NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY CIENTIFIC UARTERLY. QUARTERLY no 3(92)

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2 NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY CIENTIFIC UARTERLY QUARTERLY no 3(92) WARSAW 2013

3 SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE Associate Professor Andrzej Glen, Ph.D. chairman, Professor Stanisław Zajas, Ph.D. deputy-chairman, Professor Waldemar Kaczmarek, Ph.D. Management and Command Faculty, Professor Waldemar Kitler, Ph.D. National Security Faculty, Dr James Corum Baltic defence College, Col. Miroslaw Dimitrov, Associate Professor National Defence Academy in Sofia, Lieutenant-General Professor Teodor Frunzeti, Ph.D. National Defence University in Bucharest, Doc. Ing. Mariana Kuffova, Associate Professor Armed Forces Academy in Slovakia, Professor Pavel Necas Armed Forces Academy in Slovakia, Col. Dimitar Tashkov, Associate Professor, Ph.D. National Defence Academy in Sofia, M.A. Adam Szynal Thematic editor: Assoc. Prof. Piotr Gawliczek, PhD The list of reviewers: Colonel Instructor Stan ANTON, Ph.D.; Commander Professor Vasile BUCINSCHI, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Dipl. Eng. Pavel BUČKA, Ph.D.; Colonel Assoc. Prof. Gheorghe CALOPĂREANU, Ph.D. ; Colonel Miroslav Stefan DIMITROV, Assoc. Prof.; Colonel Instructor Pascu FURNICĂ, Ph.D.; Doc. Ing. Peter LIPTAK, Cs.C.; Colonel Assoc. Prof. Iulian MARTIN, Ph.D.; Colonel Professor Dimitar NEDYLKOV; Colonel Assoc. Prof. Constantin POPESCU, Ph.D.; Colonel Professor Ion ROCEANU, Ph.D.; Researcher Alexandra SARCINSCHI, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Dipl. Eng. Peter SPILÝ, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Andrzej Glen, Ph.D.; Prof. Waldemar KACZMAREK, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Waldemar KITLER, Ph.D.; Col. Assoc. Prof. Dariusz KOZERAWSKI, Ph.D.; Prof. Stanisław KOZIEJ, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof.Marian KOZUB, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof.Zdzisław KURASIŃSKI, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Józef MARCZAK, Ph.D.; Col. Assoc. Prof. Maciej MARSZAŁEK, Ph.D.; Col. Assoc. Prof. Wojciech NYSZK, Ph.D.; Maj.Gen. Assoc. Prof. Bogusław PACEK, Ph.D.; Prof. Jacek PAWŁOWSKI, Ph.D.; Prof. Piotr SIENKIEWICZ, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Stanisław SIRKO, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Zenon STACHOWIAK, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof.Jeremiasz ŚLIPIEC, Ph.D.; Col. Prof. Jarosław WOŁEJSZO, Ph.D.; Col. Assoc. Prof. Marek WRZOSEK, Ph.D.; Prof. Stanisław ZAJAS, Ph.D.; Assoc. Prof. Janusz ZUZIAK, Ph.D. Editorial committee: Anna Doraczyńska, M.A. chief editor (tel. 6/ ), Jeremy Wysakowski-Walters, M.A. editing of papers in English Address: Warszawa 72 al. gen. Antoniego Chruściela 103, bl. 4 tel./fax: (6) zn@aon.edu.pl All articles are available in Polish in Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Obrony Narodowej National Defence University Scientific Quarterly has been indexed in the international database Index Copernicus Master List. The papers published in the NDU Scientific Quarterly are reviewed by experts. They express individual opinions of the authors; they are also verified by an anti-plagiarism system. National Defence University Typesetting, printing and binding: Publishing House of National Defence University, order no 93/2014, edition of 150 copies

4 T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S NATIONAL SECURITY Andrzej NOWAK, EngD. CYBERSPACE AS A NEW QUALITY OF HAZARDS... 5 Kamila TROCHOWSKA, Ph.D. OPERATIONALIZATION OF CULTURE IN COUNTERING ASYMMETRIC THREATS Col Ph.D. Marek BRYLONEK SECURITY CRISIS IN THE SAHEL REGION Paulina ZAMELEK, Ph.D. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION S WORKS ON THE DEFENCE SECTOR Marian LUTOSTAŃSKI, Ph.D. NATIONAL CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND ITS ACTIVITY IN THE AREA OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE Emilia MIKOŁAJEWSKA, Ph.D. Dariusz MIKOŁAJEWSKI, MSc maj ret. CIVIL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE APPLICATION OF AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY ART OF WAR Prof. Wojciech MICHALAK, Ph.D. DOMINANCE IN THE AIR AND FROM THE AIR Col. Andrzej POLAK, Ass. Prof. THE ART OF WAR FROM THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE Lt. Col. Wojciech WIĘCEK, Ph.D. ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF HELICOPTER-BORNE COMBAT ASSAULT AND AIR ASSAULT TASK FORCES IN OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT IN WOODED-LAKE AREAS ECONOMY OF SECURITY AND LOGISTICS Lt Col. (res.) Ryszard RADZIEJEWSKI, Ph.D. INFRASTRUCTURE AND SECURITY VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND PREPARATION Cdre Ryszard SZYNOWSKI, Ph.D. DEFENCE TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PERSONNEL WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF ADVANCED DEFENCE COURSES

5 Lt. Col. Piotr MALINOWSKI, Ph.D. Eng. MILITARY LEADERSHIP A MULTIDIMENSIONAL PHENOMENON (Short communication) EXPERIENCE Igor RAFALSKI, doctor of history EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION IN POST-WAR EUROPE COMMENTS, REVIEWS AND REPORTS Assoc. Prof. Andrzej CIUPIŃSKI, Ph.D. Book Review: Leonard Łukaszuk, Cooperation and Rivalry in Outer Space. Law. Economy. Politics (Współpraca i rywalizacja w przestrzeni kosmicznej. Prawo. Gospodarka. Polityka.) Toruń, Poland, 2012 pp

6 Zeszyty Naukowe AON nr 2(59) 2005 NDU Scientific Quarterly no 3(92) 2013 ISSN CYBERPRZESTRZEŃ JAKO NOWA JAKOŚĆ ZAGROŻEŃ ISSN NATIONAL SECURITY CYBERSPACE AS A NEW QUALITY OF HAZARDS Andrzej NOWAK, EngD. National Defence University Abstract The article aims at presenting the essence of the concept of cyberspace. Particular attention was put here on the very complicated, scientific and legal lineage related to IT technology, IT systems, etc. The article depicts the examples of the biggest cyber attacks observed in the last decade as well as their relation with other areas of critical infrastructure. There is also a reference to issues concerning the structure of units dealing with the phenomenon, as well as countries which are at the possession of special units to perform tasks within cyberspace. All in all, however, the presented information should be taken as an outline of the tackled problems, an outline organizing the knowledge concerning the multifaceted and interdisciplinary concept of cyberspace. Key words cyberspace, hazards, security Introduction The hazards stemming from cyberspace are not new phenomena. The present image of cyberspace makes it necessary to treat this sphere as a strategic one for the security of a country. There are two basic reasons supporting the idea: firstly, Information Technology 1 is the key component of the critical infrastructure of a country, e.g. it is used in the management of electricity networks, telecommunications, transport, banking, healthcare, etc. thus a cyber attack on the critical infrastructure can automatically jeopardize the security of the whole country; secondly, IT plays a significant role in any conflict since it is the key 1 Wikipedia the application of computers and telecommunications equipment to store, retrieve, transmit and manipulate data 5

7 ANDRZEJ NOWAK element in management centres as well as command posts concerning not only strategic resources but also the Armed Forces. The deliberation concerning cyberspace should start with the attempt to define the concept. It is not a simple task, since in spite of numerous efforts there is no commonly accepted concept apparatus within this area, and particular notions are adequate for use in certain schools of thought. It is very probable that the concept of cyberspace was used for the first time in 1984 by an American writer William Gibson 2 in his novel Burning Chrome. It was a computer generated world of immersion 3, virtual reality, which the American classical writer of the cyberpunk novel referred to in the first volume of his trilogy Neuromancer as a matrix. However, the term cyberspace was popularized for good by common access to the Internet, as well as films based on Gibson s motives, like e.g. Johny Mnemonic, or the trilogy Matrix, which meant hallucination. Moreover, it can be stated that at the beginning of the 90s the concept of cyberspace started to be commonly used. At that moment the development of Information Technology was at such a level that Nicholas Negroponte announced that the atom had ceased to be the elementary element and was replaced by a binary number. Whereas, Philip Elmer DeWitt described cyberspace as Plato s plane of ideal forms, metaphorical space, a virtual reality 4. However, we should not get carried away by this type of fantasy cyberspace is a physical domain. Nowadays, except land, sea, air or space there is another environment for human activity (including military ones). Nonetheless, it is very different from the three enumerated. First of all, it is an entirely man-made area, being the result of the creation of IT systems and networks enabling electronic communication. Moreover, the participants of this battle field have full control over the environment s qualities. Still, the destruction or even deformation of the digital elements result in a topographical change of the operation area. It can be compared to a land battle when suddenly a mountain appears or disappears. In cyber warfare, geography and geopolitics are totally meaningless. In 1995, the RAND Corporation 5 was asked by the United States Department of Defense to check the possibilities of strategic information warfare. The final report concludes that the techniques of information warfare totally disregard geographical distance; the goals 2 William Gibson (born on 17 March 1948 in Conway, South Carolina) American science fiction writer, the inventor of cyberpunk. 3 Immersion a situation when a text is accompanied by a picture, sound, or animation as well as a rich system of connections, offering the possibility of free choice, it can facilitate the experience of immersion, being surrounded by the world created by the piece of art. 4 Vide: Gregory J. Rattray Wojna strategiczna w cyberprzestrzeni (original title: Strategic Warfare in Syberspace), Warszawa 2004, p RAND Corporation American nonprofit research institution originally formed for the needs of the US Armed Forces. 6

8 CYBERSPACE AS A NEW QUALITY OF HAZARDS within the US borders are as susceptible as the ones in the local theatre of war operations 6. It means that an attack can be carried out from any place on the Earth. A similar definition is provided by a dictionary i-słownik : (Eng. cyberspace; Greek kybernetes steersman, governor as well as to control, to manage) recently the prefix cyber is connected with new, electronic technology and is used in an IT, interactive meaning. In other words, the concept refers to everything connected with computers. Cyberspace is a communication space created by a system of Internet links. Cyberspace, similarly to telecommunications, makes it easier for the network users to contact other people, also in real time. It is the space between open communication through connected computers and IT links in the whole globe. The definition entails all electronic communication systems (including classical telephone networks), which transfer information from numerical sources. Thus, it can be assumed that cyberspace is slowly becoming a basic channel of information exchange 7. However, according to the US Department of Defense, cyberspace, similarly to the domains of land, sea, and air, has become another domain for warfare 8. It is defined as an interdependent and interrelated infrastructural IT network, including the Internet, telecommunication networks, computer systems and the systems managing production processes and control in strategic sectors connected to national security. It is a comprehensive attitude. The Americans pay less attention to the ownership of the strategic sector and focus more on its defence. A similar practical approach is presented by other western countries. The Polish legal system also defines the concept of cyberspace. The definition of this incredibly important notion is included in the amendment of the Act of 30 August 2011 on the martial law and the competences of the Chief of the Polish Armed Forces and rules governing his subordination to the constitutional bodies of the Republic of Poland. The above document defines cyberspace as the domain of information processing and exchange, created by ICT systems, determined in Art. 3 point 3 of the Act of 17 February 2005 on the computerization of activities of entities performing public tasks 9. At the same time, it should be stated that the Ministry of Administration and Digitization of Poland, being responsible for the coordination of the general security policy of Polish cyberspace, is still working on providing definitions for difficult concepts in a document entitled Polityka Ochrony Cyberprzestrzeni RP 6 Gregory J. Rattray Wojna strategiczna w cyberprzestrzeni (original title: Strategic Warfare in Syberspace), Warszawa 2004, p.24 7 vide: i-słownik: [ ]. 8 US Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, July 2011, [ ]. 9 Ustawa z dnia 29 sierpnia 2002 r. o stanie wojennym oraz kompetencjach Naczelnego Dowódcy Sił Zbrojnych i zasadach jego podległości konstytucyjnym organom RP (Act of 29 August 2002 on military law and the competences of the Chief of the Polish Armed Forces and rules governing his subordination to the constitutional bodies of the Republic of Poland). 7

9 ANDRZEJ NOWAK (Polish Cyber Defence Policy) 10. In this document, in a chapter entitled Definitions Cyberspace is defined as the domain for information processing and exchange, created by ICT systems, determined in Art. 3 point 3 of the Act of 17 February 2005 on the computerization of activities of entities performing public tasks (Journal of Laws No. 64, item 565, with further amendments) alongside with connections between them and relations with the users; in accordance with the Act of 30 August 2011 on the amendment of the Act on martial law and the competences of the Chief of the Polish Armed Forces and regulations governing his subordination to the constitutional bodies of the Republic of Poland and other acts (Journal of Laws No. 222, item 1323). In further part, the cyberspace of the Republic of Poland (referred to as CRP) was defined as such: the cyberspace within the borders of Poland and beyond them, in places where the representatives of the Republic of Poland are present (diplomatic posts, military contingent). At this point a certain inaccuracy can be noticed, since the definition of cyberspace presented by the quoted law regulations does not entail the computer devices of the citizens of Poland, it mentions terminals such as 11 modem, phone, router or network interface card. Taking into consideration the above, one can assume that a computer or other device of a citizen or an entrepreneur, connected to the Internet via the router or modem of a telecommunication company is not an element of cyberspace, thus the concepts of a cyber attack or cybercrime are not applicable here. Due to that, it warranted that the definitions of cyberspace and the cyberspace of the Republic of Poland should be changed in such a way that they include technical resource devices of every user of CRP including every individual citizen and entrepreneurs. In other words, it should be expressed more precisely that computers, servers, TV sets, SAT decoders are all called terminals of cyberspace. It should be also emphasized that the concept of a cyber attack 12 does not include attacks from Polish cyberspace on the cyberspace of other countries, since the concept was artificially limited to technical resources defined by the Polish law regulations i.e. the Act of 17 February 2005 on the computerization of activities of entities performing public tasks and telecommunication law, referred to by the act quoted in the definition of cyberspace. It means that an attack launched with the use of Polish cyberspace aimed at the cyberspace of another country, is not a cyber attack because of the fact that the concept cyberspace does not include the cyberspace of other countries, nor global cyberspace. To conclude, it is important to emphasize that the concepts used in the mentioned document are not clear and comprehensible for every citizen of the November 2012 the Minister Michał Boni asked for a change in the cabinet s list of legislative and non legislative acts concerning the title of the document Programme of Cyberspace Defence into Polish Cyber Defence Policy. 11 In the act there is an entry telecommunication terminal device a telecommunication device for a direct or indirect connection to the network termination (Art. 2 point. 43). 12 Cyber attack intentional interference in proper cyberspace functioning Polityka CBR, p. 6. 8

10 CYBERSPACE AS A NEW QUALITY OF HAZARDS Republic of Poland and result in an unnecessary legal mess. Specifying the term cyberspace, it refers to the Act of 17 February 2005 on the computerization of activities of entities performing public tasks, and the latter refers to the telecommunication law pointing at the network termination (of cyberspace) in the form of a router, modem, network interface card, or a telephone in every citizens household. Unfortunately, the computer connected by router does not belong to the resources of cyberspace in accordance with the biding definition. Due to the above mentioned fact, there is a need to redefine the concepts of cyberspace and the cyberspace of the Republic of Poland, as well as deliberate on the concepts of a cyber attack, cybercrime and, finally, implement the concepts of global cyberspace, the cyberspace of another country and cyber hazard. The definitions presented below could be taken into consideration 13 : global cyberspace or cyberspace a system of exchange and processing of information (data) functioning in accordance with formal rules, legal regulations in use in the territories of particular countries, operating thanks to the connection of technical resources located on the territory of every single country. cyberspace of the Republic of Poland a system of exchange and processing of information (data) functioning in accordance with formal rules, legal regulations in use within the territory of Poland, operating thanks to the connection of technical resources local to the territory of Poland. It should be also noticed that the document Polish Cyber Defence Policy is very different from the standards determined in the norm PN-ISO/TEC 2700 as far as the management of information security is concerned the goals of the application of protection measures as well as the issues which should be regulated by the Policy of Security and which should be addressed by the policy i.e. it should safeguard the utility, adequacy and effectiveness 14. The examples of hazards Cyberspace, because of its unique qualities, is especially susceptible to cyber espionage acts, which are no longer reserved to secret services. Today, the most important actors are rival companies, research institutes, universities, as well as individual hackers employed to perform a specific task. In order to depict the hazards connected with cyberspace, it is worth presenting facts of the most vivid cyber attacks which took place in the last decade. None of them was qualified as an act of war, nor resulted in an official conflict involving 13 cf BIODO Uwagi do Polityki Ochrony Cyberprzestrzeni RP. pdf in: pl/fobjects/details/3564/biodo-uwagi-do-polityki-ochrony-cyberprzestrzeni-rp-pdf.html, [ ]. 14 Vide: Norm ISO/TEC 27001:2007, Technika informatyczna, Technika bezpieczeństwa, Systemy zarządzania bezpieczeństwem informacji, Wymagania, PKN, Warszawa 2007, p

11 ANDRZEJ NOWAK the forces of the whole technologically advanced country. Nonetheless, the examples presented below can present an imagined image of the future battle field or confrontation. Imagine the lights in this room suddenly go out, and we lose all power. We try to use our cell phones, but the lines of communication are dead. We try to access the Internet with our battery-powered laptops, but the Internet, too, is down. After a while, we venture out into the streets to investigate if this power outage is affecting more than just our building, and the power is indeed out as far as the eye can see. A passer-by tells us the banks are closed and the ATMs aren t working. The streets are jammed because the traffic lights are out, and people are trying to leave their workplaces en masse. Day turns to night, but the power hasn t returned. Radio and TV stations aren t broadcasting. Telephones and the Internet still aren t working, so there s no way to check in with loved ones. After a long, restless night, morning comes, but we still don t have power or communication. People are beginning to panic, and local law enforcement can t restore order. As another day turns to night, looting starts, and the traffic jams get worse. Word begins to spread that the US has been attacked not by a conventional weapon, but by a cyber weapon. As a result, our national power grid, telecommunications, and financial systems have been disrupted worse yet, they won t be back in a few hours or days, but in months. The airports and train stations have closed. Food production has ceased. The water supply is rapidly deteriorating. Banks are closed so people s life savings are out of reach and worthless. The only things of value now are gasoline, food and water, and firewood traded on the black market. We ve gone from being a superpower to a third-world nation practically overnight 15. This is not a scenario of a horror or science-fiction film, but a quotation from the testimony of Sami Saydjari, the chief of the organization Professionals for Cyber Defense, before the House Committee of Homeland Security, which took place in April Saydjari made the speech the day before events which turned the world s attention to the risks stemming from cyberspace. From 27 April to 11 May, 2007 Estonia was a victim of cyber attacks. The excuse for the attack was the Estonian decision to move a monument commemorating the soldiers of The Red Army (the so called Bronze Soldier), this change resulted in riots. The Estonian ICT network faced a critical point. It is worth mentioning here that Estonia is very often called E-stonia due to its stateof-the-art IT level. Over 90% of bank transactions are carried out on-line, it is possible to send tax declarations through the Internet. Every citizen is in the possession of Digital ID, which enables even voting via the Internet. The Estonian government implemented a system called evalitsus (e-country), by which the 15 Addressing the Nation s Cyber Security Challenges: Reducing Vulnerabilities Requires Strategic Investment and Immediate Action, Testimony of Sami Saydjari Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, p. 1 in: [ ]. 10

12 CYBERSPACE AS A NEW QUALITY OF HAZARDS process of informatization is supported. The cabinet itself communicates through computers to much an extend, and all government documents are available on-line. It significantly reduces the time and increases the efficiency 16. All the factors contributed to the cyber attacks on the Estonian ICT infrastructure. At a high point, i.e. on 9 May, celebrated in Russia as Victory Day, the activity on Estonian web pages increased twentyfold. The biggest 10 attacks amounted to 90 Mb/s and lasted continuously for over 10 hours. The pages of the government, chancellery of the president as well as of the leading newspapers were all down. Moreover, banking systems collapsed, and last but not least the network of the Estonian police went down. The Estonians were cut off from Internet information, as well as more seriously, they had no access to banks and money 17. The functioning of the state administration, which was wired to much an extend, was suddenly questioned. According to the Estonian Minister of Defence: Jaak Aaviksoo, This was the first time that a botnet threatened the national security of an entire nation 18. The Estonian governing bodies also thought about using Article 5 of the Washington Treaty which referred to mutual help of NATO member countries when one of them was the goal of an attack. The Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip, when asked for the reasons of the attack, said that: the computers used for the attack had the IP addresses of Putin s administration. The action against Estonia was well synchronized at the same time there were attacks on the Estonian Embassy in Moscow and the representatives of air lines. Whereas the official Russian delegation visiting Tallinn said that the Estonian government should hand in its resignation. During the cyber attack aimed at Estonia, the aggressors used a brutal but very effective form of attack called DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service). By this method, particular servers are flooded by a giant amount of data, which leads to overloading and consequently they are blocked. Soon after the attacks, the Estonian government put the blame on the Russian Federation, however, a 5-year investigation did not prove that the hackers were following the Kremlin s orders. The general attorney, Heili Sepp, said that in spite of the fact that a significant number of IP addresses connected with the attack were identified, most of them were found outside Estonia. Unfortunately, the letters requesting legal assistance addressed to the governments of the Russian Federation and Lithuania were rejected without any effect. Due to the lack of possibilities to 16 Vide: E-Eesti/E-Estonia, [ ]. 17 Vide: Rosyjscy hackerzy podbijają Estonię, Gazeta Wyborcza, , [ ]. 18 J. Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe, Wired Magazine, , [ ]. 11

13 ANDRZEJ NOWAK continue the investigation, the office of the general attorney closed the proceedings at the end of July The analysis conducted by specialists on information security proved 20 that some of the attacking computers were registered to the Russian president s administration, however, most attacks were done through infected computers in Egypt, Vietnam or Peru. The only argument which can be used against Russia is the fact that because of historical and prestige reasons Russia might have been interested in such an operation. The attack resulted in NATO s mobilization. In 2008 a centre for cyber defence was created with its headquarters in Tallinn. The centre was to carry out simulations, create special systems of protection, as well as to prepare projects aimed at the creation of a basis for cyber-security in NATO. Of course the goal was to safeguard the security of the IT systems of the institution itself, and not of the member countries. It turned out, however, that the centre does not function in the way it should. This is caused by accusations that the originator and the main director of the centre cooperated with Russian intelligence. This resulted in a situation which cannot be solved even today. However, the Estonian example is not the only one in Europe. In 2008 there were two similar incidents. The first one happened in Lithuania. Soon after a ban on using and possessing symbols of the Soviet Union, hundreds of government pages were taken over and replaced by others. They usually showed Soviet symbols together with vulgar texts referring to the Lithuanian government. The attack was not as paralysing as the one in 2007, but it showed how easy it was for hackers to take down the government's IT systems. The next victim of a cyber attack, in chronological order, was Georgia. It happened during, or in fact just before the entering of the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by the Russian Army. The attack was of a mixed character, i.e. a combination of DDoS attacks and taking over some Internet websites. It is hard to resist the impression that it was an element of a normal war operation. The information paralysis which happened in Georgia facilitated regular warfare. All the cases presented above have one common element The Russian Federation. In spite of the lack of sufficient proof, all the three incidents were connected with situations where the interests of Moscow were put in jeopardy. Another problem which bothered many countries was the Iranian nuclear programme. Instead of a traditional attack, the countries decided to make use of the 19 Vide [ ]. 20 After the attack, Tallinn created a group of volunteers who would protect the country during a cyber war. Now it is a group of 80 people. In everyday life these are IT experts, engineers, employees in banks, big corporations or ministers. Usually these are 20 or 30-year-old people. They meet every week in Tallinn and Tartu in: [ ] 12

14 CYBERSPACE AS A NEW QUALITY OF HAZARDS possibilities given by cyber attacks. Namely, the Iranian nuclear programme 21 was struck by the following viruses: Stuxnet, Duqu and then Flamer According to the Symantec company, Stuxnet was made expressly to disrupt the work of a programme responsible for centrifuges used for uranium enrichment in an Iranian nuclear plant 22. The virus was able to cause a serious breakdown of the key devices. The hostile software paralysed both computers as well as automated systems of monitoring in both research institutes. Except that, the virus chooses at random several devices on which at night it plays the song Thunderstruck of the legendary group AC/DC at the top volume 23. The first reference to the Stuxnet virus, was noticed in 2010 as the version. However, the data gathered up to that moment indicated that its oldest compilations come from the year Symantec published a report in which it gives evidence that the work on an earlier version of a Stuxnet worm number started in 2005 and it was said to operate in the network in the years 2007 and Stuxnet 0.5 was not as aggressive as the later versions, however, it was still able to make serious damage. It is true that this version also aimed at the Iranian nuclear installations, however it followed a different strategy with the goal to turn off valves in uranium enrichment plants in Natanz. Whether the mission of Stuxnet 0.5 was successful or not is unclear, but its later versions were made with a different framework of development, they were more aggressive and they changed the strategy of attack, which allowed them to modify uranium enrichment's centrifuge speed as evidenced by information provided in Symantec s report 25. What is more, Stuxnet 0.5, unlike its later version, was based on the Flamer platform and did not exploit any Microsoft vulnerabilities. However, similarly to them, it looked for a particular model of Siemens PLC. The way it operates suggests that it was probably created to spy on, reprogramme industrial installations, and as a result paralyse central units of big industrial plants. The fear of Stuxnet is bigger if we realize what is the scale of the 21 It was in two cities: Natanz as well as in Fordo. 22 During a presentation on the conference Virus Bulletin 2010 in Vancouver an expert on security, from Symantec, Liam O Murchu, using an electronic air pomp connected to a SIEMENS S7-300 PLC controller as well as software SIMATIC Step 7 programmed the time of the pomp s work so that it operated for 3 seconds from the time it was turned on. Then, he placed a Stuxnet virus into the system infecting the PLC controller and changing the earlier parameters of the time of work extended it to 140 seconds, which caused that the balloon to burst if the PLC controller was plugged in a pipeline, a nuclear power plant, or was on an international airport it is easy to imagine the consequences. 23 See more: kowany- przez-ac-dc#ixzz2n9gwdslh, [ ]. 24 Vide: Stuxnet 0.5: How It Evolved w: how-it-evolved, [ ]. 25 Ibidem. 13

15 ANDRZEJ NOWAK problem a special virtual code can be the reason of real modification in factories, companies or even nuclear power plants. This is another proof of how small the difference between the virtual and the real world is nowadays. From a technical point of view, Stuxnet is the name of a Trojan being only one element of the whole hazard. The infection triggered by Stuxnet is done in two phases: In the first phase, Stuxnet spreads via computers working under Windows systems, but its presence is hidden from the security software due to the use of two known and two unknown vulnerabilities. Stuxnet is spread through removable drives (in systems with auto start function) computer systems steering industrial devices and in particular such systems as nuclear installations which because of security reasons do not have access to the Internet; it spreads in LAN networks via a Windows Print Spooler; it spreads through System Message Block; it makes copies and starts its code on computers via net share; it also makes copies and starts its code on computers working under the control of data base server WinCC. In the second phase Stuxnet is looking for one thing i.e. a Windows work station, which is usually a separate post used to monitor and control ICS (Industrial Control Systems), and in particular the one which uses Siemens PLC (Programmable Logic Controller). It is most probable that the creators of Stuxnet were aware of the fact that this type of work stations are accessible by different types of viruses or malware only through USB flash discs. Thus, when Stuxnet reaches its target (particular Siemens PLC device), it remains undetected and starts to modify the Industrial Control System, sabotaging the whole system like a rootkit. Moreover, Stuxnet used valid digitally signed certificates the aforementioned infected drives were signed by two reliable companies Realtek and JMicron. The certificates were probably stolen (both companies are located in Hsinchu Science Park in Taiwan). At the moment when the first Stuxnet s attacks were spotted, anti-virus companies were not prepared for this type of threat and the virus was marked as 0-day threat. The present situation is a little bit better, most producers of antivirus software supplemented their database of signatures with a proper tool detecting the worm. It turns out that Stuxnet was not a one-time incident. Except Stuxnet and Duqu there is also R2D2. It all proves that we have definitely entered the era of spy and government Trojan Horses. Software has become a weapon. Stuxnet and Duqu were followed by Flame, which is one of the most complex and sophisticated pieces of malicious software ever seen as Symantec presents 26. Flame is able to attack and steal data, what is more, it can even record voice and send it back to a hacker. 26 K. Majdan, Wykryto nowe zagrożenie in zenie-z-czyms-takim-jeszcze-sie-nie-spotkalismy, [ ] 14

16 CYBERSPACE AS A NEW QUALITY OF HAZARDS However, there is one radical difference, namely Stuxnet is able to deal with one target at a time, while Flame can strike simultaneously over 600 goals. Although no government officially admitted to creating the virus, and none was caught red handed, the experts are unanimous that the cyber action was carried out on US and Israeli initiative 27. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the experts on security issues are astonished that hackers who created those viruses were able to hide behind the Microsoft programme. Moreover, they warn that this method might have been used to spread other viruses, which are still there to be discovered. Recently, Internet espionage is at its peak. At least, we can come to such conclusion when we analyse in more detail the recently revealed operation called Red October. Kaspersky Lab boasts of this cyber-espionage campaign targeting diplomatic and government institutions worldwide 28. According to the biggest producer of anti-virus computer software Kaspersky in the network there is a new hazard. In short it is called Rocra, which is short for Red October, (the name stems from the fact that research on the issue started in October 2012). It is very probable that it has operated for 5 years now and it steals information from computers, smartphones and external storage devices in the EMEA region (Eastern and Central Europe) and Central Asia. Red October has a module structure and it changes each time to adjust itself to the needs of the attack on a particular victim. Each of over a thousand modules has its own function: steals codes, contact lists stored on mobile devices, copies s, registers operations performed on the keyboard, etc. According to Kaspersky Lab, the virus comes from Russia, and the huge infrastructure, comprising dozens of servers responsible for its spreading, shows that it might be a governmental operation, similarly to the Flame virus. Red October displays many similarities to the Stuxnet virus discovered in 2011, which managed to infect 100 thousand computers in 155 countries within 11 months. Interestingly, according to the data provided by Kaspersky Lab, Red October used the tactics of breaking into subsequent computers in stages first it acquired data from one computer and used it to break into another and another one. And so on and so forth... Kaspersky informed in a detailed report that it was a very wide-reaching action. It struck 69 countries all over the world. The victims included public administration (diplomatic and politics), research institutions, military facilities, 27 In 2012 the New York Times informed that the Stuxnet virus was most probably created by the governments of two countries i.e. the USA and Israel, vide: /06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against iran.html?_r=4&pagewan ted=all&, [ ]. 28 Kaspersky Lab Identifies Operation Red October, an Advanced Cyber-Espionage Campaign Targeting Diplomatic and Government Institutions Worldwide vide: com/about/news/virus/2013/kaspersky_lab_identifies_operation_red_october_an_advanced_cyber_es pionage_campaign_targeting_diplomatic_and_government_institutions_worldwide, [ ]. 15

17 ANDRZEJ NOWAK and employees of power stations. The report was published on 14 January, and Kaspersky has been investigating the case since last October. Kaspersky notices that in total there have been hundreds of computers infected worldwide, however mainly the victims come from the former Soviet Bloc as well as from Asia. The biggest number of infected computers was found in Russia (35), Kazakhstan (21), and Azerbaijan (15). The list also includes such countries as Belgium (15 infected computers), the USA (6), Vietnam (6) or Switzerland (5). Taking into consideration the information presented above, it can be concluded that the action was aimed at people in the possession of important information, usually the core information for national security. The computers which were infected belonged to politicians, diplomacy representatives, researchers, sales representatives, people dealing with nuclear energy, aviation and energy sectors. It is worth noticing that Poland is one of the few European countries where the hazard was not registered nor proved. Kaspersky notices that the espionage network is very advanced. However, the way in which the chosen computers are taken control of is surprisingly easy. It is all started with a fake with an attachment. For instance, information on a diplomatic car for sale was sent. The attachment included details of the offer, but most importantly a malicious code using a vulnerability in MS Word or MS Excel. When the victim opened the attachment, a Trojan was installed on the computer. But this is not everything the virus was later able to download and install further modules of the malware. The latter one enabled hackers to have access to most information. They could take over files from a computer or even USB drives or telephones (iphone, Nokia, Windows Mobile). They also had access to s from Outlook and made use of the keyboard strikes. To make a long story short the espionage was widereaching. There is still no answer for one of the key questions who did it? What do we know so far? According to Kaspersky, the servers were located in Russia and Germany. Exploit, the programme using the MS Word and MS Excel vulnerabilities, looked like a Chinese programme, the programme installed on the victim s computer seemed to be produced in Russia. Kaspersky set a trap in a few domains used by the malware and it turned out that in the period of time between 2 November 2012 and 10 January 2013 there were 55 thousand connections. Most of them were registered in Switzerland, Kazakhstan, Greece and Belarus. So far there is no proof that the attacks were sponsored by a particular country. There is also no information about the fate of the stolen data. It could have been sold on the black market, or might have been used by the hackers themselves. Thus, who was it? The government of any country? Taking into consideration the scale of the operation it is a very probable version there are many countries which carry out a far-reaching espionage actions, thus, it is not a surprise that the operations are now located in the Internet. The origin of the software might be the 16

18 CYBERSPACE AS A NEW QUALITY OF HAZARDS argument against. However this may be illusionary, since we can assume that they decided to use the best available software. On the other hand, countries are not very eager to use foreign software it is safer to make your own one. Thus, it might be rather a big operation of an international terrorist organization. The creation of units for cyberspace warfare The above presented information leads to a conclusion that the common computerization and dynamic development of the Internet observed at the beginning of the 21st century facilitates the process of using cyberspace for operations which put the security of many countries in jeopardy. According to independent experts, the group of countries which were first to use wide-scale, planned and organized forms of cyber attacks to realize their own political, intelligence and military goals includes: the USA, Russia and China. Nonetheless, the Americans admit that they are far behind Russia and China on this field 29. As said by the Pentagon, i.e. the US Department of Defense, the above prerequisites oblige the Department of Defense and the US government to strengthen the national defence system against cyber attacks 30. This is why cyber forces are called into being. The analysis of subject literature reveals that the United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) is a special part of the US Army prepared to run operations on the field of state-of-the-art IT technology. USCYBERCOM started its operation on 21 May 2010 and from its first beginnings it recruits mainly specialists on the security of ICT systems, however it is not a secret that that the US government also seeks out people with unique hacking abilities 31. USCYBERCOM is responsible for the centralization of secret operations run in cyberspace as well as for the organization of the available IT resources and the protection of the US military networks. Presently, the Pentagon wants to expand the personnel from 900 to 4900 people. Thus, there is a plan to create 3 separate cyber forces, namely 1) Cyber National Mission Forces, 2) Cyber Protection Forces and 3) Cyber Combat Mission Forces 32. The first forces will be responsible for the protection of the critical infrastructure of the country, the second one for the protection of the network of 29 USA w obronie przeciw cyberwojnie buduje cyberarmię, in: pl/artykul/usa_w_obronie_przeciw_cyberwojnie_buduje_cyberarmie_ html, [ ]. 30 USA w obronie przeciw cyberwojnie buduje cyberarmię, zobacz in: sci24.pl/artykul/usa_w_obronie_przeciw_cyberwojnie_buduje_cyberarmie_ html, [ ]. 31 Pentagon buduje cyberarmię in: mie,wid, ,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=110374, [ ]. 32 Vide: xander,17428, [ ]. 17

19 ANDRZEJ NOWAK the Department of Defense, and the third one will carry out planned cyber attacks. According to the American military experts, nowadays and in the future, the operations of the conventional military forces are and will be less significant than cyber operations 33. The conclusion comes from the observation of the changes and events in cyberspace. Recent events have forced the Americans to expand their cyber forces. In the present cyberspace there are serious, well organized attacks. There are also well grounded fears that the USA is being attacked by foreign countries, or wellfinanced criminal groups. According to Alan Paller, the director for research at the SANS Institute, China and Russia in at the possession of much more developed and better organized cyber forces than the USA. The USA is therefore reduced to trying to catch up with them. Paller thinks that the real challenge is to find the proper number of experts. The problem in finding 4000 experts is that every important branch of the economy banks, energy companies, telecommunication firms, the defence industry, hospitals, the government are all looking for the same people. The demand for high-class experts is huge, however there are not enough of them on the job market 34. Taking into consideration the above facts, it is obvious that Pentagon takes cyber hazards very seriously. The US Department of Defense decided to prepare an Internet simulation to practice different scenarios of cyber warfare. Cyber Range is to be ready next year, and it will be used to test defensive and offensive operations 35. The plan of the project was prepared by Lockheed Martin, a company which received a grant of 30,8 million dollars from Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). A rival project was created by the John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, which got for this purpose 24,7 million dollars. The role of Cyber Range is to imitate governmental, military and commercial networks as well as human reactions and weaknesses during operations on different defence levels as well as during the preparation of combat 33 According to the latest information, the Pentagon is creating several cyber teams, which are tasked with offensive operations against cyber attacks threatening the US critical infrastructure. This information was given on 12 March 2013 by general Keith Alexander, the commander of the US Cyber Command, to the senate committee on Armed Services. He stressed that the threat of attacks on the US electricity network and other vital systems is real and it requires more aggressive steps of the government and the private sector, aimed at better protection against such attacks. He also said that such teams will operate outside the USA but he did not reveal where exactly. According to the general it is necessary to define the act of cyber warfare, in: Pentagon-tworzy-ekipy-do-zwalczania-zagrozen-w-cyberprzestrzeni,wid, ,wiadomosc.html? smgajticaid=6103b8 [ ]. 34 M. Błoński, USA budują cyberarmię in: 35 Pentagon tworzy symulator cyberwojny in: gon.tworzy.symulator.cyberwojny.html, [ ]. 18

20 CYBERSPACE AS A NEW QUALITY OF HAZARDS plans. DARPA wants the simulator to carry out simultaneously many tests and scenarios of offensive and defensive operations, which might be necessary in the future. Up to now, Lockhead Martin and John Hopkins University should have prepared prototypes of Cyber Range, which will be presented for assessment. DARPA will choose only one of the projects, which will be realized and implemented. Obviously the US government has a more and more serious attitude to cyber hazards and intends to prepare well for possible attacks from the Internet. It was much earlier that the Pentagon announced that cyber attacks will be treated as seriously as traditional attacks targeted at national security. Another country in the possession of Cyber forces is China. The subject literature emphasizes the fact that China has been suspected for a long time of carrying out cyber attacks on targets located in other countries. Probably many any espionage Trojans come come from China, however there is no firm evidence for that. Still, on 16 July 2011, the national TV channel CCTV 7 (Military and Agriculture) broadcasted a documentary entitled Military technology: the Internet storm is coming, which presented an attack initiated by a government system on goals located in the USA. A proof for the existence of such software is a front page piece of news said Mikko Hypponen, the director of the research department at F-Secure, a Finnish producer of anti-virus software 36. Moreover, in an interview for the Xinhua agency, Geng Yansheng, the representative of The Chinese Ministry of Defence, admitted that China has a unit of Internet Forces. Geng Yansheng said that the unit is responsible for the protection of Chinese cyberspace against external attacks, it has existed since 2009 and it consists of about 30 people. However, the publicized reports indicate that the Chinese Internet offensive unit has existed for at least five years, with much more than 30 people. A top secret unit of the Chinese Army was also revealed in a report made by Mandiant, a US company safeguarding security on the Internet and it is addressed as the most dangerous group of cyber terrorists in the world. These are hundreds or thousands of super-efficient computer experts with a perfect command of English. They steal strategies and business plans, s, and contact lists, as well as confidential data of companies and institutions. The author of the report is absolutely sure that they operate in China, and the Chinese government is completely aware of the fact 37. The authors of the report traced Chinese hackers for six years, in classified US documents they are called Comment Group. The authors are convinced that all traces lead to Shanghai, to the command of the Chinese Army unit The 36 Vide: [ ]. 37 Vide: Raport Mandiat APT1 Exposing One of China s Cyber Espionage Units in: [ ]. 19

