From preparedness to partnerships: case study research on humanitarian logistics

Transcription

1 Intl. Trans. in Op. Res. 16 (2009) DOI: /j x INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN OPERATIONAL RESEARCH From preparedness to partnerships: case study research on humanitarian logistics Rolando M. Tomasini a and Luk N. Van Wassenhove b a Program Manager, INSEAD Humanitarian Research Group, Boulevard de Constance, Fontainebleau, France, b Henry Ford Chaired Professor in Manufacturing at INSEAD and Academic Director of the INSEAD Social Innovation Center, Boulevard de Constance, Fontainebleau, France s: [email protected] [Tomasini]; [email protected] [Van Wassenhove] Received 12 January 2009; accepted 18 January 2009 Abstract Disasters are on the rise, more complex, and donor support is increasingly unpredictable. In response to this trend humanitarian agencies are looking for more efficient and effective solutions. This paper discusses the evolution of supply chain management in disaster relief and the role of new players like the private sector. It is based on research conducted by the Humanitarian Research Group at INSEAD. Keywords: humanitarian supply chain; disaster relief; uncertainty; public private partnerships 1. Introduction Disasters come to test the reactivity of our systems, especially the capacity of different actors to work together. They demand solutions that include governments, military, civil society, and humanitarian organizations. Under normal circumstances these actors have little incentive to work together for an extended period of time. Yet, when a disaster strikes, they are suddenly faced with the pressure to combine all their capacity and capability to relieve human suffering. Getting different actors to work together by sharing processes and distribution channels demands a vision that goes beyond mere logistics (moving goods from point A to point B). It requires a supply chain management approach to effectively coordinate performance, eliminate redundancies, and maximize efficiencies in terms of costs and speed. It also helps to create a repository of data to analyze post-event learning (Thomas, 2004). In commercial supply chains this approach forms the basis of a business model that encourages different actors to deliver a product or a service at a certain cost, quality, and time, to make a profit. In humanitarian operations, profit is replaced by the objective of timely and appropriate provision of aid to beneficiaries. In other words, the right goods, at the right place, at the right Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

2 550 R. M. Tomasini and L. N. Van Wassenhove / Intl. Trans. in Op. Res. 16 (2009) time (before it is too late) for those who need it most. In addition, the disaster supply chain should not destroy local economies, but rather reduce the vulnerability levels. This article first describes the characteristics of the humanitarian supply chain to differentiate it from the commercial supply chain. Then it illustrates with cases and examples our research agenda (i.e., preparedness, response, and collaboration). Finally, it discusses opportunities for the private and humanitarian sector to work together towards social improvements. 2. Characteristics of the humanitarian supply chain Humanitarian logistics is defined as the process of planning, implementing and controlling the efficient, cost effective flow and storage of goods and materials as well as related information from the point of origin to the point of consumption for the purpose of alleviating the suffering of vulnerable people. The function encompasses a range of activities, including preparedness, planning, procurement, transport, warehousing, tracking and tracing, customs and clearance (Thomas, 2004). Absent in this definition is the notion of profit, a salient characteristic of the commercial sector. In lieu of profit, humanitarian organizations seek a balance between speed and cost in their supply chain. Consider that disasters vary in types and levels of intensity, each demanding a different response. However, regardless of their nature they typically show distinct stages: ramp-up, sustain, and ramp-down. The ramp-up stage covers the first few days after the onset of the disaster, during which getting access to the field and setting up operations as fast as possible is the highest priority. During the sustain stage agencies focus on implementing their programs, while cost and efficiencies gain importance. In the ramp-down stage agencies are focusing on their exit strategy including transfer of operations to local actors. In terms of operational performance the interesting part about the transition between the stages is the shift in focus from speed to cost reduction. Driven by the urgency of the needs and high levels of uncertainty, during the ramp-up stage all processes focus on speed and cost takes a back seat. Humanitarian agencies prioritize the need to get to the area, witness and document the extent of the damage, assess how many resources are needed, and implement immediate solutions. With speed as the main driver, lead time reduction becomes an important area of consideration. Looking at the industries that compete on the basis of speed, research shows that the total lead time (the elapsed time to complete a business process) only contains 3 5% value adding time (Handfield and Nichols, 1999). That leaves much room for improvement, especially in the humanitarian sector, where any improvement in the supply chain lead time can have a significant positive impact on the beneficiaries and therefore higher return on donations (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009). This validates our focus on supply chain management as a key factor in the overall effectiveness of any humanitarian response. Cost is a driver adopted in the later stages of a disaster, once the operation has been set up, roles have been defined, and there is better visibility about the process to assist beneficiaries. As soon as the needs of the beneficiaries are defined (demand) and the donations have been received (supply), the relief supply chain starts to resemble a normal business supply chain. Consequently, donors will increasingly look for efficiency in how their money is being spent. A concrete example would be the choice of transportation mode. In the ramp-up stage agencies may choose to fly in all

