Transport Policy in London: Lessons for Almaty.

Transcription

1 Transport Policy in London: Lessons for Almaty. Zhanna Baigabulova University of Oxford Working paper N 1050 February 2010 Transport Studies Unit School of Geography and the Environment 1

2 INTRODUCTION The 20 th century has seen extensive infrastructure development. By the end of the century the UK and many other European countries accepted that constructing more infrastructure capacity would not ease congestion, as traffic tends to fill additional space (Ieromonachou et al, 2007). The need for more efficient use of current capacity and the importance of demand management became apparent. At the same time it became clear that vehicle technology will be cleaner as agreements between the EU, national Governments and industries become more common. But this is not enough to solve either the problem of congestion or that of carbon dioxide. In the era of receding oil resources, growing demand for fuel may negate all technological achievements in the energy efficiency of vehicles. Demand management tools should and can affect travel behaviour to reduce car travel and contribute to a considerable growth of public transport use. Traffic congestion is a widespread and common problem in big cities. Science has accumulated diverse methods to combat congestion, the viability of which has been shown by various cities. The most commonly used measures to combat congestion have been road construction, parking levies and development of public transport; congestion charging is a more innovative and effective instrument that has been introduced in just few cities. Strictly speaking, bringing congestion to an efficient level is a non-trivial task. However, some cities have managed to get congestion under control, and London is a successful example for transport policy implementation of a range of complementary pricing mechanisms. The objective of this paper is to analyse London transport policy and extract lessons that can be applied to Almaty, which has serious traffic and air pollution problems. This paper looks at the main tools which form the overall transport policy of London and those that affect the urban traffic situation, including road user charging, vehicle and fuel taxes and parking policy. This paper focuses on the congestion charging scheme (LCCS) and the possibility of introducing road pricing in Almaty. Despite the success of LCCS, there are number of obstacles which might arise from implementing congestion charging in Almaty. Nevertheless, consideration of such a measure in the future transport programmes might be useful, especially when accompanied with other measures, like the development of public transport and the toughening of parking controls. 2

3 1. TRANSPORT POLICY IN ALMATY Almaty is the biggest city in Kazakhstan with a population of million people in an area of km 2 (The Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan (ASRK), 2009). It was the capital until 1998, and is the cultural, historic, financial, scientific and industrial centre of the country. Almaty is a fast growing city alongside the capital city of Kazakhstan (Astana). It is experiencing enormous ecological problems, which are linked to the city s transport problems. Figure 1.1 shows general structure of the city. Figure 1.1: General Structure of Almaty City 3 km Source: It is important to note the unique features of the city s climate. The city is located at the foot of the Tien Shan Mountains, which surround the city from the south and south-east (Figure 1.2). Consequently, the altitude ranges within the city are more than 300 metres. Under general favorable climatic conditions the region is characterized by extremely weak natural cleansing of the air. The city is located in the depression where windless weather, fogs and ground temperature inversions are common. The optimal air quality is observed only in the upper south part of the city, within a narrow zone of 20 km from the bottom of the mountains. But it is exactly in this zone that intensive construction by high-rise buildings is carried out, impeding the flow of air. 3

4 The transport situation in Almaty is characterized by dramatic growth in the number of vehicles since the 1990s. Figure 1.3 shows the annual increase in the number of cars during the period between 2000 and Here the number of cars increased from 166,000 in 2000 to 453,500 in 2008, with more than 90% being in individual ownership (ASRK, 2009). This leads to a car ownership level at 311 per 1000 population (against countrywide level of 154). In addition, approximately 200,000 non-resident vehicles enter daily into the city (KT, 2008a). It is predicted that by 2010 cars number will increase to 855,000 (KT, 2008b). Figure 1.2: Location of Almaty within Kazakhstan Thousands Figure 1.3: Number of Cars in Almaty Source: The agency of Statistics of the Republic Figure 1.2 Number of automobiles in Almaty of Kazakhstan. Public transport in Almaty is quite diverse and includes buses, trolley-buses, and tramways. Table 1.1 gives information about fleet and patronage of public transport. Buses are the main form of public transport in Almaty. They also receive the highest patronage in comparison to the other modes. Buses have been the 4

5 only mode of public transport with a substantial increase in the number of vehicles despite the fact that in the 1990s many routes were closed. Other forms of public transport, trolleybus and tramway transport have had a more difficult history. The economic crisis of the 1990s caused the closing of many their routes. Today only two tramway routes remain, and the rolling-stock was more than four times larger in 1991 *. The trolley-bus fleet decreased from 413 * in 1991 to 191 in There are currently 131 routes in the city, of which 119 are bus routes, 10 are trolley bus routes and 2 are tramway routes. As of 2009 there are 1884 buses, 28 tramways and 114 trolley buses which run within the city (Almaty official website, 2009). Table 1.1: Fleet and patronage of public transport in Almaty ( ) Public transport fleet Buses* Tramways Trolley-buses Patronage (million people) Buses Tramways Trolley-buses Passenger traffic (million passenger km) Buses Tramways Trolley-buses Note: * Including buses belonging to organizations not engaged in public transport services Source: The agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan. It can be seen from the above numbers that there is a significant discrepancy between data from Statistic agency and Official website of the city regarding public transport fleet. The differences in bus fleet numbers can be explained, as data from Statistical agency includes buses of commercial organizations. The agency does not give any explanations and details of this market, but this market is considerable, as many private organizations provide transport for their employees. But more accurate details can only be calculated by comparing data from the Statistical agency and the Almaty official website. Thus the market of buses not engaged in public transport services makes up about 63% of all buses. The discrepancy in the data of other public transport fleet is harder to explain, as the * Source:

6 practice of conveying of employees to homes does not take place here. The only assumption is that data from Statistical agency also includes vehicles in out-of-working condition. Table 1.1 shows that from 2006 the fleet number is decreasing despite the constant patronage growth. This is a controversial situation, as there are fewer vehicles to serve more people, and this has resulted in more crowded travel conditions. As a result of the dramatic decrease in tramway and trolley-bus fleets, people, who used to travel by these modes, were forced to transfer to buses, which cannot cope with constantly increasing patronage. In September 2008, the electronic ticketing system Validator was introduced in Almaty public transport. In trolley buses and tramways the system is working successfully, but in buses, though installed on 74 routes out of total 119, the system is not in use (Bill.kz). This fact is accepted by the authorities, but they cannot change the situation. It seems it is unlikely that it will be fully used for many reasons. Firstly, the privatized and weakly controlled forms of bus services complicate this task. Secondly, the chosen system has some weak points, including the absence of tickets classification and problems with giving any change. Thirdly, there was no clear information campaign for the passengers. They were not informed how to use the new ticketing system. The underground in Almaty also has a complex history. The first projects were developed in early 1980s by Moscow Institute Metrogiprostroi together with former Leningrad Institute Lengiprometrotrans, and in 1988 construction began. By 1991, 137 buildings were demolished for metro needs, but the collapse of the USSR and the following economic crisis of the 1990s halted building plans until Since then the Government has assigned substantial amounts of funds for metro construction, but a significant part of this money has been transferred to road construction. Authorities have promised to open the first line for operation in 2010 (Table 1.2 and Figure 1.4). Table 1.2: Main facts about Almaty metro Length of first line 8.5 km Interval between trains mins Total length of three lines 45 km Average capacity of one unit 173 passengers (5 Passengers/ m 2 Average distance between stations 1.27 km Average depth of stations 40 m Planned speed 40 km/h Maximum depth of stations 78 m Source: Source:

7 The two main problems with the Almaty metro are the particular natural features of the area and the routes selected. The construction of metro entails such difficulties as dealing with liquid soils and underground rivers. The location of the city in the seismic zone also complicates the works and raises the price per constructed kilometre. Seismic safety is also weakened by rocky soils formed by mountain torrents, which are typical in this region. Secondly, the underground construction has caused much concern because of the illogical location of some stations and lines. For example, the station Raiymbek (Райымбек) does not reach the train station Almaty-II by almost one kilometre (CentrAsia, 2009). Obviously, people intending to travel with luggage would not walk this distance, but rather use a car or bus. Also, the distances between stations are too long. Thus, the passenger capacity on lines might turn out to be low in practice. Problems include nonobservance of technical requirements, and the tender processes. The construction of metro, besides safety problems of metro itself, has also generated safety concerns about the buildings located above tunnels (Time, 2007). Figure 1.4 The Scheme of the Almaty Metro 3 km First line Second line Third line Source: The authorities have recently considered the development of a BRT (bus rapid transit) system and/or a LRT (light rail transit) system. In terms of capital investments, BRT might be given greater priority, as it is much cheaper than LRT or the metro. In 7

