1 I Know You Want Me - Unplugging PlugX Takahiro Haruyama / Hiroshi Suzuki Internet Initiative Japan Inc.
2 Who are we? Takahiro Haruyama Forensic Investigator & Malware Analyst Presenter & Hands-on Trainer SANS DFIR Summit, BlackHat USA/EU, CEIC, FIRST, RSA Conference JP, etc.. EnCase Certified Examiner since Hiroshi Suzuki Malware Analyst & Forensic Investigator Presenter & Hands-on Trainer Co-author of Haruyama s presentation of BlackHat USA/EU, FIRST, domestic conference in Japan (MWS, and others)
3 Overview Motivation Evolution of PlugX Parsing PlugX Config Associating PlugX samples with known targeted attack groups Classifying PlugX samples Finding relationships between PlugX groups and known attacker groups Wrap-up
5 What s PlugX? RAT used for targeted attacks Also known as Korplug/Gulpix/Sogu/Thoper/Destory RAT Acknowledged in earlier 2012 Trend Micro pointed out it was part of a campaign that has been since 2008  The author extends its implementation aggressively AlienVault identified the author?  AhnLab acquired PlugX builder/controller 
6 Motivation PlugX includes config data like PoisonIvy e.g., C2 hostname/ip/domain, installed service name/registry value The config information can be used for identifying attacker groups FireEye published the analysis result about PoisonIvy configs  So, what about PlugX? The author's continual update makes it difficult 10 config size versions frequently-changed encryption algorithms We tried to categorize PlugX samples in terms of attackers based on intelligence extracted from config data and code
7 EVOLUTION OF PLUGX
8 Type I: Behavior Summary create&run Dropper (exe) create load (DLL load order abuse) signed executable (exe) PlugX Loader (DLL) Cont.
9 Type I: Behavior Summary PlugX Loader (DLL) decrypt & decompress (Cont.) create & inject code (depend on config) 1 st injected process (e.g., svchost.exe) create & inject code Config Original PE (DLL) PlugX Payload(only resident in RAM) 2 nd injected process (msiexec.exe)
10 Type I: Encrypted Data Table
11 Type I: Config (Xsetting) C2 Setting protocol, port, hostname C2 Setting URL download C2 Setting from the URL Install Options type (service, registry, registered_by_loader) install folder path service name, registry value Others Proxy Setting stand alone flag (not inject code) code injection target mutex name
12 Type I: Downloading C2 Setting C2 Setting URL examples content.com/s/eg3qu sm8pl4iz49/index.txt 77 Download data from the URL and decode a string between DZKS and "DZJS"
13 Type I: Debug Strings Some samples include debug string file name function name version path etc Useful information for analysis
14 Type I: Debug Strings (Version Path)
15 Type I: Functions and Plugins Functions File/Registry operations Keylogging, screenshot, remote shell portscan, SQL command, etc Plugins install path + %d.plg (use LdrLoadShellcode to load)
16 Type I: Protocols Supported Protocols TCP, HTTP, UDP, ICMP (not implemented) Traffic data is encrypted the same algorithm as PlugX Payload dword value used as key (date?)
17 Type I: Bypassing UAC Dialog For default UAC setting Win7 machines (ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin!= 2) PlugX: create msiexec.exe process and inject code to it msiexec.exe: abuse DLL load order to execute malicious code in sysprep.exe process sysprep.exe (privileged): run PlugX again
18 Type II: Summary Observed since 2013/3Q The differences Anti-reversing/forensic techniques Encryption algorithm changed Config extended More protocols ICMP DNS  (not sure) More functions e.g., network sniffing to steal proxy auth info Debug strings suppressed
19 Type II: Anti-reversing/forensic techniques PlugX payload MZ/PE signatures replaced by XV magic GULP in encrypted data table eliminated string obfuscation (decode/clear) massive API wrappers added for anti code diffing Type I Type II
20 Type I Type II: Encryption algorithm changed Type II
21 Type II: Config Extended magic word for message authentication multiple code injection targets (1 -> 4) configuration for screenshots
22 Type III: Summary Observed since mid 2012 It may be ancestor of Type I & II, but still evolving The differences Very different implementation from Type I & II no PlugX Payload, no encrypted data table More advanced anti-reversing string obfuscation (200->1000) code obfuscation Config shrunk C2 Setting/C2 Setting URL/Proxy Setting merged Recently Type II members (e.g., magic word) added TCP & HTTP supported
23 Type III: Code Obfuscation junk code inserted
