Rajnish Kumar. Curriculum Vitae (Nov 2012)

Transcription

1 Rajnish Kumar Curriculum Vitae (Nov 2012) Phone: +1 (832) Web : SW 8th St, Room - ECS 254, University Park, Miami, Fl RESEARCH INTERESTS Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Network Economics, Mechanism Design, and Corporate Finance. TEACHING INTERESTS Undergraduate Level: Microeconomics, Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Corporate Finance, Mathematical Economics, and Statistics. Graduate (Masters, and Ph.D.) level: Microeconomics, Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Corporate Finance, Mathematical Economics, and Topics courses in (a) Mechanism Design/Social Choice Theory (b) Network Economics. CURRENT POSITION EDUCATION Postdoctoral Researcher in the School of Computing and Information Sciences at Florida International University (August ) Rice University, Houston, TX, USA Ph.D. in Economics, June 2010 Dissertation Title: Essays on Implementation and Network Cost Sharing. Committee Chair: Dr. Herve Moulin M.A. in Economics, January 2010 Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi, India M.S. in Quantitative Economics, 2004 Delhi University, Delhi, India B.A. in Economics, 2001 FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS Graduate Scholarship, Rice University Fellowship, Government of India Scholarship, WORK EXPERIENCE Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, USA Postdoctoral Scientist, India Development Foundation, Gurgaon, India Research Associate, TEACHING AND RESEARCH EXPERIENCE Courses Taught

2 Spring 2012, Topics in Algorithms (COT 6936(Partial)), FIU (PhD Course) Fall 2011, Advanced Microeconomic Theory (Econ 7725 (Partial), LSU (PhD Course)) Spring 2011, Principles of Microeconomics (Econ 2000, LSU), Two Sections Fall 2010, Advanced Microeconomic Theory (Econ 7725 (Partial), LSU (PhD Course)) Fall 2008, Principles of Economics I (Econ 211, Rice University) Teaching Assistant Spring 2010, Advanced Game Theory (Econ 440), Professor Herve Moulin Spring 2009, Introduction to Game Theory (Econ 340.1), Professor Simon Grant Spring 2008, Corporate Finance (Econ 448.1), Professor Camelia Bejan Fall 2007, Introduction to Game Theory (Econ 340.1) Professor Simon Grant Spring 2007, Corporate Finance (Econ 448.1) Professor Camelia Bejan Spring 2006, Principles of Economics I (Econ 211) Professor Ronald Soligo Fall 2005, Principles of Economics I (Econ 211) Professor Ronald Soligo PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: Referee for: Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Discrete and Applied Mathematics Conference organization: (1) Bargaining, Evolution and Networks : A Conference in Honor of Hans Haller, February 25-26, 2011 at LSU (2) Networks and Development: Exploring An Emerging Theme, March 24-25, 2012 at LSU RESEARCH PAPERS PUBLICATIONS: 1. Job Market Paper (A): Implementing Efficient Graphs in Connection Networks, with Ruben Juarez (October 2012, Economic Theory, 45 pages) Abstract We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a network that meets the connection demands of a set of agents. The agents simultaneously choose paths in the network connecting their demand nodes. A mechanism splits the total cost of the network formed among the participants. We introduce two new properties of implementation. The first property, Pareto Nash implementation (PNI), requires that the efficient outcome always be implemented in a Nash equilibrium and that the efficient outcome Pareto dominates any other Nash equilibrium. The average cost mechanism and other asymmetric variations are the only mechanisms that meet PNI. These mechanisms are also characterized under strong Nash implementation. The second property, weakly Pareto Nash implementation (WPNI), requires that the least inefficient equilibrium Pareto dominates any other equilibrium. The egalitarian mechanism (EG) and other asymmetric variations are the only mechanisms that meet WPNI and individual rationality. EG minimizes the price of stability across all individually rational mechanisms. SUBMITTED PAPERS 2. Secure Implementation in Production Economies Revision submitted to Mathematical Social Sciences Abstract: This paper shows that, in production economies, the generalized serial social choice functions defined by [Shenker (1992)] are securely implementable (in the sense of [Saijo et al. (2007)]) and that they include the well-known fixed path social choice functions. 3. Job Market Paper (B): Price Discrimination in Quantity Setting Oligopoly, with Levent Kutlu Under review at International Journal of Industrial Organization Abstract: We analyze a two-stage quantity setting oligopolistic price discrimination game. In the first stage firms decide capacities and in the second stage they simultaneously price discriminate. For given capacities, we provide an algorithm that defines the price discrimination behaviour of the firms in second stage. The firms focus more on the high valuation customers which results in a coarse partition of high valuation customers and fine partition of low valuation customers. We