8 addition, the current energy shortage may be another factor against LRT, as this will require additional electricity production. Notwithstanding this the authorities have considered the LRT mode in greater detail. There are two versions of LRT development in the city. The first option is limited by the modernization of existing tramway lines. The second option additionally considers the expansion of current lines and the construction of new lines (Almaty official website, 2009). There is no any open information about BRT plans, meaning that LRT has been given priority in these plans. Public transport, despite its versatility, has many problems. The bus service lacks reliability and safety. It is only the trolley-bus and the tramway services run by the state authorities that are reliable and safe (in the context of driving accuracy). Though more reliable, they receive less patronage because of their small network and limited rollingstock. There is a tendency towards a gradual reduction in the number of bus routes. The authorities explain this by the need to address to duplication and unprofitability of some routes. For example, in 2006 there were 167 bus routes, whereas in 2009 this number declined to 119 (ASRK, 2009). But these actions ignore the fact that the current number of buses is not able to accommodate the growing passenger demand. In general, the current situation with respect to public transport is partly the reflection of the difficult 1990s, when full privatization of the bus network took place. At that time public transport had many criminal features, bringing huge profits to their operators. Since then the situation has improved, but operators still do not receive any subsidies. As a result, authorities do not have enough power to influence their services and prices. The unauthorized rises of bus fares, changes or cancellations of route are typical problems of Almaty bus services. The poor quality of the public transport system has led to serious ecological problems for Almaty. The air pollution problems and the issue of Euro standards in Kazakhstan have now become important. Transport is a primary source of air pollution in the city, as 90% of all emissions into the atmosphere come from transport. In 2007, 170,000 tonnes of air pollutants out of total 185,000 tonnes came from vehicles (KT, 2008b). This number would rise to 265,000 tonnes by 2010 considering expected growth of car ownership. These pollutants include sulphur dioxide, nitric oxide, carbon monoxide, PM and formaldehyde. Unfortunately official statistics does not give detailed data for each pollutant. 8

9 As a result of fast growing traffic and attendant air pollution, the city has the highest index of air pollution and the highest rate of respiratory morbidity among other Kazakhstan s cities. In 2002, research was carried out by the biology faculty of Kazakh National University to compare lead levels in the blood of citizens of Almaty and Ecibastuz (Kostuk, 2002). They found that lead levels were much higher in Almaty citizens (44mg/l) than Ecibastuz (34mg/l). This conclusion is despite the fact that Ecibastuz has two big power plants (ash dumps and coal), whereas Almaty saw the decrease of industries during over the last 18 years (a period when automobile numbers have increased rapidly). The main reasons behind these numbers have been the fast growth of vehicles and the fact that a significant number of Almaty vehicles are technically out-of-date. 78% of all vehicles in Almaty are more than 7 years old (Zakon, 2008). In January 2008 the Government issued a decree to adopt European vehicle emissions standards. From 15 July 2009 Euro-2 standards for vehicles has come into force and fuel standards were introduced six months later. Euro-3 and 4 will be introduced over the next five years (Table 1.3). The introduction of Euro standards bans the import of old vehicles. The existing stock of cars will not be affected by these requirements, as they can be used until complete depreciation and scrapping takes place. Table 1.3: Introduction of Euro standards in Kazakhstan Euro-2 Euro-3 Euro-4 vehicles Fuel Vehicles Fuel Vehicles Fuel 15 July 2009 (Ban of import of cars produced 1 January January 2011(Ban of import of cars 1 January January January 2016 before1997) produced before 2001) Source: Zakon, 2009 As can be seen from the Table 1.3, there is a big time gap between introduction of the standards for vehicles and fuel. This discrepancy between fuel and vehicle standards could negate all potential achievements. The percentage of vehicles produced before 1997 is relatively low (around 10%). Thus the real effects will be even lower as existing vehicles do not have to meet these standards. There are three main limitations to the introduction of Euro standards in Almaty. Firstly, the most problematic factor concerns the production of proper fuel. The modernization of oil-refining capacity to comply with the requirements is complex and expensive. The financing sources are also unclear. Even if the three oil-refining companies (in Kazakhstan) modernize today, they might reach Euro-2 standards, but then a few years 9

10 later they have to conduct even more expensive modernization to meet Euro-3 standards. The authorities themselves accept the fact that oil-refining industries will be able to produce appropriate petrol only by 2014 to meet Euro-3 requirements (MTK, 2009). Secondly, the introduction of Euro standards assumes the implementation of control systems with a comprehensive database. This again is a complex and an expensive process. But ignoring this part of the reform will increase the frequency of fraud and tax evasion. The third factor concerns low quality of technical inspection of vehicles, which can diminish all advantages of the vehicles meeting Euro standards. The widespread practice at fuel stations of diluting petrol with diesel (or ethanol), and fraud during technical checkups may also worsen the situation. The issue is complicated by the fact that neighbouring countries have already accepted these standards: Euro-2 in Uzbekistan; Euro-3 in Russia, Ukraine and China. In this situation Kazakhstan is becoming a storehouse of old vehicles and adoption of Euro-2 looks like a move backwards. Another problem is the quality of the transport routes and streets, which were never designed to accommodate so many cars. The city lacks multi-level junctions at the intersections of busy roads. Existing bypass highways from the north side do not fulfill their functions as almost all big markets are located on these roads. As a result it is faster to move through downtown than around it, though there are only two through traffic streets in the city. Rarely in the city does the driving speed exceed km/h (it should be borne in mind that there is no official data, and these speeds are estimates). Lengthy traffic congestion (in both time and space) is typical for the city. Infrastructure development is now very active. In 2008, 10 new routes were completed and 4-6 more are planned to be completed in 2010 (Almaty official website, 2009). This impressive investment was reached because of new strategy of authorities to bypass bureaucracy, and construction was started without waiting for each part of the project to be finished (Zakon, 2007). This strategy casts doubt on the efficiency of new thoroughfares. In 2002 general layout of two new bypass roads (Almaty Ring Road and East Bypass Road) was adopted, but only one has been recently started. Unfortunately, newly constructed thoroughfares do not accommodate cycling routes. The situation is aggravated by a strange parking system ( Almaty Parking ) where 50 tenge (20 pence) per day is paid and officially the charge is voluntary. In reality drivers are forced to pay double the amount, but they are not given any receipt (KT, 2009). The revenue from parking is going to the city budget and spent on general municipal 10

11 expenditures. There is no information if revenue from parking or part of it is used to invest in parking or in wider transport improvements. Congestion problems were conducive to the tendency for an increase in the amount of cycling. A group of cycling activists has made an online survey, which showed that 90% of participants support the creation of cycle paths, and 40% are ready to use bicycle for daily trips (Vechernii Almaty, 2009). The situation has moved forwards and the proposal has been included into the Environment City Program A project for the first cycle path of 4500m length has been approved and its construction started in spring Despite these positive changes, the most difficult problem for cycling is the low driving culture of motorists and non-observance of traffic regulations. Cyclists are often forced off the roads by motorists. Conclusion: Almaty has a weak transport policy which favours automobiles rather than public transport. Generally, transport problems have a low priority in the programmes of city development. This applies more generally in Kazakhstan. The statistics of OECD shows that in 2007 there were many environmental partnerships in Kazakhstan with different countries and world organizations, but none of them included transport (OECD, 2007). In Almaty there has been a rapid growth in the number of vehicles alongside a fragile transport infrastructure, giving rise to a high level of air pollution and morbidity. Urban planning is a new trend in city programmes, which will help to develop Almaty as a multicentre city and thus to reduce travel distance. These programmes also include buses working on gas and biofuels. But there is a concern over whether the political power will be strong enough to implement this long term task. Currently, the adoption of road pricing in city centre is being considered by city authorities. But there is no any official information about what type of pricing is considered, what supplementary measures will accompany the reform and whether it will be a route based or an area based system. Experience from other cities can test many useful ideas for the improvement of the urban transport network. Authorities in Almaty tend to make hasty decisions, and often they fail to consider a sufficient range of options and make an authoritative comparison between them. London is reputed to have diverse transport policies, including a widespread public transport network, a sophisticated electronic ticketing system and road pricing. The latter has deeply affected transport situation in central London. London offers many 11

