. C2: Crisis prevention, conflict transformation or peacebuilding are an integral component of the overall objective of the project/programme, i.e. are crucial to its implementation. This can be tested by answering the question: "Would the project/programme have been implemented at all without this development-policy objective?" C1: Crisis prevention, conflict transformation or peacebuilding are an important part of the project/ programme concept, but are not in themselves crucial to its implementation. They are reflected in one of the indicators at the level of the overall objective, or at the very least in the phase objective/component objective and their indicators. C0: Crisis prevention, conflict transformation or peacebuilding are not an explicit objective of the project/programme. Since the project/programme takes place in a conflict-prone and highrisk environment, however, it is planned and implemented on a conflict-sensitive basis. Corresponding preparation and continuous monitoring will seek to ensure as far as possible that the measure does not inadvertently exacerbate the conflict, but rather strengthens those results that help de-escalate the conflict and build peace. Source: Lorenz, GTZ, AURA Guideline Supplement 2005 A project can thus only be classified as C2 or C1 if and when peacebuilding is expressly designated in the project documents as a primary or secondary objective, or as indicator. For the three classifications (C2, C1 and C0), different levels of PCA intensity are required. A PCA with all four steps forms the basis for classification as C2 or C1. For a project to be classified as C0, at minimum a DNH analysis should be carried out, and possible negative unintended impacts should be identified and subsequently be monitored within the scope of impact monitoring. The BMZ sector strategy also describes the general requirements that BMZ places on the conflict-sensitive design of development projects/programmes in countries with a heightened or acute need for crisis prevention. These apply especially to C0 projects/programmes. Box 4: Criteria for conflict-sensitive project design Taking into account the conflict situation when analysing the context and defining the core problems. Taking into account the analysis of the parties to the conflict when defining target groups, mediators and political executing agencies. 12

13 Taking into account the recommendations of the PCA when designing promotion components and methodical procedure of the project/programme. Identification of the geographical project area in relation to the region directly or indirectly affected by the conflict. Involvement of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments and consideration of any necessary adjustments in the course of the project to the implementation plan, the assessment of the expected impacts and risks, and the budget Incorporation of conflict-related indicators into monitoring and evaluation. Source: BMZ Sector Strategy for Peacebuilding 2005 Introduction For countries with a "heightened or acute need for prevention" this does not imply conversely that the introduction of the C marker classification system now requires all development interventions in conflict countries to become "peace projects". In the case of C0 and C1 projects/programmes the aim is rather to identify and utilise the existing potentials for peacebuilding in the course of project work in the given sectors (e.g. sustainable economic development, youth promotion, education, water etc.). To this end it is often necessary and appropriate to make only gradual adjustments to the existing or planned project design. For an environmental project/programme this can mean e.g. not only supporting the resolution of resourcebased conflicts on a one-off basis, but also helping build capacities for conflict management within the responsible institutions. In this way a model for peaceful conflict transformation can arise that also impacts other social spheres. The relevance assessment (see Guideline 2) conducted within the scope of the PCA can identify such potentials. Unintended impacts of development interventions that exacerbate a conflict can also sometimes though not always be avoided through relatively simple measures such as greater transparency on the part of the project and an improved communication strategy (e.g. publicising the criteria applied by project actors in their own actions: With whom do we do what, how, why...?). Dealing with the pronounced dynamics of conflicts poses a challenge in this context. The conflict-sensitive design of measures is therefore a continuous process that should be integrated into the existing management and steering processes. Special requirements do apply, however, to explicit peacebuilding projects/programmes (C2) and to country portfolios in cooperation countries for which peacebuilding is a designated DC priority area (which is currently the case in Guatemala, Colombia, Senegal and Sri Lanka). These projects must be clearly identifiable as part of a proactive strategy for peacebuilding based on a peace and conflict analysis (CA) and clear, conflictsensitive goals, and must have a conflict-sensitive project design. 2. Introduction to the PCA Method The Peace and Conflict Assessment method was developed by the political scientist Thania Paffenholz in collaboration with Luc Reychler of the University of Louvain (Paffenholz 2005). PCA attempts to place the methods for conflict-sensitive planning and steering of development interventions available hitherto within a standardised framework that is appropriate to the established practices of DC contract and cooperation management. In this way the DC instruments already used such as analyses of executing organisations or the project environment, and impact monitoring are supplemented by a conflict component (CA and the peace and conflict-related impact monitoring), and more closely interlinked, which should make projects more conceptually coherent in terms of conflict-sensitivity. This facilitates the planning and steering of conflictsensitive measures. 13

14 Introduction The following graphic (fig. 1) provides an overview of the four methodological steps of PCA: Fig. 1: Peace and Conflict Assessment Element 1 Element 2 Element 3 Element 4 a) Peace and conflict analysis and b) Peacebuilding needs Peace and conflict-related relevance assessment Risk management Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring Source: based on Paffenholz What is new about PCA? PCA builds on the experiences of peacebuilding and development organisations that have been utilising methods such as the CA, DNH and peace and conflict-related impact monitoring in the planning and steering of development interventions in conflict situations for a number of years. PCA combines these already well established methods and adds to them a number of innovative elements: Through the concept of peacebuilding needs (PBN), PCA calls for the clear formulation of what are considered from DC perspective to be the changes needed to transform a conflict situation (see Guideline 1b for further details). This promotes a higher degree of transparency on the part of DC with respect to its own objectives, and at the same time allows an improved strategic orientation of DC, both at the political level and at the level of individual projects/programmes. The relevance assessment, an instrument originally used in evaluation, is a helpful tool to assess strategies and development interventions that are not geared primarily toward peacebuilding as well as to continually review peace and conflict-related DC strategies, and C2 and C1 projects/programmes, against the background of the respective conflict dynamics (see Guideline 2 for further details). The relevance assessment creates links between the objectives and activities of the project/programme on the one hand, and the peacebuilding needs on the other, and identifies how the development intervention's contribution to peacebuilding can be increased. Thereby the link to peacebuilding is no longer defined primarily in terms of the designated content of the measure (e.g. training in conflict transformation, dialogue promotion), but rather in terms of the relationship to specific factors for peace and for conflict (e.g. conflict over natural resources, political participation) in the respective context. One important step forward made by PCA is the incorporation of risk management, and especially the security analysis, into the planning and implementation of projects/programmes in conflict situations (see Guideline 3 for further details). PCA thus satisfies the demand laid down in the BMZ sector strategy that the safety of all actors must always take precedence over the implementation of individual measures. The major significance that PCA attaches to the peace and conflict-related impact monitoring is consistent with the current emphasis of DC on results-based management (see Guideline 4), which makes it easier to integrate PCA into the standard DC steering instruments (e.g. Development-Policy Framework for Contracts and Cooperation / AURA offer and appraisal report). 14

15 PCA is a logical sequence of closely linked elements. This involves a risk of conceptualising PCA as a linear or path-dependent process in which the results of the initial CA would largely determine the DC measures identified at the end. To avoid this effect, PCA users should consciously run through different options for analysis and action and incorporate learning loops, on the basis of which they can regularly review their conclusions in the light of their growing body of experiential knowledge. Introduction In principle a PCA can be conducted at both country level (analysis and evaluation of the entire country portfolio and priority area strategies) and at the level of an individual project/programme (analysis and evaluation of the programme portfolio or sector environment). The level at and intensity with which a PCA is conducted will depend at the country level on the political priorities set by BMZ, and at the project/programme level on the prominence of the theme at the level of objectives (C2 or C1), as well as on issues of feasibility and acceptance by the partner side. 2.2 What is PCA at country portfolio level? At country level PCA supports the conflict-sensitive design and steering of the entire DC country portfolio, lead-managed by BMZ. In countries where peacebuilding is an overarching theme and/or a priority area in its own right, a full PCA should be carried out to review and where appropriate adjust the current project portfolio. This will include a sound CA, the relevance assessment and the integration of peace and conflict-related issues into development-policy context monitoring. The latter supplements the monitoring of indicators as indicated in the priority area strategy paper for peace promotion at country level. In conflict and post-conflict countries where peace promotion is a cross-cutting issue, standard country level monitoring of context and results should also include issues of the peace and conflict-related impact monitoring. Box 5: Country portfolio and PCA Peacebuilding is a full PCA for portfolio adjustment and priority area continuous portfolio steering at priority area level (e.g. within the scope of government negotiations) Peacebuilding is a standard monitoring of context and results should also cross-cutting issue incorporate peace and conflict-related impact monitoring (PCA element 4) depending on security situation, risk management and security analysis (PCA element 3) CA and relevance assessment desirable (PCA elements 1 and 2) 15

16 Introduction The following graphic (fig. 2) shows the key questions to be addressed by a full PCA at country level: Fig. 2: PCA at country portfolio level Continuous portfolio steering 1. Peace and conflict analysis and peacebuilding needs Which conflicts constrain national development and what are their causes? Which peacebuilding vision does DC aim for, and what needs to change in order to achieve it? 2. Peace- and conflictrelated relevance assessment How relevant is the current DC portfolio (definition of priority areas and priority area strategies) to positively influencing the conflict dynamics/the peace process? Do the projects/programmes correspond to the peacebuilding needs? Are synergies successfully achieved between the individual measures and with the international community? 3. Conflict-related risk management Which political risks and security problems caused by political conflicts in the country do DC projects/programmes face? How can development cooperation respond to them? 4. Peace and conflictrelated impact monitoring Which positive results for peace is DC generating in the country? How can these be further increased? Which negative results for peace is DC generating in the country? How can these be avoided (DNH)? Documents Country concept, priority area strategy paper (either for peacebuilding or for other sectors), priority area strategy paper monitoring documents, progress reports 2.3 What is PCA at project/programme level? At project/programme level, PCA supports the conflict-sensitive design of projects and programmes of German DC. Depending on the C marker classification, different requirements apply. BMZ, KfW and GTZ have laid down the following methodological minimum standards for projects/ programmes classified as C2, C1 and C0 respectively: 16

17 Table 1: Minimum standards for TC and FC projects/programmes (see Annex 2 for detailed description) Peace and conflict analysis Peace and conflictrelated relevance assessment Risk management Peace and conflictrelated impact monitoring Introduction C2 Develop national PBN. More in-depth and project/ programme-specific PBN for region of intervention. Establish whether the planned or existing design makes a direct and relevant contribution to the national PBN, and if appropriate develop options for action to ensure relevance. Ensure continuous monitoring of the conflict context to ensure safety of staff and risk management within the scope of strategies and projects/ programmes. Orientation toward peacebuilding objectives develop peace- and conflict-related indicators Potential unintended negative impacts must also be assessed in C2 projects. C1 Develop national PBN. Identify relevant sectoral PBN and project/ programme-specific PBN for priority area and region of intervention. Establish whether the planned or existing design makes a contribution toward the sector-specific PBN, and if appropriate develop options for action to ensure classification as C1. Ensure continuous monitoring of the conflict context to ensure safety of staff and risk management within the scope of strategies and projects/ programmes. Incorporate peacerelated aspects into impact monitoring. In the case of peacebuilding sub-component develop corresponding indicators. Other components as with C0 (see below). C0 Address the conflict themes relevant to the project/ programme in the course of the preparatory mission (dividers/ connectors) and incorporate these into the project design. Not needed Security analysis only required with respect to staff safety. To identify unintended impacts, conduct regular impact monitoring in the form of a DNH check. This can be done briefly in the form of a DNH check. Where a PCA has already been carried out at country level and national peacebuilding needs have been described within the scope of the brief politico-economic analysis, the recommendations of the PCA serve as the starting point for further adjustment of the individual development interventions. Projects/programmes can also refer to the conflict and security analysis at country level, although these usually have to be supplemented by more in-depth analysis for the respective project context. Where no country-level PCA has taken place, a sector- and project/programme-specific peace and conflict analysis is necessary for a full PCA. 17

18 Introduction The issues addressed by the PCA change according to the implementation phase of a project/programme. The following graphic (fig. 3) provides an overview of the key issues of conflict-sensitivity in the course of a project. Fig. 3: PCA in the implementation phases of a project/programme Project planning Project implementation Project evaluation 1. Peace and conflict analysis and peacebuilding needs What are the causes of the conflicts, which peacebuilding vision does DC aim for and what can be changed in the sector to help achieve this? How are the conflicts developing, what does this mean for DC peacebuilding objectives and what new action does this require? How did the conflicts develop, what did this mean for DC peacebuilding objectives and what new action did this require? 2. Peace and conflict-related relevance assessment How can the project/ programme be designed such that it makes a positive contribution toward peacebuilding? Does the project meet the current peacebuilding needs? How can it adjust to them? Did the project/ programme identify the peacebuilding needs and adjust its measures accordingly? 3. Risk management Which possible risks do the existing conflicts pose for the project/ programme? How can these be avoided? Which current risks do the existing conflicts pose for the project/ programme? How can it respond to them? Did the project identify conflictrelated risks and respond appropriately to them? 4. Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring Which positive results can be expected from the project/programme (results hypotheses, indicators)? Which negative results (monitoring areas)? How can these be avoided (DNH)? Which positive results is the project/ programme showing and how can these be further boosted? Which negative results are evident and how can the project/ programme reduce them (DNH)? Did the project/ programme identify and boost its positive impact? Did the project/ programme identify its negative impacts on the conflict and take appropriate counter-measures (DNH)? Documents AURA offer / appraisal report Monitoring of the environment/sector Impact monitoring Progress report Final report Evaluation report 18

19 3. Practical Implementation of PCA 3.1. How is PCA implemented at country portfolio level? Introduction Responsibility for the decision to give a DC portfolio a peacebuilding orientation rests with the BMZ, which is able to draw on corresponding information from German and international actors. When circumstances in a conflict country so dictate, BMZ supported by the country team initiates the survey and review of the entire DC portfolio with respect to its peacebuilding orientation. In such cases it is the task of the implementing organisations to provide professional and logistical support for this review. Within the scope of their advisory role, however, they may also initiate a review of the peacebuilding impacts of the project portfolios entrusted to them and e.g. if there is an increased risk of a violent escalation of a conflict submit proposals for adjustment of the project portfolio to BMZ. In both cases, PCA provides the methodological framework for the review process. Depending on the context, responsibility for conducting the PCA rests with the BMZ country division or the responsible country desks of the implementing organisations (e.g. GTZ Country Director). The responsible unit usually delegates the extensive survey and evaluation of data at country level to a team of external consultants. All concerned actors such as the unit commissioning the study, the country teams of the implementing organisations and the partner should, however, be informed of the objectives of the PCA and involved in all the key steps of the assessment in order to ensure ownership of its results and recommendations. The following graphic (fig. 4) shows the roles and responsibilities of BMZ and the implementing organisations in a PCA initiated by BMZ: Fig. 4: Implementation of PCA at country portfolio level Portfolio adjustment and steering Responsibility for PCA BMZ country division initiates and evaluates PCA defines the strategic orientation of DC with respect to peacebuilding Country desk of implementing organisation (e.g. country director) supports the implementation of the PCA integrates PCA into the mix of instruments for portfolio steering (e.g. monitoring of context / priority area strategy paper) may in consultation with BMZ adjust country portfolio In countries where the topic is of great political significance or where peacebuilding is a sectoral priority area, the results of the PCA at country level form the basis for adjustment of the DC portfolio and the development of conflict-sensitive steering instruments such as context monitoring. The individual elements of PCA can be used selectively to support the individual phases of portfolio adjustment. 19

20 Introduction Table 2: Phases of portfolio adjustment and PCA Phase Task PCA 1. Definition of the current position 2. Awarenessraising and training 3. Strategic development Strategic DC-related CA Survey of current German and international DC portfolios Identification of starting points for a stronger contribution toward peacebuilding Awareness-raising of staff and partners by involving them in the definition of the current position Staff Trainings Clarification of the status of peacebuilding (priority area or cross-cutting issue) Definition of the peacebuilding objectives of DC, and development of corresponding strategies Element 1: CA and assessment of peacebuilding needs Element 2: peace and conflictrelated relevance assessment Elements 1 and 2: peacebuilding needs and options for DC action Participatory, inclusive implementation of PCA Where appropriate, training in PCA Element 2: options for DC action Element 3: risk management 4. Formalisation Treatment of the theme in government negotiations, minuting of details, allocation of funds Adjustment of existing / preparation of a new priority area strategy paper and other relevant strategy papers Possibly design and approval of new development interventions with a peacebuilding focus 5. Implementation Planning workshop to integrate peacebuilding into the current country portfolio Regular self-evaluation and external evaluation of the project/programme with respect to peacebuilding Creation of a system to monitor the conflict context and the impacts of DC on the conflict situation Results of elements 1-4 PCA at project/programme level Elements 1-3 Element 2: peace and conflictrelated relevance assessment Element 4: peace and conflictrelated impact monitoring Element 1: CA Element 3: risk management Element 4: peace and conflictrelated impact monitoring Conflict-sensitive quality management (staff task forces, professional in-process consultancy, human resources development) Security management Element 3: risk management Source: Phases and tasks of portfolio adjustment, adapted after Scherg

21 3.2. How is PCA implemented at project/programme level? Implementation of the BMZ sector strategy at project/programme level is the task of officers responsible for contracts and cooperation, and project or programme managers. The officer responsible for contracts and cooperation is supported in this by the appropriate country division of the implementing organisation, as well as the in-country representation (e.g. country director). When a new development intervention is being planned, PCA implementation is initiated and supported by the responsible country divisions at BMZ and the implementing organisations. Introduction At project/programme level in particular it is appropriate to implement PCA in individual segments oriented toward the planning steps and steering instruments of the development intervention, or to integrate PCA into these. It is important here to adopt an inclusive approach. Together with the staff and partners a joint understanding of conflict sensitivity should be established and the expectations attached to the PCA should be clarified. In the course of this process, changes to the key questions and the procedure of PCA may arise that are important for adapting the PCA to the specific needs of the project/programme. This helps bring about a situation in which PCA is not seen as an additional formal requirement, but as a means of supporting the project work. The project/programme can delegate the actual collection and evaluation of data to external service providers, although the project team and their partners should be involved in the key analytical steps. The following graphic (fig. 5) shows the responsibilities for implementing PCA during the different phases of contract management. Fig. 5: Implementing PCA at project/programme level Project planning Project implementation Project evaluation Responsibility for PCA Country division of the implementing organisation initiates PCA and accepts results takes sector-specific advice from the sector division Project appraisal mission / preparation of feasibility study implement PCA Project management (e.g. contact person) integrates PCA into the project s monitoring and steering system Client / country division of the implementing organisation initiates integration of PCA into evaluation takes sector-specific advice from the sector division Evaluation mission implements PCA PCA can be applied either independently as a methodology in its own right, or as a "toolbox" to supplement existing DC planning and steering instruments. The two versions and their areas of application are explained below Conducting a full PCA In the case of a peace and conflict-related review (and possibly adjustment) of the definition of priority areas, the conflict-sensitive design of priority area strategies, the establishment of peacebuilding as a priority area, or the planning of new peacebuilding projects/programmes (C2 projects), it is recommended that a full PCA (all four elements) be carried out, with support from a team of external consultants. In these situations the 21

22 Introduction four elements of PCA provide the information needed to identify, appraise, implement and steer peacebuilding measures. A full PCA is also recommended when planning new development interventions (C0, C1) in countries with a "heightened or acute need for prevention" ("yellow and red countries"), or when reviewing the entire country portfolios in these countries, in order to facilitate timely action for subsequent conflictsensitive contract management. Where possible, an attempt should be made to create a standard process possibly adapted to PCA to address the key cross-cutting issues. Box 6: Implementing a full PCA: areas of application All four PCA elements must be applied when: reviewing (and possibly adjusting) the conflict-sensitivity of the country concept and definition of priority areas, or when orienting the country strategy toward peacebuilding goals; adjusting priority area strategies to increase the contribution made to peacebuilding within the scope of sectoral orientations; adjusting a country portfolio to incorporate peacebuilding as a priority area; planning, implementing and evaluating (new) peacebuilding projects/programmes (C2 and C1). It is recommended that all four PCA elements be applied when: reviewing a country portfolio with respect to peacebuilding as a cross-cutting issue. PCA elements 1 (CA) and 4 (peace and conflict-related impact monitoring) must be applied when: planning new DC interventions in countries with a "heightened or acute need for prevention" (C0). PCA element 3 (risk management) and the element of security management contained therein must be applied in all countries. The intensity will depend on the respective level of security threat. 22

23 The following graphic (fig. 6) shows the key steps in the process of implementing a full PCA. Fig. 6: Steps in the process of implementing a PCA Introduction I. Preparation of the PCA BMZ regional division Contract and cooperation manager 1. Defining the goals of the PCA 2. Providing the needed resources 3. Specifying the Terms of Reference 4. Appointing an appropriate PCA team 5. Logistical preparation 6. Briefing the PCA team II. Implementation of the PCA BMZ regional division Contract manager 7. Induction into the PCA method, where appropriate 8. Data collection and evaluation 9. Feedback workshop (possibly in-country and at Head Office) 10. Final report III. Utilisation of the PCA BMZ reg. division Contract manager 11. Integration of PCA results into political steering and contract management, and implementation of the PCA recommendations 12. Conflict-related impact monitoring Source: adapted after DFID

24 Introduction 3.4. Selective integration of PCA into DC steering instruments ("toolbox principle") The steering instruments of peacebuilding projects/programmes (C2), and of country portfolios that include peacebuilding as a priority area, can be built entirely on the PCA method. In other projects/programmes (C0 and C1), and in country portfolios with peacebuilding as a cross-cutting issue, it is recommended that selected conflict-specific issues be integrated into standard steering instruments (e.g. management principles, context monitoring, impact monitoring). This means that individual steps, key questions or instruments of PCA would be selectively incorporated into these systems. The utilisation of PCA in this way, however, presupposes that a local peace and conflict analysis and a peacebuilding needs assessment, to which the remaining steps will repeatedly refer, have already been carried out. This analysis can be conducted by the project/programme itself or if appropriate in the given working context a third party analysis can be used (e.g. UN, international NGOs; peace accord). As from 2008 onwards, the brief politico-economic analyses for countries with a heightened or acute need for prevention already include a national CA (element 1a). The description of the peacebuilding needs (element 1b) contained therein will provide a first orientation for PCA implementation. Box 7: Selective integration of PCA into DC steering instruments in the following areas of application: implementation, steering and evaluation of development interventions in countries with a "heightened or acute need for prevention" (C0) conflict-sensitive steering of a DC portfolio in a conflict country (with peacebuilding as a cross-cutting issue) Since the PCA method is geared toward the phases of contract and project management, its elements can be integrated into the standard steering instruments with relative ease. The table below (table 3) provides an overview of how individual PCA elements can be utilised for and integrated into contract and cooperation management at country and project/programme level. Table 3: Selective integration of PCA into DC steering instruments Steering instruments PCA element Instruments Country level (peacebuilding is a cross-cutting issue) Development-policy context monitoring Element 1: CA and peacebuilding needs Conflict profile Stakeholder analysis Factors for conflict and peace Trends and scenarios Security management Element 3: risk management Security analysis Monitoring of the priority area strategy paper Element 4: peace and conflict-related impact monitoring Results chains DNH Project/programme level (C0 projects/programmes) Feasibility studies, appraisal mission, implementation offer / appraisal report Element 1 and 4 CA and peace and conflictrelated impact monitoring can be conducted within the scope of a DNH check DNH check 24

25 Project planning, operational planning Depending on the political sensitivity of the project Element 3: risk management Conflict-sensitive context monitoring Introduction Management principles DNH Security management Depending on the threat level Element 3: risk management Security analysis Impact monitoring Element 4: peace and conflictrelated impact monitoring Results chains DNH Participatory impact monitoring Evaluation (e.g. PPR) Element 4: peace and conflictrelated impact monitoring Source: Steering instruments of development cooperation, adapted after Lorenz 2005 More detailed information on the conflict-sensitive design of these steering instruments can be found in the GTZ guideline "Recommendations for contract and cooperation management to ensure the conflict-sensitive design and steering of TC projects and programmes" (2005). The following guidelines focus on presenting the methodological aspects of PCA: by breaking it down into comprehensible and discrete methodological steps, they explain the procedure and provide tips on practical application. 25

26 Annex 1: Overview of Peace and Conflict Assessment PCA element 1. Peace and conflict analysis and peacebuilding needs Objective Gain a more in-depth understanding of the conflict context. 2. Peace and conflict-related relevance assessment Assess the peacebuilding relevance of DC measures. Identify entry points for DC support to peacebuilding. Identify entry points for the adjustment of measures. Key questions Which conflicts are constraining the development of the country or the project region? What are their causes? Which vision (of peace) does DC seek to bring about? What needs to be changed in order to achieve this (PBN)? What are the objectives, activities and principles of work of the DC measure(s)? Do they make a positive contribution to peacebuilding? Which objectives and activities are not relevant? What would be the points of departure for strengthening the promotion of peacebuilding? How can the measures be adjusted? Instruments Guideline 1a Guideline 1b Guideline 2 Peace and conflict analysis Development and peacepolicy deficits, and visionbuilding for peace Description of DC measures Relevance assessment Peacebuilding needs Application in contract and cooperation management Analysis of the context Context monitoring Conflict-sensitive planning and steering Introduction 3. Risk management 4. Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring Review the feasibility of DC measures in the conflict context. Avoid impacts that exacerbate the conflict. Develop a security strategy. Strengthen impacts that help build peace. Are conditions conducive to the implementation of the DC measure? Is the safety of all actors guaranteed? How can the measure respond to conflict-based risks? Which measures make an effective contribution toward peacebuilding? What are the factors for success? Which conclusions can be drawn from this for other measures? Which aspects of the project/ programme exacerbate the conflict? Why? How can these impacts be avoided? Guideline 3 Guideline 4 Analysis of the context DNH Security analysis Results chains Participatory impact monitoring Security management Results-based monitoring Context monitoring Monitoring of the priority area strategy paper 26

27 Annex 2: Minimum Standards for Peace and Conflict Assessments (PCAs) in C0, C1 and C2 Projects/Programmes Introduction Conducting PCAs in C0 Projects/Programmes Minimum Standards for Technical and Financial Cooperation (TC/FC) Projects/Programmes January 2007 Pursuant to the BMZ Sector Strategy for Crisis Prevention, development interventions classified as C0 must be designed on a conflict-sensitive basis. The overarching goal here is to systematically avoid unintended negative impacts resulting from sector-based measures. In this context it is fundamentally important to raise four key questions in relation to the respective intervention: "What are we doing?" / "Where will the intervention take place?" / "Who will we be working with?" and "How will we proceed?" For the conflict-sensitive planning or orientation of a C0 project/programme it is sufficient to conduct a reduced and modified PCA. In this context "reduced and modified" means that the required minimum standards are the conduct of a peace and conflict analysis (PCA element 1), and the peace and conflict-related impact monitoring (PCA element 4), which together form a kind of methodological framework. The other elements of PCA become correspondingly less significant, and are applied in a reduced form. To ensure the conflict-sensitive design of C0 projects/ programmes the following steps must therefore be applied: 1. Peace and conflict analysis: The first step is to establish whether key data for an analysis of the conflict are already available, or whether a peace and conflict analysis (CA) has already been carried out. Here it is possible to refer to internationally available CA authorised by BMZ or (from 2008 onwards) to the conflict-related sub-analyses included in the newly-introduced brief politico-economic analyses. If no CA or brief politico-economic sub-analysis exists to which one could refer, the conflict-related themes relevant to the project/programme must be analysed within the scope of the project appraisal, and incorporated into the project design. This can take place in an abridged form on the basis of a do no harm (DNH) check. Here it is important to analyse the causes of the conflict, as well as the connecting and dividing / escalating and de-escalating factors within the conflict that affect the project environment. From this analysis the project/programme potentials for strengthening or weakening the connectors/ dividers should then be identified (see the four key questions above). 2. Peace and conflict-related relevance assessment: It is to be assumed that development interventions classified as C0 are of limited relevance in terms of any direct contribution toward the peacebuilding needs (PBN) of the respective country. The step of assessing this relevance can therefore be omitted (unless there is an explicit requirement / political will to explore the potential e.g. for turning a C0 project/programme into a C1 project/programme). 3. Risk management: In the case of a C0 classification risk management is confined to the security analysis. All development interventions in crisis-prone or (post-)conflict countries must address the risk that staff, project partners or project assets may become the victim of attack. A security analysis should therefore be conducted to examine and realistically assess on the one hand the potential threats, and on the other hand the existing capacities of the project/programme and its staff to deal with them appropriately. The respective security strategy for a project/programme will be embedded into the country-specific security provisions for German development cooperation (DC), which are based on the respective national security strategy of the German Embassy and possibly also of other multilateral organisations (e.g. the United Nations / UN). 27

28 Introduction The second component of risk management, i.e. monitoring of the development-policy environment, can be omitted in C0 projects/programmes in its decidedly conflict-oriented way. In the case of C0 projects/programmes the political risks present in the respective country context are dealt with through the usual standard procedures. 4. Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring always needs to take into account both the intended (positive) and the unintended (both positive and negative) impacts of a project/programme; yet the focus is always on monitoring (and containing) the unintended negative results. Both types of result (intended/ unintended results) should undergo a) a 'security check', as there is always a risk that certain envisaged development-policy results may not be desired/accepted by some (potentially violent) groups. b) a DNH check at regular intervals designed to identify unintended negative impacts, thus creating a basis for changing course. Alternatively, those themes relevant to the conflict can also be monitored within the scope of the normal results-based monitoring system. Conducting PCAs in C1 Projects/Programmes Minimum Standards for Technical and Financial Cooperation (TC/FC) Projects/Programmes January 2007 Development interventions classified as C1 have a clearly defined relationship to the conflict context in the respective country, and make a direct (sometimes also indirect) contribution toward "crisis prevention, conflict transformation or peacebuilding". This contribution is described at the level of the secondary objectives, the level of results, or within the scope of a project/programme sub-component, thus making it an integral component of the project/programme concept. At the level of the primary objectives, however, the development intervention aims to achieve development results in another sector (e.g. economic promotion). It is appropriate to classify a project/programme as C1 if and when its secondary objectives, a sub-component, the concept, the methodological approach etc. are directly related to the (post-)conflict situation, and this relationship is formalised in the project documents (e.g. in the Development-Policy Framework for Contracts and Cooperation / AURA offer). For C1 projects/programmes the relationship of the respective sector (e.g. economic promotion, education) to the conflict is the key aspect. The existing potentials of the sector for addressing the national peacebuilding needs are utilised, and the project/programme makes a direct/indirect contribution toward peacebuilding through the conflict-sensitive design of individual (partial) measures. The conceptual orientation of development interventions classified as C1 thus goes beyond conflict-sensitive project/programme design (C0). Alongside the basic premise of conflict-sensitivity, development interventions classified as C1 must also be relevant to the conflict. Pursuant to the BMZ Sector Strategy for Crisis Prevention, and to ensure the relevance of the (partial) measures, all four core elements of the PCA are correspondingly applied in C1 projects/programmes. The application of these elements here differs from their application in C2 projects/programmes chiefly in terms of its complexity, scope and methodological depth. For C1 projects/programmes the following elements must be applied: 1. a) Peace and conflict analysis The starting point is always a CA at country level. Either this is already available and authorised by the BMZ country division, or from 2008 onward will be prepared within the scope of the brief 28

29 politico-economic analyses. A further possibility is that the responsible BMZ country division in cooperation with an implementing organisation commissions the preparation of a new CA. Within the scope of project/programme planning the existing CA, including the PBN identified at the national level, is then broken down in relation to the respective region and/or sector. If required, more detailed information relevant to the respective sector can be obtained from supplementary studies, or by analysing links between various existing sector studies along the lines of conflict. These should describe at the very least the causes of the conflict, lines of conflict, structures, actors, dynamics and scenarios for the respective sector and/or region. Introduction b) Peacebuilding needs The sector-specific PBN for development interventions classified as C1 are derived from and defined on the basis of the national PBN identified within the scope of the CA at the country level. Regardless of whether a new development intervention is being planned or an existing project/programme is being reviewed the sector-specific PBN constitute a key framework of reference ( yardstick ) for assessing the peacebuilding relevance of a development intervention or its (partial) measures. The results of this element are the project/programme and sector-specific PBN derived from the sectorspecific CA. 2. Peace and conflict-related relevance assessment Assessing the relevance of a development intervention involves establishing whether the concept of the planned (or ongoing) project/programme makes a relevant contribution toward addressing the previously determined sector-specific PBN, or how (where appropriate) the relevance of a project/programme can be raised so that it can be classified as C1. If the project/programme has not yet been classified (e.g. as C0 or C1), the relevance assessment determines the appropriate C marker. Whereas development interventions classified as C2 and C0 are defined unequivocally in terms of their peacebuilding relevance (C2: HIGH relevance C0: NO relevance), for C1 projects/programmes this is more difficult, and sometimes the boundary, especially between C1 and C0, becomes hazy. The intensity of a C1 project/programme may fall anywhere between the following two poles: A. Most of the activities/components and anticipated results are clearly related to the sector-specific PBN: "The project/programme is (recognisably) relevant to peacebuilding" and: B. Only some activities are consistent with the PBN: "The project/programme is of limited peacebuilding relevance". 3. Risk management: Context monitoring and security analysis Conflict-based risk management avails itself of the established (development-)policy instruments and mechanisms (e.g. the crisis plan and security provisions of the Federal Foreign Office, and information systems of other donors such as UNHCR or NGO networks). These deliver a wealth of valuable information on current developments in the conflict environment and personal security aspects that can be utilised to devise an appropriate security strategy for the project/programme. 29