3 R. M. Tomasini and L. N. Van Wassenhove / Intl. Trans. in Op. Res. 16 (2009) aid at high cost. To supply the same goods over the following weeks they will seek cheaper options for procurement, transportation, and distribution such as buying regionally, using road or sea delivery, and working through local actors to distribute the aid in the communities. The balance between cost and speed is not limited to disaster response only. It is also pertinent to disaster preparedness, where the supply chain approach may be closer to its commercial counterpart. Conscious of cost and speed, humanitarian agencies work to develop processes and products to be better prepared to target both objectives. For example, they preposition goods regionally to reduce the procurement cost of standardized high-demand goods, while reducing the lead time when disaster strikes. In some cases, prepositioning allows agencies to do postponement by delaying to the last possible moment the combination of goods that will be sent to the field in order to adapt them to the local requirements. Our research shows that humanitarian supply chains also differ from commercial ones because of ambiguous objectives, limited human and capital resources, high levels of uncertainty, and the politicized environment (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009). Ambiguous objectives make it difficult to assess the level of commitment of the different actors often operating uncoordinated, and spontaneously. Limited human resources are the result of high staff turnover and a scarce pool of qualified and readily deployable personnel, whereas capital resources are subject to unpredictable donations that limit the liquidity of managers in the field. Uncertainty directly affects the quality of the assessments of supply and demand. All this in an environment subject to the political agendas of the different actors involved including donors, governments, military, and aid agencies. In the next section, we discuss our research agenda, which goes into greater detail about the preparedness and response stages of a disaster, and the different issues that relate to their management. It also discusses the collaboration opportunities with other sectors. 3. Our research agenda Building upon the differences between commercial and humanitarian supply chains our research agenda has three main focus areas: preparedness, response, and collaboration. We have implemented this agenda in close collaboration with humanitarian organizations and private businesses to develop case studies, articles, and reports useful in teaching, training, and research (see Table 1). In the area of disaster preparedness we have focussed on what organizations can do between disasters in order to improve their response when disaster strikes. Most projects in this area look at repositioning, and in some cases accepting supply chain management as a central function of the organization. Preparedness also deals with restructuring the supply chain network, including pooling resources, prepositioning of relief items, and postponement. In the area of disaster response we have focussed on coordination issues that emerge when multiple actors need to interact to respond to an emergency. Coordination is particularly challenging given the lack of profit incentives in the humanitarian supply chain, but also because it operates in an environment without clear command and control where priorities are constantly changing. Most of our research highlights the different styles of coordination and their applicability to specific environments.

4 552 R. M. Tomasini and L. N. Van Wassenhove / Intl. Trans. in Op. Res. 16 (2009) Table 1 Humanitarian research group case studies Disaster CSR/ partnership Healthcare Transport HRG case studies Region Academic fields SCM/ operations management Strategy Politics Finance OB/ leadership Negotiations Marketing Entrepreneurship Ethical issues Coordinating disaster logistics after El Salvador s earthquakes using SUMA s Humanitarian Supply Latin America x x x Management System x x International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC): Asia x x Choreographer of disaster management. Gujarat earthquake United Nations Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC): An Global x x x operational and conceptual inter-agency logistics platform United Nations Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC): The Global (Africa) x x genesis of a humanitarian relief coordination platform United Nations Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC): Fuels: Middle East x x x x a humanitarian necessity in 2003 post-conflict Iraq Genetically modified food donations and the cost of Africa x x x x neutrality. Logistics response to the 2002 food crisis in Southern Africa World Food Program Lesotho: Building sustainable Africa x x operations Yogyakarta earthquake: International Federation of the Red Cross first experiences with a decentralized Asia x x x supply chain (forthcoming) x United Nations Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC): Global x x Managing information in humanitarian crisis International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC): Latin America x x Choreographer of disaster management. Hurricane Mitch Humanitarian response the 2006 Lebanese/Israeli conflict Middle East x x x United Nations Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC): Middle East x x Afghanistan operations first year United Nations Joint Logistics Center (UNLC): Logistics Middle East x x x moving the seeds of a brighter future. Afghanistan 2nd Year. Capital markets or alms (World Food Program AXA) Africa x Agility: a global logistics company and local humanitarian Middle East x x partners (forthcoming) Global Impact: managing corporate giving Global x x x x Fighting the Flu Tamiflu stockpiling: a pandemic Global x x x x preparedness policy Hopital de Dieu Lebanon (forthcoming) Middle East x x Moving the World: TNT World Food Program Global x partnership 5 years later: when the music changes so does the dance (forthcoming) Moving the World: TNT World Food Program Global partnership. Looking for a partner Moving the World: TNT World Food Program partnership. Learning to dance Global x