12 lessons, and this example is taken as a case study, focusing on its congestion charging scheme, followed by the comparative analysis of both cities. 2. TRANSPORT POLICY IN LONDON From the 1980s traffic in London had experienced constant decline in driving speed. Table 2.1 shows this decreasing trend in Central London from the 1980s. In order to ease congestion problem, some new transport policies were introduced, including road construction, public transport investment, parking and road allocation. But the turning point in addressing the key traffic problem in London was the initiation of anti-congestion program launched by the Mayor of London Ken Livingstone in The introduction of the London congestion charging scheme (LCCS) was the main point in his manifesto for election in After sufficient research, publications and public consultations the LCCS was implemented in February The fee to enter into the charging zone is now 8 (initially was 5 until 24 July 2005) on weekdays between 7 a.m. and 6 p.m. excluding public holidays. Figure 2.1 shows the boundaries of the scheme with extension zone. Detailed description of how the LCCS works and exemptions are given in Appendix I. Table 2.1: Average all day network speeds (km/h) within the charging zone ( ) 1986 Jun/Jul 1990 Jun/Jul 1994 Jun/Jul 1997 Jun/Jul 2000 Jun/Jul 2002 May/Jun Source: TfL, 2005a. Table Impact of LCCS on Traffic, Travel Behaviour and Environment Traffic patterns. The LCCS was intended to reduce traffic congestion in Central London. Transport for London (TfL) defines congestion as the difference between the average network travel rate and the uncongested (free-flow) network travel rate in minutes per vehicle-kilometre (TfL, 2003, Table 3.1, p. 46). TfL has predicted the reduction of traffic volume (excluding pedal and motorcycles) within the initial charging zone by some 10 to 15%; congestion was expected to decrease by 20-30%. Real changes exceeded expectations: in the first two years congestion decreased by 30% and by 22% in the third year in comparison with pre-charging years (TfL, 2005a). Congestion rate was 1.6 minutes per kilometre average for against the pre-charging rate of 2.3 minutes per kilometre (TfL, 2005a). However, comparing average congestion levels for 2006 against a pre-charging baseline, congestion was only 8% lower in 2006 (TfL, 2007b). No reductions 12

13 were observed for the subsequent years (Table 2.2) despite the continuing slight reduction in the volume of traffic circulating within the original zone (Table 2.3). Figure 2.1: London congestion charging zone with Western extension area, and its location within the Greater London boundary Source: TfL, 2009b; TfL, 2006, p.12 Table 2.2: Comparative congestion statistics for the original central London charging zone Averaging period Mean excess travel rate (minutes per kilometre) Difference 2002 representative value (%) 2002 calendar year % observed average 2002 calendar year 2.3 base representative level 2003 post charging % 2004 post charging % 2005 post charging % 2006 post charging 2.1-8% 2007 post charging 2.3 0% 2008 January April 2.3 0% Source: TfL, 2008a. Table 4. Overall, the possible reasons of increasing congestion might be road and street works which significantly affect the performance of the central London road network. Besides that, other measures have had a significant influence on the traffic situation: road space reallocation in favour of buses, pedestrians and cyclists, and improved traffic management arrangements, such as traffic lights redistribution. It is argued that without road charging traffic congestion would be even worse (TfL, 2007b; Santos, 2008b). 13

14 The number of all vehicles entering the zone during the charging hours in 2003 was reduced by 14% in comparison with The most significant reduction was in the number of cars - 33% in 2003, but only one per cent in 2004, while the number of buses and coaches increased by 23 and 8%, respectively (Table 2.4). Table 2.3: Trends in composition of traffic entering the central London charging zone Vehicle type Vehicles (000s) Percentage share Vehicles (000s) Percentage share Vehicles (000s) Percentage share All vehicles % % % Four or more wheels % % % Potentially % % % chargeable - Cars and minicabs % % % - Vans 55 15% 49 15% 48 15% - Lorries and other 15 4% 13 4% 13 4% Non chargeable % % % - Licensed taxis 56 15% 66 20% 63 20% - Buses and coaches 13 4% 16 5% 16 5% - Powered 28 7% 31 10% 28 9% twowheelers - Pedal cycles 16 4% 18 6% 24 7% Source: TfL, 2007b. Table 2.2 Table 2.4. Key year-on-year changes to traffic entering the central London charging zone during charging hours, 07:00-18: vs vs vs vs vs vs 2002 All vehicles -14% 0% -2% 0% 0% -16% Four or more wheels -18% -1% -2% -1% 0% - 21% Potentially chargeable -27% - 1% -3% 0% 1% - 29% - Cars and minicabs -33% - 1% -3% - 1% 0% - 36% - Vans -11% - 1% -4% 2% 1% - 13% - Lorries and other -10% - 5% -4% 6% 9% - 5% Non chargeable 17% 1% -1% -1% -1% 15% - Licensed taxis 17% -1% 1% -3% - 5% 7% - Buses and coaches 23% 8% -4% -3% 5% 31% - Powered two-wheelers 13% -2% -9% 0% - 3% -3% - Pedal cycles 20% 8% 7% 7% 12% 66% Source: TfL, 2008a. Table 3.1 In 2007 the charging zone was extended westwards. The description of Western extension zone is given in Appendix II. But in November 2008 the new Mayor, Boris Johnson, announced his intention to remove it after consultations with the public and stakeholders. These consultations showed that overall 69% of respondents supported the removal (TfL, 2009a). The zone will be removed by spring 2010 (BBC, 2008a). Public transport. As trip to the city centre became more expensive many Londoners switched the mode to public transport. Livingstone s team had anticipated this and before 14

15 implementing the LCCS, public transport services were significantly improved. The number of buses was increased substantially before the LCCS started, alongside with more frequent services, new and expanded routes and bigger buses. By 2005 bus network has grown to approximately 8,500 buses on around 700 routes, many of which operate for 24 hours (GLA, 2005). The introduction of Oyster ticketing system in 2003 has significantly helped to speed up journeys and reduce queues on the city's public transport network. Oyster is valid on all public transport modes. This system allows passengers to use it as single tickets, period tickets and travel permits, and can be purchased and recharged through various outlets. TfL monitoring shows that nearly three times as many passengers can pass payment gates using Oyster cards than printed tickets (40 passengers per minute vs 15); these time savings are even greater on buses. By July of 2008, 17 million cards had been issued since the introduction of the system and the amount of cash payments on Underground and buses reduced to just 5% (BBC, 2008b). As a result of implemented measures, there was a substantial reduction in excess waiting time by 24% overall across Greater London and by over 30% in and around the charging zone in the first year after the introduction of the LCCS (Santos, 2008). The number of passengers crossing the initial zone increased by 38% in 2003 with the following growth by 12% in 2004 (Tables 2.5 and 2.6). Concerning London Underground, there were no significant changes in patronage. In the western extension zone the number of bus passengers increased by 6% in 2007 during charging hours, and bus network capacity increased by around 17%. The LCCS is not the only reason for increased bus passengers, as the reorganisation of bus fares system has led to the decrease of bus tickets prices. Table 2.5: Bus passengers and buses observed at a selection of sites on the charging zone boundary, between 2002 and 2004, Inbound Outbound Passengers Buses Passengers per bus Passengers Buses Passengers per bus Autumn ,300 4, ,650 3, Autumn ,600 5, ,800 3, Autumn ,200 6, ,150 4, Source: TfL, 2005a. Figure 29 Between 2002 and 2003 bus speeds increased by 7% inside the congestion charging zone and by 2% on the Inner Ring Road (TfL, 2007b). However, since 2003 the trend of declining bus speeds is prevailing in the zone. Since 2003, the overall reduction in bus 15

