XPath Injection Attacks Of the Awesome Advanced Automated Kind. Paul Haas Kiwicon 7
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1 XPath Injection Attacks Of the Awesome Advanced Automated Kind Paul Haas Kiwicon 7
2 Agenda Who, What, Why, How, Where, When
3 Who Paul sss Haas Security Security-Assessment.com in Wellington Experience 10 years in computer security, hailing from California, living in NZ Expertise across entire pentest spectrum: App, Net, WIFI, DB, etc. Talks: OWASP Day NZ 2013, sec. training classes, Defcon 2010 Bash-Fu Master, XPath Ninja, CTF Winner, Psychic Beach bum Passions Solving complex problems (the hack) Alternately: making them more complex Mario Kart duals at sunset on the beach
4 What What is XPath? Like SQL but for XML Documents SQL: SELECT book FROM bookstore WHERE title='test' XPATH: /library/book/[title='test'] Uses File System Folder/Path syntax with slashes / Parent, Ancestor, Sibling, Descendants, nodes Based on standards we don t really care about W3C: XQuery, XLink, XSLT Guaranteed universal implementation
5 What <?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso "?> <!-- Protect this document --> <lib> <book> <title>learning XPath</title> <description>and why you are doing it wrong</description> <price>10.99</price> <author>that Guy</author> <author>someone Else</author> </book> <book> <title>necronomicon</title> <description <price><?cat /dev/random;?></price> <author>"mad Arab" Abdul Alhazred</author> </book> <book> <title>les Fleurs du mal</title> <description>spleen et Ide'al</description> <price>5</price> <author>charles Baudelaire</author> </book> </lib>
6 What Examples count(/lib/book) /lib/book[1]/price //book[last()]/description /lib/book[title='learning XPath'] Elements // anywhere,. Current,.. Parent, * wildcard Functions name, count, string-length, translate, concat, contains, substring Operators +-/*, div, =,!=, <, <=, >, >=, [ ], or, and, mod, as a union operator
7 Wut XPath 1 introduced in 1999 Built-in and included with most XML frameworks/libraries All features should be present in any XPath implementation XPath 2 'Working Draft' introduced in 2007 Introduces powerful functions useful for hacking Not common in wild or fully implemented in most libraries XPath 3 in candidate status as of January 2013 No known implementations
8 Why Why XPath? XPath allows queries to read from a sensitive backend database Used in variety of web frameworks as a replacement for SQL Commonly used to provide dynamic user interaction/search Certain characters can modify purpose and function of query Modified query can access other part of database Including arbitrary XPath functions Risk XPath 1: Retrieve the entire database XPath 2: Access remote files on the server Why does this sound familiar? What other attack is similar to this?
9 Why XPath Injection (XPi) Same risk as SQL Injection Much less awareness Only a couple of tools Plenty of vulnerable frameworks Similar Injection Techniques If you know SQLi, you can do XPi Single ' and double " quotes escape strings Spaces escape numerical input Brackets [ ] used to escape XPath conditions Error, union, time-based, blind techniques Still works: x OR 1 = 1 Even better: x AND 1=0] //*["1"="1
10 Why Penetration Testing Need to be aware of emerging technologies and vulnerabilities XML technologies on the rise, more enterprise Increased number of applications using XPath Lack of techniques, tools and cheat sheets Existing Work Various presentations and whitepapers about injection techniques XPath-blind-explorer: Windows binary to perform blind injection xcat.py: Blind XPath injection with focus on XPath 2 techniques Both tools designed by same author for Blackhat
11 Why xcat Advantages Reconstruct a remote XML database using blind XPi Replaces Windows binary with open source Python implementation Includes both XPath 1 and 2 techniques Uses threading and other optimization techniques xcat Disadvantages Best optimizations only work in XPath 2 Version 1 falls back to slow linear methods Threading makes improvements impossible Cannot customize retrieval content Can do better
12 y? Better Faster Stronger Use xcat as a starting point Open source, allow future improvements Focus solely on XPath 1 injection techniques Use blind injection so method is universal Allow customisation of retrieval content Blind Injection Does not rely on XPath data being returned, errors or speed of response Ask yes/no question about the database Distinguish if true/false using response Repeat until no questions remain