21 ANDRZEJ NOWAK headquarters are located in a white, modest, 12-storey office building, surrounded by restaurants and residential buildings in a poor Pudong area in the suburbs of Shanghai. An incidental observer would never notice that in this exact place there are the command headquarters of the mysterious unit 61398, which is presently the favourite media target. Its formal name is the 2 nd Bureau of the People s Liberation Army General Staff Department s 3 rd Department. Officially, the bureau does not exist in the description of military structures. A huge pile of evidence indicates that 90 percent of attacks come from Unit 61398, the group was given several names in classified US correspondence and now it is called Comment Crew or Shanghai Group. Analysing the Mandiant s special report, it is necessary to quote the most important assumptions and observations: Unit is staffed by hundreds and perhaps thousands of people trained in computer security and computer network operations and also proficient in the English language. The unit has stolen hundreds of terabytes of data from at least 141 organizations simultaneously, in 20 major industries, out of which 87% are in English speaking countries. The special unit stole information including military plans, business plans, and s, as well as contact lists 38. Of course China rejects the accusation, claiming that hacker s attacks are supranational and it is almost impossible to trace their source. Thus, it turns out that we are witnesses to another struggle between a superpower in the twilight, and a new emperor. In this battle, however, the USA does not want to give away the position of IT leader and wants to influence the public opinion in order to create a negative image of China. It should be kept in mind that the US sword is double edged, and the USA also has systems such as Echelon or Carnivole which are able to invigilate people. Another country is Germany, which released official information that it has created two new governmental organizations. Their work will be directly connected with Internet security and cyber warfare. The first organization is called Nationales Cyber-Abwehrzentrum (NCAZ), and the second one is called Nationaler Cyber-Sicherheitsrat. Their task is to protect German industrial and military infrastructure against attacks from hackers and defend it in the case of an outbreak of cyber warfare 39. The Nationaler Cyber-Sicherheitsrat started its operation on 1 April It was headed by Cornelia Rogall-Grothe, Secretary of State in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The members include prominent people from the ministry of internal affairs, the ministry of defence, the ministry of justice and the ministry of 38 Ibidem p Minister Obrony Narodowej otwiera Centrum Cyberobrony Narodowej in: ise.de/newsticker/meldung/innenminister-eroeffnet-nationales-cyber-abwehrzentrum html, [ ]. 20

22 CYBERSPACE AS A NEW QUALITY OF HAZARDS finance. Whereas the personnel of NCAZ, at least at the initial state, includes the employees of the Federal Office for Information Security or the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. The document describing the two organizations gives three reasons why they were called into being. The first one is the increasing threat caused by specialized malware and the necessity to trace and respond to cyber attacks. The second reason is the increasing number of industry s weak points, beginning the moment it uses more and more often state-of-the-art technology. The third one is the hazard connected with worms such as Stuxnet. Germany calls for the European Union and NATO, as well as its own Armed Forces, to tighten cooperation in order to protect the member states from cyber attacks 40. A more complicated situation connected with cyber units is observed in Russia. In spite of the fact that in the media and reports of companies dealing with security in cyberspace there are many accusations aimed at Russia, officially it is only beginning to create such units. In March 2012 the Deputy of Russian Defence, Dmitrij Rogozin announced the formation of Cyber Command, he said that the whole document had been already prepared and he expressed hope that Cyber Command will be created soon. Information available on the website of Izwiestija as of 12 February 2013 proves that if the plan of creating the Cyber Command is accepted by the Russian political leaders, the Command will start its operation even before We can also read there that according to a prominent source in the Ministry of Defence, the future Cyber Command will be very similar to the USCYBERCOM. The Russian Cyber Command will work for the Army, police and all civil authorities and its main task will be the protection of national interests 42. It is worth keeping in mind that in Russia there are already several bodies monitoring cyber hazards. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has K office, while the Federal Security Service the Centre of Information Security, and Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information (FAPSI) is responsible for IT warfare operations at a strategic level. The subject literature also gives information concerning other countries which possess units prepared for cyber warfare, including e.g. Great Britain, Israel, Iran, South Korea. 40 Strategia Cyberobrony dla Niemiec in: DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Informationsgesellschaft/cyber.pdf, [ ]. 41 Vide: W Rosji cyberwojska in: [ ]. 42 Vide: Rosyjscy wojskowi przygotowują się do cyberwojen in: cles/ /fm/81961, [ ]. 21

23 ANDRZEJ NOWAK Poland has also created a new organizational structure called Centrum Bezpieczeństwa Cybernetycznego (Cyber Security Centre) 43. It is located in Białobrzegi, where there is the 9 th Signal Battalion. It has operated since the summer of And this is everything that is officially known. The Ministry of National Defence does not want to reveal any details. It is known that military computer experts protect the offices of the Ministry of National Defence and command headquarters which are the target of regular hacker attacks. In 2011 the Ministry of Defence planned to spend one milliard zloty for information technology. The plan included inter alia, the first digital battalion in the Army. Soldiers and their commanders would be able to use technical advancements such as displays providing information useful on the battle field 44. Conclusions Cyberspace has become a new area of struggle, which results in numerous changes both in the pragmatic as well as the legal-organizational dimension of security systems functioning across the whole world, each country and locally. The construction of the legal system, as the countries response to the chances and challenges stemming from cyberspace, is an extremely complex task. It is not only the outcome of the pace of technological advancement but also it stems from the specific character of the environment and its interactive nature. In order to shape the legal norms on the national level, the regulations concerning international cooperation, as well as strategies and security policy, it is necessary to take into account two basic challenges. The necessity of a fast reaction, on the one hand, and reaction to small, mobile groups, on the other hand, constitute a new quality in the area of creating new legal regulations concerning the security of a country 45. One cannot forget, that in spite of the fact that cyber hazards are a totally different category of legislative-organizational challenges, the problems which they cause are similar to those generated by other asymmetrical threats, like e.g. terrorism. Their common characteristic is that the country s structures are forced to evolve in the direction of less hierarchical but more flexible solutions. Network ability, both in a social as well as technological dimension, along with all the consequences, seems to be one of the most important concepts of the new security paradigm at the national and international level. 43 Wizyta Szefa BBN w Centrum Bezpieczeństwa Cybernetycznego in: portal/pl/2/3305/wizyta_szefa_bbn_w_centrum_bezpieczenstwa_cybernetycznego.html, [ ]. 44 Polska armia broni się przed atakami hakerów in: tle,polska-armia-broni-sie-przed-atakami-hakerow,wid, ,wiadomosc.html, [ ]. 45 cf Krzysztof Liedel, Paulina Piasecka, Wojna cybernetyczna wyzwanie XXI wieku, Quarterly Bezpieczeństwo narodowe, No 17/2011, p. 25 and further. 22

24 CYBERSPACE AS A NEW QUALITY OF HAZARDS Cyber warfare is a fact. During the last year, the number of politically motivated attacks through the Internet has exceeded the levels of acceptability. In just one country, the USA, the following institutions were the target of attacks: The White House, The Department of Homeland Security, Secret Service, The US Department of Defense. Countries get engaged in the Cyber Arms Race and develop their abilities to carry out cyber warfare in which governmental networks and critical infrastructure will be the main targets. However, cyber warfare is not only a war between computers. It can cause real damage in the real world and can result in the death of many people 46. Cyber weapons take critical infrastructure as their target. The owners of cyber weapons not only prepare cyber defence but also cyber attacks aimed at among other things energy networks, transportation routes, telecommunication networks, financial systems, and water supply systems; this is due to the fact that they can be quickly immobilized with a relatively small effort. In most developed countries the critical infrastructure is connected to the Internet and it is not sufficiently protected this is why those installations are especially susceptible to hazards. A lack of proper protection as well as a lack of preparation are the reason for much more damage being caused by the present attacks than in the case of operations carried out in the past. There are so many actors involved in cyber warfare acting in so many ways, that the rules of engagement are not clearly defined. It is also ambiguous what duties should be assigned to companies and institutions in connection with the defence and the education of the society in order to prevent cyber attacks. Without a proper definition there are no explicit criteria to take decisions in a situation when the proper response to cyber attack is a political reaction, or even the threat of a military operation. The private sector is most endangered. In many developed countries the critical infrastructure is in private hands, due to that it is a perfect target of cyber attacks. However, in the scope of the prevention cyber attacks, the private sector depends on the steps taken by the government. In the face of virtual fire everyone is endangered: governmental institutions and companies, as well as every individual citizen. Without the insight into the government strategy on cyber defence, the private sector is not able to take effective preventive measures. Due to that the experts call for an explicit public debate on the problem of cyber warfare. Bibliography Addressing the Nation s Cyber Security Challenges: Reducing Vulnerabilities Requires Strategic Investment and Immediate Action, Testimony of Sami Saydjari Before the 46 Czy trzecia wojna rozpocznie się w Internecie in: , ,Czy_trzecia_wojna_swiatowa_rozegra_sie_w_interneci.html, [ ]. 23

25 ANDRZEJ NOWAK House Committee on Homeland Security , BIODO Uwagi do Polityki Ochrony Cyberprzestrzeni RP.pdf in: Czy trzecia wojna rozpocznie się w Internecie in: atowa_rozegra_sie_w_interneci.html. E-Eesti/E-Estonia, Gregory J. Rattray Wojna strategiczna w cyberprzestrzeni (the original title: Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace), Warszawa Alexander, Abwehrzentrum html i-słownik: J. Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe, Wired Magazine, , K. Majdan, Wykryto nowe zagrożenie w Kaspersky Lab Identifies Operation Red October, an Advanced Cyber-Espionage Campaign Targeting Diplomatic and Government Institutions Worldwide in: n_red_october_an_advanced_cyber_espionage_campaign_targeting_diplomatic_an d_government_institutions_worldwide. Krzysztof Liedel i Paulina Piasecka, Wojna cybernetyczna wyzwanie XXI wieku, Quarterly Bezpieczeństwo narodowe, No 17/2011. M. Błoński, USA budują cyberarmię w: Norma ISO/TEC 27001:2007, Technika informatyczna, Technika bezpieczeństwa, Systemy zarządzania bezpieczeństwem informacji, Wymagania, PKN, Warszawa Pentagon buduje cyberarmię w: Pentagon tworzy symulator cyberwojny in: 24

26 CYBERSPACE AS A NEW QUALITY OF HAZARDS Polska armia broni się przed atakami hakerów in: Raport Mandiat APT1 Exposing One of China s Cyber Espionage Units in: Rosyjscy hackerzy podbijają Estonię, Gazeta Wyborcza, , Rosyjscy wojskowi przygotowują się do cyberwojen in: Strategia Cyberobrony dla Niemiec in: mationsgesellschaft/cyber.pdf. Stuxnet 0.5: How It Evolved w: US Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, July 2011, USA w obronie przeciw cyberwojnie buduje cyberarmię, in: berarmie_ html. Ustawa z dnia 29 sierpnia 2002 r. o stanie wojennym oraz kompetencjach Naczelnego Dowódcy Sił Zbrojnych i zasadach jego podległości konstytucyjnym organom RP. W Rosji cyberwojska in: Wizyta Szefa BBN w Centrum Bezpieczeństwa Cybernetycznego in: wa_cybernetycznego.html. 25

27 NDU Zeszyty Scientific Naukowe Quarterly AON nr no 2(59) 3(92) ISSN KAMILA TROCHOWSKA THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF CULTURE IN COUNTERING ASYMMETRIC THREATS * Kamila TROCHOWSKA, Ph.D. National Defence University Abstract The main purpose of the article is to analyse the cultural dimension of the military-led endeavors of the international community aimed at countering asymmetric threats such as post-modern terrorism and insurgencies. Although the international community agreed that military activity itself is not a proper answer to the transnational terrorist threat, the use of military components will be continued in such activities. In particular, military operations have nowadays extended way beyond the traditional, Clausewitz s hard power concept. Not only do we observe the shift of the centers of gravity in today s operations towards the human terrain, namely the area of an operation's population, but contemporary military operations are also characterized by the rising significance of non-kinetic elements in COIN/anti- and counterterrorism operations, such as civil-military cooperation, civil affairs, and psychological and information operations, which are based on profound knowledge of adversaries cultures. With the emergence of population-centric operations, the urgent need of considering the cultural factors of the Area of Operation emerged, and the missing link between the awareness of the cultural aspects of threats, such as also terrorist activity, and operational plans that consider them, which had not yet been found and fully utilized in military planning. Therefore we face a need for the skill of operationalization of culture, understood as the identification of features of culture of any object involved in the activity and vital for military activities, and the ability to integrate such knowledge and skills into the processes of shaping military security. Hence, although the article s main focus is on the military aspects of combating terrorism, the strategic security environment changes and the paradigm shift, demand us to consider a wide socio-cultural context, not only the criminal and military aspect of terrorism. Although insurgency and terrorism are not the same phenomena, their culture, motivations, mechanisms and organizational structure is alike, and they both use terrorism as their tactics. Many of the lessons learned during counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq can be used while combating terrorism within military and other security operations elsewhere, not only for the needs of the military, but also other armed 26 * The project was funded by the Polish National Science Center, grant No. DEC- 2011/01/N/HS5/00981.

28 OPERATIONALIZATION OF CULTURE IN COUNTERING ASYMMETRIC THREATS formations such as the police and civilian specialists working in the field. Various pieces of research proves that the operationalization of culture can be an effective tool in enhancing the effectiveness of employing uniformed formations to counter violent extremisms. Key words: post-modern terrorism; population-centric operations; operationalization of culture in COIN, counter and anti-terrorism activities; interdisciplinary approach "The nature of terrorist groups is beginning to change from those who want a place at the table to those who want to destroy the table and all of those who sit at the table." Introduction James Woolsey According to the American Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, in concordance with the definitions of NATO and international society, combating terrorism embraces all direct actions undertaken against terrorist networks and their components, along with indirect activities aiming at shaping the global audience s perception of the phenomenon and creating an environment in which the emergence and development of such groups is hindered. Nowadays, combating terrorism is performed within three distinct, yet integrated categories of states activity: counterinsurgency operations (COIN), counterterrorism and antiterrorism activities of both a military and non-military nature (Jałoszyński, 2008, p ). The differences between them are significant: COIN, defined as all military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency, is the prevailing strategy in combating terrorism within military operations, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. It focuses on the local civilian population, aiming at securing it from the enemy and winning the support of the area of operation's population through effective governance, eventually defeating insurgents and terrorist groups, or making them insignificant (Fulk, 2011, p. 5). Counterterrorism on the other hand, embraces Special Forces Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism(jp 1-02, 2008), which in military operations can take the form of missile strikes from unmanned aerial systems (drones), and special operations raids against high value targets, including senior leaders (Fulk, 2011, p. 2). Lastly, antiterrorism, is defined widely as defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of a country s infrastructure and populace to terrorist acts (Jałoszyński, 2008, p. 99). Those three endeavours are complimented by, and comprise, a spectrum of other possible means for terrorism prevention that integrate the efforts of global governments, uniformed formations, NGOs and other agents. They are either of an economical nature (cutting terrorist 27

29 KAMILA TROCHOWSKA funding and tracking the connections with transnational organized crime groups), military (preemptive and preventive operations), socio-political (intervening in failing and failed countries that are said to be the breeding grounds for terrorism), legal (with counter-effective results, such as Germany s social policy reform proposed by Tholo Sarrazin (Theil, 2010), intelligence cooperation (with the limited effectiveness of cooperating with Pakistani and Russian intelligence agencies), along with expanded psychological or information operations aimed at contemporary media, as the terrorist groups make very efficient use of those tools of globalization (against which they claim to be fighting). Although the international community agreed that military activity itself is not an appropriate answer to the transnational terrorist threat, or in combating an insurgency, which also uses terrorist tactics and governs itself with similar rules, the use of military components will be continued in such activities. In particular, military operations have nowadays extended way beyond the traditional Clausewitzian hard power concept. Not only do we observe the shift of the centres of gravity in today s operations towards the human terrain, namely the area of operation's population, giving rise to a new quality of population-centric operations. Contemporary military operations are also characterized by the rising significance of non-kinetic elements in COIN, anti- and counterterrorism operations, such as civil-military cooperation, civil affairs, psychological and information operations, which are based on a profound knowledge of adversaries cultures (Bados, 2010). Most of the activities, however, are marked with a countereffective, symptomatic approach, since the military perspective needs to be completed with a profound holistic understanding of the deeper social and cultural roots of the phenomenon of terrorism. A perfect example for this is the parallel ISAF and Enduring Freedom operations in Afghanistan, the international community s flag military endeavours in combating terrorism. The main objective of the intervention was eliminating Al-Qaeda s training cells and elements from the country and along the Afghan-Pakistani border (Polish Operational Command, 2011), and building a stable, democratic country which would not be a safe heaven for such components. The majority of the terrorist groups though, have moved at the start of the military intervention from the area of operation towards Pakistan, Yemen, Iran and Somalia, and the 2011 Operation Neptun Spear that eliminated Osama Bin Laden did not improved the local security environment, neither did it break the global terrorist network, as the nature of contemporary terrorist groups is network-centric and they can easily prosper without central command (Stubbs, 1998; Kamieński, 2009). On the contrary, the Afghan operation has rendered new problems that the international community will yet have to face. Due to kinetic military activities and a failure to understand and integrate the cultural dynamics of the area of operation s human terrain into military planning, we face upcoming threats that are a response to our own actions, such as the growing resistance of the Taliban and a rise in insurgency. The major and most troublesome feature of the ongoing 28

30 OPERATIONALIZATION OF CULTURE IN COUNTERING ASYMMETRIC THREATS conflict is its intestinal character and polymorphous nature, as the insurgency is taking place in an ambiguous and constantly shifting environment, with the constellation of cells gravitating to one another from time to time to carry out armed attacks, a characteristic of both terrorist and insurgent organizations (Coker, 2006). Hence, if we could refer to a metaphor, we have cut off only one head of the Hydra, in place of which three new have grown. The symptomatic military approach towards terrorism shall create more and more problems, unless for the uniformed formations purposes we can find a way of providing a holistic understanding of the broad and complex phenomenon of terrorism. Therefore we face a need for the skill of operationalizing culture, understood as the identification of features of culture of any object of the activity vital for military and other uniformed forces, and integrating such knowledge and skills into the processes of shaping the security of the area of operation (Bados 2011). Another important issue is that insurgency and terrorism are not the same phenomena, yet their culture, motivations, mechanisms and organizational structure are alike, and they both use terrorism as their tactics. As one of the leading scientists in the field of the operationalization of culture, Montgomery McFate stated, the enemy we are facing today and are likely to face for years to come, is non-western in orientation, transnational in scope, non-hierarchical in structure, and clandestine in approach; and it operates outside of the context of the nation-state. Neither al Qaeda nor insurgents in Iraq are fighting a Clausewitzian war, where armed conflict is a rational extension of politics by other means. These adversaries neither think nor act like nation-states. Rather, their form of warfare, organizational structure, and motivations are determined by the society and the culture from which they come (McFate, 2005, p. 43). Hence many of the lessons learned during counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq can be used while combating terrorism within military and other security operations elsewhere, not only for the needs of the military, but also other armed formations such as the police and civilian specialists working in the field. Therefore, the article s main focus is on the military aspects of combating terrorism, however, the strategic security environment changes and the paradigm shift demand us to consider the wide socio-cultural context, not only the criminal and military aspect of terrorism in such operations. Root Cause Analysis of terrorist activity and the major allied forces failures in combating it, performed by the Author in the Afghan operation context (Trochowska, 2010), has proven that an interdisciplinary approach is needed, one that provides a wide and multidimensional background to terrorist activity, whether in military operations or elsewhere. Discussion of the Afghanistan and Iraq case studies revises the basic erroneous assumptions about terrorism that hinder the effectiveness of military operations aimed at combating terrorism and providing security in given region. Examples of research collected proves that the operationalization of culture can be an effective tool in enhancing the effectiveness of employing military forces to counter violent extremism. 29

31 KAMILA TROCHOWSKA The operationalization of culture in population-centric operations Socio-cultural factors have played a major role in the majority of counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations during the majority of military operations that NATO s armies have been engaged in since the end of Cold War. The emergence of the concept of population-centric operations (such as the Afghan or Iraqi missions), has raised a demand for the profound understanding of the cultural factors of the area of operation. In the conflicts in question, we are facing a shift of the centre of gravity towards the area of operation's population (the human terrain), whose support must be won to achieve the operation s goals, as the enemy is hiding and operating among them and a clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants is no longer possible (Gentile, 2009). Consequently, those operations gave priority to non-kinetic military activities, such as psychological operations (PSYOPS), information operations (INFOPS) or the significance of civil-military cooperation components (CIMIC), which are based on an in-depth understanding of the cultural aspects of the reality they work in. The culture of the area of operation's population, however, affects and is affected by all the aspects of military operations, be they counterinsurgency or counterterrorism. Those fields are among others: Force Preparation in the aspects of training, exercising, educating of the forces and doctrine formation, Battlespace Awareness, through the collection of relevant data and Intelligence, Survelliance and Reconnaissance (ISR) activities, Force Application in all kinds of manoeuvres to influence and provide security for the population and infrastructure, Logistics, where the movement and sustainment of the forces and operational contract support will also have its cultural variables Command and Control activities, The mission s Structure Organization and Cooperation with other engaged actors, such as civilian components or NGOs, where perceptions, will, behaviour, and the capabilities of partners, adversaries and relevant populations are of major significance, Network-Centric sustainment, where detecting, analysing and responding to events must be undertaken in concordance with vital cultural factors of the Area of Operation. (Bados, 2010, p ) Therefore, combating and preventing terrorist actions can only be effective when the situational awareness of the operational environment is full and in-depth, and cultural awareness of the area of operation is a vital component of the overall situational awareness (CACOL, 2009). Also NATO nations have understood the significance of that fact, which influenced the shape of the Multinational Experiment 6 ( ), in particular with objective 4.3, which focuses specifically on cultural aspects. The major gaps and cultural issues within contemporary operations have been 30

32 OPERATIONALIZATION OF CULTURE IN COUNTERING ASYMMETRIC THREATS outlined in Multinational Experiment 6. Baseline Assessment 2008, which has stated that: The ability to understand the dynamics of the operational environment, accounting for the social, cultural, political, legal, economic, and physical conditions is crucial when facing irregular threats. Few personnel outside of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community are educated in Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency, or receive cultural awareness training. Cultural awareness at the macro and micro level are of equal importance and it is necessary to develop guidelines to accommodate cultural differences and avoid offensive and ineffective communication. Forces must train in foreign languages, cultural intelligence, negotiation, and dispute resolution. An effective interagency framework for building partner capacity rooted in a deep understanding of the indigenous culture that the threat has emerged from, unity of effort among the various agencies involved, and sustained interaction and relationships with the host country over time is required. Commanders need to appreciate the underlying interagency issues (such as institutional cultures, policies, resources, and differences in procedures) in order to effect real integration for waging Irregular Warfare. (Pamplos & Pena, 2010 p ). As a result of the combined endeavours of NATO nations, a set of best possible solutions regarding the operationalization of culture for the deployed personnel has been created, and some of the best practices will be summarized in the following part of the article. Cultural awareness, the term that NATO has designated to all levels of the operationalization of culture in the initial period of the MNE 6, is not an allencompassing skill for deployed personnel, since the influence of cultural factors on the mission s overall success will be different at each of its levels, and a different set of skills pertaining to cultural competence will be demanded. At the strategic/political level, cultural aspects of the area of operation and the decisive components awareness of them will be the major determinant of shaping the political goals and the strategic aims of the operation (Kim, 2009). An improper inclusion of the cultural factors in the planning processes might render the goals difficult or hard to achieve. At the operational level, cultural factors shape the chain of command and decisions, impacting on the level of security in the area of operation, as a wrong inclusion of the cultural data hinders the gaining of the local population s support, lowering hence the effectiveness of either counterinsurgency or counterterrorism. At the tactical level, where the forces have most contact with the culturally diverse environment, even minor cultural mistakes and misunderstandings might lead to the negative perception of the forces by the local population, whose support, as aforementioned, must be gained, whether concerning counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, or counterterrorism in Iraq (Mc Fate, 31

33 KAMILA TROCHOWSKA 2005); not to mention the fact that any cultural blunders at the higher levels of planning and command, will be passed on to lower levels of the operation, creating a spiral of mistakes. Consequently, the range of cultural information and intercultural skills required from the forces (levels of operationalization of culture), will vary at different levels of the operation. The most comprehensive model of the skills demanded at various levels of the operation is based on Bloom s Taxonomy for Cognition, recommended in the executive report of the NATO Multinational Experiment No 6, goal 4.3. devoted to shaping cultural awareness for the purpose of military operations (Figure 1): Source: Bados, 2010, p Figure 1. Bloom s Taxonomy for Cognition: Levels of operationalization of culture The importance of Bloom s hierarchy rests on the creation of a scale to portray the levels of a staff s abilities to use culture operationally. At the base of the scale stands the ability to identify and describe a given culture, which equals cultural awareness (cultural understanding), needed for the tactical level of an operation. Further on, lies the ability to internalize culture, i.e. the skill of taking the investigated object s point of view as one s own for a better understanding of certain phenomena and threats, and accurate prediction, demanded at the operational level. Over cultural understanding we find the ability to use cultural information across Lines of Operation (LOOs), which demands high-level cultural

34 OPERATIONALIZATION OF CULTURE IN COUNTERING ASYMMETRIC THREATS competence, required at the operational and strategic levels of the operation. Bados provides a perfect example of the application of the taxonomy on a battlefield situation: a team may benefit from being trained to understand that certain cultural ideas or terms apply to an operational environment. They may be able to recognize some of these terms and use them in the development of operational plans: to understand, apply, and repeat back. It does not necessarily mean that the team is capable of performing in-depth analysis and evaluation that permits them to determine the operational relevance of certain bits of cultural information. Without analysis and evaluation, it is difficult to determine second and third level effects, or to break previous inaccurate perceptions. Consequently, if they are unable to do this, they may be incapable of progressing to the highest step in Bloom s hierarchy, to create innovative plans that achieve the appropriate effect (Bados, 2010, p. 9). We must also realize one vital issue, which in the majority of the solutions in the field of operationalization of culture was neglected. Culture understood as a set of values, traditions, beliefs, forms of social organisation, behaviours, networks of meanings that an individual perceives the world through (UFMCS, 2009, p. 106), is a dynamic, constantly evolving matter. Culture is most of all a pattern of reactions and adaptation schemes towards the changing environment. That was the part that was not taken into account in the majority of existing endeavours concerning the operationalization of culture, and the knowledge of the culture of the area of operation was drawn from sources that were created before the deployment of the forces. Which might indeed give us some hints regarding the nature of the threat we will be facing, however a constant and professional monitoring of the social changes and shifts of the behavioural aspects of given entity is needed. We must realize that no society we study is set in stone, and a society which comes into contact with any kind of external influence, will change vastly. The presence of uniformed formations along with a threat posed by irregular warfare are definitely an altering factor, and the knowledge of a population s behaviour modes (that we have gained before the deployment), and that is so important operationally, might no longer be relevant. We must also remember that our own culture and behaviours are pre-determined in the same way as those of the area of operation's population. Therefore, considering cultures in isolation, and not understanding our own cultural biases, might lead to the inability of internalizing an adversary's culture which is a crucial step towards higher operational culture skill, cultural competence and genuinely effective use of the operationalization of culture. The above danger of misunderstanding the cultural dynamics of the area of operation one is involved in, that hinders both a full situational awareness and the perception of the enemy and irregular threat, was already noticed centuries ago by the classic Chinese author of strategic thought, Sun Tzu. As he stated: "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy, but know yourself, your chances of winning or 33

35 KAMILA TROCHOWSKA losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril" (Sun Tzu, 2002 ). The particular significance, when facing any asymmetric opponent (given terrorist or insurgent), of self-awareness and the ability to internationalize adversaries culture was also expressed in the U.S. Marine Corps manual The Operational Culture for Deploying Personnel. As it claims, the purpose of the double, in-depth awareness is to keep the deployed personnel in the same ballpark and the same sport as the enemy, who is able to control this aspect of the game because it is his country, his culture, and his language. The insurgent gets to define who he says he is, not the foreign army who is fighting him. In other words, you have to defeat him on his cultural terms (CAOCL, 2009, p. 87). Yet, the knowledge has not been properly utilized, and some of the most hindering misconceptions pertaining to terrorism and the nature of insurgency, which have vastly influenced the effectiveness of operations, will be discussed further on. The chosen tools of the operationalization of culture Having laid the theoretical foundations of the concept of the operationalization of culture, let us review some existing models of the operationalization of culture for the purpose of combating asymmetrical threats. It will give us an insight into which cultural data might be relevant operationally, and how to integrate them in operational planning. The recommendations of the Combat Studies Institute gathered in Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for US AF Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries (2006), the experiences of the American Human Terrain System used in Iraq and Afghanistan ( ), the 9-step Cultural Methodology of Red Teams used currently in the U.S. Army, and the results of NATO s MNE 6 ( ) joint research, will provide a multidimensional perspective on the possibilities in question. Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for US AF Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries (The Combat Studies Institute: 2006), lists the following cultural and religious factors as being crucial for proper Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (JIBP): The society, its demographics, history, and economical aspects. Customs and everyday life patterns. Values, ideologies and motivations. Religious practices. External cultural and religious influences. Cultural and religious attitudes toward warfare. Level of religious tolerance. The significant historical cultural and religious tensions. 34

36 OPERATIONALIZATION OF CULTURE IN COUNTERING ASYMMETRIC THREATS International interactions. Decision making styles. The IBP cultural data must be available and further on utilized during mission analysis and course of action development in order to consider its impact on plan execution. The commanders should bear in mind that these cultural and religious factors in some way influence assumptions, constraints, restraints, implied tasks, and initial risk assessment, all of which are crucial for the success of the operation. Moreover, the identified negative impacts on feasibility, suitability, or acceptability should lead to a course of action's rejection or modification to mitigate the potential damaging effects (Wunderle, 2006, p ). The operational planning process suggested by the research which includes all the aforementioned cultural factors, is very comprehensively described by the scheme provided in Figure 2: Source: Wunderle, 2006, p. 80. Figure 2. Including cultural intelligence in operational planning 35

37 KAMILA TROCHOWSKA Human Terrain System The second initiative that was supposed to improve the cultural situational awareness of the area of operation was the U.S. Army s Human Terrain System deployed first in Iraq and later in Afghanistan. Due to requests of Iraqi and Afghan missions commanders, who had noticed that a lack of cultural knowledge highly hinders any operational efforts they were undertaking, as well as the 2006 change of doctrine of counterinsurgency operations by General David Petraeus, included in the famous FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Field Manual (2006), in 2006 the Joint Improvsed Explosive Devices Defeat Organization approved the requests and financed the first HT Teams. It was the JIED that was the initial founder of the venture as it had proven that some of the IED attacks were the local population s revenge for the lack of respect of the U.S. soldiers towards the local customs and significant places. Human Terrain Teams were five- to nine-person teams whose task was to support field commanders by filling their cultural knowledge gap in the current operating environment and providing cultural interpretations of events occurring within their area of operations. The team was composed of individuals with social science and operational backgrounds and deployed with tactical and operational military units; they comprised of a team commander, social scientists, a research manager and local culture experts. Their main goal was to assist in bringing knowledge about the local population into a coherent analytic framework and build relationships with the local power-brokers in order to provide advice and opportunities to Commanders and staffs in the field (Finney, 2008, p ). They were performing field research mainly by engaging with the locals and observing their customs and habits personally during patrols and meetings with local residents. The cultural data range that was gathered and analysed by the HTTs, and that would be later internationalized, was much wider and detailed than the one suggested by Wunderle (2006). The Human Terrain Handbook that provides a very detailed picture of HTT s activities, methodology and desired outcomes, included the ethnographic, anthropological and social profiles of the following aspects of the area of the operation's culture Current Social Institutions, Historical Institutions, Spheres of Influence, External Factors Influencing the Operating Environment, Demographics, Social Organizations, Area, Infrastructure, Religious Factors, Identities, Cultural Nuances, Social Norms, and Popular Attitudes (Finney, 2008). An example of detailed ASCOPE (Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organization, People, Events) methodology support questions and research areas of the OPE culture categories that might be used during field research would be as follows (Figure 3): 36

38 OPERATIONALIZATION OF CULTURE IN COUNTERING ASYMMETRIC THREATS PEOPLE 1. Social Structures 1.1. Groups 1.2. Networks 1.3. Institutions 1.4. Organizations 1.5. Roles/Status/Gender 1.6. Social Norms 1.7. Culture 1.8. Identity a. Cultural Forms Narrative Symbols Rituals b. Beliefs and Belief Systems Core beliefs Intermediate beliefs Peripheral beliefs c. Values d. Attitudes towards other Social groups Ideologies Government Allied Forces e. Perceptions f. Power What type of power does the group have? What do they use their power for? How is their power acquired and maintained? Which leaders have power within particular groups? What type of power do they have? How is their power acquired and maintained? g. Interests 2. Physical security a. Is the civilian population safe from harm? b. Is there a functioning police and judiciary system? c. Are the police fair and non-discriminatory? d. If the police are not providing security, who is? 3. Economic resources a. GDP b. Economic situation in the area c. Poverty and unemployment 4. Political participation a. Do all members of the civilian population have a guarantee of political participation? b. Is there ethnic, religious, or other discrimination? c. Is the government violating human rights? d. Is there an occupying force in the country? e. Do all civilians have access to basic government services, such as health care, sewage, water, electricity, and so forth? f. Are there legal, social, or other policies that contribute to the insurgency? 5. Grievances a. What are the insurgents grievances? b. What are the grievances of the population? c. Would a reasonable person consider them to be valid? d. Are the articulated grievances of the population and those of the insurgency the same? e. What does the government believe to be the grievances of the population? Does it consider those grievances to be valid? f. Are the articulated grievances of the population the same as those perceived by the government? g. Has the government made genuine efforts to address these grievances? 37

39 KAMILA TROCHOWSKA PEOPLE EVENTS 6. Additional Civil Considerations 1. National and religious holidays 2. Agricultural crop/livestock and market cycles 3. Elections 4. Civil disturbances 5. Celebrations h. Are these grievances practically addressable or are they beyond the immediate capacity of the government (for example, major social and economic dislocations caused by globalization)? i. Can armed forces address these interests or grievances to elicit support from the civilian population? a. Languages and dialects spoken by the populace. b. Nonverbal communication, like hand signals and gestures. c. Education levels, including literacy rates, and availability of education. d. Means of communication and its importance to the populace. e. Interpersonal via face-to-face conversation, , or telephone. f. Mass media, such as print publications, radio, television, or the Internet. g. National history and political history. h. Events leading to the insurgency. i. Events contributing to the development of the insurgency. j. The availability of weapons to the general population a. How are the celebrations performed? b. What is the society s attitudes towards them? c. Should armed formations take part in them? How would that be viewed by the population? d. Are there any dangers pertaining to the celebrations? 38 Figure 3. ASCOPE methodology support questions and research areas of the OPE culture categories Although at the beginning the commanders witnessed an improvement of the security situation within their areas of operation, the program identified certain failures such as a lack of trust of the local population (the patrols were uniformed and treated as intelligence units although they were gathering unclassified information), the unpreparedness of civilian scientists (such as anthropologists and sociologists) to function in a battlefield environment, along with objections and the condemnation of the use of social science for military purposes from the American Anthropological Association (CEAUSSIC, 2009); eventually the program was suspended in July 2010 (Human Terrain System, 2011). The final conclusions pertaining to the program were not wholly negative though. Despite the operational use of civilian scientists in the battlefield possibly being a matter of controversy, the methodology of the research and subject matters investigated by HTTs potentially is of use for deployed armed forces. Moreover, in the MNE 6 final report (2011), NATO recommended the use of Human Terrain Teams during operations, however, in a slightly changed shape as a result of the lessons learned.