30 Introduction Where new projects/programmes are being planned or existing ones adjusted, a DC-relevant context analysis (feasibility check) is conducted to ensure that appropriate framework conditions exist for the (planned) project/programme, and that its feasibility can therefore (still) be guaranteed. The results are documented in the form of recommendations concerning the timing and region of intervention for the measure, executing agencies, implementing organisations, target groups, and the specific design of individual components. Particular risk factors should be incorporated into the subsequent project/programme monitoring system. During the implementation of C1 projects/programmes, the need to develop a system for context monitoring depends on how sensitive the immediate political environment of the development intervention is. Where possible the results of these project/programme-related monitoring activities should be integrated into overarching (national) monitoring systems. There should in any case be a link to the 'normal' monitoring system of the project/programme (see point 4). Carrying out a security analysis is a binding standard in all countries with a heightened or acute need for prevention, and this can take place at any time. All projects/programmes in crisis-prone or (post-) conflict countries must address the risk that staff, partners or project assets may become the victim of a politically motivated attack, given the fact that the intervention's direct link to the conflict places its work in a highly politicised context. A security analysis should therefore be conducted to examine and realistically assess on the one hand the potential threats, and on the other hand the existing capacities of the project/programme and its staff to deal with the situation appropriately. The respective security strategy for a project/programme will be embedded in the country-specific security provisions for German DC, which are based on the respective national security strategy of the German Embassy and possibly also of other multilateral organisations (e.g. UN). 4. Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring Positive impact on peace: An intended/positive impact on peace is defined at the level of components and secondary objectives, and as such is an integral part of the intervention s results-based monitoring. If the project/programme has an explicit peace and conflict-related component, there will be corresponding indicators for that component in the overall project/programme monitoring system anyway. Negative impact on peace: All measures (especially those with no explicit link to peace that are designed to help achieve the sector objective) should be analysed for their possible unintended, negative impact on peace, primarily using the DNH instruments. Project personnel should be sensitised to potential negative results. Moreover, agreement must be reached within the project/programme as to how these potential undesired impacts can be monitored (it is not always appropriate to define corresponding indicators). Example of a project/programme with a peace and conflict-related component: If the development intervention includes a specific peace and conflict-related component (with intended positive results), then the potential negative results (risks) can be defined as the peacebuilding results chain is developed (for that component) along with the corresponding indicators for impact monitoring. Mandatory for the other components/activities is at least an assessment of the conflictrelated impacts by means of a DNH check. 30

31 Example of a project/programme without a conflict-related component: If a C1 project/programme has no explicit peacebuilding component (but perhaps just various conflictrelated sub-activities within the individual components), then there will be no corresponding impact indicators. Instead, the potential negative results and risks for conflict transformation and peacebuilding should be reviewed when developing the usual sector-specific results chains and indicators per programme component. Introduction Conducting PCAs in C2 Projects/Programmes Minimum Standards for Technical and Financial Cooperation (TC/FC) Projects/Programmes April 2007 Development interventions classified as C2 have a clearly defined relationship to the conflict context in the respective country or region. They make a direct contribution toward "crisis prevention, conflict transformation or peacebuilding". C2 classification: Crisis prevention, conflict transformation or peacebuilding are the primary objective of the development intervention, i.e. crucial to its implementation. This can be ascertained by posing the question: "Would the project/programme have been implemented at all without this development-policy objective?" (BMZ Sector Strategy for Crisis Prevention 2005) It is appropriate to classify a project/programme as C2 if and when its primary objective and its overall conception are explicitly related to the conflict or post-conflict situation, and this relationship is formalised in the project documents (e.g. in the AURA Offer). Due to their explicit sectoral and conceptual orientation toward peace (peacebuilding, peace stabilisation etc.), development interventions classified as C2 are also termed "peace programmes". Next to the basic premise of conflict-sensitivity, C2 projects/programmes must also be highly relevant to the conflict. Pursuant to the Sector Strategy for Crisis Prevention, and to ensure this relevance of the project/programme design, all four core elements of PCA are applied in C2 projects/programmes. The application of these elements here differs from their application to development interventions classified as C1 in terms of its complexity, scope and methodological depth. For development interventions classified as C2 the following elements must be applied: 1. a) Peace and conflict analysis The starting point is always a CA at country level. Either this is already available and authorised by the BMZ country division, or from 2008 onward will be prepared within the scope of the brief politicoeconomic analyses. A further possibility is that the responsible BMZ country division in cooperation with an implementing organisation commissions the preparation of a new CA. The CA, including the peacebuilding needs assessed at country level, forms the point of reference and thus the basis for C2 projects/programmes. Often, however, the information base contained in a general CA will not be sufficient, because C2 projects/programmes require specific and detailed information (on specific themes such as the situation of child soldiers, or region-specific information). It may then be appropriate to consult supplementary studies (conducted by research institutions or other donors) or where no such studies exist to commission them. Alternatively a sound information base can be obtained by analysing 31

32 Introduction links between various existing studies along the lines of conflict. These should contain detailed descriptions of the causes of the conflict, lines of conflict, structures, actors, dynamics and scenarios for the respective region. b) Peacebuilding needs The national PBN identified in the CA at country level form the basis for C2 projects/programmes. Regardless of whether a new development intervention is being planned or an ongoing project/ programme is being reviewed the national PBN form the key framework of reference for assessing an intervention s direct relevance to peace. This step identifies the national PBN as derived from the CA (and describes them in more detail for specific regions). 2. Peace and conflict-related relevance assessment In the case of C2 projects/programmes, the relevance assessment involves establishing whether the overall design of the planned (or ongoing) project/programme is relevant to addressing the previously determined national PBN, or how (where appropriate) the relevance of a development intervention can be increased so that it can be classified as C2. If the project/programme has not yet been classified (e.g. as C0, C1 or C2), the relevance assessment determines the appropriate C marker. It is unlikely that a development intervention will be classified as C2 without planners explicitly working or planning toward that end. Whereas C1 projects/programmes are somewhat more difficult to define in terms of their relevance to peacebuilding, C2 projects/programmes must be of HIGH relevance to the national PBN. The primary objective of the development intervention and thus its overall design must be clearly related to the national PBN. 3. Risk management: Context monitoring and security analysis Conflict-based risk management avails itself of the established (development-)policy instruments and mechanisms (e.g. the crisis plan and security provisions of the Federal Foreign Office, and information systems of other donors such as UNHCR or NGO networks). These deliver a wealth of valuable information on current developments in the conflict environment and personal security aspects that can be utilised to devise an appropriate security strategy for the project/programme. Where (new) projects/programmes are being planned or existing ones adjusted, a context analysis (feasibility check), oriented towards development cooperation (DC), continuously assesses if appropriate framework conditions exist for the (planned) project/programme, and if its feasibility can therefore (still) be guaranteed. The results are documented in the form of recommendations concerning the timing and region of intervention for the measure, executing agency, implementing organisations, target groups, and the specific design of individual components. Particular risk factors should be incorporated into the subsequent project/programme monitoring system. Given the high level of political sensitivity, it is recommended that during the implementation of development interventions classified as C2 a project/programme-specific context monitoring system be established. Where possible the results of this monitoring of areas relevant to the project/programme should be integrated into national monitoring, as both country-level monitoring and monitoring at the level of C2 projects/programmes should capture national dynamics. 32

33 Carrying out a security analysis is a binding standard in all countries with a heightened or acute need for prevention, and this can take place at any time. All development intervantions in crisis-prone or (post- )conflict countries must address the risk that staff, partners or project assets may become the victim of a politically motivated attack, given the fact that the intervention s direct link to the conflict places its work in a highly politicised context. A security analysis should therefore be conducted to examine and realistically assess on the one hand the potential threats, and on the other hand the existing capacities of the project/programme and its staff to deal with the situation appropriately. The respective security strategy for a project/programme will be embedded in the country-specific security provisions for German DC, which are based on the respective national security strategy of the German Embassy and possibly also of other multilateral organisations (e.g. UN). Introduction 4. Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring Positive impact on peace: Intended positive impact on peace is defined at the level of the primary objective, and as such forms the basis for results-based monitoring of the respective C2 project/programme. The entire monitoring system of the development intervention is thus based on peace and conflict-related results chains together with the corresponding indicators. Negative impact on peace: All measures should also be analysed complementary for possible unintended negative results (measures related to crisis prevention and peacebuilding too can inadvertently cause negative results), primarily using the DNH instruments. Project personnel should be sensitised to potential negative impacts. Agreement must be reached within the project/programme as to how these potential undesired impacts can be monitored (it is not always appropriate to define corresponding indicators). Annex 3: Glossary Armed conflict/war Armed conflicts and wars are fought between permanently organised, armed parties, each publicly proclaiming their own objectives, which they believe to be incompatible with those of the other party or parties. In most cases at least one government is involved as a primary party to the conflict. In addition to other possible conflict issues, armed conflicts and wars are usually fought in order to gain control or sovereignty over a piece of territory, or to gain control of or influence a national government. An armed conflict is a conflict of the type described above in which acts of violence cause at least 25 fatalities a year. A war is an armed conflict that causes the violent deaths of at least 1,000 people a year. (SIDA 2004) Causes of conflict Depending on the focus and perception of the conflicting interests, conflicts can be classified in different ways, e.g. distribution conflicts, ideological, religious or ethnic conflicts, conflicts about certain rights, etc., although the causes of a conflict are never one-dimensional. For development cooperation it is primarily the root causes that are important, i.e. the structural causes of conflict, since they have a particular influence on violent attempts to resolve a conflict. 33

34 Introduction Root causes can be broken down in the following way: - illegitimate, undemocratic and inefficient governance, a lack of opportunities to reconcile the interests of various population groups, the absence of active civil society organisations and free media; - unequal political, economic and cultural opportunities of various population groups, violation of the collective rights of individual groups, particularly minorities, e.g. with respect to access to natural resources, dissociation from government or other elite groups; - high crime level and lack of security, social and political violence in particular on the part of the state security forces, biased law enforcement by judiciary and security forces. (BMZ Sector Strategy for Crisis Prevention 2005) Conflict and post-conflict countries Conflict and post-conflict countries are at the heart of the BMZ sector strategy. There is no internationally accepted definition or list of countries, which is why BMZ bases its definition on the categorisation of countries within the scope of its crisis early warning system (adapted in turn from the definitions of the Working Group on the Causes of War / AKUF). Conflict countries include developing countries and transition states in which violent conflicts are currently ongoing either in individual regions or throughout the country. In post-conflict countries, violent conflict has been ended by a ceasefire or a peace agreement at least one year before. Less than ten years have elapsed, however, since the end of violent hostilities. This categorisation is adjusted by BMZ every year to bring it into line with recent developments. (BMZ sector strategy 2005) Conflict and violent conflict The term conflict should be seen here as defining the relations between two or more mutually dependent parties, in which at least one party sees the relationship as negative, or in which the parties pursue contradictory interests and needs. Additional criteria for definition and differentiation might include, for instance, the number and type of the actors involved, the duration and intensity of the conflict, or the root causes underlying the conflict. Conflict is a necessary part of social change. Particularly during phases of socio-economic change and political transformation, conflicts can lead to crises which embrace society as a whole and can escalate into violent hostilities. The aim of development policy is to help prevent or overcome violence as a means of resolving conflicts. The focus here is on societal and political conflicts. (BMZ sector strategy 2005) Conflict management and conflict transformation Conflict management is generally the term used to describe the way external actors participate in shaping the way a conflict is resolved, trying to regulate the way the conflict is handled and to prevent the use of violence. This term is often used in development cooperation synonymously with the term "conflict transformation", although the latter also embraces the overcoming of structural causes of conflict, and of the attitudes and behaviour patterns of the parties to violent conflicts. Conflict transformation thus goes beyond conflict management and leads to a change in the way those involved act and perceive the problem. (BMZ sector strategy 2005) Conflict sensitivity Conflict sensitivity means taking into account the reciprocal influence that exists between the conflict and measure taken, with the goal of avoiding any negative, conflict-aggravating impacts, and strengthening positive, deescalating and peace-promoting impacts (do no harm principle). (BMZ sector strategy 2005) 34

35 Crisis prevention Crisis prevention comprises timely, planned, systematic and coherent action at various levels of state and society to prevent violent conflicts. Measures designed to prevent crises aim to reduce the potential for any (further or repeated) outbreak of violent conflict or escalation to a crisis before, during or after violent conflicts by eliminating the root causes of the conflict and promoting the establishment of institutions, structures and "cultures" of peaceful conflict resolution. (BMZ sector strategy 2005) Introduction Do no harm By far the most important rule for development cooperation in crisis situations is the golden rule "do no harm", made popular by Mary B. Anderson. In line with this principle, unintended consequences of humanitarian aid and development cooperation and any unintentional aggravation of the conflict should be recognised, avoided and mitigated, and effects which foster peace and bridge the differences between parties to the conflict should be intentionally strengthened. (BMZ sector strategy 2005) PCA versus PCIA PCA (Peace and Conflict Assessment) is a method for the conflict-sensitive design and steering of individual projects, programmes or country portfolios, geared to the project planning and steering cycle. PCA comprises the following four elements: 1) peace and conflict analysis and assessment of peacebuilding needs, 2) peace and conflict-related relevance assessment, 3) risk management and 4) peace and conflict-related impact monitoring. PCIA (Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment) encompasses a number of methods for the monitoring of results for humanitarian and development measures in conflict zones. Peace (positive, negative) Negative peace means the absence of organised military violence, whereas positive peace is only deemed to have been reached when there is an absence of structural violence. Development policy aims to achieve positive peace (as defined by Johan Galtung). (BMZ sector strategy 2005) Peace and conflict analysis A peace and conflict analysis can be performed at local, national or regional level. It generally embraces the production of a conflict profile, the analysis of root causes, of actors and relations, the deduction of trends and conflict dynamics, as well as possible approaches to changing the situation. A peace and conflict analysis is always subjective, and there is never only one view of a violent conflict neither on the sides of the parties to the conflict, nor on the part of external actors. For this reason it is highly desirable to involve a variety of different points of view, e.g. by conducting the peace and conflict analysis together with other partners (the multi-actor perspective). (BMZ sector strategy 2005) Peacebuilding Peacebuilding measures are medium and long-term in design and aim to establish long-term interest reconciliation and conflict resolution mechanisms. They are also geared to overcoming the structural causes of violent conflicts and the comprehensive creation of framework conditions suitable for peaceful and equitable development. In development work the term "peacebuilding" is used to underline the fact that positive peace must still be built with the help of active support for structural reforms, even after a peace agreement has been signed. 35

36 Introduction To underline the close correlation between peace and development, and the way development-policy inputs help shape conditions, the German term Friedensentwicklung (literally "peace development") was coined within the scope of conceptual development. Although similar to "peacebuilding" there is no direct translation of this term. (BMZ sector strategy 2005) Peacebuilding needs The term peacebuilding needs denotes the totality of changes needed in a local context, a country or a region for peaceful conflict transformation or for preventing an outreak of violent conflict. This can include overcoming the root causes of a conflict, establishing mechanisms for peaceful conflict transformation, and modifying patterns of behaviour and perception on the part of the parties to the conflict. PBN describe the objectives for development measures in conflict countries, whereas individual measures can only ever make a partial contribution. PBN are not objective in nature. In fact, the selection of PBN is inevitably influenced by the subjective perceptions of reality, interests and scope for action of the actors concerned. It is therefore important during this step to ensure ownership for the PBN selection through broad-based participation. Where agreements (e.g. peace accords) between the parties to the conflict already exist, these should be used as a basis for defining the PBN. Relevance, relevance assessment The term relevance denotes the extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with the target groups requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies. (After OECD 2002) Within the scope of the PCA, the term relevance relates to the consistency between the peacebuilding needs and the results of a development measure or country portfolio. A relevance assessment is the process of analysing this peacebuilding relevance, by comparing the (anticipated) results of the project/programme with the local or national peacebuilding needs. Results-based monitoring Results-based monitoring is part of the self-evaluation of projects/programmes, and is designed to help steer the project/programme with a constant view to its results. Results are defined as all those changes within society that can be causally attributed to the development intervention. They can be intended or unintended, and positive or negative. Results-based monitoring assesses not only the project/programme objective, but also its outputs, activities, financing and risks, with respect to the changes it brings about. (GTZ, Lorenz, 2004) Risk, risk management Risks are factors in the environment of a development intervention that negatively affect or are likely to affect the achievement of its objectives. Risk management analyses the likelihood that these risks will take effect, and the ensuing impacts on the development intervention. (After OECD 2002) Conflict-related risks are a consequence of development interventions in conflict situations. They can include physical threats to staff, theft, and the impairment of project work by the causes or effects of the conflict such as mistrust or poorly defined land tenure. 36

37 Security sector The security sector encompasses security management and supervisory agencies such as ministries for interior affairs, foreign affairs and defence, national security advisory boards, financial management authorities, specific committees of the legislative branch, traditional authorities, human rights commissions and civil society organisations. It also includes judicial and penal bodies (ministries of justice, courts, public prosecutors' offices, prison authorities, ombudspersons, representatives of traditional legal systems), as well as enforcement agencies such as the armed forces, police force, gendarmeries, paramilitary forces, presidential security forces, civil and military intelligence services, coastal guards and border patrol, customs authorities, reservists, and local security forces. Finally the security sector also includes extrajudicial forces such as liberation armies, guerrilla armies, and private security and guard services. (Interministerial Framework Concept SSR 2007) Introduction Security sector assessment The conduct of a sound security sector assessment is a basic prerequisite for identifying both the partner country s needs, and practical starting points for corresponding development-policy support. Security sector assessment offers a range of methodological tools for the systematic survey and analysis of security sectors. Using a checklist, the security sector of a partner country can be described in detail, analysed, and checked for deficits. (GTZ, Hofmann, 2006) 37

38 Introduction Annex 4: Bibliography and Further Reading Anderson, Mary B., 1999: Do No Harm. How Can Aid Support Peace or War. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Anderson, Mary B. / Olson, Lara, 2003: Confronting War. Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners. Cambridge, MA: Collaborative for Development Action. Barbolet, Adam et al., 2005: The Utility and Dilemmas of Conflict Sensitivity. Berlin: Berghof Handbook. Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2005: Discussion Series on PCIA. Berghof Handbook. BMZ, 2005: Sector Strategy for Crisis Prevention, Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding in German Development Cooperation. Bouta, Tsjeard / Frerks, Georg / Bannon, Ian, 2005: Gender, Conflict and Development. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Brabant, Koenraad van, 2001a: Operational Security Management in Violent Environments A Field Manual for Aid Agencies. Humanitarian Practice Network. London: Overseas Development Institute. Brabant, Koenraad van, 2001b: Mainstreaming the Organisational Management of Safety and Security. A Review of Aid Agency Practices and a Guide for Management. London: Overseas Development Institute. HPG Report 9. Brabant, Koenraad van, 2002: Module Security Strategies. London: RedR. Bush, Kenneth, 2003: Hands-On PCIA. Part I. A Handbook for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment. Collaborative for Development Action, 2004: Reflecting on Peace Practice Handbook ( Collier, Paul et al., 2003: Breaking the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development Policy. World Bank Research Report. Washington, DC: World Bank. CPR Network, 2005: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) Handbook. ( DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2005: Preventing Conflict and Building Peace. A Manual of Issues and Entry Points. Paris: OECD/DAC. Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, 2002: Sicherheitsleitfaden. Bonn: Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.v. DFID, 2002: Conducting a Strategic Conflict Assessment. London. DFID, 2005: Guidance on Evaluation and Review for DFID Staff. London: DFID Evaluation Department. Dugan, Máire A., 2001: Imaging the Future: A Tool for Conflict Resolution. pp in: Thania Paffenholz / Luc Reychler, Peacebuilding. A Field Guide. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Dworken, Jonathan T., 2001a: Threat Assessment. Training Module for NGOs Operating in Conflict Zones and High-Crime Areas. London: RedR. Dworken, Jonathan T., 2001b: Vulnerability Assessment. Training Module for NGOs Operating in Conflict Zones and High-Crime Areas. London: RedR. Dworken, Jonathan T., 2001c: Security Planning. From Risk Assessment to Security Plan. Training Module for NGOs Operating in Conflict Zones and High-Crime Areas. London: RedR. Eguren, Enrique, 2005: Protection Manual for Human Rights Defenders. Dublin: Front Line. The International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders. Fisher, Simon et al., 2000: Working with Conflict. Skills and Strategies for Action. Responding to Conflict (RTC). London: Zed Books. Frieters, Norbert, 2003: Konflikt-Monitoring für Vorhaben der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Eschborn: GTZ. Hasemann, Armin / Hübner-Schmid, Katharina / Dargatz, Anja, 2005: Konfliktanalyse zur Entwicklung von Handlungsoptionen für gesellschaftspolitische Kooperationsprogramme. Ein methodischer Leitfaden. Bonn: FriEnt/FES/GTZ. ( Hasemann, Armin, 2005: Konfliktbezogene Wirkungsbeobachtung, inkl. Konfliktsensitive Planung von gesellschaftspolitischen Kooperationsprojekten. Ein methodischer Leitfaden. Bonn: FES. Hofmann, Birgit, 2006: Checklist zur Bestandsaufnahme und Analyse von Sicherheitssekto-ren in Partnerländern. Eschborn: GTZ. Interministerielles Rahmenkonzept zur Unterstützung von Reformen des Sicherheitssektors in Entwicklungs- und Transformationsländern, 2006, Jackson, Stephen with Siobhan Calthrop, 2002: Making Sense of Unstable Contexts. Tools for Analysis and Action. World Vision. John Hopkins University, Conflict Management Tools, 38

39 Leonhardt, Manuela, 2001: Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and Management. A Practical Guideline. Eschborn: GTZ Leonhardt, Manuela, 2001: Conflict Impact Assessment for Development Projects. A Practical Guideline. Eschborn: GTZ. Litsch, Elisabeth Maria / Linsenmayr, Rainer, 2006: Wenn Wissen Leben retten kann Gewalt und Gefahren gewachsen sein. Ein praktischer Ratgeber für den Auslandseinsatz. Eschborn: GTZ. Introduction Lorenz, Kathrin, 2005: Recommendations for Contract and Cooperation Management to Ensure the Conflict-Sensitive Design and Steering of TC Projects and Programmes. A Guideline. Eschborn: GTZ. OECD/DAC, 1999: Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies. OECD/DAC, 2002: Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management. Paris: DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation. OECD/DAC, forthcoming: Guidelines for Conflict-Sensitive Impact Assessment. OECD/DAC, 2007: Handbook on Security System Reform. Supporting Security and Justice. Paris: OECD. Paffenholz, Thania, 2004: Designing Transformation and Intervention Processes. p in: Austin, Alex / Fischer, Martina / Ropers, Norbert (eds.), Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict. The Berghof Handbook. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Paffenholz, Thania, 2005: Third-Generation PCIA. Introducing the Planning and Assessment Approach for Conflict Zones. Berlin: Berghof Handbook. Paffenholz, Thania / Reychler, Luc, 2007: Aid for Peace, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Rothman, Jay, 2004: Action Evaluation. Berlin: Berghof Handbook. Saferworld et al., 2004: Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development Cooperation, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding. A Resource Pack. London. Scherg, Nina, 2004: Leitfaden zur krisenpräventiven Portfoliogestaltung. Eschborn: GTZ. SDC, Monitoring entwicklungsrelevanter Veränderungen (MERV) SDC, 2005: Conflict-Sensitive Program Management in International Cooperation. Mainstreaming the Prevention of Violence. Bern. SIDA, 2004: Conflict-Sensitive Development Cooperation. How to Conduct a Conflict Analysis. Stockholm: SIDA. Sprenger, Dirk / Kruk, Gabriele, 2005: Basic Principles of Crisis Prevention, Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding. Course Concept and Training Module for Decision-Makers and Experts in German Development Cooperation. Bonn/Eschborn: BMZ/GTZ. UNDP / World Bank, 2004: Practical Guide to Post-Conflict Needs Assessment. New York/Washington DC. UNDP / World Bank, 2005: An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices Using Results-Based Frameworks in Fragile States. New York / Washington DC. UNDG ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues, 2004: Inter-Agency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Transition Situations. New York. USAID, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, 2004: Conducting a Conflict Assessment. A Framework for Analysis and Program Development. Washington DC. VENRO, 2003: Mindeststandards für die Personalsicherheit in der humanitären Hilfe. Bonn: VENRO. Wils, Oliver et al., 2006: Systemische Konflikttransformation. Konzept und Anwendungsgebiete. Berlin: Berghof Foundation for Peace Support. Zupan, Natascha, 2005: Methoden der Evaluation im Konfliktkontext. FriEnt Briefing Nr. 3. Bonn. Websites (database containing evaluation reports on humanitarian aid, often in conflict situations) (PCIA dialogue series) (CPR Network: Compendium of Operational Tools for Peacebuilding) (database containing international tools for conflict analysis, conflict-sensitive project planning and conflict-related impact monitoring / OECD DAC Evaluation Resource Centre; contains approx. 50 peace- and conflict-related evaluation reports by international donors) 39

40

41 Peace and Conflict Assessment Element 1a Peace and Conflict Analysis Schritt Element 1a+1b PCA Element 1a: Element 2: Element 3: Element 4: Introduction Peace and Conflict Analysis (CA) Element 1b: Peacebuilding Needs (PBN) Peace and Conflict- Related Relevance Assessment Risk Management Peace and Conflict- Related Impact Monitoring

42 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations BMZ CA CPR Network DC DFID German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development Peace and Conflict Analysis Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network Development Cooperation Department for International Development (GB) Element 1a DNH FAO GIEWS GIGA Do No Harm Food and Agriculture Organisation (UN) Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture (FAO) German Institute of Global and Area Studies (formerly the German Overseas Institute) GTZ ICG IGAD INCORE IOM IPS NEWS NGO OCHA OMS PBN PCA PCIA PIHRE RTC SDC SIDA UN UNHCR USAID WHO Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit International Crisis Group Intergovernmental Authority on Development International Conflict Research International Organisation for Migration Inter Press Service Nexus of Early Warning Systems (The International Famine Centre) Non-Governmental Organisation Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN) World Health Organisation (Organisation mondiale de la Santé) Peacebuilding Needs Peace and Conflict Assessment Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Partners in Human Rights Education Responding to Conflict Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency United Nations United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United States Agency for International Development World Health Organisation 42

43 Table of Contents 1. Task Definition and Application What is the peace and conflict analysis? What does the peace and conflict analysis do? Applications of the peace and conflict analysis Country level portfolio adjustment Planning a new project/programme or adjusting an existing one Baseline for risk management: identifying relevant areas for DC-relevant context monitoring at country or project/programme level Peace and conflict analysis as an instrument for conflict management/transformation Practical Implementation of a Peace and Conflict Analysis Conducting a peace and conflict analysis at country level Conducting a peace and conflict analysis at project/programme level 49 Element 1a 3. Basic Elements of the Peace and Conflict Analysis Conflict profile Stakeholder analysis Factors for peace and for conflict Conflict dynamics and scenarios 56 Annexes Annex 1: Peace and Conflict Analysis Tools 58 Annex 2: Extract from the Peace and Conflict Analysis for Colombia 60 Annex 3: Sources of Information on Conflict Countries 62 Annex 4: Bibliography and Further Reading 64 Index of boxes and tables Box 1: Elements of a development-policy peace and conflict analysis 46 Box 2: Peace and conflict analysis at country level 47 Box 3: Peace and conflict analysis and C marker classification 47 Box 4: Key questions for the peace and conflict analysis 51 Box 5: Key questions for the conflict profile 51 Box 6: Stakeholder analysis in the security sector 52 Box 7: Target groups, partners and mediators 53 Box 8: Key questions for the stakeholder analysis 54 Box 9: Key questions for analysing the factors for peace and for conflict 56 Box 10: Key questions for the trend and scenario analysis 56 Table 1: Using the peace and conflict analysis in PCA 44 Table 2: Roles and tasks in a peace and conflict analysis at country level 48 Table 3: Roles and tasks in a peace and conflict analysis at project/programme level 50 Table 4: Interlocutors for the stakeholder analysis 53 Table 5: Scenario analysis 57 43

44 Summary: Results of the Peace and Conflict Analysis The peace and conflict analysis (CA) forms the basis for all further elements of the Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA). It analyses the conflict inter alia by describing the causes, actors, trends and scenarios, and relating these aspects to development cooperation (DC). The table below shows where the results of the CA are used within the PCA. Table 1: Using the peace and conflict analysis in PCA Element 1a Results of the peace and conflict analysis Conflict profile Peace and conflict stakeholders Used in the following elements/steps of PCA implementation Identifying the need for action and corresponding options by DC and other actors with respect to the conflict situation Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring Defining the peacebuilding needs Conflict-sensitive selection of partners and target groups Risk management Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring Factors for peace and for conflict Scenarios Defining the peacebuilding needs Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring Context monitoring Risk management Security analysis Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring 44

45 1. Task Definition and Application Element 1a Objective Key questions Peace and conflict analysis Gain a deeper understanding of the peace and conflict context Which conflicts are constraining the development of the country / the project region? Who is involved in them? What are their causes? How do they evolve? Procedure Areas of application Conflict profile Stakeholder analysis Analysis of factors for peace and for conflict Trends and scenarios Context analysis Risk management Regular monitoring of the cooperation environment Element 1a 1.1. What is the peace and conflict analysis? Conflict analysis is an ongoing process in which a conflict situation often comprising many conflicts is analysed in order to identify and better understand the situation in all its complexity. (Sprenger/Kruk 2005) Peace and conflict analyses (CAs) have long been conducted in non-development contexts by numerous actors and for various reasons. Diplomatic representations, security services, political foundations, academic institutions, and international and national NGOs monitor political developments at the national level. The majority of these analyses focus on the political and military level of the conflict scenario. These analyses, however, usually pay little or no attention to locally confined conflicts, long-term factors influencing the conflict, and civil society actors that are of special importance for development cooperation (DC). Studies of this kind offer only limited guidance for DC action. Development-policy actors therefore require supplementary studies/analyses to complement the CA available from other institutions. Within the scope of German national DC, the conflict section of the brief politico-economic analysis will include a DC orientation framework. From 2008 onward, this will be prepared on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) for all partner countries by the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA formerly known as the German Overseas Institute). One section will include a brief CA for countries with a heightened or acute crisis potential. Where crisis prevention is the subject of special attention in a country or region, more in-depth analyses with specific focuses (e.g. a sector) will be necessary and will have to be prepared. 45

46 A development-policy CA will focus on those social and political conflicts that impact negatively on a country's development and may (potentially) become violent. Box 1: Elements of a development-policy peace and conflict analysis definition of the (substantial, social, geographic) areas of conflict stakeholder analysis issues Element 1a causes of the conflict (primary causes, secondary causes and factors that prolong the conflict) course of conflict (history, current dynamics) previous attempts to manage the conflict and their impacts structures and processes that reduce the conflict (e.g. institutions for constructive conflict management, traditional forms of conflict management) trends and scenarios Source: Sprenger/Kruk What does the peace and conflict analysis do? The more conflicts escalate, the more difficult it becomes for both those involved and outsiders to maintain an independent view of the conflict and identify points of entry for constructive solutions. The CA supports both external and internal actors in broadening their own perspective on the conflict and avoiding onesided value judgements. This is important in order for actors to be able to recognise their own scope for action and its limitations, to set the right priorities and to avoid mistakes. A CA is also needed in order to identify and minimise security risks. It further helps actors assess possible trends in the conflict, and act with foresight. It thus forms the basis for conflict-sensitive planning of strategies and actions. (see Sprenger/Kruk 2005) 1.3. Applications of the peace and conflict analysis Country level portfolio adjustment A one-off, detailed CA forms the basis for reviewing and adjusting a country portfolio in relation to peacebuilding. It identifies areas of conflict in the DC environment, and analyses their causes, dynamics and impacts. On the basis of this deeper understanding of the conflict situation, the peacebuilding vision that development cooperation seeks to help bring about in the partner country can be formulated, and those areas where changes would be needed for this (the peacebuilding needs / PBN) can be identified. The CA also provides a framework for assessing the relevance of existing or planned priority areas and development interventions, and for assessing possible risks that existing conflicts may pose for DC. Finally, the CA serves as a frame of reference for monitoring the peace and conflict-related DC impacts. Within the scope of conflict-sensitive portfolio steering, the CA should be updated at appropriate intervals, to be determined by the dynamics of the respective conflict situation. A first rough orientation can be obtained by studying the conflict factors and PBN described in the brief politico-economic analysis, but often a more in-depth analysis will be required. 46

47 Box 2: Peace and conflict analysis at country level Peacebuilding as a in-depth CA priority area (structures, actors, dynamics, scenarios) Peacebuilding as a brief analysis based on secondary sources cross-cutting issue (e.g. existing studies) and interviews Planning a new project/programme or adjusting an existing one The planning of a new project/programme or adjustment of an existing one in a conflict region requires the country level CA to be supplemented by a description of the specific local and sectoral causes, actors and dynamics of the conflict. This information provides starting points inter alia for the conflict-sensitive selection of project personnel, target groups and partners, the conflict-sensitive design and implementation of individual measures, and conflict-related risk management. The CA also serves as a baseline study for peace and conflictrelated impact monitoring. Element 1a Box 3: Peace and conflict analysis and C marker classification C1, C2 projects/programmes in-depth sector-specific CA C0 projects/programmes brief analysis of the local conflict situation based on the do no harm approach (DNH, connectors/ dividers, escalating/deescalating factors, actors) Baseline for risk management: identifying relevant areas for DC-relevant context monitoring at country or project/programme level In conflict situations, monitoring of the development-policy environment an instrument that is increasingly being used for project/programme and country portfolio monitoring in DC should incorporate conflict-specific aspects. In relatively stable situations a six-monthly update of the CA may suffice. Where rapid political developments take place, monthly to three-monthly analyses may be appropriate, while in acute situations (e.g. coup, acute unrest) the situation should even be monitored on a weekly basis (see Guideline 3 for further details) Peace and conflict analysis as an instrument for conflict management/ transformation A CA conducted jointly with representatives of the parties to the conflict can serve as an instrument for conflict management, provided that a methodical approach is pursued which places the discussion between the two sides on an objective footing, creates improved mutual understanding and familiarises the parties to the conflict with various models for conflict resolution. This presupposes, however, that the parties to the conflict already possess a certain degree of mutual trust and willingness to engage in dialogue. A joint CA requires sound preparation and professional moderation, and should be integrated into a long-term process of cooperation with the parties to the conflict. DC organisations have used the joint CA successfully at the local level to address low-level conflicts. 47

48 2. Practical Implementation of a Peace and Conflict Analysis 2.1. Conducting a peace and conflict analysis at country level Element 1a The conflict section of the brief politico-economic analysis provides a first orientation system for each country. Given the very brief and general nature of the description provided in this analysis, either BMZ or an implementing organisation in close consultation with BMZ may commission a more in-depth developmentpolicy CA at country level. In view of the scope and complexity of the task, national CAs are usually assigned to a team of external consultants. A combination of country experts with development practitioners plus international and national consultants has proven a successful model here. For detailed information and materials on a CA at country level, see the publication Konfliktanalyse für gesellschaftliche Kooperationsprogramme (Hasemann/Hübner-Schmid/Dargatz 2005, currently only available in German). CAs at country level are designed to create a binding analytical basis to serve as a frame of reference for the conflict-sensitive design of future DC. Ownership of the CA by the concerned DC actors on the ground is especially important here. If within the framework of an in-depth analysis first strategic decisions or provisional value judgements and recommendations are made, it becomes especially important to ensure that this occurs jointly with the various actors in-country in a structured process. Depending on the respective country context it may be especially important for later processes to ensure that the issue of conducting a CA be raised by BMZ at government level, for instance within the scope of government negotiations or consultations. Table 2: Roles and tasks in a peace and conflict analysis at country level Responsible Client (BMZ) Role/tasks Initiates and diffuses the discussion of the results of the brief politicoeconomic analysis, and especially of its conflict section Decides on the possible need for a more in-depth analysis Initiates and commissions the in-depth CA, evaluates its results and supports their implementation Authorises the CA and makes it binding for the work of the implementing organisations May discuss the results with the partner government within the scope of government consultations/negotiations Involves the German Embassy In-country representation of the implementing organisation (e.g. GTZ country director) Appointed officer of implementing organisation or consultants (When an in-depth CA is initiated by BMZ) Responsible for implementation and quality assurance of in-depth CA, supported by sectoral divisions of the implementing organisation Involve other German and possibly international actors in-country Where appropriate, may provide German Embassy with advance information concerning implementation Delegate implementation and evaluation of the analyses to staff or external consultants 48