16 speeds within the central zone has been 14%. Buses in 2007 were 8% slower than before charging was introduced in 2002 (TfL, 2008a). Public transport to a great extent depends on the traffic situation. Thus, declining bus speeds reflect most probably the overall increase in congestion level in London. Table 2.6 Number of bus passengers and buses observed crossing the Western extension zone boundary during charging hours. 07:00-18:00, 2004 to Inbound Outbound Passengers Buses Passengers Per bus Passengers Buses Passengers per bus ,200 4, ,200 4, ,400 4, ,400 4, ,500 4, ,100 4, ,000 5, ,200 5, Source: TfL, 2008a. Table 5.2 Environmental effects of the LCCS. Transport is a significant contributor of emissions and contributes substantially to air pollution. Road transport in Greater London was responsible for 41% of NO x and 67% of PM 10 emissions in 2003 (GLA, 2007b). Regarding CO 2, road transport was responsible for 22% of emissions in 2006 (of which cars and motorcycles contributed 49%) (GLA, 2007a). Though environment was a secondary concern of the LCCS, the Scheme can be considered in part as a measure to improve local air quality. However, congestion charging can help in emissions reduction provided this does not encourage redistribution of travel spatially and temporally, or promote increases in travel distance (Anable and Shaw, 2007; Santos and Fraser 2006; Banister, 2005). As TfL (2007b) claims, there were substantial reductions of vehicle emissions after the introduction of charging zone (Table 2.7). However, the LCCS is not the only reason for this trend, but also the strict Euro standards which vehicles must meet in the UK. Consequently, between 2002 and 2003, NO x and PM 10 emissions reductions within the zone were 13% and 16%, respectively. Out of these, 8% and 6%, respectively, are brought by the LCCS through reduced traffic volumes and speed changes. There was a 16% reduction in CO 2 emissions in 2003 resulting from congestion charging. However, in 2004 these cutbacks were far smaller: only 5% and 6% for NO x and PM 10, and less than one per cent for CO 2. Reductions were also significantly smaller in the following years (ibid., p.67). Overall, this emissions trend reflects the traffic reductions in the charging zone, which were significant in the first year, but negligible in the following years. Regarding the Western extension zone, reductions of emissions are more modest than predicted and smaller than those reported for the original zone (Table 2.8). Here emissions 16

17 of NO X have reduced by 2.5%, of PM10 by 4.2% and emissions of CO2 by 6.5% (TfL, 2008a) against expected reductions, which were 4% and 5% for NOx and PM10, respectively (TfL, 2007b). Table 2.7: Emissions changes of NO X, PM 10 and CO 2. Percentage change, 2003 compared with 2002 Charging zone Inner Ring Road Change NOx PM 10 CO 2 NOx PM 10 CO 2 Traffic volume change Speed change Traffic volume and speed change Vehicle stock change Overall traffic emissions change versus 2002 Additional background change from technology improvement (fleet turnover) Source: TfL, 2007b. Table 4.3 Table 2.8: Emissions changes of NO X, PM 10 and CO 2 in the western extension (% change ) Inside Western extension zone (%) Western extension boundary road (%) Change NOx PM 10 CO 2 NOx PM 10 CO 2 Traffic volume and composition change Speed change Traffic volume/composition and speed Change Vehicle stock change 2007 versus (without WEZ) Vehicle stock change 2007 versus (with WEZ) Vehicle stock + volume and speed WEZ change 2007 versus 2006 (with WEZ) Note: Western extension boundary route excludes the Free Passage Route. Source: TfL, 2008a. Table 5.14 Parking policy. Parking policy has a strong effect on traffic situation in any city. In London, parking policy is made within the framework of maximising non-car travel and making the best use of London s public transport network (GLA, 2002a). Parking standards in London are strict and based on PTAL (Public Transport Accessibility Level) scores, which was originally developed by London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham for the assessment of parking provision for commercial development proposals and later adopted by TfL. The PTAL is ranked into 6 levels (1 to 6), where 6 represents a high level of accessibility and 1 a low level of accessibility. The LATS analysis (1991) shows clear correlation between PTAL level and car use (Table 2.9). It can be seen that car use increases as PTAL level decreases. The better public transport access has an area the lower level of car use. This trend suggests lower car parking provision as PTAL level increases. 17

18 Table 2.9: Percentage car use for Shopping (LATS 1991) PTAL % Car use Car use relative to use at PTAL 1 (%) Source: GLA, 2002b. Tables 1, 2. The GLA Act 1999 set out primary legislation to introduce workplace parking levies (WPL). However, it was found that implementation of WPL will be costly with just 3% - 4% of traffic reductions (Butcher, 2010). Thus WPL was ruled out as a tool to reduce traffic in London. The levy would have affected workplace vehicles of employers, employees, business visitors and students, and assumes off-street parking at the employer s, employees or shared expenses. A survey made by the ROCOL group (2000) showed strong opposition by businesses and employees. 75% of employers and 78% of car driving employees opposed this idea. Again this backlash reduces to 53% and 51%, respectively if the revenues were spent on transport improvements. The revision of the parking system was a part of congestion charging programme. To leave the car parked on the street has become an expensive pleasure, but time limits mean that it is difficult to leave the car for more than two hours at one place. Currently the parking fee is 1 per 15 minutes from 8 am to 7 pm (City of London, 2009). Congestion charging has a significant influence on parking situation in the city. The scheme had caused a reduction in the use of public and private off-street parking places as well as onstreet spaces in Central London, but not outside the zone. This trend has started before the introduction of LCCS, as between 2003 and 2002 parking charges increased. As a result, parking activity inside the charging area decreased by 28% and by 3% outside the zone; revenues from on-street parking within the charging zone fell by 18%. TfL has estimated that during the operation of the scheme there was 15 million loss per year of net revenues from parking charges (TfL, 2007c, Tables 18, 19). Today, technological advances can relate parking charges to emissions level. For example, London Borough of Richmond in April 2007 introduced green parking policy related to CO 2 emissions, according to which the most polluting vehicles pay an extra 25% to park, while others do not have this increase or have 25% reduction (London Borough of Richmond upon Thames, 2009). 18

19 2.2 LCCS: Public Acceptability and Use of Revenues In London, all revenues from road pricing are required to be spent on transport sector for at least ten years from its implementation (GLA Act 1999). Before the introduction of the LCCS, there were in-depth surveys and consultations regarding public opinion. The survey of ROCOL (2000) revealed that 53% of respondents ( general public ) thought road user charging was a good thing for London, but only 30% of car drivers supported this idea. This proportion increased to 73% and 62%, respectively if revenues were directed to transport improvements on their preferred spending packages. The support of stakeholders was also high, with 84 organisations out of 96 that responded favoured the concept of road charging (TfL, 2002). Most revenue from the Scheme comes from chargeable vehicles and enforcement income (Table 2.10). Anticipated revenues from the Scheme were expected to be higher (around 130 million) (TfL, 2003). TfL explains this by lower number of chargeable vehicles than expected, and this was in turn due to the greater than expected levels of traffic reduction. While revenues are increasing, the costs of running the LCCS have kept stable (except 2007/08 year), thus giving the opportunity to spend more money on public transport improvements (Table 2.11). Indeed, it was considered as being political savvy to connect road pricing and public transit (Small, 2005). Table 2.10: Scheme revenues and costs ( million provisional) 2004/2005 a) 2005/2006 b) 2006/2007 c) 2007/2008 d) Total costs Revenues Standard daily vehicle charges Fleet vehicle daily charges Resident vehicles Enforcement income received Total revenues Net revenues Source: a) Charge at 5. TfL, 2005a. Table 93; b) Charge at 5. TfL, Table 9.3; c) Charge at 5 pre- July 2005a, 8 post-july TfL, Table 6.2; d) Charge at 8. TfL, 2008a. Table TfL (2007c) claims that monetary savings achieved due to the charging scheme are high, estimating them at 44.8 million with a 8 charge (Table 2.12). They point out that the fuel savings arising from reduced vehicle kilometres across London are 27 million litres (1.7%) with a 5 charge and 30 million litres (1.9%) with an 8 charge. However, whether these savings are really obtained is arguable, as charging payments made by 19