40 OPERATIONALIZATION OF CULTURE IN COUNTERING ASYMMETRIC THREATS Red Teaming Another initiative aiming at providing opportunities for employing the operationalization of culture in combating asymmetric threats is the U.S. Army Red Teaming concept, developed by The University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS) at Fort Leavenworth. The institution is an Armydirected education, research, and training initiative for Army organizations, joint organizations, and other government agencies (UFMCS website 2011). Red teaming is defined as: a structured, iterative process executed by trained, educated and practiced team members that provides commanders with an independent capability to continuously challenge plans, operations, concepts, organizations and capabilities in the context of the operational environment and from the partners and adversaries perspectives. A Red Team is educated to look at problems from the perspective of the adversary, with the goal of identifying alternative strategies and provides commanders with critical decision-making expertise during planning and operations. Red Team Leaders are expert in: Analysing complex systems and problems from different perspectives to aid in decision making using models of theory. Analysis of the concepts, theories, insights, tools and methodologies of cultural and military anthropology to predict the other s perceptions of our strengths and vulnerabilities. Applying critical and creative thinking in the context of the operational environment to fully explore alternatives to plans, operations, concepts, organizations, and capabilities. Applying advanced analytical skills and techniques at the tactical level through strategic level and develop products supporting command decision making and operational execution (UFMCS, 2011). The Red Team Handbook puts priority on the cultural determinations of the opponent s background, motivations and actions, and to concepts vital for our case. The first are the 13 Critical Variables of the Operational Environment that must be profoundly investigated before any planning: the Physical Environment, Nature and Stability of the Critical Actors, Sociological Demographics, Culture, Regional and Global Relationships, Military Capabilities, Information, Technology, External Organizations Involved, National Will and the Will of Critical Actors, Time, Economics and the Religion of both the area of operation and the uniformed component involved. For a more efficient coping with the task, the Red Teams are advised to use the 9-Step Cultural Methodology that enables the RT members to carry out an in- depth analysis of the area of operation and facilitates the further decision-making process. The 9-Step Cultural Methodology is advised to be used at the beginning of the decision making process to ensure that alternative perspectives and information are available during either the design, assessment or execution of a given operation. 39

41 KAMILA TROCHOWSKA Step 1 focuses on establishing a base line of understanding by examining four ways in which one's own force and the enemy force see each other. At this stage, we must address the following issues: 1. How X (our force) views itself. What are our fundamental beliefs about our motives, values and ourselves? 2. How Y (the enemy) views itself. It is crucial that no cultural or personal bias comes into the analysis, it must be objective and focus on Y s perspective. 3. How X views Y. The next step is to determine how our force views the enemy, and what are the disconnections between our point of view on his actions and his own. 4. How Y views Y. In turn, we also need to understand how the enemy views and assesses us and our actions. Step 2, and all the following, focuses on collecting data and possible explanations of the enemy s culture and identity. In this one, the crucial question will be: What defines Y s social system? What are the Roles of family and tribe? How is social status acquired? What is the family organization? What are the connections between the society and the state? Is the society pluralistic, synergetic or assimilatory? Step 3: What are the sources of power? What is the role of charisma, birth status, violence and law in distributing power? Are politics used for religious purposes or religion is used for political purposes? What are the key institutions in the social structure and how did the leaders of those institutions acquire their role? Step 4: What are the critical narratives of the cultural history? What are the key myths associated with the society s origin and social control? What role did colonialism play? How does the strength of nationhood and citizenship relate to a core concept? Step 5: What is the role of the formal and informal economy? What is the understanding of corruption? How is Y s economy similar or different to our own? How big is the formal economy compared with the informal economy? Why is this so? Step 6: What cultural forms and semiotics are endemic in the society? What are the symbols, values, beliefs, and celebrations? Are there any taboos, rites of passage; or methods of degradation, enhancement, renewal, conflict resolution or integration? Who are the heroes and what traits and deeds are they cherished for? What is the role of emotional outburst and how is it seen by Y s society? Step 7: What sociolinguistics are evident? What is the true nature of greetings and farewells? What rhetoric is used and what type of communication is appreciated? What are the concepts that translate with difficulty into our language? Step 8: What are their core emotional beliefs? For what reasons is it permissible to kill someone (law, honour, revenge)? To what degree is human life valued? Step 9, is the final one and demands the conduction of a cognitive analysis of the ways in which the data and motivations gathered in Steps 2-8 shape the enemy 40

42 OPERATIONALIZATION OF CULTURE IN COUNTERING ASYMMETRIC THREATS (UFMCS, 2011, p ). Afterwards, taking into account the identities and perceptions of the analysis from Step 1, we will be able to indict aspects of our behaviours and actions which we can alter to achieve desired results, through operationalizing crucial features of the enemy s culture. The possibilities of the use of Red Teaming in combating terrorism was noticed much earlier. In the Red Teaming the Terrorist Threat to Preempt the Next Waves of Catastrophic Terrorism (2003), Dr. Joshua Sinai outlines the guidelines for the use of Red Teams in preventing and responding to the terrorist threat. The following range of tasks is prescribed for RT consideration and analysis at each of the three operational levels (Figure 4): Source: Sinai, Figure 4. Red team tasks in analyzing terrorist groups What is also important, in Red Team models, is that a vulnerabilities assessment must be performed by using databases that terrorists would use, not necessarily RT members expert knowledge of what might be the target country s vulnerabilities, because what we consider vital, terrorists may not. Moreover, Red Team members need to understand how a terrorist group goes about deciding on what is important for them to target and what they perceive to be important criteria for measuring the desired impact of an attack (Sinai, 2003), which perfectly fits the rules of the 9-Step Cultural Methodology described and proves the usefulness of the method, and Red Teaming as such, in combating terrorism. 41

43 KAMILA TROCHOWSKA NATO s recommendations on the operationalization of culture The fourth set of recommended solutions is the effect of NATO s Multinational Experiment No 6 that took place in the years The outcomes of Goal 4.3, that focused specifically on cross-cultural awareness in military operations, were included in the SP TRADOC Directorate for Research, Doctrine, Organization and the Materiel Document Operationalization of Culture into Military Operations's Best Practices and provides the official guidelines for NATO nations. It suggests the employment of Foreign Area Officers, the use of Human Terrain Teams, Red & Green Teaming and Re-framing/Profiling actors analysis methods, specifying the requirements for cultural experts (Bados, 2010). The Foreign Area Officers (FAO) or cultural advisers (CULAD) are the principal attachment to the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) or assignment subordinate units on operational culture and planning related to their designated geographical region of expertise while serving as the cultural and sometimes language advisor to the commander. As SMEs, the CULAD advises commanders on the effective integration of operational culture into the Marine Corps planning process. The CULAD provides SME support on operational cultural planning considerations in support of deploying commanders (Bados, 2010, p.13-14). Their main duties are to advise the Commander on the cultural considerations of operational plans, the second and third order effects of operations on the people and their culture. They also participate in exercises, planning groups, conferences and workshops in order to maintain professional competence in core skills. Human Terrain Teams (HTTs), the second recommended concept, are based on the American concept described above, but due to some lessons learned during the original HTT activities, they are modified. They still are five- to nine-person teams with a combined social sciences and operational background, deployed by the Human Terrain System (HTS) to support field commanders by filling their cultural knowledge gap in the current operating environment and providing cultural interpretations of events occurring within their area of operations. Their goal is also the same: to fill the cultural knowledge void by gathering ethnographic, economic, and cultural data on an area of operations and providing databases and tools to support analysis and decision making processes. The NATO-recommended HTTs, however, have a much more developed structure and support, and are built upon seven components, or pillars : human terrain teams, reach-back research cells, subject-matter expert-networks, a tool kit, techniques, human terrain information, and specialized training (Bados, 2010, p ). Their broader scope of research and reach-back support is supposed to protect against the mistakes of the original American HTTs. The last recommended solution is Red & Green Teaming and Re-framing/ Profiling actors analysis methods, a concept that has been pioneered by the Swedish Ministry of Defence, and is in principle a modified version of the 42

44 OPERATIONALIZATION OF CULTURE IN COUNTERING ASYMMETRIC THREATS aforementioned U.S. Army Red Teaming concept. The concept was developed to a point where it was possible to apply a method to generate all the involved actors analysis in order to become more holistic and comprehensive and engulf the different range of stakeholders that coalition s forces have to confront. It could be defined as a method to understand the mindset of relevant actors in an area of operation and to contribute to the staff s learning of the Operational Environment: the Red & Green teams give a voice to the key actors in the operation and their main purpose is that of challenging Blue thinking. They discover hidden assumptions and mirror imaging. The method used by the Red & Green teams (Profiling/reframing) focuses attention on seeking to understand the actors' frames of references in order to come closer to how they might think, what they might want, how they could interpret our actions, and how else we could interpret their beliefs and action. As opposed to using Blue mindset and frames of reference to guess what other actors might think or do. This, in turn, lays better foundations for the development of a potential Red or Green Course of Action (Bados, 2010, p.15). Terrorism, Afghanistan and Iraq: lessons (un)learned Having browsed through existing models, advantages and opportunities of operationalizing culture for combating asymmetrical threats, let us investigate how cultural mistakes can hinder the operation. A Root Cause Analysis1 of the causes of terrorist acts in the area of operation was performed by the author for Afghanistan in the Social and Cultural Aspects of Terrorism. Root Cause Analysis Application in Operation Decision Process 2010 conference speech and article published at the International Peacekeeping Forces Training Center. The work outlined the major cultural factors and causes of the terrorist activity in the region. The ones that have not been previously taken in to account in military planning were varying values, priorities and attitudes towards such fundamental issues as the significance of human life and the creation of one s identity. It was also the cultural background and psychological aspects stemming from it that caused the violence used by the opponent: expressive and existential in nature, as opposed to the instrumental violence preferred by the ISAF forces. And among other crucial socio-cultural factors was the reactive dimension of terrorist acts. They were in the majority of cases response to ISAF forces activities and mistakes resulting from 1 Root cause analysis (RCA) is a problem-solving method that identifies the core causes of problems or events. The RCA as a generic skill that can be applied to any kind of problem, bases on the belief that problems are optimally solved by attempting to correct or eliminate root causes, as opposed to merely addressing the immediately obvious symptoms. By directing corrective actions against the determined root causes, the likelihood of problem recurrence should be minimized or eradicated to. Although since it is obvious that that complete prevention of recurrence by a single intervention is not always possible, RCA may best be an iterative process, and a tool of continuous improvement (Okes 2009). 43

45 KAMILA TROCHOWSKA insufficient knowledge about the area of operation's culture, customs and taboos (Trochowska, 2010). Let us provide a few examples of how cultural misconceptions and misunderstandings pertaining to terrorist activities hinders the very concept of combating it. First of all, we should understand the difference between modern and postmodern terrorism (whose representatives are the contemporary transnational terrorist groups such as Al-Kaida), to which the Tokyo subway sarin attacks of Aum Shinrikyo sect in 1995 gave rise. Post-modern terrorism is by its nature completely different from modern terrorism, embodied by such groups as the IRA. Modern terrorism, was either nationalistically, ethnically or politically driven, but the targeted victims were usually selective and defined. The violence was used in an instrumental fashion, as a tool of changing the reality. The structure of such groups was hierarchical and set, and the support of public opinion was of vast significance (Kamieński, 2009). Combating this type of terrorism was easier, as they were stemming from the system they were operating in and their goal was not the full destruction of the system, but achieving certain specified goals. It was possible to negotiate with the leaders which was evidently proven in the IRA's case, which at least officially is no longer in operation. Post-modern terrorism, however, is denoted as hyper-asymmetrical and culturally alien to the societies that have to deal with it. It is driven by ideological and religious motivations, hence the violence that is used has an expressive (communicative) and even existential dimension, giving the individual and group sometimes the only sense of their very existence. The victims are mass, accidental and not limited with any selection criteria. The organizational structures are network-centric and decentralized, with cells forming ad hoc to fulfil a specific mission. The support of the public opinion is insignificant, what matters though, is the media presence and making as many spectators as possible familiar with the group s goals, attacks and victims in order to install fear, terror and the feeling of a constant threat in the targeted societies. (Kamieński, 2009, p.196). Such distinction and specifications as to the nature of contemporary terrorism enables us to more accurately understand the tactics, motivations, targets and potential courses of action the organizations might choose. Another significant misunderstanding pertaining to contemporary terrorist groups is profiling and myths about the influence of poverty on the rise of terrorist movements. It is significant as it hinders the very concept of preventive military strikes on failing states with a high level of poverty that are said to be the breeding grounds of terrorists. As the 2010 research of Alan Kruger, at the time Assistant US Secretary of State, and Harvard Professor Alberto Abadie proves, there is no indirect connection between low income and education level and terrorism. As controversial as it might seem, when we look at the 9/11 hijackers, over a half of them held university degrees (obtained, nota bene, from American institutions). Also the majority of prisoners detained in Saudi Arabia under the charge of participating in terrorist organizations, generally originate from the middle social 44

46 OPERATIONALIZATION OF CULTURE IN COUNTERING ASYMMETRIC THREATS class (Stern, 2010, p. 100). Another profiling myth is a strong religious affiliation, as only 5% of the detainees have ever performed any formal religious functions. The American edition of Newsweek, moreover, presents the new terrorist profile: young, ambitious and well-educated individuals, with strong personality and motivation. A perfect example of that is provided in the Inside Al-Quaeda article, where Hanif, a young Afghan university student drawn recently to Al-Quaeda to perform a suicidal attack in the tribal regions of Afghanistan is portrayed. As he claims, although he does have a choice of an alternative and prosperous future, becoming a martyr and fighting with the infidels who occupy Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine is the primal and most important life goal (Yousafzai, 2010). Not only did the recruiting standards of terrorist organizations rise. Among some of the young Muslims the emergence of Jihad is Cool phenomenon has been observed (Stern, 2010). Aggressive ideology and joining terrorist organizations is in some circles seen as trendy, the same as listening to rap music and having a fascination with gangster rap culture in Western societies. It might have a source in the sense of belonging and collective identity such groups provide and sometimes it is the only source of identity youth might have in order to fill the existential void. Following the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings Spain s Fidel Sendagorta Gomez del Campillo (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation) noted that Germany s Turkish minority could not be described as integrated, yet Germany had suffered no attacks while the perpetrators of the Madrid and London attacks had been relatively integrated. Whether integration or the lack thereof was a factor in the attacks he said the most worrying trend in Europe was the growing hostility between communities. He stated that, "Young people were motivated by an ideology powerful enough to point them in the direction of murder and suicide-bombings despite living in environments far removed from the more traditional scenes of violence, such as Palestine. Through attacks in Afghanistan, the United States, Spain and the United Kingdom, these young people were also given the impression that victories were possible. In their eyes it was a winning strategy awakening their thirst for honour and glory, concepts he argued which were no longer of relevance in European society" (Sendagorta Gomez del Castillo, 2010). This is a significant and powerful statement. It advances the idea that the moral, ideological and cultural aspects of the phenomenon should be a top priority of social scientists and others who are tasked with combating violent extremism. The next issue, significant in particular in the Afghan realms, and one that is not much spoken of, is the important psychological drive for youth to join terrorist movements. Much has been written about the role of madrasas in the development and inspiration of terrorism; beyond the Pakistani press, however, there is not much space devoted to the common practice of the sexual abuse of boys attending such institutions. Likewise, the rapes committed by the Afghan National Army and Police on young boys are neither reported, nor seem to be noticed by the ISAF 45

47 KAMILA TROCHOWSKA forces, where checkpoints are used as traps for the victims on Thursday evenings (Stern, 2010). Thursday is named the man loving day in that context, as it is believed that the Friday prayers are an absolution, and the local population accepts the status quo, as either the Army or the Police are traditionally considered authorities to which one must be obedient. The fear and humiliation incited in the young men in this way, push them in consequence to join terrorist organizations in order to deal with the trauma they have experienced. The group provides identity and a sense of power that deletes the sense of powerlessness they have felt before. Acts of terror become hence a source of improving the destroyed self-image. Although close relationships between men in Afghanistan are a matter of tradition, ones that are forced are not and have grave indirect security consequences. For the stability forces, leaving the situation to itself and pretending it has never taken place, in order to keep the positive image of the Afghan uniformed formations they have trained, is unacceptable. The next vital issue is that of understanding the reactive character of terrorist activity, which results from the mistakes of our own forces, and their causes are usually misconceptions pertaining to the area of operation's culture. Even very simple cultural behaviour aspects can hinder negotiation, communication and situational awareness as such at the tactical level of operation. One of them is showing emotions, usual for Western cultures, which by the Afghans is seen as a sign of weakness and causes them to lose respect towards the person displaying them. Another of many such things might be that women are on no account spoken about, and showing pictures of the spouse to an Afghan man might make him think that one is a dahwuz a person without honor (CAOCL, 2009, p. 78). And there are plenty more simple rules unfamiliar to deployed personnel that might hinder or destroy communication with the locals and affect negatively the operation. But there are also more grave cultural blunders, at the operational level, such as night raids. International forces rely heavily on night raids to capture or kill high-level insurgents, and such activities are a critical component of NATO s strategy there, but a growing number of Afghans, including President Hamid Karzai, have condemned the raids as disrespectful to Afghan culture, and say they undermine the authority of the government and security forces (Peter, 2011). Although they are a part of COIN strategy and operationally they are justified, the way they are performed creates counter-effective consequences. As Colonel Łukasiewicz from the Polish Armed forces deployed in Ghazni district has observed, an alien man entering an Afghan house is perceived as an unforgivable offence to the man of the house s honour, as he could not protect the privacy of the women living there. The rules pertaining to protecting the women from human sight and a strong sense of honour are strictly obeyed to in Afghan society. Hence, the only way for the man to regain his honour is to take revenge on those who caused him to lose it by either joining the insurgents himself or sending a male member of the family to do so (Łukasiewicz, 2010). Thus, acting in a way that is operationally justified, but 46

48 OPERATIONALIZATION OF CULTURE IN COUNTERING ASYMMETRIC THREATS culturally inappropriate, the ISAF forces hinder their own efforts in stabilizing the security situation and undermine their image, deepening the already existing distrust and grudges against them shared by the area of operation population. Lastly, it has been observed that the structure of any insurgency will reflect the indigenous social organization of the geographical region. Thus, as Montgomery McFate explains in The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture, analysing the Iraqi tribal and kinship system allowed the 4th Infantry Division to capture Saddam Hussein. Although most U.S. forces were preoccupied with locating the 55 high-value targets on the Bush administration s list, Major General Raymond Odierno, USA, understood that relationships of blood and tribe were the key to finding Saddam Hussein. Two total novices, Lieutenant Angela Santana and Corporal Harold Engstrom of 104th Military Intelligence Battalion, were assigned to build a chart to help the 4th Infantry Division figure out who was hiding Saddam. According to Santana, a former executive secretary, their first thought was Is he joking? This is impossible. We can t even pronounce these names. Despite the challenges, they created a huge chart called Mongo Link depicting key figures with their interrelationships, social status, and last-known locations. In the end, the investigated patterns emerged, indicting the extensive tribal and family ties to the six main tribes of the Sunni triangle: the Husseins, al-douris, Hadouthis, Masliyats, Hassans, and Harimyths, which enabled the discovery of Saddam Hussein (McFate, 2005, p.45). This proves evidently how useful ethnographical knowledge can be at the strategic level in detecting and combating asymmetrical threats, if properly operationalized. Conclusion The subject matter analysed in the article provides an overview of only a small number of the many socio-cultural misunderstandings that have a grave impact on the effectiveness of combating post-modern terrorism and insurgency by uniformed formations. The suggested solutions in the operationalization of culture, are also selective, and are intended to serve as potential models to be adjusted to specific operational requirements. Gathered research proves that cultural awareness at the tactical level, and the use of, for instance, Human Terrain Teams there, the ability to internationalize culture at the operational level with the support of tools such as Red Teaming, and cultural competence at the higher levels of the chain of command and the strategic level as specified in the described Combat Studies Institute s outlines, are a prerequisite to success in countering violent extremisms. Without an in-depth understanding of the socio-cultural roots of contemporary threats, which enables full situational awareness, along with basic cultural training and the proper operationalization of culture procedures, combating them will be highly hindered, if not counter-effective. 47

49 KAMILA TROCHOWSKA There is a question, however, of how much of the terrorist s rationale and motivations can we understand if in the majority of cases we are able to do research on only the major cultural patterns of the societies the extremists originate from. However, their motivations, reaction mode and set of values will be highly corresponding to the general patterns that manifest themselves in problematic situations and particular circumstances. What we should focus on then, will be the wide, socio-cultural background of the phenomenon, not only its individual, security, behavioural or statistic dimensions to gain the full picture. This will enable us to focus on the critical aspects of the culture of the area of operation such as values, morality, different world perceptions and include them in the decision process in order to benefit fully from the possibilities offered by the operationalization of culture. Only then can we effectively continue the ISR activities, choose the most appropriate courses of action, eliminate root causes of threats and after comprehensive assessment of our actions, carry out successful counterterrorism and counterinsurgency endeavours. And in the long term build a stable, multicultural environment of global security. References American Anthropological Association (2009). Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Communities (CEAUSSIC). Final Report on The Army s Human Terrain System Proof of Concept Program. Retrieved from Bados, V. (2010). Operationalization of Culture into Military Operations. Best Practices. Granada: SP TRADOC. CACOL USMC (2009). Operational Culture for Deploying Personnel. Quantico: Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning of the U.S. Marine Corps, Training And Education Command. Coker, C. (2006). Cultural Ruthlessness and the War Against Terror. Australian Army Journal, Vol III, Number 1, Finney, N. (2008). Human Terrain Team Handbook. Kansas: Fort Leavenworth Human Terrain System. Fulk, B. (2011) An Evaluation of Counterinsurgency as a Strategy for Fighting the Long War. Carlisle Papers Series. Carlisle: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. Gentile, G. (2009) A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army. Retrieved from Human Terrain System (2011). U.S. Army official website. humanterrainsystem.army.mil/default.htm Stubbs, J. (1998). Superterrorism and the Military Instrument of Power. Alabama: Maxwell Air Force Base. Retrieved from: Jałoszyński, K. (2008). Contemporary Dimensions of Antiterrorism. Warsaw: TRIO. 48

50 OPERATIONALIZATION OF CULTURE IN COUNTERING ASYMMETRIC THREATS Kamieński, Ł. (2009). Technology and Future Warfare. Nuclear and Information Revolutions in Military Affairs. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Kim, Y. (2009). Cultural Dimensions of Strategy and Policy. Carlisle: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. McFate, M. (2005). The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture. Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 38, Peter, T. (2011). Afghanistan: NATO's night raids cause more harm than good, report says. Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved from Theil, S. (2010). Germany Censors Itself. American edition of Newsweek. Sept. 13 Issue, 42. Yousafzai, S. (2010). Inside Al-Quaeda. American edition of Newsweek. Sept. 13 Issue, Sendagorta Gomez del Campillo, F. (2006). The Madrid Terror Bombing. ISS Forum speech: Islam and Terrorism. What Can We Learn from London and Madrid Bombings. Retrieved from Sinai, J. (2003). Red Teaming the Terrorist Threat to Preempt the Next Waves of Catastrophic Terrorism. 14th Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium & Exhibition. Retrieved from Stern, J. (2010). Mind Over Martyr. How to Deradicalize Islamist Extremists. Foreign Affairs, January/February (89), The University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS) official website. Fort Leavenworth. Trochowska, K. (2010). Social and Cultural Aspects of Terrorism. Root Cause Analysis Application in Operation Decision Process. Conference speech and article. Terrorism and Military Operations. Kielce: International Peacekeeping Forces Training Center. Tzu, S. (2002) The Art of War: The Denma Translation. Boston: Schambala Publications. UFMCS. (2011). Red Team Handbook. US Army University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: UFMCS. U.S. Department of Defense. (2008). Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP 1-02). Washington: JCS. Wunderle, W. D. (2007). Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for US Armed Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press. 49

51 NDU Zeszyty Scientific Naukowe Quarterly AON nr no 2(59) 3(92) ISSN MAREK BRYLONEK SECURITY CRISIS IN THE SAHEL REGION Col Ph.D. Marek BRYLONEK Polish Military Gendarmerie Headquarters Abstract Crisis situations in the Sahel region are nothing new. However geographical vicinity of Europe, historical ties, considerable Sahel states diasporas living in Europe and in particular last events with direct participation of numerous European countries brought an increased interest in the Sahel in many professional groups. It is worth to take a closer look at this region. The article contains a review of the crisis reasons and intertied reactions of international organizations, describing complexity of solving crises in Africa. Since recently African organizations have also been involved in dealing with crises on their continent. Nevertheless there is no doubt that international community is only at the outset of delivering assistance to the Sahel states. Key words security, crisis, Africa, Sahel 50 It is a veritable ocean, a separate planet, A varied, immensely rich cosmos. Only with the greatest simplification,for the sake of convenience, can we say Africa. Introduction R. Kapuściński The Sahel is an immense geographical region in North Africa. It is stretching from the west coast to the east coast of Africa, respectively through Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Sudan, until Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Sahel s western and central parts are mainly desert. They are home for a few antagonizing desert populations, since decades conducting destructive struggles (Figure 1). The security crisis in the region of western and central Sahel should not be surprising for international community. The situation of the states located there is characterized by poverty, economic underdevelopment, malnutrition of society and complete lack of perspectives for any ameliorations. These facts are leading to consecutive phases of humanitarian crisis, internal social conflicts, formation of

52 SECURITY CRISIS IN THE SAHEL REGION criminal groups and organized crime as well as terrorist activities. The consequences of the Libyan crisis aggravated this situation, resulting in numbers of armed bandits and extremists stepping from Libya to southern states 1. Source: Muggah R., Zyck S., Conflicts in Mali and the Sahel. International Journal of Stability and Development. 06/ London Figure 1. The Sahel s region Northern regions of Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad, because of their vast, uninhabited, difficult to control spaces and very often only contractual borders, became kingdom of crime and lawlessness (Figure 2). There are various terrorist and bandit groups operating at these areas. The most influential among them are the Touaregs, part of whom is grouped into the National Movement of the Azawad s 2 Liberation MNLA (fr. Mouvement National de Libération de l Azawad), Al-Qaida of the Islamic Maghreb AQMI (fr. Al-Qaida Maghreb Islamique) together with its fraction Movement for Unity and Jihad of the Western Africa MUJAO (fr. Mouvement pour l Unité et du Jihad an Afrique de l Ouest). Because of the terrorist attacks resulting in deaths of many American and European citizens, since 2008 the Sahel s region has raised interest of international organizations and states possessing there their employees and citizens. The European Union, the United Nations organizations and also among others Canada, France and the United States started deliberations on possible ways of preventing banditry and terrorist attacks (Figure 2). 1 B. Pacek, New missions of the European Union. NDU Scientific Papers. 4(89)/2012. Warsaw 2012, p Azawad region at the north of the Republic of Mali which is a subject of claims of Touaregs, aiming at founding their own independent state under the same name (author s note). 51

53 MAREK BRYLONEK Source: Busch, G.K., The Logistics of the war in the Sahel. International Journal of Security and Development. 06/ London Figure 2. Area of terrorist activity in the Sahel region 52 Anti-crisis activities of international organizations African Union After the military coup d état against the President of the Republic of Mali Mr. Amadou Toumani Touré which had taken place on the 21 March 2012, the African Union (AU) suspended Mali as a member of this organization. It also severely condemned the coup, as an event destabilizing the country and contributing to an overall growth of the tensions in the region. Moreover, the African Union addressed three international organizations for assistance in restoration of constitutional order in the Republic of Mali: 1. The Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS The United Nations. 3. The European Union. 3 ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States is a regional group of 15 countries, founded in Its mission is to promote economic integration in all fields of economic activity, particularly industry, transport, telecommunications, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions, social and cultural matters. (Source: access: )

54 SECURITY CRISIS IN THE SAHEL REGION M A L I Source: self-elaboration. Figure 3. Exposition of organizations and states actively engaged in amelioration of security situation in Mali and in the Sahel The African Union undertook further actions directed at solving the crisis. During the African Union Peace and Security Council summit on the 24 October 2012 a Strategic Concept for the Resolution of Crises in Mali was adopted 4. The main goal of this Concept was to define conditions of strengthening the regional and international efforts and mobilization of all possible forces and means to ensure lasting stabilization of the Republic of Mali. The Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission also describes the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS, directed at starting mediations between the Mali s Goverment of National Unity GNU and the Touareg rebel organization MNLA (fr. Mouvement National de Liberation de l Azawad), but also at a possible deployment of the ECOWAS states mission at the Malian territory 5. 4 Crisis Management Concept for a possible CSDP mission in Mali. European External Action Service. Brussels p Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Strategic Concept for the Resolution of the Crises in Mali. African Union. Addis Ababa p

55 MAREK BRYLONEK The Strategic Concept of the African Union (AU) 6 contains seven indirect, short-, mid- and long-term objectives regarding solving the crisis in Mali, ones if, in accordance with experts opinions, fulfilled, will ensure lasting stabilization of the Republic of Mali. These indirect objectives are 7 : 1. Governance within Mali. 2. Preservation of Mali s national unity and territorial integrity. 3. Organization of free, fair and transparent elections. 4. Reform of the security sector. 5. Stabilization, justice and support to post-conflict peace building efforts. 6. Addressing international terrorism and transnational organized crime. 7. Provision of humanitarian aid and facilitation of return of Internally Displaces Persons and refugees. The strategic concept of the AU is specifically turning attention to two basic aspects. First of them is in the regard of the scope of undertaken activities encompassing the territory of the whole Sahel and not only of the Republic of Mali, to ensure stabilization in the whole region thus to avoid emergence of similar incentive points in other Sahelian capitals. The second aspect is in the regard of the necessity of provision of help to the AU by other international organizations. In this context the AU is in particular turning attention to the need of cooperation with the UN and the EU justifying that with the use of its own means and assets, the AU will not be able to fulfill the goals set up in its strategic concept. The AU had also pointed out that any possible engagement of the African countries in a military operation would only be a bridging deployment. It should be noted that the AU role in solving this conflict was as a matter of fact limited to the so called soft power. The reason for that was not a general tendency for solving conflicts by the AU, but rather a simple lack of means and assets enabling conduct of an autonomous peace enforcement military operation. Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS On 13 June 2012 during the annual meeting of the United Nations Security Council with the African Union Peace and Security Council, the Chairman of ECOWAS requested for an agreement to deploy the ECOWAS Standby Brigade with the aim of stabilizing the situation in Mali. The UN Security Council agreed this deployment to accomplish the following goals 8 : i) Ensure the security of the Transitional Government and Institutions, ii) Restructure and reorganize the Malian security sector, 6 Strategic Concept for the Resolution of the Crises in Mali. African Union. Addis Ababa 2012, p Ibidem, p Strategic Concept for the Resolution of the Crises in Mali. African Union. Addis Ababa 2012, p

56 SECURITY CRISIS IN THE SAHEL REGION iii) Restore state authority over the northern part of the country, iv) Combat terrorism and criminal networks. ECOWAS started planification efforts on preparations and deployment of military forces in the Republic of Mali. It also immediately turned for help of the UN and the EU for military expertize in operational planning, logistics and reconnaissance. Initially the ECOWAS mission was to be named MICEMA (ECOWAS Mission in the Republic of Mali) and was to consist of 5000 troops. Planned tasks of the mission were to be: (i) restoration of constitutional order, by means of force if necessary and (ii) provision of help to the Malian army to regain control over the whole country s territory. It was assumed that this mandate will be executed by (1) protection of civilian population, (2) provision of security for the benefit of humanitarian and non-government organizations, (3) creation of conditions for safe transport movement and (4) creation of conditions for return of displaced persons and refugees. The linchpin of operational forces was to be created by four ECOWAS countries, that is Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Ivory Coast. Very soon it turned out that without a considerable support by other organizations the mission might not take place at all. The ECOWAS was missing key means and assets, like for example strategic and tactical transport, integrated command and control system, elements of medical coverage. At the end of 2012 the name of the planned mission was changed to AFISMA (African-led International Support Mission in Mali). The African organizations and countries had interest to underline the intervention s continental dimension. With help of the UN and the EU planners preparatory works were finalized, while the UN Security Council in its Resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012 authorized the deployment of the AFISMA mission at the Malian territory, for an initial period of one year. In accordance with its mandate the mission was to undertake any actions deemed necessary, in line with the international humanitarian law and with respect to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Mali, aimed at 9 : (a) Rebuilding the Malian security forces, (b) Supporting the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north of its territory under the control of terrorists, extremists and armed groups, in reducing their capabilities, while taking appropriate measures not to threat the civilian population, (c) Supporting the Malian authorities in maintaining security, (d) Supporting the Malian authorities in their primary responsibility to provide protection to the population, (e) Supporting the Malian authorities in creating the Safe and Secure Environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid and the voluntary return of displaced persons and refugees, (f) Protecting the mission s personnel, premises and equipment. 9 Resolution 2085 (2012). UN Security Council. New York 2012, p

57 MAREK BRYLONEK At the beginning of 2013 terrorists offensive from the northern Mali started. They started their movement south with the aim of taking control of the central and southern parts of the country. In response to the deteriorating situation in Mali, president of the French Republic, François Hollande, in accordance with previous agreements with the Malian authorities and the African Union and in the execution of the UN Security Council Resolution 2085, on 11 January 2013 declared France s readiness to stop the jihadists offensive. On the same day the French operation Serval began 10. The AFISMA s deployment commenced on 17 January 2013 with the arrival of the Nigerian military contingent numbering approximately 1000 troops. The following week Burkina Faso military contingent arrived to Mali with around 150 troops. It is estimated that on 31 January 2013 the AFISMA forces were about 1400 soldiers from among others Nigeria, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Niger. The incoming national contingents were deployed in strategic towns in the north and in the south of Mali. It is assessed that on 3 March 2013 the AFISMA was counting approximately 6000 troops, with the biggest contributions of Chad (about 2000 troops), Nigeria (about 1000 troops), Togo (about 700 troops), Niger (about 700 troops) and Senegal (about 500 troops) 11. From the beginning of the AFISMA s deployment it was clear that the intervention of the ECOWAS forces was only an initial support for the Republic of Mali and that in the future this mission will be replaced by another one under the UN auspices. The efficiency of the Economic Community of West African States military operation since the very beginning was limited by small amounts of available key means and assets. Moreover, the realities of the Sahel region implicated doubts of the interim Malian authorities with regard to the effectiveness of neighboring states forces, if those states were coping with similar problems as the Republic of Mali. United Nations On 25 April 2013 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted the Resolution 2100 establishing the UN mission in the Republic of Mali, known under the acronym MINUSMA (fr. Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali). The transfer of responsibility for the theatre of operations between the AFISMA and MINUSMA missions took place on 1 July The UN mission manpower authorized by its mandate was of uniformed personnel (11200 military and 1440 police). 10 Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the AFISMA. African Union. Addis Ababa. 2013, p Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the AFISMA. African Union. Addis Ababa 2013, p

58 SECURITY CRISIS IN THE SAHEL REGION The MINUSMA s mandate obliged the mission to support the Malian authorities to ensure stabilization in the main agglomerations, to protect civilian population, to support political and electoral processes and to ensure that human rights were respected 12. Even though the majority of the ECOWAS forces re-hatted and became the MINUSMA s forces, as the AFISMA s manpower was about 6500 troops, it was vital to conduct a new force generation. The fact that the UN took over the responsibility, once again proved that as a matter of fact it was the only organization capable of executing such multidimensional and integrated missions. The MINUSMA s mandate was defined as robust peacekeeping. It meant that the blue helmets had authority to use force not only in self-defence, but first of all to defend the mission s mandate. In practice it meant that the force could be used at the tactical level against anybody hampering the mandate s execution. However, in accordance with its mandate, MINUSMA was neither a peace enforcement mission nor an antiterrorist operation. The UN soldiers should not then undertake direct fire confrontations with the armed groups from the north of Mali. This task was entrusted to the French operation Serval, whose mandate derived as a conjunction of the Malian authorities agreement for intervention and the UN Security Council Resolution The MINUSMA s initial mandate was foreseen for 12 months starting from 1 July It should be in particular noted that most of the MINUSMA s personnel served before in the AFISMA mission as citizens of Mali s neighboring countries, whose presence the Malians approached with caution. The interim Malian government in the role of organization which could deliver particularly valuable assistance to this state saw the European Union. European Union Anticipating development of possible scenarios for security situation in the Sahel region, the European Union (EU) still in 2010 began strategic planification works over a possible support to this region. In 2011 the EU adopted the strategy for security and development in the Sahel, a document normalizing types and scope of possible assistance options. The EU also started considerations over a possible deployment of a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) mission. At the end of 2011 when the situation in Mali started to aggravate, Niger was the only peace refuge in the western Sahel region. The authorities of the Republic of Niger demonstrated an explicit inclination of solving inherent troubles, particularly taking measures against their spill-over to other countries. The authorities of Niger, as of the only 12 Resolution 2100 (2013). UN Security Council. New York 2013, p Tardy, T. Alert. Mali: the UN takes over. European Union Institute for Security Studies. Paris 2013, p

59 MAREK BRYLONEK one of the three potential states, in which the EU CSDP mission could be functioning, formulated a clear desire to host the mission. The strategic goal of the CSDP engagement in the Sahelian states is to strengthen the political stability, the security and the rule-of-law. The derivative of this goal is to improve the efficiency of the security forces, something that should potentially weaken the terrorist and bandit groups, Al-Qaida in particular, and in the future eliminated them entirely. The Republic of Niger is in possession of three kinds of security forces: National Police, National Guard and Gendarmerie. Nevertheless their operational capabilities and effectiveness are not sufficient. The EUCAP Sahel Niger mission focused on the training and efficacy enhancement of these three kinds of security forces. This mission comprises around 50 persons of international staff. Its majority are lawyers, judges, policemen and gendarmes. The EUCAP Sahel Niger is executing its tasks through training, monitoring, assistance and coordination of the Niger s security forces 14. Except for the mission in Niger, the EU since January 2013 has deployed to Mali the military training mission EUTM Mali, also being a part of the EU strategy for security and development in the Sahel. In accordance with contents of the UN Security Council Resolution 2071 of 12 October 2012, urging international organizations to deliver assistance to the Malian authorities to enhance capabilities and efficiency of their armed forces 15, the EU decided on its participation with a reservation that the training Mission would only operate at the territory of the safer southern part and would not support in any way the operational activity in the north 16. In pursuance of the adopted mandate, the EUTM Mali received a short horizon objective to supplement operational shortfalls of the Malian armed forces by: (i) Training of a Joint Tactical Task Force of a battalion size GTIA (fr. Groupements Tactiques Interarmes) and his supporting units. (ii) Advising in the scope of creation and functioning of the command and control systems. (iii) Advising in the scope of logistic systems functioning. In medium and long horizons, the Mission will be engaged in advising and mentoring to the Malian armed forces in the scope of modern methods of command and management 17. Apart from the two above mentioned crisis management missions, the EU also proposed execution of additional services in favour of the AFISMA mission. These services took form of the clearing house mechanism. The aim for activation of this clearing house platform was to support the AFISMA mission so 14 Pacek B., New missions of the European Union. NDU Scientific Papers. 4(89)/2012. Warsaw 2012, p Resolution 2071 (2012). UN Security Council. New York 2012, p Crisis Management Concept for a possible CSDP military mission in Mali. European External Action Service. Brussels 2012, p Ibidem, p

60 SECURITY CRISIS IN THE SAHEL REGION as to enable it to achieve full operational capabilities, in particular through coordination of national contingents deployment and in a further perspective through coordination of transports of equipment, armament and ammunition 18. The clearing house for supporting the ECOWAS mission was located in Brussels and was based on the means and assets of the EU Military Staff (EUMS), being a part of the European External Action Service. It used to be functioning as the main office for gathering all requests incoming via EUMS liaison officers from African states contributing to the AFISMA mission. It was also collecting offers of assistance to AFISMA incoming from the EU member states as well as from the third states. As the next step the clearing house used to distribute the offers of assistance according to previously received requests. The EU engagement in solving the crisis in the Sahel region is complex and multidimensional. It is justified by the current level of ambition of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, permitting to deploy a few non-executive missions of a limited manpower (30 50 soldiers and/or policemen), rather than one bigger executive mission. To sum things up, the EU presence in the Sahel in manifesting itself through the civilian advisory police mission EUCAP Sahel Niger and through the military advisory training mission EUTM Mali. During the functioning of the ECOWAS AFISMA mission, that is in the first half of 2013, the EU was also providing clearing house services in favour of this mission. French operation Serval As a response to the request of the interim president of the Republic of Mali, on 11 January 2013 France started the military intervention with the aim of regaining control of the three northern provinces ruled by armed islamic groups. The president of France decided in a few weeks time that French armed forces would conduct the intervention. The reasons for the French intervention are defined as (i) the will to defend the integrity of Mali, (ii) the will to prevent destabilization of Mali and neighboring states and (iii) the obligation to fight terrorism 19. The French Republic as the first country in the world warned the international community about the presence of radical terrorist groups in the north of Mali. Moreover, France as the first NATO country started the intervention, being aware that with all probability no other state would join them in a spectacular way. Even the fact that terrorists kept French hostages in the north of Mali did not stop the intervention. Potential threats which might appear in result of France s military actions were in detail analyzed by the ministerial offices in Paris. In fact two main factors decided that the intervention took place. First of them were geographical 18 EEAS provides a Clearing House mechanism to support AFISMA mission in Mali. Press information. European External Action Service. Brussels 2013, p De Boissière, J.B. Operation Serval in Mali: Fight against the terrorism and the Strengthening of fragile states. National Strategy Forum Review. Chicago 2013, p

61 MAREK BRYLONEK conditions. Regions of the north of Mali are vast desert areas easily enabling identification and elimination of armed gangs. In open spaces even well-armed bandit groups, do not have chances in confrontation with modern armies, equipped with newest technologies. The second factor was the hostile attitude of local Malian society towards the terrorists. The reason for that were crimes which they committed on local populations, such as rapes, burning houses or child-soldiers recruitment. The majority of terrorists had come from Arab states so they did not have any connections to Mali. This context completely differed from guerilla activities supported by local societies 20. During the first two days of the intervention, the French air force conducted bombardments of the moving south terrorist groups. The terrorists logistic infrastructures in the north of Mali were also bombed. The first French combat group was formed of their elements stationing in Chad, Senegal and Ivory Coast. New components of forces and equipment were transported from France. At the end of January 2013 French land forces, supported by attack helicopters, liberated the towns of Timbuktu and Gao. At the beginning of February the antiterrorist offensive was finished. In March, with the assistance of Chadian army, French parachute units started fights to liberate the terrorists stronghold in Kidal, the north-east region of Mali. French forces were approximately 4000 troops. At the beginning of April, France started withdrawal, under the assumption that French forces would be partly relieved by the ECOWAS mission. In September 2013, François Hollande announced victory in the war with terrorists. He also informed the newly-elected president of Mali, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, about further readiness of France to support Mali, should it be needed 21. EUROGENDFOR, EGF European Gendarmerie Force The EUROGENDFOR was established on 17 September 2004 in Noordwijk, the Netherlands. Its foundation was proposed in the frame of the European Security and Defence Policy as a contribution to ensure security and respect for law and justice, by the French Minister of Defence (MOD) Michele Alliot-Marie, during an informal EU MOD meeting in Rome in October The French initiative was first of all supported by the MODs of Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, all possessing police forces with the military status, capable of execution of police tasks of strengthening and substitution of local police. In this way new forces were created, able to execute police tasks in crisis management operations, named European Gendarmerie Force. The EUROGENDFOR can be used under the Ibidem, p Tramond, O. Early lessons learned from France s operation Serval in Mali. Army Magazine. Arlington 2013, p. 4.

62 SECURITY CRISIS IN THE SAHEL REGION auspices of the EU, the NATO, the UN or other international organization or coalition of states 22. The EGF members are 7 EU countries possessing police forces with military status: France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Spain. Moreover, Lithuania is an EGF partner, while Turkey an observer. At the beginning of 2013, during the Dutch presidency of the EUROGENDFOR decision-making committee CIMIN (fr. Comité Interministeriel du Haut Niveau), initial planification efforts over a possible EGF engagement in the police mission in Mali started. The CIMIN decided that the EUROGENDFOR should be above all functioning under the EU auspices. As all EGF members are also EU members, the EUROGENDFOR is institutionally closest to the EU. Furthermore, in results of consultations with the EU crisis management structures, the Republic of Mali was indicated as a country in which the EUROGENDFOR mission would be most desired. The EGF also sent their strategic planners to the EU structures in Brussels. In September 2013 the planners took part in an EU technical mission for a new potential EU EUROGENDFOR engagement in Mali. As a result of conducted efforts, a EUROGENFOR options paper for Mali was elaborated. It was based upon the assumption that because of already considerable international presence in Mali, the EGF mission would only have a supportive role with manpower of about 50 personnel and would be focused on training and advisory functions for the benefit of one or more of three types of security forces functioning in Mali: Gendarmerie, Police or National Guard 23. As regards the mission s expertise it was assumed that the training and advisory activities would not only embrace typical police skills but also functional elements of each security structure, like financial, personnel and logistic issues. In the options paper, two possibilities for the EGF deployment in Mali were deliberated. Beforehand, common assumptions for these options were adopted 24 : 1. The EUROGENDFOR mission will be part of an EU mission. 2. It will be a non-executive training and advisory mission. 3. It will be located in Mali s capital Bamako. 4. The mission s activities will be conducted basing on two already existing Malian training centres located in the vicinity of Bamako i.e. police training centre and gendarmerie training centre. Option no. 1 vertical activities conducted at strategic, operational and tactical levels in favour of one of the three Malian security forces, that is gendarmerie, police or national guard. Formation which is preferred by EGF planners is gendarmerie because of obvious similarities of structures and 22 The European Gendarmerie Force: Beyond potential. Policy brief. Clingendael Conflict Research Unit. Hague 2012, p EUROGENDFOR options paper for Mali. EUROGENDFOR Permanent Headquarters. Vicenza 2013, p Ibidem, p

63 MAREK BRYLONEK functioning. It is assumed that the activities would be mainly focused on training for higher personnel and advising for the benefit of key personnel. Option no. 2 horizontal functioning at one level only, strategic, operational or tactical in favour of all three listed above security forces. In this option, the EGF mission would be the main part of the EU mission training component. Basing on the Malian training centres, the EGF would mainly conduct police skills training, that is criminal reconnaissance, investigations, terrorism and organized crime counteraction and methods of intervention. Because of a higher visibility the option no. 2 is preferred 25. There are expectations that final decisions on this engagement shall be made in the second or third quarter of Conclusion The security crisis in the Sahel and the accompanying internal conflicts are amongst the biggest contemporary security threats possessing a direct impact on the situation in Europe. For these reasons many international organizations and single states engaged in solving of this crisis. Planification processes for new missions are ongoing. However, many years are needed to shape and train effective and reliable security and armed forces in the Sahelian countries. The terrorists activities in the Republic of Mali belonged to the most severe and demanded for a robust international military intervention. As the terrorist groups were considerably weakened and the situation became calmer, the time came for activities of humanitarian and non-governmental organizations to commence processes to ameliorate living conditions of society, education and medical services. Bibliography Busch, G.K., The Logistics of the war in the Sahel. International Journal of Security and Stability. June/July London De Boissière, J.B. Operation Serval in Mali: Fight against the terrorism and the Strengthening of fragile states. National Strategy Forum Review. Chicago Crisis Management Concept for a possible CSDP military mission in Mali. European External Action Service. Brussels Crisis Management Concept for a CSDP mission in the Sahel. European External Action Service. Brussels EUROGENDFOR options paper for Mali. EUROGENDFOR Permanent Headquarters. Vicenza Ibidem, p. 6.