49 Head Office of the implementing organisation (When an in-depth CA is initiated by BMZ) Provides professional support for the entire process, prepares and finalises the Terms of Reference, discusses the Terms with BMZ and the foreign representation of the implementing organisation Discusses the conclusions of the CA and options for action with BMZ External consultants Provide conceptual support, and may perform practical implementation of the CA Stakeholders German Embassy Moderate the discussion and follow-up process Supports the CA, may also be appropriate to include the embassy in the discussion and finalisation of the Terms of Reference Element 1a German DC organisations in-country and at head offices Provide conceptual inputs to the CA, and to the conclusions and recommendations Provide information and contacts Bi- and multilateral donors Government/partner(s) Provide information and contacts Provide feedback on the results of the CA Intern. and nat. NGOs Research institutes Where possible, representatives of the parties to the conflict Alongside the regular updating of the conflict section of the brief politico-economic analysis, a number of institutions such as the International Crisis Group (ICG) now publish regular analyses of key conflict countries. These reports provide a sound basis for assessment of the conflict situation by BMZ or the implementing organisations. However, since the focus of these reports especially those of the ICG is on the macropolitical level, supplementary studies based on these are sometimes required for DC-relevant aspects. Helpful information on integrating the CA into the monitoring of the development-policy environment can be found in the guideline Konfliktmonitoring für Vorhaben der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (Frieters 2003, currently only available in German) Conducting a peace and conflict analysis at project/programme level CAs at project/programme level focus on the respective (geographical) environment and priority area of specific development interventions. Here, the knowledge of local and international staff, partners, intermediaries and target groups is of major importance. In addition, the perspectives of various local actors should also be included. This can occur either through one-on-one interviews or in group discussions, or within the scope of a moderated workshop. 49

50 Table 3: Roles and tasks in a peace and conflict analysis at project/programme level Responsible Officer responsible for contracts and cooperation (e.g. programme manager) Role/tasks Initiates the CA, prepares the Terms of Reference, identifies team to conduct the CA, quality assurance Utilises the results of the CA Element 1a In-country representation of the implementing organisation (e.g. GTZ country director) Sectoral division of the implementing organisation External consultants Is kept informed on implementation at project/programme level, and where appropriate utilises the results of the CA for the entire portfolio Where appropriate (e.g. in politically highly sensitive regions or sectors) discusses implementation with German Embassy Provides professional support, possibly makes initial recommendation to conduct a CA Provide professional support and may provide practical implementation of the CA Stakeholders May moderate the discussion and follow-up process Project/programme personnel Partners/intermediaries Target groups Other DC organisations in the region of intervention Local civil society Research institutes Moderate representatives of the parties to the conflict May participate in data survey and analysis Discuss conclusions and recommendations of the analysis Support data survey Provide feedback on results of the CA Provide conceptual inputs to CA and to the formulation of conclusions and recommendations Provide information and contacts 3. Basic Elements of the Peace and Conflict Analysis It is the CA s task to identify conflicts and explain them such that possible approaches can be developed to handle them constructively. Conflict situations are often comprised of several overlapping conflicts of varying levels of intensity. These conflicts can unfold on various levels, among changing social groups and in different sectors. The CA therefore begins by identifying the lines of conflict that exist within a country or a region. Subsequently, the CA analyses the actors involved, the causes and the course of the conflict. To identify possible measures to reduce these conflicts, the analysis also covers the existing structures and processes for conflict management, the options for action by "actors for peace", and external factors that promote peace. A balanced analysis will not only focus on the "negative" factors and actors, but will also consciously seek out positive potentials. This is the reason why the term "peace and conflict analysis" is preferred in this guideline. 50

51 Only rarely do individual factors or actors exclusively either exacerbate or reduce the conflict. Groups often do not act homogeneously, and some members hold more moderate positions. Conflict actors also change their position in the course of the conflict, and adopt new roles. Under changed geopolitical conditions, individual warlords may see an advantage in pushing for peace talks. Elections are often seen as a means of peaceful settlement of interests, although under unfavourable conditions they can also trigger political crises and conflicts. Thus, in the CA, it is important to achieve a dynamic understanding of the course of the conflict by focusing special attention on the interrelationships between the conflict actors, various factors influencing the conflict, the conflict itself and the wider context. Box 4: Key questions for the peace and conflict analysis In which regions and/or sectors do tensions or dissatisfaction currently exist? What are the core problems and major lines of conflict? Element 1a Who are the relevant groups of actors in relation to these lines of conflict and core problems? Which goals are they pursuing? What power and resources do they possess? Which conflict resolution bodies and mechanisms exist at the governmental and non-governmental levels? How are these utilised? Are they seen as legitimate and useful for regulating the conflict? Which role does international DC play as an actor in this conflict? How is it perceived? Which scenarios for future development (6 months 5 years) are conceivable? What comprises the greatest potential for conflict? What comprises the greatest potential for peace? Source: Hasemann/Hübner-Schmid/Dargatz 2005 For an example of a CA (Colombia), see Annex Conflict profile The conflict profile aims to define the temporal, spatial and substantial boundaries of the conflict or conflict situation that DC faces or wishes to affect. Given the large number of overlapping conflicts this profiling is necessary in order to define the object of the CA and make it manageable. At the same time the conflict profile enables planners to outline the scale and significance of the conflict, and thus assess the need for action and the corresponding options for DC. In order to better identify the scale of the conflict and the need for action, it is possible to conduct a baseline threat and risk analysis for instance for the security sector, which is itself often an important conflict actor (see below). An extensive list of tools for this first step of a Security Sector Assessment is contained in the Checklist zur Bestandsaufnahme und Analyse von Sicherheitssektoren in Partnerländern, Hofmann, GTZ, Eschborn 2006 (currently only available in German). Box 5: Key questions for the conflict profile Which regions of the country are politically unstable or display a high level of violence? Where is the violent conflict located? Which conflict do we mean precisely? Which issues are at stake in this conflict? What are the main lines of conflict in the region/sector/country? 51

52 At which levels is the conflict fought out (local, regional, national, international)? Are different conflicts overlapping on various levels? Do the lines of conflict cut across different levels? What form does the conflict take? Which means are employed by which party? What is the present scale of the conflict (dead, injured, displaced)? How has the conflict evolved to date (stages of escalation, attempts at resolution)? What are the political, economic, social and humanitarian consequences of the conflict? Element 1a Is there also a high level of violence independently of the conflict? 3.2. Stakeholder analysis The stakeholder analysis analyses those groups that influence or are affected by the identified conflict constellation. It seeks to identify the positions of the respective stakeholders, their networks and their respective scope for influencing the conflict, as well as their tendencies to either pursue violence or work for a peaceful resolution. Key parameters here are the identity of the respective actors, their interest in the issues at stake, and their power and (potential) influence over the conflict. The stakeholder analysis should identify points of entry and partners for peacebuilding measures. A development-oriented stakeholder analysis might draw a rough distinction between the following stakeholder groups (see SIDA 2004): a) Stakeholders with power and influence over the conflict: This group includes actors who possess formal or informal power in society, especially commanders in the security services (armed forces, secret service, police force the security sector as a whole is generally a particularly powerful actor able to exercise great Box 6: Stakeholder analysis in the security sector The Security Sector Assessment offers a specific set of tools for conducting a stakeholder analysis for the security sector. A checklist to identify the stakeholders and analyse their power relations can be found in: Hofmann, Birgit, 2006: Checklist zur Bestandsaufnahme und Analyse von Sicherheitssektoren in Partnerländern. Eschborn: GTZ, p. 6 f. (currently only available in German). influence, often playing a key role in conflicts), representatives of stakeholders wielding political power (government, political parties), representatives of stakeholders wielding economic power (landowners, major entrepreneurs, international enterprises, trade unions), and representatives of stakeholders wielding social power (churches, media, councils of elders, women's groups). b) Stakeholders with potential influence over the conflict: These actors can play an important role in peaceful conflict resolution, but are often unorganised and therefore difficult to identify. They include youth, women, landless peasants and civil society groups. c) Stakeholders that are especially exposed to or affected by the conflict ( vulnerable groups ): Poor and marginal groups are more vulnerable to violent conflicts than the well-off middle and upper classes, who have more options for escaping the violence. These include among others women, children, the elderly, the injured and the disabled, the rural population, slum dwellers, groups who suffer religious or ethnic discrimination, and the displaced. Some of these can be easily mobilised and recruited for certain political purposes (including the forced recruitment of child soldiers). At the same time, these groups are also the traditional DC target groups. d) External stakeholders: External stakeholders such as refugees, diaspora groups, neighbouring states and regional powers wield considerable influence over "intra-state" conflicts. External intervention or the spill-over of violence into neighbouring states can cause regionalised conflicts in which movements of 52

53 weapons, armed forces, refugees and valuable raw materials are no longer determined by national boundaries. In these situations it is also necessary to take into account the interests of multilateral (e.g. UN), regional (e.g. Intergovernmental Authority on Development / IGAD) and private organisations (e.g. NGOs), as well as those of bilateral donors. On the basis of the stakeholder analysis, a subsequent step will seek to identify the role of the target groups and partners of DC as actors in the conflict, thus shedding light on this aspect of the interrelationship between DC and conflict. Box 7: Target groups, partners and mediators Target groups DC target groups can generally be aligned directly or indirectly with either one of the parties to the conflict. Particularly in conflicts which have been going on for a longer period, almost everybody takes sides because they are personally affected. Partners and mediators Partners and mediators in crisis prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding are also often internal actors and have some sort of relation to the parties to the conflict. They can, however, also be regional and international organisations or NGOs. Element 1a Source: BMZ sector strategy 2005:16 Table 4: Contacts/actors for the stakeholder analysis Level Sector Contacts/actors Remarks National level policy-making government and parliament political parties federal/local representatives justice judges lawyers' associations local arbitrators traditional justice (e.g. elders) human rights organisations 1. balanced mix of governmental and non-governmental representatives 2. broad spectrum of opinions, various political positions security business civil society armed forces security services and police force human rights organisations international human rights organisations economic policy-makers public/private-sector actors professional/trade associations trade unions associations, networks media universities religious organisations grass-roots organisations 3. include regional and local perspectives and value judgements (urban/rural), balanced relationship between age groups and genders 4. include sectors relevant to the conflict 53

54 International level German and EU representations key bilateral donors multilateral donors and donor coordination mechanisms observer missions, peacekeepers (where present) early warning and risk assessment mechanisms Element 1a Both levels political analysts with a profound knowledge of the local situation and long-term vision Source: adapted after Hasemann/Hübner-Schmid/Dargatz 2005 Box 8: Key questions for the stakeholder analysis obtain various political positions Who are the key stakeholders in the conflict? What are their vested interests? What power and resource base do they have at their disposal? What relationships exist between the conflict stakeholders? What are the key conflict issues at stake between the stakeholders? What commonalities exist between the conflict stakeholders? Which stakeholders are willing to use violence or are already doing so? Do they expect to gain economic or political benefits from this? Which stakeholders are trying to remain neutral or to resist violent conflict? What are their visions for peace? What scope do they have for influencing the situation? How do insecurity and fear influence the way the conflict is fought out? Which roles do men and women play in the conflict? What are their specific needs, interests and (potential) strengths? How are vulnerable groups affected by the conflict? Which position do they occupy in the conflict? How do they survive within the conflict? How do they participate in the conflict? What are their visions for peace? Which stakeholders also use violence outside the conflict? Who does this affect? 54

55 3.3. Factors for peace and for conflict Factors for peace and for conflict are those structures and processes that either lead to violent conflict or can help promote peaceful co-existence. Understanding these factors can help identify points of entry for peacebuilding measures later on. Three categories of factors for conflict can be distinguished: a) Root causes are a necessary precondition for the emergence of violent conflict, though in themselves are not a sufficient condition. Root causes are usually static and change only very slowly. They include poverty, economic inequality, a lack of political participation, human rights violations, impunity and scarce natural resources. In rare cases ethnicity or religious differences can be the causes of conflicts. Usually, though, religious or ethnic allegiance is a factor for instrumentalisation and mobilisation and therefore not a cause, but rather an accelerator. b) Accelerators reinforce the root causes and can lead to violent conflict. These factors include competition for power and influence, inadequate institutions and processes for conflict management, and access to weapons. An important role is also played here by the mobilisation strategies of the parties to the conflict. Element 1a c) Factors prolonging the conflict: In longer-lasting conflicts the root causes become less and less important. The conflict gathers its own momentum and becomes a self-reproducing system. New factors for conflict emerge that often form circular chains of impact. These include economic and political advantages gained from the conflict by individual actors (war economies), dynamics of honour and revenge, and mistrust and fear of the opponent ("security dilemma"). The factors for peace can also be broken down into three categories: a) De-escalation structures and processes (connectors): These factors can include a stable macroeconomic situation, functioning democratic structures, historic links between the parties to the conflict, the joint recognition of religious authorities, international sanctioning regimes against war criminals, and constructive engagement by third states. b) Capacities and institutions for conflict management: Institutions and processes for conflict management exist at various levels and in various degrees of formalisation. They range from councils of elders, ombudspersons, arbitration and mediation bodies, the national legal system and security sector, through to truth commissions and the International War Crimes Tribunal. These help build peaceful co-existence by regulating the conflict. To achieve this, however, all sections of the population must have equal access to these institutions, and perceive their decisions as legitimate and just. c) Conflict management initiatives: It is most important here to be familiar with and support current efforts for conflict transformation such as mediation activities by third states, civil society initiatives, ceasefire agreements, peace negotiations, demobilisation processes and elections. Corresponding local conflict management initiatives should also be taken into account here. Having identified the factors for peace and for conflict, the next step is to identify the peacebuilding needs (see Guideline 1b). To this end the relationships between the individual factors, as well as key problems, are identified using tools such as the conflict tree, the force field analysis or the "paper computer" (see Annex 1 for an overview of analytic tools). 55

56 Box 9: Key questions for analysing the factors for peace and for conflict Which long-term, structural factors can lead to tensions and conflicts? How do these factors interact? Which medium- and short-term factors contribute to an escalation of the conflict? How do they mutually reinforce each other? Which factors help maintain the existing violent conflict? Which impact and reaction chains ( vicious circles ) can be identified here? Element 1a Which structural factors are conducive to peaceful coexistence? Which formal and informal structures and processes for peaceful conflict management exist? Which medium- and short-term factors help de-escalate the conflict? How do these affect the accelerating factors? 3.4. Conflict dynamics and scenarios The scenario analysis describes various possible courses of the conflict, and identifies corresponding options for action. This supports the long-term planning of development organisations in unstable areas, and promotes flexible responses to extraordinary circumstances. The scenario analysis forecasts future trends on the basis of an extrapolation of the dynamics between the parties to the conflict, and current developments in the long-, medium- and short-term factors for peace and for conflict. Depending on the strength ascribed to the respective factors, various scenarios can be obtained. The following factors have proven successful in forecasting future conflict trends (see Department for International Development / DFID 2002): structural vulnerability of a society to violent conflicts (due to the presence of structural factors for conflict / root causes) political and economic advantages that elite groups can gain from instability and violence, and the vested interest of these groups in continuing the conflict instead of creating peace capacity of a society to contain or manage conflicts constructively. Alternatively the tool of force field analysis (see Annex 1) can be used to determine the respective importance of the various factors for peace and for conflict, and their possible interactions with other factors. Box 10: Key questions for the trend and scenario analysis What are the current trends in the key factors for peace and for conflict? How are the relationships between the parties to the conflict developing? Which actors are gaining influence, which are losing influence? Which tendencies are evident in the general level of violence within the society? Are peace initiatives gaining significance, or losing momentum? What might trigger a further escalation or a de-escalation of the current conflict situation? 56

57 A scenario analysis requires the following steps: 1. Define the time frame for which the scenarios are to be produced (usually between 6 months and 5 years) 2. Describe three alternative scenarios (1. best case, 2. middle case (sometimes also referred to as the most likely case), 3. worst case) in approximately 50 words, based on the analysis of the long-term trends in the factors for peace and for conflict 3. Define indicators to measure the realisation of the respective scenarios, or describe events that would mark their realisation 4. Describe the strategic objective in the respective scenarios (approx. 50 words), i.e. how can the organisation make a positive contribution under the given circumstances. For the worst case scenario it may also be necessary to incorporate contingency plans, e.g. to cover the eventuality of an escalation in the violent conflict. Element 1a Table 5: Scenario analysis Scenarios and objectives Scenario Best Case Describe the best possible scenario (clear improvement in the respective situation), as well as the assumptions on which the scenario is based. Objective Optimum objective Describe how DC can proactively support the emerging positive trends. Indicators Middle case / most likely case Describe a scenario in which the current situation remains essentially the same. Indicators Worst case Describe the worst possible scenario (clear deterioration in the present situation), as well as the assumptions on which the scenario is based. Indicators Status quo objective Describe how DC can positively influence the given circumstances where these are likely to remain essentially unchanged. Minimum objective Describe how DC should respond to a deterioration in the conflict and security situation, and how it can make a positive contribution under these circumstances. Define criteria for discontinuation. Source: CPR Network

58 Summary: Results of the peace and conflict analysis The CA forms the basis for all further elements of the PCA. It analyses the conflict inter alia by describing the causes, actors, trends and scenarios, and relating these aspects to DC. The table below shows where the results of the CA are used within the PCA. Using the peace and conflict analysis in the PCA Results of the peace and conflict analysis Used in the following elements/steps of PCA implementation Element 1a Conflict profile Peace and conflict stakeholders Identifying the need for action and corresponding options by DC and other actors with respect to the conflict situation Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring Defining the peacebuilding needs Conflict-sensitive selection of partners and target groups Factors for peace and for conflict Scenarios Risk management Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring Defining the peacebuilding needs Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring Risk management Security management Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring Annex 1: Peace and Conflict Analysis Tools Overview of peace and conflict analysis tools Steps of peace and conflict analysis Tools Sources 1. Conflict profile Timeline: the key events of a conflict are listed chronologically along a timeline. Conflict phases: tool to identify phases and cycles of escalation and de-escalation of the conflict, in order to locate the present situation in the overall course of the conflict. Conflict arena (geographical CA): supports spatial analysis of the conflict. Fisher et al., Responding to Conflict (RTC) 2000 Leonhardt, GTZ, 2001 Fisher et al., RTC 2000 Leonhardt, GTZ, 2001 Leonhardt, GTZ,

59 Threat and risk analysis within the scope of a security sector analysis: toolkit for general analysis of the security situation for the population. Hofmann GTZ, Stakeholder analysis Conflict mapping: produces a graphic representation of the conflict actors, their relationships and the issues at stake. Next to the parties directly involved in the conflict, this also takes account of other groups linked to the parties or able to influence them. Fisher et al., RTC 2000 Leonhardt, GTZ, 2001 Conflict pyramid ("Lederach triangle"): specially suited for analysing the different levels of the conflict, and for identifying strategically placed key figures and institutions that are to be influenced (differentiation between the upper, mid and grass-roots levels). Conflict layer model: consists of concentric circles showing the needs, interests and objectives or positions of the individual parties to the conflict, from the core to the periphery. Fisher et al., RTC 2000 Leonhardt, GTZ, 2001 Fisher, RTC 2000 Leonhardt, GTZ, 2001 Element 1a Analysis of actors and power in the security sector: identifies the actors and institutions relevant to the security sector by taking account of their power bases and relationships. Needs and fears mapping: Each actor's interests, expectations, needs, fears and potentials are entered in a table to provide an overview and allow comparisons to be made. Hofmann, GTZ, 2006 SDC Analysis of factors for peace and for conflict 4. Conflict dynamics and scenarios Conflict tree: core problem is identified, and causes and results are ascribed to it. Conflict pillars: to identify factors that sustain a conflict situation and make peaceful resolution more difficult, and identify scope for a development organisation to weaken, eliminate or give a positive role to these factors. Paper computer (grid): systematic discussion and evaluation of the mutual dependency of influencing factors within a system. Force field analysis: looks at one single objective, such as the holding of democratic elections, and estimates the strength of the forces (e.g. radical parties) which will support or obstruct the project. Trend analysis: to analyse key factors assumed to influence the course of the conflict. Scenario analysis: to outline the best, middle and worst-case scenarios, in order to define realistic objectives for projects. Fisher et. al, RTC 2000 Leonhardt, GTZ, 2001 Fisher et al., RTC 2000 Leonhardt, GTZ, 2001 GTZ 1996 Fisher et al., RTC 2000 Leonhardt, GTZ, 2001 DfID 2002 CPR Network

60 Further reading CPR Network, 2005: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) Handbook. ( DFID, 2002: Conducting a Strategic Conflict Assessment. London. Fisher, Simon et al., 2000: Working with Conflict. Skills and Strategies for Action. Responding to Conflict (RTC). London: Zed Books. Hofmann, Birgit, 2006: Checklist zur Bestandsaufnahme und Analyse von Sicherheitssekto-ren in Partnerländern. Eschborn: GTZ. Jackson, Stephen with Siobhan Calthrop, 2002: Making Sense of Unstable Contexts. Tools for Analysis and Action. World Vision. Element 1a Leonhardt, Manuela, 2001: Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and Management. A Practical Guideline. Eschborn: GTZ ( SDC, 2005: Conflict-Sensitive Programme Management in International Cooperation. Mainstreaming the Prevention of Violence. Bern. ( resource_en_24650.pdf) SDC, 2006: Conflict Analysis Tools. ( For further literature see Annex 4: Bibliography and Further Reading. Annex 2: Extract from the Peace and Conflict Analysis for Colombia Causes of the conflict Social and economic disparity has remained a "breeding ground" for various forms of violence in recent years, despite positive macroeconomic growth rates. The figures for social inequality in Colombia are among the highest in Latin America 62% of the population are considered poor. The situation in rural areas in particular has deteriorated, because the current government is mainly focusing on large-scale strategic projects and largely ignoring the interests of the rural population. The government's economic policy is primarily geared to free trade and large-scale projects, which at least in the short to medium term is tending to worsen the social situation. Over the last ten years, the counter-reform in the agricultural sector (buying-up of land by drug barons, extensive utilisation etc.) has undermined all constructive efforts, which already lacked conviction. As a result, slums in the urban centres are continuing to grow. Weak state institutions and their lack of orientation toward the common good have historically led to the state intervening in conflicts over social inequality if it intervenes at all always in favour of the status quo. This has changed little in recent years. The policy of "democratic security" benefited chiefly the inhabitants of the large and medium-sized cities, making these locations even more attractive to migrants and exacerbating the social problems there. Despite having strengthened the capacities for state repression, the current government is at the same time pursuing a worrying "de-institutionalisation" of political processes. This is weakening existing institutions (including those of the state), replacing them with direct forms of political action. This is not conducive to good governance, because it hinders transparency and accountability. Historic structures of violence: Colombia has a tradition of high rates of violence. A number of data show a slight decline in violence (above all in the murder rate) in recent years. Yet this finding is not undisputed. There is evidence that numerous crimes are no longer being reported, and that paramilitary groups have changed their strategy such that they no longer carry out massacres according to the current definition of the term, but instead kill people "step by step". It is also not certain whether the guerrillas really have been significantly weakened militarily, or whether they are not merely adapting strategically to the current situation and waiting for a more opportune moment. 60

61 Dynamics of the conflict The key dynamics of the conflict in Colombia are: Drug cultivation and trade: The prevailing positive current view, especially among the US authorities, is that cultivation and trade are being suppressed, and that market prices are rising due to the ensuing scarcity. At the same time, however, there are reports suggesting that cultivation practices are being strongly adapted (e.g. to higher-yielding plants), and that trade continues to flourish. Drug trafficking, which is controlled by armed groups, leads to a symbiosis of different forms of violence, making civil conflict transformation more difficult. The spread of networks involving criminal and legal elites is receiving too little attention. The most recent studies provide an impressive demonstration of how this development works, and how far it reaches. Given their links to violent actors, these networks seriously threaten to spoil efforts to transform the conflict. The growing involvement of external actors, especially the USA: The role of the USA in the conflict is ambivalent. On the one hand, the military aid has clearly intervened in the relationship between the various armed groups. On the other hand the conditionality of support imposed by the US Congress has also helped introduce a number of minimum human rights standards. Element 1a When considering the relationship between the government and armed actors, the fact that the two operate within different time frames should not be underestimated. While the government needs to demonstrate positive results within the given legislative period, the armed actors are not subject to this constraint. Against this background the guerrillas can "sit it out" and wait for a change of government, while on the other hand the paramilitary groups may have an interest in capitalising on the current government's willingness to hold talks. Peacebuilding needs Tackle the root causes of the conflict: reduce social inequality, strengthen and promote democratically legitimated and controlled state institutions, dismantle structures of violence and promote cooperative civil structures. Reduce the conflict dynamics: suppress the structures underpinning the war economy, promote alternatives to drug cultivation and trade and reduce demand, promote policy coherence among external actors to ensure minimum human rights standards when dealing with crimes against humanity. Strengthen genuinely civil groups and organisations, and protect and broaden their scope for action: peaceful conflict management presupposes the existence of scope for possible civil action, i.e. the existing freedoms must be protected and broadened (especially with respect to transparency, accountability and democratic controls on elected and mandated representatives, particularly in areas located within the sphere of influence of armed actors.) Build alliances between internal actors committed to civil conflict management: this includes both civil society actors and the promotion of those bodies within the state apparatus and the administration that embody an integrative and democratic approach to politics. 61

62 Risk assessment The role of the Colombian state as an actor in the conflict needs to be recognised and reflected upon more intensively than hitherto: This includes the current trend toward de-institutionalisation, which is rendering efforts to promote good governance by state institutions ineffectual. The polarisation of friend/foe perceptions being reinforced by government supporters is making it more difficult to build trust and cooperation between the state and civil society, which is a core DC objective. Element 1a The promotion of large-scale strategic projects as part of the government's economic policy is reinforcing social disparity. International DC should not be used merely to cushion the social impacts of this policy. With regard to cooperation with civil society actors, the question arises of how civil Colombian civil society actually is. The length of the conflict has led to a situation in which various elements within society have either taken sides or have to tolerate armed actors. Supporters of the armed actors also often proclaim that they represent the interests of civil society (e.g. large landowners). The meaning of the term "civil society" in this context therefore needs to be defined more closely. Cooperation with organs of the state in those regions controlled by armed groups needs to be reflected upon in light of the fact that power in these areas is shared between the state and paramilitary groups. Here, the existence of different "rules of play" and logics create a number of problems. DC therefore needs to ask itself how participation can take place in such a climate of fear and intimidation, and how transparency, accountability and an orientation toward the common good can be promoted in such contexts. Source: adapted and abridged after Sabine Kurtenbach, Conflict Analysis for Colombia Update (2006) Annex 3: Sources of Information on Conflict Countries Specialised websites FAO Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) INCORE Ethnic Conflict Archive International Crisis Group International Committee of the Red Cross International Famine Centre, Famine NEWS Relief Web UNHCR News USAID Famine Early Warning System WHO/OMS Emergency and Humanitarian Action World Food Programme Centre for Security Sector Management SaferWorld

63 Media sources online AllAfrica African Studies Quarterly BBC World Service - Focus On Africa BBC News World CNN Interactive IPS - Inter Press Service The Alternative Newslink One World News The Guardian / Observer USAfricaonline Homepage Element 1a Washington Post Humanitarian crises and refugees International Alert IOM Migration Site Irish Centre for Migration Studies Norwegian Refugee Council PIHRE: Human Rights Related Documents Refugees International The Defense Monitor UNHCR Refworld United States Institute of Peace Highlights UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs- OCHA-Online documents.htm doc100?openform 63

64 Annex 4: Bibliography and Further Reading Anderson, Mary B., 1999: Do No Harm. How Can Aid Support Peace or War. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Anderson, Mary B. / Olson, Lara, 2003: Confronting War. Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners. Cambridge, MA: Collaborative for Development Action. Barbolet, Adam et al., 2005: The Utility and Dilemmas of Conflict Sensitivity. Berlin: Berghof Handbook. Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2005: Discussion Series on PCIA. Berghof Handbook. Element 1a BMZ, 2005: Sector Strategy for Crisis Prevention, Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding in German Development Cooperation. Bouta, Tsjeard / Frerks, Georg / Bannon, Ian, 2005: Gender, Conflict and Development. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Brabant, Koenraad van, 2001a: Operational Security Management in Violent Environments A Field Manual for Aid Agencies. Humanitarian Practice Network. London: Overseas Development Institute. Brabant, Koenraad van, 2001b: Mainstreaming the Organisational Management of Safety and Security. A Review of Aid Agency Practices and a Guide for Management. London: Overseas Development Institute. HPG Report 9. Brabant, Koenraad van, 2002: Module Security Strategies. London: RedR. Bush, Kenneth, 2003: Hands-On PCIA. Part I. A Handbook for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment. Collaborative for Development Action, 2004: Reflecting on Peace Practice Handbook ( Collier, Paul et al., 2003: Breaking the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development Policy. World Bank Research Report. Washington, DC: World Bank. CPR Network, 2005: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) Handbook. ( DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2005: Preventing Conflict and Building Peace. A Manual of Issues and Entry Points. Paris: OECD/DAC. Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, 2002: Sicherheitsleitfaden. Bonn: Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.v. DFID, 2002: Conducting a Strategic Conflict Assessment. London. DFID, 2005: Guidance on Evaluation and Review for DFID Staff. London: DFID Evaluation Department. Dugan, Máire A., 2001: Imaging the Future: A Tool for Conflict Resolution. pp in: Thania Paffenholz / Luc Reychler, Peacebuilding. A Field Guide. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Dworken, Jonathan T., 2001a: Threat Assessment. Training Module for NGOs Operating in Conflict Zones and High-Crime Areas. London: RedR. Dworken, Jonathan T., 2001b: Vulnerability Assessment. Training Module for NGOs Operating in Conflict Zones and High-Crime Areas. London: RedR. Dworken, Jonathan T., 2001c: Security Planning. From Risk Assessment to Security Plan. Training Module for NGOs Operating in Conflict Zones and High-Crime Areas. London: RedR. Eguren, Enrique, 2005: Protection Manual for Human Rights Defenders. Dublin: Front Line. The International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders. Fisher, Simon et al., 2000: Working with Conflict. Skills and Strategies for Action. Responding to Conflict (RTC). London: Zed Books. Frieters, Norbert, 2003: Konflikt-Monitoring für Vorhaben der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Eschborn: GTZ. Hasemann, Armin / Hübner-Schmid, Katharina / Dargatz, Anja, 2005: Konfliktanalyse zur Entwicklung von Handlungsoptionen für gesellschaftspolitische Kooperationsprogramme. Ein methodischer Leitfaden. Bonn: FriEnt/FES/GTZ. ( Hasemann, Armin, 2005: Konfliktbezogene Wirkungsbeobachtung, inkl. Konfliktsensitive Planung von gesellschaftspolitischen Kooperationsprojekten. Ein methodischer Leitfaden. Bonn: FES. Hofmann, Birgit, 2006: Checklist zur Bestandsaufnahme und Analyse von Sicherheitssekto-ren in Partnerländern. Eschborn: GTZ. Interministerielles Rahmenkonzept zur Unterstützung von Reformen des Sicherheitssektors in Entwicklungs- und Transformationsländern, 2006, 64

65 Jackson, Stephen with Siobhan Calthrop, 2002: Making Sense of Unstable Contexts. Tools for Analysis and Action. World Vision. John Hopkins University, Conflict Management Tools, Leonhardt, Manuela, 2001: Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and Management. A Practical Guideline. Eschborn: GTZ Leonhardt, Manuela, 2001: Conflict Impact Assessment for Development Projects. A Practical Guideline. Eschborn: GTZ. Litsch, Elisabeth Maria / Linsenmayr, Rainer, 2006: Wenn Wissen Leben retten kann Gewalt und Gefahren gewachsen sein. Ein praktischer Ratgeber für den Auslandseinsatz. Eschborn: GTZ. Lorenz, Kathrin, 2005: Recommendations for Contract and Cooperation Management to Ensure the Conflict-Sensitive Design and Steering of TC Projects and Programmes. A Guideline. Eschborn: GTZ. OECD/DAC, 1999: Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies. OECD/DAC, 2002: Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management. Paris: DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation. OECD/DAC, forthcoming: Guidelines for Conflict-Sensitive Impact Assessment. OECD/DAC, 2007: Handbook on Security System Reform. Supporting Security and Justice. Paris: OECD. Paffenholz, Thania, 2004: Designing Transformation and Intervention Processes. p in: Austin, Alex / Fischer, Martina / Ropers, Norbert (eds.), Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict. The Berghof Handbook. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Element 1a Paffenholz, Thania, 2005: Third-Generation PCIA. Introducing the Planning and Assessment Approach for Conflict Zones. Berlin: Berghof Handbook. Paffenholz, Thania / Reychler, Luc, 2007: Aid for Peace, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Rothman, Jay, 2004: Action Evaluation. Berlin: Berghof Handbook. Saferworld et al., 2004: Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development Cooperation, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding. A Resource Pack. London. Scherg, Nina, 2004: Leitfaden zur krisenpräventiven Portfoliogestaltung. Eschborn: GTZ. SDC, Monitoring entwicklungsrelevanter Veränderungen (MERV) SDC, 2005: Conflict-Sensitive Program Management in International Cooperation. Mainstreaming the Prevention of Violence. Bern. SIDA, 2004: Conflict-Sensitive Development Cooperation. How to Conduct a Conflict Analysis. Stockholm: SIDA. Sprenger, Dirk / Kruk, Gabriele, 2005: Basic Principles of Crisis Prevention, Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding. Course Concept and Training Module for Decision-Makers and Experts in German Development Cooperation. Bonn/Eschborn: BMZ/GTZ. UNDP / World Bank, 2004: Practical Guide to Post-Conflict Needs Assessment. New York/Washington DC. UNDP / World Bank, 2005: An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices Using Results-Based Frameworks in Fragile States. New York / Washington DC. UNDG ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues, 2004: Inter-Agency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Transition Situations. New York. USAID, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, 2004: Conducting a Conflict Assessment. A Framework for Analysis and Program Development. Washington DC. VENRO, 2003: Mindeststandards für die Personalsicherheit in der humanitären Hilfe. Bonn: VENRO. Wils, Oliver et al., 2006: Systemische Konflikttransformation. Konzept und Anwendungsgebiete. Berlin: Berghof Foundation for Peace Support. Zupan, Natascha, 2005: Methoden der Evaluation im Konfliktkontext. FriEnt Briefing Nr. 3. Bonn. Websites (database containing evaluation reports on humanitarian aid, often in conflict situations) (PCIA dialogue series) (CPR Network: Compendium of Operational Tools for Peacebuilding) (database containing international tools for conflict analysis, conflict-sensitive project planning and conflict-related impact monitoring / OECD DAC Evaluation Resource Centre; contains approx. 50 peace- and conflict-related evaluation reports by international donors) 65

