Public Key Infrastructures
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1 Public Key Infrastructures Ralph Holz Network Architectures and Services Technische Universität München November 2014 Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 1
2 Part 2: Recent results or: the sorry state of X.509 Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 2
3 How This Got Our Interest (1) PKI weaknesses in 2008 Early December 2008: Error in Comodo CA: no identity check Reported by Eddy Nigg of StartSSL (a CA) A regional sub-seller just took the credit card number and gave you a certificate No real reaction by Mozilla Late December 2008: whitehat hacks StartSSL CA Technical report: simple flaw in Web front-end Certificate for mozilla.com issued Caught by 2nd line of defence: human checks for high-value domains Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 3
4 How This Got Our Interest (1) PKI weaknesses in 2008 Early December 2008: Error in Comodo CA: no identity check Reported by Eddy Nigg of StartSSL (a CA) A regional sub-seller just took the credit card number and gave you a certificate No real reaction by Mozilla Late December 2008: whitehat hacks StartSSL CA Technical report: simple flaw in Web front-end Certificate for mozilla.com issued Caught by 2nd line of defence: human checks for high-value domains Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 3
5 How This Got Our Interest (1) PKI weaknesses in 2008 Early December 2008: Error in Comodo CA: no identity check Reported by Eddy Nigg of StartSSL (a CA) A regional sub-seller just took the credit card number and gave you a certificate No real reaction by Mozilla Late December 2008: whitehat hacks StartSSL CA Technical report: simple flaw in Web front-end Certificate for mozilla.com issued Caught by 2nd line of defence: human checks for high-value domains Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 3
6 How This Got Our Interest (2) PKI weaknesses in 2009 February 2009 New easy attack on MD5 ( MD5 considered harmful today ) Demonstrated by issuing valid but fake CA certificate Fast reaction by vendors: MD5 to be disabled for signatures by 2012 Spring 2009 J. Nightingale of Mozilla writes crawler to traverse HTTPs sites Goal: determine number of MD5-signed certificates (11%) This piece of software was made public, it s our starting point Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 4
7 How This Got Our Interest (2) PKI weaknesses in 2009 February 2009 New easy attack on MD5 ( MD5 considered harmful today ) Demonstrated by issuing valid but fake CA certificate Fast reaction by vendors: MD5 to be disabled for signatures by 2012 Spring 2009 J. Nightingale of Mozilla writes crawler to traverse HTTPs sites Goal: determine number of MD5-signed certificates (11%) This piece of software was made public, it s our starting point Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 4
8 How This Got Our Interest (2) PKI weaknesses in 2009 February 2009 New easy attack on MD5 ( MD5 considered harmful today ) Demonstrated by issuing valid but fake CA certificate Fast reaction by vendors: MD5 to be disabled for signatures by 2012 Spring 2009 J. Nightingale of Mozilla writes crawler to traverse HTTPs sites Goal: determine number of MD5-signed certificates (11%) This piece of software was made public, it s our starting point Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 4
9 How This Got Our Interest (3) State of Mozilla Root Store Mozilla 2009: Does anyone know who owns this root cert? It turned out there were root certs that no-one could remember No-one could remember when they were accepted, or on which grounds Ideal PKI Root CA Involuntary Bridge CA Root Store Intermediate CAs... End host certs Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 5
10 Kurt Seifried vs. RapidSSL How to hijack a Web mailer in 3 easy steps Step 1: register address: ssladministrator@portugalmail.pt Step 2: ask RapidSSL for certificate for portugalmail.pt, giving this address as your contact Step 3: Watch Domain Validation by probe fail Kurt succeeded. It cost him < 100 USD. Main failure here: Web mailers and CAs have not agreed on protected addresses This issue is now in Mozilla s Problematic practices Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 6
11 How This Got Our Interest (4) In 2011, the foundations of X.509 were rocked. March 2011: Comodo CA hacked (a sub-seller, again) Attacker claims to come from Iran 10 certificates for high-value domains issued Browser reaction: blacklisting of those certificates in code Neither CRLs nor OCSP trusted enough to work for victims July 2011: DigiNotar CA hacked Attacker claims to be the same one as in March 531 fake certificates, high-value domains E.g., Google, Facebook, Mozilla, CIA, Mossad, Skype Some hints pointed at Man-in-the-middle attack in Iran The Netherlands PKI was operated by DigiNotar... For the first time, a Root CA is removed from a browser for being compromised Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 7
