Secure Services withapache CXF
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1 Karlsruher Entwicklertag 2014 Secure Services withapache CXF Andrei Shakirin, Talend ashakirin.blogspot.com/
2 Agenda Introduction in Apache CXF Security Requirements Apply security features to CXF Services (JAX-RS)
3 AboutMe Software architect in Talend Team PMC and committer in Apache CXF and commiter in Apache Syncope projects Speaker for Apache and Java conferences
4 Apache CXF
5 WhyCXF? Alternatives: Jersey RestEasy Axis 2 Metro CXF Benefits: Strong standards support SOAP & Rest services Comprehensive Security Streaming and performance Flexibility Large and active community
6 Who usescxf? Apache: Camel, ServiceMix, Syncope JBoss JAX-WS stack TomEE JAX-WS and JAX-RS stacks Talend, Fusesource, MuleSoft, WSO2 Google Adwords, TomTom,
7 Security Requirements Authentication(HTTP basic, digest, UsernameToken, X500, Kerberos, SAML) Authorization(method/resource based, XACML) Confidentiality(SSL, message encryption) Integrity(SSL, message signature) Non-repudiation(message signature)
8 Transport Layer Security Authentication Confidentiality Integrity
9 IsSSL Safe?
10 SSL Handshake
11 Server CertificateValidation 1. Check certificate validity period 2. Check is Certificate Authority (CA) a trusted CA 3. Check the issuer's digital signature in whole chain 4. Check if domain name in the server's certificate match the domain name of the server itself 5. Check CA revocation list
12 Recommendations Apply negative security tests using abnormal SSL certificates (self-signed, issues for another host, etc) Don t modify application code and disable certificate validation even for testing Verify libraries default set up, use explicit options if necessary
13 HTTPS: JAX-RS 2.0 Client
14 HTTPS: CXF Client
15 HTTPS Server: Jetty
16 Authentication HTTP basic, digest Kerberos X509 SAML JWT
17 HTTP Basic 1. Client: GET /users/ua1b2c3 HTTP/ Server: HTTP/ Unauthorized WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="nmrs_m7vkmomq2ym3:" 3. Client: GET /users/ua1b2c3 HTTP/1.0 Authorization: Basic QWxhZGRpbjpvcGVuIHNlc2FtZQ==
18 HTTP Digest 1. Client: GET /users/ua1b2c3 HTTP/ Server: HTTP/ Unauthorized WWW-Authenticate: Digest qop="auth,auth-int", nonce="dcd98b7102dd2f0e8b11d0f600bfb0c093", opaque="5ccc069c403ebaf9f0171e9517f40e41" 3. Client: GET / /users/ua1b2c3 HTTP/1.0 Authorization: Digest username= ashakirin", realm="[email protected]", nonce="dcd98b7102dd2f0e8b11d0f600bfb0c093", uri="/dir/index.html", qop=auth, nc= , cnonce="0a4f113b", response="6629fae49393a c4ef1", opaque="5ccc069c403ebaf9f0171e9517f40e41" HA1=MD5(username:realm:password) HA2=MD5(method:digestURI) response=md5(ha1:nonce:ha2)
19 JAAS
20 Kerberos
21 SAML
22 SAML in Rest Services 1. Enveloped <env:envelope xmlns:env=" <Book ID="67ca6441-0c4e-4430-af0e-9463ce9226aa"> <id>125</id> <name>cxf</name> </Book> <!-- SAML assertion with an enveloped signature--> <saml2:assertion>... </saml2:assertion> </env:envelope> 2. Authorization header Address: Http-Method: GET Headers: {Accept=[application/xml], Authorization=[SAML ejydv1mtokgqf ]} 3. Form values Encoding: ISO Http-Method: POST Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Headers: {Accept=[application/xml], Cache-Control=[no-cache], connection=[keepalive] Payload: name=cxf&id=125&samltoken=ejydv1tzqkgqfs+vsdipwcnfjwiduzuigqj
23 UseCase forws-trust
24 WS-Trust: Security Token Service
25 JSON Web Token Signature = HMACSHA256(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWT Header)) +. + BASE64URL(JWT Claims), key)
26 ChooseAuthentication Method What kind of credentials users will provide for the authentication (passwords, smart cards, public/private keys)? Which authentication methods are supported by existing infrastructure? Should you support Single sign-on? Is it necessary to associate additional data with user principals? Do you need to communicate with external services?