5 R. M. Tomasini and L. N. Van Wassenhove / Intl. Trans. in Op. Res. 16 (2009) Table 1. (Contd.) Disaster CSR/ partnership Healthcare Transport HRG case studies Region Academic fields SCM/ operations management Strategy Politics Finance OB/ leadership Negotiations Marketing Entrepreneurship Ethical issues North Star Foundation: Paving the road to healthy highways a partnership to scale up HIV/AIDS clinics in Africa Africa x x x Medicines for malaria venture: accessing the inaccessible Africa x x x x Fleet Forum: Rethinking humanitarian vehicle Global x x x x management North Star Foundation a partnership to scale up HIV/ Africa x x x x x x x x AIDS clinics in Africa Safety in numbers: Danida s multisectoral partnership to Global (Africa) x x x x x reduce road risk in developing countries (forthcoming) Moving the world UNJLC: Transport optimization for Africa x x South Sudan World Vision International Fleet Management Global (Africa) x x Optimization International Committee of the Red Cross Fleet Global (M East) x x Management Vehicle Optimization (forthcoming) International Federation of the Red Cross: Fleet Global (M East) x x Management Optimization World Food Program Fleet Management Vehicle Optimization (forthcoming) Global (M East) x x Cases have women in leading roles., Cases and inspection copies available from the European Case Clearing House

6 554 R. M. Tomasini and L. N. Van Wassenhove / Intl. Trans. in Op. Res. 16 (2009) In the area of collaboration our research took a broader approach considering the different ways in which actors can contribute to emergency response operations. Projects in this area describe the actors that interact with the humanitarian sector, as well as the different models for engagement ranging from commercial activities (e.g., third-party service providers) to pure philanthropy Preparedness When disaster strikes and the needs peak, it is already too late to develop solutions that were not in place before. Even though every disaster may be different, the process of responding to them remains relatively similar in all cases. A needs assessment must be carried out to determine what goods and services are required. Donations and procurement processes are mobilized to meet those needs. Trained staff is assigned to receive and distribute the goods, while specialized teams carry out the services (e.g., medical, telecommunications, water sanitation). Agencies need to monitor the evolution of the needs and how they are met by the donations. In other words, a supply chain is activated every time a new disaster happens. The difference lies in the type of disaster that occurs, the number of people affected, the resources needed and available locally, and the easiness to work on site. Embracing supply chain management as a central function to respond to disasters is a process humanitarian agencies only formally started in the last decade. For example, the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) was invited by the Government of Honduras to assist in the relief efforts of Hurricane Mitch in However, they failed to coordinate the relief contributions of the donating National Societies; its technical staff had arrived on the disaster scene far too late; its specialised equipment was only deployed at the eleventh hour; and basic supplies took two weeks to mobilise and distribute to the population (Chomilier et al., 2003). In response to their poor performance, the IFRC underwent several restructuring exercises to make supply chain management a central function of the organization. They reorganized their management team and functions into five areas: human resources, knowledge management, finance, logistics, and community relations. This exercise was the first of many improvements that would lead in 2006 to becoming the recipient of the prestigious European Supply Chain Excellence Award traditionally given to private sector companies. Since then the IFRC has continued to reinforce their supply chain management to be better prepared, e.g., decentralizing and creating Regional Logistics Units that enable them to be closer to disaster-prone regions and customizing their solutions to local needs. Focusing on supply chain structures and processes to respond to disasters is important to improve preparedness. Another important capability is the ability to cope with uncertainty. Demand uncertainty is relatively quickly resolved as the humanitarian supply chain is activated. The first assessment provides a baseline of needs that evolves as the relief operation unfolds. Demand uncertainty can also be anticipated in the field to avoid disruptions and bottlenecks. This was the case for the United Nations Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC) in Iraq where the local team forecasted fuel shortages in the country even before all the humanitarian agencies were deployed. Failure to identify this need would have led to serious disruptions in the humanitarian