66

67 Peace and Conflict Assessment Element 1b Defining the Peacebuilding Needs Element 1b PCA Element 1a: Element 2: Element 3: Element 4: Introduction Peace and Conflict Analysis (CA) Element 1b: Peacebuilding Needs (PBN) Peace and Conflict- Related Relevance Assessment Risk Management Peace and Conflict- Related Impact Monitoring

68 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations Element 1b BMZ CA DAC DC GoU GTZ LDUs NGO OECD PBN PCA SIDA UN UPDF German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development Peace and Conflict Analysis Development Assistance Committee Development Cooperation Government of Uganda Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit Local Defence Units Non-Governmental Organisation Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Peacebuilding Needs Peace and Conflict Assessment Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency United Nations Uganda People s Defence Forces 68

69 Table of Contents 1. Task Definition and Application What are peacebuilding needs? What are country-level peacebuilding needs? What are project/programme-level peacebuilding needs? Practical Implementation Defining the peacebuilding needs at country level Defining the peacebuilding needs at project/programme level Methodology for Defining the Peacebuilding Needs Step 1: Where do we want to go? (Peacebuilding vision) Step 2: What needs to be done to get there? (Peacebuilding needs) Step 3: How can we help bring about these changes? 79 Annexes Annex 1: Defining the Peacebuilding Needs for the Water Sector in Uganda 82 Annex 2: Factors for Conflict and Options for Action by a Decentralisation Programme in Latin America 83 Annex 3: SIDA Peacebuilding Framework 86 Annex 4: Bibliography and Further Reading 89 Element 1b Index of boxes and tables Box 1: Peacebuilding needs at country level 73 Box 2: Peacebuilding needs and C markers 73 Box 3: The complexity of peace processes 76 Box 4: Negative and positive peace 76 Box 5: Key questions for identifying peacebuilding needs 77 Box 6: Elements of a good intervention strategy 79 Box 7: Key questions for assessing activities of other stakeholders 80 Table 1: Using peacebuilding needs in PCA 70 Table 2: Roles and tasks when defining peacebuilding needs at country level 74 Table 3: Roles and tasks when defining peacebuilding needs at project/programme level 75 Table 4: Documentation of peacebuilding needs 78 Table 5: Levels of peacebuilding needs and corresponding use as frames of reference 78 69

70 Introduction Element 1b Summary: Defining the Peacebuilding Needs The peacebuilding needs (PBN) are determined by comparing the results of the peace and conflict analysis (CA) with a vision for peace. They define the sphere of action where changes are needed in order to help peacefully transform the conflict. They form the orientation framework for the next step, where a development cooperation (DC) country portfolio or individual DC projects/programmes are assessed with regard to their peacebuilding relevance, and fresh options for action are identified. The table below shows the points at which the Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA) makes use of the PBN. Table 1: Using peacebuilding needs in PCA Results of element 1b PBN Used in the following elements/steps of PCA implementation Identifying options for DC action Assessing the peacebuilding relevance of ongoing projects/programmes Impact monitoring (PBN as points of reference for generating conflict-related results chains) Peacebuilding Strategy Identifying options for DC action 70

71 1. Task Definition and Application Element 1b Objective Key questions Defining the peacebuilding needs Identify points of entry for peacebuilding, which can be tackled by development cooperation or other actors Which (peace) scenario does development cooperation aim to help bring about? How can this situation be realised? Procedure Areas of application At which levels is action required? Analyse weak points and build a vision Identify peacebuilding needs Contextual analysis Strategy development Element 1b 1.1. What are peacebuilding needs? The peace and conflict analysis (CA) generates a large amount of information on the causes, actors and current dynamics of the conflict situation that needs to be systematised such that it can be used to orient action. This is the task of the sub-element "Defining the Peacebuilding Needs" within the Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA). The term "peacebuilding needs" (PBN) denotes all (potential) areas of action for a peaceful transformation of the conflict. This may include tackling the key structural causes of the conflict, strengthening peace constituencies, and developing institutional capacities for peaceful conflict management. These areas of action are identified on the basis of the CA. The PBN first of all provide a range of options for action that go beyond the scope of normal development cooperation (DC). By identifying the PBN the PCA seeks to promote a creative process of reflection on the conflict that is independent of existing sectors and programmes, and generates fresh ideas and approaches. Only in the following element "Peace and Conflict-Related Relevance Assessment" (see Guideline 2) are the PBN broken down to the actual options for intervention by DC and the respective organisations, at which point the corresponding options for action to address the individual peacebuilding needs are defined. PBN can be identified at national, sectoral and local level, which are mutually complementary. A further distinction can be drawn between short-term, medium-term and long-term PBN, according to their urgency and feasibility. This distinction will help prioritise the corresponding measures later on. The national PBN will usually provide the orienting framework for the country level, for strategic political decisions and for projects/programmes classified as C2. For development interventions classified as C1 or C0 the sectoral or local PBN will provide orientation. Although the PBN are derived from the CA, they are not compelling objective necessities. It is rather the case that their identification is the most political step of the PCA, which should be carried out with due sensitivity. Whether and which root causes of the conflict (e.g. land distribution, school system) should be addressed, and which actors in peacebuilding or in the conflict (e.g. trade unions/employers' associations, think tanks close to the government or the opposition) should be supported, are political decisions that depend on the interests, the perceptions of reality and the options for action of the stakeholders. This step highlights the political role played by DC as an external actor in the conflict: it supports certain elements, processes and structures in the cooperation country on the basis of its own convictions and interests. The PBN described 71

72 Introduction Element 1b in the conflict section of the brief politico-economic analysis must therefore be understood as a suggestion made by its author. This strongly underlines the political role of BMZ, which in this case should assume a lead role in the discussion and adjustment of the PBN and their anchoring in the wider community. BMZ is also responsible for commissioning in-depth analyses and studies to identify differentiated PBN, and for incorporating these into corresponding country and sector strategies as key aspects of the context. To make transparent the subjectivity of the strategy-building process, the PCA introduces the instrument of vision-building. This involves the actors participating in the PCA (DC organisations, partners etc.) to formulate a joint vision for peace, on the basis of which the PBN can subsequently be defined. The more detailed the description of the vision for peace is, the more clearly the convictions and interests of the participants come into focus. The value of this exercise is that it makes convictions and interests transparent, so that they can be discussed. It also helps more easily identify starting points for cooperation with other actors of a similar persuasion. In some countries in conflict and especially post-conflict countries the PBN are already present in the form of a peace accord between the parties to the conflict, a reconstruction plan of the international community or the political guidelines of the UN transitional administration. These reference documents also serve as a basis for designing bilateral DC activities, options for which are identified in the following step. These documents should, however, not simply be accepted unquestioningly but should be reviewed in the light of a self-conducted CA. Within the scope of the PCA, the PBN form the starting point from which the relevance of ongoing DC measures can be reviewed, and new measures in regions of conflict can be identified and planned. Here, a distinction is drawn between national and sectoral PBN. The national PBN describe general areas of action for peacebuilding. Sectoral PBN describe areas of action within existing sectors, and are restricted to the scope for peacebuilding inputs within those sectors What are country-level peacebuilding needs? The PBN at national level can be helpful in making a first assessment of the conflict-sensitivity and peacebuilding orientation of existing priority areas. Sectoral PBN provide the framework of reference for assessing the conflict-sensitivity of elements of the priority area strategies. In countries where peacebuilding is a priority sector, the PBN identified at country level serve as points of orientation for DC, which all measures must be harmonised with. In this case it is not necessary to develop sectoral PBN, as the national PBN already provide the points of orientation that need to be incorporated into the priority area strategies. In countries where peacebuilding is to be mainstreamed as a cross-cutting issue, it is sufficient to identify the PBN in relation to the sectors covered by DC (e.g. PBN in the environmental sector). It then is also necessary to address the question of whether or to what extent certain problems in the respective sector (e.g. competition for natural resources) either reflect basic factors underlying the conflict (e.g. political and social marginalisation of certain social/ethnic groups at the national level), or themselves create conflicts. In many conflict constellations, the security sector is itself an actor within the conflict (see Guideline 1a). Depending on the role played by the security sector in the conflict, security sector reform can be a PBN. In application example 1 (see Annex 1) the participants of a PCA training measure noted that the North of Uganda had a poorer water supply than the rest of the country, replicating the root cause of the conflict traditional discrimination against the North. The participants took the view that this was due at least in part to corruption and poor management of the water utilities, which were also causing conflicts over access to water in other parts of the country. The participants therefore defined anti-corruption measures for the water utilities and a faster development of water supply in the North as a PBN in the water sector. 72

73 Box 1: Peacebuilding needs at country level Peacebuilding as a detailed definition of PBN at country priority sector level as a basis for re-orientation of DC Peacebuilding as a definition of PBN in the existing DC priority cross-cutting issue sectors (sectoral PBN) 1.3. What are project/programme-level peacebuilding needs? When a PCA has been carried out at country level, the PBN identified at national or sector level provide an orienting framework for the design of individual development interventions. However, these PBN often remain too general to serve as a basis for the definition of concrete measures. In this case it is appropriate to further differentiate the PBN already identified for the respective sector and the respective regions of intervention. Where no CA has been carried out, and consequently no PBN have been identified at country level, and where no comparable reference documents exist, PBN should still be defined for the planning or review of C2 and C1 projects/programmes. C2 projects/programmes are usually oriented toward the overarching PBN of the country or region of intervention (e.g. promotion of dialogue and reconciliation, demobilisation). In projects/programmes where peacebuilding is a secondary goal (C1), the aim is to identify the existing potentials for peacebuilding within the given sector, and harness these by designing the measures on a conflict-sensitive basis. For C0 projects it is sufficient to identify options for strengthening the connectors and weakening the dividers that exist in the project context (see Guideline 4: The Do No Harm Method). Element 1b Box 2: Peacebuilding needs and C markers C2 definition of and orientation toward national PBN C1 definition of and orientation toward sectoral PBN C0 brief analysis of options for influencing the connectors/dividers through the do no harm approach 2. Practical Implementation The peacebuilding needs are defined after completion of the CA. Since this step involves a process of negotiating various interpretations, interests and possible actions in the context of the conflict, it is necessary to pursue an inclusive, integrative approach. An appropriate way of achieving this is to organise a professionally moderated workshop or series of workshops that offer all actors affected by or involved in the changes associated with the PCA an opportunity to put forward their perspective. To facilitate this the results of the CA should be made available to the workshop participants well enough in advance Defining the peacebuilding needs at country level The PBN described in the brief politico-economic analysis constitute a suggestion made by the authors of that analysis, and provide initial orientation. It is therefore necessary to compare these with existing peacebuilding visions of the future. 73

74 Introduction Element 1b At country level it is first of all important to examine reference documents that are relevant to the PBN. If these prove to be insufficient, the PBN should be defined together with BMZ, the implementing organisations, partners and representatives of the civil society, as well as where possible the parties to the conflict. In many countries in conflict the government has an official policy or strategy for peace that often also includes development-policy measures. These quite often form part of a hearts and minds -strategy designed to bring the population in dissenting areas back into the polity through internationally financed development-policy measures. Documents of this kind place bilateral DC in a dilemma. On the one hand DC is increasingly obliged to support national development plans, while on the other hand by doing so it is supporting the strategies of the government, which is a party to the conflict. This problem should be discussed openly as the PBN are being defined. Table 2: Roles and tasks when defining peacebuilding needs at country level Responsible Client (BMZ) Role/tasks Issues the overall commission to define the PBN Performs concluding evaluation (and prioritisation) of the identified PBN, settles on the development-policy response to the results, and decides when and how the further PCA steps should be initiated. In-country representation of the implementing organisation (e.g. GTZ country director) Assumes (or delegates) responsibility for coordination of the entire implementation process and for quality assurance of the results of the PBN definition Involves other German, national and possibly international actors in the process External consultants Moderate the process of analysis and possibly negotiation of the PBN Stakeholders Government/partner(s) German Embassy Participate in definition of the PBN and/or provide feedback on the identified PBN German DC organisations in-country Bi- and multilateral donors Intern. and nat. NGOs Research institutes Moderate representatives of parties to the conflict 74

75 2.2. Defining the peacebuilding needs at project/programme level At project/programme level too, the PBN are best defined following the CA. Since reference documents rarely exist for the local and sectoral PBN, it is important here to involve individuals with a detailed understanding of the local situation. At this level it is also easier to integrate intermediaries and target group representatives into the process. To achieve this, surveys, group discussions and participatory workshops can be carried out. Table 3: Roles and tasks when defining peacebuilding needs at project/programme level Responsible Officer responsible for contracts and cooperation (e.g. programme manager) External consultants Role/tasks Initiates identification/definition of the PBN, responsible for quality assurance, follow-up Where appropriate, moderate the process of analysis and negotiation Element 1b Stakeholders Project/programme staff Partners/intermediaries Target groups Participate in the process of defining the PBN Other DC organisations in the area of intervention Local civil society Research institutes Moderate representatives of parties to the conflict Where appropriate, participate in the process of defining the PBN Feedback on the identified PBN The methodology for defining the PBN is essentially the same at the country and project/programme levels, and is shown below. 3. Methodology for Defining the Peacebuilding Needs As discussed above, the PBN described in the brief politico-economic analysis provide a good first orientation, but these should certainly be reviewed. Since they form the basis for the subsequent PCA elements, it is important to achieve a harmonised and common understanding of them among BMZ, implementing organisation(s) and the partner government. In many cases a more in-depth analysis, and on that basis a further development and differentiation of the PBN, will be necessary. A description is given below of the steps that can be taken to define the PBN on the basis of the CA. Here too it is appropriate to emphasise the importance of involving national actors where possible. 75

76 Introduction Element 1b Box 3: The complexity of peace processes In practical civil conflict management the metaphor of the "architecture of peace" is often used to express the complex structure of peacebuilding. Here the architect (= advisors, international team of facilitators) supports the owner of the building (= the parties to the conflict) for a limited period in erecting or reconstructing the building (= relationships and structures). To achieve this, a variety of construction materials (= development cooperation, sanctions, peacekeeping missions) are available that can be provided by various building contractors (= UN, bilateral donors, NGOs, national organisations) with various capacities. Key to the long-term utility and durability of the building is an appropriate architecture (= strategy for peace) that is oriented toward both the needs of the building's owner and its users (= the population), and the materials available. The architecture must also take into account the needs of the building's environment (= regional conflict, interested third parties). Designing an architecture of this kind is made more difficult by the fact that the clients involved are a group of co-owners who often have diametrically opposed expectations and claims on the building. It may also not be clear who among the co-owners is actually entitled to have a say. This requires a working process between the architect and the owners that needs to be carefully planned, while at the same time it will be fraught with numerous difficulties. During this process, various alternative options will repeatedly be identified between which choices will need to be made. The metaphor of the architecture of peace underlines the fact that peacebuilding is a complex and often contradictory process in which numerous actors with different tasks and capacities cooperate. DC makes only a partial contribution to this process. Nevertheless it is important that all actors do not lose sight of the overarching goal of a peaceful society, and orient their work toward this vision. Source: adapted after Leonhardt/Nyheim 1999, Wils et al Step 1: Where do we want to go? (Peacebuilding vision) This step involves the actors concerned describing as precisely as possible their own vision of a state of "peace" within society, which should ensue when the conflict is brought to an end. To achieve this, the participants should describe first of all individually, then in groups, how people should live and how key social, economic and political aspects of the country would need to be designed in order to make that kind of life possible. It can be helpful here to draw the traditional distinction between negative and positive peace (see box 4). Box 4: Negative and positive peace "Negative peace is understood as the absence of war and direct personal violence. (...) Positive peace on the other hand includes the absence of structural, indirect violence, and thus the realisation of comprehensive social justice. (...) In other words a positive concept of peace always has a utopian core." (Imbusch/Zoll 1996, quoted in Sprenger/Kruk 2005) "Peace is not only the absence of conflict, but requires a positive, dynamic participatory process where dialogue is encouraged and conflicts are solved in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation." (UN 1999, quoted in Sprenger/Kruk 2005) 76

77 The challenge in vision-building is to describe the vision of positive peace for the country as precisely as possible, so that concrete starting points for peacebuilding within the scope of German DC emerge. The basic problems at country level identified in the CA offer key points of departure here. However, planners should avoid equating positive peace with development in general. The vision of peace rather relates to specific problem areas, for which it develops positive scenarios even if later on these can no longer be tackled by the traditional DC segments, but are assigned e.g. to the spheres of diplomacy or economic cooperation. The vision for peace represents a subjective view of the conflict. Different actors (in the conflict) have different visions. This makes it important to identify and discuss differences. Visions for peace can also be identified for a single sector (e.g. water supply) or geographic region (e.g. the zone of intervention of a DC project/programme). For the security sector there are international standards and best practices (such as the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials adopted by the UN General Assembly, or the Council of Europe Recommendations on Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector, and the Right to Conscientious Objection to Military Service, or the OECD/DAC Handbook on Security System Reform, 2007), which should be used as an orienting framework. Element 1b This step involves, among other things, making the frequently implicit visions of the future (what a peaceful country might look like) explicit, so that they can be discussed. Though many elements of the future vision may be described in the general development-policy strategies, these are often not concretised for the respective situation. The process of participants becoming aware of both their own vision for the future and that of their partners is a key element for designing the relevant inputs to crisis prevention and peacebuilding Step 2: What needs to be done to get there? (Peacebuilding needs) In the next step the participants build a bridge between the current situation as described in the CA, and the vision for peace. Here they describe the tasks that must be performed in order to overcome the conflict and achieve the desired vision for peace. The overall aim is to promote positive processes and at the same time create a structural basis for peaceful conflict resolution (infrastructure for peace). The following approach can help achieve this: 1. Identify key problem areas and opportunities contained in the vision for peace Which factors oppose a realisation of the vision for peace? Where are positive trends already evident? 2. Identify the changes needed to realise the vision (PBN) What must be changed? Where are positive starting points already evident? The point of entry is always the CA. Creative methods such as brainstorming or mind mapping should also be used to generate fresh options for action. The following key questions (see box 5) can be used in this context: Box 5: Key questions for identifying peacebuilding needs Which key factors for conflict and for peace should be addressed, and how? Which institutions and processes for constructive conflict management should be promoted, and how? Which actors for peace should be strengthened, and how can that be achieved? 77

78 Introduction How can spoilers, who have an interest in an escalation or continuation of the violent conflict, be influenced? How can the security of the population be improved? At which social/political/economic etc. levels are changes needed? In which sequence and over what period of time should the various factors be addressed? Element 1b The PBN can be documented using the following table (table 4). Short-term, medium-term and long-term PBN should be described separately (the options for action are only added in the course of performing the relevance assessment). Table 4: Documentation of peacebuilding needs Problem areas Peacebuilding needs Options for action (= result of the relevance assessment) Problem A Problem B Short term Medium term Long term Short term Medium term Long term The Peacebuilding Framework of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA; see Annex 3) is based on a similar procedure. PBN can be identified at country level, for a particular sector or for a specific geographic region. Table 5: Levels of peacebuilding needs and corresponding use as frames of reference Levels of PBN national PBN (national PBN) + sectoral PBN (national PBN) (+ sectoral PBN) + PBN for geographic regions of project/programme interventions Frame of reference for country strategy and priority area setting priority area strategies and projects/ programmes Project/programme and its components 78

79 3.3. Step 3: How can we help bring about these changes? Initial thoughts on a DC peacebuilding strategy When identifying the PBN the final step is to look more closely at the overarching framework (often determined by BMZ policy) in which the peacebuilding strategy of a donor and the implementing organisation will gradually emerge. Once the strategic framework is (reasonably) clear it becomes easier following the peace and conflict-related relevance assessment (see Guideline 2) to identify a concrete intervention strategy with corresponding options for action. The following aspects are important both with respect to the initial strategic issues (see box 6 below) and when defining the options for action: The prioritisation of the PBN: What is most urgent in the country? Which needs is DC at all capable of tackling? The interrelationships between the PBN: Which of the PBN mutually influence each other? Existing or planned inputs by other external or internal actors Potentials for raising the effectiveness of individual measures by actively seeking synergies Element 1b What is the time frame available? Box 6: Elements of a good intervention strategy demarcation of the political options (by BMZ and the partner side) clear understanding of institutional mandate as development-policy actor, of own vision for peace and objectives existence of a detailed CA clear definition of the role of DC, and transparent communication thereof to all stakeholders identification of suitable partners and points of departure timing: long-term commitment combined with flexible utilisation of windows of opportunity thinking in terms of processes, while at the same time building an infrastructure for peace recruitment of suitable staff and partners who are both professionally well qualified and committed to peace cooperation and coordination: identification of strategic alliances for peace involving other internal and external actors promotion of a sustainable peace process integration of learning loops Source: modified after Paffenholz 2004 Numerous tools originating from the CA can also be used to support the elaboration of the peacebuilding strategy at various stages of PCA implementation. These include the tools "time frame" (after Lederach), "conflict pyramid" ("Lederach triangle"), "peace and conflict constituencies" and "multi-track approach". For more information on these tools, see Sprenger/Kruk (2005). 79

80 Introduction Element 1b What are the others already doing? Before the organisation identifies options for action in its own work in the next PCA step (Guideline 2: Peace and Conflict-Related Relevance Assessment), it should obtain a rough overview of the activities of other international and national actors with respect to peacebuilding. The following actors and institutions should be approached: German and EU representations major bilateral donors multilateral implementing organisations, donors and donor coordination mechanisms observer missions, peacekeepers (where applicable) national donor coordination agencies (e.g. ministry for planning) civil society platforms Box 7: Key questions for assessing activities of other stakeholders For other organisations On which conflicts is the organisation working in the country? What are the organisation's interests and priorities? What is its position vis-à-vis the main parties to the conflict? In which regions does the organisation operate? What were the key criteria when selecting those regions? Which tools does the organisation use when working on the conflict? What were its experiences with those tools? Which partners does the organisation cooperate with in the conflict context? How successful is this cooperation? Which measures are taken to make the organisation's work conflict-sensitive? What influence does the organisation have on the conflict situation? Which changes are evident? Assessing the joint role of international actors To what extent are the various initiatives coherent or complementary? To what extent have the various initiatives been mutually coordinated or harmonised? If they have been harmonised, in what way? Source: developed after Hasemann/Hübner-Schmid/Dargatz 2005 Where key PBN are already being addressed by other actors, this can be indicated in an additional column in table 4 (documentation of peacebuilding needs). 80

81 Summary: Defining the Peacebuilding Needs The peacebuilding needs are determined by comparing the results of the CA with a vision for peace. They define the sphere of action where changes are needed in order to help peacefully transform the conflict. They form the orientation framework for the next step, where a DC country portfolio or individual DC projects/ programmes are assessed with regard to their peacebuilding relevance, and fresh options for action are identified. The table below shows the points at which PCA makes use of the PBN. Results of element 1b Used in the following elements/steps of PCA implementation PBN Identifying options for DC action Assessing the peacebuilding relevance of ongoing projects/programmes Impact monitoring (PBN as points of reference for generating conflict-related results chains) Element 1b Peacebuilding strategy Identifying options for DC action 81

82 Element 1b Introduction Annex 1: Defining the Peacebuilding Needs for the Water Sector in Uganda Root causes Escalating factors De-escalating factors Vision PBN for water sector North-South divide Colonial division (labour, economic) Traditional land ownership Favouritism and segregation Lack of protection of civilians Increased disappointment and loss of confidence in Central Government Army Parts of the Uganda People s Defence Forces (UPDM) & Local Defence Units (LDUs) remain uncontrolled by the Government of Uganda (GoU) Belief in quick military victory on the GoU s side Breakdown of social structures because of war Conciliation role of elders weakened Intensified favouritism and segregation Implementation of peace process in Southern Sudan Acholi traditional reconciliation mechanisms Increased ownership & empowerment to decentralised local district administration Improved transparency & accountability for use of resources for reconstruction and development War fatigue & wish for improved living conditions Political, social and administrative reintegration of the North into the Nation Achieving MDGs for the North as fast as for the rest of Uganda Equitable, sufficient and transparent allocation of resources Short term Increase transparency & accountability of Central Govt. in allocation & use of funds for conflict resolution Promote anti-corruption & good governance in water service delivery Adjustment of investment planning and i mplementation to provide faster water access in the North according to needs Consider social/ethnic balance in water management studies Equitable allocation of resources to where the people are ( allocation principles ) Mid term Implement district allocation principles Adequate/existing returnee programme Low societal development & lack of societal cohesion Lack of nation building Long term Equal coverage & access to water and sanitation across Uganda Lack of good governance Rampant corruption in the water sector Strengthen structures, functions & responsibilities for WATSAN service delivery Source: document resulting from a GTZ training measure in Uganda,

83 Annex 2: Factors for Conflict and Options for Action by a Decentralisation Programme in Latin America A) Line of conflict: national government regional governments Factors for conflict Options for action by the programme Election of regional governments Introduction of the decentralisation process Transfer of competences from the national to the regional level (accreditation process) National sector ministries still retain their competences and are in some cases deliberately delaying the transfer of competences. The transfer of resources in the decentralisation process is poorly transparent and in some cases information is contradictory; e.g. the central state publishes information to the effect that financial transfers to the sub-national level have been made, while sub-national governments indicate that they have not received them. These delays, contradictions and failures to keep promises mean that the population is currently experiencing little benefit from the decentralisation process. The population perceives the process as resulting not in a "more citizen-friendly" state, but rather in "less state presence". National level - Deliver advisory services to help clarify division of competences between the levels. - Support the process of competence transfer. - Strengthen the participation of the sub-national levels in the design of the decentralisation process (e.g. co-design of the rules). - Promote transparent governance at all levels; monitor development plans and participatory budget plans. Regional level - Support the regional government's accreditation process; clarify and institutionalise the upward and downward responsibilities of the concerned levels. B) Line of conflict: departmental and local governments population Road blockades Occupation of public buildings Politicians under threat Mayors occasionally murdered Issues - failure to keep election promises - accusations of corruption - disclosure of public expenditure (budgets) Causes of conflict Further develop "round tables for poverty alleviation" as an instrument for the practice of dialogue and participation. - Involve new regionally/locally relevant actors. - Utilise synergies e.g. with church-based initiatives. - Address regional/local issues that are politically charged. Element 1b 83

84 C) Resource-based conflicts Local/native population (national and transnational) businesses in the timber and minerals sector - Lack of information on and poor transparency of responsibilities at the various state levels - Only privileged sections of the population have access to information. The current information policy means that especially those groups susceptible to conflict are not being reached. - Lack of information on existing rights to and opportunities for participation/co-determination - Poor representation on existing committees for participation/co-determination - Marginalised sections of the population do not see existing mechanisms for co-determination and participation as real places for negotiation, and therefore ignore them. - Abuse of public office for personal and political ends ("tradition of abuse of office") Triggers - Rumours - Measures available (e.g. round tables) are not applied by representatives of the state or are not utilised in the event of conflict. - Coordination of state institutions and security agencies: although these are present on the ground, in case of conflict they do not respond in time, or respond only when instructed to do so by the central state, without any reference to local governments. Issues - Compliance with environmental standards - Recognition of indigenous rights and territorial claims - Provision of social protection Element 1b Introduction Council for regional and local coordination - Define tasks and roles. - Train representatives of the state in the discharge of their mandate. - Develop the capacities of institutions for performing their tasks (e.g. participatory budget planning). Strengthen information channels. - Reflect on public opinion and the role of the media in cases of conflict. - Raise awareness of civil rights and perform civic education. - Raise awareness of the services provided by the state. - Cooperate with political foundations in this context. Establish regional/local information centres providing legal information and basic services (e.g. birth certificate, electoral register) and civic education. No direct intervention in conflict mediation processes. Identify cases of local conflict in the programme region. Involve marginalised groups in the existing participatory mechanisms. 84

85 Native population settlers state with respect to the demarcation of indigenous territories Conflicts between neighbouring local communities regarding water usage Source: adapted after Scherg, GTZ 2004 Cause of conflict: distribution of resources Triggers - privatisation - award of concessions (timber, mining) by the state with no regard to social or ecological sustainability - illegal (timber) exploitation that goes unpunished by the state - no mechanisms available to record, respond to and channel complaints - failure to involve marginalised groups in local decision-making processes - poor transparency of the roles and (mutual) responsibilities of the state (national and regional levels) and private enterprises (possible conflict of interests) Incorporate the issues at stake into regional/local development plans. Strengthen the existing mechanisms for identification and dialogue (e.g. defensoría). Element 1b 85

86 Element 1b Introduction Annex 3: SIDA Peacebuilding Framework The Peacebuilding Framework of the Swedish agency SIDA is based on a similar approach. In a general way it identifies key problems for peacebuilding at national level, the needed changes ("goals and opportunities", equivalent to the PBN), and finally concrete options for DC action by (corresponds to PCA element 2: peace and conflict-related relevance assessment). These can serve as suggestions that can be adapted to the specific conflict situation within the scope of a PCA. A) Structural instability and structures working for peace Problem Goals and Opportunities (= PBN) Means (examples) (= "options for action") Structural instability and structures causing violent conflict Structural instability caused by Poverty and economic inequality Do no harm Do maximum good Conflict-sensitive DC and conflict management Reducing structural conflict motives Promoting structural stability Addressing economic inequalities of marginalised groups and elites Job creation for marginalised youth Improving socio-economic opportunities for marginalised ethnic minorities Bad governance and weak state institutions Democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights (including minority rights) Institutions capable of managing change and resolving disputes, such as ombudsman and independent judiciary Independent and pluralistic media (freedom of expression) Media support; press institute, training of journalists, conflict-sensitive journalism Security sector reforms (democratic control and transparency) Democratic culture Absence of cross-cutting social and civil society organisations Environmental insecurity (resource-based conflicts) Development of a vibrant and democratic civil society with cross-cutting interdependence Sustainable use of natural resources. Stopping the possibility of looting natural resources as a means for financing war. Support to civil society organisations promoting a multitude of cross-cutting identity markers (commerce, politics, human rights, culture) Support to reform of land rights systems Diversification of economy or support of state control of natural resources 86

87 Gender inequality Women s active participation in conflict management processes Availability of small arms and anti-personnel mines Capacity building for women s networks Capacity building for military in the rules of war and international humanitarian law Decreased abuse of women in armed conflict Promotion of disarmament and arms control Mine-clearing operations in post-conflict countries Increased small arms control, weapons collection and destruction Changing gun culture to a culture of non-violence B) Struggle for power and influence Incompatible interests, based on grievances, for example Understanding of counterparts positions Power-sharing and co-operation & adherence to international law Supporting independent and pluralistic media Supporting democracy through power-sharing and participatory processes Supporting civil society / NGOs Mediation, reconciliation, peace education Information about rights Underestimation of adversary s strength Understanding the cost of conflict Facilitating dialogue Information exchange on weapons and mine maps Security sector reforms Attractiveness of violent conflict, based on greed, for example Increasing the cost of the use of force Increasing the benefits of peace Smart sanctions, supporting a war crimes tribunal Arms limitations and reductions Reducing the pool of potential recruits, improving social services for key groups Dealing with common problems cooperatively (such as the sustainable use of natural resources) Undercutting the war economy (greed) Disarmament, demobilisation & reintegration of ex-combatants Element 1b 87

88 Element 1b C) Security dilemma Fear (perceived security threats) Reducing fear Facilitating dialogue and reconciliation Trauma healing, confidence-building measures Supporting independent and pluralistic media Rule of law Vulnerability (real security threats) Reducing vulnerability Demobilisation, disarmament & reintegration of ex-combatants Monitoring missions, human rights observers Supporting law enforcement, security sector reforms Distrust Building trust Reconciliation Confidence-building measures Dealing with common problems cooperatively (vaccinations, water management, housing) Cultural exchanges Temporary cease-fires and days of peace Source: SIDA 2004 Introduction 88