24 Type III: DESTORY? Type III checks the consistency of its decrypted config If not successful, pop up a message The correct spelling seems to be DESTROY
25 executable loading PlugX encrypted data table Type I Type II Type III Comparison signed exe signed exe rundll32 Yes Yes (no GULP ) protocols TCP,HTTP,UDP TCP,HTTP,UDP, ICMP,DNS? Functions compared with Type I Debug Strings (Version Path) string obfuscation No TCP,HTTP - more much more sometimes rarely not at all No Yes Yes (much more) code obfuscation date dword value No No Yes , , , ,
26 PARSING PLUGX CONFIG
27 Related Works PlugXExtract for Type I  decrypt, but not parse plugxdecoder for Type I  decode PlugX traffic then extract encrypted artifacts (not parse) Volatility Plugin for Type I & II  decrypt then parse supported 6 config size versions 0xbe4, 0x150c, 0x1510, 0x1b18, 0x1d18, 0x2540
28 Implementation Type I & II Immunity Debugger script Search encrypted data table in injected process GULP signature for Type I PIC (Position Independent Code) for Type II Decrypt (&decompress if needed) config/original PE Parse config supported: 0x150C, 0x1510, 0x1B18, 0x1D18, 0x2540 Type III IDAPython script Deobfuscate strings and identify config decryption routine You need to specify the deobfuscation function Decrypt and parse config supported: 0x72C, 0x76C, 0x7AC, 0x840, 0xDF0
29 ASSOCIATING PLUGX SAMPLES WITH KNOWN TARGETED ATTACK GROUPS
30 Summary We analyzed over 150 samples About 30 samples do not contain configurations. These are DEMO version. So we classified other 123 samples at this time. Procedure Categorize samples into some groups 1. Make groups based on service name (registry value) except default service name (SxS, XXX, TVT) 1 group includes at least 4 samples 2. Merge groups by using following information C2 (IP address, hostname, domain, owner ) debug string (version path), date dword etc Check relations between the groups and published targeted attack reports Are they connected to famous targeted attack groups?
31 The Main Source of the Intelligence for the C2 Connection VirusTotal passive DNS ching/ AlienVault Open Threat Exchange TEAM CYMRU IP to ASN Mapping Many targeted attack reports - Our internal Passive DNS and IP2DNS system dig, nslookup, whois command And other whois sites
32 CLASSIFYING PLUGX SAMPLES
33 Summary of PlugX Groups We found seven groups. *Sys group *Http group Starter group graphedt group WS group 360 group cochin group
34 *SYS GROUP
35 *Sys Group Some samples use *Sys as the service name.
36 *Sys Group Some another samples share the domain of *Sys group samples.
37 *Sys Group Some another samples share the domain of *Sys group samples.
38 *Sys Group This is the overall *Sys group.
39 *Sys Group Most samples of *Sys group use the same network. C2s are managed by the same domain owner.
40 WS GROUP
41 WS Group Some samples use WS as the service name.
42 WS Group This is the overall WS group.
43 WS Group Most samples of WS group use the same IP address. All samples of the WS group share these domains as the C2s.
44 *HTTP GROUP
45 *Http Group Some samples use *Http as the service name.
46 *Http Group Sample 16 and sample 24 use the same domain.
47 *Http Group Sample 13 and sample 69 use the same IP address.
48 *Http Group Sample 69 and sample 60, 61 have the same registry value.
49 *Http Group Sample 24 and sample 23, 53, 20 use *Gf value as the service name. And similar debug strings.
50 *Http Group Characteristics of the *Http group Some C2s are connected to the same network.
51 *Http Group Characteristics of the *Http group Some domains are managed by the same owner.
52 STARTER GROUP
53 Starter Group Some samples use Starter as the service name.
54 Starter Group Sample 71 and 56 use the same IP address. Sample 56 and several samples use the same domain.
55 Starter Group Sample 66 and several samples use the same domain. Sample 66 and other ones use the same IP address. Sample 26, 123 and 54 use the same domain.
56 Starter Group Sample 67 and several samples use the same IP address. Sample 52 and 18 use the same domain.
57 Starter Group Sample54, 55 and 56 use SxS[a-z] as the service name. And these samples use the same debug string.
58 Starter Group This is the overall Starter group.
59 GRAPHEDT GROUP
60 Graphedt Group Some samples use graphedt as the service name.
61 Graphedt Group This is the overall graphedt group.
62 Graphedt Group Graphedt group characteristics Most samples of the Graphedt group Some domains are managed by the same owner. The C2s belong to these networks.
