FIPS Non Proprietary Security Policy: Kingston Technology DataTraveler DT4000 Series USB Flash Drive
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1 FIPS Non Proprietary Security Policy Kingston Technology Company, Inc. DataTraveler DT4000 G2 Series USB Flash Drive Document Version 1.8 December 3, 2014 Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology Company, Inc. Page 1 of 21
2 Abstract This document provides a non proprietary FIPS Security Policy for the DataTraveler DT4000 G2 Series USB Flash Drive. Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology Company, Inc. Page 2 of 21
3 Table of Contents 1 Introduction About FIPS About this Document External Resources Notices Acronyms Kingston Technology DataTraveler DT4000 G2 Series USB Flash Drive Product Overview Validation Level Detail Cryptographic Algorithms Approved Algorithms Algorithm Implementation Certificates Other Algorithms Cryptographic Module Specification Module Interfaces Roles, Services, and Authentication Operator Services and Descriptions Operator Authentication Authentication Strength Physical Security Operational Environment EMI/EMC Cryptographic Key Management Self Tests Power On Self Tests Conditional Self Tests Mitigation of Other Attacks Guidance and Secure Operation Crypto Officer Guidance General Guidance User Guidance Module Initialization and Configuration Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology Company, Inc. Page 3 of 21
4 List of Tables Table 1 Acronyms and Terms... 6 Table 2 Validation Level by DTR Section... 7 Table 3 Algorithm Certificates... 8 Table 4 Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping Table 5 Supported Roles Table 6 Operator Services and Descriptions Table 7 CSP Management Details Table 8 Public Key Management Details List of Figures Figure 1 Physical Boundary... 9 Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology Company, Inc. Page 4 of 21
5 1 Introduction 1.1 About FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules specifies requirements for cryptographic products to be deployed by Federal Agencies in both the United States and Canada for the protection of sensitive but unclassified information. The Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) is a joint effort between the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) that validates cryptographic modules to the FIPS standard. The CMVP accredits independent Cryptographic and Security Testing (CST) laboratories to perform FIPS testing. The CST labs use the Derived Test Requirements (DTR), Implementation Guidance (IG), and applicable CMVP programmatic guidance to test the cryptographic modules against the applicable standards. NIST s Computer Security Division (CSD) and CSEC jointly serve as the Validation Authorities for the CMVP, validating CST test reports and issuing certificates for products pursuing FIPS validation. Validation is the term given to a product that is documented and tested against the FIPS criteria. More information is available on the CMVP website at 1.2 About this Document This non proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the DataTraveler DT4000 G2 Series USB Flash Drive from Kingston Technology provides an overview of the product and a high level description of how it meets the security requirements of FIPS This document contains details on the module s cryptographic keys and critical security parameters. This Security Policy concludes with instructions and guidance on running the module in a FIPS mode of operation. The Kingston Technology DataTraveler DT4000 G2 Series USB Flash Drive may also be referred to as the module in this document. 1.3 External Resources The Kingston Technology website (http://www.kingston.com) contains information on the full line of products from Kingston Technology, including a detailed overview of the DataTraveler DT4000 G2 Series USB Flash Drive solution. The validated modules listing on the CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/stm/cmvp/validation.html) contains links to the FIPS certificate and Kingston Technology contact information. Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology Company, Inc. Page 5 of 21
6 1.4 Notices This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification. 1.5 Acronyms The following table defines acronyms found in this document: AES ANSI CSEC CSP DRBG DTR ECB FIPS GPC GUI HMAC KAT NIST NVRAM PBKDF RNG RSA SHA USB Acronym Table 1 Acronyms and Terms Term Advanced Encryption Standard American National Standards Institute Communications Security Establishment of Canada Critical Security Parameter Deterministic Random Bit Generator Derived Test Requirements Electronic Codebook Federal Information Processing Standard General Purpose Computer Graphical User Interface Hashed Message Authentication Code Known Answer Test National Institute of Standards and Technology Non Volatile Random Access Memory Password Based Key Derivation Function Random Number Generator Rivest Shamir Adelman Secure Hash Algorithm Universal Serial Bus Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology Company, Inc. Page 6 of 21