20 drivers partly offset these savings, and there may also be longer journeys made to avoid paying the charge. Table 2.11: Application of congestion charging scheme revenues ( million provisional) 2003/2004 a) 2005/2006 b) 2006/2007 c) 2007/2008 d) Bus network improvements Borough plans. Support to London Boroughs 2 for local transport improvements. Roads and bridges Road safety Environment 2 Walking and cycling Total Source: a) GLA, 2005; b) Charge at 5. TfL, Table 9.4; c) Charge at 5 pre-july 2005a, 8 post-july TfL, p.114; d) Charge at 8. TfL, 2008a. Table 10.3 Table 2.12: Total Fuel Cost Savings, million per year Source: TfL, 2007c. p.14 5 charge 8 charge Resource costs Fuel duty VAT Total Political Factors which affected some Features of the Scheme Ideally, road charging should vary according to congestion level and vehicle type. Santos and Fraser (2006) argue that LCCS is short of adequately charge discriminative prices in time and for different vehicles. The charge to enter into the zone does not vary temporarily, spatially and modally. They have calculated the congestion effects of three vehicle types (cars, LGVs, HGVs), and came to conclusion that cars are overcharged by the 5 charge and even more by the 8 charge, and goods vehicles are undercharged (Table 2.13). Important decisions concerning the Scheme (the charge level, times and zone limits) were based on political considerations, rather than on economic principles (Santos and Fraser, 2006). If the charges were higher for HGVs (as was originally proposed), there would have been no need to increase it later, but the decisions were strongly influenced by different pressure groups, including entertainment community and businesses. After more than five years when congestion charging was first introduced (2003), 70,000 fewer cars enter the original zone and 30,000 less cars enter the extension zone (TfL, 2007a, p. 12). Santos (2008) notes that the decision to extend to scheme to the Western area (Figure 2.1) was also politically motivated, as TfL forecast low cost-benefit ratios. 20

21 Table 2.13: Area Marginal Congestion Costs and the 5 charge Efficient km with 5 charge Actual km with 5 charge Efficient charge with actual km Cars Vans Lorries Source: Santos and Fraser, p Particular aspects of London before the introduction of LCCS London s experience of congestion charging cannot be easily applied to other cities in the UK, and even less so for other cities in the world. London had particular features before the implementation of the scheme. 1. London has the highest use of public transport in the UK, and this has increased substantially in the last five years. In 2001 only 12% of all people entering central London used cars (TfL, 2003). Overall, London has the lowest levels of car dependency in the UK. 2. Sufficient comprehensive research and analysis for implementing road pricing had been carried out. 3. The necessary legislation was in place. The GLA Act 1999 had given the Mayor the powers to implement road pricing and workplace parking levies. 4. The Mayor had the strong political will and leadership to introduce road pricing, notwithstanding public opposition. Any road pricing scheme needs charismatic individual that spearhead projects (Ieromonachou, et al 2007). In London this essential role of project champion was played by Ken Livingstone, who pushed road pricing from concept to implementation. The congestion charging scheme in London has had a significant effect on the traffic situation, but its influence is partly limited because the zone covers a very small area. It is important to consider other factors which affect the whole area of Greater London (Figure 2.2). 21

22 Figure 2.2: Great London Boundary and LCCS 5km Source: TfL, p Low Emission Zone Greater London introduced Low Emission Zone in February This was designed to directly address air pollution rather than traffic problems, and is independent from the LCCS. London has the worst air quality in the UK and among the worst in the EU. This scheme covers almost all the area of Greater London and does not affect cars and motorcycles. LEZ operates 24 hours a day, every day and uses the same ANPR system. Vehicles (includes lorries, coaches and buses) which do not comply with LEZ emissions standards (which are based on Euro-3 standards) must pay 200 every time they entry the zone area. Payment options and penalty rules are similar to those being used in LCCS. If a vehicle fails to pay the charge by midnight on the next working day after the day of travel a PCN of 1000 may be issued. The PCN is reduced to 500 if paid within 14 days and increases to 1500 if not paid within 28 days. Exemptions are made only for agricultural and forestry vehicles and equipment; construction machinery; historic and military vehicles. The Scheme is implemented in four stages, two of which have already been introduced in February and July 2008 (Table 2.14). However, the new Mayor of London has suspended the third phase of the LEZ, which was due to affect vans and minibuses from October The capital costs of the scheme were 50 million with 80 million of operating costs and only 5-7 million annual revenues (TfL, 2008b). Thus, LEZ does not generate revenues, but will have significant health benefits. In contrast to the LCCS, the main aim of the scheme is not to reduce traffic and congestion, but to improve local air quality 22

23 through stricter emissions standards, targeting old, heavy diesel vehicles (ibid.; Banister, 2008). Road traffic in London is responsible for 70% of PM10 emissions. Thus, the primary target of LEZ is particulate matters, but other pollutants are also expected to be influenced. LEZ does not have the aim of reducing CO2 emissions and there are no expectations for substantial abatements, even though TfL expects small benefits from CO2 reductions. The level of compliance of vehicles with the requirements of the scheme seen by cameras is high, and the compliance level started to increase in 2007 prior to the introduction of LEZ (Table 2.15). TfL (2008b) estimates that this pre-compliance effect reduced emissions in Greater London of NOX by 1.4%; of NO2 by 1.3%; of PM10 by 1.1%; and of PM2.5 by 1.4% (p.103). It is estimated that the Scheme is responsible for half of the total reductions of PM10 emissions and for about 10% of total NO2 reductions (Table 2.16). Table 2.14: Stages of LEZ implementation Date 4 February July 2008 LEZ emissions standards a standard of Euro III for particulate matter (PM) for lorries over 12 tonnes a standard of Euro III for PM for lorries between 3.5 and 12 tonnes and buses and coaches with more than eight seats plus the driver's seat over 5 tonnes 4 October 2010 a standard of Euro III for PM for larger vans and minibuses 3 January 2012 a standard of Euro IV for PM for lorries over 3.5 tonnes and buses and coaches over 5 tonnes Source: Table 2.15: Summary of trends in compliance with phase 1 of the scheme (%) National registered vehicle fleet Greater London registered vehicle fleet HGVs only (over 12 tonnes in weight). Source: TfL, 2008b. Table 13.3 Spring End April Table 2.16: Changes in modelled annual mean concentrations of key pollutants (μg m-3) during 2007 Background change 2007 Total change 2007 Scheme-attributable change (pre-compliance) during 2007 NO PM Note: All sources - Greater London area averages. Source: TfL, 2008b. Table 7.3 Most recent TfL projection of impact of scheme phases 1 and 2 in Vehicle and Fuel Excise Duties in the UK Technology improvements have significant impact on the level of fuel use and pollutant emissions from road transport. Overall in the UK there is a falling trend in emissions from road transport (Table 2.17), which is substantially affected by the quality requirements for both fuels and vehicles. Clearly, technological factors have played an important role here. Vehicle taxes are implemented through national taxation policies, and 23

24 this aspect has been considered in the first part of this paper. Here, the UK vehicle and fuel taxes are considered in more detail, as this is a decisive factor affecting the fleet composition of London s and the country as a whole. Table 2.17: Pollutant emissions from road transport in the United Kingdom: (thousand tonnes) Carbon monoxide (CO) Nitrogen oxides (NOx) Particulates (PM10) Benzene* 1,3-butadiene Lead (Pb/)** Sulphur dioxide (SO2) Notes: * Reduction in road transport benzene emissions in 2000 mainly due to reduction in benzene content of petrol. ** Reduction in road transport lead emissions in 2000 is mainly due to a ban on the general sale of leaded petrol. Source: DfT, Transport statistics Great Britain: 2008 edition. Table 3.8. Vehicle Excise Duty (VED) in the UK is an annual tax and it is based on fuel type that a vehicle uses and CO2 emissions. There is no annual fee for low carbon vehicles (Band A), but it can reach up to 405 for high carbon vehicles (Band M) (Table 2.18). From April 2010 there will be new first registration fee for new cars, where the highest fee can reach up to 950. Already registered and lower emitting cars will be charged less, and higher emitting cars will pay more. Motorists must also ensure that they keep their vehicle in a roadworthy condition. Thus MOT certificate approves if a vehicle meets the minimum acceptable environmental and road safety standards required by law. Every vehicle older than three years needs an annual MOT test. Table 2.18: Annual VED rates (cars registered on or after 1 March 2001) Band CO2 emission (g/km) Petrol and diesel Alternative fuel cars cars A Up to 100 Not applicable Not applicable B C D E F G H I J K* L M Over * Band K includes cars that have a CO2 Figure over 225g/km but were registered before 23 March 2006 Source: DirectGov 24