89 Annex 4: Bibliography and Further Reading Anderson, Mary B., 1999: Do No Harm. How Can Aid Support Peace or War. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Anderson, Mary B. / Olson, Lara, 2003: Confronting War. Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners. Cambridge, MA: Collaborative for Development Action. Barbolet, Adam et al., 2005: The Utility and Dilemmas of Conflict Sensitivity. Berlin: Berghof Handbook. Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2005: Discussion Series on PCIA. Berghof Handbook. BMZ, 2005: Sector Strategy for Crisis Prevention, Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding in German Development Cooperation. Bouta, Tsjeard / Frerks, Georg / Bannon, Ian, 2005: Gender, Conflict and Development. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Brabant, Koenraad van, 2001a: Operational Security Management in Violent Environments A Field Manual for Aid Agencies. Humanitarian Practice Network. London: Overseas Development Institute. Brabant, Koenraad van, 2001b: Mainstreaming the Organisational Management of Safety and Security. A Review of Aid Agency Practices and a Guide for Management. London: Overseas Development Institute. HPG Report 9. Element 1b Brabant, Koenraad van, 2002: Module Security Strategies. London: RedR. Bush, Kenneth, 2003: Hands-On PCIA. Part I. A Handbook for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment. Collaborative for Development Action, 2004: Reflecting on Peace Practice Handbook ( Collier, Paul et al., 2003: Breaking the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development Policy. World Bank Research Report. Washington, DC: World Bank. CPR Network, 2005: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) Handbook. ( DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2005: Preventing Conflict and Building Peace. A Manual of Issues and Entry Points. Paris: OECD/DAC. Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, 2002: Sicherheitsleitfaden. Bonn: Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.v. DFID, 2002: Conducting a Strategic Conflict Assessment. London. DFID, 2005: Guidance on Evaluation and Review for DFID Staff. London: DFID Evaluation Department. Dugan, Máire A., 2001: Imaging the Future: A Tool for Conflict Resolution. pp in: Thania Paffenholz / Luc Reychler, Peacebuilding. A Field Guide. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Dworken, Jonathan T., 2001a: Threat Assessment. Training Module for NGOs Operating in Conflict Zones and High-Crime Areas. London: RedR. Dworken, Jonathan T., 2001b: Vulnerability Assessment. Training Module for NGOs Operating in Conflict Zones and High-Crime Areas. London: RedR. Dworken, Jonathan T., 2001c: Security Planning. From Risk Assessment to Security Plan. Training Module for NGOs Operating in Conflict Zones and High-Crime Areas. London: RedR. Eguren, Enrique, 2005: Protection Manual for Human Rights Defenders. Dublin: Front Line. The International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders. Fisher, Simon et al., 2000: Working with Conflict. Skills and Strategies for Action. Responding to Conflict (RTC). London: Zed Books. Frieters, Norbert, 2003: Konflikt-Monitoring für Vorhaben der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Eschborn: GTZ. Hasemann, Armin / Hübner-Schmid, Katharina / Dargatz, Anja, 2005: Konfliktanalyse zur Entwicklung von Handlungsoptionen für gesellschaftspolitische Kooperationsprogramme. Ein methodischer Leitfaden. Bonn: FriEnt/FES/GTZ. ( Hasemann, Armin, 2005: Konfliktbezogene Wirkungsbeobachtung, inkl. Konfliktsensitive Planung von gesellschaftspolitischen Kooperationsprojekten. Ein methodischer Leitfaden. Bonn: FES. Hofmann, Birgit, 2006: Checklist zur Bestandsaufnahme und Analyse von Sicherheitssekto-ren in Partnerländern. Eschborn: GTZ. Interministerielles Rahmenkonzept zur Unterstützung von Reformen des Sicherheitssektors in Entwicklungs- und Transformationsländern, 2006, 89

90 Introduction Jackson, Stephen with Siobhan Calthrop, 2002: Making Sense of Unstable Contexts. Tools for Analysis and Action. World Vision. John Hopkins University, Conflict Management Tools, Leonhardt, Manuela, 2001: Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and Management. A Practical Guideline. Eschborn: GTZ Leonhardt, Manuela, 2001: Conflict Impact Assessment for Development Projects. A Practical Guideline. Eschborn: GTZ. Litsch, Elisabeth Maria / Linsenmayr, Rainer, 2006: Wenn Wissen Leben retten kann Gewalt und Gefahren gewachsen sein. Ein praktischer Ratgeber für den Auslandseinsatz. Eschborn: GTZ. Lorenz, Kathrin, 2005: Recommendations for Contract and Cooperation Management to Ensure the Conflict-Sensitive Design and Steering of TC Projects and Programmes. A Guideline. Eschborn: GTZ. Element 1b OECD/DAC, 1999: Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies. OECD/DAC, 2002: Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management. Paris: DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation. OECD/DAC, forthcoming: Guidelines for Conflict-Sensitive Impact Assessment. OECD/DAC, 2007: Handbook on Security System Reform. Supporting Security and Justice. Paris: OECD. Paffenholz, Thania, 2004: Designing Transformation and Intervention Processes. p in: Austin, Alex / Fischer, Martina / Ropers, Norbert (eds.), Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict. The Berghof Handbook. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Paffenholz, Thania, 2005: Third-Generation PCIA. Introducing the Planning and Assessment Approach for Conflict Zones. Berlin: Berghof Handbook. Paffenholz, Thania / Reychler, Luc, 2007: Aid for Peace, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Rothman, Jay, 2004: Action Evaluation. Berlin: Berghof Handbook. Saferworld et al., 2004: Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development Cooperation, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding. A Resource Pack. London. Scherg, Nina, 2004: Leitfaden zur krisenpräventiven Portfoliogestaltung. Eschborn: GTZ. SDC, Monitoring entwicklungsrelevanter Veränderungen (MERV) SDC, 2005: Conflict-Sensitive Program Management in International Cooperation. Mainstreaming the Prevention of Violence. Bern. SIDA, 2004: Conflict-Sensitive Development Cooperation. How to Conduct a Conflict Analysis. Stockholm: SIDA. Sprenger, Dirk / Kruk, Gabriele, 2005: Basic Principles of Crisis Prevention, Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding. Course Concept and Training Module for Decision-Makers and Experts in German Development Cooperation. Bonn/Eschborn: BMZ/GTZ. UNDP / World Bank, 2004: Practical Guide to Post-Conflict Needs Assessment. New York/Washington DC. UNDP / World Bank, 2005: An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices Using Results-Based Frameworks in Fragile States. New York / Washington DC. UNDG ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues, 2004: Inter-Agency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Transition Situations. New York. USAID, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, 2004: Conducting a Conflict Assessment. A Framework for Analysis and Program Development. Washington DC. VENRO, 2003: Mindeststandards für die Personalsicherheit in der humanitären Hilfe. Bonn: VENRO. Wils, Oliver et al., 2006: Systemische Konflikttransformation. Konzept und Anwendungsgebiete. Berlin: Berghof Foundation for Peace Support. Zupan, Natascha, 2005: Methoden der Evaluation im Konfliktkontext. FriEnt Briefing Nr. 3. Bonn. Websites (database containing evaluation reports on humanitarian aid, often in conflict situations) (PCIA dialogue series) (CPR Network: Compendium of Operational Tools for Peacebuilding) (database containing international tools for conflict analysis, conflict-sensitive project planning and conflict-related impact monitoring / OECD DAC Evaluation Resource Centre; contains approx. 50 peace- and conflict-related evaluation reports by international donors) 90

91 Peace and Conflict Assessment Element 2 Peace and Conflict-Related Relevance Assessment PCA Element 1a: Element 2: Element 3: Element 4: Introduction Peace and Conflict Analysis (CA) Element 1b: Peacebuilding Needs (PBN) Peace and Conflict-Related Relevance Assessment Risk Management Peace and Conflict- Related Impact Monitoring Element 2

92 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations AURA BMZ CA DC DNH GTZ NGO OECD PBN PCA TC Development-Policy Framework for Contracts and Cooperation German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development Peace and Conflict Analysis Development Cooperation Do No Harm Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit Non-Governmental Organisation Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Peacebuilding Needs Peace and Conflict Assessment Technical Cooperation Element 2 92

93 Table of Contents 1. Task Definition and Application What is the peace and conflict-related relevance assessment? Where is the peace and conflict-related relevance assessment applied? Portfolio adjustment at country level Planning of new projects/programmes in conflict countries Orienting ongoing projects/programmes toward peacebuilding Practical Implementation of a Peace and Conflict-Related Relevance Assessment Conducting a peace and conflict-related relevance assessment at country level Conducting a peace and conflict-related relevance assessment at project/programme level Methodology for Conducting a Peace and Conflict-Related Relevance Assessment Step 1: Capacity analysis Designing country and priority area strategies and planning new projects/programmes Adjusting portfolios and ongoing projects/programmes Step 2: Comparison with the peacebuilding needs Developing strategies and planning new projects/programmes Reviewing an existing country portfolio, priority area strategies or a development cooperation project/programme Step 3: Identifying options for action Step 4: Designing new or adjusted measures 105 Annexes Annex 1: Example of Application Assessing the Peacebuilding Relevance of an Environmental Programme 107 Annex 2: Bibliography and Further Reading 109 Element 2 Index of boxes, tables and figures Box 1: The peace and conflict-related relevance assessment at portfolio level 96 Box 2: Relevance assessment and C markers 96 Box 3: Key questions for the peace and conflict-related capacity analysis 99 Box 4: Key questions to describe a country portfolio 100 Box 5: Description of an ongoing DC project/programme 101 Box 6: Key questions when identifying options for action 104 Table 1: Using the peace and conflict-related relevance assessment in PCA 94 Table 2: Roles and tasks when conducting a peace and conflict-related relevance assessment at country level 97 Table 3: Roles and tasks when conducting a peace and conflict-related relevance assessment at project/programme level 98 Table 4: Levels of peacebuilding needs and corresponding use as frames of reference 102 Table 5: Identifying options for action 104 Fig. 1: Conflict-relevant design of C1 projects/programme (using the example of an environmental programme)

94 Summary: Peace and Conflict-Related Relevance Assessment The peace and conflict-related relevance assessment results in 1) the identification of options for action by development cooperation (DC) to help build peace, and 2) the conception of new, extended or adjusted strategies and measures for peacebuilding, and the elaboration of a (still provisional) peacebuilding strategy. In the following element of the Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA; Guideline 3: Risk Management) the feasibility of these newly envisaged / adjusted measures in the conflict context is reviewed. In the final element (Guideline 4: Peace and Conflict-Related Impact Monitoring), the possible positive and negative impacts of these measures on the conflict are assessed, and conflict-sensitive criteria are integrated into the standard results-based monitoring system. Finally, the DC peacebuilding strategy can then be formulated. Table 1: Using the peace and conflict-related relevance assessment in PCA Results of element 2 Conflict-sensitive design of the project/programme, or strategy for the country portfolio (objectives, activities, partners, intermediaries, results) Used in the following elements/steps of PCA implementation Risk management to review the feasibility of the project/programme or portfolio design Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring (monitoring the newly designed or adjusted contribution to the peacebuilding needs) Element 2 94

95 1. Task Definition and Application Element 2 Objective Peace and conflict-related relevance assessment Assess the peacebuilding relevance of existing or planned development cooperation measures Adjust the existing or planned measures Key questions What are the objectives, activities and working principles of the development cooperation measures? Do these make a positive contribution toward the previously identified peacebuilding needs? Which objectives and activities are not relevant to the peacebuilding needs? How can the measure(s) be more strongly oriented toward the peacebuilding needs? Procedure Describe the existing or planned development cooperation portfolio, priority area strategies and measures Relevance assessment Areas of application Conflict-sensitive planning and steering Adjustment of measures Evaluation 1.1. What is the peace and conflict-related relevance assessment? Element 2 The peace and conflict-related relevance assessment forms the link between the definition of the peacebuilding needs (PBN), and the planning and steering of concrete development cooperation (DC) measures. The concept of relevance originates from practical evaluation. There it was defined by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 1999) as "the degree of correspondence between the programme objectives and the development needs of the country, beneficiaries, partners and donors". Through the Sector Strategy for Crisis Prevention, BMZ introduced the concept of relevance into portfolio, contract and project management for countries, priority areas and projekts/programmes in conflict countries. Here, the peace and conflict-related relevance of a DC project/programme or portfolio is defined as the degree of correspondence between its objectives and the peacebuilding needs of the country or sector. The core element of the peace and conflict-related relevance assessment is thus the comparison of the existing or planned DC measures with the previously identified PBN, in order to determine the extent to which the measures actually meet those needs. Unlike an evaluation, this kind of relevance assessment does not generate any conclusions concerning the results of development cooperation. It merely seeks to determine the appropriateness of an existing programme design with respect to the conflict as analysed. More precise pointers for conflict-sensitive design of DC can be obtained by considering various dimensions within the scope of the relevance assessment. This is important, because DC is required not only to address issues that are key to the respective peace process (thematic relevance), but also to do so in key regions (geographic relevance), together with the right actors (relevance of the actors, i.e. change agents), and at the right point in time (temporal relevance, i.e. timing). These issues also form part of the relevance assessment. 95

96 The aim here is not always to address directly a given dimension of relevance (e.g. the regions worst affected by conflicts), but to incorporate the various dimensions systematically into conceptual approaches and strategies Where is the peace and conflict-related relevance assessment applied? Portfolio adjustment at country level At country level the relevance assessment can be used e.g. in the context of adjusting priority setting or establishing peacebuilding as a priority area, or to help establish peacebuilding as a cross-cutting issue. In countries where peacebuilding is a priority area the relevance assessment should be repeated at appropriate intervals (e.g. every two years), in order to harmonise the portfolio with the conflict dynamics. Box 1: The peace and conflict-related relevance assessment at portfolio level Peacebuilding as a All projects/programmes are oriented primarily priority sector toward the PBN and are implemented on a conflict-sensitive basis. Element 2 Peacebuilding as a The priority area strategy is oriented toward the cross-cutting issue sectoral PBN. Some projects/programmes are oriented inter alia toward the PBN (C1), all projects/programmes are implemented on a conflict-sensitive basis Planning new projects/programmes in conflict countries In new development interventions the results of the peace and conflict-related relevance assessment are key to the assignment of the C marker. Box 2: Relevance assessment and C markers C2 C1 C0 (C1) C0 The project/programme is of MAJOR relevance to peacebuilding: All activities are oriented toward the PBN, which is reflected in the development intervention s systematic objectives. The project/programme is relevant to peacebuilding: Most of the activities are consistent with the PBN. The project/programme is of LIMITED relevance to peacebuilding: Only a few of the activities are consistent with the PBN. Depending on whether or not corresponding secondary objectives, indicators and activities have been defined, this development intervention will be classified as C0 or C1. The project/programme is of NO relevance to peacebuilding: None of the activities relate directly to the PBN, although they are implemented on a conflict-sensitive basis in accordance with the do no harm (DNH) principle. Source: adapted after Lorenz

97 Orienting ongoing projects/programmes toward peacebuilding The relevance assessment supports the orientation of ongoing, non-conflict-specific development interventions toward peacebuilding (C1), within the scope of an internal self-evaluation or external progress review. The point of departure here is not the PBN, but the project/programme capacities in the form of its mandate, resources, personnel, established areas of work, experiences and networks. The question is raised of whether and how these capacities can be harnessed even more effectively to help build peace. It is answered by comparing the capacities with the PBN, which are further differentiated where possible by region, sector, social group and urgency. This makes it possible to identify areas for constructive engagement within existing priority work areas, as well as new components for peacebuilding. 2. Practical Implementation of a Peace and Conflict-Related Relevance Assessment 2.1. Conducting a peace and conflict-related relevance assessment at country level The peace and conflict-related relevance assessment of a country portfolio is the responsibility of the respective BMZ country division. It can be an extremely sensitive process which, depending on the objectives (e.g. adjustment of existing priority areas [for instance replacing sustainable economic promotion with governance] or re-orientation toward peacebuilding as a new priority area), may affect the continued existence of individual projects/programmes. For this reason the relevance assessment should be carefully planned, and supported by external moderators and (where appropriate) country experts. It is recommended that the procedure be broken down into two steps: 1. Self-evaluation by projects/programmes. The projects/programmes reflect upon the degree to which their current activities are consistent with the PBN and identify capacities for a stronger orientation toward peacebuilding. 2. Overall assessment of the portfolio within the scope of a professionally moderated workshop. This will explore the peacebuilding relevance of both the priority area strategies and individual development interventions, as well as the degree to which the individual elements coalesce to form a coherent peacebuilding strategy. Element 2 When conducting a relevance assessment at country level the expert and managerial staff of the projects/programmes and the relevant in-country executing agencies / partners should be invited to participate. Independent external experts should be called in to obtain an external perspective on the projects/programmes. During this step it will be the responsibility of BMZ and the respective partner government to jointly negotiate and agree on the scope for developing options for action, and to communicate this to the actors concerned in the form of an orienting framework. Table 2: Roles and tasks when conducting a peace and conflict-related relevance assessment at country level Responsible Client (BMZ) Role/tasks Issues the overall commission to conduct a Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA) Defines the general scope for action: To what extent can/should the existing country portfolio be modified depending on the results of the relevance assessment? Discusses this with the partner government 97

98 Performs final evaluation of the results of the relevance assessment Discusses further procedure with relevant actors (partner side, GTZ country director etc.) Decides on adjustments to be made In-country representation/ country representative of the implementing organisation (e.g. GTZ country director) Officers responsible for contracts and cooperation (e.g. project/programme managers) External consultants Responsible for overall coordination of implementation and quality assurance of the relevance assessment Involves other German and national actors Conduct the relevance assessment as part of the self-evaluation of their projects/programmes Moderate the joint relevance assessment at country portfolio level Stakeholders Government, partner(s) Participate in the relevance assessment or give feedback on its results Element Conducting a peace and conflict-related relevance assessment at project/programme level When planning a new development intervention the primary purpose of the relevance assessment is to generate options for peacebuilding action and the implementation thereof within the scope of the overall project/ programme design (C2) or components thereof (C1). These options will be based on the results of the peace and conflict analysis (CA) and the identified peacebuilding needs (elements 1a and 1b of PCA). Here too it is appropriate to hold a workshop with a broad range of participants, including the appraisal team, the planned project/programme partners, and other intermediaries and target-group representatives. This can help foster broad ownership of a conflict-relevant and sensitive working manner among all actors from the outset. The relevance assessment of an ongoing development intervention should involve the project/programme staff, partners, intermediaries and target-group representatives. It is important to make clear to these individuals and groups that the relevance assessment will require them to reflect critically and constructively upon their own work, a process which may lead to changes in the work for specific components. Table 3: Roles and tasks when conducting a peace and conflict-related relevance assessment at project/ programme level Responsible Officer responsible for contracts and cooperation (e.g. programme manager) External consultants Role/tasks Initiates the relevance assessment, quality assurance, follow-up Where appropriate, may moderate the relevance assessment Stakeholders Project/programme staff Partners/intermediaries Target groups External experts (civil society, research, parties to the conflict) Participate in the relevance assessment Where appropriate, may provide feedback on the results of the relevance assessment 98

99 3. Methodology for Conducting a Peace and Conflict-Related Relevance Assessment The peace and conflict-related relevance assessment encompasses a) the capacity analysis, b) the comparison of these capacities with the PBN, c) the identification of options for action and d) the elaboration of a DC strategy for peace or integration of peacebuilding elements into priority area strategies (country level), or the elaboration of a modified project concept (project/programme level). These basic steps can be conducted at portfolio and/or project/programme level, in strategic development, in the planning of new measures, and in the adjustment of existing measures Step 1: Capacity analysis Designing country and priority area strategies and planning new projects/programmes The first step to be performed when developing a strategy, or planning a new project/programme, is an analysis of the peacebuilding capacities of the implementing organisation. This helps the organisation identify its own strengths and weaknesses in this area, and on that basis to select from the numerous peacebuilding needs those tasks for which it is best suited. It is then possible to define realistic objectives, and later on options for action. Any engagement that overstretches capacities can entail significant negative consequences, a fact which becomes especially relevant in crisis prevention and peacebuilding work. Box 3: Key questions for the peace and conflict-related capacity analysis a) Significance of peacebuilding for the organisation To what extent are the current position papers and guidelines (Sector Strategy for Peacebuilding, Action Plan Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-conflict Peacebuilding ) known to all those responsible, and to what extent have they been contextualised for the country level? To what extent does the management consider peacebuilding important in the country concerned? Element 2 To what extent do seconded and local staff consider peacebuilding important in the country concerned? What experience has the organisation gained so far with peacebuilding? Has this caused any reluctance to address the issue? To what extent do the clients support the organisation's involvement in peacebuilding in the country concerned? Are there any relevant international obligations concerning peacebuilding? b) Organisational culture and institutional structures Is the organisational culture of the organisation suited to peacebuilding work? Do the existing communication structures permit a critical analysis of political issues, and appropriate responses? Are the hierarchies sufficiently clear to be able to implement conflict-sensitivity within the project/ programme? Do the existing institutional structures in the country support conflict-sensitive work? Is it to be expected that professional support for the task will be provided by the Head Office? Does the organisation have any professional strategies for work in this field? 99

100 c) Capacity development Do the personnel possess the appropriate competences to be able to perform the tasks needed in this field? Is the social, ethnic etc. background of the personnel appropriate for them to work in this field? Can staff of this kind be recruited? Can the personnel be offered the training measures needed for them to prepare themselves for the tasks in hand? Does the organisation possess appropriate analytical tools for the task? Do the staff possess the necessary skills to be able use these tools productively? Is there any crossover or are there any links between peacebuilding and the work of the organisation to date in the country? How can existing contacts and competences be utilised? d) External relations How do the organisation's partners see involvement in peacebuilding? Is an involvement of this kind perceived as legitimate? Does the organisation have partners that possess the necessary political neutrality and peacebuilding competences which would enable them to work effectively on the issue? Which networks is the organisation's in-country staff involved in? Are these appropriate for the task in hand, and can they be utilised accordingly? Element 2 Which networks is the organisation involved in (e.g. donor or NGO coordination)? Can these be utilised for the task in hand? Is the institutional environment's relationship to peacebuilding a positive one? How would involvement in peacebuilding affect the organisation's other activities in the country? Are the risks which that entails acceptable? Source: adapted after Saferworld et al Adjusting portfolios and ongoing projects/programmes In addition to the capacity analysis, the relevance assessment of existing country portfolios, priority area strategies or ongoing projects/programmes also requires further information on the implemented measures. This information should be prepared within the scope of a self-evaluation such that it can be cross-referenced with and compared to the peacebuilding needs. The various dimensions of peacebuilding relevance may be differently weighted, depending on the country. The following questions (see box 4) should be raised with respect to an existing DC country portfolio: Box 4: Key questions to describe a country portfolio What are the priority areas of the current country portfolio? Which goals are they designed to help achieve? How are these goals to be achieved (development-policy hypothesis)? Which programmes and individual measures make up the portfolio? 100

101 How are the existing measures distributed regionally? What are their objectives? At which levels of society do they take effect? Which are the key partners, implementing organisations and target groups in the country? Which content-related and institutional interfaces exist between the programmes? Projects/programmes can be described with reference to the following characteristic features: Box 5: Description of an ongoing DC project/programme Purpose / planned results of the project/programme Executing agencies, partners, implementing organisations, target groups, other stakeholders Focal priority areas, components, measures and activities regional distribution of the measures timing and duration of the individual measures modus operandi of the development intervention (= methodological approach) actual results of the project/programme, risks 3.2. Step 2: Comparison with the peacebuilding needs Developing strategies and planning new projects/programmes Element 2 When developing strategies or planning new projects/programmes, this step can be omitted. Alternatively where plans for a new project/programme have already taken concrete shape these may be reviewed using a procedure analogous to the one described below. In most cases concrete ideas or experiences will already exist that can then be fed into the processes of developing strategies and planning new projects/programmes Reviewing an existing country portfolio, priority area strategies or a development cooperation project/programme In this step the existing DC capacities and priority areas are reviewed to see how they relate to the peacebuilding needs. The question to be addressed is to what degree do the objectives and capacities of the organisation or project/programme correspond to the peacebuilding needs. The starting point is the PBN formulated in element 1b of the PCA, to which the DC priority areas are now assigned. The aim here is not for development cooperation to make a contribution to all the PBN, but for a part of the DC strategy/measures to be assigned to a segment of the PBN that is considered relevant. The majority of the PBN cannot be tackled (exclusively) by DC, as they call for other means such as diplomacy. The priority areas and corresponding strategies of a country portfolio are assigned to the national PBN. The priority area strategies and projects/programmes are assigned to the sectoral PBN. The activities of a DC project/programme are assigned to the sectoral PBN. 101

102 Table 4: Levels of peacebuilding needs and corresponding use as frames of reference Levels of the PBN national PBN (national PBN) + sectoral PBN (national PBN) (+ sectoral PBN) + PBN for geographical regions of project/programme interventions Frame of reference for country strategy and priority area setting priority area strategies and projects/programmes Projects/programmes and their components As described in Guideline 1b, the sectoral PBN describe the changes needed to reduce conflictuality in the respective sector (e.g. health system, resource management) itself, while at the same time contributing to peacebuilding by making improvements in that sector. Annex 1 to the present guideline shows the peace and conflict-related relevance assessment of an environmental programme. In this case, the causes of the national conflict as manifested in the environmental sector were first of all described. On that basis sectoral PBN were identified, and the project/programme measures assigned to these. Other measures of the development intervention that are not relevant to the conflict are not shown. Element 2 In this step the question often arises of which project/programme measures can be included, and how direct their relationship to the PBN must be. Particularly in C1 and C0 projects/programmes it is important to include not only the direct objectives of the development intervention, but also its indirect outputs. Fig. 1 shows the example of an environmental programme whose purpose is to help establish sustainable natural resource management in a conflict country. To achieve this objective the programme is strengthening the regulatory and conflict management capacities of the state environmental institutions, and promoting forms of sustainable resource management. In so doing it is promoting sources of income for the rural population, as well as helping develop their organisational and articulatory capacities in the context of environmental issues. The programme is also supporting fora for dialogue between the state and civil society on controversial environmental issues. Through the specific measures by which the programme seeks to help secure sustainable resource management, it is at the same time making important contributions toward the sectoral PBN. 102

103 Fig. 1: Conflict-relevant design of C1 projects/programme (using the example of an environmental programme) Project/ programme purpose Sustainable natural resource management Conflict-relevant measures in the environmental sector Strengthen the positive presence and conflict management capacities of the state Relevance Sectoral peacebuilding needs Create the economic base for post-war reconstruction Improved governance Transparency and legality Strengthen the economic base, social cohesion and organisational capacities of the rural population Constructive conflict management Economic alternatives to migration and drug cultivation Culture of dialogue and participation Element 2 This step results in an assessment of the peace and conflict relevance of current DC measures. This serves to help reflect upon the orientation of the country portfolio and priority areas assign the appropriate C marker to individual DC projects/programmes classify the projects/programmes within a DC portfolio in terms of their relevance to peace and to conflict Step 3: Identifying options for action Where the planning process for development measures is already complete, it is usually not sufficient to merely classify the measures according to their relevance to peace and to conflict. In conflict countries the task is rather to increase the peace and conflict relevance of existing measures and identify new options for action. Organisations and projects/programmes are thus called upon to identify their own options for action that will help address the PBN. 103

104 Box 6: Key questions when identifying options for action Which key PBN have so far not been adequately addressed? Which geographical regions are receiving too little attention? Which key sectors have so far not been adequately addressed? Which actors for conflict and for peace should be receiving even closer attention? Which spoilers should be integrated more effectively into the peace process? Which local peace initiatives should be supported more intensively? Which key initiatives already launched by others should be further promoted and placed on a broader footing? Options for action are identified on the basis of an analysis of the capacities of the organisation (for new projects/programmes) and its focal areas of work to date (for portfolio adjustment, or project/programme adjustment). These capacities are analysed with respect to their peacebuilding potentials. The analysis is performed by comparing the capacities of the organisation with the PBN, the question here being how can the existing capacities be better utilised for peacebuilding. The capacities of the organisation or project/programme include their competences, resources, personnel, networks, contacts and experiences. Element 2 If a security sector reform has been identified as a PBN, then a first option for action might be to improve local security in cooperation with the police force by introducing a community policing approach. Table 5: Identifying options for action (see also table 4 in Guideline 1b: documentation of peacebuilding needs) Peacebuilding needs Current contribution made by the programme Options to improve the contribution Short term Medium term Long term The two fundamental options that exist are either identifying new peacebuilding measures, or making existing strategies and measures more relevant and responsive to the conflict. New strategic elements and measures: These can be complementary strategic elements, or self-contained new projects/programmes, or additional programme components that complement appropriately the existing focal areas of work. Increasing the conflict relevance of existing measures: This can be achieved either by steering "secondary effects" more consciously e.g. strengthening a culture of dialogue by supporting forums for environmental dialogue, as in the example described above (see also Annex 1). A stronger relevance to the conflict can also be achieved by adjusting the region of intervention, or by selecting partners and target groups on a more conflict-sensitive basis. 104

105 The final judgement of the identified options for action should not be based solely on their formal conflict relevance, as this in itself is often not yet sufficiently informative. It is also important to ensure that the individual options coalesce to form a coherent and effective DC peacebuilding strategy. Building on the first thoughts on a DC peacebuilding strategy, which ideally will have been formulated when identifying the PBN (see Guideline 1b), it now becomes appropriate to elaborate more concrete pillars of the intervention strategy. To this end the identified options for action must be judged on their own individual merits, but also checked for consistency with the overarching framework of the DC peacebuilding strategy. The possible options for action must therefore satisfy the following requirements: The options for action respond to the PBN, i.e. they are relevant. The options for action are coherent, i.e. they recognisably form part of a conflict-sensitive overall strategy, toward the realisation of which they provide a range of mutually coordinated contributions. The options for action promise to make a significant contribution toward conflict transformation, i.e. the work is clearly focused on realistic PBN. No attempt is made to satisfy the highest possible number of PBN simultaneously. The options for action are clearly coordinated with the activities of other actors (for peace), i.e. they do not duplicate the work of others but seek to make a complementary contribution. The options for action seek to address the PBN on a sustainable basis, e.g. by strengthening the appropriate institutional structures, while remaining flexible enough to respond to the current dynamics of the conflict situation Step 4: Designing new or adjusted measures When the peace and conflict-related relevance assessment is complete, the new or adjusted strategy and measures have to be designed in accordance with the rules agreed between the partner government and BMZ (e.g. priority area strategies), and between the client and implementing organisation (e.g. Development-Policy Framework for Contracts and Cooperation / AURA offer, Logframe). Ideally, this design will be formulated as a clearly delineated DC peacebuilding strategy, which on the one hand will include key development-policy underpinnings, and on the other hand will provide concrete operational starting points. It should for instance provide clear guidance on the selection or adjustment of the region of intervention, executing organisations, intermediaries and target groups, as well as on the time schedule and on the professional personnel strategy for the new or adjusted country portfolio or project/programme. Key to the manageability and feasibility of a strategy of this kind is a transparent plan of action, which should clearly indicate individual steps (including for instance the resolution of outstanding issues), their sequencing, and the allocation of responsibilities. Element 2 For further information see the Guideline "Recommendations for contract and cooperation management to ensure the conflict-sensitive design and steering of TC projects and programmes" (Lorenz 2005). Although the decisions taken and strategies elaborated in this PCA element to adjust a country portfolio or measure should be as concrete as possible, they should not (yet) lead directly to action. It is important here that they remain provisional, because in the next PCA element (Guideline 3: Risk Management) they still need to be reviewed with regard to their (risk-free) feasibility. 105

106 Summary: Assessing the Peacebuilding Relevance The peace and conflict-related relevance assessment results in 1) the identification of options for DC action to help build peace, and 2) the conception of new, extended or adjusted strategies and measures for peacebuilding, and the elaboration of a (still provisional) peacebuilding strategy. In the following element of the PCA (Guideline 3: Risk Management) the feasibility of these newly envisaged / adjusted measures in the conflict context is reviewed. In the final element (Guideline 4: Peace and Conflict-Related Impact Monitoring), the possible positive and negative impacts of these measures on the conflict are assessed, and conflict-sensitive criteria are integrated into the standard results-based monitoring system. Finally, the DC peacebuilding strategy can then be formulated. Results of element 2 Conflict-sensitive design of the project/programme, or strategy for the country portfolio (objectives, activities, partners, intermediaries, results) Used in the following elements/steps of PCA implementation Risk management to review the feasibility of the project/programme or portfolio design Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring (monitoring the newly designed or adjusted contribution to the peacebuilding needs) Element 2 106

107 Annex 1: Example of Application Assessing the Peacebuilding Relevance of an Environmental Programme Causes of the conflict Manifestation in the environmental sector 1. Weakness of the central state, inadequate services and legitimacy, corruption Traditional neglect of rural areas by the central government. Ineffectiveness and poor transparency of the environmental organisations weakens the implementation of environmental policies. Peacebuilding needs Relevant measures of the environmental programme Improve public services in rural areas. Promote the services of agricultural extension providers and other local intermediaries. Promote transparent state structures and decision-making processes, reduce corruption. Improve the management of environmental institutions' instruments for environmental economics. 2. Limited political participation, impunity, lawlessness, violent conflict Violent environmental conflicts (e.g. over water) due to poor constructive conflict management capacities of the responsible authorities. Inadequate formulation and enforcement of legal environmental standards. Inadequate inclusion of disadvantaged sections of the population in the formulation of environmental policies and rights of use (e.g. water, forest) Uncontrolled exploitation of natural resources by international concerns (e.g. precious metals, timber), sometimes within the scope of concessions of armed groups Strengthen the role of state institutions as institutionalised channels for the constructive management of environmental conflicts. Strengthen the rule of law, especially the regulation of conflicts and the enforcement of legal standards. Improve participation in political decisionmaking processes for all sections of society. Enable civil society actors to play a professional role in decision-making processes. Promote ecologically and socially responsible business practices by private enterprises. Promote the participatory preparation of land-use plans for watersheds, train officials in conflict management. Promote the preparation of land-use plans for watersheds. Help establish consultative fora to include disadvantaged sections of the population in the definition of land-use plans. Promote the dissemination of guidelines for conflict-sensitive business practices and the preparation of a Code of Conduct for forest enterprises in conflict zones. Element 2 107

108 3. Social inequality, unequal access to land and other natural resources, impoverishment 4. Lack of experience with constructive dialogue and peaceful conflict resolution 5. Drug production and trade as a source of financing for armed groups Source: Lorenz, GTZ 2005 Displacement of small farmers into ecologically marginal zones and overexploitation of soils. Powerlessness of small farmers in the face of displacement and forced recruitment by armed groups. Impoverished rural population and displaced in urban zones serve as a recruitment pool for armed groups. Violent resolution of environmental conflicts (e.g. over access to water) Low public awareness of the environmental impacts of armed conflicts Small farmers cultivate drugs due to lack of profitable legal sources of income, or in response to pressure by armed groups. Element 2 Promote sustainable natural resource management and improve rural income. Establish local associations and strengthen their role vis-à-vis external actors. Strengthen social cohesion, local identity and sense of community in rural areas. Strengthen constructive dialogue between the state and civil society. Promote a public debate on the environmental impacts of conflicts, as a starting point for elaborating joint solutions. Maintain rural households' independence from income generated through drug production. Introduce sustainable farming methods, increase the profitability of rural production. Help establish and strengthen farmers' organisations. Strengthen the human dignity, cultural identity and rootedness of local communities by promoting the joint stewardship and management of natural resources. Provide premises for societal dialogue on environmental issues. Raise awareness of the environmental impacts of armed conflicts. Improve the forestry income of landless and small farmer households. Promote food production to support the food security of rural households. 108