64 SECURITY CRISIS IN THE SAHEL REGION European External Action Service provides a Clearing House mechanism to support AFISMA mission in Mali. Press information. European External Action Service. Brussels European Union Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. European External Action Service. Brussels Pacek B., New missions of the European Union. NDU Scientific Papers. 4(89)/2012. Warsaw Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Strategic Concept for the Resolution of the Crises in Mali. African Union. Addis Ababa Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the AFISMA. African Union. Addis Ababa Resolution 2071 (2012). UN Security Council. New York Resolution 2085 (2012). UN Security Council. New York Resolution 2100 (2013). UN Security Council. New York Strategic Concept for the Resolution of the Crises in Mali. African Union. Addis Ababa Tardy, Thierry. Alert. Mali: the UN takes over. European Union Institute for Strategic Studies. Paris The European Gendarmerie Force: Beyond potential. Policy brief. Clingendael Conflict Research Unit. Hague Tramond, Olivier. Early lessons learned from France s operation Serval in Mali. Army Magazine. Arlington

65 NDU Zeszyty Scientific Naukowe Quarterly AON nr no 2(59) 3(92) ISSN PAULINA ZAMELEK THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION S WORKS ON THE DEFENCE SECTOR Paulina ZAMELEK, Ph.D. Armaments Policy Department, MoND, Poland Abstract The article presents the initiatives that the European Commission has undertaken with regard to the European defence sector, which traditionally was in the member states domain. The article describes the process in which the Commission strengthens its competences on various aspects of the internal market that influences defence enterprises and the way that member States procure military systems. At the same time, the existing prerogatives concerning the essential security interests enshrined in the EU Treaties received a new interpretation, which stimulates the integration process of the defence sector leading to an increase in EU competitiveness. Key words European Commission; defence industry; common market; European; defence market; consolidation; defence procurement The EU integration process in the defence sector allows some European institutions to increase their powers in areas that have traditionally been perceived as being essential national security and defence interests. This process is pushed by such aspects as the defence market concentration, the internationalization of production, multilateral cooperation and the joint development of armaments. These go in line with the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). National protectionism is seen at the EU level as a reason for the inefficiency of the European defence market and the inability to create an effective policy towards the defence industry. Therefore, all EU initiatives are aimed at increasing the cooperation and competitiveness of the European defence industrial sector. A number of European institutions and agencies have a real impact on the activities related to the European defence industries. In practical terms the following have a significant say on the defence sector issues: the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the Court of Justice of the European Union, as well as the 64

66 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION S WORKS ON THE DEFENCE SECTOR Economic and Social Committee. Among them all, it is the European Commission (EC) that has the strongest influence on the formation of industrial policy in the defence sector. The analysis of proposals and actions on this matter made by this institution is the subject of this article. Engaging in defence industrial policy The European Commission implements the so called EU defence industrial policy that seeks to promote competition, innovation, the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and to ensure a strong industrial base for the ESDP. The focal point of the EC s actions is the defence package, which represents a set of documents defining the principles of the modern political and legal framework which contributes to an improvement of competitiveness, bringing a greater transparency and cutting unnecessary red-tape in the defence sector 1. Such a bold approach to shaping policies and formulating priorities for the defence industry is a relatively new element in the policy of the EC. The defence sector issues as understood in a strictly political dimension have so far been a solely national domain, sometimes gaining an intergovernmental approach, but not a supranational one. EC intervention in defence sector issues was so far limited to dual-use goods 2. In the 1980s, the Council of Ministers of the European Communities rejected all proposals concerning liberalization in the trade for defence materiel and the harmonization of acquisition procedures for military equipment 3. However, in the last two decades, the EC in its role as the single market regulator has repeatedly indicated its willingness to have a closer look at armament issues in Europe. With the intention of bringing greater efficiency in the defence sector, the EC had already in the 1990 stated that: It is also in the interest of the Community to bring defence equipment protection and trade fully under the discipline of the common market, which would involve inter alia the removal of article 223 in the Treaty of Rome 4. This resulted in a slow linkage of the defence and armaments matters into European mainstream integration. Nevertheless, the 1 European Defence Industrial Policy. European Commission. (14 July 2013). 2 P. Wieczorek, Perspektywy współpracy Polski z państwami NATO w sferze przemysłu obronnego, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Warszawa Toruń 1998, pp ; J. Mawdsley, The Gap between rhetoric and reality: Weapons Acquisition and ESDP, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Bonn 2002, pp D. Greenwood, Report on a Policy for Promoting Defence and Technological Co-operation Among West European Countries, European Communities Commission, Brussels 1980; A. Fergusson, Report on Arms Procurement within a Common Industrial Policy and Arms Sales, European Parliament, 1-455/83, 27 June 1983, Luxemburg. 4 Cf. U. Mörth, Competing frames in the European Commission the case of the defence industry and equipment issue, Journal of European Public Policy, 2000, vol. 7, no 2, pp ; U. Mörth, Framing the defence industry equipment issue the case of the European commission, SCORE Rapportserie, 1999, no 1. _fs/ !/19991.pdf (8 August 2013). 65

67 PAULINA ZAMELEK consolidation of national defence industries, from the EC s point of view, as a spill-off to economic integration, aims to achieve two main objectives 5 : the harmonization of research programs and defence procurement, which would help to rationalize the global military spending of the EU and contribute to the formation of the ESDP; the establishment of a pan-european defence market, that would be free of national barriers; this would constitute a fully free competition in this area. Having conducted a series of studies and analysis on various aspects of the defence and aviation sectors in the EU, the European Commission began to present its own proposals on the formation of a consolidated European defence industry. At first, it concerned soft law documents, such as communications, reports or guidelines. Their objective was to contribute to the effectiveness and transparency of the European Community. There was also an intension to strengthen the EC s own legitimacy in the area, where the sui genesis acts were not binding in practice, but could produce legal effects 6. and helping to restructure One of the Commission s functions has been to provide financial support for the restructuring of the defence industry through various programs implemented under the instruments covered by the Structural Funds. Although their objective wasn t to invest in the defence industry as such, but they lead to supporting the regions that required assistance in economic development. Therefore, they became a symbol of European solidarity and shared responsibility for the economic and social consequences of the disarmament undertaken. Regarding regions, that were heavily dependent on the defence industry, support was implemented through programs such as PERIFRA I and II, KONVER I and II, OBJECTIF-2 or ADAPT. In 1991 the European Commission adopted the PERIFRA program, and a year later PERIFRA II. They were focused on the peripheral areas which were facing particularly serious economic problems, such as: high unemployment, environmental degradation or isolation (distant location). These programs were not directly focused on the defence industry, but helped in the conversion of some entities where the effects of demilitarization related to the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the liquidation of military bases, as well as most of the munitions factories, were the most visible and severe. This trend was evidenced in the scale of the use of PERIFRA programs out of the 53 projects subsidized by the program, 21 were related to the reduction of military activity 7. 5 P. Turczyński, Przemysł zbrojeniowy Unii Europejskiej na początku XXI wieku, Polska w Europie, 2004, no 3 (47), pp A. Zawidzka, Wspólnotowe prawo pochodne w: Unia Europejska. System prawny, porządek instytucjonalny, proces decyzyjny, J. Barcz (ed.), KSAP Instytut Wydawniczy EuroPrawo, Warszawa 2009, pp N. Hooper, N. Cox, The European Union Konver programme, Defence and Peace Economics, 1996, vol. 7, no 1, pp

68 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION S WORKS ON THE DEFENCE SECTOR The KONVER program and KONVER II were implemented in the years under the framework of the European Social Fund. They also aimed at the reconversion of regions that were dependent on the defence industry and military bases. The programs lead to the support of small and medium-sized enterprises. Some former military facilities were restored to the "civil" state. Various touristic activities and training centres were initiated. It was estimated that as a result of the KONVER programs about 700 million was spent from only The biggest beneficiary of the region at that time was the German Democratic Republic. But almost all European countries have applied for similar financial assistance from the EU funds 8. The essence of the OBJECTIF-2 program was to reduce the extent of the disparities in the level of the economic development of the Member States of the European Communities. It concerned the areas that risked decommissioning in the sphere of declining industries, especially in regions with low industrialization. Hence the support provided by this program concerned the development of new economic activities in those regions and the enhancement of the unemployed's activity on the market. The defence industry branch has proven to be the major beneficiary in the many countries where the program was conducted. In particular with regard to the infrastructure development, providing training events or other forms of education to the personnel in second occupational specialties 9. Conversely the ADAPT program realized a horizontal approach to structural changes in the economy by anticipating changes in the labour market. As a result, the program assisted workers at risk of unemployment; this were a result of changes in the industrial structure and production system (improvement of skills, employment support). Support for the restructuring of defence industries by the EC has had also the form of training on such aspects as: the management of change in the defence industry and the expectations of restructuring. One such tool was a series of conferences held between 2007 and 2008 on aspects of restructuring, that were addressed at defence industry enterprises and the governments of all EU Member States 10. Writing communications In January 1996, the European Commission presented a document entitled: The challenges facing European defence-related industry: a contribution for action 8 S. Kurinia, Współczesna brytyjska myśl obronno-ekonomiczna, AON, Warszawa 2000, pp. 148; W. Stankiewicz, Konwersja zbrojeń: oczekiwania i fakty, Bellona, Warszawa 1999, pp M. Szlachta, Restrukturyzacja i konwersja przemysłu zbrojeniowego Francji w latach (rozprawa doktorska), AON, Warszawa 2000, pp ; P. Wieczorek, Przemysł obronny państw NATO w nowych realiach polityczno-wojskowych i ekonomicznych, PISM, Warszawa 1994, pp Anticipating restructuring in the European Defence Industry. O. Bergstrom (red.), BIPE, Paris, March europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catid=782&eventsid=164&langid=pl&moredocu ments=yes&tablename=events (30 August 2012). 67

69 PAULINA ZAMELEK at the European level 11. It was adopted by the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee and therefore became the basis for a debate which determined the three points of convergence. The first point was the intention of the EU to maintain the industrial and technological base of defencerelated industries. Secondly, in addition to other national and institutional forms of action on the defence sector, the European Union constitutes the preferred framework for action for defence-related industries. The third point stressed on the need to combine different strategies provided by these forms of cooperation in favour of the particular nature of the defence industry 12. This communication, as expressed in its title, was meant to focus on the issues of defence-related industries. However if one takes into account the economic and political aspects concerning the structure of the industry, the restructuring process and competitiveness issues, as well as market fragmentation, the tools of the internal market and the external dimension affecting the industry, not forgetting, of course, the matters of security and defence, it is evident that the document concerns not only dual-use goods. In November 1997, the European Commission presented the second Communication: Implementing European Union strategy on defence-related industries 13. It appeared to be a continuation of the previous report on the defence industry. The document expressed a very pragmatic approach to the defence industry and the market for defence products. It has clearly shown the double nature of the defence industry, firstly, as a main means of the production of military equipment, and secondly, as the basis for the implementation of the CFSP. It also proposed a return to the restrictive interpretation of article 296 of the EC Treaty. However, above all, it speaks of a European armaments policy, which was said to be linked with other Community policies, in particular those concerning: industry, trade, customs duties, regions, competition, innovation and research. The Communication is accompanied by a draft EU Council Joint Action on the European armaments policy. The draft was meant to be adopted on the basis of the then current art. J.2 of the Treaty on the EU. The document also presented a precise action plan and targets for the 14 areas related to the defence industry 14. Nevertheless, this initiative of the EC failed to produce significant progress as Member States did not agree either on the merits of a common armaments policy nor its purpose. Thus, the communication did not achieve the European Commission's intended effect, and until 1999 the case has remained dormant. That aside, limited progress has been achieved in the areas of standardization and 11 Communication from the Commission, The challenges facing the European defence-related industry: a contribution for action at European level (COM(96)10 final), Brussels 24 January Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Implementing European Union strategy on defence-related industries (COM(97) 583 final), Brussels, 4 December 1997, pp Ibidem. 14 Prospects on the European Defence Industry, Defence Analysis Institute, Athens 2003, pp

70 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION S WORKS ON THE DEFENCE SECTOR customs duties 15. For the development of a common European defence market it is also important to indicate a combination of instruments that need to implement further measures in this area, which are at the disposal of the EU. This applies in particular to the instruments of a legislative and non-legislative character, that fall under the EU internal market's scope. In this case it concerns: industrial policy, common commercial policy, including the issue of customs and export controls, tax policies and regulations on public procurement, regional policy, competition policy, research and development, including innovation policy, as well as the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which formed at that time the basis of the second pillar of the EU. Another EC communication was issued at the request of the European Parliament dated 10 April 2002 and concerned the adoption of measures in the field of armaments 16. As a consequence, the EC Communication was published on the 11 March 2003 with a title: European Defence Industrial and Market Issues Towards an EU policy on defence equipment policy 17. The EC indicated in this document seven priority areas for action for the coming years, on which the EC planned to undertake detailed work. Those were: standardization, monitoring of defence-related industries, intra-community transfers, competition, public procurement rules, export control of dual-use goods, and research 18. The EU member states welcomed the proposals contained in the communication as "a valuable contribution towards creating the necessary conditions to strengthen the industrial and market situation of European business" 19. and reports In its activities, the EC was often supported by the opinions of external experts. That was the case in 2002 when the STAR 21 report 20 was prepared by the European Advisory Group on Aerospace. Based on their findings, the European Commission formulated in the following year comprehensive recommendations on 15 B. Schmidt, Armaments cooperation in Europe, ISIS, January European Parliament resolution, European defence-related industries, (P5_TA(2002)0172), Strasbourg 10 April Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, European defence - Industrial and market issues Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy (COM/2003/0113 final), Brussels, 11 March F. Cameron, G. Quille, ESDP: The State of Play, EPC Working Paper nr 11, European Policy Centre, Brussels, September E. Liikanen, Industrial Aspects of a European Defence Policy in: The path to European Defence, K. von Wogau (ed.), Maklu, Antwerpia 2004, pp European Commission, STAR 21 Creating a coherent market and policy framework for a vital European industry (Report prepared by the European Advisory Group on Aerospace), Brussels July aerospace/files/report_star21_screen_en.pdf (14 July 2012). 69

71 PAULINA ZAMELEK the development of the space industry, called "A coherent Framework for Aerospace a response to the STAR 21 Report" 21. Seeking the future in research With regard to the area of research and technological development, the EC communication of 2003 defined the activities and program of the preparatory work on strengthening the European industrial potential in the field of security research. They formed later the basis for calls for proposals and invitations to tender in this field. In the same period, on the EC s initiative a report of the so called Group of Personalities was prepared, that was titled Research for a Secure Europe. It was presented on the 15 March 2004, and played an important role in defining a range of fields and methods for financing and organizing the subsequent Framework Programmes (FP) 22. It s results for the security and defence area are seen in the dual-use technologies being developed in the projects conducted in FP IV to the current FP VIII. Aside from the competitiveness and innovation issues, the FPs allow in collaboration with the European Space Agency and some industry actors to establish and develop European capabilities for the use of operational information from the Galileo satellite navigation system or the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (Copernicus / GEMS). It may be used by citizens and decision-makers for current and ongoing information analysis in the area of land (Geoland2), marine (MyOcean), air (MACC), crisis-related natural disasters (Safer) and security (G-Mosaic). The current industrial policy of the European Commission in the area of security has also taken into account the developments within the so called Key Enabling Technologies (KETs), including: nano- and microelectronics, nanotechnology, photonics, biotechnology, advanced materials and advanced manufacturing systems. Although they are essential to strengthen the competitiveness of the European industry and the innovativeness of the EU enterprises, they obtain a low level of commercialization and social acceptance for new security technologies. These courses of action fit well into the framework of Horizon 2020 the EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation in the years aimed at ensuring Europe's competitiveness in the world. It s worth noting, that Horizon 2020 has its basis in the Europe 2020 strategy 24. Horizon 2020 while fulfilling its objectives of improving the scientific base, 21 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Coherent Framework for Aerospace a Response to the STAR 21 Report (COM/2003/600 final), Brussels 13 October B. Schmidt, Armaments cooperation in Europe, op. cit. 23 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing Horizon 2020 The Framework Programme for Research and Innovation ( ), (COM(2011)809; 2011/0401(COD)), Brussels 30 November Compare: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative. Innovation Union (COM(2010)546), Brussels 10 October 2010; Communication from the Commission, EUROPE A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (COM(2010)2020 final), Brussels 3 March

72 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION S WORKS ON THE DEFENCE SECTOR promote innovation and overcome the challenges of society will have an indirect impact on the industrial development of the defence sector. In this context, the EC initiatives on the pre-commercial procurement are also important. The Horizon 2020 defines the pre-commercial procurement as "the procurement of research and development services involving risk-benefit sharing under market conditions, and competitive development in phases, where there is a separation of the research and development phase from the deployment of commercial volumes of end-products" 25. This reflects the intentions expressed in the Commission Communication of December 2007, that was dedicated to this issue Pre-commercial Procurement: Driving innovation to ensure sustainable high quality public services in Europe 26. Pre-commercial procurement relates to the provision of services in research and development (R&D), in which intellectual property rights don t (exclusively) belong to the contracting authority. However, by improving the inflow of technology to the market, they promote greater social acceptance for new technologies and innovation, and thus ensure the sustainability and high quality of public services in Europe ("public procurement for stimulating innovation"). Due to the significant costs of R&D works, it s advised to implement pre-commercial procurement also in the area of security and defence through: the EU Framework Programmes, government-to-government programs or projects run by the EU agencies, such as: European Defence Agency (EDA), European Space Agency (ESA), European Organization for Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) or European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX). and competitiveness The linking of both areas security and defence is gaining momentum in the activities of the European Commission. This is evidenced by the recent EC s communication of July 2012, entitled Security Industrial Policy Action Plan for an innovative and competitive Security Industry 27. The areas and activities envisioned in this communication reflect the EC s recognition of the security sector as one of the main elements of the flagship initiative of Europe , which later was augmented in the subsequent EC communication: An Integrated Industrial 25 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the rules for the participation and dissemination in 'Horizon 2020 the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation ( )' (COM(2011)810; 2011/0399(COD)), Brussels 30 November 2011, Art. 2, point 1.13, pp Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Pre-commercial Procurement: Driving innovation to ensure sustainable high quality public services in Europe (COM(2007)799 final), Brussels 14 December Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee, Security Industrial Policy. Action Plan for an innovative and competitive Security Industry (COM(2012)417 final), Brussels 26 July Communication from the Commission, EUROPE A strategy for smart, op. cit. 71

73 PAULINA ZAMELEK Policy for the Globalisation Era. Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage 29. According to the EC s classification, the security sector encompasses such branches as: aviation security, maritime security, border security, critical infrastructure protection, counter-terrorism intelligence, including cyber security and communications, crisis management and civil protection, physical safety and protective clothing. As with the defence market, the EC characterized the security market as highly fragmented, regionally distributed, institutional and socially sensitive. Direct links between the two markets are expressed in the pursuit of synergies between security and defence technologies. However, its practical effect will appear in the development of hybrid "standards" by the normalization organizations and the EDA, inter alia, for products such as software-defined radio 30. On the basis of EU law, the Commission can use its competence in four areas of competition law, which directly relate to the defence industry. Those are: merger control, state aid, antitrust and cartel matters, as well as trade liberalization. As far as state aid, merger control and acquisitions are concerned, the EC has particular interest in monitoring possible impacts such measures can have on the defence sector. Whereas, with the powers in the other areas, the EC must continue to share jurisdiction with the member states or other European institutions. The European Commission gives its opinion on transactions in various forms of trading companies (mergers, acquisitions, etc.) on the off-chance that competition rules may be infringed by the concentration of capital, for example due to an increase of global market share 31. One should expect shortly EC initiatives for a greater regulation of this area, which can be related to the current works on state control over strategic defence assets and foreign investment in the defence sector 32. Acknowledging that standardization will allow European companies to broaden the scope of investments and ensure greater competitiveness against their American counterparts, the EC launched and implemented in cooperation with the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN), member states and the defence industry works on the Defence Standardisation Handbook. The 29 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era. Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage (COM(2010)614 final), Brussels 28 October Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee, Security Industrial Policy, op. cit., pp Compare. H. Chyłkowski, P. Wieczorek, Proces restrukturyzacji krajowego przemysłu obronnego w latach na tle zmian zachodzących w sektorze zbrojeniowym europejskich państw NATO, AON, Warszawa 1998, pp ; P. Wieczorek, Członkowstwo Polski w NATO. Aspekty ekonomiczno-finansowe, WSZiM, Warszawa 1998, pp European Commission, Study on State Control of Strategic Defence Assets (EUROCON). Draft mid-term interim report (Studium prepared by Manchester Institute of Innovation Research, Kemmler Rapp Böhlke, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, Instituto Affari Internazionali, Natolin European Centre), April 2010 (not published). 72

74 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION S WORKS ON THE DEFENCE SECTOR Handbook contained references to standards and commonly used terms, which supported the contracting process in the defence sector. In 2005 this document was transferred into a European Handbook on Defence Procurement and according to a new division of competence was handed to the European Defence Agency for further elaboration. Now it constitutes the root of the European Defence Standards Reference System (EDSTAR) 33. The task taken on by the EC, still within the communication of , concerned monitoring the defence-related industries, but it has not been successfully implemented. The commission conducted market research and studies, which were intended to provide general data on industrial and the economic state of the defence industry enterprises in Europe. Despite incurring huge costs of implementation (260 thousand Euro), the research failed to establish consolidated figures for various groups of enterprises. That was due to differences in the scale and scope of their activities on the military and civilian market, and the differences in the assessment of turnover thresholds for dual-use goods. The data that was gathered was, however, transferred to the EDA, which was then bound with the Steering Board decision to work on the creation of a database of the European defence industry. The goal of the Defence Industry Data (DID) project was to support the decision-making process at European level, by analysing trends in the development of the European defence market and the European technological and industrial base. DID should also allow for identifying the skills and capabilities of current defence capabilities, including identification of the scale of supply of the major manufacturers and suppliers of military equipment in the different areas of specialization 35. The EC s priority is also the development of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). The EDTIB sets the foundations for the European Security and Defence Policy, because it connects the dual-use technologies and defence-related industries. Moreover, it puts a stress on the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. And this task is within the direct competence of the European Commission. These aspects found their reference in the next EC communication entitled A strategy for a stronger and more competitive European defence industry 36, which was published in December Although the strategy is not a legally binding act, it was an important sign for the European defence sector and the EU member states, showing the need of: 33 European Defence Standards Reference System (EDSTAR). (28 August 2012). 34 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, European defence - Industrial and market issues, op. cit. 35 European Defence Agency, Steering Board Decision in the National Armaments Directors format, 19 March Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A strategy for a stronger and more competitive European defence industry (COM(2007)764), Brussels, 5 December

75 PAULINA ZAMELEK further structural and organizational changes, development and growth, further consolidation process of the European defence industrial sector, and an increase of spending on defence research and technology. The strategy emphasizes the special nature of this sector and its unique relationship with national governments. However it also notes, that much more can be done in order to unlock its full potential to meet the challenges, those that appear together with globalization, but also as a result of emerging security challenges. Firstly, for member states it s necessary that the defence industrial sector brings benefits in exchange for the sustained effort made by them. Secondly, defence industrial sector is obliged to provide ESDP capabilities needed in an effective and efficient manner, guaranteeing European autonomy, affordability and the ability to conduct international operations, as well as continue cooperation in the development and production of defence equipment. The strategy points out three groups of elements, which hinder the development of the European defence market and the European defence industry. These are: financial considerations associated with the relatively decreasing levels of defence spending and the very low efficiency of European R&D investments, especially when compared to the 6-fold higher level of R&D spending in the USA; continuing market fragmentation, which arises from dedicating approximately 85% of defence spending on protectionist defended national markets. However, it s also associated with exemptions allowed for in public procurement on the basis of art. 346 TFEU, with the hypertrophy of bureaucracy in the control of intra-eu transfers in military equipment, with national legislation aimed at the control of strategic defence assets regardless of the European dimension, with a low level of international cooperation in the process of defining operational requirements, with insufficient R&D investments and rare joint military production programs, and lastly with offset requirements imposed due to military equipment orders, which often distort the market by introducing a greater risk for a buyer to focus on the attractiveness of the offset instead of the competitiveness of the acquired military system; effective expansion of non-european markets despite clear national preference, a significant part of the European defence equipment is imported, mainly from the USA. This is a disadvantage for the EU because of the disproportionate openness of both markets. The strategy emphasizes that it is not possible to maintain such an approach if Europe wants to keep a large and dynamic technological and industrial base in the defence sector. Without a change in national policies, European industry will be threatened with becoming a niche player and a subcontractor for major non- European suppliers, and thus put at risk the autonomy of the ESDP. The same arguments have been repeatedly raised at the political level by the leading EU figures. Javier Solana, former High Representative for the CFSP or Günter 74

76 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION S WORKS ON THE DEFENCE SECTOR Verheugen, former European Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry as well as the Directorate General of the European Commission have reiterated calls to member states for the consolidation of European defence industries, indicating that the current fragmentation of the sector in the long run is unsustainable. Hence there appears the insistent criticism of duplicating European armaments programs carried out independently by a number of member states. The European Commission presented in the strategy proposals for actions and measures to be undertaken in the near future to increase the competitiveness of the European defence industry. They included the following tasks 37 : implement the so-called defence package, that relates to the progressive establishment of an open European defence market. The defence package concerns this strategy and two directives initially presented in 2007 the defence 38 and transfer 39 directives; adopt and disseminate common standards for defence equipment; undertake more effective use by the EC of available legal remedies, including directives, to ensure fair competition in the defence market; explore the advantages of establishing an EU information security system in the defence sector; examine the possibility of legal supervision over strategic defence assets to ensure security of supply at the European level, while maintaining the national security interests of the EU member states; increase coordination including in terms of combining efforts and sharing work between the EU member states on one side and between the EU bodies and member states on the other, in order to get the best and most optimal results of actions taken, while using the most cost-effective solutions in the area of public procurement, investments and R&D resources; strengthen the position of small and medium-sized enterprises in the defence market. Think small first The hands-on activities in the latter aspect to strengthen the position of small and medium-sized enterprises in the defence market are in recent years in the spotlight of the Commission's attention. The SMEs constitute one of the four leading areas, next to the strengthening of the technological and industrial base, standardization in the defence sector and the elaboration of the legislative rules for defence procurement and intra-eu transfers. In the EU the SMEs are recognized as 37 Ibidem. 38 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts in the fields of defence and security (COM(2007)766), Brussels 5 December European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community (COM(2007)765), Brussels 5 December

77 PAULINA ZAMELEK companies of up to 250 employees, that have an annual turnover not exceeding 50 million. The study carried out by the EC has shown that SMEs are somehow excluded from the supply side of the economy, despite the fact that they often bear the greatest administrative costs of operations as a result of various EU and national requirements. Given the enormous economic potential inherent in SMEs, which in the EU represent about 99.8% of all enterprises or about 23 million industrial units, that provide about 80% of all jobs, the EC devoted to them a separate communication to find ways to favour their development. This document, entitled the Small Business Act 40 (SBA) was issued on 25 June 2008 and has implemented the motto Think Small First. The SBA was based on ten guiding principles of EC s policy towards the European SMEs in order to increase the competitiveness of the European economy. However, this task needs to be undertaken both the Commission and the member states. Although the SBA does not apply directly to the SMEs in the defence sector, it strengthens the position of defence-related companies through the implementation of the proposals set out in the document. It facilitates the functioning of the defence market and provides additional incentives to engage in security research carried out under the Framework Programmes. In turn, conferences directly targeting the defence SMEs sector were organized between 2009 and 2010 by the European Commission in cooperation with the EDA and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) in seven EU countries: Germany, Sweden, Spain, Hungary, Greece, Poland and Belgium 41. The purpose of the series of conferences entitled strengthening of the SMEs in the defence sector was to present the initiatives undertaken at the European level for defence-related SMEs. It was intended also to present the results of the final report of the study carried out by the European Commission on the competitiveness of the defence industry and SMEs 42 and to gather feedback on the issues that face companies in this sector. The study revealed that main factors affecting the competitiveness of SMEs concern the lack of information on tenders and future capabilities requirements, the problem of access to finance, the increasing dependence of national contracting authorities on primary defence suppliers, and legislative failures in the areas of offset and export policies. to get a comprehensive picture According to the EC s work plan for the years , in the first half of 2013 a new EC communication was planned to be published, that would 40 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Think Small First A Small Business Act for Europe (COM(2008) 394 final), Brussels 25 June Conferences on small and medium sized enterprises in the defence sector, DG Enterprise and Industry, European Commission =3445&lang=pl (16 August 2013). 42 European Commission, Study on the Competitiveness of European SMEs in the defence sector (Study carried out by Europe Economics), Brussels 5 November

78 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION S WORKS ON THE DEFENCE SECTOR comprehensively encompass all the areas previously mentioned in the EC s documents. The working title of this communication was a comprehensive strategy for the defence sector. Its preparations were a part of the activities carried out by the European Commission s Task Force on the Defence Industry & Market set up to identify the areas of the European Defence Technology and Industrial Base and the European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM) that would require action on the side of the EC, and in particular on issues relating to: the internal market, industrial policy, defence and research, and innovation. These were also the areas identified in the indicative roadmap of EC s the future communication 43. Reference was also made to the possibility of including some related areas, such as energy strategy for the defence sector, raw materials, space policy, trade policy and competition policy, as well as transfers and security industry policy. This document intended to set out the Commission s objectives and proposals to strengthen the internal market in the defence sector, support the competitiveness and innovativeness of the EU defence industry, promote synergies between civil and military research, promote the efficient use of all defence-related policies thus strengthening the SMEs in the defence sector and provide a strong industrial base for the objectives of Common Security and Defence Policy. Eventually, this communication was published on 24 July 2013 under the title Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector 44. Although in the consultation process it was directed at the defence sector only, in the final version of this document the EC encompassed both defence and security sectors, as both show blurring lines on their activities, and will have a similar impact on the future activities of the European institutions. Due to numerous, complex, interrelated and difficult to foresee security challenges, the main message of the Communication stressed the need for the consolidation of defence industries to allow for comprehensive and efficient actions in financial, industrial and operational terms. The action plan for the communication is built on seven proposals: strengthening the internal market for defence through ensuring market efficiency, tackling market distortions and improving the security of supply; promoting a more competitive defence industry via five sets of actions on: standardisation, certification, raw materials, SMEs and skills; exploiting the dual-use potential of research and reinforcing innovation; development of capabilities; space and defence in terms of: space infrastructure, satellite communication, and an EU high resolution capability; 43 European Commission, Communication on a comprehensive strategy to strengthen Europe's defence sector indicative roadmap, Brussels October 2012, impact/planned_ia/docs/2013_markt_016_communication _on_defence_en.pdf (29 December 2012). 44 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector (COM(2013)542 final), Brussels, 24 July

79 PAULINA ZAMELEK application of EU energy policies and support instruments in the defence sector; strengthening the international dimension with regard to: competitiveness in third markets and dual use export controls. An important explanation for the grounds for particular proposals is given in the Commission staff working document on defence accompanying the document Communication Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector 45. This document provides some statistical information regarding the EU defence industry and market; highlights the economic importance of the defence industry and its contribution to growth and jobs and the challenges it is facing; analyses the evolution of defence spending in Europe and its consequences for the EU defence industrial base; presents the challenges facing the internal market for defence; describes the status and progress in consolidation in the defence industry; analyses defence industrial supply chains and the role of SMEs in the sector and describes new business strategies in the defence industry in an evolving global setting. Due to the fact that the publication of the communication was very recent and provided a selection of options for actions that would concern all the member states, it still requires their approval. It s the heads of states that will discuss the scope of the mandate for the EC s actions at the December 2013 European Council meeting. Although, the early 1990s examples of the EC s initiatives show that the consent on the EC s proposal is not an axiom, however the current political environment connected with the newest EC s communication allows to foresee acceptance on the issue at political level. It shall be noted that the proposals and recommendations generated by the EC for a particular areas of action and policies sometimes result from external analytical studies carried out on behalf of the Commission. Such external expert studies and analyses often helped to precisely determine guidelines for further work on the development of a competitive and open European defence market. Therefore, together with the integration process, a number of areas for analysis have risen in past years. With regard to defence-related industries the following studies have been undertaken on behalf of the EC 46 : a study on the development of a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base 47 ; 45 European Commission, Commission staff working document on defence accompanying the document Communication Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security (SWD(2013) 279 final), Brussels, 24 July Reference documents of the European Commission Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry. (30 August 2012). 47 European Commission, Study on the Development of a European Defence Technological Industrial Base. Main report (Study carried out by TNO Quality of Life, FOI, HCSS, CDE i FRS), Brussels September

80 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION S WORKS ON THE DEFENCE SECTOR a study on the nature and impacts of barriers to trade with the United States for the European defence industry 48 ; a study on the impact of emerging defence markets and competitors on the competitiveness of the European defence sector 49 ; a study on the industrial implications in Europe of the blurring of dividing lines between security and defence 50 ; a study on the competitiveness of the EU aerospace industry with focus on the aeronautics industry 51 ; a comprehensive analysis of emerging competences and skill needs for the optimal preparation and management of change in the EU defence industry 52. Moreover, it seems that the actions taken by the Commission in relation to the development of European industry and the attempts for economic recovery are also reflected in the functioning of the European defence industrial sector. In this context they are also identified as tools for the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy 53. This aspect is kept by the EC in mind while conducting current works that relate to various aspects of industrial policy and the consolidation of defence industries. The guardian of the treaties The legal basis of the European Commission s competences in the areas of: defence equipment competitiveness, public procurement, as well as regulations on import duties and export licenses are based on its role as the "guardian of the treaties" establishing the European Communities. The competence of the EC to ensure the adequate application of the treaties, and the competence to monitor the measures taken by the competent EU institutions on the basis of the Treaties (art. 17, para. 1 TEU), give the EC also a competence over the interpretation of the 48 European Commission, Study on the Nature and Impacts of Barriers to Trade with the United States for European Defence Industries. Final report (Study carried out by Decision Etudes Conseil and U.S.-Crest), Brussels December European Commission, Study on the Impact of Emerging Defence Markets and Competitors on the Competitiveness of the European Defence Sector FWC Sector Competitiveness Studies. Final Report (Study carried out by ECORYS SCS Group), Brussels, 12 February European Commission, Study on the industrial implications in Europe of the blurring of dividing lines between Security and Defence. Final Report (Study carried out by Instituto Affari Internazionali, Manchester Institute of Innovation Research and Institut des Relations Internationales et Strategiques), Brussels 15 June European Commission, FWC Sector Competitiveness Studies Competitiveness of the EU Aerospace Industry with focus on: Aeronautics Industry. Within the Framework Contract of Sectoral Competitiveness Studies ENTR/06/054 (Study carried out by ECORYS Research and Consulting), Rotterdam 15 December European Commission, A comprehensive analysis of emerging competences and skill needs for optimal preparation and management of change in the EU defence industry (Study carried out by Eurostrategies), Brussels May European Parliament, Report of 31 October 2012 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Rapporteur: Arnaud Danjean) (A7-0357/2012; 12562/ /2138(INI))., Brussels 31 October

81 PAULINA ZAMELEK area related to art. 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 54. Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome and art. 296 of the Maastricht Treaty (TEU) or art. III-342 of the draft Constitutional Treaty of the EU, and recently art. 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) regardless of its name, the article has kept the same wording in each of the successive treaties. This article states that no member state is obliged to supply information, including defence procurement information, the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security or national defence. Moreover, each member state could undertake preventive measures with regard to the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war materiel, which were considered necessary for the protection of the essential 55 interests of its security. Therefore, the article concerns not only the exceptions in defence procurement of the highest importance to the defence capabilities of member states, but also the exclusions of the defence companies from the EU rules on mergers and monopolies. This was the kind of a confirmation, that armaments policy remains the responsibility of member states. However, it didn t apply to dual-use goods, whose production and trade was subject to economic activity regulations used in the Communities 56. It is important to note, that ever since the Treaty of Rome went into force, art. 223 was interpreted broadly, and thus, it completely excluded armaments from the common market regulations. That meant, that with the use of art. 223 of the Treaty of Rome, a state seeking a supplier of military materiel for its armed forces could entrust such a delivery to a designated entity without a need for competitive tendering, negotiation and other forms of selection. The assessment of the need to apply the exemptions granted in art. 223 was made solely by the concerned member state, which could undertake actions found necessary to protect its vital interests, and also directly related to the production of weapons, ammunition and military equipment or trade in these products. With such solutions at hand, individual member states were able to freely direct all the orders in the field of defence and security to domestic entities, and only in exceptional cases use foreign suppliers. This was the basis for the formation of a separate national legislation on defence procurement. In practice however, it caused not only the elimination of foreign companies in national defence markets, but introduced a kind of protection 54 P. Koutrakos, Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence in EU Constitutional Law. The legal regulation of sanctions, exports of dual-use goods and armaments, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2001, pp Essential the term has several meanings. In view of the Treaty establishing the European Community, it can be interpreted as basic or fundamental. The explanation given in the European Commission s Interpretative Communication on the application of Article 296 of the Treaty in the field of defence procurement states that: the particularly strong wording (essential) limits possible exemptions to procurements which are of the highest importance for Member States' military capabilities. 56 H. Chyłkowski, P. Wieczorek, Proces restrukturyzacji krajowego, op. cit., pp

82 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION S WORKS ON THE DEFENCE SECTOR for the domestic industrial base and defence procurement excluded from the general rules on competition and state aid, which existed in the common market 57. Regardless of the European Commission s role as the "guardian of the treaties", the EC has had no prerogative to evaluate the essential security interests of the member states, or the kinds of defence systems being ordered by member states to protect those interests (national prerogative). The EC s task was to ensure that member states actions comply with the EC Treaty. Thus, it was authorized to verify fulfilment of the conditions for the exemption applied by member states on the basis of art. 346 TFEU in relation to the procurement of dual-use items, offset, state aid, custom duties or various forms of concentration of capital (mergers and acquisitions in the context of competition law) 58. The EC takes into account the specific nature of the defence sector. However, if there is a doubt that the exemption was necessary to protect the essential security interests of a country, the EC has the right to require from such a state a confirmation in the form of necessary documentation and evidence. The burden of proof lies in this case on the member state, which has to justify the application of art. 346 TFEU with the reasons necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security. Foregoing EC opinions on cases concerning the self-justification of essential security interests have dismissed the use of generally natural reasons, that would relate to a member state s geographical, political, historical situation, alliance commitments, or specific aspects of industrial and economic condition, even though such reasons may be associated with trade in arms, munitions and war material 59. Moreover, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) case-law testifies that exemption from the Community provisions based in art. 346, para.1, point. b TFEU may apply only to the production of or trade in the equipment which is designed, developed and manufactured specifically for military purposes. Member states are obliged to cooperate with the Commission in good faith in all investigations initiated by the EC (art. 4, para. 3 TEU). Such cooperation is also crucial in the proceedings taken to the EU Court of Justice by the EC pursuant to art. 258 TFEU in an event of a breach by a member state of its liabilities under the treaties. The same applies to a proceeding initiated by any other member state in accordance with art. 259 of the TFEU. Therefore, the verification of the misuse of powers provided for in art. 346 TFEU can be adequately applied to the public procurement of defence materiel pursuant to art. 348 TFEU. 57 Compare: B. Cichocki, A. Konarzewska, Ł. Niewiadomski, P. Pacuła, Amerykańska ustawa o inwestycjach zagranicznych i bezpieczeństwie narodowym a podobne uregulowania w Unii Europejskiej, Rosji i Chinach, Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, 2008, no 7 8, pp ; A. Konarzewska, Propozycje Komisji Europejskiej w sprawie europejskiego rynku uzbrojenia, Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, 2008, no 7 8, pp Ibidem. 59 Zamówienia w dziedzinach obronności i bezpieczeństwa, Public Procurement Office, Warszawa 2011, pp