7 2 Kingston Technology DataTraveler DT4000 G2 Series USB Flash Drive 2.1 Product Overview Kingston s DataTraveler DT4000 G2 Series USB Flash Drive is assembled in the U.S. for organizations that require a secure way to store and transfer portable data. The stored data is secured by hardware based 256 bit AES encryption to guard sensitive information in case the drive is lost or stolen. Its durable, metal casing provides added protection. The DataTraveler DT4000 G2 Series USB Flash Drive is an enterprise grade USB Flash drive with 256 bit on the fly encryption. Its strong password rules and lock down control protect against brute force attacks. Such advanced security features make the DataTraveler DT4000 G2 Series USB Flash Drive ideal for corporations and service organizations that require employees to transport large digital files consisting of confidential documents. 2.2 Validation Level Detail The following table lists the level of validation for each area in FIPS 140 2: FIPS Section Title Validation Level Cryptographic Module Specification 3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3 Finite State Model 3 Physical Security 3 Operational Environment Cryptographic Key Management 3 Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility Self Tests 3 Design Assurance 3 Mitigation of Other Attacks Table 2 Validation Level by DTR Section N/A 3 N/A The Mitigation of Other Attacks section is not relevant as the module does not implement any countermeasures towards special attacks. Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology Company, Inc. Page 7 of 21
8 2.3 Cryptographic Algorithms Approved Algorithms In FIPS mode of operation, only the following FIPS approved algorithms are to be used: AES ECB/CBC/XTS mode with 256 bit keys encryption/decryption SHA 256 hashing HMAC SHA 256 for HMAC functions DRBG: HMAC SHA 256 DRBG RSA: Signature verification using 2048 bit keys with SHA 256 (Used for firmware update verification) SP PBKDF (option 2a) (vendor affirmed) o o o Password/passphrase length used in key derivation: 8 bytes ~ 136 bytes The upper bound of the probability of having the password guessed at random is: 1 / (26 * )^8. Please see Section for a detailed description of the authentication mechanism. The "iteration" count of SP PBKDF2 (HMAC SHA 256) module is There is a 256 byte salt used in the module and the salt is generated by SP A HMAC SHA 256 DRBG and is stored to emmc Algorithm Implementation Certificates The module s cryptographic algorithm implementations have received the following certificate numbers from the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program: Algorithm Type Algorithm Standard CAVP Certificate Use Random Number Generation DRBG: HMAC SHA 256 DRBG SP A # 494 Random Number Generation Hashing SHS (SHA 256) FIPS # 2379 Message digest Symmetric Key AES ECB/CBC/XTS mode with 256 bit keys FIPS 197 SP E # 2838 Encryption / decryption for entire partition Hashed message HMAC SHA 256 FIPS # 1779 HMAC functions authentication code Asymmetric Key RSA FIPS # 1480 Firmware update verification Table 3 Algorithm Certificates Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology Company, Inc. Page 8 of 21
9 2.3.3 Other Algorithms The module implements the following other algorithms: Hardware based random number generator (HWRNG) o This HWRNG is used only as a seeding mechanism to the FIPS approved DRBG. RSA 2048 for key wrapping (allowed for use in FIPS mode) o Key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength 2.4 Cryptographic Module Specification The module is the Kingston Technology DataTraveler DT4000 G2 Series USB Flash Drive running Firmware Version 3.05 on Hardware part DT4000 Version 1.0 [4GB, 8GB, 16GB, 32GB, 64GB, 128GB or 256GB]. The module is classified as a multi chip standalone cryptographic module, and the physical cryptographic boundary is drawn at the module s printed circuit board with USB connector and LED interface and includes all significant components within that boundary. The module s memory is logically partitioned; memory not executable by the module (Host application on CD ROM partition) is considered excluded. The physical boundary is pictured in the image below: Figure 1 Physical Boundary Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology Company, Inc. Page 9 of 21