25 Fuel Excise Duty (FED) in the UK is among the highest in Europe. The price of diesel is the highest in Europe and the price of unleaded petrol is the third highest (Table 2.19). Taxes compose significant part of fuel price (Figure 2.3). Before the introduction of Fuel Price Escalator (FPE) in 1993, UK fuel was among the cheapest in Europe. FPE followed the abolition of Car Purchase Tax and initially was at 3% above inflation rate, but later increased to 5% and then to 6% per annum (Potter and Parkhurst, 2005). The introduction of FPE was justified by the Government to reduce car use and tackle Climate change. But as a result of escalator, in 1999 taxes made up to 83% of retail price of fuel being the most expensive in Europe (DfT, 2009). This led to fuel protests in 2000 which contributed to the end of escalator in November It is argued that abolition of the escalator failed the attempts to balance the costs of car use and public transport. The Government believed that during this period million tonnes of carbon emissions were saved (Potter, 2008). Many other EU countries have similar escalators, but slower and smoother, and this probably helped to avoid protests, reaching at the same time similar fuel duties and prices. However, even when the escalator was abandoned in the UK the fuel price continued to rise, but mostly as a result of increase of oil costs. Thus, the policy to tackle growing emissions through fuel duties is becoming less feasible politically, and some EU countries have already experienced protests to cut fuel duties. Table 2.19: Petrol and diesel in the European Union: retail prices (US Dollars) and tax as a percentage of retail prices, 2007 Country Premium unleaded Premium Diesel: per 100 petrol (95 RON): unleaded petrol litres per 100 litres (95 RON) (%) United Kingdom Austria Belgium Denmark Germany Finland France Greece Irish Republic Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden Source: DfT (2008). Transport statistics Great Britain: 2008 edition. Table Diesel (%)

26 Figure 2.3 Fuel Price Composition in the UK, 2009 (Pence) (Pence) % Unleaded petrol Ultra low sulphur diesel Product FED VAT Source: DfT, Table 3.3 The results of the measures implemented in London and the UK are significant. In 2007, just 35% of Londoners drove to work in a car, a van or a minibus. The introduction of the congestion charge was conducive to 28% drop in use of private cars (2007) in central London. In the same year the rate of licensed cars was 343 per thousand of the population, the lowest rate in the country. The number of fatal or serious road accidents reduced by 47 % (against 40% countrywide) by 2007 compared with the average (GLA, 2009). Thus, the transport policies in both cities have been considered and it is now possible to draw lessons from the London experience. The first question is: what recommendations can be made from congestion charging and can this policy be implemented in Almaty. The second question is: what lessons can be seen from the overall transport policy on London. 3. LESSONS FROM TRANSPORT POLICY IN LONDON The third section of this paper is divided into three parts. The first shows comparative data for both cities. The second considers lessons from London Congestion Charging Scheme for wider introduction in Almaty. The third part observes lessons and potential for all the transport policy measures considered that are not related to road pricing. Parameter Area, population, density and income Road transport London Area: km2 Population: 8.6 mln (2007) Density: 4761 people/km2 Average income (London): annual Private cars number (2007): approx mln Ownership level (2007): 343 per 1000 population Congestion charging: 8 to enter downtown. 28% reduction in car use. 26 Almaty Area: km2 Population: mln ( ) Density: 4379 people/km2 Average income (Almaty): tenge ( 522) monthly; 6264 annual Private cars number (2008): 453,500 + daily 200,000 non-residents vehicles Ownership level: 311 per 1000 population Road pricing: is under consideration

27 Public transport Parking Taxation policies (countrywide) Air pollution Walking cycling and LEZ: affects all vehicles except cars and motorcycles on the area of Greater London. 200 fee by vehicles not answering LEZ emissions standards. Fleet (2005): 8500 buses; 147 (LU(2008/9); 94 (DLR (2008); 24 (Tramlink (2009)) Routes (2005): 700 (buses); 11 (LU lines); 4 (DLR); 3 (Tramlink) Patronage (2007): 35% (LU), 10% (buses), 44% (National Rail) Electronic ticketing system: Oyster card. Valid on all modes. 95% use Metro: Extensive system (408kms), some LRT (DLR and Croyden Tram 57kms) and commuter rail (788kms) Parking levies: 4/hour (max 2 hours) Current requirements: Euro-4 Fuel price (2009) US$: premium 95 RON /l; diesel /l VED are based on carbon emissions 41% of NOx and 67% of PM10 from road transport (2003) Widespread network of cycling paths Fleet (2008): 5075 (buses); 45 (tramways); 191 (trolleybuses). Running number of buses Routes (2009): 118 (buses); 2 (tramways); 9 (trolleybuses) Patronage (2008): 90% by bus services Electronic ticketing system: Validator (installed on buses, but not used). Metro: is under construction from the 80s. Seismic zone, underground rivers and liquid soils complicate the construction. Three lines of total 45 km are planned. Plans: LRT or BRT are considered 50 tenge ( 0.2)/day (official fee) 100 tenge ( 0.4)/day (real unofficial fee) Current requirements: Euro-2 standards (from July, 2009). Exploited cars are not affected. Euro-3 from Fuel price (2009) US$: AI-93 (premium) approx. 0.6/l; diesel approx. 0.47/l Vehicle duties do not depend on emissions level 90% of all pollutants from transport sector First cycling path length 4.5 km is under construction 3.1 Lessons from London Congestion Charging Scheme Lessons from LCCS can be formulated within five main groups: political, economic, social, technical and environmental. The political group considers political support and the importance of public community involvement. The group considers the following factors: - It is important to get the public community to first accept that congestion is a serious problem and then to persuade them that road pricing is an essential part of any solution. Often the public has little knowledge of the possibilities of congestion charging or road pricing. In this case high levels of support should not be expected. In the London case, the pre-charging public consultations showed high levels of support for charging, implying that people were well-informed about the possibilities of congestion charging and the possibilities of using it as a demand management measure. - Two-way communication with the public community. Public opinion should be analysed and taken into the consideration. The experiences of some cities (Manchester, Edinburgh, New York) show that public opinion should not determine the final decision of 27

28 whether a project should go ahead or not. Stockholm, however, may be considered as an exception, where a referendum after congestion charging trial resulted in its reintroduction (Eliasson, 2008). Still it is a different case, as the vote took place after people had tried road pricing. Many professionals agree that bringing the public consultations to a referendum can lead to a failure to implement road pricing projects (Santos and Fraser, 2006, Santos, 2008b). Though, it should not affect the final adoption, the active involvement of all affected groups businesses, local authorities and residents and interaction with decision makers is essential. It is important to come to reconcilable and consistent expectations and motivations between them. This will help to strengthen the concurrence between anticipations and results (Banister et al, 2007, Ieromonachou, et al 2007, Santos, 2005) - Strong political support can accelerate the implementation of a new project. It is argued that the short tenure of politicians is one of the main obstacles to introduce radical policies in transport like road pricing (Banister et al, 2007). This is true, as transport is a sector where innovative policies require a passage through bureaucratic national legislative process. But the London case showed that strong political leadership can transform intentions into policy actions within available tenure and even allow re-election for the next period. The economic group includes factors that can help make road pricing project economically efficient. The group considers the following factors: - Comprehensive and detailed analysis including a cost-benefit analysis should be carried out in advance of the proposed implementation. Key decisions are of vital importance for achieving the best outcomes of a new scheme and any miscalculations that can cause failure need to be addressed as early as possible. - Motorists should benefit from congestion charging, otherwise it is not a charge, but a tax. Congestion charging is often perceived as a tax by motorist groups. Indeed, the charge can be regressive, as it does not vary with income. However, the right design of the scheme can minimise adverse effects on the poor (Santos and Rojey, 2004). Hence, revenues should be invested into transport sphere as compensation to motorists, either through public transport or road investments. 76% of LCCS revenues were allocated into bus network improvements in first year of operation, and 82% in the following years. 28