83 PAULINA ZAMELEK and the watchdog in abuses The EC has repeatedly used the legal remedy provided for in art. 348 TFEU and brought the matter directly before the ECJ, if a member state abused their powers in circumstances referred to in art. 346 TFEU (essential security interest), which have had the effect of distorting the conditions of competition in the common market. In these cases, the Court shall decide the matter. Similarly, pursuant to art. 339 TFEU, the Commission is obliged to uphold the confidentiality of the information received from the member states. However, the Court's judgments delivered in this mode are usually given against member states, such as: - Judgment of 2 October 2008 in case C-157/06 Commission v Italy; - Judgment of 8 April 2008 in case C-337/05 Commission v Italy; - Judgments of 15 December 2009 in cases C-284/05 Commission v Finland, C-294/05 Commission v Sweden, C-372/05 Commission v Germany (paragraph 69), C-387/05 Commission v Italy C-409/05 Commission v Greece, C-461/05 Commission v Denmark and C-239/06 Commission v Italy; - Judgment of 13 September 2007 in case C-260/04 Commission v Italy (paragraph 35); - Judgment of 16 September 1999 in case C-414/97 Commission v Spain (paragraph 21); - Judgment of 17 September 1998 in case C-323/96 Commission v Belgium; - Judgment of 3 May 1994 in case C-328/92 Commission v Spain; - Judgment of 5 December 1989 in case C-3/88 (Re Data Processing) Commission v Italy. First attempts in defence procurement regulation As announced in earlier, EC s documents on the direction of works to be undertaken 60, and with regards to the plans of the founding in 2004 of the European Defence Agency (EDA), that could be theoretically "competitive" to the European Commission in the area of the European defence market, the EC published in September 2004 a Green Paper on defence procurement 61. In EU practice, a green paper is treated as a form of communication on a specific policy area, with an objective for an open consultation and a debate on a topic. It may indicate an impetus for a legislative action. As opposed to green papers, white papers already contain specific proposals for EU action. Thus, the Green Paper on defence procurement was an expression of political will on the part of the Commission to encourage a debate between member states and an attempt to redefine the scope at that time was still in force of art. 296 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. This publication was preceded by a series of seminars conducted by the EC from the beginning of 2004, which gathered experts from the side of the EU 60 Vide: Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, European defence Industrial and market issues, op. cit. 61 European Commission, Green Paper. Defence procurement (COM(2004)608), Brussels 23 September

84 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION S WORKS ON THE DEFENCE SECTOR governments and industry to exchange technical information about the specific expectations and concerns regarding future Commission actions. At the same time it was the first policy document dedicated to the issue of defence procurement, which included an "official" diagnosis of the functioning of the defence industry in the EU. It pointed out several problems, among them: the national fragmentation of defence markets; special features distinguishing the defence area from other types of public procurement, which constitute a very complex legal framework in this area; the dominant role of the state; an indication of the levels of cooperation in order to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of European defence enterprises, as well as to increase the interoperability and compatibility of the armed forces in Europe, and thus increase the transparency and openness of the European defence market 62. The EC s document argues that the problems, that exist in defence procurement are mainly due to member states' approach, in which: the announcement of contract notice, if it happens at all, is placed in special national bulletins, of which the content, frequency and method of dissemination are different in different countries; there are numerous possibilities for the non-publication of contract notices provided for in national legislation, which vary from country to country; the technical specifications are often very detailed and are based on inhomogeneous standards; the criteria for selecting suppliers take into account, in some countries, the ability of offering industrial offsets, but in most states confidentiality and the security of supply are the most important. Their definition remains vague, therefore its assessment is not based on the same requirements, which sometimes refer to the origin of goods or the nationality of the supplier; tendering is mainly done through negotiated procedures which do not all follow the same rules, particularly as regards the extent of the negotiations and the possibilities for changing the subject of the contract; in the award of contracts, priority is given to the best value for money option. However, in some states security of supply and offsets are again taken into account at this stage 63. The Green Paper consultations with member states (based on the subsidiarity principle) were a sort of call to liberalize some aspects of defence procurement, such as: the harmonization of procedures for the awarding of contracts for military equipment, the central publication of tenders in a similar manner as for consumer goods, the coordination of spending on the research and development of new defence systems or the creation of joint defence programs. It was argued, that all types of contracts, including the supply of food, building barracks, sewing and laundering of uniforms, or civilian transport should be subject to free competition 62 Cz. Marcinkowski, Europejski rynek broni: jednolity czy konkurencyjny?, Kwartalnik Bellona, 2007, no 2, pp European Commission, Green Paper, op. cit., pp

85 PAULINA ZAMELEK regulations that are applied in the common European market. This would lead to the formation of a common European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM). The document also stated that such actions could not be taken within the existing at that time legal framework that related to public procurement 2004/18/EC (called the Public Sector Directive ) and 2004/17/EC (called the Utilities Directive ) 64 due to a broad interpretation of the exemptions concerning essential security interests (art. 296 TEU). And still, this problem has not been eliminated as a result of the existing ECJ case-law. Two instruments were presented for the member states' consideration that would enhance their mutual access to the defence markets, namely: to develop a document limited to clarifying the existing legal framework for defence procurement in the form of a legally non-binding act, that would be based on the existing ECJ jurisprudence in art. 296 TEU; to create a separate legal instrument i.e. a new directive aimed at establishing specific rules in the field of defence, taking into account the sector s characteristics, which would complement the existing EU legislation to provide greater legal certainty, access to information on orders at the EU level and the necessary mechanisms of flexibility in awarding contracts in the defence area. The Green Paper consultations lasted four months, but the results were published only a year later, in the EC s communication of December The document pointed out that measures taken in the area of defence procurement are part of a broader system of work on the defence sector, which are performed simultaneously at the EU and intergovernmental level. It was underlined, that under EU law the defence procurement is subject to the rules of the common market. Thus, except for the procurement performed in the area of art. 296 TUE, other areas shall be bound by Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the awarding of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts that, on 31 January 2006, replaced a few other directives: Directive 92/50/EEC 66 (public service contracts), Directive 93/36/EEC 67 (public supply 64 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (Official Journal of the EU L 134/114, 30 April 2004). Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (Official Journal of the EU L 134/1, 30 April 2004). 65 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the results of the consultation launched by the Green Paper on Defence Procurement and on the future Commission initiatives (COM(2005)626 final), Brussels, 6 December Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts (Official Journal of the European Communities L 209/1, 24 July 1992). 67 Council Directive 93/36/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating procedures for the award of public supply contracts (Official Journal of the European Communities L 199/1, 9 August 1993). 84

86 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION S WORKS ON THE DEFENCE SECTOR contracts) and Directive 93/37/EEC 68 (public works contracts). The results of the notices published in the Supplement to the Official Journal of the EU, dedicated to European public procurement (Tenders Electronic Daily, TED), showed that the Ministries of Defence have published only 10% of their orders. On this basis, the Commission concluded that member states have used their national systems of direct orders to a large extent, based on the diverse selection criteria and methods used. This has also confirmed a lack of effectiveness of the Public Sector Directive (2004/18/EC) in the area of defence procurement in the EU 69. In the process of the Green Paper consultation the European Commission received 40 opinions from 16 member states, institutions and industrial entities. This was considered a high level of commitment taking into account the sensitivity of the issues and the relatively small number of actors involved. The main comments referred to the following issues 70 : open tendering procedures based on publication in the Official Journal of the European Union are not compatible with confidentiality requirements; the use of negotiated procedure which is the only appropriate procedure is too restrictive and not properly defined; the selection criteria are based solely on technical, economical and financial aspects, however key conditions for selecting tenderers in the defence sector such as security of supply, confidentiality and urgency are missing; the rules on technical specifications, time limits and follow-up contracts are inappropriate. The EC s communication also notes that the opinion-providers supported the implementation of the initiatives proposed earlier by the European Commission (i.e. the publication of an interpretative communication on art. 296 TEU and the development of a defence directive) and therefore excluded the option on "no need to act". A favourable approach was also taken on the creation of the Code of Conduct on defence procurement by the EDA. It was interpreted as a key factor in the growth of transparency and competition in the segment, which was not covered by the work of the European Commission, that is to say in cases where art. 296 TEU is applied 71. In line with the course of action notified by the EC, in December 2006 an Interpretative Communication on the application of article 296 of the Treaty in the field of defence procurement 72 was issued, which explained the circumstances 68 Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts (Official Journal of the European Communities L 199/54, 9 September 1993). 69 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the results of the consultation launched by the Green Paper on Defence Procurement, op. cit., pp Ibidem, pp Ibidem, pp European Commission, Interpretative Communication on the application of Article 296 of the Treaty in the field of defence procurement (COM(2006)779 final), Brussels, 7 December

87 PAULINA ZAMELEK of the uniqueness of the application of exemptions in this area. The precise and narrow interpretation indicated in this document was based on the existing ECJ case-law, which has repeatedly argued, that any exemption from the rules should ensure the effectiveness of the rights granted by the Treaty through strict interpretation. It is underlined, that art. 296 TEU may be used in exceptional circumstances and only in specific cases in order to protect defined national security interests. It can not be applied "automatically" for the protection of the economic interests of the specific features of defence materials, which is classified as a "grey area", and where the application of art. 296 TEU is less obvious 73. In this way, art. 296 TEU can not cover indirect offsets, because it is not associated with the military sphere and does not protect the interests of national security, but only represents the economic aspect of an agreement even though such an offset is a result of a defence contract for the supply of military equipment excluded from the application of the general principles on the basis of art. 296 TEU. An interpretation of various segments of the defence market in the context of art. 296 TEU is presented in Table 1. T a b l e 1 Defence market segments in the context of art. 296 Treaty establishing European Community Category defence procurement as of 2008 Category defence procurement in the internal market option Segment Use of art. 296 TEU Impact 86 Acquisition not according to the EC directive 2004/18/EC Procurement not in accordance with Directive 2004/18/EC Highly sensitive items (nuclear weapons, etc.) Art. 296 TEU invoked always No open competition Procurement in accordance with EDA Code of conduct on Defence Procurement Complex weapon systems (combat aircrafts, etc.) Art. 296 TEU invoked always Open competition sometimes Acquisition according to the EDA Code of Conduct Procurement in accordance with a draft of New Defence Procurement Directive Warlike items (rifles, etc.) Art. 296 TEU invoked always Open competition often Acquisition according to the EC directive 2004/18/EC Procurement in accordance with Directive 2004/18/EC Non-warlike items (boots, etc.) Art. 296 TEU invoked sometimes Open competition often Source: Towards a European Defence Market, D. Keohane (ed.), Chaillot Paper, November 2008, no 113, EU ISS, Paris, pp. 39; and: Defence Procurement in the European Union The Current Debate, B. Schmitt (ed.), EU ISS, 2005, Paris, pp The need for the rigorous interpretation of art. 296 TEU redoubles with the circumstances of new emerging threats, with the blurring of the existing lines between military and general-purpose equipment, and between internal and external security. Also, purchases of equipment associated with the sphere of 73 A. Konarzewska, Propozycje Komisji Europejskiej, op. cit., pp

88 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION S WORKS ON THE DEFENCE SECTOR security, in the context of the so-called dual-use goods, requires the use of public procurement rules (unless the use of the general principles would need to disclose information, which a member state considers contrary to the essential interests of national security). Moreover, a list of military equipment of 1958, which includes 15 types of military systems approved by the Council of Ministers of the European Communities on 15 April 1958, and concerns the exemptions based on art. 223 of the Treaty of Rome, is not in itself a justification to exclude purchases of defence systems from public procurement, although it enlists articles intended for exclusively military purposes that were designed and manufactured for strictly military objectives. Officially, the military list is not either the appropriate reference to the concept of essential security interest, as this list wasn t published nor updated for 50 years. Eventually, it got published by the Council of the EU in , but is not considered to be a basis for specific exemptions. Therefore, nowadays each case of the application of article 346 TFEU must be considered on clearly an individual basis and in relation to the concept of an essential national security interest. Also, it is not and can not be defined by the EU legislation or EU Court of Justice case-law, but solely by the decision of a member state 75. Such an approach, based on an individual assessment of each case is particularly rigorously required in "frontier" cases, where the use of art. 346 TFEU may be perceived as controversial. and the success of the defence package After the first exploratory activities in the area of defence procurement, the European Commission s focus was laid on the so called defence package, which includes three documents: the previously discussed A strategy for a stronger and more competitive European defence industry 76 of December 2007 and presented at the same time two draft directives on defence procurement 77 and on crossborder defence transfers 78. In the opinion of the EC, the objective of including the 74 Extract of the Council decision 255/58 of 15 April 1958, Council of the European Union (14538/4/08 REV4), 26 November re04.en08.pdf (29 July 2013). 75 Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC (OJ UE L 216/76, 20 August 2009), motif Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A strategy for a stronger and more competitive European defence industry, op. cit. 77 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts in the fields of defence and security (COM(2007)766), Brussels 5 December European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community (COM(2007)765), Brussels 5 December

89 PAULINA ZAMELEK defence sphere of public procurement and cross-border transfers in a legally binding form throughout the EU was manifold. It was intended to introduce more flexible rules for the implementation of contracts (as it was in the civil sector). It should increase competition in the defence market, improve the efficiency of public funds spent and cut prices. It eventually intended to improve the quality of military equipment and services delivered to the armed forces, as well as to restrict the freedom of interpretation of the essential security interests by member states. As a result, it was assumed to strengthen the defence industry across the EU and further implement the Common Security and Defence Policy based on the interoperable and compatibly equipped armed forces of the EU member states. All of these directions lead to the formation of an effective European Defence Equipment Market with possibilities for equal cooperation between all EU member states. Taking into account the specificities of the defence sector, this sort of liberalization was meant to progressively include the ideals of the EU's four freedoms, that is the free movement of people, goods, services and capital between all the national defence markets. It also meant moving away from thinking in terms of national security to the pan-european level, that would reflect member states' full confidence in each other and the EU institutions at large. In addition, the proposals for the greater defence sector cooperation generated by the EU institutions were supposed to make the best use of key trends currently shaping the defence market. Those were: potential for consolidation, commercial technology transfer and the growing involvement of private sector 79. The legal form applied in this case a directive is addressed to the EU member states in order to align their national legislations. A directive instructs member states in the result to be obtained, but leaves them the choice of the form and methods they adopt to achieve the EU objectives within their national legal framework (art. 288 TFEU). Thereby, the EC plans on the restriction of art. 346 para. 1 TFEU use, were brought into force 80. Directive 2009/81/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security 81, called the Defence Procurement Directive (DPD), concerns special construction, procurement of military equipment and its maintenance, as well as sensitive, non-military security equipment in the security area (i.e. equipment used by counter-terrorist units, which have similar properties to defence products and their purchase is subject to similar procedures). The Directive originally was extended to contracts worth more 79 W. Pałka, Liberalizacja europejskiego rynku obronnego i polski przemysł obronny, Kwartalnik Bellona, no 1/ (15 August 2012). 80 Compare: A. Konarzewska, Propozycje Komisji Europejskiej, op. cit., pp ; B. Cichocki, A. Konarzewska, Ł. Niewiadomski, P. Pacuła, Amerykańska ustawa o inwestycjach zagranicznych i bezpieczeństwie narodowym op. cit. 81 Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009, op. cit. 88

90 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION S WORKS ON THE DEFENCE SECTOR than for supplies and services and for works. However, the EC has already twice periodically revised these thresholds, adapting them to the global circumstances. Since 1 January 2012 they amount to respectively and The Directive does not cover the dual-use goods whose acquisition is subject to the rules of the single market. Article 13 of the DPD refers also to specific exemption areas to which the Directive does not apply. These are: contracts for which the application of the rules of this Directive would oblige a member state to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security; contracts for the purposes of intelligence activities; contracts awarded in the framework of a cooperative research and development (R&D) program conducted jointly by at least two member states; contracts awarded in a third country, carried out when forces are deployed outside the territory of the EU, where operational needs require them to be concluded with economic operators located in the area of operations; service contracts for the acquisition or rental of land, existing buildings or other immovable property; government to government (G2G) contracts relating to: the supply of military equipment or sensitive equipment; works and services directly linked to such equipment; or works and services specifically for military purposes, or sensitive works and sensitive services; arbitration and conciliation services; financial services, with the exception of insurance services; employment contracts; R&D services other than those where the benefits accrue exclusively to the contracting authority for its use in the conduction of its own affairs. Terms and conditions of conducting tenders and contracting expressed in the DPD take into account the specificity of the defence market, its sensitivity and complexity. The DPD ensures compliance with the principles of classified information protection during the execution of contracts, the ability to directly consult and negotiate contracts with selected companies during the conduction of the procurement process, and even introduces criteria for selecting bidders. The DPD includes also a possibility of awarding additional contracts within five years from the main contract and accepts framework agreements for a period of seven years. The Directive allows the contracting authorities to impose requirements on a tenderer in relation to the security of supply. It allows to include in a tender 82 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1251/2011 of 30 November 2011 amending Directives 2004/17/EC, 2004/18/EC and 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council in respect of their application thresholds for the procedures for the awards of contract (OJ L 319/43, 2 December 2011); Commission Regulation (EC) No 1177/2009 of 30 November 2009 amending Directives 2004/17/EC, 2004/18/EC and 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council in respect of their application thresholds for the procedures for the award of contracts (OJ L 314/64, 1 December 2009). 89

91 PAULINA ZAMELEK specific criteria for potential suppliers, which would be bound to the security of information, confidentiality, timely delivery of sufficient quantities of military equipment and services to ensure the continuity and availability of maintenance, repair and upgrade, especially during crises and armed conflicts 83. In addition, the DPD introduces provisions relating to subcontracting, which aim at bringing competition to the supply chains of the prime contractors and suppliers by increasing the chances of participation of local enterprises in the projects. At the same time, such a flexible regime as that of DPD allows member states to protect their vital national security interests enshrined in the art. 346 TFEU. Theoretically, the Directive does not limit the exemptions under art. 346 TFEU, but in practice the interpretation of this article is significantly different from the existing interpretation of art. 296 TEU due to the stricter criteria for exemptions, which relate almost to a situation similar to a state of war. The result is a limitation of defence contracts that would go with the exclusion of the DPD, and ultimately the public procurement law. Such a situation requires careful and reasonable justification as to the facts of each individual contract awarded in exclusion of public procurement law. As a consequence, a comprehensive documentation shall be in place proving that due to the essential security interest there was no other possibility than to select a particular supplier of armaments, military equipment or services for a particular military system 84. In order to support member states in the proper transference of the DPD into national laws, the Directorate General for Internal Market and Services of the European Commission developed seven guidance notes for specific areas of the DPD s application, which were dedicated to: the field of application, exclusions, research and development, security of supply, security of information, subcontracting and offset 85. The European Commission in its report on the legal assessment of the correctness of the DPD s transference by the EU member states into their national legal systems concluded that the exchanged directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC became an important element of the EC s policy for the creation of an EDEM and the development of a level playing field 86. The EC pointed out that the existing economic provisions discriminated potential bidders; though only four countries implemented the directive to a full scope within the time limit until 21 August After that date the EC started the infringement procedures in accordance with art. 258 TFEU against 23 countries. Eventually, by July 2012, the majority of member states, which have implemented the DPD (23), did this correctly. 83 A. Konarzewska, Propozycje Komisji Europejskiej, op. cit., pp Zamówienia w dziedzinach obronności i bezpieczeństwa, op. cit., pp Defence procurement, European Commission, DG Markt. publicprocurement/ /rules/defence_procurement/index_en.htm (29 December 2012). 86 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on transposition of directive 2009/81/EC on defence and security procurement, European Commission (COM(2012)565), Brussels 10 October

92 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION S WORKS ON THE DEFENCE SECTOR However, regarding the other four countries, including Poland, the EC sent in September 2012 requests to the EU Court of Justice to impose penalties pursuant to art. 258 and 260 of the TFEU for failure to implement the Defence Procurement Directive. If the request was accepted by the EU Court of Justice, the financial impact of the penalty imposed on Poland by the EC could reach 70,000 per day for each day of delay since the date the Court s judgment would be pronounced for the violation Poland's duties, until the implementation of the Directive 87. The EC s report also states that the majority of countries also transferred the subcontracting clauses which were not mandatory. Stressing on this issue shows that the EC s intention was to enhance competition in the supply chain, which constitutes the cornerstone of the European Commission s policy. The Commission will continue to monitor the state of transference with regard to the content and means of ensuring its full compliance with European legislation. Moreover, the EC s report notes that defence contracting has became the subject of internal market rules and only exceptional exemptions may apply. As a consequence, the EU member states are obliged to publish tender notices, use harmonized procedures and seek the withdrawal of offset. The EC in particular will take steps to eliminate the use of offsets, which it considers as contrary to the Treaty principles 88. The second directive of the EC s defence package presented in 2007 was the Directive 2009/43/EC on simplifying the terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community 89, known as a Transfer Directive. Its objective was to remove barriers to intra-community trade in the defence sector by the harmonization of the rules on the transferring of defence products and improvements in export controls. At the same time the Transfer Directive was meant to contribute to the strengthening of the internal market, the reduction of the administrative burden (about 400 million year) and the elimination of the delays in trade, that weakened the competitiveness of industrial enterprises. Through the introduction of such a control system, the traceability of defence products and the transparency of transfers, the intention of the EC also was to ensure that the national security interests and political interests of member states are taken into account during the re-exporting of military systems, and in terms of their security of supply 90. The Transfer Directive stipulates the simplification of national systems in granting European defence enterprises export licenses of a general, global and 87 Public procurement: Commission asks Court of Justice to fine Poland, The Netherlands, Luxembourg and Slovenia for not implementing defence procurement rules, European Commission, Press Release IP/12/1020, Brussels, 27 September (29 December 2012). 88 Ibidem. 89 Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 on simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community (OJ EU L 146/1, 10 June 2009). 90 Towards a European Defence Market, D. Keohane (red.), Chaillot Paper, November 2008, no 113, EU ISS, Paris, pp

93 PAULINA ZAMELEK individual nature for the sale of military equipment and the mutual recognition by the EU member states. Before the Transfer Directive was in force, the existing national regulations of individual members governing the cross-border transfer of defence products were the same for both other EU states and third countries. The Directive applies to the defence-related products that are listed in the Annex of the directive, although it has been already updated twice by the EC 91. The Annex contains a list of 22 major categories of armaments intended for military use, such as guns and light weapons, including ammunition, tanks and other armoured military vehicles, military vessels (surface or underwater), armoured or protective equipment, aircrafts and unmanned airborne vehicles. The EC s report on the implementation of the Transfer Directive by the EU member states was published in June Bearing in mind that the transference of the Transfer Directive was due by 30 June 2011, the report mentioned an opening of proceedings for failure to fulfil obligations pursuant to art. 258 TFEU towards seven member states which have not notified their national transferences. 92 Conclusions Despite the initial limitation of the original competence area of the European Commission to that of dual-use goods, this European body wants and as it declares will take regulatory actions in the European defence market, seeing the benefits of its works in the common European market 93. And indeed, in view of the steps undertaken by the European Commission in the last decades, and the competences it gained in recent years in the defence and security sectors, at present the EC s actions are meant to lead to a formal development of the European Defence Industrial Policy. Moreover, with legal and economic tools at its disposal it s able to enforce the formation of the European Defence Equipment Market. The latest communication of July 2013 tends to even strengthen its powers for a greater scope of action in the European defence sector. Therefore, the various directions presented by the EC seem to receive acceptance at the December European Council meeting by the majority of member states that effectively speak with one voice on the proposals. Although it will mean more coordination, monitoring and transparency on the same principles enshrined in legislation that 91 European Commission, Commission Directive 2010/80/EU of 22 November 2010 amending Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the list of defencerelated products (OJ L 308/11, 24 November 2010); European Commission, Commission Directive 2012/10/EU of 22 March 2012 amending Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the list of defence-related products (OJ L 85/3, 24 March 2012). 92 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC simplifying terms and conditions for transfer of defence-related products within the EU (COM(2012)359 final), Brussels 29 June D. Calleja-Crespo, P. Delsaux, Defending European defence: The Commission s role, Bepa Monthly Brief, Bureau of European Policy Advisors, European Commission, March 2012, no 54, pp. 6 7.

94 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION S WORKS ON THE DEFENCE SECTOR previously allowed the EU member states to protect a range of their national security and defence interests, such transformation could be important for the financial and technological efficiency of Europe at large, and for the achievement of the political, economic and military objectives of the EU. From a single member states perspective, the issue of defence sector transformation usually is related to the size of it s defence industry. However, in case of regional disintegrations in Europe, one may hope that the defence sector transformation process won t form thick division lines between the countries that benefit most or little on the EC s initiatives. In general, the change in the national approaches regarding the need for the EC s actions has evolved on the plus side of the EC and the reasons for that process can be found in the decreasing levels of defence expenditures in the EU member states, that already are not sufficient for the preservation of a competitive technological and industrial defence base at any national level in the EU that would be able to compete on a cross-atlantic basis. The change of member states perception in favour of the European defence sector integration comes also form the strict interpretation of market principles in the context of art. 346 TFEU. Therefore, initiatives of the European Commission gradually, but consequently are changing the environment of the European defence industry from a state of a "guarded" industry and fragmented national markets towards a pan-european defence market, led in the direction of cross-border cooperation and international partnerships in order to increase the effectiveness of the EU as a whole, execute necessary rationalization and implement specialization and a proper use of the competitiveness mechanism of European enterprises in the world. Bibliography Books: Chyłkowski H., Wieczorek P., Proces restrukturyzacji krajowego przemysłu obronnego w latach na tle zmian zachodzących w sektorze zbrojeniowym europejskich państw NATO, AON, Warszawa Koutrakos P., Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence in EU Constitutional Law. The legal regulation of sanctions, exports of dual-use goods and armaments, Hart Publishing, Oxford Kurinia S., Współczesna brytyjska myśl obronno-ekonomiczna, AON, Warszawa Wieczorek P., Perspektywy współpracy Polski z państwami NATO w sferze przemysłu obronnego, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Warszawa Toruń Stankiewicz W., Konwersja zbrojeń: oczekiwania i fakty, Bellona, Warszawa Szlachta M., Restrukturyzacja i konwersja przemysłu zbrojeniowego Francji w latach (rozprawa doktorska), AON, Warszawa The path to European Defence, Wogau K. von (ed.), Maklu, Antwerpia Unia Europejska. System prawny, porządek instytucjonalny, proces decyzyjny, Barcz J. (ed.), KSAP Instytut Wydawniczy EuroPrawo, Warszawa

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96 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION S WORKS ON THE DEFENCE SECTOR Mörth U., Framing the defence industry equipment issue the case of the European commission, SCORE Rapportserie, 1999, no !/19991.pdf (8 August 2013). Pałka W., Liberalizacja europejskiego rynku obronnego i polski przemysł obronny, Kwartalnik Bellona, no 1/2011. Prospects on the European Defence Industry, Defence Analysis Institute, Athens Public procurement: Commission asks Court of Justice to fine Poland, The Netherlands, Luxembourg and Slovenia for not implementing defence procurement rules, European Commission, Press Release IP/12/1020, Brussels, 27 September 2012 Schmidt B., Armaments cooperation in Europe, ISIS, January Towards a European Defence Market, D. Keohane (red.), Chaillot Paper, November 2008, no 113, EU ISS, Paris. Turczyński P., Przemysł zbrojeniowy Unii Europejskiej na początku XXI wieku, Polska w Europie, 2004, no 3 (47). Wieczorek P., Przemysł obronny państw NATO w nowych realiach polityczno-wojskowych i ekonomicznych, PISM, Warszawa Zamówienia w dziedzinach obronności i bezpieczeństwa, Public Procurement Office, Warszawa EU documents: Commission Regulation (EU) No 1251/2011 of 30 November 2011 amending Directives 2004/17/EC, 2004/18/EC and 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council in respect of their application thresholds for the procedures for the awards of contract (OJ L 319/43, 2 December 2011); Commission Regulation (EC) No 1177/2009 of 30 November 2009 amending Directives 2004/17/EC, 2004/18/EC and 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council in respect of their application thresholds for the procedures for the award of contracts (OJ L 314/64, 1 December 2009). Communication from the Commission, The challenges facing the European defence-related industry: a contribution for action at European level (COM(96)10 final), Brussels 24 January Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Implementing European Union strategy on defence-related industries (COM(97) 583 final), Brussels, 4 December Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, European defence Industrial and market issues Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy (COM/2003/0113 final), Brussels, 11 March Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Coherent Framework for Aerospace a Response to the STAR 21 Report (COM/2003/600 final), Brussels 13 October Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative. Innovation Union (COM(2010)546), Brussels 10 October 95

97 PAULINA ZAMELEK 2010; Communication from the Commission, EUROPE A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (COM(2010)2020 final), Brussels 3 March Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Precommercial Procurement: Driving innovation to ensure sustainable high quality public services in Europe (COM(2007)799 final), Brussels 14 December Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee, Security Industrial Policy. Action Plan for an innovative and competitive Security Industry (COM(2012)417 final), Brussels 26 July Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era. Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage (COM(2010)614 final), Brussels 28 October Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A strategy for a stronger and more competitive European defence industry (COM(2007)764), Brussels, 5 December Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Think Small First A Small Business Act for Europe (COM(2008) 394 final), Brussels 25 June Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Stronger European Industry for Growth and Economic Recovery. Industrial Policy Communication Update (COM(2012) 582 final), Brussels 10 October Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the results of the consultation launched by the Green Paper on Defence Procurement and on the future Commission initiatives (COM(2005)626 final), Brussels, 6 December Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector (COM(2013)542 final), Brussels, 24 July Council of the EU, Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dualuse items (OJ L 134/1, 29 May 2009). Council of the EU, Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (OJ L 335/99, 13 December 2008). Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts (Official Journal of the European Communities L 209/1, 24 July 1992). Council Directive 93/36/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating procedures for the award of public supply contracts (Official Journal of the European Communities L 199/1, 9 August 1993). 96

98 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION S WORKS ON THE DEFENCE SECTOR Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts (Official Journal of the European Communities L 199/54, 9 September 1993). Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (Official Journal of the EU L 134/114, 30 April 2004). Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (Official Journal of the EU L 134/1, 30 April 2004). Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 on simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community (OJ EU L 146/1, 10 June 2009). Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC (OJ UE L 216/76, 20 August 2009). European Commission, Commission Directive 2010/80/EU of 22 November 2010 amending Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the list of defence-related products (OJ L 308/11, 24 November 2010). European Commission, Commission Directive 2012/10/EU of 22 March 2012 amending Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the list of defence-related products (OJ L 85/3, 24 March 2012). European Commission, Interpretative Communication on the application of Article 296 of the Treaty in the field of defence procurement (COM(2006)779 final), Brussels, 7 December European Commission, Communication on a comprehensive strategy to strengthen Europe's defence sector indicative roadmap, Brussels October 2012, /docs/2013_markt_016_communication_on_defence_en.pdf (29 December 2012). European Commission, GREEN PAPER. Defence procurement (COM(2004)608), Brussels 23 September European Commission, STAR 21 Creating a coherent market and policy framework for a vital European industry (Report prepared by the European Advisory Group on Aerospace), Brussels July report_star21_screen_en.pdf (14 July 2012). European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts in the fields of defence and security (COM(2007)766), Brussels 5 December European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community (COM(2007)765), Brussels 5 December

99 PAULINA ZAMELEK European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the rules for the participation and dissemination in 'Horizon 2020 the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation ( )' (COM(2011)810; 2011/0399(COD)), Brussels 30 November European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing Horizon 2020 The Framework Programme for Research and Innovation ( ) (COM(2011)809; 2011/0401(COD)), Brussels 30 November European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC simplifying terms and conditions for transfer of defence-related products within the EU (COM(2012)359 final), Brussels 29 June European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on transposition of directive 2009/81/EC on defence and security procurement, European Commission (COM(2012)565), Brussels 10 October European Commission, Commission staff working document on defence accompanying the document Communication Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security (SWD(2013) 279 final), Brussels, 24 July European Commission, Study on State Control of Strategic Defence Assets (EUROCON). Draft mid-term interim report (Studium prepared by Manchester Institute of Innovation Research, Kemmler Rapp Böhlke, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, Instituto Affari Internazionali, Natolin European Centre), April 2010 (not published). European Defence Agency, Steering Board Decision in the National Armaments Directors format, 19 March European Parliament resolution, European defence-related industries, (P5_TA(2002)0172), Strasbourg 10 April European Parliament, Report of 31 October 2012 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Rapporteur: Arnaud Danjean) (A7-0357/2012; 12562/ /2138(INI)), Brussels 31 October Extract of the Council Decision 255/58 of 15 April 1958, Council of the European Union (14538/4/08 REV4), 26 November /st14/st14538-re04.en08.pdf. Fergusson A., Report on Arms Procurement within a Common Industrial Policy and Arms Sales, European Parliament, 1-455/83, 27 June 1983, Luxemburg. Greenwood D., Report on a Policy for Promoting Defence and Technological Co-operation Among West European Countries (III-1499/80), European Communities Commission, Brussels Internet sources: Defence procurement, European Commission, DG Markt x_en.htm Decisions of the Polish Government 98

100 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION S WORKS ON THE DEFENCE SECTOR European Defence Industrial Policy. European Commission European Defence Standards Reference System (EDSTAR) Reference documents of the European Commission Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry 99

101 NDU Zeszyty Scientific Naukowe Quarterly AON nr no 2(59) 3(92) ISSN MARIAN LUTOSTAŃSKI NATIONAL CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND ITS ACTIVITY IN THE AREA OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE Marian LUTOSTAŃSKI, Ph.D. National Centre for Research and Development Abstract The National Centre for Research and Development (NCBR) is a specialized agency established in 2007 by the Minister of Science and Higher Education. The Act on the National Centre for Research and Development of 30 April 2010 modified its functioning. The activity of the NCBR is focused on performing tasks related to state policy on science, science and technology and innovation. Its mission is to support Polish scientific institutions and enterprises to develop their capacities to create and utilize solutions based on R&D results. NCBR initializes and realizes the financing of research and development works and participates in the execution of international programs. Such undertakings stimulate processes going on in science, economy, defense and state security. They bring tangible scientific results for the competitiveness of the economy as well as increase the safety of citizens and the whole state in the domain of national security and defense. Key words security, science, research, development, NCBR 100 Introduction The intention 1 of this article is a presentation of the role of the National Centre for Research and Development (NCBR) in stimulating processes taking place in science, economy, state security and defence as well as in transferring results of research and development work to mentioned areas. The security of the nation, as well as the security of the state is both the aim and the task of the Republic of Poland (RP). It means that the security of the nation and the state is of utmost importance to the RP and thus it is its superior goal, its fundamental reason of state. 1 The article opens the cycle of information about NCBR. It presents activities addressed to state security and defense. Following articles will be focused on principles of collaboration between R+D institutions and entrepreneurs, financing and organization of calls for projects.

102 NATIONAL CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND ITS ACTIVITY Security meant as a protection against the expanding and changing range of external and internal threats is broadly present both in theory and practice. A theoretical approach provides many much evidence for the necessity of having the capacity to secure relevant conditions for ensuring the existence and development of state-run-institutions as well as for the survival and development of the nation, the most important component of each state. Practical challenges are in the domain of various institutions interest and organizational entities which are oriented on securing personal protection. Supervision of security is a statutory duty of many institutions, state services and formations such as: the armed forces, police, the Internal Security Agency, Foreign Intelligence Agency, Government Protection Bureau, Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, State Fire Service of Poland and other services and guards. Security and activity led security are always related to the quality of our life. It sounds like a truism but this shows the key position of security in the hierarchy of human needs: its relevance and peculiar importance. Each day we experience many threats, those which are embedded in our reality and threats which may emerge in favourable conditions (potential threats). We are aware of threats existing in our life in schools, on the streets, during working hours, mass events, domestic and foreign trips etc. Sources of threads are differentiated. Domestic and international sources of threads induce the necessity of undertaking special activities that may be realized by the RP individually or due to either NATO obligations or on the basis of our tasks as a member state of European Union (EU) they can be realized with allies. Many entities are involved in a complex process of ensuring security to the nation and to the state. We can find scientific and R&D institutions: R&D institutes (formerly called R&D units), institutes of the Polish Academy of Science, departments and other organizational units of colleges performing scientific works (for example clinics), consortia, foundations and R&D performing enterprises. Their activity related to the creation of the capacity to develop and utilize solutions based on results of research is supported by the National Science Centre and National Centre for Research and Development. It is a specific area where theory is confronted with practice and needs are compared with possibilities. The establishment and activity of institutions merging theory and practice is a consequence of science and innovation policy realized by the state. Such policy is oriented on the identified needs of science and economy and on social expectations, including problems of security in a broader meaning. The goal of establishing institutions performing and supporting scientific and R&D activity is related to the execution of tasks aimed at stimulating the progress and ability of the state to create and exploit novel solutions based on scientific and technological results in the economy and in the area of security. 101

103 MARIAN LUTOSTAŃSKI The National Centre for Research and Development (NCBR) plays a significant role in stimulating technical development and innovation 2. The NCBR s functioning was modified in 2010, 3 therefore it is worth looking closer at the purpose of this relatively new entity and its influence on the economy and state security. Before entering into details we may say that the NCBR influences essentially the social and economic reality and performs important initiatives focused on stimulating the economy and on reinforcing the security of the nation and the state. Having regard to standards of the scientific, or scientific-popular, nature of this study it is worth underlining that the author perceives, in his opinion, there to be a strict relationship between problems of economic growth and security and such entities as the nation and the state. The relation mentioned above embraces the internal and external security 4 of both entities. It means that activity of state institutions, including the NCBR, has to be seen as very important in the process of the safe growth of state economy and society. The necessity of securing safety is and must be linked to the science and state economy in the author s point of view. It is a key factor stimulating the activity in the area of security and has to be a reason for changes in the process of achieving better forms of providing security to society and to the state. It is also naturally linked with entities providing security, their capacity and ability to reach set goals and tangible results. What is the NCBR? What are its main tasks and intended role in the area of science, economy, defence and state security? A closer look at the institution enables one to answer these basic questions. All available sources, including legal acts on the NCBR functioning and author personal experience, allow one to set up the thesis that the NCBR is an important, specialized institution contributing to the development of science, economy and security on behalf of the state. Let us start from basic identification: the NCBR is a national legal entity which activity is focused on executing state policy in science, science and technology and innovation. Its mission is to support Polish scientific institutions and enterprises to create and utilize solutions resulting from scientific research and to stimulate processes going on in various areas of state activity for the benefit of society. 2 Innovation refers to product or process and may have radical, gradual or imitative nature. 3 National Centre for Research and Development was established in 2007 for executing tasks concerning state policy in the area of science, science and technology and innovation. Vide: NCBR2011, s. 7 NCBR document issued in The term security contains area of defense however it is treated separately in legal regulations and in relevant bibliography. According to author the term nationalsecurity should cover all forms of protection and defense against all forms of thread. Nevertheless, due to current legal regulation terms security and defense will be used separately. 102

104 NATIONAL CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND ITS ACTIVITY Legal and program basis for the functioning of the National Centre for Research and Development The NCBR s functioning is determined in many documents and regulations of various significance. The most important document is the Act on the National Centre for Research and Development of 30 th April 2010 (OJ No 96, pos. 616). The act contains basic principles of the NCBR s functioning, however there are also other acts, regulations and legal norms of almost the same importance 5. The functioning of the NCBR is also regulated by the implementation of acts and by internal regulations 6. On the other hand it is worth recalling the specific regulation issued by a Director of the NCBR, no 21/2012, announcing organizational regulation of the National Centre for Research and Development Office on 15 May It is also worth drawing attention to resolutions of the Steering Committee for Research and Development Works in the Field of National Security and Defence and especially to the resolution of 20 December 2010 on the Regulation of the Steering Committee and to the text of the Regulation 7. 5 The list of acts which are essential to NCBR functioning is specified below: 1) Act on Public Finances of 27th August 2009 (OJ. No 157, pos. 1240); 2) Act on Financing Science of 30 April 2010 r. (OJ. No 96, pos. 615); 3) 9 September 2010, on National Centre for Research and Development statute (OJ. No 171, pos. 1153); 4) 17 September 2010, on monthly remuneration of the Chairman and members of the Council of the National Centre for Research and Development (OJ. No 178, pos. 1199); 5) 17 September 2010, on detailed procedure of realization of tasks of the National Centre for Research and Development (OJ. No 178, pos. 1200); 6) 27 September 2010, on detailed criteria concerning remuneration of thenational Centre for Research and Development staff (OJ. No. 181, pos. 1222); 7) 29 September 2010, on calls for a position of Director and Deputy Director of the National Centre for Research and Development (OJ. No 184, pos. 1242); 8) 20 October 2010, on monthly remuneration of the Chairman and members of the Steering Committee for Research and Development Works in the Field of National Security and Defense (OJ, No 205, pos. 1361); 9) 28 October 2010, on conditions and mode of granting public aid and de minimis aid by the National Centre for Research and Development (OJ. No 215 pos. 1411); 10) 29 December 2010, on mandatory elements of annual activity report and annual and quarterly financial report of National Centre for Research and Development (OJ. No 9, pos. 44); 11) 4 January 2011, on managing realization of research and development works for national security and defense by National Centre for Research and Development (OJ. No 18, pos. 91); 12) 31 August 2011, on changes in regulation related to detailed criteria concerning remuneration of the National Centre for Research and Development staff (OJ No 182 pos. 1085). 6 Regulations issued by the Director of NCBR have to be included in the set of all regulations on NCBR functioning. The majority of them aim at the improvement of NCBR activity thus it is not rational to list them all in this article. 7 The resolution introduces Regulation of the Steering Committee. The text of the Regulation contains detailed mode of operation of the Steering Committee. 103