7 R. M. Tomasini and L. N. Van Wassenhove / Intl. Trans. in Op. Res. 16 (2009) aid process. Thanks to the anticipation, new fuel sources were identified in advance and proper rationing ensured the best use of the resources available (Samii and Van Wassenhove, 2005). Supply uncertainty is relatively more complex because donor generosity is hard to predict, and matching supply and demand is hard given the lack of centralized data. In an ideal world disasters would be funded according to their needs. Instead, donors are driven by personal motivations, religious convictions, political agendas, and media attention. As a result, many disasters go unnoticed and unfunded. Disasters that do get attention may not necessarily receive the relief items corresponding to the most urgent needs. So-called unsolicited donations (e.g., toothpaste for tsunami victims) may create bottlenecks at already damaged and congested points like airstrips. In an effort to create more pull-driven (needs-based) supply chains, humanitarian organizations have increasingly implemented information management tools and worked with third parties who can help them match needs to donors for different types of disasters. Global Impact, like AidMatrix and Charitic.fr, is one of those third-party NGOs providing solutions dedicated to matching private and individual donors to needs identified in the field by humanitarian agencies (Stapleton et al., 2008a). Global Impact is in contact with agencies to document their needs, usually in an online catalogue. In parallel they make the catalogue available to companies and individuals to match needs with donations Response Uncertainty is even more relevant when it comes to the context of the disaster. Beyond matching supply and demand there are a number of external factors, such as security and politics, influencing uncertainty and affecting a response. The response to the Lebanese crisis of 2006 is a perfect example of an operation where the primary role of the international humanitarian community was to address the security factors affecting the area. Lebanon, a prosperous and resilient country with a long history of humanitarian operations, had all the resources to meet its own needs and roll out its own relief operations following the massive attacks from Israel that destroyed entire neighbourhoods, airports, ports, main roads, and bridges. However, the difficulty was the severe security constraints that inhibited the movement of goods within the country (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2008a). The international humanitarian agencies, largely represented by the United Nations and the regional Red Crescent Societies, had to mediate with the Israeli forces to reiterate their mandate and humanitarian space. Such space is made up by the agencies adherence to three main principles: humanity, neutrality and impartiality. The combination of these three principles ensures that humanitarian agencies will not discriminate against, or align themselves with, any group while attending human suffering (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009). In return, they should be granted immunity from any fighting and guaranteed full access to do their job. Through arduous negotiations and risk taking, the humanitarian agencies attending to the Lebanon crisis managed to roll out their relief efforts and provide assistance despite the lifethreatening challenges imposed by the conflict. In other instances, governments can create less violent, but equally disturbing challenges to the humanitarian supply chain. This was the case of the 2002 Southern African Food Crisis during which the President of Zambia rejected several hundred tons of maize after finding a trace of