29 However, in other cities (Oslo, Stockholm, Trondheim) preferences are demonstrated for road investments (CURACAO, 2010). - Importance of public information campaigns. People should be informed well in advance about a new project through the full range of media. After public consultations and before the Scheme started, three million households in London received two leaflets. Information on the Scheme was announced through radio, TV, newspapers, and a website was opened with all information and instructions (Santos and Fraser, 2006). - Importance of public transport. With poor public transport, road pricing is a regressive tax, but with good public transport road pricing is, to some degree, a luxury tax (Santos and Shaffer, 2004, p.171). In London, 80% of charging revenues are invested into public transport improvements (mainly bus network), and 20% into roads, environment (mainly road safety schemes for school children) and walking projects. The provision of an alternative to the car prior to the charging was the key part of the successful introduction of the Scheme. - Importance of balance between the feasibility of a scheme and its effectiveness. The LCCS has many discount groups. These mitigations were probably made in order to achieve public support to implement the Scheme. Pure efficient desired scheme would hardly be introduced, but its acceptable effective variation may be attained (Banister et al, 2007). - The choice of technology is crucial in a new road pricing project. The use of relatively simple and unsophisticated technology of the ANPR as in London has helped to introduce road user charging in the short time constraint given to TfL by the Mayor. Later this technology can be replaced by a new improved system. Now TfL is conducting technology trials (mainly with GPS) to make the Scheme more sophisticated. The social group implies the importance of an overall transport policy within which road pricing can comfortably sit and it includes assessment of distributional impacts: - Careful assessment of distributional effects. Data about where people live, work, what transport they use, and information about who will lose and who will gain is essential for impact assessment. If impacts are hard to foresee, then small-scale experiments may help to assess the impacts and work out and optimize the scheme (Banister et al, 2007). - Congestion charging should be a part of an overall transport strategy. Before implementing the LCCS, the bus service network was significantly improved and 29

30 expanded. The Scheme was also accompanied by bus priority measures (in terms of traffic lights and road space), reduced fares and improved service. Despite the success of the scheme in London, there are number of obstacles which might arise when implementing congestion charging in Almaty. These factors can be placed under the following headings. The political factors consider the absence of political will and legislation which can allow the acceptance of such a scheme. Officially the Mayor (Akim) of Almaty does not have the power to introduce road pricing and he is not interested in this at all. The transport problem in general is a low priority in the programmes of city development. There is also need for the legislation which would allow the revenues to be directed to the transport sector in the city, otherwise revenues would become part of the state budget. Economic factors include four issues: - There is a big question about where to find the necessary resources for the realisation of the scheme which is likely to be expensive. In addition, there would have to be substantial investments in public transport, as the city does not have an underground and the alternatives do not seem to be attractive, either politically or economically. - The absence of detailed transport and travel data significantly complicates the task of conducting a comprehensive appraisal and cost-benefit analysis. - Difficulties in determining the direct impacts and usefulness of congestion charging are also important. In London the Scheme was implemented alongside other measures, thus making it difficult defining direct benefits. This issue is crucial for researchers and policymakers. As road pricing is considered to be a more radical measure compared to traditional ones, many researches agree that authorities should probably first consider other tools before planning the introduction of road pricing. - The probability of high-scale fraud and evasion. It is suggested that cities considering the implementation of congestion charging might start with a simple system, for example the paper-based ALS initially used in Singapore (Santos, 2005). It is true that this option can be a good starting point. Although, in the Almaty case (and probably in many countries with developing economies), this choice might not be the most convenient way to start because of corruption and the possibility of fraud and evasion. It is preferable to avoid personal interaction between a violator and a scheme representative. If whenever 30

31 authorities of Almaty were to consider congestion charging, a manual paper-based version should be considered with care. The social factors include administrative problems and public perception of the issue: - Perception of public transport as a form of transport for the poor. There is a strong mentality that using public transport is shameful and discreditable (disregarding income levels). People who own private vehicles tend not to use public transport. - Lack of experts. There are no institutes or universities with traffic management or traffic engineering departments. The only transport institute focuses mainly on transport communication systems and freight forwarding. The country suffers from a lack of experts in this field and hence the ability of the environmental and transport authorities to prepare good, viable transport projects. - Some practical administrative problems, which London had faced (such as PCN issued in error and license plate theft), can have greater scale in Almaty. Currently, the level of plates theft in Almaty is small scale, but the cars themselves or their expensive accessories are the main target of thieves. Lack of proper parking places is also conducive to car theft. Strong enforcement is central to effective implementation. There are many obstacles which can prevent the implementation of congestion charging in Almaty in the near future, including the high costs, the lack of proper data and political acceptance. Goodwin (1989) concludes that proposals for road pricing have a tendency to suffer from the fate of being constantly withdrawn from governments programmes. Almaty is likely to suffer from the same fate of these withdrawals. However, it could begin to start thinking in this direction, and this would be progress for the city. The case of London has shown that this tendency can be overcome and implementation can then take place. Besides being political acceptable, road pricing should be widely accepted in people s mind in order to be effective. But affecting people s perceptions is a long-term task and unlikely to have immediate effects. Thus, it seems that in Almaty, transport policies other than congestion charging are likely to have a greater chance of being successfully introduced. These include technological measures rather than those that affect people s travel behaviour or lifestyle. Hence it is reasonable to examine other available solutions. 31

32 3.2 Lessons from an overall transport policy in London The lessons from London transport policies have been grouped into three sectors. The first group considers taxation policies that affect more technology of vehicles. Taxation policies have had a significant effect on the composition of vehicle fleet in London. Data on emissions trend show that there were substantial reductions of pollutants due to a ban on the sale of particular fuel types, and introduction of more stringent emissions requirements for vehicles and fuel. As described above, the situation with respect to fuel and vehicle taxes in Kazakhstan is unclear and unstable. For Almaty, it is crucially important to put in clear order the situation with fuel and vehicle standards and taxes, and then relate them to emissions and engine size. This can also help to promote smaller cars, which are obviously more suitable for use in an urban environment, as they take up less road space and use less fuel. In Almaty, the percentage of people using small, more energy efficient cars is negligible, as large sport utility vehicles are more popular and they are thought of as a status symbol. The second group includes urban planning measures that change urban environment in favour of sustainable transport and thus affect travel behaviour. Promotion of walking and cycling. London is at the forefront of efforts by cities to create a comfortable environment for walking and cycling. In media it was announced that the city is committed to spending 500 million over the next ten years on walking and cycling programmes (GLA, 2008). Encouraging people to walk and cycle in a developing economy is not an easy task. In general, media plays an important role in this clash between motorists and pedestrians and can strongly affect people s behaviour. One of the measures to encourage people walking and cycling can be comprehensive explanation of the link between active lifestyle (which is implied under walking and cycling) and health (Banister et al, 2007). Additionally, demonstrating the correlation between vehicles related emissions and health might have better chances of getting people out of their cars, than raising concerns about global warming. Pollution directly affects people s life, and people generally tend to concern more about issues closely related to them at the time. One of the other measures can be the development of urban planning strategy which can create opportunities for people to make journeys within one administrative authority. Anable and Shaw (2007) say this city-region concept can contribute to the increasing 32

33 number of people who walk or cycle to work. Referring to the survey made by DfT (2007) they note 37% of respondents agreed that many short cars journeys could be easily made by walking or cycling. The third group includes promotion of public transport and traffic measures helping to ease traffic situation on the roads. Public transport. Probably the most important lesson learnt from London is the significant public transport improvements that have taken place. The experience of major world cities has proved that the effectiveness of a city s functioning directly depends on highly developed public transport and it is crucially important to tackle congestion. The London case (and many other cities with good public transport) has showed that nine out of ten people, even well-off, will prefer public transport to traffic congestion provided there is a high level of reliability and safety. Central to any strategy would be the extensive introduction of bus lanes. In Almaty, it might be reasonable to have also physical barrier between public transport and automobiles where possible, as local motorists are inclined to violate traffic regulations. Electric public transport appears to be very promising in Almaty. The electric engine is the most favorable form of traction in a mountainous area, as it manages ascents better, can pause during stops and generates energy on descents. It is also less noisy and more efficient. Best of all, this transport does not emit exhaust fumes in streets (Gilbert and Perl, 2008). The high construction cost of LRT is often an excuse for actions being delayed. In case of very tight budget, the investment can come from the public sector. For example, in the Denver area (Colorado, USA) 57% of voters agreed the sales tax to increase in order to finance the expansion of LRT (Banister et al, 2007). However, the development of electric transport entails the need for more electricity. Currently Almaty suffers from electricity deficit and further demand will make this problem more acute. This problem needs to be resolved through investment in the development of renewable energy sources. Another way to reduce traffic pressure is the minimization of peak hours through the differentiation of working hours for different organizations (at least for public institutions). It is already practiced in many other cities. Almaty authorities have started to move in this direction and a few organizations have changed their working hours. But there are some administrative barriers to more extensive implementation. 33