109 Annex 2: Bibliography and Further Reading Anderson, Mary B., 1999: Do No Harm. How Can Aid Support Peace or War. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Anderson, Mary B. / Olson, Lara, 2003: Confronting War. Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners. Cambridge, MA: Collaborative for Development Action. Barbolet, Adam et al., 2005: The Utility and Dilemmas of Conflict Sensitivity. Berlin: Berghof Handbook. Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2005: Discussion Series on PCIA. Berghof Handbook. BMZ, 2005: Sector Strategy for Crisis Prevention, Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding in German Development Cooperation. Bouta, Tsjeard / Frerks, Georg / Bannon, Ian, 2005: Gender, Conflict and Development. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Brabant, Koenraad van, 2001a: Operational Security Management in Violent Environments A Field Manual for Aid Agencies. Humanitarian Practice Network. London: Overseas Development Institute. Brabant, Koenraad van, 2001b: Mainstreaming the Organisational Management of Safety and Security. A Review of Aid Agency Practices and a Guide for Management. London: Overseas Development Institute. HPG Report 9. Brabant, Koenraad van, 2002: Module Security Strategies. London: RedR. Bush, Kenneth, 2003: Hands-On PCIA. Part I. A Handbook for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment. Collaborative for Development Action, 2004: Reflecting on Peace Practice Handbook ( Collier, Paul et al., 2003: Breaking the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development Policy. World Bank Research Report. Washington, DC: World Bank. CPR Network, 2005: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) Handbook. ( DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2005: Preventing Conflict and Building Peace. A Manual of Issues and Entry Points. Paris: OECD/DAC. Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, 2002: Sicherheitsleitfaden. Bonn: Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.v. DFID, 2002: Conducting a Strategic Conflict Assessment. London. DFID, 2005: Guidance on Evaluation and Review for DFID Staff. London: DFID Evaluation Department. Element 2 Dugan, Máire A., 2001: Imaging the Future: A Tool for Conflict Resolution. pp in: Thania Paffenholz / Luc Reychler, Peacebuilding. A Field Guide. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Dworken, Jonathan T., 2001a: Threat Assessment. Training Module for NGOs Operating in Conflict Zones and High-Crime Areas. London: RedR. Dworken, Jonathan T., 2001b: Vulnerability Assessment. Training Module for NGOs Operating in Conflict Zones and High-Crime Areas. London: RedR. Dworken, Jonathan T., 2001c: Security Planning. From Risk Assessment to Security Plan. Training Module for NGOs Operating in Conflict Zones and High-Crime Areas. London: RedR. Eguren, Enrique, 2005: Protection Manual for Human Rights Defenders. Dublin: Front Line. The International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders. Fisher, Simon et al., 2000: Working with Conflict. Skills and Strategies for Action. Responding to Conflict (RTC). London: Zed Books. Frieters, Norbert, 2003: Konflikt-Monitoring für Vorhaben der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Eschborn: GTZ. Hasemann, Armin / Hübner-Schmid, Katharina / Dargatz, Anja, 2005: Konfliktanalyse zur Entwicklung von Handlungsoptionen für gesellschaftspolitische Kooperationsprogramme. Ein methodischer Leitfaden. Bonn: FriEnt/FES/GTZ. ( Hasemann, Armin, 2005: Konfliktbezogene Wirkungsbeobachtung, inkl. Konfliktsensitive Planung von gesellschaftspolitischen Kooperationsprojekten. Ein methodischer Leitfaden. Bonn: FES. Hofmann, Birgit, 2006: Checklist zur Bestandsaufnahme und Analyse von Sicherheitssekto-ren in Partnerländern. Eschborn: GTZ. Interministerielles Rahmenkonzept zur Unterstützung von Reformen des Sicherheitssektors in Entwicklungs- und Transformationsländern, 2006, 109

110 Jackson, Stephen with Siobhan Calthrop, 2002: Making Sense of Unstable Contexts. Tools for Analysis and Action. World Vision. John Hopkins University, Conflict Management Tools, Leonhardt, Manuela, 2001: Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and Management. A Practical Guideline. Eschborn: GTZ Leonhardt, Manuela, 2001: Conflict Impact Assessment for Development Projects. A Practical Guideline. Eschborn: GTZ. Litsch, Elisabeth Maria / Linsenmayr, Rainer, 2006: Wenn Wissen Leben retten kann Gewalt und Gefahren gewachsen sein. Ein praktischer Ratgeber für den Auslandseinsatz. Eschborn: GTZ. Lorenz, Kathrin, 2005: Recommendations for Contract and Cooperation Management to Ensure the Conflict-Sensitive Design and Steering of TC Projects and Programmes. A Guideline. Eschborn: GTZ. OECD/DAC, 1999: Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies. OECD/DAC, 2002: Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management. Paris: DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation. OECD/DAC, forthcoming: Guidelines for Conflict-Sensitive Impact Assessment. OECD/DAC, 2007: Handbook on Security System Reform. Supporting Security and Justice. Paris: OECD. Paffenholz, Thania, 2004: Designing Transformation and Intervention Processes. p in: Austin, Alex / Fischer, Martina / Ropers, Norbert (eds.), Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict. The Berghof Handbook. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Paffenholz, Thania, 2005: Third-Generation PCIA. Introducing the Planning and Assessment Approach for Conflict Zones. Berlin: Berghof Handbook. Paffenholz, Thania / Reychler, Luc, 2007: Aid for Peace, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Rothman, Jay, 2004: Action Evaluation. Berlin: Berghof Handbook. Element 2 Saferworld et al., 2004: Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development Cooperation, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding. A Resource Pack. London. Scherg, Nina, 2004: Leitfaden zur krisenpräventiven Portfoliogestaltung. Eschborn: GTZ. SDC, Monitoring entwicklungsrelevanter Veränderungen (MERV) SDC, 2005: Conflict-Sensitive Program Management in International Cooperation. Mainstreaming the Prevention of Violence. Bern. SIDA, 2004: Conflict-Sensitive Development Cooperation. How to Conduct a Conflict Analysis. Stockholm: SIDA. Sprenger, Dirk / Kruk, Gabriele, 2005: Basic Principles of Crisis Prevention, Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding. Course Concept and Training Module for Decision-Makers and Experts in German Development Cooperation. Bonn/Eschborn: BMZ/GTZ. UNDP / World Bank, 2004: Practical Guide to Post-Conflict Needs Assessment. New York/Washington DC. UNDP / World Bank, 2005: An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices Using Results-Based Frameworks in Fragile States. New York / Washington DC. UNDG ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues, 2004: Inter-Agency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Transition Situations. New York. USAID, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, 2004: Conducting a Conflict Assessment. A Framework for Analysis and Program Development. Washington DC. VENRO, 2003: Mindeststandards für die Personalsicherheit in der humanitären Hilfe. Bonn: VENRO. Wils, Oliver et al., 2006: Systemische Konflikttransformation. Konzept und Anwendungsgebiete. Berlin: Berghof Foundation for Peace Support. Zupan, Natascha, 2005: Methoden der Evaluation im Konfliktkontext. FriEnt Briefing Nr. 3. Bonn. Websites (database containing evaluation reports on humanitarian aid, often in conflict situations) (PCIA dialogue series) (CPR Network: Compendium of Operational Tools for Peacebuilding) (database containing international tools for conflict analysis, conflict-sensitive project planning and conflict-related impact monitoring / OECD DAC Evaluation Resource Centre; contains approx. 50 peace- and conflict-related evaluation reports by international donors) 110

111 Peace and Conflict Assessment Element 3 Risk Management Analysing and Reducing Risks for Investments, Personnel and the Achievement of Development Cooperation Objectives PCA Introduction Element 1a: Peace and Conflict Analysis (CA) Element 1b: Peacebuilding Needs (PBN) Element 2: Peace and Conflict-Related Relevance Assessment Element 3: Risk Management Element 4: Peace and Conflict- Related Impact Monitoring Element 3

112 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations BMZ BOGs CA COPE DC DFID EC EU GTZ InWEnt KfW NGO PBN PCA RMO UN USA V-EZ ZS German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development Basic Operating Guidelines Peace and Conflict Analysis Cooperation With Personnel in Stress, Conflict and Crisis (GTZ) Development Cooperation Department for International Development (GB) Economic Cooperation European Union Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit InWEnt Capacity Building International, Germany Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau Non-Governmental Organisation Peacebuilding Needs Peace and Conflict Assessment Risk Management Office United Nations United States of America International Training Centre for Development Cooperation (InWEnt) KfW Central Services Element 3 112

113 Table of Contents 1. Task Definition and Application What is risk management? Applications of risk management What is risk management at country level? What is risk management at project/programme level? Measures to Increase the Security of Staff Against Physical and Psychological Violence Context Monitoring, Assessment and Evaluation of Risks for Development Cooperation How is context monitoring done? Methodology of context monitoring Step 1: Defining the stakeholders and objective Step 2: Defining what is to be monitored (monitoring checklist) Step 3: Data collection Step 4: Data evaluation 127 Annexes Annex 1: Elements of the Security Analysis 130 Annex 2: UN Criteria for Assessing the Phases of a Crisis 131 Annex 3: Components of a Security Plan 132 Annex 4: Checklist for Conflict-Related Context Monitoring at Project/Programme Level 133 Annex 5: Conflict Risks in a New Decentralisation Project/Programme 134 Annex 6: Bibliography and Further Reading 135 Index of boxes, tables and figures Box 1: Basic premises of the Risk Management Office in Nepal 117 Box 2: Cooperation and coordination with the German Embassy 118 Box 3: Example: DFID-GTZ Risk Management Office in Nepal 119 Box 4: Risk management at project/programme level 121 Table 1: Roles and tasks in security analysis at country and project/programme level 121 Table 2: Basic elements of risk management 122 Table 3: Roles and tasks in conflict-related context monitoring at country level 124 Table 4: Possible format for the brief record 127 Table 5: A schematic view of areas for monitoring (example of use) 128 Fig. 1: Elements of development cooperation and security-related risk management 117 Element 3 113

114 Summary: The Risk Management Process and Its Results Element 3 of the Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA) Risk Management seeks to identify the potential (negative) effects that a conflict may have on development cooperation (DC), and ways of professionally managing them. With the overall objective of reducing threats and preventing risks, this PCA element aims primarily to help a) recognise existing/changing risks, b) identify necessary adjustments to measures, and c) establish appropriate implementation structures. Based on the DC-relevant security analysis and context monitoring, in this element the DC country portfolio and/or individual development interventions are continually reviewed to ensure that their implementation remains feasible and as risk-free as possible within the given conflict situation. It addresses the risks of physical and psychological violence against personnel, issues of investment security, and the risks to the feasibility of the strategy, project/programme design and achievement of objectives. In the subsequent and final PCA element (Guideline 4: Peace and Conflict-Related Impact Monitoring), the converse issue is raised of how DC intends or is able to influence the (violent) conflict. Element 3 114

115 1. Task Definition and Application Element 3 Objectives Risk management Identify risks for project and portfolio management emerging from the development cooperation environment, and any need to adjust measures Manage systematically the risks posed by the environment for personal safety of development cooperation staff investments the feasibility of the development cooperation country strategy and measures Key questions Which trends and changes are currently taking place in the development cooperation environment (conflict dynamics/escalation, regional changes, actors, themes and events)? What are the consequences of these events/changes for staff safety and implementation of the portfolio? Are the risks to personnel and the portfolio still acceptable? Procedure/ instruments Development cooperation related security analysis Monitoring of the development cooperation environment, risk assessment Identify the action required at the strategic, operational and personnel levels Areas of application Development cooperation related security analysis Monitoring of the development cooperation environment Development and implementation of risk-conscious implementation strategies for development cooperation measures In contrast to the more analytical elements 1 and 2, elements 3 and 4 of the Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA) are integrated into ongoing management in crisis countries. This means that the present element takes on the following special characteristics: The PCA element Risk Management is an integral component of the duty of care and is thus a managerial task (at both country and project/programme level). The aspects of staff safety and (conflict-sensitive) operational orientation should be understood as being closely linked. Risk management (PCA element 3) and peace and conflict-related impact monitoring (PCA element 4) are closely linked to each other Element 3 Increasingly, development cooperation (DC) is operating in settings where an elevated level of violence and conflict is encountered in the societies of the partner countries. Only professional risk management ensures the safe and effective implementation of DC contracts. 115

116 1.1. What is risk management? Working definition: Risk management is a process in which risks to personnel, to investments and to the achievement of DC objectives are made transparent. Measures are then taken to minimise the threats to personnel and ensure that the risks for the achievement of DC objectives are acceptable. Risk management therefore comprises 1. Security and peace and conflict analyses. The security analysis identifies the anticipated immediate risks posed to individuals and infrastructure in the implementation of the (planned) DC measures. The security concept is developed on the basis of the analysis of the potential threat, the possible vulnerability and the capacities of the organisation (see Annex 1). For further details on peace and conflict analyses see Guideline 1a. 2. Continuous context monitoring. In order to be able to continuously observe the dynamic courses of conflicts and the security situation, relevant areas for monitoring are identified from the results of the security and conflict analyses. Current trends and developments are then systematically traced, which provides a basis for the 3. Assessment and evaluation of risks. The trends identified in the areas for monitoring are evaluated and assessed with respect to their potential risks. This assessment encompasses the dimensions a) feasibility of the DC strategies, b) feasibility of the concrete DC measures, and c) personnel safety. 4. Steering and adjustment of measures. In order to be able to respond appropriately and responsibly to the changed framework conditions and risks, strategies, modes of implementation, personnel aspects and additional (security) measures are reviewed and brought into line with the new situation. Element 3 116

117 Fig. 1: Elements of development cooperation and security-related risk management Peace and conflict analysis Security analysis Country concept: priority area setting priority area strategies country talks political dialogue use of instruments etc. Security concept: crisis checklists training measures local advisory services etc. identification of relevant areas for monitoring Continuous DC-related context monitoring with respect to the selected areas in order to assess and evaluate risks Risk Management Strategy: Which risks does the strategy involve? Are the framework conditions (still) such that the objectives can be achieved and the strategy implemented? Structures and processes: Are there clear roles and responsibilities for risk management? Are the procedures and processes designed such that the risk is recognised, minimised and the work takes place under acceptable risk conditions? Personnel: Is risk management understood to be part of the management's responsibility? Are the staff members suitable and sensitised to the risks? Do staff members know how to minimise risks? Measures to increase staff safety: Is sufficient protection against hazards in place? All are staff members suitably prepared for possible hazardous situations? DC structures: coordination mechanisms roles and responsibilities for risk management international and national networks etc. Project concept: personnel strategy operation etc. Risk management examines the effects of the conflict situation on DC, and seeks options for maintaining graduated scope for DC action under these circumstances. Two closely related objectives are key here: 1. Guaranteeing an (acceptable) level of security for personnel against physical and psychological violence, as well as an acceptable level of security for property (office, cars, materials) against removal and misuse. The safety of staff must always be the top priority ( section 2). 2. Ensuring that objectives are achieved and investments protected. This is achieved by continuously adjusting the strategic and operational orientation of DC on the basis of monitoring the dynamic contexts of conflict and insecurity ( section 3) Element 3 Box 1: Basic premises of the Risk Management Office in Nepal (see below for further details) Effective risk management and effective development work are mutually inseparable. Both require a sound understanding of the local context and a comprehensive knowledge of what connects or divides people and communities. In the context of complex and violent conflicts it is also important for an organisation and for development programmes to be highly sensitive both to their self-perception, and to how they are seen by various groups and actors. 117

118 Risk management is part of an organisation s corporate duty of care, and as such is clearly a managerial task. Risk management at country level is therefore the responsibility of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the management of the implementing organisations (e.g. GTZ country director or country officer of KfW). At project/programme level responsibility rests with the officer responsible for contracts and cooperation. Risk management and peace and conflict-related impact monitoring are closely linked. For instance, unexpected results detected by impact monitoring may either point to "false" results hypotheses, or in conflictual situations may often also indicate elevated risks for staff safety and for the feasibility of the existing DC activities. Conversely, high-risk aspects identified in the risk management process should be incorporated into the mechanisms of impact monitoring so that any unintended negative impacts of DC can be properly assessed and monitored. The identified elements of risk management apply in all countries with a heightened or acute need for prevention (i.e. once again the "yellow and red" countries, see annual BMZ crisis early warning report). In these countries in particular this management tool has the key function of identifying security concerns and other constraining factors that mark the limits of DC interventions, as well as providing a transparent public rationale for the specific procedure adopted in these situations Applications of risk management What is risk management at country level? Risk management is a continuous process of steering and management applied in crisis countries. It enables BMZ and the management of the implementing organisations to reduce the risks to staff members, and to make full use of the options for DC and for continuing to work in contexts and regions where it would no longer be responsible to work without a professional risk management system. Continuous context monitoring and conscious and systematic management of the risks at country level provide managers with an improved basis for reviewing, presenting and substantiating the strategies and procedures that have been adjusted to the respective situation. It can also serve as a basis for making appropriate strategic decisions in these complex situations (e.g. adding conditionalities, modifying the advisory approach or the geographical focus of DC). In order to achieve donor coherence in politically delicate situations, a systematic evaluation of this kind is usually absolutely essential. Element 3 Box 2: Cooperation and coordination with the German Embassy DC-related context monitoring can be a politically sensitive issue in its own right. Thus in any case it is imperative to ensure close cooperation between the German Embassy, the responsible BMZ division and the other implementing organisations. Due to the interfaces with respective tasks of the embassy as well as activities of other international donors both need to be included as in important source of existing information. To date, comprehensive risk management at country level has been developed in only a few cases in DC. Where risk management systems are in place (e.g. Risk Management Office / RMO in Nepal) they are highly effective. Joint analyses and discussions about perspectives of the donor community are important elements in that matter. From a financial perspective, too, such systems can be operated most cost-efficiently in association with other actors. 118

119 Example of risk management at country level in Nepal The following example will illustrate how during the escalation of the conflict in Nepal it was possible not only to continue working even in those regions particularly hard hit by the violence, but also to keep the risks to staff significantly low. The example and the experiences gained in Nepal provide a particularly clear illustration of the following aspects: successful institutionalisation of risk management at country level; joint approach of several international organisations; linking of staff safety aspects with the effective and conflict-sensitive orientation of DC. Box 3: Example: DFID-GTZ Risk Management Office in Nepal The task of the RMO operated jointly by the Department for International Development (DFID) and GTZ in Nepal is to enable DC projects/programmes to work successfully and safely in a conflict region. The approach pursued by the RMO is to link security and risk management with development work. Effective risk management and effective development work are mutually inseparable. Both require a sound understanding of the local context and a comprehensive knowledge of what connects or divides people and communities. In the context of complex and violent conflicts it is also important for an organisation and for development programmes to be highly sensitive both to their self-perception, and to how they are seen by various groups and actors. The DFID-GTZ Risk Management Office in Nepal began its work in December The RMO currently employs four permanent staff members: one international risk management advisor, one national deputy to the risk management advisor, one information coordinator and one finance/administration coordinator. The purpose of the office is to advise, train and support DFID, the GTZ office and the DC programmes so that these programmes can also continue their work under conditions of conflict. The RMO budget for the two-year period was 570,000. The risk management system comprises: 1) The collection and analysis of relevant information / monitoring of the conflict and security environment The RMO has established a system to collect and analyse conflict-related information from the field and from the media. The DC programmes are kept up to date on the respective threat situation through regular meetings and reports. 2) Emergency back-up communication systems In order to remain in contact even in remote regions or in situations when conventional (mobile) telephone networks are no longer working, the DC programmes are provided with radio equipment and satellite telephones. Element 3 3. Crisis management The RMO has developed a number of procedures to be followed in the event of possible crisis events or scenarios. These procedures are contained in a policy pack along with other materials. In case of crises or emergencies, the RMO team and a network of trained district emergency coordinators are on hand to advise and assist the DC programmes. 119

120 4. Basic Operating Guidelines To protect the DC measures against the consequences of being perceived as siding with or being taken in by one or other of the parties to the conflict, ten international donors / implementing organisations agreed on a code of conduct referred to as the Basic Operating Guidelines (BOGs). These guidelines, based on the principles of the International Red Cross, describe the mission of the signatory organisations as strictly neutral and humanitarian, and indicate to the parties to the conflict the required framework for development work. Violence, theft, or the harassment or abduction of staff of one of the signatories will result in consequences and sanctions being imposed by all. The BOGs also rule out any kind of financial payments being made to the parties to the conflict. 5. Instructions on how to deal with the parties to the conflict The staff of development interventions in Nepal are often approached and questioned by armed members of the parties to the conflict. As well as receiving financial demands, the project staff are questioned concerning the background to the foreign presence and development policy in Nepal. They occasionally also face general political questions concerning the foreign policy of the donor countries, again posed by members of armed groups. The RMO makes these difficult situations easier for project staff by providing them with a list of standardised, politically and objectively correct answers to a list of frequently asked questions, enabling them to present a common face. 6. Training The RMO provides project staff with basic risk management training in negotiation/communication skills, risk assessment, crisis management, conflict transformation and first aid. These measures are tailored to the specific demands of working in the context of the conflict in Nepal. Source: after Dan Huntington, Risk Management Advisor, DFID/GTZ Risk Management Office, Nepal What is risk management at project/programme level? Element 3 When a new project/programme is being prepared a security analysis is conducted to determine whether appropriate framework conditions exist, so that the feasibility of the planned development intervention can be guaranteed. The results are documented in the form of a description of the risks, and recommendations for managing them. The planned timing of the measure and the region of intervention are examined closely once more, this time from a security angle. Also documented are the special risks faced by the respective executing agencies, implementing organisations and target groups, as well as concerns raised in connection with the content of individual project components. In the case of ongoing projects/programmes new or additional options for action developed in the PCA element "Peace and Conflict-Related Relevance Assessment" are evaluated with respect to their feasibility and risks. Special risk factors should be incorporated into the subsequent results-based project/programme monitoring system. During the implementation of development interventions it is helpful for risk management at project/programme level to draw on the context monitoring at the national level. Additional effort for comprehensive, project/programme-specific context monitoring should be kept to a minimum. When establishing the monitoring system at country level it should therefore be ensured that wherever possible the aspects relevant to projects/programmes are integrated. Informally (or formally within the scope of annual reporting) almost all projects/programmes have established a system through which they are able to obtain information on trends in the specific environment that they consider relevant. In risk management it is thus especially important to extend such existing systems for context monitoring to include key conflict aspects, and to focus on the risks that emerge from them. 120

121 In politically sensitive development interventions (all C2 projects/programmes, but also others such as those in the field of human rights etc.), the immediate conflict environment of the project/programme should be monitored at regular intervals in addition to the monitoring system at country level. Depending on the threat level, a detailed security analysis focusing on the project/programme and its immediate radius of intervention must be carried out. This may generate additional security strategies that complement the frameworks in place at the national level. Box 4: Risk management at project/programme level Appraisal of new projects/ security analysis and risk assessment where appropriate programmes adjustment of the planned project/ programme design C2 conflict-related context monitoring security analysis C1, C0 security analysis 2. Measures to Increase the Security of Staff Against Physical and Psychological Violence Building on the initial security analysis, measures to increase staff safety encompass a broad spectrum ranging from preventive measures (e.g. information systems, standard operating procedures, training measures etc.) to evacuation plans. This package of measures relates to the country level and specific regions of DC intervention, and is often referred to as the security strategy. The security strategy must continuously adapt to changing conditions and needs, and is therefore a "living document". Transparency of the strategy and of the rationale behind relevant decision making increases people's acceptance of the strategy, and their motivation to follow its rules. Security analysis at country and project/programme level is primarily the task of the in-country office of the respective organisation, which carries out the analysis in consultation and exchange with the German Embassy and the international organisations (e.g. mission of the United Nations / UN, see UN criteria in Annex 2) and establishes a corresponding security management framework in the country. The frequency with which the security aspects of the context monitoring procedures are updated will depend on the dynamics of the violent situation in question, and may fluctuate between daily, weekly, monthly or six-monthly reports. The key tasks of the various officers responsible for contracts and cooperation for the individual development interventions comprise the provision of information from their areas of work, and implementation of the security management framework. Table 1: Roles and tasks in security analysis at country and project/programme level Element 3 Responsible German Embassy BMZ Role/tasks Monitors the security situation, communicates with DC organisations in the country, designs a crisis plan (focusing on the contingency of evacuation) Ensures that the DC-relevant security analysis is conducted by the implementing organisations (duty of care) 121

122 In-country representation of the implementing organisation (e.g. GTZ country director or country officer of KfW) Responsible for implementation and quality of the DC-relevant security analysis at country level Establishes a structure (e.g. own office) and trains staff to analyse and evaluate security-relevant changes in the environment, possibly in cooperation with other international organisations Designs and adjusts the security strategy and is responsible for its implementation (in consultation with BMZ) Officer responsible for contracts and cooperation (e.g. programme manager) External consultants Responsible for implementing a project/programme-specific detailed security analysis Responsible for implementing the security strategy at project/ programme level Conceptual support and practical implementation of the security analysis Stakeholders German DC organisations in-country Bi- and multilateral donors Provide information and contacts Provide inputs to the security analysis Government/partner(s) International and national NGOs Research institutes The concrete design of the security strategy is highly situation-specific. Given the importance of the issue it is recommended that professional expertise be called in to assist during the establishment and initial implementation phase. This guideline therefore does not provide detailed methodological orientation on aspects of managing the risks of physical and psychological violence to which DC personnel and infrastructure are exposed, but only lists basic elements, and specify sources and responsible agencies. Unfortunately the guidance in place is often confined to international personnel, and does not include national staff. Element 3 Table 2: Basic elements of risk management Element Analysis and monitoring Security analysis Assess the situation of threat, vulnerability and organisational capacities (deterrence, protection and acceptance). Comments Should be carried out by specialised individuals/experts, depending on the level of threat Monitor security-relevant changes in the environment either separately or as an integral component of broader context monitoring. Define responsibilities clearly, if required establish own office (see RMO Nepal). 122

123 Regular meetings for evaluation and to develop scenarios and corresponding options for action Should take place on a regular basis and if possible integrated into existing processes (e.g. management meetings of officers responsible for contracts and cooperation with country director etc.) Prevention and management Crisis checklist of the crisis officer and crisis plans in the respective countries (GTZ/embassy) Develop a security plan (introduction, background, standard operating procedures, crisis plans and practical information). Emergency scenarios for possible crises (funds and implementation plans adjusted to the respective scenarios, appropriate means of communication, guarantee of medical care, appropriate safety equipment) Training measures for security awareness, self-protection and driving Advisory services for security delivered locally. Depending on the circumstances and level of threat, a security advisor might be deployed as a short-term or as a long-term expert. Training measures for personal stress and crisis management (GTZ, InWEnt V-EZ) Develop basic operating guidelines for work in regions affected by conflict. In close consultation with the embassy Crisis desks of the implementing organisations Detailed description of the components of a security plan (see Annex 3) Should be reviewed regularly to check that they are still appropriate, also with respect to possibly changed conditions (which form of crisis is likely?) Are offered among others by GTZ/KfW and InWEnt V-EZ Various models possible, what is crucial are clear responsibilities and the consistent application of security-related decisions, strategies and preventive measures, also during "non-violent" periods Are offered among others by GTZ and InWEnt V-EZ Particularly appropriate for work at local level, and in coordination with other donors and implementing organisations Preventive medical measures Etc. Further information (currently only available in German): GTZ Crisis Desk and COPE: Medical training measures appropriate to the situation, depending on the level of threat and current health care provision Element 3 GTZ "Sicherheit- und Krisenmanagement im Ausland - Handlungsrahmen": Litsch, Elisabeth Maria / Linsenmayr, Rainer, 2006: Wenn Wissen Leben retten kann Gewalt und Gefahren gewachsen sein: Ein praktischer Ratgeber für den Auslandseinsatz. Eschborn: GTZ. KfW: Abteilung Zentrale Services (ZS) BMZ Crisis Officer, Head of Section 213, [email protected] 123

124 3. Context Monitoring, Assessment and Evaluation of Risks for Development Cooperation Context monitoring always requires a conscious decision concerning its intensity. As well as supporting more complex and elaborate systems, the procedure described here can also be used to support more systematic monitoring within the scope of normal reporting. Since regular context monitoring is very complex, it is best to take the country level as a starting point. The methodology is comparable at all levels. At project/programme level, a pragmatic approach is required. Highly project/programme-specific aspects can be supplemented using key questions or checklists for the respective development intervention. The checklists should be prepared and tested when project/programme implementation begins. The planners should then determine the intervals at which the evaluation of the political risks needs to be regularly updated (e.g. every 6 months), in order to be able to identify changes in the conflict-related framework conditions (see Annexes 4 und 5 for examples). Where possible, systematic context monitoring should be conducted jointly by several organisations in the country concerned. At the level of German DC, in many cases the country team would be the appropriate platform for exchange here. This can support the development of a joint evaluation of the conflict situation, thus harmonising and strengthening the position of the participating organisations vis-à-vis the conflict actors. At the same time the effort for the individual organisations can be kept relatively little. Some of the options for actions identified through context monitoring at country level (e.g. adding conditionalities, geographical concentration of DC) can, however, only be implemented appropriately in coherence with other donors. Therefore a regular mechanism should be established for feeding the debates conducted within the country team into the national discussion bodies of other bilateral and where appropriate multilateral donors How is context monitoring done? Conflicts are highly dynamic and complex processes. A conflict can quickly change the framework conditions, jeopardising the development-policy mandate or the current approach. The systematic monitoring of conflict dynamics can be performed at various levels of systematisation and intensity. It can take a very simple form, or can be very extensive. In yellow countries for instance it may be sufficient to explicitly include the conflict-related risks in the annual reports in the existing formats. The degree of complexity should be determined by the objectives, the external circumstances and the potentials of the organisation. The more that context monitoring can be incorporated into existing processes, the better. Element 3 Table 3: Roles and tasks in conflict-related context monitoring at country level Responsible BMZ Role/tasks Initiation of and support during context monitoring, and where needed adjustment of country and priority area strategies Cooperation with German Embassy during context monitoring German Embassy (economic cooperation/ EC specialists) Country team in Germany Management of the DC country team on-site in close cooperation with BMZ and programmatic support in context monitoring Deliver advisory services to BMZ 124

125 In-country representation of the implementing organisation (e.g. GTZ country director or country officer of KfW) Country team in-country Responsible for implementation and quality assurance of context monitoring, and evaluation of its results Restructuring/adjustment within the scope of the responsibilities of the implementing organisations External consultants Conceptual support in the development of an appropriate monitoring system, and where appropriate delivery of ongoing technical consultancy inputs on its implementation/application Stakeholders German DC organisations in-country Bi- and multilateral donors Government/partner(s) Provide information and contacts Provide inputs for context monitoring May utilise the results and provide joint feedback International and national NGOs Research institutes Monitoring the conflict-related environment means monitoring the political, economic and social context of DC against the background of the conflict. It neither replaces nor competes with formalised conflict monitoring, as is normally performed by diplomatic representations, but rather focuses on a smaller range of factors that are relevant to the strategy and practical implementation of DC. It is therefore especially important to identify coherently the areas for monitoring on the basis of the peace and conflict analysis (CA) and the security analysis for DC. Conflict-related context monitoring is an informal instrument that builds on the CA and provides the basis for systematic risk management. In doing so it guarantees that the strategy, design and orientation of the country portfolio or the project/programme are harmonised with the changing (conflict) environment, and that conditions for safe and successful project/programme implementation remain in place, and that the management is responding appropriately to possible risks Methodology of context monitoring Step 1: Defining the stakeholders and objectives To be able to define the object and process of context monitoring, the participating organisations must from the outset establish a common understanding of their objectives. The following objectives may be linked to context monitoring: Element 3 space for joint reflection and discussion of developments relevant to the conflict, and for elaborating DC approaches and strategies that respond to these trends. Visualisation of and transparency in the approaches taken by the participating organisations in dealing with the conflict-related framework conditions of their work. provision of current conflict-related analyses that form a frame of reference for internal decision-making by the participating organisations concerning the steering and adjustment of their programmes. 125

126 Step 2: Defining what is to be monitored (monitoring checklist) The subjects for context monitoring include current trends in the fields of security, politics, civil society, in the economic, ecological and social environment (internal factors) and in the international domain (external factors). Special attention is focused on those trends that might affect the peacebuilding objectives of the participating organisations. Not only risks, but also opportunities should be identified to which the organisations should possibly respond. Conflict-related context monitoring builds on the peace and conflict analysis already carried out, the results of which can be used to identify what is to be monitored. Especially when drawing up the monitoring checklist, it is important to include the various factors for peace and for conflict, the actors for peace and for conflict, and the anticipated scenarios. It may also be the case that the assumptions and risks for the project design contained in the offer text and in the existing report formats highlight relevant objects for monitoring for the respective priority area. This presupposes, however, that the conflict was already systematically taken into account in the planning (working in conflict). Having said that, conflict-related context monitoring cannot document all the possibly significant trends in the country, but must be confined to those data relevant to the participating organisations. To achieve this it is helpful to design the project/programme-specific context monitoring and the national context monitoring on a complementary basis. To this end, when responding e.g. to the national monitoring checklists (for the country level), the individual projects/ programmes should provide only answers that are "filtered" for their specific sector or region of intervention. This information is then supplemented by the national monitoring. Example: Infiltration by rebels The infiltration of institutions or civil society bodies by rebels can have negative consequences if this is not monitored in good time. Example: Affinity of security agencies The affinity of national security agencies for certain groups of society creates a negative attitude toward the institution among the disadvantaged groups, which may bring about or reinforce a crisis situation. Example: A society's perception of small arms The proliferation and use of small arms in a country's society can, if the background is not analysed, result in escalation of an existing crisis situation due to misperceptions Step 3: Data collection Element 3 Responsibility for implementation of this context monitoring rests with the management of the participating organisations, who may delegate the task to appropriate units or staff members. The data collection should be coordinated by a joint body of the participating organisations, which should also evaluate the data. Ideally, context monitoring will be integrated into regular meetings as an item on the 126

127 agenda. This also determines the periodicity of the surveys, whereas context monitoring at six-monthly intervals would seem appropriate given a relatively stable situation. Particular events may necessitate additional monitoring or shorter reporting intervals. Responsibility for data collection, and preparation and documentation of the evaluation meetings, can be rotated among the participating organisations. Where possible, national resource persons and other international actors should also be involved. In cases where the national intelligentsia are strongly politicised it can be difficult to identify sources (e.g. academics, journalists) that are acceptable to all sides. Here, the expertise of the political foundations and local contacts can be helpful Step 4: Data evaluation The results of each context monitoring survey should be documented in a short record, and/or should be incorporated into the regular reporting procedures. These documents contain a short version of the key monitoring results, and briefly outline the need for discussion and action by the participating organisations arising from them. This does not imply that all the participating organisations must agree on a single interpretation of the current trends. The record may therefore also reflect different perspectives. Depending on the degree of sensitivity of the information in the record, the accessibility and dissemination of the record and the analyses should be thoughtfully managed (e.g. only available for inspection in hard copy at the GTZ office). Table 4: Possible format for the brief record Objectives, strategies and measures of DC (country level and/or project/programme level) Changes in contextual factors that are relevant to these objectives, strategies and measures Risks and opportunities created by these changes in the environment Options for risk reduction This instrument is also too imprecise to be able in itself to define possibly needed changes in the work of individual DC organisations. It should rather be seen as an indicator of possibly problematic developments that may require more precise investigation. Context monitoring does not therefore imply any direct course of action, but is rather designed to provide a common frame of reference to which the decisions taken internally by the individual organisations can refer. Where possible, however, the participating organisations should strive to coordinate their approach to the results of the context monitoring. Element 3 127