8 556 R. M. Tomasini and L. N. Van Wassenhove / Intl. Trans. in Op. Res. 16 (2009) genetically modified grains in the shipments delivered by the World Food Program (WFP; Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2004). This crisis was the largest of its kind for the area, affecting many countries, and triggering the procurement of several thousands tons of food aid for the region. Zambia, a sovereign state, was in its full right to reject the aid which forced the WFP to take back all the maize, identify alternative supply sources, and redistribute new maize. WFP negotiated to have the genetically modified maize milled to be distributed in neighbouring countries. Milling ensured that the maize would not be replanted, which would affect the organic crops of the region, and enabled WFP to reinforce the maize with nutrients. This change had an impact on time delays as well as costs incurred by the WFP. It also illustrates the high levels of agility humanitarian organizations are capable of. Regardless of the type of uncertainty affecting the humanitarian supply chain, information management can help to reduce the complexity brought about by uncertainty. That is what several initiatives driven by the humanitarian agencies attempt to do through designing a common language, increasing visibility, and promoting collaboration. As mentioned earlier, disaster relief operations are carried out by humanitarian agencies who, unlike private companies, do not share the same explicit profit incentives to collaborate and exchange information. In an effort to address the difficulties arising from lack of information and information asymmetry, groups like the UNJLC have worked to standardize the exchange of information on topics that concern most actors. For example, in Afghanistan UNJLC set up through their website a bulletin service that helped the different actors during the ramp-up stage to have access to basic information like a directory of agencies working in the area, visa requirements, customs procedures, housing options, and security updates. Through the subsequent stages of the disaster these bulletins served to monitor the division of tasks in the field, anticipate and communicate solutions to problems of common interest like fuel (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2005). In Afghanistan, the exchange of information was also crucial to dissolving a trucking cartel that had formed among locals who were taking advantage of the uncoordinated requests from the humanitarian sector for trucking services into the war-torn areas. As soon as the UNJLC managed to consolidate the rates being negotiated, it normalized the prices by providing a clearer picture of how much demand and supply was at stake in that operation (Samii and Van Wassenhove, 2003). Information management can help increase visibility and foster transparency in the humanitarian supply chain. A good example is the use of commodity or inventory tracking systems like SUMA. During the 2001 earthquakes in El Salvador, SUMA, an inventory tracking system designed with the support of the Pan American Health Organization, was used to record all donations and purchases coming into the government warehouses managing the relief operation. The system produced periodic reports on what goods had been received and dispatched, what needs were still standing, and who was responsible for distribution. This information tracking had a positive impact on accountability, and helped reduce suspicions of theft, losses, or manipulation of aid. In general, having more visibility of the needs and the roles of the actors helped to organize the different players, including the private sector, for a better collaboration (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2003). Disaster response is a challenging task due to the high levels of uncertainty and limited resources in every situation. However, agencies investing in information management can help facilitate the response by creating greater visibility of the needs and more accountability among the different actors involved.

9 3.3. Collaboration R. M. Tomasini and L. N. Van Wassenhove / Intl. Trans. in Op. Res. 16 (2009) Collaboration is necessary not only among humanitarians but also with other players like the private sector and local communities. Humanitarian agencies are present to attend to the needs arising from a disaster. They may not have the resources or capabilities the private sector has to meet unanticipated needs. They also need to work with communities to ensure a substantial reduction of risk factors jeopardising good recovery before they can exit the relief operation Private sector Being a good corporate citizen is at the heart of most companies humanitarian activities, whether this revolves around providing cash, goods, human resources, knowledge and expertise, or a combination of these, each with its pros and cons (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009). Increasingly, companies are opting to design their social engagement through long-term programs or partnerships with humanitarian partners. Private logistics companies participate in partnerships with humanitarian organizations, approaching the latter not only from a charitable concern but also as an opportunity for learning and business development. Some of these collaborations have taken the form of long-term partnerships, like TNT and WFP with their Moving the World initiative. Other collaborations are more project based like FedEx, DHL or Agility. In a partnership every joint project either between or during disasters is an opportunity to learn. Done well, these partnerships can become learning laboratories for both parties (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2007). Humanitarian agencies invest equal resources, hoping to enhance their performance and core competencies through interaction with their private sector partners. In operational terms, humanitarians can mainly benefit from their partners in two areas: back office support for better disaster preparedness and movement of key assets during a crisis (e.g., food donations, medicines, shelters, or telecommunications equipment) Communities: develop local capacity Partnerships can go beyond emergencies to focus on sustainable reduction of vulnerabilities in the communities affected. Very often disaster relief serves to attend to the immediate needs of a trigger event. Unless proper attention is given to reducing the vulnerability factors that led to the event in the first place, or to increasing the community s ability to deal with such events, it is unlikely that sustainable improvements will result. Once again supply chain management can help communities post-disaster recovery in different ways. For example, WFP in Lesotho acknowledged the need to train locals in supply chain management so as to empower residents to take more responsibility over food aid distribution. This included helping staff in field offices to improve tracing and tracking, inventory management, planning, and forecasting, i.e., basic functions to optimize the use of the limited resources and the impact of food aid on communities in remote mountain areas (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2008b). It has been noted that for many diseases like malaria, HIV/AIDS, and TB, the main challenge is to set up a supply chain adapted to the therapeutic requirements of the drugs, remote areas, and at

