Certification Path Processing in the Tumbleweed Validation Authority Product Line Federal Bridge CA Meeting 10/14/2004
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1 Certification Path Processing in the Tumbleweed Validation Authority Product Line Federal Bridge CA Meeting 10/14/2004 Stefan Kotes, Engineering Manager
2 Agenda Tumbleweed company overview Certification path processing» Basics» PKI Structures Path Processing Tumbleweed Client PKI Applications» Desktop Validator, Server Validator Path Processing Tumbleweed Validation Authority» Overview, VA Distributed Model» Delegated Path Validation, Delegated Path Discovery Case Study Bridge VA» Bridge VA Properties, Central & Distributed Model, Bridge VA Benefits Tumbleweed Solutions Recap Questions? SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 2
3 Company Overview Founded in 1993 Headquartered in Redwood City, CA» Currently over 250 employees worldwide» IPO in 1999 (NASDAQ:TMWD)» Tumbleweed and Valicert merged in June 2003» Global Presence» 700+ Commercial and Federal Customers Technology innovators Identity Management Solution (Valicert Validation Authority) Secure, Automated, Guaranteed Data Transfers (SecureTransport) Secure Messaging & Content Filtering (MMS & SecureRedirect) SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 3
4 SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 4 Tumbleweed Enterprise Solutions Tumbleweed Offers PKI Validation Authority Secure Transport Secure/Automated Data Exchange Org Firewall Policy Based Protection Spam Protection Tumbleweed eliminates complexity, risk, & cost associated with multiple point solutions. In-Depth Reporting
5 Certification Path Processing Basics: Digital Certificates securely binding the identity of a person/device to a public key. Core responsibility of an application - verify the authenticity and validity of certificate. Certification Path Processing Functions Step 1: Creating chain of trust (establishing a certification path) Step 2: Validating the created certification path SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 5
6 SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 6 Hierarchical Structure Hierarchical PKI: Relying parties trust single root CA Root CA certifies public keys of intermediate CAs Certificates are issued only in one direction ( a CA never certifies superior CA ) Certification path building simple typically forward build direction is used Compromise of trust root may compromise entire system
7 SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 7 Bi-lateral Cross-Certified Structure Cross-Certification: Root CA is issuing a certificate for the other PKI s root CA Relying parties of each PKIs can verify and accept certificates issued by other PKI Multiple cross-certified PKIs create mesh PKI Number of relationships grows exponentially with number of PKIs Mesh PKI - creation of unintended certification paths Lack of commercial adoption
8 SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 8 Cross-Certification with a Bridge CA Role of Bridge CA: Bridge multiple existing PKIs Reduce number of trust relationships between CAs Equate different PKI policies How it works: Bridge CA cross-certifies with principal CA in each participating PKI. Each participating CA needs to cross-certify with only one other CA Number of certified relationships grows linearly Bridge CA Deployment Issues: Complex certification path building traversing multiple PKI directories following AIA extension supporting multiple validation mechanisms (CRLs, CRLdp, OCSP) building paths in forward and reverse directions Source: NIST Recommendation for X.509 Path Validation Version 0.5 May 3, 2004 and Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certification Path Building (DRAFT RFC)
9 SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 9 Desktop Validator Architecture Desktop Validator (Standard) is used to enable certificate status checking for Windows client applications, such as Microsoft IE, Outlook, Outlook Express, Office (for signed word and Excel documents), and other client applications that use CAPI.
10 SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 10 Desktop Validator Architecture Desktop Validator (Enterprise) is used to enable certificate status checking for Windows server applications, such as IIS, Exchange 2003 (for OWA), Domain Controllers (for smart card login), IAS (for wireless authentication), and other evolving secure servers using CAPI (e.g. Voice-over-IP)
11 SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 11 Server Validator Architecture Server Validator (SV) is used to enable certificate status checking for secure web servers. Server Validator is invoked during the SSL/TLS handshake when a client authenticates to a web server using an X509v3 certificate. SV is responsible for ensuring that the certificates in the certificate chain are valid (not revoked) Server Validator works with a wide range of secure servers, and runs on Windows 2000/2003 and UNIX/Linux
12 DV/SV Path Processing Path Building in MS CAPI and Web Servers MS CAPI and Web Servers currently do not allow path building to be delegated to trust providers or web server APIs Default path discovery must succeed before validation plugins are executed Path Validation in MS CAPI and Web Servers Not complete Default process differs among different Windows system (NT, 2000, XP, 2003) No certificate policy processing in Windows 2000 DV/SV Path Validation Follows RFC 3280 Provides the same functionality across al supported platforms Can refine and enforce stricter validation rules Based on C/C++ and Java Valicert Validator Toolkit SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 12
13 DV/SV Path Validation Steps Completeness of mandatory Certificate Information Certificate Time Validity Name Chaining (Subject Name, Issuer Name) Key Identifier Chaining (Authority Key Identifier, Subject Key Identifier (SKID)) Certificate Integrity Check (valid signature) Critical Extensions Check Basic Constraints Validation Is certificate a CA or end-entity Certificate Chain Length (path length = 0 allows only end entity certificates) Name Constraints Validation Certificate Policy Validation (policy oid assertions) SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 13
14 Path Processing Standards Desktop Validator and Server Validator have been tested by DoD Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) using the NIST test suite. - For DOD JITC site html -- includes DoD JITC issued certificates of compliance Testing of DV/SV in 2003 utilized the Conformance Testing of Relying Party Client Certificate Path Processing Logic 1.07 documents, which is the basis for the JITC application testing suite. Public Key Interoperability Test Suite (PKITS) Certification Path Validation Version 1.0 9/2/04 will be the basis of our future testing efforts for DV/SV. See for latest PKITS SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 14
15 SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 15 VA Server Architecture VA aggregates revocation data (CRLs) from multiple certification authorities (CA). VA-to-VA mirroring allows for efficient revocation data transfer between VA s (especially useful for low bandwidth environments) VA can integrate with a variety of hardware signing module (HSM) vendors for secure signing of the OCSP response VA supports direct, VA delegated, and CA delegated trust models For VA white papers, see
16 SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 16 VA Repeater Architecture Distributed HTTP proxy caching is described in RFC 2616 (and the earlier RFC 1945) Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) (RFC 2560) is used to check status of a certificate issued by a CA without requiring a client to obtain the CRL issued by that CA. OCSP uses HTTP as its transport protocol. By excluding the nonce from OCSP requests, OCSP queries over HTTP are cacheable. A Responder can pre-produce signed OCSP responses (section 2.5 of RFC 2560) A Repeater can accept pre-produced OCSP responses published by a Responder. A Repeater can forward OCSP queries to a Responder on-demand or a repeater can mirror pre-computed OCSP caches periodically from the responder.
