Penetration Testing Windows Vista TM BitLocker TM

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1 Penetration Testing BitLocker TM Drive Encryption Douglas MacIver Penetration Engineer System Integrity Group, Corporation Hack In The Box 2006/09/ Corporation. All rights reserved.

2 Trustworthy Computing The security of our customers' computers and networks is a top priority, and we are committed to building software and services to better help protect our customers and the industry. Threats discussed in this presentation are not secrets Our customers adversaries are aware of these attack vectors Our customers need this information too, so that they may make informed decisions about the level of data protection that they need Corporation. All rights reserved.

3 Presentation Outline BitLocker Introduction BitLocker Technical Highlights Pen Testing BitLocker Top Threats Part 1 (basic mode) Top Threats Part 2 (advanced modes) Summary Questions (at the end, please) Corporation. All rights reserved.

4 BitLocker Drive Encryption: Feature Introduction Data Confidentiality Encrypts the OS volume Secure decommissioning System Integrity Cryptographically validates pre-os components The lost or stolen laptop is the primary threat scenario Provides multiple levels of protection with basic and advanced modes Corporation. All rights reserved.

5 Security Management secure usable affordable 5 Adapted from Jesper M. Johansson, Security Management, TechNet 2006 Corporation. All rights reserved.

6 BitLocker Key Points BitLocker in its basic mode provides a higher-level of data security with no additional security burden on the user BitLocker provides a range of options that allows customers to configure BitLocker for their security needs BitLocker should be deployed on platforms that have the Designed for Windows logo Corporation. All rights reserved.

7 Presentation Outline BitLocker Introduction BitLocker Technical Highlights Pen Testing BitLocker Top Threats Part 1 (basic mode) Top Threats Part 2 (advanced modes) Summary Questions (at the end, please) Corporation. All rights reserved.

8 Trusted Platform Module v1.2 BitLocker uses TPM v1.2 (not v1.1) Similar to the functions and security properties of Smart Cards Fastened onto motherboard Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) Can have Tamper Resistance / Reaction / Evidence Trusted Computing Group (TCG) specification BitLocker can be used without TPM But this mode does not include BitLocker s pre-os integrity validation Corporation. All rights reserved.

9 BitLocker Modes Basic TPM Advanced TPM + PIN TPM + USB Dongle USB Dongle Corporation. All rights reserved.

10 Trusted Computing Base (TCB) The totality of protection mechanisms within a computer system, including hardware, firmware, and software, the combination of which is responsible for enforcing a security policy. [INFOSEC glossary] BitLocker s use of a TCB: Trusted identification of code and data loaded during boot Foundation that OS builds on OS Code Integrity x64 platforms: digital signatures for kernel-mode software Corporation. All rights reserved.

11 TCB Validation TPM s Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) M M M M M: Measurement MBR: Master Boot Record Boot Mgr: Boot Manager Corporation. All rights reserved.

12 Presentation Outline BitLocker Introduction BitLocker Technical Highlights Pen Testing BitLocker Top Threats Part 1 (basic mode) Top Threats Part 2 (advanced modes) Summary Questions (at the end, please) Corporation. All rights reserved.

13 Adversary Objectives Read plaintext data off of the disk Gain access to encryption keys Gain control of privileged threads Corporation. All rights reserved.

14 Physical Memory Ghosts: Warm Warm ghosting 1. Attacker boots system 2. Attacker warm reboots into OS which avoids destruction of RAM image 3. Attacker then can access ghost secrets in memory Mitigations: Platforms where BIOS clears memory on reboot BitLocker advanced modes Corporation. All rights reserved.

15 Physical Memory Ghosts: Cold Cold ghosting Physical memory cells may retain charge long enough to be copied Iceman attack Battery-backed DIMMs make this even easier Mitigations: BitLocker advanced modes Corporation. All rights reserved.

16 Cheap, Easy, & Distributable HW-oriented Attacks PCI bus exploit with repurposed PC Card device and DMA (direct memory access) e.g. CardBus DMA technique demoed by David Hulton at ShmooCon, 2006 laptop DMA Modified PC Card ram Mitigation: BitLocker advanced modes Corporation. All rights reserved.

17 Cheap, Easy, & Distributable HW-oriented Attacks Xbox v1-style attacks LPC bus, HyperTransport bus, etc. Hacking the Xbox, by Andrew bunnie Huang Mitigation: BitLocker advanced modes Corporation. All rights reserved.

18 Threats against the TCB Executing code-of-choice within the TCB Controlling the instruction pointer Potential pre-os component vulnerabilities (bootmgr, winload, winresume, etc.) Mitigation: MS Security Development Lifecycle Mitigation: BitLocker advanced modes Corporation. All rights reserved.

19 Threats against the TCB Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM) is intended to be immutable portion of BIOS Attacking the CRTM Execute chosen-code in CRTM Control / prevent measurements Physically remove it Attack existing CRTM (e.g. buffer overrun) Attack secure update-mechanism to inject unauthorized code into CRTM Mitigation: BIOS meets BitLocker requirements Mitigation: BitLocker advanced modes Corporation. All rights reserved.

20 Ciphertext Manipulation Threats Attacker can alter disk sectors offline, which will subsequently be decrypted during boot AES-CBC allows attacker to make known deltas in the decrypted data These deltas could be used to alter the security posture of the stolen laptop Mitigation: AES-CBC + Diffuser Mitigation: BitLocker advanced modes Corporation. All rights reserved.