128 Table 5: A schematic view of areas for monitoring (example of use) The presented scheme was used by a country team on-site under the management of the German Embassy. Many of the listed observation areas (such as the general security situation, political environment, trends in global economy) are within the monitoring-responsibility of the Embassy. It is therefore essential to very closely cooperate with the embassies, which are part of the country team on-site. Subject areas for conflict-related context monitoring What opportunities and risks do these trends create for German DC? Are there any links to specific DC nterventions? If so, which ones? Should German DC respond to these trends? If so, how? Security territorial development of the conflict (e.g. "corridors" of armed groups) security situation in the project regions displacements, human rights situation Political environment peace negotiations elections conflict-relevant legal initiatives, strategies and laws conflict-relevant changes, restructurings, new staff appointments in state institutions Civil society peace initiatives of the national civil society changes in the national organisational landscape (for peace) scope for action by civil society organisations working on peace issues Element 3 Economic, ecological and social environment trends in the global economy (e.g. WTO, world market prices) and economic reforms (e.g. privatisations) that may impact on the social situation of the population or on the conflict war economy and initiatives to control it ecological crises (e.g. water scarcity, logging) economic and social situation of the population (e.g. nutritional status, educational status, poverty) reintegration of former child soldiers International actors conflict-relevant strategies and initiatives of major international actors (e.g. USA, EU, China, India) donor conferences (e.g. adding conditionalities) 128

129 Summary: The Risk Management Process and Its Results Element 3 of PCA Risk Management seeks to identify the potential (negative) effects that a conflict may have on DC, and ways of professionally managing them. With the overall objective of reducing threats and preventing risks, this PCA element aims primarily to help a) recognise existing/changing risks, b) identify necessary adjustments to measures, and c) establish appropriate implementation structures. Based on the DC-relevant security analysis and context monitoring, in this element the DC country portfolio and/or individual development interventions are continually reviewed to ensure that their implementation remains feasible and as risk-free as possible within the given conflict situation. It addresses the risks of physical and psychological violence against personnel, issues of investment security, and the risks to the feasibility of the strategy, project/programme design and achievement of objectives. In the subsequent and final PCA element (Guideline 4: Peace and Conflict-Related Impact Monitoring), the converse issue is raised of how DC intends or is able to influence the (violent) conflict. Element 3 129

130 Annex 1: Elements of the Security Analysis Threat Security concept/ strategy Vulnerability Capacities Threat Threat is the possibility that someone may inflict damage on another person, and damage their physical and moral identity or property through an act of violence. All international organisations in a region are exposed to the same threat. Vulnerability Vulnerability is the probability that an organisation is confronted with a threatening situation in which it is forced to suffer damage to its staff or assets. Within a given threat situation the vulnerability of individual organisations differs according inter alia to the nature of their activity, the location and mobility of their staff, the value of their local assets and the local reputation of the organisation. Element 3 Capacities Capacities are the strengths and resources that an organisation possesses in order to achieve a certain degree of protection, acceptance or deterrence for its work. These may include staff safety training, a functioning team, good knowledge of the local situation, access to secure transport and communications facilities, and access to national and international media and decision-makers. Security concept/strategy A security concept/strategy aims to reduce the threat and vulnerability of an organisation, while at the same time increasing its capacities. Sources: Dworken 2001a, Eguren 2005, Sprenger/Kruk

131 Annex 2: UN Criteria for Assessing the Phases of a Crisis Security situation Freedom of movement Supplies Communications Phase 1: Crisis looms, otherwise normality prevails - isolated attacks - risk of escalation - increased vigilance and security precautions required - local freedom of movement possible - specific rules and precautions must be observed - restrictions on overland travel - limited supply of specific products (e.g. petrol, medicines) - local communication and/or communication with the capital temporarily more difficult Phase 2: Crisis escalates - unrest confined to the project region, violent clashes in the immediate environments - local freedom of movement is possible, though subject to short-term/repeated restrictions - overland journeys no longer possible - supplies in general reduced, though staple food is available on markets and in shops - communication in the project region restricted - some restrictions on communication outside the (project) region Phase 3: Full-blown crisis / partial evacuation - extended, sustained unrest and armed clashes no longer confined to certain areas - state of emergency declared - movement outside the building no longer possible or no longer risk-free - long-term restrictions on freedom of movement - curfew Phase 4: Full-blown crisis / evacuation - local/national armed clashes - immediate risk to project personnel including direct threat of violence - only occasional/ limited movement possible - risk of becoming completely confined to buildings - partial shortages of vital goods - restricted access to local market still possible - supplies from other regions no longer guaranteed - shortage of vital goods - no further supplies possible or foreseeable - only limited communication possible in the project region and within the country - foreign communication uncertain/impossible - communication with the outside world (largely) cut off Element 3 Source: Litsch/Linsenmayr 2006 after UN standards 131

132 Annex 3: Components of a Security Plan Introduction Objectives, target groups and implementation of the security plan, staff induction and training needs, resources for implementation of the security plan Background Brief description of the mandate and task of the organisation, summary of the threat situation, brief description of the security strategy of the organisation (deterrence, protection, acceptance) Standard Operating Procedures Regulations concerning among others staff mobility, communications, management of the offices, dealing with armed groups, preventing accidents and criminal attacks, response to security incidents, and documentation and reporting on security incidents Crisis plans Description of possible incidents (e.g. abduction, murder, natural disaster, conflict escalation), allocation of responsibilities and tasks in case of crisis, response plan who needs to be informed? For which section of the staff is the plan binding (e.g. evacuation), what happens to the national staff? Management of financial resources and assets Practical information List of names and telephone numbers of staff members, important contact addresses (government representatives, transport firms, airport, hospitals, doctors), maps (with meeting points, overland routes, border crossings, airfields), list of emergency supplies (food, medicine, clothing, documents) Source: Dworken 2001c, Eguren 2005 Element 3 The security plan should be understood as a "living document" that must be brought into line with the changing security situation and the demands of project work at regular intervals. Since it is also considered part of the duty of care, it is a managerial responsibility. In many cases inter-organisational coordination is recommended, to ensure that if and when an emergency does arise, bottlenecks and duplication of work are avoided. 132

133 Annex 4: Checklist for Conflict-Related Context Monitoring at Project/Programme Level Location Where is the project/programme located regarding the "geography of violence" (e.g. areas with a high level of violence)? What is the status of the territory where the project/programme is located in relation to the conflict (contentious territory, newly accessible, recently conquered)? Is the intervention area accessible? What infrastructure is present (roads, water, electricity etc.)? Timing What is the current stage of the conflict (escalating, stalemate, paused, post-conflict)? Which current or foreseeable political, economic or socio-cultural trends might affect the project/programme (trade agreements, changes in commodity prices, elections, arrival/departure of military forces, refugee movements)? Are the opportunities for working in this specific area increasing or decreasing? Are other organisations moving into or leaving the region? Why? Political context What kinds of relationships exist between local communities and the political and military authorities (cooperative, difficult, distrustful)? Who are the allies, who are the "enemies"? How might this affect the project/programme? What level of political support does the project/programme enjoy at local, regional and national level? Are there any formal or informal peace initiatives? Do these include the key actors? Who or what do they exclude? How does the local political system function? How does this affect the project/programme? Are the political leaders accountable for their work? What are the levels and patterns of corruption? Do political leaders use terror and violence against the local population? Which politically, economically or socially sensitive issues does the project/programme affect? Military context What kinds of relationships exist between the armed groups (war economy, black marketing, power struggles within and between armed groups)? What forms, patterns and intensity of violence exist in the intervention area? How does this affect the project/ programme's target groups? How does it affect the development intervention? Socio-economic issues What are the consequences of the conflict in the intervention area (physical security, fear, trauma, war economy, food security, infrastructure, social relations, health, family structures)? What kinds of relationships exist within and between the main communities in the intervention area (cooperative, interdependent, competitive)? What are the dynamics within these relationships and what is shaping them e.g. gender, religious affiliation, social status? Which cultural factors might affect the project/programme (e.g. rejection of western ideas, fear of external control, gender roles)? Partners and stakeholders Which capacities does the implementing organisation or the project/programme s executing agency possess? Do they have suitable and qualified staff? What is the involvement of the implementing organisation / executing agency in the conflict and the peace process? What is their political position? Are the organisations accepted by the local population? By what criteria are the project/programme s target groups selected? What are the political implications of this selection? To what extend can women and marginalised groups be included? Are appropriate conditions for effective project/programme implementation in place (leadership, coordination, access, trust, technical capacities, gender sensitivity)? To what extend are the stakeholders able to make choices themselves? How far can they initiate changes? Which possible barriers exist that might exclude certain groups from participation? Other factors Which other conflict-related factors might affect the project/programme? Element 3 Source: Bush

134 Annex 5: Conflict Risks in a New Decentralisation Project/Programme Assessing the conflict risks in a new project/programme in the "decentralisation / community development" sector Risk factor Assessment Comments / coping strategy Political instability caused by the persistent violent conflicts between the transitional government, former military and rebels High Monitor conflict trends and pursue security management cooperation with UN peacekeeping mission, in order to be able to protect personnel and investments in case of escalating violence Lack of will on the part of violent forces to embrace pluralist and democratic values, and participate constructively in local development processes Varies by municipality Create an "observer role" to facilitate a process of integrating violent actors into the planning steps Bear in mind the possible risks of legitimating violent actors Lack of civil society participation in public affairs due to political pressure and threats from violent actors (strong theoretical emphasis on participation vs. real scope for shaping change) and due to frustration with the performance of democratic structures Varies by municipality Provide informal and formal spaces for participation. Pursue a process-based approach founded on transparency and trust inducement. Build trust by focusing on quick impacts on people's life situation. Poor capacity of state structures to guarantee rapid, transparent and flexible channelling of financial support High Select executing organisation on the basis of a conflict-sensitive institutional analysis, and ensure capacity building of the organisation through technical cooperation. Lack of qualified target-group representatives Medium Pursue medium- and long-term commitment to capacity building. Element 3 Politicised demand that runs counter to a real public good and pro-poor orientation Mistrust of state structures caused by general dissatisfaction with life situation High High Due to the frequent deformation of political processes this risk should be considered high. Tying the approach into medium-term strategic development planning at community level can help prevent misallocations. Visibly implement quick-impact projects in order to respond to the population's expectations. Source: Lorenz

135 Annex 6: Bibliography and Further Reading Anderson, Mary B., 1999: Do No Harm. How Can Aid Support Peace or War. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Anderson, Mary B. / Olson, Lara, 2003: Confronting War. Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners. Cambridge, MA: Collaborative for Development Action. Barbolet, Adam et al., 2005: The Utility and Dilemmas of Conflict Sensitivity. Berlin: Berghof Handbook. Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2005: Discussion Series on PCIA. Berghof Handbook. BMZ, 2005: Sector Strategy for Crisis Prevention, Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding in German Development Cooperation. Bouta, Tsjeard / Frerks, Georg / Bannon, Ian, 2005: Gender, Conflict and Development. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Brabant, Koenraad van, 2001a: Operational Security Management in Violent Environments A Field Manual for Aid Agencies. Humanitarian Practice Network. London: Overseas Development Institute. Brabant, Koenraad van, 2001b: Mainstreaming the Organisational Management of Safety and Security. A Review of Aid Agency Practices and a Guide for Management. London: Overseas Development Institute. HPG Report 9. Brabant, Koenraad van, 2002: Module Security Strategies. London: RedR. Bush, Kenneth, 2003: Hands-On PCIA. Part I. A Handbook for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment. Collaborative for Development Action, 2004: Reflecting on Peace Practice Handbook ( Collier, Paul et al., 2003: Breaking the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development Policy. World Bank Research Report. Washington, DC: World Bank. CPR Network, 2005: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) Handbook. ( DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2005: Preventing Conflict and Building Peace. A Manual of Issues and Entry Points. Paris: OECD/DAC. Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, 2002: Sicherheitsleitfaden. Bonn: Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.v. DFID, 2002: Conducting a Strategic Conflict Assessment. London. DFID, 2005: Guidance on Evaluation and Review for DFID Staff. London: DFID Evaluation Department. Dugan, Máire A., 2001: Imaging the Future: A Tool for Conflict Resolution. pp in: Thania Paffenholz / Luc Reychler, Peacebuilding. A Field Guide. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Dworken, Jonathan T., 2001a: Threat Assessment. Training Module for NGOs Operating in Conflict Zones and High-Crime Areas. London: RedR. Dworken, Jonathan T., 2001b: Vulnerability Assessment. Training Module for NGOs Operating in Conflict Zones and High-Crime Areas. London: RedR. Dworken, Jonathan T., 2001c: Security Planning. From Risk Assessment to Security Plan. Training Module for NGOs Operating in Conflict Zones and High-Crime Areas. London: RedR. Eguren, Enrique, 2005: Protection Manual for Human Rights Defenders. Dublin: Front Line. The International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders. Fisher, Simon et al., 2000: Working with Conflict. Skills and Strategies for Action. Responding to Conflict (RTC). London: Zed Books. Element 3 Frieters, Norbert, 2003: Konflikt-Monitoring für Vorhaben der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Eschborn: GTZ. Hasemann, Armin / Hübner-Schmid, Katharina / Dargatz, Anja, 2005: Konfliktanalyse zur Entwicklung von Handlungsoptionen für gesellschaftspolitische Kooperationsprogramme. Ein methodischer Leitfaden. Bonn: FriEnt/FES/GTZ. ( Hasemann, Armin, 2005: Konfliktbezogene Wirkungsbeobachtung, inkl. Konfliktsensitive Planung von gesellschaftspolitischen Kooperationsprojekten. Ein methodischer Leitfaden. Bonn: FES. Hofmann, Birgit, 2006: Checklist zur Bestandsaufnahme und Analyse von Sicherheitssekto-ren in Partnerländern. Eschborn: GTZ. Interministerielles Rahmenkonzept zur Unterstützung von Reformen des Sicherheitssektors in Entwicklungs- und Transformationsländern, 2006, 135

136 Jackson, Stephen with Siobhan Calthrop, 2002: Making Sense of Unstable Contexts. Tools for Analysis and Action. World Vision. John Hopkins University, Conflict Management Tools, Leonhardt, Manuela, 2001: Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and Management. A Practical Guideline. Eschborn: GTZ Leonhardt, Manuela, 2001: Conflict Impact Assessment for Development Projects. A Practical Guideline. Eschborn: GTZ. Litsch, Elisabeth Maria / Linsenmayr, Rainer, 2006: Wenn Wissen Leben retten kann Gewalt und Gefahren gewachsen sein. Ein praktischer Ratgeber für den Auslandseinsatz. Eschborn: GTZ. Lorenz, Kathrin, 2005: Recommendations for Contract and Cooperation Management to Ensure the Conflict-Sensitive Design and Steering of TC Projects and Programmes. A Guideline. Eschborn: GTZ. OECD/DAC, 1999: Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies. OECD/DAC, 2002: Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management. Paris: DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation. OECD/DAC, forthcoming: Guidelines for Conflict-Sensitive Impact Assessment. OECD/DAC, 2007: Handbook on Security System Reform. Supporting Security and Justice. Paris: OECD. Paffenholz, Thania, 2004: Designing Transformation and Intervention Processes. p in: Austin, Alex / Fischer, Martina / Ropers, Norbert (eds.), Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict. The Berghof Handbook. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Paffenholz, Thania, 2005: Third-Generation PCIA. Introducing the Planning and Assessment Approach for Conflict Zones. Berlin: Berghof Handbook. Paffenholz, Thania / Reychler, Luc, 2007: Aid for Peace, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Rothman, Jay, 2004: Action Evaluation. Berlin: Berghof Handbook. Saferworld et al., 2004: Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development Cooperation, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding. A Resource Pack. London. Scherg, Nina, 2004: Leitfaden zur krisenpräventiven Portfoliogestaltung. Eschborn: GTZ. SDC, Monitoring entwicklungsrelevanter Veränderungen (MERV) SDC, 2005: Conflict-Sensitive Program Management in International Cooperation. Mainstreaming the Prevention of Violence. Bern. SIDA, 2004: Conflict-Sensitive Development Cooperation. How to Conduct a Conflict Analysis. Stockholm: SIDA. Sprenger, Dirk / Kruk, Gabriele, 2005: Basic Principles of Crisis Prevention, Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding. Course Concept and Training Module for Decision-Makers and Experts in German Development Cooperation. Bonn/Eschborn: BMZ/GTZ. UNDP / World Bank, 2004: Practical Guide to Post-Conflict Needs Assessment. New York/Washington DC. UNDP / World Bank, 2005: An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices Using Results-Based Frameworks in Fragile States. New York / Washington DC. Element 3 UNDG ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues, 2004: Inter-Agency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Transition Situations. New York. USAID, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, 2004: Conducting a Conflict Assessment. A Framework for Analysis and Program Development. Washington DC. VENRO, 2003: Mindeststandards für die Personalsicherheit in der humanitären Hilfe. Bonn: VENRO. Wils, Oliver et al., 2006: Systemische Konflikttransformation. Konzept und Anwendungsgebiete. Berlin: Berghof Foundation for Peace Support. Zupan, Natascha, 2005: Methoden der Evaluation im Konfliktkontext. FriEnt Briefing Nr. 3. Bonn. Websites (database containing evaluation reports on humanitarian aid, often in conflict situations) (PCIA dialogue series) (CPR Network: Compendium of Operational Tools for Peacebuilding) (database containing international tools for conflict analysis, conflict-sensitive project planning and conflict-related impact monitoring / OECD DAC Evaluation Resource Centre; contains approx. 50 peace- and conflict-related evaluation reports by international donors) 136

137 Peace and Conflict Assessment Element 4 Peace and Conflict-Related Impact Monitoring PCA Introduction Element 1a: Peace and Conflict Analysis (CA) Element 1b: Peacebuilding Needs (PBN) Element 2: Peace and Conflict-Related Relevance Assessment Element 3: Risk Management Element 4: Peace and Conflict- Related Impact Monitoring Element 4

138 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ALNAP Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action AURA BMZ CA CDA DAC DC DNH GTZ NGO OECD PBN PCA PCIA PRSP RTC TC UN ZFD Development-Policy Framework for Contracts and Cooperation German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development Peace and Conflict Analysis Collaborative for Development Action Development Assistance Committee Development Cooperation Do No Harm Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit Non-Governmental Organisation Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Peacebuilding Needs Peace and Conflict Assessment Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Responding to Conflict Technical Cooperation United Nations Civil Peace Service Element 4 138

139 Table of Contents 1. Task Definition and Application What is peace and conflict-related impact monitoring? Applications of peace and conflict-related impact monitoring What is peace and conflict-related impact monitoring at country level? What is peace and conflict-related impact monitoring at project/programme level? Practical Implementation of Peace and Conflict-Related Impact Monitoring Performing peace and conflict-related impact monitoring at country level Performing peace and conflict-related impact monitoring at project/programme level Methodology of Peace and Conflict-Related Impact Monitoring Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring at country portfolio level Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring at project/programme level The do no harm method Working with conflict-sensitive results chains Participatory impact monitoring 153 Annexes Annex 1: Basic Concepts and Methods of Peace and Conflict-Related Impact Monitoring 154 Annex 2: PCIA Checklist 156 Annex 3: Positive and Negative Impacts of Development Interventions in Conflict Situations Checklist 157 Annex 4: Peace and Conflict-Related Impact Monitoring (Example of Use) 164 Annex 5: Bibliography and Further Reading 165 Index of boxes, tables and figures Box 1: Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring at country level 142 Box 2: Priority area strategy paper monitoring: sample structure of an annual monitoring report 145 Box 3: Key questions for the conflict-sensitive review of a development intervention 147 Box 4: Interactions between development interventions and the conflict context according to do no harm 147 Box 5: Key questions for formulating results hypotheses and chains 152 Box 6: Key questions for participatory conflict-sensitive impact monitoring 153 Table 1: Requirements for peace and conflict-related impact monitoring 142 Table 2: Roles and tasks in peace and conflict-related impact monitoring at country level 143 Table 3: Roles and tasks in peace and conflict-related impact monitoring at project/programme level 144 Fig. 1: The do no harm matrix for analysing the impacts of project work on the conflict Element 4

140 Summary: Results of Peace and Conflict-Related Impact Monitoring Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring represents the final element of the Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA). Following the peace and conflict analysis (CA), the conflict-relevant orientation of the project/ programme or country portfolio toward the peacebuilding needs, and the analysis of the risks that the existing conflict situation poses for the implementation and achievement of objectives of the country portfolio or individual project/programme, peace and conflict-related impact monitoring helps observe the demonstrable and traceable positive and negative impacts of development cooperation (DC) on the conflict situation. Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring supports the planning, implementation and evaluation of DC measures in conflict zones. Element 4 140

141 1. Task Definition and Application Element 4 Objective Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring Prevent impacts that exacerbate the conflict. Strengthen impacts that promote peace. Key questions Which measures have made a successful contribution toward peacebuilding? What are the factors for success? Which lessons can be learned for other measures? Which aspects of the country portfolio, the priority area strategy or the project/ programme are conducive to peace or exacerbate the conflict? Why? How can these negative impacts be avoided? Procedure/ methodology Do no harm Results chains Participatory impact monitoring Areas of application Results-based monitoring at country or project/programme level Priority area strategy paper monitoring (where peacebuilding is integrated as an explicit cross-cutting theme or is a priority area in a country) 1.1. What is peace and conflict-related impact monitoring? Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring observes the results of a development cooperation (DC) project/ programme or country portfolio with respect to the peace and conflict situation. It covers both the intended and the unintended, and the positive and negative impacts of the project/programme or country portfolio. These may be either anticipated, as in the case of ex ante risk management, or may already have occurred, as in the case of project monitoring and evaluation. One special feature of peace and conflict-related impact monitoring compared to conventional results-based monitoring approaches in DC is the fact that it not only explores the impacts of the project/programme outputs ("What does DC do?"), but also considers the effects of the presence of DC and its modus operandi ("How does DC do it?") on peace and conflict in the country concerned. This means that the scope of conflict-sensitive impact monitoring is usually wider than that of conventional DC monitoring, which generally focuses on the impact of the project/programme outputs ("What was generated and how is that being utilised?"). On the basis of conflict-sensitive impact monitoring, recommendations are drawn up as to how negative impacts of DC can be avoided or alleviated, and positive impacts can be reinforced and new opportunities utilised. A more detailed definition of peace and conflict-related impact monitoring, explaining how it differs from general monitoring etc., can be found in Annex 1: Basic Concepts and Methods. 141 Element 4

142 1.2. Applications of peace and conflict-related impact monitoring What is peace and conflict-related impact monitoring at country level? Within the scope of programme formation and the establishment of priority areas, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) is increasingly demanding regular result checking at the national level. The starting point for this is the priority area strategy papers, which include indicators of results for the respective sector. In those countries where peacebuilding is a priority area and a corresponding priority area strategy paper is therefore in place, the indicators defined therein must be monitored. In countries where peacebuilding is a cross-cutting issue, country-wide conflict-related impact monitoring is usually not appropriate. In this case the focus will be on the conflict-sensitive design and its monitoring at the level of the individual project/programme. Regardless of the criterion of whether peacebuilding is a priority area or a cross-cutting issue in a country, depending on the country context the question should be raised as to whether it is appropriate to incorporate conflict-related indicators also in the other sectors (and their priority area strategy papers), thus documenting their conflict sensitivity. In these cases the corresponding priority area strategy papers, or more specifically their conflict-related indicators, should of course also be monitored at country level. Box 1: Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring at country level Peacebuilding as a main focus on monitoring of the priority priority area area strategy paper for peacebuilding Peacebuilding as a where in place and relevant: monitoring of cross-cutting issue the conflict-related indicators of the existing priority area strategy papers; impact monitoring takes place primarily at project/ programme level: implementation and monitoring of do no harm (DNH) What is peace and conflict-related impact monitoring at project/programme level? The requirements for monitoring a development intervention's impacts on peace and conflict will differ according to its C marker. Table 1: Requirements for peace and conflict-related impact monitoring Project/ programme type Positive impacts on the conflict situation Negative impacts on the conflict situation Element 4 C2 projects/ programmes Positive conflict-related impacts are defined at the level of the overall objective of the project/programme, and are therefore an integral component of impact monitoring. The overall objective, results chains and indicators of results are laid down in the Development-Policy Framework for Contracts and Cooperation (AURA) offer or appraisal report. Possible negative impacts on the conflict situation are an additional area to be monitored. 142

143 C1 projects/ programmes Positive conflict-related impacts are defined at the level of components and are therefore an integral component of impact monitoring. The objective and results indicators of the peacebuilding component are laid down in the AURA offer or appraisal report. Possible negative impacts on the conflict situation are an additional area to be monitored. C0 projects/ programmes Possible positive and negative impacts on the peace and conflict situation are an additional area to be observed within the scope of the development intervention s internal impact monitoring. This additional area will be dealt with supplementary to the target results of the project/programme. Source: revised after Lorenz Practical Implementation of Peace and Conflict-Related Impact Monitoring 2.1. Performing peace and conflict-related impact monitoring at country level Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring at country portfolio and priority area level is the task of the in-country representative of the implementing organisation (e.g. GTZ Country Director) and priority area coordinators. This officer initiates the collation of the results of the individual project monitoring systems, and evaluates these with respect to their overall contribution toward the peace- and conflict-related objectives of development cooperation in the country concerned. As mentioned above, these objectives together with the corresponding indicators are documented in a priority area strategy paper for peacebuilding; alternatively or in addition to these the peace- and conflict-related indicators contained in priority area strategy papers for other priority areas are (also) referred to. Table 2: Roles and tasks in peace and conflict-related impact monitoring at country level Responsible In-country representation of the implementing organisation or responsible country officer (e.g. GTZ country director) Role/tasks Responsible for implementation and quality assurance of peace and conflict-related impact monitoring Collation of the results at priority area level Priority area coordinators Officers responsible for contracts and cooperation Make available the results of the monitoring systems of the individual projects/programmes Stakeholders German DC organisations in-country Provide feedback on the results of impact monitoring Government/partner(s) Research institutes 143 Element 4

144 2.2. Performing peace and conflict-related impact monitoring at project/programme level Detailed information on integrating peace and conflict-related impact monitoring into the regular results-based monitoring procedures of development interventions can be found in the GTZ guideline "Recommendations for contract and cooperation management to ensure the conflictsensitive design and steering of TC projects and programmes" (Lorenz, 2005). Table 3: Roles and tasks in peace and conflict-related impact monitoring at project/programme level Responsible Officer responsible for contracts and cooperation (e.g. project or programme manager) External consultants Role/tasks Responsible for integrating peace- and conflict-specific issues into the impact monitoring system of the project/programme Responsible for communicating and utilising the monitoring results within the scope of project/programme steering Where appropriate, provide support in establishing the monitoring system Stakeholders Project/programme staff members Participate in impact monitoring Partners/intermediaries Target groups External experts (civil society, research institutes) Provide feedback on the results of impact monitoring Impact monitoring usually highlights the tension between the various interests and goals of the participating actors. The development intervention's commissioning bodies wish to know whether the funds they have made available are being employed cost-effectively and in a manner conducive to achieving the objectives. They also wish to know which lessons have been learned from the project/programme for the future support of similar measures. For the implementing organisation, the project management and the staff, conflict-sensitive impact monitoring is a tool to support project/programme steering during the implementation process. They are interested primarily in issues of the relevance of individual activities in the face of changing framework conditions, the effectiveness of their own work and the achievement of objectives. The partner side or national government wishes to know whether and to what extent the development intervention actually is helping stabilise the conflict and improve living conditions, is fitting into national programmes and is harmonised with other external and internal initiatives. Within the scope of the process accompanying the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) national governments themselves are increasingly commissioning evaluations in order to assess the quality of the international support delivered to their programmes. Element 4 The clients, target groups or beneficiaries of DC services hold a stake in the quality and benefits of those measures. It is also important to establish whether the services are available to all who are interested, or whether certain groups enjoy preferential access. The objectives of peace and conflict-related impact monitoring should therefore be jointly defined, and both stakeholders and outsiders should be given an opportunity to voice their opinions on the measures. 144

145 3. Methodology of Peace and Conflict-Related Impact Monitoring 3.1. Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring at country portfolio level To date, little experience with peace and conflict-related impact monitoring at country portfolio level is available. This is linked to the difficulty of demonstrating the impacts of individual DC projects/programmes at the national level. For this reason impact monitoring at the national portfolio level is usually confined to looking at the impacts of the individual projects/programmes (see Section 3.2) as a whole and placing these in the in the context of the conflict as a whole. The reference documents used are the priority area strategy paper for peacebuilding and/or priority area strategy papers for other sectors, as well as other cross-cutting DC strategy papers linked to peace and conflict. On this basis conclusions can be drawn concerning the difficulties and success factors for peacebuilding and the further design of the DC portfolio. Box 2: Priority area strategy paper monitoring: sample structure of an annual monitoring report Chapter 1 Describe briefly the development of the conflict and the key political developments during the reporting period. Describe the external factors that have influenced the achievement of objectives by German DC during the reporting period. Chapter 2 Provide an overview of the strategic objectives of the priority area strategy paper and compare these with the focal areas of work by German DC during the reporting period. Explain any discrepancies. Chapter 3 Describe the status of the achievement of objectives with reference to the individual "working objectives" of the priority area strategy paper, as measured by the prescribed indicators. Which objectives did the programme / the sector pursue during the reporting period? To what extent were the priority area strategy paper indicators achieved during the reporting period? Which priorities were set? How relevant were the individual indicators to the achievement of the overall objective? Time-frame: When should the indicator have been fully achieved? How far has the achievement of objectives progressed? Describe qualitatively and where appropriate quantitatively the achievement of indicators. In the case of quantitative indicators: How is the quantitative change in the indicator to be interpreted? Is it significant? Which external factors positively or negatively influenced the achievement of the "working objective" during the reporting period? (Length of report per working objective: approx pages) Synthesis: Evaluate the achievement of objectives by the entire German DC portfolio with reference to the development hypothesis (key cause of the conflict). 145 Element 4

146 Describe other instruments of German DC and their contribution toward the development hypothesis of the priority area strategy paper (foundations, Civil Peace Service / ZFD, InWent). Chapter 4 Describe the current conflict-sensitive enhancements of the German DC portfolio in the country. Chapter 5 Describe the key lessons learned in relation to the prospects and further development of the DC portfolio. Formulate recommendations for BMZ. Total length: approx pages 3.2. Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring at project/programme level The scope of peace and conflict-related impact monitoring varies according to the C marker assigned to the project/programme in question. For all development interventions, possible unintended negative impacts must be monitored within that framework. This applies to peace programmes (C2), sector programmes with a peace and conflict-related secondary objective (C1), and to sector programmes that have no direct link to the conflict but that are designed on a conflict-sensitive basis (C0). The DNH method provides a good framework for monitoring and assessing the unintended negative and positive impacts. When assessing the conflict-related impacts of projects/programmes at the level of objectives it is recommended to work with results chains, and to apply a participatory approach The do no harm method When to use it The DNH method is designed to identify unintended positive and negative impacts of DC and emergency aid measures in conflict situations. It can be applied at any point during contract and cooperation management (i.e. at any point during the project cycle). Background The DNH approach was developed in the 1990s by Collaborative for Development Action (CDA; www. cdainc.com) in response to the failures of humanitarian and development organisations in conflict countries such as Somalia (1993), Rwanda (1994) and Liberia (1996). In these cases the international organisations were too late in recognising the signs of conflict escalation, and once the violence had escalated they exacerbated it further because they acted without having an adequate understanding of the situation. The Hippocratic imperative "do no harm" is now considered the international standard for international organisations operating in regions of (potential) conflict. A large number of international organisations both governmental and non-governmental have integrated this method into their planning and steering instruments for projects/programmes in conflict regions, in some cases in a modified form. Basic assumptions Element 4 The DNH principle is based on the assumption that in conflict situations there are both factors separating the parties to the conflict so-called "dividers" and factors uniting the parties in spite of the conflict socalled "connectors" (see Fig.1 below). These factors can be found in various spheres of society. These spheres include structures and institutions (e.g. land tenure; active local human rights organisations), attitudes and behaviours (e.g. discrimination against refugees; tolerance), values and interests (e.g. various economic interests; common religion), experiences (e.g. attacks on the civilian population by the other party to the conflict; experience of suffering shared by women on both sides of the conflict), and events and symbols (e.g. flags, anniversaries; shared cultural traditions). 146

147 The DNH approach is also based on the experience that all forms of intervention in a conflict context inevitably impact on that conflict, be it positively or negatively. These impacts are generated both by the mere presence and modus operandi of a project/programme (the "How will we proceed?"), and by the actual services (the "What are we doing?"). These specific aspects of a project/programme are identified by asking a series of key questions (see Sprenger/Kruk 2005): Box 3: Key questions for the conflict-sensitive review of a development intervention Why is the project/programme being implemented? Which purpose is the project/programme designed to serve? Which activities is the project/programme carrying out? How is the project/programme being implemented (strategies and methods)? Where is the project/programme being implemented? When and for how long will the project/programme be implemented? For whom, with whom and by whom is the project/programme being implemented? Source: Sprenger/Kruk 2005 after CDA These aspects of the project/programme should be interfaced with the conflict such that any possible negative impacts on the conflict situation are avoided, and any positive options for action can be utilised. In the next step the DNH method explores the effects that these specific aspects of the project/programme have on the "connectors" and "dividers" within the conflict environment. For this purpose it offers a list of key questions drawn up on the basis of numerous evaluations and consultations. Hence, the DNH method distinguishes between two types of interaction between the project and the conflict context: Box 4: Interactions between development interventions and the conflict context according to do no harm a) Resource transfers Distribution impacts: The resources and services of the project/programme benefit predominantly one party to the conflict, and/or reinforce the differences between groups. Market impacts: The presence of international organisations drives up local market prices, salaries and margins of profit. Local service providers are unable to compete with the heavily subsidised services of the international organisations. Substitution impacts: The tasks taken on by international organisations substitute or displace local sources. The international resources for the social sector free up local resources that e.g. can then be used for warfare. Misuse impacts: Theft, corruption and mismanagement result in a loss of project/programme resources, which often fall into the hands of one party to the conflict who for instance is operating road blocks, and who is thus strengthened economically. Legitimation impacts: The advisory services delivered by an international organisation or cooperation with it normally boost the reputation of a local institution. This entails a risk of legitimating conflict actors. 147 Element 4