3 solve the equilibrium price discrimination for Cournot as a benchmark case of first stage. It is found that the quantity weighted average price increases with the level of price discrimination as opposed to established results in the literature for one-stage games. Moreover, the deadweight loss does not vanish with the level of price discrimination as is the case with one-stage games and monopoly. 4. Potential in Bicooperative Games: A Note, with Surajit Borkotokey, and Sudipta Sarangi Under review at Journal of Public Economic Theory Abstract: In this note we show the existence of a unique potential for bicooperative games. The marginal contribution vector of this potential function coincides with the Shapley value. A crucial step in accomplishing this task is to identify upper and lower restricted bicooperative games using the chain structure of these games. The Shapley value is also shown to be consistent. Working Papers: 5. Network Stability in the Context of Information Games under Node Failure, with Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard, S.S. Iyengar, and Sudipta Sarangi Abstract: We consider a game-theoretic network formation model where players initiate links with other players in the network taking into account costs and benefits of their actions. Each agent in the network has information that is valuable to the other agents, who can access it by forming links. Linking is a costly activity and provides access to the information of every agent that can be reached directly, or indirectly through a sequence of links. Flow of information in the network is bidirectional regardless of who initiates the links. We allow for the possibility of node failure in this game. Node failure results in the disappearance of all the links associated with the node that fails. This is an important model of network formation which has surprisingly not been explored in the literature. The application of this model ranges from social networks under disaster, cyber security, and online peer-to-peer file sharing platforms to redundancy in routing and information flow. Using ex-ante expected payoffs individual players (or nodes) or a central planner makes their network formation decision taking the possible disappearance of nodes into account. Our focus is on the stable and efficient network architectures under this framework. For stability we rely on Nash equilibrium and efficiency is based on the utilitarian notion of maximizing aggregate utility. Interestingly we find that equilibrium networks will either be empty or connected in spite of the possibility of node failures. In contrast with the deterministic setting where the stable and efficient architectures are always trees, in our set up both stable and efficient networks can have back-up links. We also illustrate how game-theoretic models of node failure differ from models allowing for link failure. 6. Ex-ante versus Ex-Post Rationing Rules for State Contingent Claims, with Sinan Ertemel Abstract: We consider the resource allocation rationing problems where the claims are state contingent, i.e., each agent submits a distribution of claims rather than one deterministic claim. We consider two natural approaches in such situations namely, ex-ante and ex-post rationing rules. We compare the ex-ante and ex-post allocations by the Proportional and Egalitarian rules for various distributions of claims and find out sufficient conditions for the distribution of the vector of claims where an agent prefers ex-ante allocation to ex-post allocation or vice versa. We also characterize the ex-ante and ex-post Proportional rules with the variations of well-established axioms. 7. Evacuation: Social Decision and Planer Intervention, with Matthew Wiser, and Sudipta Sarangi Abstract: We consider the evacuation decision made by the inhabitants of a region to be hit by a probable natural calamity, e.g., a hurricane in Louisiana. The decision of an individual in such a scenario depends on many factors including his personal experience from history, the decision of his neighbors and acquaintances, his trust in those neighbors and acquaintances, the prediction of intensity of that calamity, the source of that prediction, the message from state authority, etc. The decision to evacuate is a non-trivial question because in the case of the occurrence of the calamity it will prove to be a good decision to have evacuated whereas in case of nonoccurrence it will prove to be not just a futile exercise but also the loss of cost of moving (including the cost against inertia to not move) incurred. We use the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of a dynamic game of incomplete