63 360 GROUP
64 360 Group Some samples use 360 as the service name.
65 COCHIN GROUP
66 Cochin Group The subdomain of some samples includes cochin*.
67 FINDING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PLUGX GROUPS AND KNOWN ATTACKER GROUPS
68 MAUDI OPERATION
69 Maudi Operation *Sys group and sample 97 connect to Maudi operation .
70 Maudi Operation The domain owners of *Sys group and sample 97 match this operation.
71 Maudi Operation Norman Shark said, Maudi operation targets Mongolian Korean Local Chinese interests and human rights activists
73 1.php A poison ivy sample of 1.php  connects to Starter group.
74 1.php 1.php may be related to APT1, zscaler said. flower-show.org targets Japan, China, Taiwan / USA relationship .
76 Sykipot The IP address of the C2 used by sample 62 belonging to WS group is the same as the one used by Sykipot .
77 Sykipot The companies attacked by this latest wave of Sykipot include, but aren t limited to, organizations in the following market sectors, primarily based in the US or UK:  Defense contractors Telecommunications Computer Hardware Chemical Energy Government Departments
78 Sykipot Another C2 of 1.php PosinIvy sample connects to This connects to Sykipot C2.
79 Sykipot Another C2 of 1.php PosinIvy sample connects to This connects to Sykipot C2.
81 menupass Graphedt group is actually the same as menupass . Some of our customers were targeted from menupass in Aug to Oct, 2013 .
83 APT1 The C2 of sample 55 belonging to Starter group is the same IP address as the one used by APT1 .
84 APT1 The C2 of the sample 88 has the same IP address as the one used by APT1.
85 APT1 Many C2s of APT1 samples and graphedt / WS group belong to the same network range.
86 APT1 Many C2 of APT1 samples and graphedt / WS group belong to the same network range.
87 APT1 Many C2 of APT1 samples and graphedt / WS group belong to the same network range.
88 APT1 Many C2 of APT1 samples and graphedt / WS group belong to the same network range.
89 APT1 Many C2 of APT1 samples and graphedt / WS group belong to the same network range.
91 Winnti The C2s of some samples are the same as the C2s used by Winnti  .
92 Winnti Those Winnti samples are also related to APT1.
93 Winnti Those Winnti samples are also related to APT1.
95 Hangover WS group is the same as Hangover group .
96 Hangover All samples of WS group connect to two domains. Those are the same as sample 62 s C2.
98 Night Dragon Sample 95 related to Winnti is also related to Night Dragon .
100 Ke3Chang Many C2s of *Http / Starter group and Ke3Chang  samples belong to the same network range.
102 ICEFOG Many C2s of *Http / Starter group and ICEFOG  samples belong to the same network range.
103 KHAAN QUEST
104 Khaan Quest 
105 Khaan Quest
106 Summary for relation We found some known attacker groups from PlugX samples.
108 Wrap-up Analyzed 3 types of PlugX samples Implemented PlugX config parsers for all types categorized samples into groups based on PlugX config and code Some groups are connected to known targeted attack groups The tools and results are available on BlackHat archives
109 Questions? Please scan your badges for evaluation surveys!
110 References  PlugX: New Tool For a Not So New Campaign <  Tracking down the author of the PlugX RAT <  ETSO APT Attacks Analysis < pdf>  Poison Ivy: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence <  PlugX "v2": meet "SController <  PLUGX - PAYLOAD EXTRACTION <  plugxdecoder < 110
111  The Chinese Malware Complexes : The Maudi Surveillance Operation < MaudiOperation.pdf>  Alleged APT Intrusion Set: 1.php Group < df>  Jul 5 CVE PDF invitation.pdf with Poison Ivy from pu.flower-show.org <  The Sykipot Attacks References (Cont.) <  Poison Ivy: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence <  Internet Infrastructure Review (IIR) Vol.21 < 111
112 References (Cont.)  APT1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units <  Winnti More than just a game - Securelist <  The rush for CVE a hot commodity < 06_a_hot_commodity>  Exploit Proliferation: Additional Threat Groups Acquire CVE <  Command and Control in the Fifth Domain <  Operation Ke3chang - Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs < 112
113 References (Cont.)  THE ICEFOG APT: A TALE OF CLOAK AND THREE DAGGERS <  Khaan Quest: Chinese Cyber Espionage Targeting Mongolia < 113
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