13 XPath Injection : A Brief Primer Find your own vulnerable application Test all locations of dynamic input : GET, POST, HTTP Headers, cookies, etc. Identify SQL flaw using basic injection Discover complex SQL injection isn t working Injection Comparisons ' OR '1'='1 Supported in both SQLi and XPi ' OR user() AND '1'='1 Works in SQLi only ' OR count(//*) AND '1'='1 Works in XPi only ' OR lower-case('a') AND '1'='1 Works in XPath 2 ' OR kart() AND '1'='1 Doesn t work anywhere
14 Demo
15 Reconstructing an XML database using XPath Starting at the root node (node= /*[1]'): 1. Print node name: name(node) 2. Print out each attribute name/value: 3. Print out each comment: count(node/comments()) 4. Print out each processing instruction: count(node/processinginstruction()) 5. Print out each text for: count(node/text()) 6. Repeat this function recursively for each child: count(node/*) Tedious, hence the need to automate the attack Needs to be further simplified for blind injection
16 Blind Injection : The question game To recover a number, need to guess using yes/no For strings, guess length & guess each character Must be repeated for everything in the database xcat XPi Version 1 Blind Retrieval Guesses numbers by starting from 0 and going up Guess characters by starting at a and ending at Z Only correct guess returns a valid injection result Threaded to speedup slow guessing process You re doing it wrong
17 Search Techniques xcat uses a linear search method for blind retrieval There are faster search algorithms, implement these Determine if XPath 1 has necessary functionality Binary Search Keeps dividing problem in half until single answer is found IE: Is character in the first or second half of the alphabet? Requests = ln(size of alphabet), 8 requests for entire ASCII set Numerical Binary Conversion Convert number to binary and check value of each bit individually IE: 56 = 0b , 8 requests to reconstruct numbers <256
18 XPath has a minimal function set No direct method to determine if a character is present in a set No method to convert a number to binary, or character to number Recreate using SCIENCE Binary Search Use contains function while dividing set in half until match contains([a..z], character), contains([a..m], character), contains([a..g], character), contains([a..d], character), contains([a..b], character), character = A Numerical Binary Reconstruction Recreate bit shift/2binary using floor, division and modulus for n in range(0,8): bit[n] = floor(number div 2**n) mod 2
19 Better search algorithms Adds code/query complexity More difficult to thread Need additional XPath 1 functions Not present in xcat ~6-8x speedup (logarithmic) BUT WAIT, there s more There are additional tricks to speedup retrieval To reach XPath 2 speeds with XPath 1 at no additional cost Using patented backend logic and XPath black magic
20 Improvement: Case Sensitive -> Insensitive Match xcat provides a lower-case match for XPath 2 only Recreate XPath 2 lower-case() function in XPath 1 translate(character, [A-Z], [a-z]) Slight improvement in number of XPath queries (<1%) Only efficient for very large databases, not looking for passwords Matching case after fact less efficient than just using Binary Search
21 Improvement: Normalize Whitespace Eliminate unnecessary whitespace before reconstruction XPath 1: normalize-whitespace(string) Eg: [Space] [Space]* = [Space] Significant improvement for 'text like' databases (<15%)
22 Improvement: Maintain Global Count Get initial count of each type of node, attribute, text, comment, processing instruction count(//*), count(//comment()), count(//text()), Decrement count when accessing that type Stop accessing that type when count is zero Useful for top-heavy documents (comments only at top) Slight speed improvement at small cost of initial requests (1-5%) Very useful for documents missing a node type 5-10% speed improvement for each missing type
23 Improvement: Eliminate Non-Existent Characters Given set of all possible characters, determine if they are present anywhere in the database using a global search for c in [A..Z]: node_exists[c] = count(//*[contains(name(), c)]) for c in [A..Z]: attr_exists[c] = count(//*@[contains(name(), c)]) Allows us to shrink our character set to stuff that exists in the DB Speedup based on how many characters removed (10-25%) Can also be used to identify Unicode and other strange encodings