12 How This Got Our Interest (4) In 2011, the foundations of X.509 were rocked. March 2011: Comodo CA hacked (a sub-seller, again) Attacker claims to come from Iran 10 certificates for high-value domains issued Browser reaction: blacklisting of those certificates in code Neither CRLs nor OCSP trusted enough to work for victims July 2011: DigiNotar CA hacked Attacker claims to be the same one as in March 531 fake certificates, high-value domains E.g., Google, Facebook, Mozilla, CIA, Mossad, Skype Some hints pointed at Man-in-the-middle attack in Iran The Netherlands PKI was operated by DigiNotar... For the first time, a Root CA is removed from a browser for being compromised Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 7
13 How This Got Our Interest (4) In 2011, the foundations of X.509 were rocked. March 2011: Comodo CA hacked (a sub-seller, again) Attacker claims to come from Iran 10 certificates for high-value domains issued Browser reaction: blacklisting of those certificates in code Neither CRLs nor OCSP trusted enough to work for victims July 2011: DigiNotar CA hacked Attacker claims to be the same one as in March 531 fake certificates, high-value domains E.g., Google, Facebook, Mozilla, CIA, Mossad, Skype Some hints pointed at Man-in-the-middle attack in Iran The Netherlands PKI was operated by DigiNotar... For the first time, a Root CA is removed from a browser for being compromised Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 7
14 DigiNotar vs. Iran? Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 8
15 Can We Assess the Quality of this PKI? A good PKI should... allow HTTPs on all WWW hosts... contain only valid certificates... offer good cryptographic security Long keys, only strong hash algorithms, have a sensible setup Short validity periods (1 year) Short certificate chains (but use intermediate certificates) Number of issuers should be reasonable (weakest link!) Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 9
16 Acquiring Our Data Sets Active scans to measure deployed PKI Scan hosts on Alexa Top 1 million Web sites Nov 2009 Apr 2011: scanned 8 times from Germany March 2011: scans from 8 hosts around the globe Passive monitoring to measure user-encountered PKI Munich Research Network, monitored all SSL/TLS traffic Two 2-week runs in Sep 2010 and Apr 2011 EFF scan of IPv4 space in 2010 Scan of 2-3 months, no domain information Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 10
17 In the meantime... EFF scan presented at 27C3 Focuses on CA certification structure Scan of IP addresses: does not allow to check match of host names No temporal distribution EFF project: SSL Observatory Ivan Ristic of Qualys presents similar scan Smaller data basis Data set not published as raw data No temporal distribution Could not include it in our analysis Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 11
18 Our Data Sets Active Scans Passive Monitoring EFF IPv4 scan Location Time (run) Type Certificates Tuebingen, DE November 2009 Active scan 833,661 Tuebingen, DE December 2009 Active scan 819,488 Tuebingen, DE January 2010 Active scan 816,517 Tuebingen, DE April 2010 Active scan 816,605 Munich, DE September 2010 Active scan 829,232 Munich, DE November 2010 Active scan 827,366 Munich, DE April 2011 Active scan 829,707 Munich, DE April 2011 Active scan with SNI 826,098 Shanghai, CN April 2011 Active scan 798,976 Beijing, CN April 2011 Active scan 797,046 Melbourne, AU April 2011 Active scan 833,571 İzmir, TR April 2011 Active scan 825,555 São Paulo, BR April 2011 Active scan 833,246 Moscow, RU April 2011 Active scan 830,765 Santa Barbara, US April 2011 Active scan 834,173 Boston, US April 2011 Active scan 834,054 Munich, DE September 2010 Passive monitoring 183,208 Munich, DE April 2011 Passive monitoring 989,040 EFF servers March June 2010 Active IPv4 scan 11,349, million certificates to evaluate. Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 12
19 Our Data Sets Active Scans Passive Monitoring EFF IPv4 scan Location Time (run) Type Certificates Tuebingen, DE November 2009 Active scan 833,661 Tuebingen, DE December 2009 Active scan 819,488 Tuebingen, DE January 2010 Active scan 816,517 Tuebingen, DE April 2010 Active scan 816,605 Munich, DE September 2010 Active scan 829,232 Munich, DE November 2010 Active scan 827,366 Munich, DE April 2011 Active scan 829,707 Munich, DE April 2011 Active scan with SNI 826,098 Shanghai, CN April 2011 Active scan 798,976 Beijing, CN April 2011 Active scan 797,046 Melbourne, AU April 2011 Active scan 833,571 İzmir, TR April 2011 Active scan 825,555 São Paulo, BR April 2011 Active scan 833,246 Moscow, RU April 2011 Active scan 830,765 Santa Barbara, US April 2011 Active scan 834,173 Boston, US April 2011 Active scan 834,054 Munich, DE September 2010 Passive monitoring 183,208 Munich, DE April 2011 Passive monitoring 989,040 EFF servers March June 2010 Active IPv4 scan 11,349, million certificates to evaluate. Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 12