21 Encryption without Diffuser Encrypt with AES-CBC Decrypt with AES-CBC Corporation. All rights reserved.

22 Modification of AES-CBC Ciphertext Attacker flips a single bit in the ciphertext (0xf8 to 0xf9) Decrypt with AES-CBC One block randomized Known delta in next block Corporation. All rights reserved.

23 AES-CBC + Diffuser Attacker flips a single bit in ciphertext (0x58 to 0x59) Entire sector is randomized Decrypt with AES-CBC + Diffuser Corporation. All rights reserved.

24 Ciphertext Manipulation Threats 24 AES-CBC + Diffuser helps, but there are still threats Cost: randomize entire sector (512+ bytes) Result: limited control of where data changes occur Effects: denial of service critical services fail to load? AES-CBC Diffuser 128 is default mode of BitLocker Mitigation: BitLocker advanced modes 2006 Corporation. All rights reserved.

25 Presentation Outline BitLocker Introduction BitLocker Technical Highlights Pen Testing BitLocker Top Threats Part 1 (basic mode) Top Threats Part 2 (advanced modes) Summary Questions (at the end, please) Corporation. All rights reserved.

26 Advanced Mode: TPM + PIN M M M M M M M 1337 M M M M 1337 PIN Corporation. All rights reserved.

27 TPM + PIN Threats For unseal to succeed: TPM Authdata value correct TRUNC(SHA256(PIN), 20B) TPM PCR values correct Attack: Brute-force PIN Mitigation: TPM Anti-hammering: TPM Authdata failure lockout geometrically increases Mitigation: Use platforms that meet BitLocker requirements Corporation. All rights reserved.

28 TPM + PIN Key-wear Analysis Function keys used for input F1..F10 these are not commonly used Speculation: an adversary may be able to determine which keys occur in the PIN Mitigation: longer pins (via group policy), diverse pins; numeric keys will work on many keyboards Corporation. All rights reserved.

29 Boot Rootkits BitLocker detects boot rootkits installed offline BitLocker detects online boot rootkits that are BitLocker-unaware BitLocker does not protect against boot rootkits that are BitLocker-aware and travel through the OS. Mitigation: MS Security Development Lifecycle Mitigation: Windows Vista OS Security, Config, Best Practices Corporation. All rights reserved.

30 Multi-visit / Premeditated Attacks Attacker hobbles BitLocker protection prior to laptop loss or theft There are many advance-strikes Mitigations: Windows Vista OS Security, Best Practices Corporation. All rights reserved.

31 Cryptographic Threats 31 Diffuser is a new algorithm and implementation BitLocker s AES-CCM is a new implementation of the AES-CCM standard Correct use of cryptographic APIs, counters, IVs, nonces, etc. Chosen- & Known- plaintext threats Ciphertext modification threats Mitigations: MS SDL, internal crypto review & validation Mitigations: external crypto review & validation, Crypto 2006, FIPS, Common Criteria 2006 Corporation. All rights reserved.

32 Lost While Unlocked Device is found, stolen, or illicitly accessed after the authorized user has authenticated, but before the device reaches the off state Also known as One Chance attacks Physical Memory Threats Cheap, Easy, & Distributed HW-based Threats Mitigations: Best Practices, Group Policy for Hibernate Corporation. All rights reserved.

33 Data Remanence: Electromigration Relocation of metal atoms due to high current densities Detection: OEM ports Mechanical probing Focused ion beam devices Peter Gutmann, Data Remanence in Semiconductor Devices, August Corporation. All rights reserved.

34 Presentation Outline BitLocker Introduction BitLocker Technical Highlights Pen Testing BitLocker Top Threats Part 1 (basic mode) Top Threats Part 2 (advanced modes) Summary Questions (at the end, please) Corporation. All rights reserved.

35 Pen Testing BitLocker: : The Team Team of several dedicated penetration engineers Collaborated with the Secure Windows Initiative (SWI) team Engagements with several external security vendors Engagements with many partners Engagements with security researchers Corporation. All rights reserved.

36 Pen Testing BitLocker : The Process Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) Threat Modeling / Threat Storming Component data flows Large feature spanning hardware and software Broad and deep analysis Security code review Software and hardware pentests Trust-boundary Fuzzing Automated Analysis Tools Corporation. All rights reserved.

37 Presentation Outline BitLocker Introduction BitLocker Technical Highlights Pen Testing BitLocker Top Threats Part 1 (basic mode) Top Threats Part 2 (advanced modes) Summary Questions (at the end, please) Corporation. All rights reserved.

38 Hardware platform is the new attack perimeter As some cracks are filled, other surfaces become interesting OS and Network are being hardened Data / Device mobility is prevalent The user and his devices have become the attack vectors Widely-deployed disk encryption will result in an increased attack effort against hardware Adapted from David Maynor, You are the Trojan!, ToorCon 7, Corporation. All rights reserved.

39 BitLocker Key Points BitLocker in its basic mode provides a higher-level of data security with no additional security burden on the user BitLocker provides a range of options that allows customers to configure BitLocker for their security needs BitLocker should be deployed on platforms that have the Designed for Windows logo Corporation. All rights reserved.

40 More Information Trustworthy Computing BitLocker Questions bdeinfo[at]microsoft.com BitLocker Blog blogs.msdn.com/si_team Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) msdn.microsoft.com/security/sdl Trusted Computing Group (TCG) Windows Hardware & Driver Central (WHDC) Corporation. All rights reserved.

41 Thank you for attending. Questions? 2006 Corporation. All rights reserved. This presentation is for informational purposes only. makes no warranties, express or implied, in this summary Corporation. All rights reserved.

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