148 b) Implicit ethical messages Cultural factors: If the behaviour of foreign experts is being perceived as disrespectful, this also sets a bad example for the relationship between the parties to the conflict. Standard of living: Due to their high standard of living foreign experts are often perceived as being linked to the local elite, and close to them and their interests. Use of resources: If personnel of aid organisations use scarce resources such as petrol, official cars or communication equipment for private purposes, e.g. leisure activities, this strengthens the perception that generally those in control of scarce resources get away with using them for their own pleasure. Lack of respect and competition among external actors: Such behaviours convey to the local population the impression that cooperation and mutual respect enjoy only minor importance also among the external actors. Powerlessness: When project/programme staff are unwilling to accept responsibility for the consequences of their actions, this sends the message that individuals are virtually powerless in the face of wider structures. Tension and mistrust on the part of project staff members get transferred onto their partners. As a result, the conflict becomes omnipresent in everyday life. Different valuation of human lives: The failure to include local staff members in the organisation's security plans sends the message that the lives of local people are worth less. Demonisation and victimisation in public: In the age of the Internet the interested local population is usually well informed on the statements made by the organisation at the international level. Allocations of blame, the victimisation of certain groups or political accusations are sensitively interpreted as the organisation s taking sides in the conflict. Weapons and power: When organisations employ armed security personnel for their own protection, they often indirectly support one party to the conflict financially. This also sends the message that weapons are a legitimate means of dealing with the conflict. Source: GTZ Training CD: Basic Principles of Crisis Prevention, Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding. Course concept and training modules for decision-makers and experts in German development cooperation. (after Mary B. Anderson, 1999) Element 4 148

149 Conducting a DNH analysis within the scope of the Peace and Conflict Assessment Within the scope of the Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA) it is appropriate to modify the DNH method, in order to be able to integrate the data and ideas gathered in the previous steps. On this basis a project/ programme-specific list of questions can be drawn up to support the identification of unintended impacts. During implementation of the development intervention the list of questions drawn up when the project/ programme was launched should be brought into line with the changing conflict situation and new project/ programme activities at regular intervals. Working on the basis of the DNH principle, we recommend the following steps for the conflict-sensitive assessment of unintended impacts: 1. Specify the social sphere and geographical area in which conflict-relevant impacts of the project/programme may be anticipated. 2. Identify the factors for peace and for conflict, as well as the actors for peace and for conflict, that may possibly be affected by the development intervention (using the peace and conflict analysis as a basis, see Guideline 1a). 3. Add to those factors and actors possible further spheres or areas where the project might impact on the conflict (on the basis of the DNH checklists included in Annex 3: Positive and Negative Impacts of Development Interventions in Conflict Situations Checklist). 4. Review the project/programme being planned or under implementation in relation to the list of key questions for the DNH approach (as shown above). 5. Formulate hypotheses on possible unintended conflict-related impacts of the project/programme, and on this basis draw up a list of questions for conflict-sensitive impact monitoring. 6. Referring to the list of questions, collect data on the unintended (and intended) impacts of the project/ programme using various survey methods (e.g. one-on-one interviews with beneficiaries, group discussions, expert interviews with various actors, desk study, quantitative data), and triangulate the data. It is important here to pursue a participatory approach and remain on the lookout for hitherto unexpected impacts. 7. Document the intended and unintended project/programme impacts, draw up recommendations for further steering of the development intervention. 8. Revise the list of questions on the basis of the fresh insights gained, in preparation for the next episode of monitoring. Depending on the duration, the resourcing and the political sensitivity of the development intervention this kind of detailed impact monitoring should be repeated at intervals of between 6 and 12 months. 149 Element 4

150 Element 4 Fig. 1: The do no harm matrix for analysing the impacts of project work on the conflict Source: see CDA 2001 ( in: Sprenger/Kruk 2005 Conflict context Options Dividers / potentials for violence Project Connectors / potentials for peace systems & institutions attitudes & behaviours values & interests experiences symbols & events or mandate funding organisational structure motivation objectives location dates and duration measures target group(s) partner(s) personnel approach methods systems & institutions attitudes & behaviours values & interests experiences symbols & events or Options Resource transfers & Implicit ethical messages Resource transfers & Implicit ethical messages 150

151 Working with conflict-sensitive results chains Applications Conflict-sensitive results chains are suitable for monitoring the intended positive results of a development intervention both during its implementation (ex medio) and after its completion (ex post). They are therefore used above all in projects/programmes with an explicit peacebuilding orientation (C2, C1). The results chains and indicators of other projects/programmes (C0) in conflict situations should also be reviewed with respect to their conflict sensitivity, and if appropriate modified. What are peace and conflict-related impacts? It is important to remember the following when defining peace and conflict-related impacts: Short-term and long-term impacts: A balanced relationship between work for short-term and work for long-term results is especially important in conflict transformation (see Responding to Conflict / RTC 2000:159). On the one hand development interventions face the task of helping solve rapidly emerging crises on a timely and flexible basis. On the other hand they are guided by the vision of building sustainable processes and structures that enable peaceful conflict management, and creating appropriate and balanced living conditions that undermine the use of violence in pursuit of particular interests or personal enrichment. Flexibility: Conflict situations are extraordinarily dynamic, and call for continuous review of the relevance and feasibility of the original project/programme objectives. Conflict-sensitive impact monitoring should therefore ask whether and to what extend the desired results remain relevant, and what remains feasible under the changing conditions. Levels of impact and attribution gap: The peacebuilding needs approach abandons the premise that development interventions must make a direct contribution toward reducing violence. However, it is important that the project/programme can be integrated into a broader peacebuilding strategy, and is linked to similar initiatives. Constructing conflict-sensitive results chains Results chains show how a development intervention aims to help address a certain problem. They are based on results hypotheses, which reflect the strategic project/programme approach, and describe the individual logical steps between the actions of the project/programme and the desired change. Within the scope of the PCA the results hypotheses are based on the peacebuilding vision and the peacebuilding needs (PBN, see Guideline 1b). Conflict-sensitive results chains establish a link between the activities of a project/programme and the desired changes in the peace and conflict situation. Normally the results chains demonstrate the contribution of a project/programme toward achieving the peacebuilding needs. The satisfied PBN thus represent depending on the project type the indirect or aggregated benefit (or impacts) of a development intervention. In this case the results hypothesis of the project/programme will be based on the peace and conflict analysis (CA, see Guideline 1a), and will be formulated on the assumption that working towards or achieving the peacebuilding needs will positively influence the peace and conflict situation. Conflict-sensitive results chains can be constructed on the basis of the standard results model used in the organisation in question. The GTZ model involves a sequence of inputs, activities, outputs, use of outputs, direct benefit, indirect benefit or highly aggregated benefit. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation distinguishes between short-term, medium-term and long-term results. 151 Element 4

152 Box 5: Key questions for formulating results hypotheses and chains Anticipated results of the project strategy (which are relevant to the project/programme and the target group?) Why do we believe that project strategy A will help bring about anticipated result Z? Which steps does the strategy comprise? Which stakeholders participate in this process? What is the time frame and on which assumptions is it based? Which enabling and constraining factors can be assessed, and how can these be influenced? Source: adapted after Hasemann 2005 Defining conflict-sensitive results indicators Conflict-sensitive results indicators operationalise the individual steps of the results chain up to the peacebuilding needs, and thereby should take into account the specific features of conflict transformation. These include the following characteristics: In accordance with the ABC triangle of conflict transformation, changes relevant to the conflict occur in the spheres of attitudes, behaviour and context. It is necessary to specify in which actors changes in attitude and behaviour are supposed to occur, and/or in which institutions structural changes are supposed to occur. Guidance can be provided here by the peace and conflict analysis, which supplies information on (structural) factors for peace and for conflict, and on the key actors. Changes can occur on a short-term basis, e.g. when participants in a training course are immediately able to successfully apply what they have learned. Changes can occur on a medium-term basis, e.g. when an organisation whose establishment and consolidation has been promoted participates actively and constructively in supporting peace talks as part of civil society. Changes can sometimes also become apparent only in the long term, e.g. when a measure to create formal land titles leads to a reduction in violent conflicts over land in the years thereafter. In the case of measures that take effect in the medium or long term, proxy indicators should be used that indicate whether and to what extent a situation has already moved in the desired direction. Different perspectives: Given the high degree of politicisation and polarisation of societies in conflict, there may be major differences in the way the parties to that conflict evaluate individual changes. "Objective verifiability" is therefore a difficult quality criterion for conflict-sensitive results indicators. It is, however, important when collecting the data to endeavour explicitly to obtain different perspectives on the project/ programme work. Quantitative and qualitative data: The process orientation of conflict transformation also makes it more difficult to collect "objectively verifiable" data on the results of measures. In peacebuilding, major importance is attached to changes in the attitudes, relations and behaviour of the stakeholders, and changes in the quality and sustainability of processes. Element 4 152

153 Participatory impact monitoring In participatory impact monitoring the project/programme stakeholders are actively involved in identifying and evaluating project results. In the case of individual development projects these stakeholders include the staff members of the implementing organisation, representatives of the target groups, and other involved public and private organisations (e.g. civil society organisations, governmental institutions). Participatory impact monitoring reflects a wider spectrum of perspectives on the quality and results of a project/programme. Here, representatives of target groups and other involved organisations are asked to report on actual, tangible changes in their work and life contexts that have emerged as a result of the project intervention. They are also called upon to identify and evaluate strengths and weaknesses of the project activities, and formulate recommendations for the further development of these measures. This enables the stakeholders that are involved in the project/programme or affected by it to shape the future project measures through their input. Participatory monitoring thus itself becomes a tool of empowerment. Unlike other forms of monitoring, participatory monitoring focuses on institutional learning. It is a process jointly owned and driven by all stakeholders that possibly with external consultancy support should help improve work to date. The focus here is on qualitative questions concerning how development measures generate results. Why are some approaches feasible and successful, and others not? How does the measure generate the desired changes? Box 6: Key questions for participatory conflict-sensitive impact monitoring How were you involved in the project/programme? How would you assess the activities of the project/programme? In your opinion, what were the strengths and weaknesses of its strategies, content and methods? Which lessons should be learned from the project/programme? What changed for you personally and in your current work context as a result of the project/ programme? How would you judge these changes? What changes occurred in your organisation as a result of the project/programme? How would you judge these changes? In your opinion, what are the major challenges with respect to the conflict situation? What needs to be done, who needs to do it, and how? Summary: Results of Peace and Conflict-Related Impact Monitoring Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring represents the final element of PCA. Following the CA, the conflict-relevant orientation of the project/programme or country portfolio toward the peacebuilding needs, and the analysis of the risks that the existing conflict situation poses for the implementation and achievement of objectives of the country portfolio or individual project/programme, peace and conflict-related impact monitoring helps observe the demonstrable and traceable positive and negative impacts of DC on the conflict situation. Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring supports the planning, implementation and evaluation of DC measures in conflict zones. 153 Element 4

154 Annex 1: Basic Concepts and Methods of Peace and Conflict-Related Impact Monitoring Definitions Conflict-sensitive monitoring and conflict-sensitive evaluation can in principle be implemented both at the project level and at the level of a country portfolio. The following remarks relate to both levels. Monitoring is an internal process implemented by the management of DC measures. The object of monitoring is the continuous or periodical collection of information on the status of the implementation of measures, usually on the basis of previously defined indicators. Monitoring focuses on the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation of the plan of operations and the achievement of objectives. Since results-based management was introduced, early results of the measures and the DC-relevant environment have also increasingly become a focus of monitoring. The objective of monitoring is the steering and continuous improvement of the quality of DC. Peace and conflict-related impact monitoring introduces additional observation components into existing monitoring systems by investigating the implementation process and the results of DC with respect to their impact on the peace and conflict environment. Depending on the objective of the DC measures, the focus is on the achievement of their objectives for peace (e.g. C1, C2 projects/programmes; peacebuilding as a county priority area) or on the early recognition and prevention of unintended negative impacts (e.g. C0 projects/ programmes). A simple form of conflict-related impact monitoring can support this task. Evaluation is an external process in which the value and significance of completed DC measures is reviewed, and lessons are learned for similar measures. Evaluations review and assess the design, implementation and results of the measures. Here the evaluation criteria by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD DAC 1991) are usually applied, i.e. relevance, effectiveness (achievement of objectives), efficiency (use of funds), impact and sustainability. These criteria must be adapted to the specific sphere of intervention of the measures. For conflict-sensitive evaluations a number of additional criteria have become established in recent years. These include connectedness (between projects/programmes generating short- and long-term results), coordination and coherence, coverage (inclusiveness) and participation (Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action / ALNAP 1998). Conflict-related impact monitoring thus makes a contribution toward the evaluation of DC measures in conflict situations, although the issues covered by an evaluation go beyond those covered by impact monitoring. Element 4 154

155 How can conflict-relevant changes be identified? When the deductive approach is applied a results hypothesis is formulated and then tested in relation to reality. This hypothesis is based on theoretical knowledge, practical experiences or plausibility. The use of results chains in DC is a typical example of the deductive approach. The advantage of this approach is that it reduces the field of monitoring from the outset, thus simplifying the selection of indicators and the interpretation of data. The limits of the deductive approach lie in precisely this reduction of the field of vision, which creates a risk of key changes and problems going unnoticed. It is also not very flexible, and its linearity makes it more difficult to conceptualise complex links. In the context of conflict-sensitive impact monitoring the deductive approach is therefore suitable mainly for monitoring the intended, positive results of a project/programme. The inductive approach is characterised by an open procedure in which the monitoring team identify conflict-relevant changes in the project/programme environment by pursuing an often iterative process of observations and surveys. For this purpose checklists can be used that are either based on international experiences with conflict-related impacts of DC (e.g. the DNH method), or that are prepared by the monitoring team themselves on the basis of the peace and conflict analysis. Other inductive methods include conflict monitoring, from which conclusions are drawn concerning the influence of the project/programme, and participatory impact monitoring. The strength of this approach lies in the profound understanding that can be gained from the project/programme results. In particular, this approach makes it possible to identify unintended positive and negative impacts of a project/programme. Its weaknesses lie in the relatively large amount of time required and the possible subjectivity of the monitoring team. Table 1: Monitoring intended and unintended conflict-related impacts Impacts Intended Unintended Positive Negative deductive (results chains) inductive (participatory methods) inductive (DNH, participatory methods) inductive (DNH, participatory methods) As a general rule a mix of deductive and inductive methods should be applied. Empirically sound monitoring of conflict-related changes calls for comparison of the situation before and after the intervention, as well as comparison of an area with intervention and an area without. This requires the preparation of a high-quality baseline study at the outset of the project/programme. The standard social science and participatory methods are available for data collection. It is especially important here to verify information by triangulating the statements obtained from different sources. 155 Element 4

156 Element 4 Annex 2: PCIA Checklist Areas of impact Positive impacts Negative impacts Does the project/programme help reduce conflict potentials? A. Factors for peace and for conflict A B C D E (Please give key factors from the peace and conflict analysis.) B. Actors for peace and for conflict A B C D E (Please give key actors from the peace and conflict analysis.) Does the project/programme strengthen factors for peace? (Please relate to concrete factors.) Does the project/programme promote joint interests among the actors? Does the project/programme create opportunities for dialogue and cooperation between the actors? (Please relate to concrete actors.) Does the project/programme strengthen existing conflict potentials? Does the project/programme affirm or promote structures that aggravate the conflict? Does the project/programme create new conflicts? (Please relate to concrete factors.) Does the project/programme strengthen tensions between groups? Does the project/programme strengthen economic incentives to continue the conflict? (Please relate to concrete actors.) C. Initiatives and capacities for peaceful conflict management A B C D E (Please specify.) D. Security A B C D E (Please specify the key factors for insecurity.) Does the project/programme promote transparent, democratic decision-making processes and reconciliation of interests? In the project/programme environment, are self-reliant peace initiatives emerging or are existing ones being strengthened? (Please relate to concrete institutions and initiatives.) Are people in the project environment increasingly rejecting violence as a means of resolving conflicts? Is the security situation of people in the project region improving? (Please relate to concrete factors.) Does the project/programme weaken existing capacities for conflict resolution (e.g. by establishing parallel structures)? Does the project/programme weaken existing peace initiatives (e.g. by promoting a "peace market")? (Please relate to concrete institutions and initiatives.) Does the project/programme put people at risk (staff members, partners, target groups)? (Please relate to concrete factors.) Source: revised after Leonhardt 2004a 156

157 Annex 3: Positive and Negative Impacts of Development Interventions in Conflict Situations Checklist Preliminary remark This checklist does not distinguish between pre-war and post-war situations, because it is often difficult in practice to draw a clear-cut distinction. Instead, the questions are worded so that they can be used for varying intensities of conflict resolution and the associated levels of violence. I. Negative impacts Areas of negative impact Examples Key questions I. Affirmation or promotion of structures that aggravate conflict ("structural violence") Does the government instrumentalise the project/programme for its own purposes (in the context of the conflict)? E.g. by - "rewarding" groups or regions to which it has political links or allies in the conflict - asserting state presence and control in remote regions - pursuing a "carrot and stick" strategy against dissident regions. Which interests is the government pursuing with the project/ programme? How was the project region selected? What role does it currently play in the conflict context? Is the timing of the project related to certain developments in the course of the conflict (e.g. peace negotiations)? Does the project cooperate with illegitimate or corrupt structures or individuals? E.g. - Staff members of the partner organisation use project materials for private purposes, which further reinforces the local differences between the privileged and the disadvantaged. - The partner's procedure for selecting candidates for training measures is not transparent. How was the executing organisation selected? How is its internal structure and modus operandi to be judged? Who are the partners and intermediary organisations? Is enough known about their interests, internal organisation and relationships with the target groups? Are the selection criteria and financing inputs of the project/ programme transparent to all stakeholders, especially the target groups? Element 4 157

158 Element 4 Are the principles and values that the project/programme represents disputed among the parties to the conflict? E.g. - family planning in a strongly religious environment - liberalisation of land ownership in an existing conflict between small farmers and large landowners - decentralisation where relations between the central state and traditional local authorities are tense. Does the daily work of the project/programme legitimate or reinforce power structures and social differences that the people perceive as problematic? Does the project/programme create new dependencies? E.g. - on local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) - on food aid. From where did the project/programme receive its mandate to work on a particular theme? With what motivation and what objective is the project/programme being implemented? Does the project/programme represent the values and goals of a particular party to the conflict? Does the project/programme unquestioningly accept parameters (e.g. use of national symbols, language requirements, restrictions on the holding of workshops) set by the authorities? Is the working language of the project/programme a language of which only one (ethnic, social) group has a good command? Do the criteria for staff selection (e.g. educational status, language skills, mobility) indirectly give preference to a certain group? Do the project staff maintain private social relations only with certain social, political etc. groups? Which approach does the project/programme pursue? How important is the empowerment of target groups? What kind of measures are supported? 158

159 II. Strengthening of tensions between groups III. Weakening of local (peace) initiatives Element 4 Do individual interest groups use the project/programme for their own ends? E.g. - Local potentates channel development monies through personal networks, thus strengthening their position of power. - Political or similar groups publicly portray the work of the project/programme as confirmation of their own position. - Local NGOs appropriate large areas of land with the support of the project/programme. Does the project/programme reinforce differences - between elites and the simple population? - between social, religious and/or political groups? - between regions? Does the project/programme identify (unconsciously) with a particular party to the conflict (often: the "weaker one")? Does the project/programme possess the expertise necessary to professionally facilitate encounters and dialogue between the parties to the conflict? Does the project/programme create parallel (social, economic, political) structures that weaken the existing ones? Whom do the project outputs mainly benefit? - resource flows - advisory services - training How do the beneficiaries use the project outputs? E.g. - private appropriation of rehabilitated common land - application of management competences to organise radical political groups - use of marketing expertise within the scope of the war economy Does the project/programme approach (inadvertently) reinforce competition between groups for the control of and access to development monies? What role do the executing agency, partners and intermediaries currently play within the conflict as a whole? How were the target groups defined? What role do they play in the conflict context? Are the target groups really the main beneficiaries of the project/ programme? Is the project/programme perceived as being impartial? Does the project/programme adopt a clear position on human rights violations? Does the project/programme have staff members who are trained and experienced in conflict management, or is it able to draw on such expertise? What approach to capacity building does the project/programme pursue? 159

160 Element 4 Does the project/programme promote new (peace) initiatives without building on the existing ones? Are the (peace) initiatives supported by the project/programme relevant from the point of view of the population, or do they rather deflect their energy away from addressing the key problems? Is a detailed analysis of the local institutional landscape available? IV. Promotion of the economy of violence Do resource transfers or advisory inputs of the project/programme directly or indirectly benefit the economy of violence? (The term "economy of violence" refers to illegal or illegitimate economic activities that are based on the use of violence and often contribute toward the financing of violent (political) actors, e.g. drug trade or human trafficking.) Does the project/programme subsidise lengthy "reconciliation" meetings between the parties to the conflict (e.g. tribal leaders, elders)? Does the project/programme help create a situation in which peacebuilding becomes a new "market" for local NGOs? Are requests for support analysed in detail? Is a situation and peace and conflict analysis available that was jointly prepared with partners and target groups, and that could be used to identify and define priorities for promotion? Does the project/programme promote economic activities that also play a role within the economy of violence? Do parties to the conflict repeatedly violently appropriate project resources (e.g. vehicles, computers, communication devices, money)? Is the project/programme forced to pay informal customs duties, levies, road tolls etc. to armed groups (thus contributing toward their financing)? Does the project/programme use security firms whose relationship to the parties to the conflict remains unclear? Do these meetings really bring tangible results? Or does the financial support (e.g. per diems, hospitality) rather create an incentive for the parties to the conflict to further protract these meetings? Is a financial incentive created for local NGOs to work for "peace"? Are these initiatives sustainable? Does this also create for those NGOs an incentive to further protract the conflict at a low level? 160

161 V. Placing people at risk Does the project/programme expose its staff members and partners to security risks in their daily work? Can the project/programme provide adequate protection to its staff members, partners and target groups who become the target of reprisals due to the activities that they perform and that are promoted by the project/programme? Element 4 Does a mature security strategy exist? Is it being applied systematically? Does the project/programme communicate its decisions clearly to all parties to the conflict? Does the project/programme support staff members and partners suffering from burn-out or trauma as a result of their conflict-related activities? Are activities adequately discussed and agreed on in advance with all stakeholders including those with a critical attitude? Are there clear guidelines on how to deal with e.g. arrests or threats? 161

162 Element 4 II. Positive impacts Areas of positive impact Examples Key questions I. Emergence of self-reliant (peace) initiatives Does the project/programme generate (peace) initiatives (e.g. through pilot measures, training) that take on a momentum of their own? Does the project/programme support partners and target groups in developing and systematically pursuing their own objectives? Does the project/programme promote the self-reliance and sustainability of the supported initiatives from the outset? Are disadvantaged groups empowered by the project/programme to better deal with their problems and assert their interests within the existing political and social structures? Do the capacity building and advisory services of the project/ programme also benefit disadvantaged groups? Are they better able as a result to assert themselves within the existing economic and social structures? II. Establishment or reform of political institutions to address undesirable situations Does the project/programme support institutions that can make a long-term contribution toward the transformation of local conflicts? E.g. - extrajudicial arbitration bodies - mechanisms and institutions for sustainable and just utilisation of natural resources - ombudspersons - bodies representing the interests of disadvantaged groups Do the governmental and non-governmental partners and institutions supported by the project/programme make a contribution toward the peaceful and just negotiation of conflicts of interest? Does the project/ programme take appropriate account of this aspect? Are there conflict potentials that have been so far been addressed on a more or less non-institutionalised basis? Might the project/programme make a contribution here? Does the project/programme promote a transparent and just legal system that is accessible to all groups within society? Does the project/programme promote political participation, transparency and good governance? Does the project/programme approach acknowledge the importance of and strengthen processes based on the rule of law? How much importance is attached to transparency and target group participation in project/programme implementation? Which mechanisms exist to promote these aspects? 162

163 III. People resist violence Does the project/programme support people and organisations that resist marginalisation and violence? Does the project/programme support balanced reporting in the media? Are young people being encouraged (e.g. through conflict management training measures in schools) to positively influence those of their peers who are willing to pursue violence? IV. Improved security of the population Does the project/programme enable the population to return to pacified areas through targeted de-mining, the marking of minefields and mine training? Does the population feel more secure, and are they gaining a new freedom of movement? Source: revised after Leonhardt 2004, Anderson/Olson 2003 Element 4 Does the project/programme pursue an inclusive approach that includes all major stakeholders? Does it attempt when so doing to prevent processes of marginalisation that are common in the local context? Do the project/programme staff show respect for differences? Are prejudices brought out into the open and reflected on? Does the project/programme strengthen the conflict resolution competences of key multipliers within the institutions and communities? Does the project/programme itself embody values such as respect, justice and non-violence? Does the project/programme have strategies to help improve the security situation of the target population? Does the project/programme support dialogue and trust-building measures between hostile groups? 163

164 Annex 4: Peace and Conflict-Related Impact Monitoring (Example of Use) Factor for conflict Measures Impacts that reduce the conflict Impacts that may exacerbate the conflict Orientation of measures International, criminal trade networks a) Agricultural promotion (Ex-)rebels prefer legal employment in agriculture to illegal activities in the war economy. Rebel groups can also profit from an increase in agricultural production by financing themselves from compulsory levies extracted from farmers. Counter-measures lie beyond the reach of the project. Compulsory levies could be prevented by establishing a police force bound by the rule of law and legitimated within the population. b) Rural infrastructure development (Ex-)rebels prefer legal employment in labourintensive infrastructure development to illegal activities in the war economy. An improved rural transport network could also be used to transport war economy goods (weapons, diamonds, timber), and thus help finance rebel groups. Counter-measures lie beyond the reach of the project. The transport of illegal goods could be prevented in the long term by establishing a police force bound by the rule of law and legitimated within the population, and in the short term by UN peacekeeping troops. c) (Re-) construction and equipment of schools (Ex-) child soldiers receive formal training, and thus prospects for employment in the peace economy. No strengthening of the factor for conflict foreseeable. No adjustment necessary d) Psychosocial care of women No weakening of the factor for conflict foreseeable. No strengthening of the factor for conflict foreseeable. No adjustment necessary International and regional destabilisation a) Agricultural promotion b) Rural infrastructure development No weakening of the factor for conflict foreseeable. No weakening of the factor for conflict foreseeable. No strengthening of the factor for conflict foreseeable. An improved rural transport network could be used to transport weapons from and into neighbouring countries. No adjustment necessary Counter-measures lie beyond the reach of the project. The import and further transport of weapons could be prevented in the long term by improved border controls. c) (Re-) construction and equipment of schools No weakening of the factor for conflict foreseeable. No strengthening of the factor for conflict foreseeable. No adjustment necessary d) Psychosocial care of women No weakening of the factor for conflict foreseeable. No strengthening of the factor for conflict foreseeable. No adjustment necessary Source: Lorenz 2005 Schritt 4 164

165 Annex 5: Bibliography and Further Reading Anderson, Mary B., 1999: Do No Harm. How Can Aid Support Peace or War. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Anderson, Mary B. / Olson, Lara, 2003: Confronting War. Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners. Cambridge, MA: Collaborative for Development Action. Barbolet, Adam et al., 2005: The Utility and Dilemmas of Conflict Sensitivity. Berlin: Berghof Handbook. Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2005: Discussion Series on PCIA. Berghof Handbook. BMZ, 2005: Sector Strategy for Crisis Prevention, Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding in German Development Cooperation. Bouta, Tsjeard / Frerks, Georg / Bannon, Ian, 2005: Gender, Conflict and Development. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Brabant, Koenraad van, 2001a: Operational Security Management in Violent Environments A Field Manual for Aid Agencies. Humanitarian Practice Network. London: Overseas Development Institute. Brabant, Koenraad van, 2001b: Mainstreaming the Organisational Management of Safety and Security. A Review of Aid Agency Practices and a Guide for Management. London: Overseas Development Institute. HPG Report 9. Brabant, Koenraad van, 2002: Module Security Strategies. London: RedR. Bush, Kenneth, 2003: Hands-On PCIA. Part I. A Handbook for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment. Collaborative for Development Action, 2004: Reflecting on Peace Practice Handbook ( Collier, Paul et al., 2003: Breaking the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development Policy. World Bank Research Report. Washington, DC: World Bank. CPR Network, 2005: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) Handbook. ( DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2005: Preventing Conflict and Building Peace. A Manual of Issues and Entry Points. Paris: OECD/DAC. Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, 2002: Sicherheitsleitfaden. Bonn: Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.v. DFID, 2002: Conducting a Strategic Conflict Assessment. London. DFID, 2005: Guidance on Evaluation and Review for DFID Staff. London: DFID Evaluation Department. Dugan, Máire A., 2001: Imaging the Future: A Tool for Conflict Resolution. pp in: Thania Paffenholz / Luc Reychler, Peacebuilding. A Field Guide. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Dworken, Jonathan T., 2001a: Threat Assessment. Training Module for NGOs Operating in Conflict Zones and High-Crime Areas. London: RedR. Dworken, Jonathan T., 2001b: Vulnerability Assessment. Training Module for NGOs Operating in Conflict Zones and High-Crime Areas. London: RedR. Dworken, Jonathan T., 2001c: Security Planning. From Risk Assessment to Security Plan. Training Module for NGOs Operating in Conflict Zones and High-Crime Areas. London: RedR. Eguren, Enrique, 2005: Protection Manual for Human Rights Defenders. Dublin: Front Line. The International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders. Fisher, Simon et al., 2000: Working with Conflict. Skills and Strategies for Action. Responding to Conflict (RTC). London: Zed Books. Frieters, Norbert, 2003: Konflikt-Monitoring für Vorhaben der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Eschborn: GTZ. Hasemann, Armin / Hübner-Schmid, Katharina / Dargatz, Anja, 2005: Konfliktanalyse zur Entwicklung von Handlungsoptionen für gesellschaftspolitische Kooperationsprogramme. Ein methodischer Leitfaden. Bonn: FriEnt/FES/GTZ. ( Hasemann, Armin, 2005: Konfliktbezogene Wirkungsbeobachtung, inkl. Konfliktsensitive Planung von gesellschaftspolitischen Kooperationsprojekten. Ein methodischer Leitfaden. Bonn: FES. Hofmann, Birgit, 2006: Checklist zur Bestandsaufnahme und Analyse von Sicherheitssekto-ren in Partnerländern. Eschborn: GTZ. Interministerielles Rahmenkonzept zur Unterstützung von Reformen des Sicherheitssektors in Entwicklungs- und Transformationsländern, 2006, Element 4

166 Jackson, Stephen with Siobhan Calthrop, 2002: Making Sense of Unstable Contexts. Tools for Analysis and Action. World Vision. John Hopkins University, Conflict Management Tools, Leonhardt, Manuela, 2001: Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and Management. A Practical Guideline. Eschborn: GTZ Leonhardt, Manuela, 2001: Conflict Impact Assessment for Development Projects. A Practical Guideline. Eschborn: GTZ. Litsch, Elisabeth Maria / Linsenmayr, Rainer, 2006: Wenn Wissen Leben retten kann Gewalt und Gefahren gewachsen sein. Ein praktischer Ratgeber für den Auslandseinsatz. Eschborn: GTZ. Lorenz, Kathrin, 2005: Recommendations for Contract and Cooperation Management to Ensure the Conflict-Sensitive Design and Steering of TC Projects and Programmes. A Guideline. Eschborn: GTZ. OECD/DAC, 1999: Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies. OECD/DAC, 2002: Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management. Paris: DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation. OECD/DAC, forthcoming: Guidelines for Conflict-Sensitive Impact Assessment. OECD/DAC, 2007: Handbook on Security System Reform. Supporting Security and Justice. Paris: OECD. Paffenholz, Thania, 2004: Designing Transformation and Intervention Processes. p in: Austin, Alex / Fischer, Martina / Ropers, Norbert (eds.), Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict. The Berghof Handbook. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Paffenholz, Thania, 2005: Third-Generation PCIA. Introducing the Planning and Assessment Approach for Conflict Zones. Berlin: Berghof Handbook. Paffenholz, Thania / Reychler, Luc, 2007: Aid for Peace, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Rothman, Jay, 2004: Action Evaluation. Berlin: Berghof Handbook. Saferworld et al., 2004: Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development Cooperation, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding. A Resource Pack. London. Scherg, Nina, 2004: Leitfaden zur krisenpräventiven Portfoliogestaltung. Eschborn: GTZ. SDC, Monitoring entwicklungsrelevanter Veränderungen (MERV) SDC, 2005: Conflict-Sensitive Program Management in International Cooperation. Mainstreaming the Prevention of Violence. Bern. SIDA, 2004: Conflict-Sensitive Development Cooperation. How to Conduct a Conflict Analysis. Stockholm: SIDA. Sprenger, Dirk / Kruk, Gabriele, 2005: Basic Principles of Crisis Prevention, Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding. Course Concept and Training Module for Decision-Makers and Experts in German Development Cooperation. Bonn/Eschborn: BMZ/GTZ. UNDP / World Bank, 2004: Practical Guide to Post-Conflict Needs Assessment. New York/Washington DC. UNDP / World Bank, 2005: An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices Using Results-Based Frameworks in Fragile States. New York / Washington DC. UNDG ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues, 2004: Inter-Agency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Transition Situations. New York. USAID, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, 2004: Conducting a Conflict Assessment. A Framework for Analysis and Program Development. Washington DC. VENRO, 2003: Mindeststandards für die Personalsicherheit in der humanitären Hilfe. Bonn: VENRO. Wils, Oliver et al., 2006: Systemische Konflikttransformation. Konzept und Anwendungsgebiete. Berlin: Berghof Foundation for Peace Support. Zupan, Natascha, 2005: Methoden der Evaluation im Konfliktkontext. FriEnt Briefing Nr. 3. Bonn. Element 4 Websites (database containing evaluation reports on humanitarian aid, often in conflict situations) (PCIA dialogue series) (CPR Network: Compendium of Operational Tools for Peacebuilding) (database containing international tools for conflict analysis, conflict-sensitive project planning and conflict-related impact monitoring / OECD DAC Evaluation Resource Centre; contains approx. 50 peace- and conflict-related evaluation reports by international donors) 166

167

168 PCA Peace and Conflict Analysis (CA) Peace and Conflict-Relatet Relevance Assessment Risk Management Peace and Conflict-Related Impact Monitoring Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH Dag-Hammarskjöld - Weg Eschborn / Germany T F E [email protected] I