20 Our Data Sets Active Scans Passive Monitoring EFF IPv4 scan Location Time (run) Type Certificates Tuebingen, DE November 2009 Active scan 833,661 Tuebingen, DE December 2009 Active scan 819,488 Tuebingen, DE January 2010 Active scan 816,517 Tuebingen, DE April 2010 Active scan 816,605 Munich, DE September 2010 Active scan 829,232 Munich, DE November 2010 Active scan 827,366 Munich, DE April 2011 Active scan 829,707 Munich, DE April 2011 Active scan with SNI 826,098 Shanghai, CN April 2011 Active scan 798,976 Beijing, CN April 2011 Active scan 797,046 Melbourne, AU April 2011 Active scan 833,571 İzmir, TR April 2011 Active scan 825,555 São Paulo, BR April 2011 Active scan 833,246 Moscow, RU April 2011 Active scan 830,765 Santa Barbara, US April 2011 Active scan 834,173 Boston, US April 2011 Active scan 834,054 Munich, DE September 2010 Passive monitoring 183,208 Munich, DE April 2011 Passive monitoring 989,040 EFF servers March June 2010 Active IPv4 scan 11,349, million certificates to evaluate. Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 12
21 Our Data Sets Active Scans Passive Monitoring EFF IPv4 scan Location Time (run) Type Certificates Tuebingen, DE November 2009 Active scan 833,661 Tuebingen, DE December 2009 Active scan 819,488 Tuebingen, DE January 2010 Active scan 816,517 Tuebingen, DE April 2010 Active scan 816,605 Munich, DE September 2010 Active scan 829,232 Munich, DE November 2010 Active scan 827,366 Munich, DE April 2011 Active scan 829,707 Munich, DE April 2011 Active scan with SNI 826,098 Shanghai, CN April 2011 Active scan 798,976 Beijing, CN April 2011 Active scan 797,046 Melbourne, AU April 2011 Active scan 833,571 İzmir, TR April 2011 Active scan 825,555 São Paulo, BR April 2011 Active scan 833,246 Moscow, RU April 2011 Active scan 830,765 Santa Barbara, US April 2011 Active scan 834,173 Boston, US April 2011 Active scan 834,054 Munich, DE September 2010 Passive monitoring 183,208 Munich, DE April 2011 Passive monitoring 989,040 EFF servers March June 2010 Active IPv4 scan 11,349, million certificates to evaluate. Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 12
22 Our Data Sets Active Scans Passive Monitoring EFF IPv4 scan Location Time (run) Type Certificates Tuebingen, DE November 2009 Active scan 833,661 Tuebingen, DE December 2009 Active scan 819,488 Tuebingen, DE January 2010 Active scan 816,517 Tuebingen, DE April 2010 Active scan 816,605 Munich, DE September 2010 Active scan 829,232 Munich, DE November 2010 Active scan 827,366 Munich, DE April 2011 Active scan 829,707 Munich, DE April 2011 Active scan with SNI 826,098 Shanghai, CN April 2011 Active scan 798,976 Beijing, CN April 2011 Active scan 797,046 Melbourne, AU April 2011 Active scan 833,571 İzmir, TR April 2011 Active scan 825,555 São Paulo, BR April 2011 Active scan 833,246 Moscow, RU April 2011 Active scan 830,765 Santa Barbara, US April 2011 Active scan 834,173 Boston, US April 2011 Active scan 834,054 Munich, DE September 2010 Passive monitoring 183,208 Munich, DE April 2011 Passive monitoring 989,040 EFF servers March June 2010 Active IPv4 scan 11,349, million certificates to evaluate. Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 12
23 Errors in TLS Connection Setup Scans from Germany, Nov 2009 and Apr 2011 % of all connections 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Other failure Unknown protocol Success Apr2011 Top 1k Nov2009 Top 1k Aug2011 Top 10k Nov2009 Top 10k Apr2011 Top 100k Nov2009 Top 100k Apr2011 Top 1m Nov2009 Top 1m Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 13
24 Errors in TLS Connection Setup UNKNOWN PROTOCOL Rescanned those hosts and manual sampling Always plain HTTP and always an index.html with HTML 2... Hypothesis: old servers, old configurations More likely to happen in the lower ranks Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 14
25 Validity of End-Hosts Certificates R 1 Root Store R 2 CA 3 CA 1 I 1 I 4 CA I 2 2 R 3 E 7 E 1 E 2 I 5 I 3 I 6 E 3 E 4 E 5 E 6 Host Certificates Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 15
26 Validation of Certificate Chains Just check chains, not host names Chain valid Expired Self signed end host certificate Root certificate not in root store No root certificate found Germany.Nov09 Germany.Apr11 China.Apr11 EFF MON1.Sep10 MON2.Apr11 % of all certificates 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 16
27 Correct Domain Name in Certificate Now also check host names Look in Common Name (CN) and Subject Alternative Name (SAN) Munich, April 2011, only valid chains: 12.2% correct CN 5.9% correct SAN Only 18% of certificates are fully verifiable Positive trend : from 14.9% in 2009 to 18% in 2011 Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 17
28 Unusual Host Names CN=plesk or similar Found in 7.3% of certificates Verified: Plesk/Parallels panels CN=localhost 4.7% of certificates Very common: redirection to HTTP after HTTPs Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 18
29 Host Names in Self-signed Certificates Self-signed means: Issuer the same as subject of certificate Requires out-of-band distribution of certificate Active scan 2.2% correct Common Name (CN) 0.5% correct Subject Alternative Name Top 3 most frequent CNs account for > 50% plesk or similar in 27.3% localhost or similar in 25.4% standard installations? Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 19