24 Improvement: Customized Retrieval Using global count improvements we have rough idea of size of database, number of characters For large document we may only want to extract 'interesting' parts Skip comments, attributes, text nodes, or limit depth Used to get basic idea of database structure for focused attacks Variable speedup (10-50%), leads well into the next improvement
25 Improvement: String Search Perform a global search for string Extract usernames, passwords, other sensitive data using optimizations //*[contains(., admin")] //@*[contains(name(), pass")] //text()[contains(., secret")] Useful for open-source, known databases and finding credentials Takes only as long as it needs
26 Improvement: Smart Reconstruction Useful portion of XML database is unique Yet large amount of XML is structure XML databases follow a predictable format Sibling nodes have similar children Use previous node to guess future ones Significant speed improvement (80%) for well-formed databases Done by comparing new data to saved node and attributes values Challenges Requires knowledge using incomplete XML document Additional logic required to prevent speedup inefficiencies
27 Improvement: Threading xcat uses threading across a linear search Cannot easily thread advanced searches as they use conditional statements based on old results for future ones Largest amount of time is spent reconstructing strings Assign a thread to each character in string reconstruction Allows use of all speedup techniques without additional complexity
28 Future Improvements: HTTP Keep Alive Keep connections open to prevent round trip TCP setup time Retrieval Resume Keep information about current reconstruction, allowing restart Compare/Update SQLmap Compare features/push XPath techniques back to SQLi Namespace checks Additional Unicode checks So without much further ado The tool you ve been waiting for
29 xxxpwn : For when SQLmap isn t working
30 xxxpwn XPath exfiltration exploitation Tool Designed for blind XPath 1 injection Open source, python, no dependencies Almost as fast as fastest XPath 2 techniques Also sounds like the title of cool hacker porn Running xxxpwn for maximum satisfaction xxxpwn.py host port and REQUIRED flags below --match MATCH : Keyword to match on successful blind injection --inject INJECT_FILE : File containing valid HTTP Request $INJECT string in file contains location of injection Use --urlencode for GET and --htmlencode for POST requests HTTP Host and Content-Length headers are automatically updated
31 Speedup Improvements implemented as optional flags --summary --no_{root,comments,values,attributes,etc.} --lowercase --global_count --normalize_space --optimize_charset --xml_match --threads THREADS --search SEARCH Additional Flags IE: --ssl
32 Adventure Time! (Tool Demo)
33 Ho-ow Retrieval Speed Comparison Results xcat version seconds with missing characters & elements xcat version seconds with missing root comment xxxpwn w/no optimizations seconds with missing Unicode é xxxpwn w/all optimizations seconds complete xcat autopwn 5.33 (7.16 with initialization) missing root comment Requires XPath 2 & local HTTP server to receive results
34 Where What good is a tool without something to use it on?
35 Where Umbraco Described as The open source ASP.NET CMS Mention of several XPath injection attacks on Google Vulnerable at /umbraco/dashboard.aspx?app=$injection No sensitive information in XML database, POC only As long as they don t update to XPath 2 they will be safe Payload provided in xxxpwn + =
36 Where? Sitecore and below Described as the Best.NET CMS for ASP.NET Version disclosure at /sitecore/shell/sitecore.version.xml SOAP methods at /sitecore/shell/webservice/service.asmx Vulnerable to blind XPath injection in <vis:databasename> field Can be used to retrieve database information including username and password from the Sitecore XML database Payload already loaded in xxxpwn Demo
37 When xxxpwn available soon on Github LINK TODO This presentation will be available on the SA website after the talk I will be around the con for questions May require Mario Kart for the answer Let me know if you find any vulnerabilities With responsible disclosure of course Then I can feed them back into xxxpwn
38 Conclusion Security-Assessment.com is hiring, come work for us
39 Thanks
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