27 Authorization Container based Simple (mapping user-> role, method-> role) Annotation based XACML OAuth
28 XACML
29 Diagram from OAuth 2.0 spec OAuth2.0
30 OAuth2.0
31 ChooseAuthorizationMethod What kind of resources should be protected? Does your Web / Application Server provide authorization? What information is required to make authorization decision? Do youneedtoprovidelimited accesstoresourcesforthe third parties?
32 Message Level Security: XML XML Signature and Encryption JAX-WS: WS-Policy, WSS4J JAX-RS: Enveloped, EnvelopingandDetachedSignatures, Encryption
33 XKMS UseCase
34 XML Key Management Service
35 JSON Web Signature JwsJsonWriterInterceptor; JwsJsonClientResponseFilter and JwsJsonContainerRequestFilter
36 JSON Web Encryption JweWriterInterceptor; JweClientResponseFilter and JweContainerRequestFilter
37 JWS/JWE in CXF
38 Conclusion 1. CXF provides a wide range of security solutions: from very simple to really complicated 2. Choice ofthesecurityfeaturesforyourservicesisbasedon usecase, requirements and existing infrastructre 3. Follow standards and prefer established solutions to secure your services 4. Check security issues for using frameworks 5. Apply negative security tests as part of your system or integration tests
39 Links CXF Rest Services security: CXF Soap Services security: Blogs:
40 OAuth2.0 in CXF
41 Recommendations Don't implement your own security Analyse and evaluate possible attacks Apply negative security tests Use black box testing tools: WS-Attacker (Ruhr-University Bochum, sourceforge) Check certificates, passwords policy, using algorithms and keys for low-level libraries and framewroks Default settings must be secure Check security issues for using frameworks
42 CXF Security Advisories
43 XKMS UseCase
44 XML Key Management Service
45 AttacksandVulnerabilities Replay Injection(XPath, XML) Wrapping Spoofing (SOAPAction, WS-Addressing) XML DOS (Oversized XML, XML Bomb) Cross-site scripting (XSS: client side script injection) Cross-site request forgery (CSRF)
46 SignatureWrappingAttack <soap:envelope.> <soap:header> <wsse:security> <ds:signature> <ds:signedinfo> <ds:canonicalizationmethod Algorithm=".../xml-exc-c14n#" /> <ds:signaturemethod Algorithm="...#rsa-sha1" /> <ds:reference URI="#theBody"> <ds:transforms> <ds:transform Algorithm=".../xml-exc-c14n#" /> </ds:transforms> <ds:digestmethod Algorithm=".../xmldsig#sha1" /> <ds:digestvalue>abcdefg </ds:digestvalue> </ds:reference> </ds:signedinfo> <ds:signaturevalue>abcdefg </ds:signaturevalue> <ds:keyinfo> <wsse:securitytokenreference> <wsse:reference URI="#X509Token" /> </wsse:securitytokenreference> </ds:keyinfo> </ds:signature> </wsse:security> </soap:header> <soap:body wsu:id="thebody"> <getquote Symbol= IBM /> </soap:body> </soap:envelope>
47 SignatureWrappingAttack <soap:envelope.> <soap:header> <wsse:security> <ds:signature> <ds:signedinfo> <ds:reference URI="#theBody"> <ds:transforms> <ds:transform Algorithm=".../xml-exc-c14n#" /> </ds:transforms> </ds:reference> </ds:signedinfo> <ds:signaturevalue>abcdefg </ds:signaturevalue> </ds:signature> </wsse:security> <! > <!-- Original SOAP Body is placed below--> <! > <wrapper> <soap:body wsu:id="thebody"> <getquote Symbol= IBM /> </soap:body> </wrapper> </soap:header> <! > <!-- Maliciously modified SOAP Body is placed below--> <! > <soap:body wsu:id="#thebody"> <getquote Symbol= Evil /> </soap:body> </soap:envelope>
48 ConfigureSSL in CXF Client: Service:
49 JWT JSON: JWS, JWE, JWT, JOSE Possible with external libraries Jose4J, JsonCrypto Tight integration is in the pipe line
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