30 Certificate Occurrences Many certificates valid for more than one domain Domains served by same IP Some certificates issued for dozens of domains Certificate reuse on multiple machines increases options for attacker Often found on hosters E. g. *.blogger.com, *.wordpress.com Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 20
31 Certificate Occurrences How often does a certificate occur on X hosts? 0.1 all certificates only valid certificates Pr[ #hosts > X ] e 4 1e Number of hosts per certificate =: X Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 21
32 Certificate Chains R 1 Root Store R 2 CA 3 CA 1 I 1 I 4 CA I 2 2 R 3 E 7 E 1 E 2 I 5 I 6 I 3 E 5 E 6 Intermediate Certificates E 3 E 4 Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 22
33 Certificate Chain Lengths 70% Apr11 Nov09 60% MON1 Share in certificates 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% and greater Chain length Finding more positive than negative: Trend to use intermediate certificates more often Allows to keep Root Certificates offline But chains still reasonably short Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 23
34 Validity Periods CDF of validity periods, active scans Pr[X < validity] Nov2009 Apr Validity (years) Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 24
35 Validity Periods CDF of validity periods, scans and monitoring Pr[X < validity] Nov2009 Apr2011 MON2, Apr Validity (years) Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 25
36 Public Key Properties Key types RSA: 99.98% (rest is DSA) About 50% have length 1,024 bit About 45% have length 2,048 bit Clear trend from 1,024 to 2,048 bit Weird encounters 1,504 distinct certificates that share another certificate s key Many traced to a handful of hosting companies Nadiah Henninger s work: Embedded devices, poor entropy! Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 26
37 Debian Weak Keys (1) Bug of 2008 Generation of random numbers weak (bad initialisation) Only 2 16 public/private key-pairs generated Allows pre-computation of private keys Debian ships blacklist of keys Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 27
38 Debian Weak Keys (2) Weak randomness in key generation serious bug of % Share of weak keys 0.6% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0 1/1/2010 Date 1/1/2011 Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 28
39 Public Key Lengths CDF for RSA key lengths double-log Y axis Pr[X < length] e 04 1e 05 Tue Nov2009 TUM Sep2010 TUM April Key length (bits) Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 29
40 Symmetric Ciphers Results from monitoring RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 (!) RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (!) RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 (!) DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA others MON1 MON % of connection ciphers (Mostly) in line with results from 2007 by Lee et al. Order of AES and RC4 has shifted, RC4-128 most popular Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 30
41 Signature Algorithms MD5 is being phased out 100% 90% Prevalence in signatures 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% RSA/SHA1 RSA/MD5 Active scans from Germany Monitoring Active scans from China 1/1/2010 Date 1/1/2011 Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 31
42 Certificate Issuers Very few CAs account for > 50% of certificates GoDaddy Equifax (several root certificates) Verisign (several roots) plesk' Thawte (several roots) localhost' or similar GeoTrust (several roots) USERTRUST Comodo GlobalSign Share (%) But there are 150+ Root Certificates in Mozilla. Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 32
43 Certificate Quality We defined 3 categories Good : Correct chains, correct host name Chain 2 No MD5, strong key of > 1024 bit Validity 13 months Acceptable Chain 3, validity 25 months Rest as above Poor : the remainder Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 33
44 Certificate Quality Share in rank range 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% Valid but poor Acceptable Good Top 1024 Top 2048 Top 4096 Top 8192 Top Top Top Top Top Top Top 1m 0% Validity correlates with rank Share of poor certificates higher among high-ranking sites Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 34
45 Conclusion In great part, the X.509 PKI is in a sorry state Only 18% of the Top 1 Million Web sites show fully valid certificates Invalid chains Expired certificates are common Often no recognisable Root Certificate Lack of correct domain information information Frequent sharing of certificates between hosts is problematic Much carelessness Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 35
46 Conclusion Certification practices are very poor. But crypto OK. Some positive developments Very slight trend for fully valid certificates Chains short, intermediate certificates used Key lengths OK Weak MD5 algorithm is being phased out Ralph Holz: Public Key Infrastructures 36
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