10 The cryptographic boundary does not include the polymer case and USB cap of the DT4000 G2 series drive. The host application (version 4.0.0) is inside of the crypto boundary but is excluded from validation. The potting provides sufficient physical security; compromising the exterior metallic casing does not compromise the security of the device. No excluded components process CSPs, plaintext data, or other information that if misused could lead to a compromise. 2.5 Module Interfaces The interfaces for the cryptographic boundary include physical and logical interfaces. The physical interfaces provided by the module are mapped to four FIPS defined logical interfaces: Data Input, Data Output, Control Input, and Status Output. The mapping of logical interfaces to module physical interfaces is provided in the following table: FIPS Logical Interface Module Physical Interface Data Input Data pins within the USB Port Data Output Data pins within the USB Port Control Input Data pins within the USB Port Status Output Data pins within the USB Port LED Power Power pin within the USB Port Table 4 Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping The USB 3.0 protocol ensures these logical interfaces are distinct. The module does not support the input or output of plaintext cryptographic key components, authentication data, and CSPs. 2.6 Roles, Services, and Authentication The following table lists the roles in the module that operators may assume. The respective services for each role are described in the following sections. Role Authentication Type & Mechanism Crypto Officer (CO) Identity based authentication via username and password (see Section 2.6.2) User Identity based authentication via username and password (see Section 2.6.2) Firmware Update Identity based authentication via username and RSA 2048 digital signature Officer verification during the Firmware Load Test. (This role has a hardcoded password, but no security is claimed for the password method of authentication.) Vendor N/A: This role is unauthenticated. (This role has a hardcoded password, but no security is claimed for the password method of authentication.) CD Update Officer N/A: This role is unauthenticated. (This role has a hardcoded password, but no security is claimed for the password method of authentication.) Table 5 Supported Roles Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology Company, Inc. Page 10 of 21
11 2.6.1 Operator Services and Descriptions The services available to the roles in the module are as follows: Service Description Service Input Service Output Roles Zeroization Zeroize all keys and CSPs Password Keys/CSPs Crypto Officer Authentication zeroized Firmware Update Load/Update firmware Signed Firmware Status output via LED and alert to Firmware Update Officer host machine GUI Set Vendor Set information on Vendor Vendor INFO Vendor INFO Vendor INFO INFO Block values value stored CD Update Load/Update CD Image to the CD ROM partition CD Image CD Image stored CD Update Officer Initialize Create password and generate keys to place the module in FIPS 140 mode of operation Enter password Show Status Verify self test success/failure Password Authentication Encrypt Encrypt partition with AES Password Authentication Decrypt Decrypt AES encrypted Password partition when reading from Authentication the device Format Drive Run Self Tests Erase all files stored on the module and zeroizes keys and CSPs Performs power on self tests; invoked by inserting module into the host machine Table 6 Operator Services and Descriptions User initiates Forgot Password procedure or initiates the format drive function once authenticated N/A Password stored, self tests run, and keys generated Status output via LED and alert to host machine GUI Partition encrypted Partition decrypted and files are readable Partition formatted and keys/csps overwritten with new values Status output of results / module disabled in tests fail, allows authentication if tests pass User User User User User User Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology Company, Inc. Page 11 of 21
12 2.6.2 Operator Authentication Username & Password The user authenticates as part of the setup process. The module needs to validate two values before the operator gets access to the private encrypted area: 1. The default user name of The secret disk password entered by the user. The module validates these values. The User roles authenticate via host machine over the USB port. Other than status functions available by viewing LEDs, the services described in Table 6 Operator Services and Descriptions are available only to identified and authenticated operators. When a User first inserts the module, they are prompted by the host application to create a username and password. Once created, the module will generate a Data Encryption Key to encrypt the partition associated with that password. Access to the host application