4 information to simulate the scenario of evacuation and have shown the conditions for social learning. 8. Allocation Rules for Fixed and Flexible Networks: The Role of Players and their Links with Surajit Borkotokey and Sudipta Sarangi Abstract: We propose an allocation rule that takes into account the importance of both players and their links and characterizes it for a fixed network. Unlike previous rules, our characterization does not require that the allocation rule be component balance. Next, we extend it to flexible networks `a la Jackson (2005). Finally, we provide a comparison with other fixed network (Myerson and Position value) and exible network (Player and Link Based) allocation rules through some examples. Work in Progress: 9. Dividing a dollar on a network with externalities, with Ruben Juarez. 10. Efficiency in the Cost Sharing on a Network: The Role of Information, with Ruben Juarez 11. On the Price Response of stocks to the Addition in S&P500 index, with Edward Lawrence and Arun J. Prakash 12. On the Uniqueness of Stable Marriages, with Giri Narasimhan, and Mario Consuegra. BOOKS: Publication: SMALL AREA ESTIMATES OF SELECTED WELFARE INDICATORS: RESULTS FOR UTTARANCHAL. November 2005, United Nations World Food Programme. Co-authored with Shubhashis Gangopadhayay, PAN Network, Maithili Ramachandran, T.O.Sridevi, Brinda Viswanathan and Wilima Wadhwa. Under progress: Monograph titled THEORY OF GAMES AND INFORMATION SCIENCE joint with S. S. Iyengar. CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS: (1) International conference on Game theory, Operations research and Applications (In honor of Prof. C. R. Rao and Prof. Lloyd Shapley) at Hyderabad, India (December, 2012) (2) 4 th World congress of Game Theory at Istanbul, Turkey (July 2012), (3) 12 th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce at San Jose (June 2011), (4) Center for excellence DHS meeting at UNC Chapel Hill, (February 2011), (5) Economics Department, LSU, Baton Rouge, USA (October 2010), (6) Conference on Network Economics at LSU, Baton Rouge, USA (February 2010), (7) Royal Economic Society conference at London, UK, (January 2010), (8) Society for Economic Design-Conference on Economic Design at Maastricht, The Netherlands (June 2009), (9) 8 th Hawaii International Conference on Social Sciences. Honolulu, Hawaii, USA (June 2009), (10) Third World Congress of The Game Theory Society at Evanston, Illinois, USA (July 2008), (11) 9 th International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare. Montreal, Canada (June 2008) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES Society for Social Choice and Welfare Game Theory Society Society for Economic Design COMPUTER SKILLS Software: Matlab, Stata, Eviews, SPSS, Mathematica and Maple. CITIZENSHIP Indian

5 REFERENCES: Dr. Herve Moulin (Advisor) George A. Peterkin Professor of Economics Department of Economics MS-22 Rice University P.O. Box 1892 Houston, TX Phone: +1 (713) Fax: +1 (713) Dr. Simon Grant School of Economics The University of Queensland Level 6, Colin Clark Building (39) St Lucia, Brisbane QLD 4072 AUSTRALIA ph fax [email protected] Dr. Sudipta Sarangi Gulf Coast Coca-Cola Bottling Co.Inc Distinguished Professor of Business Administration LSU, Baton Rouge, LA, Phone: Fax: [email protected] Dr. Ruben Juarez University of Hawaii, Department of Economics, Saunders Hall 542, 2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, Hawaii PH: (808) FX: (808) [email protected]