105 MARIAN LUTOSTAŃSKI Principles of NCBR activity are embedded in the National Research Program. Assumptions to national policy on science, technology and innovation appendix to Resolution No 164/2011 of the Council of Ministers(16th August 2011) 8. Main tasks of the National Centre for Research and Development The NCBR is a result of the reform of the science system in Poland 9 that took place in It happened due to the identification of the necessity to realize tasks defined in state policy in the area of science, science and technology, and innovation, by specialized entities 10 see Graph. 1. MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND HIGHER EDUCATION NATIONAL CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NATIONAL SCIENCE CENTRE Source: Own work. Graph. 1. Centres responsible for creating, coordinating and financing R&D projects and development works 8 The draft of the National Research Program is elaborated by the minister responsible for science after consultation with: Polish Academy of Sciences, Conference of Rectors of Academic Schools in Poland (CRASP), Main Council of Academic Schools, Main Council of the Research Institutes, economic organizations of local authorities. It is approved in form of the resolution by the Council of Ministers. Vide: Act on principles of science financing of 4th April 2010 (OJ, No 96, pos. 615, art. 4.1 and art. 4.2). 9 The reform maintained Ministry of Science and Higher Education as leader in creating state policy in R&D. The National Science Centre was established with a task to manage and finance projects from basic science area. 10 Act on National Centre for Research and Development of 10 April 2010 (OJ. No 96, pos. 616), art

106 NATIONAL CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND ITS ACTIVITY General tasks of the NCBR are defined in the Act on the National Centre for Research and Development and in the National Research Program 11. The position of the NCBR is as an important executor and participator in the process of the utilization of science and technology achievements in all areas of state activity, including the area of state security and defence. According to a legal act 12 the NCBR is an implementing agency of the minister responsible for science and its activity is focused on creating, financing and cofinancing application research. The NCBR s mission to support Polish scientific institutions and enterprises in creating and implementing modern solutions and technologies directed at increasing the innovation and competitiveness of the Polish economy for the obvious benefit of society 13. It includes the development of a scientific workforce and the transfer of scientific research and development work results to all areas of state activity. In order to fulfil this task a lot of activities focus on the consolidation and integration of Polish scientists and researchers involved in the realization of strategic scientific research and development work programs announced by the NCBR 14. They are complemented by the NCBR s priority task of supporting the development of a scientific workforce, mainly by launching and financing programs addressed to young scientists from all scientific areas 15. Among the NCBR s tasks of major importance we can find the active enhancement of cooperation between Polish entrepreneurs and businessmen on the one hand, and scientists and researchers on the other. Such activity should lead to the intensifying of the commercialization of scientific and research project results. This is realized by elaborating and later managing new national and international programs of scientific research. All NCBR activities are focused on directions of research and development works which are of strategic importance to the state Introduced by Resolution No 164/2011 of the Council of Ministers (16 August 2011) on establishing National research Program (RM ). 12 Act on Public Finances of 27 August 2009 (OJ. No 157, pos. 1240), art Act on National Centre for Research and Development of 10 April 2010, op. cit., art and art The task is realized thanks to Operational Program Human Capitals and program LIDER. OP Human Capitals established by the European Commission on is a program supporting the execution of the National Strategic Reference Framework for It is closely related to the European Social Fund activity in Poland. The LIDER Program aims at widening the competence of young scientists concerning the planning and managing of a research team that realizes commercially oriented projects. It aims also at stimulating cooperation with enterprises and inter-sectoral mobility processes between high schools and research entities. 16 Directions of strategic importance to the state cover wide range areas and define assumptions and long-term goals of the state policy in science, science and development and innovation. Vide: Act on financing science, of 30 April 2010 (OJ. No 96, pos. 615), art

107 MARIAN LUTOSTAŃSKI The NCBR s most prioritized activities are related to the execution of strategic scientific research and experimental development programs 17. It is also involved in the execution of strategic research projects 18.Other important activities are research and development works (R&D) and supportive programs 19. The general concept of assistance in the development of the Polish economy is reflected in programs oriented at supporting specific sectors. So called Sectoral Programs are realized in cooperation with entrepreneurs. Their specificity allows to utilize financial means more effectively and to increase chances for the wider commercialization of scientific and research project results as well as results of development work 20. The ultimate goal is to implement the result of projects as widely as possible in practice. Other important programs led by the NCBR are: Patent Plus Program supporting the better management of intellectual property (IP) via applications for patents and Innovativeness Creator planned as a tool for helping entrepreneurs to implement innovative solutions elaborated by Polish researchers. Due to the position of the NCBR as an implementing agency supervised by the minister responsible for science it has to realize tasks commissioned by the Minister of Science and Higher Education 21. It is worth underlining that NCBR activity is not limited to activities related to Polish institutions and national programs. Its tasks include also involvement in international and bilateral applied-research oriented programs. Such activities are realized by financing research in many projects selected in an international call 22, 17 In 2011 r. NCBR managed 2 Strategic Programs: 1) Advanced Technologies for Energy Generation comprising research focused on coal clean technologies and biomass fuels 2) Interdisciplinary System for Interactive Scientific and Scientific Technical Information aimed at the establishment of a platform enabling access to all available knowledge resources on the Internet. The third Strategic Program Prevention and Treatment of Civilization Diseases STRATEGMED will be launched soon. 18 The NCBR manages 3 Strategic Projects at present: 1) Integrated System for Reducing Energy Consumption in the Maintenance of Buildings 2) Work Safety Optimization in Mines 3) Safe Nuclear Power Engineering Development Technologies. 19 In 2011 there was announced the first call within the INNOTECH Program. It is oriented towards medium and high-tech projects focused on two program paths: In-Tech (financing innovation oriented undertakings) and Hi-Tech (financing advanced technology undertakings). The NCBR also started Applied Research Program supporting projects with high development potential and GRAF-TECH Program financing development of innovative solutions based on graphene. Vide: NCBR, op. cit. pag In frames of these programs the NCBR signed a commitment on collaboration in the realization of joint research program for the aviation industry with Polish Technological Platform of Aviation and a commitment with Polish Technological Platform of Innovative Medicine associating companies working in the area of medicine. Vide: NCBR, op. cit., pag IniTech, Technological Initiative I, Multiannual Program for Improving Safety and Conditions of Work, Multiannual Program of Polish Artificial Heart, EUREKA Initiative and ERA-NETS are programs passed to NCBR for realization and management. 22 ERA-NET CHISTERA; ERA-NET MATERA; ERA-NET MNT; JU ENIAC; ERA-NET EuroNanoMed; ERA-NET NEURON, ERA.Net RUS, CORNET, JP Neurodegenerative Disease are just examples. 106

108 NATIONAL CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND ITS ACTIVITY as well as by earmarking funds for agreement on research cooperation with many countries 23. In view of the above information it is obvious that NCBR activity is really wide and differentiated. This was a reason for the Ministry of Science and Higher Education to transfer to the NCBR the function of Intermediate Body for three important operational EU programs: Innovative Economy, Human Capital and Infrastructure and Environment. Source: Own work. Financial means addressed to state security and defence projects Financial means addressed to other area projects. Graph 2.2. Allocation of NCBR financial means (in thousand PLN) Such activities can be performed due to favourable financial conditions based on funds assigned to the NCBR according to financial means secured for science in line with annual financial plans 24. Despite the fact that financing is not a key issue for the content of the article it is interesting to show the level of money spent by the NCBR for projects related to state security and defence in 2011 and 2012 years and the financial plan for next 2 years see Graph 2. It is worth underlining that since 2008 a continuous increase of funds assigned for science has been observed. It is firmly linked with financial means originating 23 Good examples are agreements with Israel, Germany, Luxemburg, Singapore, Norway and Taiwan. The NCBR is a participant in the AAL Multinational Program. AAL is an R&D initiative set up by 20 EU member countries and 3 associated countries: Israel, Norway, and Switzerland. The European Commission provides financial support. AAL aims at the improvement of elderly people s quality of life and at strengthening European industry thanks to the implementation of information and communication technologies (ICT). 24 Vide: NCBR, op. cit. pag

109 MARIAN LUTOSTAŃSKI from Structural Funds 25 which have to be spent in a correct manner. The granting of funds has to be done through transparent procedures: the announcement of calls, application procedure, evaluation, selection, transfer of granted money, financial accounting and provision of assistance to beneficiaries utilizing EU finances 26. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL of the National Centre for Research and Development STEERING COMMITTEE for R&D programs in the field of national security and defense Source: Own work. Graph 3. Main bodies of the National Centre for Research and Development The Director of the NCBR is responsible for the proper realization of tasks. They are supported by the Council of the NCBR and the Steering Committee see Graph 3. The NCBR s influence on the standing and attractiveness of Polish science and economy is growing and it means that the NCBR affects all important areas to society including the safety of the nation and the state. The national Centre for Research and Development and its tasks related to national safety and defence The variety of real and potential threats facing the nation and the state combined with obligations imposed by the military and economic environment of Poland defines and determines the range of duties that have to be met by state institutions. It defines also areas which are the most important for the internal and external security of appointed entities. The realization of corresponding tasks is performed by authorized services and the military which have to be steadily modernized. The NCBR participates in the process of modernization together with Level of financing will be decreased due to the fact that financial perspective will soon be going to the end. 26 NCBR, op. cit., pages 7, 8.

110 NATIONAL CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND ITS ACTIVITY other institutions by managing scientific research and development works for state security and defence and financing or co-financing their execution 27. Among the main tasks carried out by the NCBR in cooperation with the Minister of National Defence (MND), the minister responsible for internal affairs (MIA) and the Head of the Internal Security Agency are activities related with research for national security and defence 28. Research undertaken by the NCBR for state security and defence are oriented on the growth of efficiency and effectiveness of activities performed by the competent services and armed forces 29 of the Republic of Poland, Police, The Internal Security Agency, Foreign Intelligence Agency, Government Protection Bureau, Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, State Fire Service of Poland 30 and other services and guards. The commitments mentioned above are focused on defining priority areas for scientific research and development works and formulating concerted assumptions for strategic programs. The Steering Committee pays a special role due to the fact that being an organ of the NCBR it performs tasks related to state security and defence, especially supporting Polish scientific institutions and enterprises in the process of creating, realizing and implementing solutions for the benefit of state security and defence. Therefore activity of the Steering Committee is aimed at sending development incentives toward entities from this area of interest and stimulating them to take part in the process of modernization and innovation. The Steering Committee acts on the basis of legal regulations and concentrates on achieving its basic goals such as: the realization of activities related to the preparation of launching strategic scientific research and development programs; defining thematic areas of scientific, research or development works for state security and defence; the distribution of financial means for programs in the most efficient and reasonable manner. 27 Act on National Centre for Research and Development of 10 April 2010, op. cit., art It is worth mentioning that in 2011 the NCBR spent 417 mln PLN for projects related to state security and defense; however financing is not the main issue of this article. 28 Research for national security and defense covers issues of general security including safety at work and security of industrial facilities and installations. Vide: NCBR, op. cit., p Such activity is oriented at supporting the process of developing the operational ability of the armed forces, particularly the ability to command, recognize, strike, backup, maintain mobility and deployment, increase the capability to survive and secure medical aid on the battleground as well as possibility to support civil systems facing non-military threats. Vide: Ibidem, pages Tasks related to research supporting processes of detecting and combating crime, state border protection, proper functioning of the system for management of crisis and protection of national critical infrastructure and functioning of rescue and firefighting system.vide: National Research, op. cit., p

111 MARIAN LUTOSTAŃSKI The achievement of basic goals is complemented by setting detailed goals which are related to the policy of state security and defence and needs. Therefore it is important to implement results of the Strategic Review of Security of Poland. In the process of achieving set goals the Steering Committee performs many organizational and content-related tasks. It is supported by the Department for Project Management in State Security and Defence 31. INTERACTIONS PROJECTORS: MND, MIA, OTHER APPLICATION NATIONAL CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT ENTITIES REALISING PROJECTS PRODUCT Source: Own work. Graph 4. The simplified scheme of the realization of innovation and modernity in the area of state security and defence All the more important content-related tasks of the Steering Committee lead to the achievement of set goals. In particular they are related to the definition of calls for projects within strategic programs of scientific research and development works and other documents necessary to conduct innovation processes from application to product see Graph 4. The organizational tasks of the Steering Committee are related to necessity of creating favourable conditions and enabling the achievement of goals. The preparation of proposals for strategic programs of scientific research and development works in the area of state security and defence 32 for the minister Organizational unit in NCBR structure. 32 Act on National Centre of 10 April 2010, op. cit., art

112 NATIONAL CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND ITS ACTIVITY responsible of science approval is an especially important task realized by the NCBR with the Steering Committee s contribution. It is worth explaining the meaning of the strategic program at the heart of the matter. Simply put, a strategic program is a collection of coherent projects 33 which are planned to be realized within its frames. Let us imagine a special purpose train 34 see Graph 5 where roughly coherent projects will secure efficiency, and safety during a trip on tracks. STRATEGIC PROGRAM Project Electronic camouflage of the train Project Acoustic detection of track damage Project Remote rearrangement of train points Project Remote detection of explosives and other obstacles on train tracks Source: Own work. Graph 5. Example of strategic program: Special purpose train It has to be underlined that the Steering Committee during its work on strategic programs has to take into account the strategic directions of interdisciplinary scientific research and development works defined in the National Research Program as it contains topics related to national security and defence 35. These priority directions are obligatory to the NCBR in the process of formulating the content of strategic programs and have to be in line with time 33 Project may be defined as an undertaking realized in the frame of a strategic program of scientific research and development works or within other task performed by NCBR. 34 Fictional program introduced for article use only. 35 National Research, op. cit. p. 6. Directions of scientific research and development works specified in the document were selected in a commitment with prominent representatives of various scientific areas in a context of economic needs and needs of state security and defense. 111

113 MARIAN LUTOSTAŃSKI frames set for corresponding research and development works 36. National Research Programs defines directions and the NCBR has to conform its activity in a way which makes it possible to realize the strategic directions of scientific research and development works within 10 to 15 years. Strategic research programs should be realized in 3-7 years taking real financing into consideration 37. The proper execution of an NCBR task relying on the submission of a strategic program of scientific research and development works proposal for approval by the minister responsible for science means that in the case of the strategic program related to scientific research and development works for state security and defence the Steering Committee has to focus on the medium and long term development needs of the relevant areas. The Steering Committee is also obliged to pay attention to criteria of the relevant program. The main criterion for the draft of a strategic program of state security and defence is its ability to integrate with programs of development for the whole area. It means that a draft of any planned strategic programs needs a diagnosis of needs done in advance and the acquisition of current achievements in science and technology in view of the possibility to fulfil the expected needs of the area of state security and defence. The determination of needs in the area of state security and defence has to be complemented by the identification and definition of the relevant priorities concerning their significance and order of realization, as well as program coherent topics. It has to be underlined that elements of strategic program related to state security and defence have to meet: criteria defined in the Act on National Centre for Research and Development of 30 April 2010, art and obtain acceptable appraisal by the Steering Committee done on the basis of the Regulation of the Minister of Science and Higher Education of 4 January 2011, on managing the realization of research and development works for national security and defence by the National Centre for Research and Development 6.1 points 1) to 4) Needs, priorities, criteria, scientific and technology achievements and real budget possibilities are the main prerequisites to be considered and correlated. It makes the formulation of strategic program draft difficult and labour intensive. The preparation of a strategic program draft requires effectiveness and close cooperation among all members of the Steering Committee 38. Such a position enables for systematic analysis and the updating of themes to be included in strategic programs. The Steering Committee Chairman influences significantly the work of the Committee which means responsibility for the stimulation of activities 36 Priority directions are not fixed and may be modified according to changing conditions needs and tasks facing economy, society and state security and defense. 37 National Research, op. cit., p Effectiveness of Members of Steering Committee is strictly proportional to their activity in represented institutions. 112

114 NATIONAL CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND ITS ACTIVITY leading to the accomplishment of the main task of the Steering Committee i.e. the preparation and submission for the minister responsible for science of the approved project of the strategic programs aimed at the realization of scientific research and development work for state security and defence 39. Periodic meetings are a basic form of work for the Steering Committee. It is a place for defining and taking decisions concerning directions of activity, the monitoring of on-going activities and checking results and mid-term results of performed tasks. During its meetings the committee identifies and defines threats to the planned and on-going undertakings in the area of state security and defence. Representative of Minister of Defence (Chairman of Steering Committee KS) Representative of Minister responsible for science Representative of economic environment industry of defense Representative of Head of the Internal Security Agency Representative of Minister responsible for internal affairs Representative of economic environment - energy sector Representative of economic environment- ICT sector Representative of Presidentof RP Source: Own work. Graph 6. Organization and composition of Steering Committee 39 Submission of strategic program project for ministerial approval is not finishing involvement of NCBR and Steering Committee. Vide: Regulation of the Minister of Science and Higher Education of 4 January 2011on managing realization of research and development works for national security and defense by National Centre for Research and Development,

115 MARIAN LUTOSTAŃSKI Representatives of ministries and representatives of economic entities relevant to state security and defence matters 40 participate in Steering Committee meetings in line with its mission and legal regulations. Representative of the President of Poland may participate in Steering Committee work in an advisory role. The steering Committee may invite other people usually experts. The organization and composition of the Steering Committee as of 2012 are shown on Graph 6. Members of the Steering Committee represent a wide spectrum of various institutions and it makes its activity more rational. This is the reason for taking accurate decisions concerning the determination of priorities and the range of modernization in the area of state security and defence via the realization of scientific research and development works. Conclusions All the considerations above focus on a diagnosis of what is the real role of the National Centre for Research and Development in the realization of tasks from area of state policy on science, science and technology and innovation in Poland. The main aim of consideration was the identification of activities taken up by the NCBR, their orientation and meaning for the process of supporting Polish scientific entities and enterprises in the launching and implementing of novel technological solutions which boost innovation in the Polish economy as well as in its segments linked to the area of state security and defence. It was meant also as a promotion of the NCBR-the institution is important for stimulation of not only the economic processes but is also important for creating favourable conditions for the development of a scientific workforce thanks to financing its contribution in scientific and development processes. Exploration of the problem of the contribution of the NCBR in state policy in innovation and modernization made it possible for the author to formulate some general conclusions: The National Centre for Research and Development is a specialized agency supervised by the minister responsible for science, focusing on performing tasks in the area of state policy on science, science and technology and innovation. 1. The NCBR is a specialized agency established by the Minister of Science and Higher Education for performing tasks related to state policy on science, science and technology and innovation. 2. The NCBR utilizes results of science in all possible areas and realizes the strategic aims of Polish science Act on National Centre., op. cit., art

116 NATIONAL CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND ITS ACTIVITY 3. NCBR activity supports Polish scientific entities and enterprises in the elaboration and implementation of novel technological solutions and thus in increasing the innovation of Polish economy for the benefit of society. 4. The NCBR launches and manages national and international programs of scientific research and development works influencing economic potential, state security, and defence. 5. Scientific research and development projects for state security and defence are important positions in NCBR activity. 6. NCBR activity animates cooperation between Polish business and scientists and influences the commercialization of scientific research results. 7. Despite animating processes in sectors of the economy, state security, and defence the NCBR consolidates the scientific community and creates favourable conditions for increasing the potential of the scientific workforce. 8. The NCBR selects in open and transparent call procedures projects which most aim at modernization and innovation and then finance or co-finance them, and also it supervises and monitors their execution. 9. The NCBR performs its mission and makes the Polish economy more competitive. It also makes the area of state security and defence more advanced. 10. Cooperation between the NCBR and the minister responsible for internal affairs in the area scientific research and development projects for state security and defence makes it attractive in a scientific as well as in practical dimension. Bibliography National Research Program. Assumptions to national policy on science, technology and innovation (appendix to Resolution No 164/2011 of the Council of Ministersof 16th August 2011,RM ). NCBR National Centre for Research and Development publication, Acts: Act on the National Centre for Research and Development of 30 th April 2010 (OJ No 96, pos. 616). Act on Public Finances of 27th August 2009 (OJ. No 157, pos. 1240). Act on principles of science financing of 4th April 2010 (OJ, No 96, pos Regulations: Regulation of the Minister of Science and Higher Education of 9 September 2010, on National Centre for Research and Development statute (OJ. No 171, pos. 1153). Regulation of the Minister of Science and Higher Education of 17 September 2010, on detailed procedure of realization of tasks of the National Centre for Research and Development (OJ. No 178, pos. 1200). Regulation of the Minister of Science and Higher Education of 28 October 2010, on conditions and mode of granting public aid and de minimis aid by the National Centre for Research and Development (OJ. No 215 pos. 1411). 115

117 MARIAN LUTOSTAŃSKI Regulation of the Minister of Science and Higher Education of 4 January 2011, on managing realization of research and development works for national security and defense by National Centre for Research and Development (OJ. No 18, pos. 91). Rules of procedures: Regulation of the Steering Committee for Research and Development Works in the Field of National Security and Defense (Appendix to Resolution No 1/2010 of the Steering Committee for Research and Development Works in the Field of National Security and Defense of 20 December 2010, on regulation of the Steering Committee for Research and Development Works in the Field of National Security and Defense, NCBR Regulation of the organization of the Steering Committee for Research and Development Works in the Field of National Security and Defense of 15 May 2012 (Appendix to the Regulation of the Director of NCBR no 21/2012). 116

118 Zeszyty Naukowe AON nr 2(59) 2005 NDU Scientific Quarterly no 3(92) 2013 ISSN CIVIL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE APPLICATION OF AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY ISSN X CIVIL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE APPLICATION OF AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY Emilia MIKOŁAJEWSKA, Ph.D. Military Clinical Hospital No. 10 in Bydgoszcz Dariusz MIKOŁAJEWSKI, MSc maj ret. Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń Abstract Ambient Intelligence (AmI) constitutes the most complex known form of human interaction with an artificial intelligent environment. It creates subsequent possibilities of integration: for both civilian and military applications of new technologies. This article aims at investigating the extent to which the available opportunities in this area are being exploited. Key words information technology, computational intelligence, military applications, medical applications Introduction Ambient Intelligence (AmI) constitutes the most complex known form of human interaction with an artificial intelligent environment. Control elements and effectors are built into almost every article of daily use such as elements of interior decoration (including walls), and streets. These elements may be interconnected thanks to ad-hoc networks and thus change education, health care, social care, national security, transport, trade, entertainment, and leisure. Research on AmI was begun in 1999 by Information Society Technologies Advisory Group (ISTAG) as 5 th frame EU programme 1. The current amount of large scale research on AmI is estimated to be at least sixty projects concerning civilian applications and at least a couple of times bigger concerning AmI military applications. AmI systems: shape communication with the user, may be controlled by users without any special skills or training, 1 Nakashima H., Aghajan H., Augusto J. C. Handbook of Ambient Intelligence and Smart Environments. Springer Verlag, New York 2010; Weber W., Rabaey J. M., Aarts E. (red.) Ambient Intelligence. Springer, New York 2005; Riva G., Vatalaro F., Davide F. (red.) Ambient intelligence. IOS Press, Amsterdam

119 EMILIA MIKOŁAJEWSKA, DARIUSZ MIKOŁAJEWSKI help develop user s knowledge, skills, and achieve success (professional, social, etc.), build trust thanks to the coherence of the system s responses with social rules. IT and cybernetics: - multi-agent systems - artificial intelligence (AI) systems - expert systems - telemedical systems - smart home and associated technology - i-wear and associated technology - affective computing (AC) systems Engineering: - microelectronics - nanotechnology - sensors and efectors - telemetry Ambient Intelligence (AmI) Komputer games: - advanced graphic techniques - human-computer interfaces - virtual reality (VR) - computer vision - marketing potential Psychology and sociology: - increasing role of computers within inter-human communication - social changes toward Information Society - decreasing family bonds - development of e-work Telecommunications: - wireless systems - ad-hoc networks - mobile systems - digital signal processing Fig. 1. Genesis of AmI systems Chances and threats AmI, as almost every development, creates both chances and threats. The most important advantages of AmI are as follows: adaptive, user-friendly real-time interfaces, better user support, quicker response to alerts, redundant, fail-safe environment for gathering and pre-processing of data sets purposes. Key issues are technical difficulties important for the selection of the proper directions of further research and development. They are as follows: - the practical implementation of biometric sensors as far as the reliability and validity of recognition systems, since even DNA test has a margin of error, - the rationalization of processing and exploitation of a huge amount of information from various sensors, 118

120 CIVIL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE APPLICATION OF AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY - proper decision making systems, including optimal (for the user) imagery of information and a limitation of transmitted information according to the needs and context. Some technologies applied within AmI systems are well known and trusted, but need to be adapted to new applications. There are three main technical components of contemporary AmI systems: Ubiquitous Computing integration of sensors and effectors into parts of the user s environment (clothes, interior decoration, streets, means of transport, toys, etc.), Ubiquitous Communication ad-hoc wireless networks useful for communication among sensors, effectors, and user, Intelligent User Interfaces technical solutions making the user (users) able to interact with AmI and to control it in a natural (voice, gestures, mimics) and personalized (preferences, context, time limit, limited amount of information, way of imaging) way 2. Ubiquitous Computing (ubicomp) constitutes the tele-information environment of the user. The user is able to interact with ubicomp, but they do not see it directly. Every element of the ubicomp may be directly or indirectly (e.g. through interfaces, etc.) accessed by the user. Moreover every element of the ubicomp fulfils tasks farmed out by the user or according to the schedule. The main features of ubicomp are as follows: ubiquity many simultaneous ways of accessing the AmI system it creates an impression that the user has access to the every service from every place in absence of the physical workstation(s) of the AmI system, transparency the blending of the technology into various user s environments. Ubicomp unlike contemporary IT systems and their interfaces do not need the concentration of the user on an operation. Moreover the user may be not conscious that any interfaces exist in their environment it may be that some changes of levels, of for example light or temperature, to values preferred by the user happen naturally. Ubicomp has huge potential abilities of gathering, processing and imaging data sets. This feature connected with user tracking and responding to their needs may create novel services. Agents of the AmI system may co-operate or compete, and the results of their activities are not deterministic. Noises and distortions may influence system operation, as far as user-system interaction is concerned. Additionally one of the required actions may be the lack of or reaction of the system. The effectivity of AmI systems depends also on important issues concerning the system s way of learning, speed of learning, and interpretation by the system user s behaviour and associated changes. 2 Nakashima H., Aghajan H., Augusto J. C. Handbook of Ambient Intelligence and Smart Environments. Springer Verlag, New York 2010; Weber W., Rabaey J. M., Aarts E. (red.) Ambient Intelligence. Springer, New York 2005; Riva G., Vatalaro F., Davide F. (red.) Ambient intelligence. IOS Press, Amsterdam 2005; Cook D. J., Song W. Ambient Intelligence and Wearable Computing: sensors on the body, in the home, and beyond. Journal of Ambient Intelligence and Smart Environments, 2009, 1(2):

121 EMILIA MIKOŁAJEWSKA, DARIUSZ MIKOŁAJEWSKI The most important threat is the perceived Surveillance Society 3. This concept relies on the purposeful, routine, systematic, and detailed gathering, storing, transmitting, and analysing of data sets from dataveillance. This information comes from the automated supervision of people s activity from simple payments using credit cards or phone calls (data trails) to the most advanced ways of direct supervision. Such situations may cause suspicion, disintegration of social bonds, and changes in democratic standards. The application of AmI may provide a misleading sense of security ( all is under control ) and distract from cheaper and more effective solutions. The excessive saturation of a person s environment with technical solutions may be regarded as improper (i.e. beyond the level necessary for effective and comfortable functioning). It may cause the dehumanization of the environment, an impression of being supervised (causing a reluctance to apply AmI systems), or even use solutions which are complex, non-effective or prone to faults. As a result there is even observed the development of privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs). It seems that virtual reality (VR), despite common use, is not the optima solution, exception in simulation systems for training purposes where accessibility, lower price, and versatility (i.e. the ability to train in any enormous conditions or environments) is precious. The case of AmI and associated human-computer interaction requires rather the implementation of virtual services to the real environment thanks to 3D avatars or Google Glass. It may help avoid disorders of cognitive functions, and may increase the effectiveness of interaction while moving (while traditional graphical user interfaces GUI are not quite effective). Destined AmI systems should provide the same level of human-ami interaction as with physical subjects (e.g. tools or elements of the real environment). The most effective would be typical for human interaction based on multimodal communication, intuition, and emotions. Mixed reality (many various levels and forms of saturation with computationally generated objects) Real environment Extended reality Extended virtuality Virtual environment Fig. 2. Virtuality continuum 4 3 Raport o społeczeństwie nadzorowanym. Surveillance Studies Network sdt.giodo.gov.pl/plik/id_p/1055/j/pl/ data pobrania r. 4 Milgram P., Kishino F. A taxonomy of mixed reality visual displays. IEEE Transactions on Information Systems, 1994, 12: E77-D. 120

122 CIVIL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE APPLICATION OF AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY The number of possible solutions increases with each day, for example Kinect, another solution not requiring the use of upper limbs, e.g. by eye blinking, eyetracking, lips and tongue movements. Voice control has limitations (small amount of commands, accuracy below 95%) and is usually is not optimal. The commercial use of brain-computer interfaces (BCI), despite available devices like the medical BCI Wadsworth System or prototypical BCI-controlled exoskeleton (MindWalker project), still need to develop. Slow BCI-based communication is possible, but more complex BCI-based real-time control constitutes a huge challenge. Moreover, technical development may mean that current EEG-based BCIs will be replaced by MEG-based BCIs as a fully non-invasive solution 5. AmI systems architecture Thanks to AmI, human-computer interaction becomes more effective, but it causes system s the architecture to be more complex. Key issues in the area of AmI systems architecture are as follows: how to implement context into the system, how to reproduce relevantly human-human interaction, how to provide flexible architecture able to effectively support the aforementioned services joining context awareness with the functionality of multimodal communication. The aforementioned problems imply three main directions of research within AmI systems: multimodal communication, including Virtual Character, context awareness, user-oriented adaptive interaction. In the case of the AmI systems, multimodal communication constitutes the highest form of inter-human interaction: with the use of speech, glance, gesture, mimicry, body language, and communication through changes in environment and context. Not only can the content of the messages may be transmitted, but associated emotions too. This situation creates problem associated with the analysis and management of information transmitted using different modalities (voice commands, beeping alarms, text messages, pictures, and movies). A human naturally associates their meanings, picks up similarities/differences, and determines their importance and influence to the context. 5 Mikołajewska E., Mikołajewski D. Interfejsy mózg-komputer zastosowania cywilne i wojskowe. Kwartalnik Bellona, 2011,2: ; Mikołajewska E., Mikołajewski D. Interfejsy mózg-komputer jako rozwiązania dla osób niepełnosprawnych z uszkodzeniami układu nerwowego. Niepełnosprawność zagadnienia, problemy, rozwiązania, III/2012(4): 19 36; Mikołajewska E., Mikołajewski D. Neuroprostheses for increasing disabled patients' mobility and control. Advances in Clinical and Experimental Medicine, 2012, 21(2):

123 EMILIA MIKOŁAJEWSKA, DARIUSZ MIKOŁAJEWSKI Context awareness has to integrate several areas: context recognition, i.e. how to gather the context from sets of signals from sensors, and from interaction with the user, context adaptation through AmI scenarios/interaction shaping depending on context instead of unified action associated with the current situation, contextual identification of resources since status (location, amount) and use of resources may be context-related, contextual anticipation the AmI system saturates the environment with context-associated information, which increases abilities to communicate with the user and to acquire knowledge concerning the context. User-oriented adaptive interaction should contain at least the following functionalities: 1. gathering information about the user, 2. decision making, 3. selection of message content and way of their imaging. AmI architectures have to take into consideration at least several separate issues. Properly implemented, AmI architecture will allow for the receiving and processing of all information regarded as potentially useful, and finally effective data mining concerning the proper description of the environment and associated user interaction. It enables proper personalized communication of the AmI system with the user and the need for user s adaptive interaction with intelligent environment. A M B I E N T I N T E L L I G E N C E interaction through environment user support - context - situation - people - things User s environment: User: - experience (objective and subiective) - knowledge - presence - activity (purposeful and emotional) Fig. 3. Key issues in user suport by AmI 122

124 CIVIL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE APPLICATION OF AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY An AmI system should imperceptibly support the user in their tasks, independently from their area and needed tools, methods or techniques. It is possible by the use of effective combinations of accessible services within the earlier defined scenarios. These scenarios forecast the behaviour of the user based on context, user preferences, hitherto experience, current tasks, activity and communication. There is need for real-time tracking and analysis of the user and their environment. Moreover various users mean various levels and ways of support, they prefer different modalities in communication, present own experience, habits, and preferences. Changes within a user s behaviour is forecast based on actual tasks and priorities, lack of enough information or time, fulfilling tasks during illness or stress. An additional issue is perceived group activity the co-operation of various users and various systems. As an example: an expert (head of the team) accompanied by an AmI system fulfilling a well known task in a hurry in co-operation with two other users (with their own AmI systems): one of them is another expert, and the second is a beginner. This situation may imply many various situations and constitute excellent conditions to test both users and AmI systems. AmI system supports the user partly thanks to the real-time tracking of the user's location and activity. The system should also track the location and activity of the AmI system components (including mobile components), particularly components interacting directly with the user. This information may be as follows: identification of the concrete user, authentication of their profile/identity and rights, physical and virtual location of the user, context and verbal context (resulting from verbal communication), abilities of communication (both possible and preferred), current and forecasted activity (based on behaviour, habits, and schedule), atypical situations and alerts, in the case of group activities: activity of the whole team, leasing of cooperation taking into consideration roles within the team (e.g. short cuts for the team leader, peer-to-peer communication, etc.). An AmI system has difficulty due to the decomposition of each user s task into elementary activities needed for fulfilling the task. This approach is required for the most effective support of the user's intent, on every stage of the task. Knowledge concerning the user s motivation, preferences, and context of action may be regarded as a key issue for proper scenario modification. Due to the huge amount of IT equipment required by one user, a key role may be played by the economy (low practice, standardization) of the AmI systems and the ability to cooperate within various equipment configurations. Ad-hoc wireless systems require proper bandwidth, what may constitute another challenge in the case of the cooperation of various AmI systems in the same close space. Apart from novel digital technologies there is a need for taking into consideration the 123

125 EMILIA MIKOŁAJEWSKA, DARIUSZ MIKOŁAJEWSKI ability to connect to the network via other mobile agents (sensors, efectors, etc.) with respect to the quality of service, security, and delay time. Current standards (WLAN IEEE , GPRS, Bluetooth 3.0, etc.) do not always fulfil these requirements, simultaneously enabling the implementation of for example Open Agent Architecture and Distributed Markup Agent Language. Proporly established personalized user feedback Communication Knowledge Perception Analysis Decision making Action 124 Fig. 4. AmI architecture allowing for assessment of the real system general structure Requirements in the area of work stations and user interfaces are difficult to couch, moreover they may not be required. Work station or terminal (in the current meaning) may not be necessary for proper multimodal communication. Ways of user-system communication in the case on an AmI system needs for the: practical implementation of interaction management, dialog based on the system knowledge and bilateral multimodal communication, lack of possibility to overload the system or overcomplicate the interaction, proper and quick response to behaviour/requirement of the user, intuitive, transparent, and unequivocal control,

126 CIVIL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE APPLICATION OF AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY equivalence of various modalities (i.e. the same command irrespective of modality: voice, test, short cut, should cause the same system response), safety (e.g. requirement for confirmation and possibility to withdraw), conformity to the abilities and preferences of the user. Many novel research methods are used to accelerate development in the area of AmI: video analysis, experiments on multi-agent systems, research on neurobiological models of consciousness, multifactorial context analysis using inputs in various modalities. This research allows for the adaptation of interaction to the user, and the bigger flexibility of AmI systems we should be aware, that computational intelligence may develop much more than its users (e.g. due to limited human physical and cognitive abilities). The training of an AmI user does not have to contain architecture, the function of the system and its installation (e.g. operation system, location and types of files, etc.), but rather only: the selection and use of an intuitive interface, the personalization (e.g. in voice-controlled systems) and selection of the user profile (if required), possibilities of carrying data sets follow the user. A perfect AmI system reflects the so called guardian angel effect the sensation of support without the presence of person/device, based only on the way of interaction. Medical and military applications of Ambient Intelligence The medical applications of AmI systems have been described in our previous work 6. The area of medical AmI systems develop very dynamically, especially thanks to the support of EU funds for solutions for disabled and elderly people. Military research significantly influences current new technologies see internet, GPS or C3I (Command, Communications, Control and Intelligence) systems. Current novel technologies try to be universal: without a priori military or civilian application. In selected cases they may differ only in case and set of fulfilled technical standards and recommendations. The COTS (commercial off the shelf) strategy seems to be the more common with every day: they decreases costs of the complex system development. As examples: VeriChip implants (Positive ID) used in some people with memory disorders,, NBIC (nano-bio-information and communication technology), xreality plus broadband access, and ihci (implicit human computer interaction). Military and civilian solutions permeate each other. The most important aspect of military application is the net-centric approach to 6 Mikołajewska E. Mikołajewski D. Zastosowanie medyczne systemów Ambient Intelligence. Acta Bio-Optica et Informatica Medica, 2011, 3:

127 EMILIA MIKOŁAJEWSKA, DARIUSZ MIKOŁAJEWSKI national security 7. It allows to forecast the quick development of military AmI systems providing: 1. on the level of command and administration: increased precision, effectiveness, velocity and coordination of operation, increased security and quicker reaction to dynamical changes of the situation, increased quality of achievable information, more effective automatic analysis of big data, including analysis of searching data sets, putting two and two together, lack of language gap, etc., increased scalability and flexibility of the systems: since single sensor (e.g. stone close to the road, distance marker, telephone box), equipment of single soldier or combat vehicle, to the complex systems covering huge areas (including enemy territory - scatterable) operating as multi-agent systems, standardized, universal and flexible architecture, increased failure-freedom, including proper operation of the partly destroyed system, resistance to babble and detection (transmission only when questioned, adhoc networks, TRANSEC and COMSEC solutions). 2. on the user level: user-oriented system, bilateral multimodal communication simultaneous use of speech, text, mimics, gestures, head movements, pictures, movies, and bioelectrical signals derived from the brain (see for example BrainGate project) 8, flexible adaptation of communication: way(s), amount, and form of transmitting information according to the needs and preferences of the user and context, hand-free technology, including remote control, silent system responses, where it is not necessary for the user to pay attention, increased precision of remote operation thanks to haptic systems and telepresence, tele-medical systems with bio-stimulators 9,10, 7 Ladner R., Petry F. E. (red.) Net-centric approaches to intelligence and national security. Springer, New York Mikołajewska E., Mikołajewski D., Interfejsy mózg-komputer zastosowania cywilne i wojskowe. Kwartalnik Bellona, 2011,2: ; Mikołajewska E., Mikołajewski D. Interfejsy mózg-komputer jako rozwiązania dla osób niepełnosprawnych z uszkodzeniami układu nerwowego. Niepełnosprawność zagadnienia, problemy, rozwiązania, III/2012(4): 19 36; Mikołajewska E., Mikołajewski D., Neuroprostheses for increasing disabled patients' mobility and control. Advances in Clinical and Experimental Medicine, 2012, 21(2): Koch S., Marschollek M., Wolf K. H. i wsp. On health-enabling and ambient-assistive technologies. What has been achieved and where do we have to go? Methods of Information in Medicine, 2009, 48(1):

128 CIVIL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE APPLICATION OF AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY application of affective computing to human emotions recognition based on changes in intonation, mimicry, gesture, and physiological response the reaction of the system to the user s emotions and motivation may increase the effectiveness of people working in stress (commanders, flight crews, ship crews) 11, security systems responding directly to the user's errors and unauthorised access. The following division of the AmI systems may be practical: systems dedicated to concrete environment (embedded), thus such systems hang over the user forming each other while the user is moving, systems dedicated to the concrete user or group of the users, moving together. Differences in architecture of the aforementioned system may be a key issue thus these systems may develop in opposite directions, creating completely novel solutions. As an example: current applications of commercial group ware with shared resources, accessible both on stationary workstations, netbooks, and smartphones. Such solutions are used in the Polish Armed Forces, but the next step would be telepresence systems similar to solutions used in Poland for remote surgical treatment purposes. Negative secondary changes as a result of long-term AmI use are not known and require deeper research. We know negative secondary changes as a result of VR abuse, thus similar effects concerning AmI are probable. Directions of further research Research on AmI focuses on the development of novel, user-friendly, cheaper and safer solutions. A key issue may be users acceptation of the novel way of interacting with the environment. The most important directions of further AmI systems development are as follows: new sensors and their multimodal systems, providing a more complete picture of the user, environment, and context, and correctness of decision making processes based on information gathered in the aforementioned way, more complex, more effective and easier to adapt scenarios of user-system interaction (including both very poor and very rich options of interaction), scalability of AmI systems from single user to complex specialized systems (for corporation or metropolis purposes), increased automatic adaptation of AmI systems toward intelligent systems. 10 Mikołajewska E., Mikołajewski D., Inżynieria biomedyczna na polu walki. Kwartalnik Bellona, 2010, 4: Cook D. J., Song W., Ambient Intelligence and Wearable Computing: sensors on the body, in the home, and beyond. Journal of Ambient Intelligence and Smart Environments, 2009, 1(2): 83 86; Raport o społeczeństwie nadzorowanym. Surveillance Studies Network 2006 sdt.giodo.gov.pl/plik/id_p/1055/j/pl/ data pobrania r. 127