34 Relatively cheap additional measures relate to changing travel behaviour. Anable and Shaw (2007) say that these soft or smart measures such as travel planning, public transport information, video conferencing, eco-driving, etc can achieve significant success in affecting the free travel choices of motorists, especially when multiple measures are implemented. They claim that in the UK these procedures can make significant contribution to the reduction of carbon emissions by 9%, thus fitting into the UK s Climate Policy. Road construction is an important factor that can help in addressing transport problems. In developed countries, the notion that expansion of road capacity cannot help to relief congestion is widely accepted, but in developing economies road construction is still playing an essential role in providing the essential basic transport infrastructure. 4. CONCLUSIONS This paper has analysed transport policy in London focusing on congestion charging. The LCCS was introduced in order to reduce traffic congestion, and despite some weaknesses and high costs the scheme has achieved its main targets. The implementation of the Scheme was accompanied with other measures such as the improvement of public transport, the introduction of the Oyster card, the reallocation of road space and the introduction of stricter parking rules. In addition to the LCCS, a range of complementary measures have been taken across London. These measures include fuel and vehicle standards, improved public transport, introduction of LEZ, road space reallocation and walking and cycling programmes, and all of these have had significant effects on the overall transport situation and air pollution in London. Among many lessons from LCCS which should be taken into account by other cities considering road pricing (for example, Almaty) are: the detailed ex ante analysis of effects; the responsiveness to the public opinion; the development of strong public transport as an alternative travel mode to the car; and the investment of all revenues from the pricing scheme in the transport sector. But the London experience cannot be easily transferred to Almaty, as London had such specific key features in place before charging started. These included appropriate legislation, comprehensive research background and the strong political leadership of the Mayor. 34

35 Thus many barriers might appear that would prevent the implementation of road pricing in Almaty. The main barriers are the absence of necessary legislation and data for analysis, the high costs of any scheme, the weak public transport system, and the problems of political and public acceptance. It might be too early to apply any form of road pricing in Almaty. However, transport policy should be worked out with due regard for the consideration of road pricing in the future. An obligatory programme needs to be introduced first, and this is a clear and effective fuel and vehicle taxation policy, followed by the improvement of public transport, strict parking control systems and improvements in the road infrastructure. This last point is crucially important factor in a developing economy with a poor infrastructure. A thoroughly worked out infrastructure strategy is a necessary condition for the successful implementation of the other measures. Almaty, as any city from developing economy, should not exceed this necessary level, but the implementation of road pricing in a city with poor public transport and a bureaucratic and ineffective taxation policy would not bring desirable effects in congestion and urban pollution reduction problems. The focus on public transport development, especially LRT, can bring significant results in this respect. Despite the problems associated with LRT, it has many advantages over conventional buses, including high passenger capacity, zero on-street emissions and higher speeds. In the short the transport strategy for Almaty should be investment in roads and public transport (probably focussing on LRT), but even this needs to be coupled with action to tighten up on emissions levels and to use the best available technology. In the longer term, the possibilities for road pricing and other forms of demand management need further consideration, as it will be impossible to accommodate the expected growth in car ownership. Almaty needs to address both the short and longer term futures, and this means investment in the knowledge base and data, as well as giving transport a much higher profile and a substantially larger budget. 35

36 APPENDIX I. HOW LCCS WORKS Exemptions and discounts are made for few groups and are summarized in Table I.1. The initial zone roughly covered 21 km2 (which is 1.3 % of Greater London); with the Western extension - 39 km2 (2.4 %). The implemented scheme affects quite small area of the whole city, but with high number of employees and business units (Tables A.1 and A.2). There are two free corridors: one north to south and another one north west of the zone, also boundary routes are free of charge. There are 340 cameras sites that comprise the system of video surveillance - ANPR (Automatic Number Plate Recognition system), which takes photo of every vehicle entering to the zone. The capital costs of the Charging Scheme were close to 200 million at 2002 prices, most of which were provided by the central government. Table A.1: Exemptions and discounts of LCCS Discount Fully exempt 100% discount with free registration 100% discount with 10 annual registration fee Category Two wheeled motorbikes, mopeds and bicycles Licensed taxis and mini-cabs Emergency Service vehicles Vehicles used by the disabled that are exempt from vehicle excise duty Public transport vehicles with nine or more seats Government operational vehicles, military vehicles Alternative fuel vehicles and electrically propelled vehicles which meet emissions standards Vehicles with nine or more seats; roadside recovery vehicle; Accredited breakdown organisations Residents of the zone with the minimum payable charge fee for the week at 4 Fleet scheme: fleets consisting of 10 or more vehicles 90% discount with 10 annual registration fee 7 instead of 8 with 10 annual registration fee per vehicle Source: Table A.2: Employees and business units within charging zone Original charging zone Number of business units 81,667 Employee jobs 1,235,257 Residents* 148, 000 Source: TfL, Table 11.2 *Santos, p.284 Western extension area 21, , ,000 Greater London 365,126 3,953,351 Enforcement. There are many ways to pay the charge, either online, through SMS or phone, or at a shop or by post. The payment can be made in advance or on the same day by midnight. The charge increases to 10 if paid on the next day. There are discounts available if payment is made annually or monthly. If the driver does not pay the fee on the next day he receives PCN (Penalty Charge Notice) for 120, which reduced to 60 if paid within 14 days. If the penalty charge is not paid within 28 days then it increases to

37 and driver receives a Charge Certificate. If within 14 days the penalty charge is not paid an offender is sent an Order for Recovery, in this case the charge is increased to 185, which the driver has to pay within 21 days. After this period the case is passed to a Bailiff. Vehicles with three or more outstanding fee will be removed or immobilised. The immobilisation fee is 70 and the removal fee is 200; storage of the vehicle costs 40 a day. The vehicle cannot be released until all fees are paid. After 56 days the vehicle may be disposed of at an auction or by scrapping. In the first three months after the introduction of the Scheme, a very high number of PCNs were issued in error, but by 2007 the percentage of error-free payments had reached 99.8%. Throughout 2005 and 2006, the proportion of PCN paid has been above 74% of all PCN issued. The remaining 26% were cancelled because of representations made or bankruptcy of the vehicle keeper. Overall, 17% fewer PCN were issued in 2006 compared to 2005 (TfL, 2007b). Representations made against PCN were very high in 2003 (64%), but they were significantly reduced in 2005 (15%). APPENDIX II. Western extension zone In February 2007 the charging zone was extended westwards. This happened despite a public backlash, as in the case of a charge increase from 5 to 8. Disagreements were strengthened also by high capital costs of the extension ( million) (Santos, 2008a). The number of exempted and discounted cars is high 31,000, comprising almost a third of vehicles entering the zone. This is because the extended zone is more residential, whereas the original zone is more of a business area. Table A.3 shows expected and actual reductions of traffic inside the extension zone. Overall, the number of cars entering the western extension zone reduced from 138,000 to 107,000 (TfL, 2008a, Table 2.9, p.38). Regarding the congestion reductions, TfL s expectations were 17-24%, but post-extension surveys did not show any consistent reductions despite reduced traffic flows. There was an average reduction in congestion of 3%, i.e. 1.7 minutes per kilometre vs 1.75 minutes per kilometre before the extension (TfL, 2008a, p.62). There were assumptions that the extension zone would lead to a decrease in the average speed in the original charging zone by 2%, as residents within the extension zone who have been given a 90% discount for the first time may start driving in both parts of the congestion charging zone (Santos, 2008). In addition, high losses (around million 37

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