17 VA Path Processing Path Processing in Validation Authority All previous examples show "fat" PKI client application What about "thin" clients like phones, PDAs working in constrained execution environments? Solution is the Simple Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP) which offers server assisted path discovery and validation. Clients have two options: Delegated Path Validation (DPV) DOD s DMS using SCVP CAM ( use of SCVP Delegated Path Discovery (DPD) SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 17
18 Delegated Path Processing Delegated Path Discovery (DPD): Getting certificate chain and revocation information (CRLs, OCSP responses) in single request Client performs path validation Authenticated DPD response is optional Certificate Sources for Delegated Path Discovery: Local certificate stores (files, CAPI stores) LDAPv3 Directory Authority Information Access extension Validation Authority Server SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 18
19 Delegated Path Processing Delegated Path Validation: Verifies is requested certificate is valid according to specified validation policy DPV response must be authenticated Revocation Info Sources for Delegated Path Validation: CRLs from Certification Authorities OCSP responses from Tumbleweed Validation Authority, or other OCSP responder Real-Time or Pre-Computed SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 19
20 SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 20 Bridge VA 3. Chain Building, Policy Processing, Status Checking Bridge VA 0. Load Local Policies Bridge CA 2. Certificate Validation Request (using SCVP) 4. Certificate Validity (after applying the Bridge CA s policies) Phone (Cert Holder) 1. Send Data with Certificate 5. Accept/Reject Transaction Wireless Gateway (Relying Party)
21 Properties of Good Bridge VA Bridge VA Requirements Ability to deal with multiple CAs and Directories Flexible search mechanisms (when looking for certificates) Support for multiple certificate validation mechanisms: OCSP (Real-Time, Pre-Computed, Identrus model, ) CRL, CRLdp Ability to enforce Bridge CA Policies Flexibility in its ability to handle local policies High performance with high security SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 21
22 SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 22 Deployment Model: Central Bridge VA A single Bridge VA running next to Bridge CA Implements Bridge CA policies Common service for all relying party applications CA1 Domain CA1 Root Relying Party 2. Validation Request (Root = CA1) 3. Validation Response Bridge CA Bridge CA Bridge VA 1. Transaction + Certificates CA2 Domain CA2 Root Trust Path Client Application 0. Issues Certificate
23 SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 23 Deployment Model: Distributed Bridge VA An organization can decide to run its own Bridge VA to overwrite the rules and policies of the Bridge CA Local Bridge VA can trust other CAs, not trust some central ones Domains that follow Bridge CA policies completely do not need their own Bridge VA CA1 Domain CA1 Bridge VA 2. Validation Request (Root Unspecified) Client Application Trust Path CA1 Root 3. Validation Response 1. Transaction + Certificates 2a. Consultation Bridge CA Bridge CA CA2 Domain Client Application Bridge VA CA2 Root 0. Issues Cert.
24 Benefits of a Bridge VA Simplifies client application path processing Gives more control over path discovery and path validation through centralized policy enforcement Easier interoperability across CAs Performance benefits for client applications Future-proofing of applications SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 24
25 SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 25 Tumbleweed Validation Solution Recap Our Validation Authority solution offers a variety of validation protocols (OCSP, SCVP, CRL, CRL DP, CMP, etc.) to choose from, allowing maximum flexibility in customer deployments Open standards based (IETF RFC 2560, 3280, NIST FIPS 140-1) Desktop Validator and Server Validator available for multiple platforms and applications Validator Toolkit available for Win32, Solaris, HP-UX, AIX, MacOS, Linux DOD JITC Tested & FIPS Certified NIAP Common Criteria (EAL3) underway
26 Resources Contact information:» Stefan Kotes» Validation Authority, Client Applications - Engineering Manager» » [email protected] Product Information and White Papers» Main Product web page» tml - Security Compliance Information SOLUTIONS FOR MISSION-CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS 26
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