129 EMILIA MIKOŁAJEWSKA, DARIUSZ MIKOŁAJEWSKI Further future constitute affective interfaces (as an element of affective computing) recognizing the mood and emotions of the user based on voice intonation, mimicry, gesture, etc. We are aware, that emotions may be shaped toward more the effective motivation of the employees, so research on these solutions are advanced. Moreover emotional status of the user may make difficult user-ami interactions, both through misunderstanding, and the different goals of the user and the AmI system 12. Conclusions The potential of the Ambient Intelligence was recognized earlier, but the advanced technical solutions needed for the practical implementation of the AmI systems means that the most efficient research is still expected in the future 13. The current development of the AmI concept constitutes a form of research on various systems, including smart home, i-wear, and intelligent household equipment 14. These technologies step in health care systems, where saturation with tele-medical systems and various IT equipment allows for development of novel technologies, such as intelligent wound dressing. Tracking systems are useful in trade and transport, and research on affective computing is conducted in advertising (see also a computer mouse with sensors for hand shaking, temperature, and humidity). Applications of AmI in the area of national security is often confidential, but it seems their use, in selected countries, may be significant, especially within counter-terrorism and advanced systems for threat analysis, recognition, command and control. Evolution toward a net-centric approach will increase this tendency. Bibliography Cook D. J., Song W. Ambient Intelligence and Wearable Computing: sensors on the body, in the home, and beyond. Journal of Ambient Intelligence and Smart Environments, 2009, 1(2): Mikołajewska E., Mikołajewski D. Inżynieria biomedyczna na polu walki. Kwartalnik Bellona, 2010, 4: Raport o społeczeństwie nadzorowanym. Surveillance Studies Network 2006 sdt.giodo.gov.pl/plik/id_p/1055/j/pl/ - access Mikołajewska E., Mikołajewski D., Informatyka afektywna w zastosowaniach cywilnych i wojskowych. Zeszyty Naukowe WSOWL, 2013; 2(168): Cook D. J., Song W., Ambient Intelligence and Wearable Computing: sensors on the body, in the home, and beyond. Journal of Ambient Intelligence and Smart Environments, 2009, 1(2): 83 86; Raport o społeczeństwie nadzorowanym. Surveillance Studies Network 2006 sdt.giodo.gov.pl/plik/id_p/1055/j/pl/ data pobrania r. 14 Cook D. J., Song W., Ambient Intelligence and Wearable Computing: sensors on the body, in the home, and beyond. Journal of Ambient Intelligence and Smart Environments, 2009, 1(2):

130 CIVIL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE APPLICATION OF AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY Koch S., Marschollek M., Wolf K. H. i wsp. On health-enabling and ambient-assistive technologies. What has been achieved and where do we have to go? Methods of Information in Medicine, 2009, 48(1): Komeńdziński T., Mikołajewska E., Mikołajewski D. Model eklektyczny/mieszany jako rozwiązanie uzupełniające we współczesnej fizjoterapii pacjentów z deficytami neurologicznymi. Materiały I Interdyscyplinarnej Konferencji Naukowej Konteksty Psychologii Rehabilitacji, Lublin Komendziński T. Multimodalna dynamika koordynacji, czyli Michael Turvey i psychologia według inżynierów (nie tylko dla inżynierów). Avant: Journal of Philosophical- Interdisciplinary Vanguard 2012; 2: 334. Komendziński T. (red.) Theoria et Historia Scientiarum, 2003, t. 7, z. 2. Special issue: Unconscious cognition and perception. Cognitive, evolutionary and psychologic perspective. Ladner R., Petry F. E. (red.) Net-centric approaches to intelligence and national security. Springer, New York Mikołajewska E., Mikołajewski D. Informatyka afektywna w zastosowaniach cywilnych i wojskowych. Zeszyty Naukowe WSOWL, 2013, 2(168): Mikołajewska E., Mikołajewski D. Interfejsy mózg-komputer zastosowania cywilne i wojskowe. Kwartalnik Bellona, 2011,2: Mikołajewska E., Mikołajewski D. Interfejsy mózg-komputer jako rozwiązania dla osób niepełnosprawnych z uszkodzeniami układu nerwowego. Niepełnosprawność zagadnienia, problemy, rozwiązania, III/2012(4): Mikołajewska E., Mikołajewski D. Neuroprostheses for increasing disabled patients' mobility and control. Advances in Clinical and Experimental Medicine, 2012, 21(2): Mikołajewska E. Mikołajewski D. Zastosowanie medyczne systemów Ambient Intelligence. Acta Bio-Optica et Informatica Medica, 2011, 3: Milgram P., Kishino F. A taxonomy of mixed reality visual displays. IEEE Transactions on Information Systems, 1994, 12: E77-D. Nakashima H., Aghajan H., Augusto J. C. Handbook of Ambient Intelligence and Smart Environments. Springer Verlag, New York Nowakowski P., Komendziński T. Poczucie sprawstwa: ujęcie interdyscyplinarne. [w:] Pąchalska M., Kwiatkowska G. E. Neuropsychologia a humanistyka, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2010, s Riva G., Vatalaro F., Davide F. (red.) Ambient intelligence. IOS Press, Amsterdam Weber W., Rabaey J. M., Aarts E. (red.) Ambient Intelligence. Springer, New York

131 NDU Zeszyty Scientific Naukowe Quarterly AON nr no 2(59) 3(92) ISSN WOJCIECH MICHALAK ART OF WAR DOMINANCE IN THE AIR AND FROM THE AIR Prof. Wojciech MICHALAK, Ph.D. National Defence University Abstract Traditional roles of air forces in combat involve the subjugation of air space and the maintaining of superiority / domination in the skies in order to create favourable conditions to conduct successful land and naval operations. They are, thus, a component supporting other forces in joint military operations. Nowadays, air forces sometimes take the role of the dominant force (a component supported by other forces) and then the joint operations of armed forces are conducted in a way (as called in the article) of dominance from the air. This allows, especially in the so-called asymmetric conflicts, to obtain the military and political goals of the war without land or naval invasion. This is a new phenomenon in the Art of War, which the author of the article tries to identify, describe and systematise. To make waging a war through dominance from the air possible, air forces must have absolute freedom to use the air space in the whole area of a conflict and in the whole territory of an opponent. The current terminology related to dominance (superiority / domination) in the air and the theory of war in the air does not provide (describe) such a situation. In this article, the views in this respect, which were in force in NATO and the Warsaw Pact and are still in force in the US Armed Forces, NATO and the Russian Federation, are critically evaluated and a new terminology taxonomy for dominance in the air is suggested. Key words Dominance from the air, dominance in the air, air superiority, dominata, dominat, air supremacy, air forces, joint operations, types of combat activities, supported component, supporting component Lessons learned from armed conflicts conducted since the beginning of World War II show that a convenient position in the skies is one of the essential conditions to be successful in an armed conflict. The significance of dominance in the air for the course and final results of operations and military campaigns is 130

132 DOMINANCE IN THE AIR AND FROM THE AIR emphasised by almost all theorists of the art of war as well as military commanders, who stress the importance of domination and superiority in air combat operations. Widespread awareness of the role of dominance in the skies does not mean understanding and the practical implementation of challenges, which result from the knowledge and acceptance of it. This is particularly true of the armed forces of these countries, in which the condition of the Air Force the main combat performers fighting for the air supremacy and superiority is gradually getting worse and worse. This issue is not always duly presented both in publications (journalism), as well as in application exercises and practical forms of military training. The majority of publications on the issues related to the battles for air supremacy and superiority come from the period of the bipolar division of the world. But since then, there have been a lot of changes, not only in the geopolitical and military environment of international security, but also new tendencies in air dominance theory and practice have been perceived. The preliminary conclusions, resulting from the recognition of the issue, suggest that the identification of the dominance and superiority in the skies functioning in the former Warsaw Pact and NATO was understood and interpreted in various ways. Also present are theoretical views and doctrinal arrangements, which are in force in the North Atlantic Alliance and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; although related to this subject they are slightly different, are often changeable and arouse some controversy. Among many problems in the area of uncertainty and investigations presented this way, the most important ones are related to the question of whether air supremacy and superiority in the previous understanding meet the requirements resulting from modern armed combat? Should these, now historical terms and definitions, be verified, for instance in the light of the Gulf War (against Iraq in 1991), or the operation in Kosovo (in 1999) and Libya (in 1986, and especially in 2011)? Indeed, during these operations the air force of the alliance / coalition or the American one (Libya, 1986) had the possibility to use the airspace unrestrainedly from the very beginning. Therefore, it was not about gaining and maintaining domination / superiority in the skies, but about such a use of an air force to achieve the most ambitious military goals (during the first month of the Gulf War) or even the political aims of the conducted operations (Kosovo and Libya). Considering the situation, in which Air Forces in some joint military operations or their critical phases (Persian Gulf) serve as a leading component, that is a supported one, instead of playing their traditional role serving as the supporting component, isn t there a need for an in-depth evaluation of the existing canons of armed combat and domination and superiority in the skies? Are we not the witnesses of new trends in the art of war, which require a different attitude to an air force's role in the armed combat and a new approach to the situation in the sky? 131

133 WOJCIECH MICHALAK Even a perfunctory analysis of indicated conditions allows one to propose a thesis stating that the existing rules of conducting an already traditional war by combined land, air, navy and special forces, whose aim was to break the enemy s forces, to take its territory mainly by land forces and to make them surrender, sometimes lose their exclusivity, and thus alternative solutions may appear. Military campaigns can be performed in many ways, but they should always be appropriate to the situation and combat abilities (the power of) the opposing sides. Experience gained in modern wars and crisis operations indicates the continuous and really remarkable growth of the importance of up-to-date air forces in military operations. Their power and abilities to accurately detect and immediately and precisely destroy the most critical and most important objects and elements of an administrative and economic system (especially critical infrastructure) as well as a military opponent throughout the depth of its combat group, and often the whole territory, allow air forces to be able to achieve military and political goals of a war almost independently (acting as a supported component) under certain conditions (especially in asymmetric conflicts). However, it is only possible in the case of the quantitative and qualitative dominance of the air force of the side, which will take over the command of the airspace forthwith and, playing the dominat 1 role, will carry out an operation, which can be called dominance from the air 2. A new quality of armed combat is being shaped, which is partly consistent with the views of an Italian general, Giulio Douhet, presented in the early 1920s, which stated that the goals of war can be achieved through bombing the opponent from the air. In this context, the phrase dominance from the air used in the article should be interpreted as the most distinct form of air domination, in which air forces with the right support from the land forces, navy and special forces will be able to somehow control the enemy from the air and make him surrender, achieving the military and political goals of the war, even without meeting the historical canon of taking the enemy s territory over by land invasion or from the sea. Dominance from the air means, thus, something else and something more than air supremacy and superiority, and the difference mainly results from the goals, for which they are obtained. Air supremacy and superiority were gained and maintained to, first of all, shape favourable conditions for conducting joint operations, and especially by the kind of troops which were supported and played the most important role in achieving the military and political goals of the war. Historically and currently, air supremacy and superiority were mainly gained 1 Dominat (Latin in ancient Rome the form of government, existing since the time of Diocletian (late third century); the absolute power of the ruler ( ); the ruler became the master (dominus) of life and property of the citizens ( ). Encyklopedia Powszechna (Universal Encyclopaedia) PWN, Warsaw 1973, volume 1., p Dominance a privileged position, control; ascendancy over somebody or something, superiority, domination. Słownik współczesnego języka polskiego (Dictionary of Contemporary Polish), volume 1, Warsaw 1998, p

134 DOMINANCE IN THE AIR AND FROM THE AIR in the interest of the land forces, although sometimes also the navy (fleet). Nowadays, they can be also gained to dominate the enemy from the air, take control over his airspace and defeat him (achieve the political goals of the operation) even without occupying his territory (Kosovo, Libya). The Art of War is, thus, enriched with new possibilities to conduct armed operations. The existing theory and practice of armed combat and domination and superiority in the skies are not becoming outdated, although new qualities, determined by the dominance from the air, are being brought. Dominance from the air is, therefore, a way to use armed forces, especially air forces, to achieve the military and political goals of the war. However, the basic condition to meet these objectives is to obtain and to maintain the highest level of dominance in the air, which provides almost absolute freedom of air forces activities. It is clear from the considerations above that dominance in the air, containing such levels of ascendancy in the third dimension, as for instance air supremacy and superiority, is a narrower term than domination from the air. The first one is supposed to provide the ease to use air forces and to create convenient conditions for regular activities and victory in the classic air-land-sea war. The second one as a form of modern war through obtaining the ease to use air forces (dominance in the air), is supposed to provide for dominating and defeating the enemy almost only from the air. Air supremacy and superiority are therefore the primary factors, but at the same time the fundamental ones, leading to victory in armed combat, waged traditionally, that is in the air, on land and sea, as well as in a modern form almost only with the use of the air power. Thus, let the essence of domination and superiority in the air be the subject of our further research. There are two schools which are the most representative in this area. One of them used to be in force in the former Warsaw Pact, including the former Soviet armed forces, and, after many modifications, it is currently promoted in the Russian Federation Army. The second one is being developed in the NATO militaries, in which developments in this field are also being made. The issue pertains to most of the militaries, in which the terms air supremacy and air superiority are more and more commonly used as synonyms, and moreover, other terms related to dominance in the air are used quite freely. What is more, various content included in particular terms is not taken under consideration. Let s analyse the issues of dominance in the air, starting from the views functioning in the former Warsaw Pact. In the Warsaw Pact armies, the only term reflecting domination in the air was the term air supremacy (gospodstwo w wozduchie). It was related to war on a large scale (it is the period of the Cold War and the bipolar division of the world), 133

135 WOJCIECH MICHALAK and was eventually defined in the early 1970s; its essence still casts a shadow over modern views existing in Russia. In the literature, it was determined that: Air supremacy is understood as such a situation in the airspace of the opponents, resulting from active operations of all kinds of armed forces, including, first of all, air forces and air defence forces, whose aviation has its own initiative and is able to impose its will upon the enemy. During the time of dominance in the air, the land forces, air forces and the navy have the possibility to perform their tasks, without coming across a strong counteraction of the enemy s air force and ground air-defence means 3. The analysis of the definition mentioned above shows that air supremacy exposes the situation of the air forces (is the subject of reference) and is related to a certain state of the situation in the airspace. Therefore, we deal with air supremacy when the air force has the lead and is able to impose its will on the opponent, and consequently, is able to perform its tasks without a strong counteraction of the enemy s air force and ground air-defence means. And it is the first condition determining the acquisition of the dominance in the air. But there is also a second condition, which states that we can talk about dominance in the air only when, apart from the air forces, also land and naval forces have the ability to perform tasks and operations without the strong and effective reaction of the enemy s air force. Therefore, obtaining domination in the air is not the goal itself but a means, which is to ensure the effective performance of operational and strategic tasks not only by air forces, but also and maybe above all by land and naval forces. Gaining and maintaining dominance in the air is, thus, supposed to support success in an armed conflict and therefore, all kind of armed forces, with the dominant role of air forces, have to participate in achieving it. These are the two conditions which have to be fulfilled to recognise the air space as a controlled (dominated) one. The theory of combat for air supremacy assumed that it could be carried out simultaneously or consecutively in one or several theatres of war operations, as well as in the ridge of operations in a front, and even in a smaller area. Therefore, according to the division of warfare, it was assumed that combat for air supremacy could have strategic, operational and tactical range. Accordingly to this division, the degrees of domination in the air were defined, and their content was as follows: Strategic air supremacy is understood as the privileged situation of one's own air force in the airspace of one or several adjoining theatres of war-operations, maintained during the whole course of a strategic operation. The supremacy could be obtained thanks to a crushing defeat of the main forces of the opposing air force groups and the ground-based anti-aircraft means of the enemy, destroying 3 Kurs opieratiwnogo iskusstwa wojenno-wozdusznych sił, Monino 1974, p.71 following: W. Michalak, Dominacja z powietrza, AON, Warszawa 1999, p

136 DOMINANCE IN THE AIR AND FROM THE AIR aerospace industry plants, airports, flight crew training centres, striking force aircraft carriers and the supplies of fuel and ammunition 4. Operational air supremacy is a privileged situation of one's own air force in the airspace of one or several adjoining operational directions of the theatre of war, maintained during the time of the whole operation. Operational supremacy in the air can be obtained by destroying the main forces of the opposing air force groups of the enemy, as well as thanks to a crushing defeat of its main forces and anti-aircraft defence 5. Tactical air supremacy 6 is the supremacy obtained in a small area and for a short period of time, necessary to complete the tasks carried out by tactical units or different kinds of armed forces. It is obtained through the destruction of aircraft and anti-aircraft means as well as through blocking the opponent s major airports 7. The analysis of the above definitions indicates that they are based on the general idea of dominance in the air, as they expose the privileged situation of one's own air force and specify the nature of tasks and operations, which have to be implemented to gain air supremacy at the appropriate scale. The essence of these definitions is, however, to appoint the spatial and time indicators of dominance in the air, clarifying the regions and territories, as well as the period of time for which the dominance is obtained. In this context, adopting the spatial indicators, in accordance with the logic of the systemic division of the art of war, that is strategic, operational and tactical dominance in the air, does not cast any doubts. What is astonishing, however, is the specification of time indicators in the strategic and operational dimension of dominance in the air as permanent situations, which is expressed in the statements that they are maintained throughout the duration of operations in the theatre of war or in operational directions. Such assumptions are even more surprising, as both from the theory and practical experience gained in wars and armed conflicts, especially the long-term ones, it is evident that the situation in the air can change rapidly. Many times, e.g. during World War II, the belligerent sides obtained and lost their strategic or operational air supremacy. Often, one of the sides obtained momentary operational or tactical air supremacy in the conditions, in which the other side of the war obtained the strategic air supremacy. Thus, stating that strategic or operational supremacy was maintained throughout the entire operation was the expression of a desired endeavour rather than a really possible situation in the air. It can be also interpreted as a manifestation of the offensive doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, because air 4 Kurs, op.cit., p.73, za: W Michalak, Dominacja, op. cit., p Ibidem. 6 Tactical air supremacy was essentially local in nature. Tactical dimension in terms of the Warsaw Pact was related to the depth of several a few dozen kilometres and concerned only military units to brigade and division level. 7 Kurs, op.cit., p.73, za: W. Michalak, Dominacja, op. cit., p

137 WOJCIECH MICHALAK supremacy, as mentioned earlier, was to be the basic requirement to achieve military success, gained as a result of strong offensive operations conducted in land and sea theatres of war. It can be noticed in the analysed definitions that operational air supremacy was supposed to be achieved as a result of the destruction of major anti-aircraft air force concentrations of the enemy. If it is considered that operational air supremacy could include a few operational-air directions, thus, sometimes the area of almost the whole theatre of war - that is the area of hundreds of thousands of square kilometres and that it should continue throughout the duration of front operations in the theatre, that is for several days, then gaining the dominance, and especially its maintenance, was not possible without the destruction of the infrastructure supporting the air force activities. This infrastructure included: refineries, pipelines, air plants and anti-aircraft equipment manufacturers, as well as logistics bases. And, in fact, combating the dominance was included in almost all exercises of the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, articulating such activities only in the definition of strategic dominance in the air should be regarded as not fully correct. In the Warsaw Pact, the term superiority in the air (priewoschodstwo w wozduchie) was also used. Its essence was defined in an encyclopaedia as having a greater number of aircraft (quantitative superiority), better types of military aircraft and better-trained military crew (qualitative superiority) by one of the warring sides, enabling success in the activities. In the final part of the extract, it is added that having superiority in the air is the basic condition to gain dominance in the air 8. The content of the definition indicates that the concept of superiority in the air was narrowed to quantitative factors, that is measurable ones, usually described by comparing the ratio of strengths and the capabilities of aircraft of the opposing sides, as well as qualitative factors, often immeasurable in number, related to better training and better weapons or a more convenient location of the air forces. That kind of understanding of superiority in the air should be criticised. In fact, it is dominated by the mass related to the number of aircraft while immeasurable factors are left in the background. Moreover, in the latter ones, a lot of elements, which have an impact on gaining the superiority in the air, are not taken into account, e.g. command craft, originality in the use of air forces, surprise, initiative or the will to fight. The impact of ground anti-aircraft means on the gaining of superiority is also omitted. It may be argued that such a notion of superiority in the air in the Warsaw Pact was promoted only to justify its different understanding in the NATO armies, and indirectly to confirm that only air supremacy on a tactical, operational and strategic scale, that is, that the views and terms, which were in force in the Warsaw Pact, render the real essence of dominance in the air. In the evaluated definition, Mała encyklopedia wojskowa, MON, Warszawa 1970, p. 810.

138 DOMINANCE IN THE AIR AND FROM THE AIR however, the statement that gaining superiority (understood even this way) favours winning dominance in the air is relevant. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, Russian theorists views on dominance in the air evolved and gradually came closer to the ones in NATO. However, their own assumptions related to operations in the air, a scale and breadth of dominance in the air or the ways to achieve it were perpetuated. Currently, the Russians endorse the views that air supremacy is possible to be obtained only in an armed struggle waged against a much weaker opponent. In the case of an armed struggle waged against an opponent having a comparable potential of offensive and defensive means of combat in the air and being able to use it efficiently, obtaining dominance in the air becomes problematic, if not impossible. Therefore, softening their views from the Soviet Union period, they begin to lean towards the traditional global terminology, partly in line with the views prevailing in NATO, and they assume that in this case (that is comparable air and space forces), a real and achievable goal is to obtain air superiority, and they treat air supremacy as the final objective the ultimate one in an air war. At the moment, they are most likely to distinguish three levels of dominance in the air 9 : 1. slight air superiority, 2. significant (important) air superiority, 3. overwhelming air superiority, that is - air supremacy. Air and space supremacy, according to Russian views, is such a condition created during an armed conflict when the air-space means of one of the sides have significant superiority and they can carry out their tasks effectively with acceptable losses, while air-space means on the other side are not able to carry out their duties effectively due to the fact that they have earlier been incapacitated or destroyed on the ground and have sustained unacceptably high losses in the airspace from the air-space defence of the dominating side 10. It is believed that air supremacy understood this way is related to a war waged on a large scale against an enemy able to use outer space for military purposes. In the case of conflict with an opponent not having such possibilities, the space aspect outlined in the definition would surely not be taken under consideration. An analysis of current Russian views shows that it is still believed that air supremacy can be obtained on a strategic, operational and tactical scale. Supremacy in outer space, however, can be obtained only on a global or strategic scale. Now, let us present some selected views on dominance in the air, which were and are promoted in the North Atlantic Alliance. As it is widely known, the basic term, which has been in force in NATO since the 1970s, defining dominance in the air was air superiority. It was 9 M. Michalec, Koncepcje operacyjnego użycia Sił Powietrznych Federacji Rosyjskiej w latach , AON, Warszawa 2012, p Ibidem, p

139 WOJCIECH MICHALAK assumed that it was of a local character, sometimes called a tactical one, and of a general character, also called operational. Superiority also had its most forceful form: air supremacy. The literature emphasised the limited area and time of local superiority, necessary to perform a certain task as well as it pointed out that general superiority referred to almost the entire area of operations occupied by land, naval and air forces for a relatively long period of time. Let us recall the definitions of superiority and dominance in the air from those years 11. Air superiority is such a state of the dominance of air forces of one of the sides over the air forces of the other side, which enables the land and naval forces of the first side to operate in a certain place and for a certain time in the absence of the effective counteraction of the air forces of the other side. Air supremacy is such a state of superiority when the armed forces of the opponent are not able to counteract effectively. It is clear from these definitions that air supremacy is the highest level of superiority. The determinants of superiority are: 1. domination in the air which should be treated as having an initiative and possibilities to force one's own will on the opponent, which means operating without the strong reaction of his air forces and air defence; 2. the ability of land and naval forces to perform tasks in the absence of the effective counteraction of the opponent s air forces. Here, it is worth paying attention to the fact that the same criteria determined the definitions of tactical, operational and strategic air supremacy in the former Warsaw Pact. The basic term in NATO was, however, air superiority. In the literature of the eighties and early nineties, the essence of air superiority and supremacy hardly changed. It was only pointed out that as far as air superiority is concerned, it enabled the conducting of any activities by land, naval and air forces in a certain place and certain time without the strong reaction of the opponent s forces (without significant obstacles on the opposing side). With regard to air supremacy, it was stated that the air forces of the opponent are not able to effectively counteract the side which dominated the air space 12. These stabilised views on air dominance (superiority, supremacy) started to evolve. It is not surprising that the terms: air and space superiority, as well as air and space supremacy were adopted in the US Air Force Basic Doctrine in The global dimensions of the superpowers policies and the increasing use of outer space for military purposes highlight the sense in considering domination in that space, both in theory and practice. For countries or alliances / coalitions running a global policy, obtaining dominance in space could be one of the most important conditions for achieving military success in a war. 11 Refarence Book.US Air Force Basie Data. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 1995, p.2-a-5; also German Regulamin sił powietrznych, ZD 65/351, p oraz Militarisches Studienglossar, Bonn 1993, p

140 DOMINANCE IN THE AIR AND FROM THE AIR The connection between air and space superiority and air and space supremacy should be emphasised. The domination of space, after all, makes it easier to obtain air superiority or supremacy, and a victory in the air allows for defeating the enemy in space. From this point of view, the armed forces of the countries which use space for military purposes have much greater opportunities to obtain air superiority or supremacy than their potential opponents, able only to perform land, air and naval activities. This observation justifies and also makes us aware of the reasons why small and medium countries tend to join coalitions and political and military alliances with regional and global powers. In the normative and doctrinal document of the US Armed Forces, mentioned before, defining air and space superiority and supremacy does not differ from the previously presented views. In fact, it is recognised that superiority is such a degree of dominance, when one's own land, air and naval forces can operate in a certain place and for a certain time without the significant counteraction of the opponent s air and space forces. Continuously deepening superiority leads to obtaining air and space supremacy. It is worth paying attention to the articulation of the essence of air and space supremacy. In the presented doctrine, it is assumed that it is such a degree of superiority, in which the enemy s air and space forces are not able to perform effective activities in any place and at any time. It is also emphasised that supremacy is obviously more desirable; very often, however, the cost of obtaining supremacy is too high and that is why obtaining air and space supremacy is more than enough to prevail in war. It is assumed in the doctrine, as in the definitions presented earlier, that supremacy is a higher degree of air superiority, but the new element is that the criterion to achieve it defines and determines an opponent s inability to perform effective activities from the air and space anywhere and at any time. It is a very strong requirement, possible to obtain only in specific conditions. Air and space supremacy understood this way is achievable only in the case of an armed conflict between a superpower or an alliance / coalition of countries with the use of the global power and a small or even a medium or a large country or a coalition of such countries, having, however, weak air forces and not able to use outer space for military purposes. A similar situation may occur during a war between a large country and a medium or small one, with the assumption that the air forces of the first country have a great qualitative and quantitative superiority over the air forces and air defence of the other state. And only in such a case can we talk about the possibility of such control of the air space, in which the opponent will not be able to use his own air forces effectively anywhere and any time during combat activities. Air supremacy, achieved under these conditions and interpreted like that, leads straight to a situation called dominance from the air - that is a situation in which the dominant air forces destroy not only air and anti-aircraft forces but also other 139

141 WOJCIECH MICHALAK troops as well as the military and economic power of the enemy, forcing him to surrender. Even bigger changes in the views on terminology related to dominance in the air were made due to the conclusions taken from the first asymmetric conflicts (the in the 1990s), in which the intervening side (alliance / coalition) gathered a many times greater air power than the invaded country had, and from the very beginning of the conflict, the first side obtained absolute air supremacy. Probably, it was the enthusiasm of that period which contributed to promoting new views and terms related to dominance in the air and then to legitimatising them in the documents of the alliance. In fact, from the very first Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter Air (AJP-01) to the last one (AJP-3.3.1) 13 there were three following degrees of dominance in the air: Favourable air situation is the one, in which the amount of air effort undertaken by the air forces of the enemy is not sufficient to prevent the success of their own land, naval and air activities. Air superiority is a degree of dominance of one force over another in an air battle, allowing the former to conduct activities by land, naval and air forces in a given place and time without a significant counteraction from the opposing side. Air supremacy is a degree of air superiority, in which the opponent s air forces are not able to counteract effectively. An analysis of NATO standardisation documents indicates that the degrees of dominance in the air are understood and defined differently than earlier. However, their evaluation challenges the correctness and validity of these solutions, especially when it comes to the legitimacy of the first degree of dominance - that is a favourable air situation. At the lowest degree of dominance, under air superiority, it is pointed out, however, that the amount of air effort of the opponent, implicitly the size and composition of his air forces, is too small to achieve success in air, land and naval activities. Thus, the quantitative and qualitative superiority of one's own air forces determines the victory in the air as well as the land and naval campaigns in advance, unless the latter ones are expected to be conducted. It can be logically deduced from this observation that the situation makes the prevailing side use air space freely from the very beginning of the conflict that is to control the air space (such as in Afghanistan or Libya). Therefore, it means achieving the highest degree of dominance in the air immediately. As a result of these assumptions, it can be wrongly conjectured that: 1. the lowest degree of dominance in the air, that is a favourable situation in the air is more important or identical to the highest degree, which is air supremacy; 2. achieving air supremacy is to lead to defeating the opponent s air forces, that is gaining a favourable air situation; AJP (B). Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter Air, NATO July 2010, p.2-1.

142 DOMINANCE IN THE AIR AND FROM THE AIR 3. achieving only the highest degree of dominance in the air leads to obtaining the lowest degree. The in-depth evaluation of the essence of favourable air situations shows that at that degree of dominance, it is important to consider the qualitative and quantitative superiority of the air forces and air defence, that is the proportion of forces of the opposing sides, which occurs before the combat activities begin, which is characteristic for asymmetric wars (conflicts). Thus, a completely different criterion than before has been adopted here to assess the degrees of dominance in the air let us recall that earlier it was the freedom to use the air space; here, however, it is the ratio of power between the opposing sides. Paraphrasing, it could be possible to adopt various criteria and create additional (new) degrees of dominance in the air and make conceptual and terminological chaos. However, that is not the point. To conclude this phase of the discussion, a thesis can be proposed that a favourable air situation should not be regarded as the first degree of dominance in the air, but as a starting point of air forces, which is supposed to provide the immediate achievement of air superiority, and even air supremacy. If we assume the thesis is correct, then in NATO normative documents, two now traditional degrees of dominance in the air remain, that is air superiority and supremacy. It should be understood that air superiority could be of a local or general (in the entire area of operations) character. Let s have a look at the recent American views on dominance in the air. In the US Air Force Doctrine dated November 2011, there is little attention paid to this problem, as its main content relates to organisation and command. It is only mentioned that there is air superiority whose essence is the same as the one presented earlier in AJP It is added, however, that in that case, also the special forces operations can be conducted in a given place and time without significant counteraction from the opposing side 14. Important innovations are included, however, in another US Air Force Doctrine 15. There are three degrees of dominance in the air presented on page 3: air parity; air superiority; air supremacy. 14 Air Force Basic Doctrine, Organization, and Command.. Air Force Doctrine Document 1., October 2011, p. 45. It is worth mentioning that on the same page, there is also a new term derived from the American Joint Doctrine JP 1-02, that is: air-space superiority, i.e. such a degree of dominance of one force over the other in space, which enables the first force to conduct activities by land, air, naval, space and special forces in a certain place without significant counteraction from the opponent side. It is, thus, a definition almost identical to the definition of air superiority, and what distinguishes it is only the name and the spin related to the possibilities to conduct activities by space forces without strong counteraction from the enemy. 15 Air Force Doctrine. Document 3-01, August 2008 (amendment 2011). 141

143 WOJCIECH MICHALAK Definitions related to air superiority and supremacy are, in fact, the same as the ones in AJP The difference is that air supremacy is not treated as a degree of superiority (like in AJP) but as a degree of dominance in the air. Moreover, it is indicated in both definitions that also space forces (in addition to air, land and naval forces) can conduct activities without the significant or effective counteraction of the opponent. What is new is the first degree of dominance in the air called air balance, which replaced favourable air situation promoted for many years. The balance is described as a situation in which one air force has no air superiority over others. In such conditions, air, land and naval operations, both own and the opponent s, are exposed to the significant counteraction of the opponent s air forces. Therefore, the intensity of air operations of both sides is balanced. It does not mean that the air situation will be stable and balanced in the entire area of operations. The opposing sides will always manoeuvre the activities (attacks), shift them to other directions and tend to gain local air superiority in the area where some especially important task is performed (e.g. counter-attacks or an attack by a tactical union of land forces). This local air superiority can be neutralised by the opponent - that is the air balance will be achieved again, or it can be the beginning of a wider air offensive in order to obtain air superiority 16. It is clear from the analysis of the essence of air balance that it cannot be regarded as a degree of dominance (ascendancy, predominance) in the air but as an element of the relation (reference) level between the air forces of the opposing sides. With such a broad meaning of the concept of relations, its taxonomy can include favourable air situation mentioned several times before as well as other concepts, such as unfavourable air situation, etc. These considerations support the previously proposed thesis on dominance in the air that in both NATO and the US documents there are two traditional degrees of ascendancy that is air superiority and supremacy. * * * The presented views of NATO, the USA, the Warsaw Pact and the Russian Federation on dominance in the air do not provide for the possible role of air forces in an armed conflict waged in the other than traditional form i.e. dominance from the air, in which they play the role of the supported element. However, conducting combat activities this way elevates dominance in the air incommensurately. The latter one must provide the for almost unlimited use of the air space by air forces, which apart from maintaining the air situation is supposed to perform strategic attacks on the national leadership and the opponent s infrastructure and economy, to have a demoralising impact on the morale of the opponent s society, to combat the most important elements of land and naval forces systems, to conduct activities related to reconnaissance, transport, and electronic overpowering, etc. Fulfilling Ibidem, p. 2 and 3.

144 DOMINANCE IN THE AIR AND FROM THE AIR the role of the dominant force by air forces, whose greatest range activities are supposed to lead to achieving the military and political aims of war, requires absolute air supremacy during the entire time of the armed conflict. In the situation outlined this way, some questions arise: How to distinguish the air supremacy necessary to win a traditional war, i.e. conducted in the form of joint operations, in which air forces play the role of the supporting component, from air supremacy assuring the overcoming of the enemy almost only from the air, i.e. implementing dominance from the air, in which air forces play the role of the supported component? Do both types of air supremacy semantically mean the same, as they should be characterised by various degrees of defeating the air enemy and freedom to use air space? These are just some of the problems that lead to deep reflections on modern air war and possible conditions in the air space. However, even a cursory analysis of these problems shows that air supremacies discussed here are different states in the air. In as much as air supremacy in a traditional war is meant to serve all kinds of armed forces and especially support a land invasion or a naval operation, supremacy in the conditions of dominance from the air is to support mainly the air forces and must be much more pervasive and authoritative than the previous one. Therefore, it is a kind of supremacy over the current understanding of air supremacy, which can be called dominant 17. And so it is proposed that the contemporary dominance in the air had three degrees reflecting possible states of ascendancy in the air: 1. the lowest degree, i.e. air superiority, which may occur on a local or global scale; 2. the middle degree, i.e. air supremacy, achieved and maintained mainly in a traditional war; 3. the highest degree, i.e. air dominant, achieved and maintained primarily in the war waged through the dominance from the air. Three-step scale of dominance in the air will be more reliable to recognise possible states in the air, which can be formed in various types of military conflicts and in various forms of strategic use of armed forces, ensuring the achievement of the assumed aims of a war. An analysis of possible conditions, in which modern armed conflicts can be waged, indicates that the second degree of dominance in the air that is air supremacy, does not always have to be fulfilled only in a traditional war, that means the one waged in air-land-naval dimension. Sometimes, it can be an intermediate degree, which favours gaining air dominant. Like the latter one, it does not only have to be achieved in the conditions of dominating an enemy from the air and achieving the aims of war almost without the use of land and naval forces. Sometimes, air dominance, understood as the absolute freedom of tactical, 17 Dominant (łac.) main feature; dominating element, outstanding ( ). Słownik wyrazów obcych PWN, Warszawa 1971, p

145 WOJCIECH MICHALAK operational and strategic use of air forces, can be gained in a war waged with the use of conventional methods. With these reflections in the background, a question about the boundaries separating the edge of superiority from supremacy and supremacy from dominance arises. This is, therefore, to clearly outline the divisions between lower and subsequent degrees of dominance in the air. The problem is extremely complex, controversial and almost impossible to clearly identify. Using the literary language, the differences between superiority and supremacy as well as supremacy and dominance are like quicksand and probably there are never any clear boundaries: superiority is from this point to that point, supremacy is above and then from now onwards, there is air dominance. The scale of an opponent's counteraction or freedom in air activities of the other side s air forces, i.e. a degree of dominance in the air is assessed and determined after an armed conflict ends, through historical research. Changeable conditions in an armed conflict, and especially in an air war as well as the variety of possible actions and counteractions blur simple indicators and calculations, making them readable only from the right perspective. The scale of the problem can be outlined by the air situation formed in 1991 during the Gulf War. Let us recall that allied air forces destroyed Iraqi air forces and air defence during first few air raids. As a result they could perform any tasks in any place and at any time, facing only a very weak counteraction from the shortrange anti-aircraft means (especially over the groupings of land forces). It did not have any major impact on the results of the use of air forces, which conducted activities in at-risk zones, at medium altitude, i.e. over the zones of flak. Therefore, whether the air situation was still the supremacy as it is commonly known or rather air dominance was achieved and was skilfully used by land forces in the last four days of the war is an important question. The dilemma requires a thorough investigation, so let s leave it as an open issue to be resolved in other considerations 18. The fundamental thesis, however, remains the same: dominance in the air space has a significant impact on the course of any armed conflict. Until recently, the canon of the armed struggle included the fact that gaining and maintaining air superiority or supremacy was to ensure the freedom of a land and naval invasion in order to achieve the military and political aims of the war. Nowadays, also modern air forces, supported by land, naval, special and space forces, conducting an operation in an asymmetric conflict can achieve air dominance, and having absolute freedom of action, they can force the enemy to surrender and ensure the achievement of the political aims of the conflict (see Kosovo, Libya). Thus, in exceptional situations, air forces stop acting the role of 18 Still, one thing is clear for almost 30 days of the war, air forces played the role of the supported component, and combat operations were fought through the dominance from the air so as to play the role of the supporting land forces component in the last four days, which completed the victory. 144

146 DOMINANCE IN THE AIR AND FROM THE AIR supporting land forces and fleet, and they become the dominant player supported by a selected means of fire, reconnaissance, anti-aircraft, communications, satellite and other resources from the other branches of armed forces. So, they sometimes become factor which decides the results of an armed conflict. Bibliography Air Force Basie Doctrine, Organization, and Command. Air Force Doctrine Document 1., Siły Powiertzne USA, październik Air Force Doctrine. Document 3-01, Siły Powietrzne USA, sierpień AJP (B). Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter Air, NATO, lipiec 2010 Encyklopedia Powszechna PWN, Warszawa Kurs opieratiwnogo iskusstwa wojenno-wozdusznych sił, Monino Mała encyklopedia wojskowa, MON, Warszawa Michalak W., Dominacja z powietrza, AON, Warszawa Michalec M., Koncepcje operacyjnego użycia Sił Powietrznych Federacji Rosyjskiej w latach , AON, Warszawa Militarisches Studienglossar, Bonn NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, Refarence Book. US Air Force Basic Data, Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Regulamin sił powietrznych, ZD, Bonn Słownik współczesnego języka polskiego, tom 1., Warszawa Słownik wyrazów obcych PWN, Warszawa Warden J.A., The Air Compaign, Waszyngton

147 NDU Zeszyty Scientific Naukowe Quarterly AON nr no 2(59) 3(92) ISSN ANDRZEJ POLAK THE ART OF WAR FROM THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE Col. Andrzej POLAK, Ass. Prof. National Defence University Abstract The article presents concepts of the art of war, that is the theory and practice of war, military activities, and crises reaction. In this context the term has two meanings. The first regards the theory, while the second is connected with practical steps taken by commands and armies in the scope of preparing and conducting the activities of war. The article describes three basic fields of the art of war, that is strategy, operational art and tactics. The first field, strategy, refers to the measures chosen and undertaken in connection with preparing the state and, first of all, the armed forces for war. The second field tactics is generally concerned with combat. Operational art is the youngest field of the art of war and it deals with operations and the art of commanding troops in operations. The article also discusses elementary categories of the art of war at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The authors of the article refer to the works of Carl von Clausewitz, Antoine H. Jomini, Ferdinand Foch, Basil H. Liddel Hart, Andre Beafre, Franciszek Skibiński, Stefan Mossor, Stanisław Rola-Arciszewski and Stanisław Koziej. Key words art of war, war activities, strategy, tactics, operational art The art of war refers to the theory and practice of war/military activities. In this context the term has two meanings. The first regards the theory, where the foundation for research is the issues connected with preparing and conducting military activities. The second is connected with practical steps taken by commands and armies in the scope of preparing and conducting the activities 1. This duality concerns not only the art of war, but also its particular elements, that is the strategy, operational art and tactics. The first field, strategy, refers to 2 : the measures chosen and undertaken in connection with preparing and conducting a particular war, campaign, battle or defence action by the highest state authorities, the high S. Koziej, Teoria sztuki wojennej, Warsaw 1993, p F. Skibiński, Rozważania o sztuce wojennej, Warsaw 1972, p. 109.