and thus any available module services requires a valid password, which is entered via a login prompt that is displayed when the module is connected to the host machine. To authenticate to the module, an operator must connect to the module via management application and provide a username and password. A valid login (i.e., valid username and valid associated password) is required for all services accessed through the application. Once authenticated, further use of the module on the host machine will not require the user to authenticate since it will already be associated with the software on the host machine. If the module is removed from the host PC and then reinserted, the operator will be required to authenticate before the module can be used. The module ensures there is no visible display of Crypto Officer or User authentication data during data entry. RSA Digital Signature The Firmware Update Officer role is identified using an 8 digit username and authenticated using the RSA 2048 signature embedded within the firmware image Authentication Strength Username & Password The User and Crypto Officer are authenticated via a username and password. The Crypto Officer password is 8 characters in length; the User password must be at least 8 characters in length. Passwords may include the following character types: uppercase letters, lowercase letters, numbers, and special characters (all US keyboard printable special characters). Therefore, the character space is 94. The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is approximately 1/94 8, which is less than 1/1,000,000. Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology Company, Inc. Page 12 of 21
13 The module will lock an account after 10 consecutive failed authentication attempts; thus, the maximum number of attempts in one minute is 10. Therefore, the probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one minute period is 10/94 8 which is less than 1/100,000. RSA Digital Signature RSA 2048 with SHA 256 provides 112 bits of security, therefore the probability of a successful random attempt is 1/(2 112 ), which is less than 1/1,000,000. An attacker may be able to perform 0.83 attempts per second via a scripted or automatic attack, therefore the probability of a success with multiple attempts in a one minute period is 50/(2 112 ), which is less than 1/100, Physical Security The module is a multiple chip standalone module and conforms to Level 3 requirements for physical security. The module is composed of production grade components and is completely covered with a hard, opaque potting material. Any attempts to remove the potting will result in permanent damage to the module. Note: Module hardness testing was only performed at ambient temperature; no assurance is provided for Level 3 hardness conformance at any other temperature. The operator of the module should inspect the outer casing of the module every time before connecting the module to a computer. If tamper evidence is observed on the outer casing, please discontinue use of the module immediately. 2.8 Operational Environment The module operates in a limited operational environment and does not implement a General Purpose Operating System. 2.9 EMI/EMC The module meets the requirements of 47 CFR PART 15 regulation & ANSI C63.4 and ICES 003 for the evaluation of Class B of electromagnetic compatibility. This device complies with Part 15 of FCC Class B rules for home or office use. Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology Company, Inc. Page 13 of 21
14 2.10 Cryptographic Key Management The table below provides a complete list of Critical Security Parameters used within the module: R = Read W = Write D = Delete Key/CSP Name Description / Use Generation Storage Establishment / Export Destruction Privileges AES Session Key (secure channel) AES 256 key used to encrypt secure channel data between host application and module Internal generation by SP A DRBG. Storage: RAM plaintext Association: Associated with unique secure channel session between host application and module. Agreement: RSA keywrap Entry: NA Output: RSA keywrapped Overwrite with zeros immediately after secure session is terminated User: R CO: R (Generated before authentication from users is initiated) MAC Key (secure channel) HMAC SHA 256 key used to authenticate messages sent via secure channel between host application and module. Internal generation by SP A DRBG. Storage: RAM plaintext Association: Associated with unique secure channel session between host application and module. Agreement: RSA keywrap Entry: NA Output: RSA keywrapped Overwrite with zeros immediately after secure session is terminated User: R CO: R (Generated before authentication from users is initiated) Data Encryption Key XTS AES 256 bit key for encryption / decryption of all files on the drive Internal generation by SP A DRBG. Storage: NVRAM (obfuscated with DEK Encryption Key). Association: The system is the one and only owner. Relationship is maintained by the controller via protected memory. Only a single AES 256 data key to encrypt a whole partition content. Agreement: NA Entry: NA Output: None The operator initiates the Forgot Password procedure The CO decommissions the drive to securely wipe the contents CO: D User: R W D Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology Company, Inc. Page 14 of 21