10 558 R. M. Tomasini and L. N. Van Wassenhove / Intl. Trans. in Op. Res. 16 (2009) times precarious infrastructure, and poorly trained and equipped staff. This is particularly true in the hardest hit areas of the world like Sub-Saharan Africa. Several public private sector initiatives today foster the development of logistics solutions to tackle these challenges. One example is the Medicines for Malaria Initiative, which focuses on working with local partners and producers to improve distribution in Africa (Stapleton et al., 2008b). Another example is the work of the North Star Foundation, setting up company-sponsored roadside HIV/AIDS wellness centres targeting truck drivers in Africa (Gatignon and Van Wassenhove, 2008). Through the different stages of a disaster, collaboration with different actors can help reduce cost and increase speed in the supply chain. These collaborations can be in the front-office (response) or back-office ( preparedness) depending on the core competencies and assets exchanged. 4. Conclusion The examples in this article highlight the important role of operations management in the improvement of disaster response. Research will help raise the profile and understanding of supply chain management in the organizations, encouraging a professionalization of the discipline and strengthening the corresponding functions. Further research is needed to extend our exploratory work. Our Humanitarian Research Group, part of INSEAD s Social Innovation Center ( is involved in research (including doctoral dissertations), as well as pedagogical development (case studies and courses). Since 2000, our group collaborates intensively with humanitarian agencies and private businesses with the objective to help develop a science of humanitarian logistics. We have also captured most of our experience in a book primarily aimed at humanitarians and interested business professionals, but also a good introduction for students and researchers interested in the topic. The book is available online ( though more information can be found on our website ( Table 1 lists the pedagogical cases we developed and clusters them by topic and by academic discipline for which they can be used. We have found that these cases generate a high level of interest and excellent discussions with all types of audiences. References Chomilier, B., Samii, R., Van Wassenhove, L.N., The central role of supply chain management at the IFRC. Forced Migration Review 18, Gatignon, A., Van Wassenhove, L.N., North Star Foundation: paving the road to healthy highways a partnership to scale up HIV/AIDS clinics in Africa. INSEAD Case 10/ Handfield, R., Nichols, E., Introduction to Supply Chain Management. Palgrave, London. Samii, R., Van Wassenhove, L.N., UNJLC Afghanistan operations first year. INSEAD Case 05/ Samii, R., Van Wassenhove, L.N., Fuels: a humanitarian necessity in 2003 post-conflict Iraq. INSEAD Case 07/

11 R. M. Tomasini and L. N. Van Wassenhove / Intl. Trans. in Op. Res. 16 (2009) Stapleton, O., Hanson, M., Van Wassenhove, L.N., 2008a. Global Impact: managing corporate giving. INSEAD Case 02/ Stapleton, O., Yadav, P., Van Wassenhove, L.N., 2008b. Medecines for Malaria venture. INSEAD Case 01/ Thomas, A., Leveraging private expertise for humanitarian supply chains. Forced Migration Review (Oxford, UK) 21, Tomasini, R., Van Wassenhove, L.N., Coordinating disaster logistics in El Salvador using SUMA. INSEAD Case 10/ Tomasini, R., Van Wassenhove, L.N., Genetically modified food donations and the cost of neutrality. Logistics response to the 2002 Southern Africa food crisis. INSEAD Case 03/ Tomasini, R., Van Wassenhove, L.N., Managing information in humanitarian crisis: UNJLC Website. INSEAD Case 04/ Tomasini, R., Van Wassenhove, L.N., Overcoming the barriers to a successful cross-sector partnership. Executive Action Report, The Conference Board, New York. Tomasini, R., Van Wassenhove, L.N., 2008a. Humanitarian response to the 2006 Lebanese-Israeli crisis. INSEAD Case Tomasini, R., Van Wassenhove, L.N., 2008b. WFP Lesotho: building sustainable operations. INSEAD Case 01/ Tomasini, R., Van Wassenhove, L.N., Humanitarian Logistics. Palgrave, London, UK.