148 THE ART OF WAR FROM THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE command of the armed forces or the high command of a particular theatre of military activity. Operational art is the youngest field of the art of war and it implies operational command 3. It deals with operations and the art of commanding troops in operations, while operational command itself is a practical dimension of operational art. The last field, tactics, is 4 an element of the art of war which involves theory and practice of soldiers, subunits, units and bigger tactical units preparing and engaging in combat. Some theorists claim that it is extremely difficult and complicated to precisely define the notion of the art of war (just as it was hard to define the science of war before) 5. Ferdinand Foch, while attempting to define it, wrote that the art of war was 6 : far from being apt to be considered as science, as war itself is a horrifying tragedy which is full of passion. In every historical epoch, as General Franciszek Skibiński wrote, when the form of war changed due to the development of war tools, there appeared sceptics who assumed that in the face of new weapons and new battlefield phenomena the art of war should cease to have any meaning, and a victory would become only a matter of destroying the enemy by means of brutal, material violence 7. General Kutrzeba stressed that the environment, humans and battle tools change, but the laws of war (armed struggle) remain unaltered. Hence, the changing nature of war and the new methods of armed struggle require the comprehensive preparation of the command and staff personnel which is suitable for the changes. And this is the still necessary and valid place for the art of war. Therefore, the art of war refers to the theory and practice of military activity, which is one of the categories of the art of war and encompass all types of activities conducted by armed forces, its most significant type being the armed struggle. The definition of armed struggle comprises all activities involving the use of arms, conducted by armed forces during war time 8. Today this definition seems unsatisfactory, since armed forces may not necessarily only use arms during warfare. Hence, it is extremely difficult to define armed struggle precisely. Another definition which assumes that armed struggle is a type of struggle consisting of conducting activities whose aim is to destroy (overpower) the enemy with the use of arms 9, diverges significantly from the art of war s theoretical bases. Firstly, armed struggle is not a type of fighting, but a type of war/military activity. Secondly, the aim of armed struggle does not necessarily have to mean the enemy s destruction. Apart from armed struggle, war and military activity includes also: relocation and combat readiness recovery. All three categories directly reflect a soldier s basic activity on the battlefield (fighting, marching and resting). It was 3 M. Wiatr, Między strategią a taktyką, Toruń 1999, p M. Huzarski, Zagadnienia taktyki wojsk lądowych, Toruń 1999, p K. Nożko, Zagadnienia współczesnej sztuki wojennej, Warsaw 1973, p F. Foch, Zasady sztuki wojennej, Warsaw 1924, p.4. 7 F. Skibiński, Rozważania o sztuce wojennej, op. cit., p Leksykon Wiedzy Wojskowej, Warsaw 1979, p Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego, Warsaw 1996, p

149 ANDRZEJ POLAK even Machiavelli who (in the 16th century), among the main war activities, listed 10 : marches, fighting the enemy and making camps. The above are only the selected categories of the art of war which, when appropriately combined, constitute a logical and orderly whole, allowing one to deal fairly efficiently with this complicated issue. The art of war in its practical dimension refers to the appropriate behaviour of commanders and troops during the preparation and conducting of activities, that is a practical ability to apply the acquired knowledge in a particular situation. Thorough and extensive knowledge is an especially persistent binder which encompasses the talent, experience and practice of the command and staff activity 11. After all, noting develops imagination so well as solid, comprehensive and thorough knowledge. A good craftsman in the art of war should be characterised by the war craftsmanship, referred to by professor Kotarbiński in the following way 12 : war craftsmanship is a special case of an ability to deal with such situations of narrowed activity when the goals of actors are incompatible and they attempt to hamper each other s aims. Strategy is one of the oldest fields of the art of war. There are as many definitions of strategy as there are authors. General Skibiński referred to strategy as the measures taken to prepare and conduct a war (campaign), chosen and applied by the highest state authorities and the high command of the armed forces 13. Clausewitz referred to it as to the science of using battles for war purposes 14, while Liddell Hart 15, called it the art of the deployment and application of war resources for political purposes. An interesting definition of strategy was offered by Jomini who said that it was 16 : the art of bringing the main army forces to the most important point of the theatre of war or an operational zone. According to Mossor, the aim of strategy should be to develop a plan of a war and to prepare this war 17. From the point of view of General Beaufre, strategy is a method of thinking which allows the applying of ideas transferred from philosophy. It is, however, also (or maybe first of all) a functional field encompassing all efforts connected with conducting a war or using physical measures to achieve political goals. In this way it becomes a scheduled procedure whose result is a theoretical or practical course of action 18. Hence, it cannot be stiff and unchangeable; and every particular situation needs a separate strategy. Strategy means researching a political situation and the general directions of its development in order to achieve the intended 10 N. Machiavelli, O wojennom iskusstwie, Moscow 1939, p K. Nożko, Intelektualne przygotowanie dowódców i oficerów sztabu w systemie obronnym RP, Warsaw 1993, p T. Kotarbiński, Hasło dobrej roboty, Warsaw 1968, p F. Skibiński, Rozważania o sztuce wojennej, op. cit., p C. Clausewitz, O wojnie, Warsaw 1958, t.1, p B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategia. Działania pośrednie, Warsaw 1959, p H. Jomini, Zarys sztuki wojennej, Warsaw 1966, p P. Mossor, Sztuka wojenna w warunkach nowoczesnej wojny, Warsaw 1986, p A. Beaufre, Wstęp do strategii. Odstraszanie i strategia, Warsaw 1968, p

150 THE ART OF WAR FROM THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE political goals. Assuming that it is politics that determines the size of the allocated forces and resources as well as the main methods of using them, Beaufre stresses the primacy of politics over strategy. The notion of strategy has evolved, especially in the context of the fact that the phenomenon of war itself has developed and become increasingly complicated. In the beginning, as General Koziej has noticed 19, strategy concerned merely managing armed forces. However, when it was noticed that war is not only a military phenomenon, the classic understanding of strategy was not enough anymore. Jomini, in order to differentiate between the state policy and military strategy, used the term great strategy, attributing it to the political leadership 20. Similar types of strategy were mentioned by Liddell Hart 21. However, in his opinion, strategy involved only war, while the great strategy concerned also civilian and military endeavours after the end of the war. The definitions of strategy started to be more inclined to refer not to the direct use of force, but rather to the threat of using it. The content of strategy has become increasingly more universal in meaning and included also non-military fields of state activity; while within strategy, military strategy, as a specific area, has been singled out 22. And in this way, a so far strictly military strategy has become one of the elements of state policy 23. Especially in the 1990s there appeared a noticeable tendency to present strategy in terms of political science, as naturally it could no longer constitute a part of the art of war. Some authors tried to distinguish a typically military aspect of strategy, in the form of armed struggle 24. If it is assumed that it is the state that is the subject of strategic thinking, different strategies shall correspond to various scopes of its activity (policies) 25. The activity of the state as a whole is dealt with by national strategy (national security strategy). Economic, defence and educational (as well as other) strategies correspond with the economic, defence and educational policy of the state. War strategy deals with the state activity in the field of preparing and conducting wars. Military policy, which includes among other things mainly the use of armed forces for its purposes, is an issue belonging to military strategy. Another element of the art of war is tactics. Like strategy, tactics is recognized as one of its oldest fields. The discussion among the theorists dealing with the question of which of them is older continues until today. And it seems rather difficult to explicitly (finally) establish. First, according to professor Koziej 26, there was tactical practice. In this earliest meaning it included only the ability to arrange 19 P. Koziej, Teoria sztuki wojennej, op. cit., p H. Jomini, Zarys, op. cit., p B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategia, op. cit., p M. Wiatr, Między strategią, op. cit., p B. Balcerowicz, Wybrane problemy obronności państwa, Warsaw 2001, p M. Krauze (red.) Teoria sztuki wojennej w kontekście teorii naukowych, Warsaw 1996, p B. Balcerowicz, Siły zbrojne w stanie pokoju, kryzysu, wojny, Warsaw 2010, p P. Koziej, Teoria sztuki wojennej, op. cit., p

151 ANDRZEJ POLAK troops in a formation on a battlefield. With time, when battles became increasingly longer, fought with the use of greater forces and in a wider area, the scope of tactics increased as well, encompassing also problems connected with the comprehensive approach to conducting a war. It was Xenophon, and probably he was not the first one, who tried to define the difference between strategy and tactics, when he wrote that 27 : tactics constitutes merely a small part of strategy. He defined the former as an ability to prepare the battle array, and the latter as the art of conducting a war. In the 18th century, a French theorist, Jacques de Guibert, offered a new definition of the art of war and tactics. Until his times tactics was understood as the ability to manoeuvre troops, which he considered to be a too narrow notion. He suggested that from that time on tactics should be understood as the art of war, that is the military knowledge in its entirety 28. Simultaneously, he did not reject the previous meaning of strategy. General Skibiński called this phenomenon a dichotomy of former notions 29, treating this dichotomy itself as categories mutually complementing each other. A German theorist, Henrich D. Bülow 30, when he tried to standardize military terminology used in the second half of the 18th century, attempted (among other things) to define both notions. In his opinion, strategy was the science of troops movement during the military activity beyond the horizon (beyond the range of artillery), while tactics was the science encompassing issues of troops movement in this exact area. Henri Jomini differentiated in the art of war five (5) clear (from his point of view), different fields 31 : the war policy, strategy (the art of skilful management of troops in the war activity theatre), higher battle tactics (operations), the engineering art and the lower one. Carl von Clausewitz, in turn, when building his theory, just like Jomini, on the basis of the experience of the Napoleonic wars, referred to strategy when he talked of using battles for war purposes 32. Three fundamental problems of any war come down to the answer to three (3) simple questions: when, where and how (in what manner) to use armed forces. The answer to the first two questions, according to General Koziej 33, could be found in strategy, and to the last one in tactics. The task of strategy was to prepare and bring armed forces (an army) to the most important point in the war theatre, which was a battle, while the task of tactics was to win this battle. As Colonel Rola- 27 Ksenofont, Wspomnienia o Sokratesie, Warsaw 1896, p R.R. Palmer, Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow. From Dynastic to National War [w:] E.M. Earle (red.) Makers of Modern Strategy. Miltary Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, Princeton 1960, p F. Skibiński, Rozważania o sztuce wojennej, op. cit., p T. Kośmider, J. Ślipiec, Operacje wojsk lądowych w poglądach przedstawicieli europejskiej myśli wojskowej od XVIII wieku do wybuchu drugiej wojny światowej, Warsaw 2008, p H. Jomini, Zarys, op. cit., p C. Clausewitz, O wojnie, op. cit., t.1, p P. Koziej, Teoria sztuki wojennej, op. cit., p

152 THE ART OF WAR FROM THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE Arciszewski stresses 34 : every battle must have a precise, strictly defined aim so as winning it brought one closer to the ultimate goal, which is the waged war. In times when the fate of war was determined with a success in one battle, it might have been adequate. Such decisive battles were called conclusive battles (battles of great importance), and later general battles 35. Some theorists consider the Battle of Sadowa (1866) as the last general battle in the history of the world. However, not all of them are convinced of the full success of the German side. Moltke s biographer (Franz Herre) wrote 36 : the battle was well planned, but not waged in the best way. He was not much mistaken as Prussian troops did not cut off the enemy s retreat, which allowed the Austrian command to withdraw from the battlefield a significant part of the defeated troops, which could enable them to recreate their forces and start the war anew 37. A battle was referred to as a clash of two hostile concentrations of forces if they constituted the main armies of both sides or at least acted independently in their separate war theatres 38. In the ups and downs of a battle the intentions, orders and above all forces of both fighting armies were gradually manifested. Clausewitz defined a battle as the proper war activity 39 and everything else as merely preparations to war. Fighting is the synonym of a battle and the aim of fighting is to destroy or defeat the opposing side. An interesting definition of a battle was offered by General Andre Beaufre, who claimed that 40 : a military settlement in its pure form takes place as the result of a won battle. The battle mechanism may take varied forms and it comes down to a relatively simple schemata. The fundamental character of a battle consists of the clash of two walls of people. Strategy and tactics are terms which commonly appear in different fields and refer to a purposeful activity or a particular course of action. For instance, in Słownik współczesnego języka polskiego [Dictionary of contemporary Polish language], strategy is defined as 41 : the way of conducting activities (usually on a large scale); a long-term action plan. It is theory and practice of an activity aimed at achieving the intended goals. Tactics (following the Słownik s editors) is 42 : a course of action, activity aiming at ensuring the achievement of an aim; a well-though-out activity aiming at the implementation of a plan. In the theory of organisation and management, strategy 43 is a model or plan which should integrate the main goals, policies and action sequences of an organisation into one coherent whole. A well formulated strategy helps to arrange 34 P. Rola-Arciszewski, Sztuka dowodzenia na Zachodzie Europy, Warsaw 1934, p Mała Encyklopedia Wojskowa, Warsaw 1967, t.1, p F. Herre, Moltke, Warsaw 1996, p R. Dzieszyński, Sadowa 1866, Warsaw 2007, p F. Engels, Wybrane pisma wojskowe, Warsaw 1962, p C. Clausewitz, O wojnie, op. cit., t.1, p A. Beaufre, Wstęp do strategii. Odstraszanie i strategia, Warsaw 1968, p R. Dunaj (red.), Słownik współczesnego języka polskiego, Warsaw 1999, t.2, p Ibidem, p A.K. Koźmiński, Zarządzanie w warunkach niepewności, Warsaw 2004, p

153 ANDRZEJ POLAK organisation resources in order to create a unique structure which is capable of operating. According to R. Ackoff, planning is the more strategic 44 : (1) the more long-term the results of the plan are and the more difficult to reverse, (2) the more functions of organizing operations are included in the plan; (3) the higher importance is placed on goals in the process of formulating aims and choosing resources. In the relevant literature the following strategic notions may be found: planning, management, strategic thinking, strategic control or strategic policy. Authors of their definitions focus their attention on a few recurrent problems 45 : goals, plan, environment, concentration, time, change, and chief executives. In Słownik wyrazów obcych [Dictionary of loan words], tactics is defined as 46 : the way, method of behaviour, which aims at achieving the intended goal; acting in accordance with the devised plan. In another dictionary the notions of strategy and tactics are synonymous and mean (among other things) 47 : the way, method, procedure, algorithm of behaviour, policy, action or activity. Generalizing, for the purposes of the logical order of further argumentation it may be assumed that strategy is, first of all, the long-term determination of aims, focusing on challenges of the future. The aim of a good strategy is to prepare for a completely new, future realty. It requires great perceptiveness, imagination and bravery. Tactics is a particular way of behaviour. Hence, strategy is the generalisation of aims, while tactics refers to the performance. The youngest field of the art of war is the operational art. Its theoretical assumptions date back to as late as the beginning of the 20 th century 48, but it originated from battle practice of the Napoleonic wars, the Prussian-French war ( ) and World War I. The subject of research in the field of operational art is first of all an operation, which over merely a few centuries underwent a peculiar evolution. Attempting to find a definition of an operation which would be relevant to the contemporary requirements, it is worth going back to its origins. H. Hermann, who has been dealing with this phenomenon for years, has noticed that the term operation itself already appeared in military terminology in the 17th century, however its content was much different from the contemporary one; and an operation was understood mainly as the military activity of an army in general. (R. Montecuccoli, Główne zasady nauki wojskowej, 1664). It was H. Lloyd who, when generalising experiences of the Seven Years War ( ), noticed that R. Ackoff, Zasady planowania w korporacjach, Warsaw 1973, p M. Marchesnay, Zarządzanie strategiczne, Warsaw 1994, p Słownik wyrazów obcych, Warsaw 1991, p Słownik synonimów, Warsaw 1997, p.124, J. Zieliński, Zarys teorii sztuki operacyjnej wojsk lądowych Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, Toruń 1998, p.24.

154 THE ART OF WAR FROM THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE war operations should not be understood as a military activity in general, but as a particular form of activity conducted by independent formations 49. Such understanding of an operation may be adopted as the first definition (and close to its essence). On the other hand, does not coming back to its older interpretations, as activity in general, mean going back to the same point? This time it is a result of an unfortunate (of course for translators) English word operation, which is translated into Polish quite freely, both as operations as well as activities. According to Lloyd 50, the essence of an operation was the activity along the operational line, creating a threat for enemy troops and forcing the enemy to withdraw from a particular area without a fight. The aim of an operation was supposed to be a terrain feature, and not the enemy troops. H. Lloyd in the content of operation differentiated: operational basis (area, a starting point for an operation), the object of an operation (a stronghold, another terrain feature or area) and the operational line (the line combining the operational basis with the object of an operation) 51. H. von Büllow understood the essence of an operation in a similar way, as troops activity along an operational line, posing a threat for an enemy and forcing the enemy to withdraw without a fight. He was the first theorist who attempted to define operation precisely. It was supposed to mean any activity undertaken in the presence of the enemy, an element of the art of manoeuvring. It was about how to outmanoeuvre the enemy, cut it off from its links, about marches, and not about striking and giving battle. The aim of an operation were not the enemy troops, but a terrain feature whose capture was to decide about the achievement of an operational goal 52. An operation itself came down to manoeuvring with troops formations. Such understanding of an operation was connected with the strategy of manoeuvring which was dominant at that time and assumed defeating the enemy without engaging in general battle. It was not the ability to fight, but the ability to avoid it that was to decide about the essence of commanding. Lloyd and Büllow s ideas were undoubtedly applied by Napoleon, with a difference that all manoeuvres he used (formations operating) served, first of all, the purpose of engaging in a decisive battle 53. Napoleon s contribution to the development of the art of war, and especially to the theory of operations, is difficult to overlook and does not need to be proved, although he himself never actually wrote any treatises. As M. Wiatr rightly noticed, Napoleon: treated commanding operations as the proper sphere of shaping battles and wars, by trying to create 49 H. Hermann, Operacyjny wymiar walki zbrojnej, Toruń 2004, p L. Wyszczelski, Historia myśli wojskowej, Warsaw 2000, p.121. The most important theoretical work by Lloyd was: The history of the Late War In Germany between the King of Prussia and the Empress of Germany and Her Allies (1776). 51 H. Hermann, Operacyjny wymiar..., op. cit., p M. Wiatr, Między strategią a taktyką, Toruń 1999, p M. Howard, Wojna w dziejach Europy, Wrocław 1990, p

155 ANDRZEJ POLAK formations capable of operating independently on a battlefield 54. For Lloyd and Büllow, operations were the goal and were supposed to lead to the defeat of the enemy, while in Napoleon s case they became only a means to achieve the goal which was to defeat the enemy in battle. On the basis of the generalized experience of the Napoleonic wars two fundamental works (2) (C. von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, ; H. Jomini, Precis de l' art de la guerre, 1838) were created, which are still considered today as the foundation of war science. For Napoleon, a battle did not constitute an integral part of an operation. The essence of an operation understood in this way was a manoeuvre (most often without the enemy s influence) aiming at imposing a battle upon the enemy 55. The battle itself was supposed to constitute a final phase of a war and not of an operation. Jomini, when analysing the notion of an operation, saw its place in strategy, due to its connection with a campaign and the war theatre itself. On the other hand, he noticed also operations at the tactical level (due to the performance details) and, calling them tactical operations, included them in the field of higher tactics 56. Clausewitz s views are considered by many theorists as a breakthrough in war theory. And although he dealt with the problem of operations only informally, notions which appear in his works were included by his predecessors in the theory of operations, such as, for example: operational basis or communication lines. Clausewitz believed that the notions of rules, regulations and methods suit better the lower levels (a battalion, regiment, division) than an army, hence he associated rules more with tactics than with strategy and wrote that: any method which could restrict war plans, or a campaign, and turn them into a kind of machine-made template should be absolutely rejected 57. He used the notion of an operation infrequently and did not treat it as a field which could reflect the creative activity of a commander. Like Napoleon, he believed that the basic aim of the military activity was to destroy the armed forces of the enemy. If Büllow and Lloyd should be treated as pioneers of the term operation, then undoubtedly Helmuth von Moltke (the Older) gave operation a new content and became its true precursor. Moltke, when drawing general conclusions from his experience, came to a conclusion that a manoeuvre (in accordance with Napoleonic understanding, an operation) and a battle constitute an integral whole, are mutually interdependent and complement each other. An operation should end with a battle, which was supposed to be synonymous with achieving its aim. It was the Prussian war school which he created that first initiated the procedure of operational planning 58, assuming that an operation encompasses everything that troops do from the moment of their concentration in the departure area until the achievement of a particular goal. Moltke recognised any regrouping, fighting of independent M. Wiatr, Między strategią, op. cit., p H. Hermann, Operacyjny wymiar.., op. cit., p H. Jomini, Zarys sztuki, op. cit., p.79-81, C. von Clausewitz, O wojnie, t.1, Warsaw 1958, p H. Hermann, Operacyjny wymiar..., op. cit. p.81.

156 THE ART OF WAR FROM THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE formations and a battle, which should end every operation, as belonging to an operation. A battle had become an integral part of an operation. Moltke 59 remains the author of the modern operation. He managed to include in it three fundamental operational factors: forces, time and area which have since then become indicators of something being operational 60. It should be stressed, however, that for Moltke the notion operation referred to the whole campaign and all troops used in it. The theory of operation was developed by field marshal Colmar von der Goltz. Despite the fact that for many theorists he remained a follower of the thesis, which sounded anachronistic already at that time, that a war result should be decided in one general battle, on the other hand he did not negate the need, and even the necessity, to conduct a number of operations at different times and at different depths. In the proposed definition, he saw an operation as: a number of regroupings, manoeuvres and battles, while he referred to the sum of operations, constituting a particular stage of war, as a campaign. General Schlichting defined the phenomenon of an operation in a similar way (1898), treating a battle as an integral part of an operation. For another German general, Alfred von Schlieffen, the main point of aiming at engaging in a general battle was the development of its plan, taking into consideration the rules of mobilization, transport and the concentration of armies as well as clearly defined directives allowing commanders to continue activities and making independent decisions in the case of the loss of contact with a superior or the development of events not included in a battle plan 61. Also Russians, such as Leer, Michniewicz and others, made an indisputable contribution to the development of operational theory. The first of them (Gen. G. Leer) who dealt with the issues concerning the development of war plans took into consideration the need to develop operational plans. In his opinion the basis of an operation was its general idea which should include two elements: a goal (an unchangeable factor) and a direction (a changeable factor). The goal and direction were supposed to constitute the general idea of an operation. Leer looked into the issue of an operation in his work entitled Strategy (1898). He defined an operation as: a complex phenomenon, composed of a number of partial activities and manoeuvres, and battles. Its content is characterized by integral unity, limited whole, and the planning of the course of events 62. The most eminent Russian war theorist of the period at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century was Gen. N.P. Michniewicz. Like Leer, he placed a great emphasis on the development, started during peace time, of a detailed plan of war and he saw an 59 L. Wyszczelski, Historia myśli, op. cit., p M. Wiatr, Między strategią, op. cit., p L. Wyszczelski, Historia myśli, op. cit., p H. Hermann, Operacyjny wymiar, op. cit., p

157 ANDRZEJ POLAK operation as: the entirety of various activities of armed services from the start of planning works until the achievement of the determined goal 63. It was in Soviet Russia, at the end of the 1920s, that the operational art was recognized as a separate scientific discipline in the art of war. This term appeared in the works of W. Triandafiłow and A. Swieczyn. 63 Ibidem, p

158 Zeszyty Naukowe AON nr 2(59) 2005 NDU Scientific Quarterly no 3(92) 2013 ISSN ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF HELICOPTER-BORNE COMBAT ASSAULT AND AIR ASSAULT ISSN TASK ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF HELICOPTER-BORNE COMBAT ASSAULT AND AIR ASSAULT TASK FORCES IN OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT IN WOODED-LAKE AREAS Lt. Col. Wojciech WIĘCEK, Ph.D. National Defence University Abstract A wooded-lake area is relatively challenging for troops, since its distinctive character causes the necessity to employ specific tactics. A number of obstacles on a given ground and low road density contribute to limited operational mobility and the necessity of fighting in opposite and often remote directions while equally employing helicopters to a large extent. Therefore, both planning and the establishment of military activities on woodedlakes areas creates a favorable opportunity to employ unconventional tactics, develop the initiative, and stimulate various activities. The data included in the study presented here was verified in the course of the military exercises held at the National Defense University in years past, the scenarios of which were located in the Masurian Lake District. Not only did the above-mentioned fact enable the exploration of the crucial aspects affecting the operations of helicopter-borne combat assaults and air assault task forces in the circumstances, but it also helped to identify the challenges faced by such elements of combat formations carrying out both offensive and defensive activities on wooded-lake terrain. From the author s point of view, the conclusions drawn may be as well employed in the processes of planning and fighting in more convenient area conditions. Key words wooded-lake area, helicopter-borne combat assault, air assault task force The specific character of wooded-lake areas 1, which mainly includes the military s limited capabilities to maneuver, involves seeking solutions so as to overcome particular difficulties. Both the previous experience of military conflicts 1 According to the doctrinal documents dating back to the end of 20 th century, the sine qua non so as to recognize a given area as a wooded-lakes was determined by woods and lakes being located around its whole surface area (or in its major part). However, the currently biding statutes distinguishes a woodland area exclusively, defined as a land entirely covered by woods or the one which is covered by woods in its large part, and where maneuver is mainly based on roads, rides, and firebreaks, all of which cause the necessity to employ other tactics than applied on the open ground. Cf. Regulamin działań wojsk lądowych, DWLąd Warszawa, p (English translation) 157

159 WOJCIECH WIĘCEK and the conclusions drawn from the exercises held indicate that an increased use of helicopters, not only due to their firing ability but also the lifting potential, would considerably influence the mobility of troops by increasing the capabilities to maneuver. Wooded-lake areas are conducive to the implementation of an extensive use of helicopters owing to their capability to fly at low altitudes as well as to the difficulties caused for a potential enemy force in organizing its air defense. Not only does it refer to effective defense, but it also relates to moving onto the offensive. The army aviation would remove maneuver restrictions due to the fact that such a use of helicopters would enable the greater mobility of troops, military reconnaissance, fire support, mine laying, and evacuation. Both the previous experience of military conflicts and the conclusions drawn from the exercises held indicate that the organizing and successful implementation of further elements of combat formation, including a helicopter-borne combat assault forces and air assault task forces 2 have an immense significance in providing great momentum in wooded-lake areas. Similarly to defense, the organization of such elements of combat formation constitutes a means to concentrate effort in other directions. However, the land discussed incorporates a number of limitations on assaulted troops. Air defense measures against a potential enemy's forces would be generally applied in clearings and the areas of cross lake passes 3 ; hence, a breakup of assaulted forces into smaller groups making use of favorable weather conditions during an overflight would gain special significance. As a general rule, the areas convenient for landing are supervised by the enemy. Therefore, it requires proper reconnaissance and searching for the solutions to enable the taking of the enemy forces by surprise and thus minimizing losses. Every so often it would be necessary to use troops around less favorable areas as in the case of shallow lake shores, or glades. Secretive approaches to the area of landing will be made below a treeline with the use of river beds, lake surfaces and paths. Spreading fires and related smoke, which reduces visibility, would turn out to be an obstacle trammeling the activities of helicopters. The content presented within this article points out that air-mobile operations in wooded-lake areas ought 2 Helicopter-borne combat assault (heliborne assault) is established when a unit may use the army s aviation. It may disorganize an agile approach of the enemy forces to the start line by means of defending pivotal landforms for a particular period of time. As far as defense is concerned, a heliborne assault may aim at the following objectives: disorganizing the enemy troops approach, devastating the combat formation s pivotal elements, trammeling maneuvers as well as disorganizing the operations of subunits and logistical sets. Air assault task force may be established by a unit after having met specific conditions, similar to the above-mentioned ones. This element of combat formation is responsible for devastating particular elements of an enemy combat formation, such as command posts. After having accomplished a given task, air assault task force returns to the formation of friendly forces. 3 Cross lake pass is defined as a narrow passage in between two bodies of water (here: in between lakes). Cf. Mały słownik języka polskiego Warszawa: PWN, p (English translation). 158

160 ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF HELICOPTER-BORNE COMBAT ASSAULT AND AIR ASSAULT TASK to be carried out by small subunits, compared with operations in normal conditions 4. As far as wooded-lake areas are concerned, heliborne assault (air assault task force) enables the simultaneous impingement of the enemy to a considerable depth of the enemy s forces. Furthermore, this elements of combat formation increase the mobility, the impact, and the capabilities of maneuver troops. In particular situations, the employment of helicopter-borne combat assaults may, in some measure, compensate for an insufficiency of the capability package held by means of the possibly of rapidly shifting concentration toward endangered directions. Heliborne assaults may be organized out of the subunits own land forces, whose means of transportation into areas of influence will be based on helicopters 5. In particular conditions, heliborne assaults may be organized on the basis of a pro tempore arranged mechanized (motorized) subunit which in such activities does not implement its standard means of transport. The main objective of such an activity is to provide the main forces with favorable conditions so as to accomplish the mission. In other words, heliborne assaults have a supplementary role, aiming at favoring the accomplishment of the principal tasks of the main body operating in the point of main effort. The organization of helicopter-borne combat assaults is influenced by the following conditions: 1. the number of helicopters which may be used, 2. soldiers state of readiness, 3. the way of insertion into the enemy's formation (both simultaneously or consecutively), 4. the location of helipad in relation to the objective (onto the objective, around the objective), 5. the degree of independence of the assault (whether operating independently or together with other assaults), 6. the mobility of the assault after having left the helicopters (whether on foot or by the vehicles airlifted into the area of operation). The activities of the assault are influenced by numerous internal factors (what means the executor possesses) and external factors (out of the executor s control, however still affecting his activity). The former includes the balance and the potential of the capability package in possession; whereas the latter includes the 4 Bujak, A Działania bojowe w specyficznych środowiskach na obszarze kraju. Rozprawa habilitacyjna. Warszawa: AON, p The helicopter-borne assault ought to be replenished with the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) navigators having various sorts of laser indicators pointing at targets with a laser beam which is visible to a naked eye during the day and the night (e.g. Green Beam III), laser rangefinders which automatically indicate both remoteness and azimuth in relation to a particular target (e.g. Vector 21 NITE), target visualizing sets (e.g. Rover 5 Handheld), and necessary communications. 159

161 WOJCIECH WIĘCEK enemy s activity, the area s conditions, the superior s aims, neighbors tasks and activity, weather conditions, the season, daytime, and the level of contamination 6. The conditions of wooded-lake areas will influence the implementation and the activity of heliborne assaults with respect to at least two factors: The influence on establishing and carrying out an assault (enplaning, flypast, landing, and deplaning). The influence on the assault s activity after having landed. In relation to what has been stated above, operations on wooded-lake areas involve the establishment and the implementation of helicopter-borne combat assaults. The areas of their embarkation need to be located in the places where the effects of the enemy s potential shock actions would be minimized. Flight corridors and profiles of the flypast ought to be delineated above challenging places (forests, wetlands, and marshlands) and across the landforms which are clearly visible from the air (channels, watercourses, and the like), all of which facilitate orientation and provide the reconnaissance of the area of influence (the location of helipad). Helicopters flight path from the assembly area up to the landing zone should provide camouflage, the engagement of possibly mostly token security forces, and top security of the assault s flight by means of the following 7 : flying at low altitudes (30-50 m.a.s.l.), especially in the direction of the combat air patrol frontier and the unexpected appearance of the the enemy force of; crossing the line of contact above the sections not being garrisoned by the enemy forces in the moment synchronized with the firing activity of air forces and artillery; attaining possibly highest airspeed; making use of interrupting weather conditions and daytime (fog, rain, night); implementing smokescreens. As far as a challenging place is concerned, the assault may be forced to land in small groups scattered apart and at a particular distance from the intended objective. It entails the necessity of assault forces to walk a considerable distance and in case of unfavorable weather conditions it may take longer than planned. Under the circumstances, the enemy forces may relatively readily detect and devastate the assault whilst still the avenue of approach. Hence, the march through path ought to provide not only proper camouflage, but it should also create an opportunity to rest. Nonetheless, this terrain also has particular advantages. Firstly, the specificity of a wooded-lake area measurably delimits the enemy's possibility to position troops and artillery in a number of places, which facilitates taking the enemy forces by surprise. Secondly, the dispersal of forces in areas of tactical importance favors misguiding the enemy as to the critical point of the assault s activity. In case of p Sikorski, B Współczesne desanty powietrzne. Materiał studyjny. Warszawa: AON, p Taktyka lotnictwa wojsk lądowych. Podręcznik Poznań: Dowództwo Wojsk Lotniczych,

162 ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF HELICOPTER-BORNE COMBAT ASSAULT AND AIR ASSAULT TASK directly dropping onto an installation, solid fire support, received also from helicopters, in order to devastate the enemy s forces in the area of the objective being overrun would be necessary. The framework of the assault airlift into the area of operation has been depicted by means of the schema below (Fig. 1). ALTERNATE ASSEMBLY AREA SP SP ALTERNATE FLIGHT CORRIDOR RP ALTERNATE LANDING ZONE START POINT FLIGHT CORRIDOR ASSEMBLY AREA I RP RELEASE POINT I LANDING ZONE Self-reported data. Fig. 1. The airlift of the helicopter-borne combat assault into the area of operation Despite the fact that an assault may be reinforced by anti-tank measures and artillery subunits so as to snipe, it shows both a limited potential as compared to the one shown by the formation of friendly forces activity and it has decreased mobility on land. Therefore, the most favorable areas of influence for landing include compounds and hidden places which constrict extensive use and maneuvers of tanks and armored vehicles. In such a way, the military capability of the assault would be on increased in case of accomplishing a task not consisting of the persistent holding out of a particular objective 8. In case of an easily accessible area; 8 It is estimated that the helicopter-borne combat assault (equivalent of battalion) can independently hold out the objective gained for 3 up to 4 hours, or engage in a maneuver activity for 6 up to 8 hours. In relation to a company force, it will be correspondingly shorter. Cf. Huzarski, M. and Kaczmarek, W Działania taktyczne batalionu. Warszawa: AON, p. 29. (English translation) 161

163 WOJCIECH WIĘCEK however, the success of assault forces is dependent on a timely linkup with a detached unit or advancing friendly force within hours. Both previously gained experience and the conclusions drawn from the exercises held show that the broad objectives of the tactical activity of assault forces may include the following aspects 9 : gaining significant ground from the enemy forces and holding them until the advancing friendly forces approach the place, destroying selected objectives attacked from the rear, disorganizing the activity of selected elements of the enemy's tactical formation. The small areas channeling the mobility of the military which are convenient for defense with very little effort constitute vital elements in the tactical activity of assault forces in wooded-lake areas. The troops turn out to be successful in overrunning major lines of defense, bridges, cross lake passes, straits 10, and road junctions so as to be able to hold them until the friendly forces arrive as well as to devastate the enemy's vital installations (artillery, helicopters on airfields, logistical sets, electronic warfare sets, and the like). Moreover, it creates opportunity to affect a particular element of the enemy formation (i.e. armed combat with the enemy's detached units, immobilization and delay of the approach). The assault may be as well landed in order to extract the enemy s specific activities by force, including changing the command post or logistical sets, disorganizing air defense, and taking out traffic devices in general. In particular cases, the very possibility of the assault approaching the enemy's formation will keep the enemy on full alert and force the maintenance of constant operational readiness in counter landing reserves 11. While planning the kit of a heliborne assault, it is necessary to take into consideration the limited lifting capability of helicopters. An airlift of a reinforced company requires 10 helicopters of the Hip type, whereas a reinforced air-portable battalion needs to be airlifted by means of 40 helicopters of the same type. As a general rule, 5 transport helicopters ought to be supported by at least 1 air cover helicopter 12. Therefore, while planning the activity of heliborne forces operating as 9 Sikorski, B Współczesne desanty powietrzne. Materiał studyjny. Warszawa: AON, p Strait is defined as a narrow challenging passage in between two obstacles on a given ground, including woods, lakes, swamps, mountains, and the like. Cf. Mała Encyklopedia Wojskowa. Vol. I Warszawa, p (English translation) 11 Prokop, A. O roli taktycznego desantu powietrznego w działaniach zaczepnych. Myśl Wojskowa nr 3/1988, p The problem would be solved by equipping the land forces with utility transport helicopters aiming at accomplishing the tasks within the scope of fire support for the combating troops, the transport of armed subunits together with equipment, life-saving, and evacuation. The helicopters are to be capable of lifting either 13 soldiers of the assault or the armament (artillery and rockets) of ca kg in weight in lighting conditions. The helicopters would be employed for various purposes, namely fire support, tactical search and life-saving, medical evacuation, and reconnaissance of various types. By 2036, the Polish armed forces will have been equipped with 90 helicopters of this sort. Cf. Grela, A. Kierunki, p (English translation) 162

164 ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF HELICOPTER-BORNE COMBAT ASSAULT AND AIR ASSAULT TASK an air-portable battalion, at least 48 helicopters need to be at the battalion s disposal (40 helicopters of the Hip type and at least 8 helicopters of the Hind type; Polish: Mi-8, Mi-24W, and Mi-24D) 13. The activity of assault forces would be undertaken in three stages, namely the embarkation of the assault, the flypast up to the area of influence, and the landing and combat respectively. As a result, the activity of this type of combat formation, apart from the embarkation, would be undertaken near the enemy force and, consequently, a considerable distance away from its own main forces. Both the main and alternative assembly areas, flight corridors, and landing zones, including one or several helipads, need to be appointed in advance. The initial stage centers on the issue of mounting areas which are to be properly marked and located as far from the affective range of the enemy combatant s artillery as possible. The assault forces are grouped into respective teams to be embarked on particular means of transport. The materials and equipment needed are embarked first, and only then soldiers are enplaned. Proper formation of transport and cover helicopters needs to be formed up along the flight corridor. The main line of the assault s relocation ought to be marked along a challenging zone so as to make the enemy s fight against the helicopters more difficult as well as to enable a proper airdrop onto the helipads around the area of interest. Furthermore, it is of paramount importance to predisable the enemy s air defense along the flight corridor by means of artillery and air force. Before landing, the cover helicopters are to destroy the enemy s measures which have been previously detected, before the transport helicopters reach the area of interest. Having landed a couple of minutes earlier, the cover section responsible for landing security 14 flags the helipads and then secures the landing of the remaining soldiers. The main forces are landed under the protection of air forces and attack helicopters. After having abandoned the helicopters, both the air defense system and the anti-helicopter system need to be provided as a priority, and only then the helicopters may be unloaded of the materials and equipment. After the unloading, the helicopters return to the airbase, the assault groups muster in previously assigned areas and declares combat readiness. The conclusions drawn from various exercises and military conflicts indicate that a heliborne assault, after having landed, may attack in restricted tasks, defend themselves successfully, and set up a variety of ambushes. Besides this they may engage in a meeting engagement as well. Therefore, it is estimated that the combat formation would consist of the following elements: the cover group, which would be responsible for the security of the area of operation in case of the enemy combatant s potential shock action; the fire support group, which would be 13 Kubinski, M Batalion jako taktyczny desant powietrzny. Wykład. Warszawa: AON. 14 It is justifiable for a cover group to have counter landing reserves equipped with portable antiaerial target measures, a navigator of the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP), and the subunit of engineer reconnaissance. 163

165 WOJCIECH WIĘCEK responsible for the backup of the remaining elements; and the attack group (the main forces of the assault), which would consist of several attack subgroups responsible for striking a particular military objective. After having overrun a given objective, the assault forces link up with the detached unit in an assigned place and carries on accomplishing the task until the approach of the main forces 15. The exact activity of a heliborne assault (reinforced company) has been depicted by means of the schema below (Fig. 2). Self-reported data. 164 Fig. 2. Activity of the helicopter-borne combat assault (equivalent of reinforced company) within the wooded-lake area According to some military theoreticians, planning to use helicopter-borne combat assaults (equivalent of battalion), which would be responsible for overrunning and holding vital objectives around the enemy s formation for several hours, can be highly risky and indecisive in relation to the capability package used 16. An assault organized by a battalion is relatively hard to maneuver and, thus, 15 Wójcik, T Rozważania o współczesnym natarciu. Warszawa: WMON, p Huzarski, M Zagadnienia taktyki wojsk lądowych. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, p. 77; Bujak, A. and Chrobak, R Uwarunkowania działań powietrzno-lądowych w terenie lesisto-jeziornym. Warszawa: AON, p. 122.