15 Key/CSP Name Description / Use Generation Storage Establishment / Export Destruction Privileges DEK Encryption Key 256 bit AES key for obfuscating the Data Encryption Key Derived from User Password using PKCS#5 PBKDF2 and HMAC SHA 256 Storage: RAM plaintext Agreement: NA Entry: NA Output: None Overwrite with zeros immediately None DRBG Entropy Input HWRNG providing 512 bit entropy to seed the SP A DRBG Internal generation by HWRNG Storage: RAM plaintext Association: The system is the one and only owner. Agreement: NA Entry: NA Output: NA Reset / reboot the module Generate a new value The operator initiates the Forgot Password procedure CO: D User: None The CO decommissions the drive to securely wipe the contents DRBG Nonce HWRNG providing 512 bit Nonce to seed the SP A DRBG Internal generation by HWRNG Storage: RAM plaintext Association: The system is the one and only owner. Agreement: NA Entry: NA Output: NA Reset / reboot the module Generate a new value The operator initiates the Forgot Password procedure CO: D User: None The CO decommissions the drive to securely wipe the contents DRBG V Value Secret value of the internal state Internally generated by SP A DRBG Storage: RAM plaintext Association: The system is the one and only owner. Agreement: NA Entry: NA Output: NA Reset / reboot the module Generate a new value The operator initiates the Forgot Password procedure CO: D User: None The CO decommissions the drive to Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology Company, Inc. Page 15 of 21
16 Key/CSP Name Description / Use Generation Storage Establishment / Export Destruction securely wipe the contents Privileges DRBG Key Value Secret value of the internal state Internally generated by SP A DRBG Storage: RAM plaintext Association: The system is the one and only owner. Agreement: NA Entry: NA Output: NA Reset / reboot the module Generate a new value The operator initiates the Forgot Password procedure CO: D User: None The CO decommissions the drive to securely wipe the contents Crypto Officer Password Alphanumeric passwords for authentication to the module. Not generated by the module; Storage: NVRAM hashed with SHA 256 Association: controlled by the controller Agreement: NA Entry: AES encrypted entry via host machine management application. Passwords are > 8 characters in length. The CO decommissions the drive to securely wipe the contents CO: R W D Output: NA User Password Alphanumeric passwords externally generated by a human user for authentication to the module. Not generated by the module; Storage: NVRAM hashed with SHA 256 Association: controlled by the controller Agreement: NA Entry: AES encrypted entry via host machine management application. Passwords are > 8 characters in length. Output: NA The operator initiates the Forgot Password procedure to overwrite the passwords with a new one The CO decommissions the drive to securely wipe the contents CO: D User: R W D Table 7 CSP Management Details Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology Company, Inc. Page 16 of 21
17 The table below provides a complete list of public keys used within the module: R = Read W = Write D = Delete Key Name Description / Use Generation Storage Establishment / Export Destruction Privileges RSA Public Key (keywrap) 2048 bit key used in the establishment of the secure channel between the host application and module. Generated externally by host application and imported to the module during establishment of secure session. Storage: RAM plaintext Association: The host application is the one and only owner. Relationship is maintained by the host application, which owns the corresponding private key. Agreement: NA Entry: Plaintext Output: None Overwrite with zeros immediately after secure session is terminated User: W CO: W RSA public key 2048 bit key used in the Firmware integrity check and firmware load test. N/A programmed during manufacturing Storage: Stored in the Firmware Area (NVRAM) along with Firmware Code and RSA 2048/SHA 256 signature where the Firmware Area is logically allocated in the emmc during manufacturing Agreement: NA Entry: Plaintext with new firmware upload Output: NA NA User: R CO: R Firmware Update Officer: R W Table 8 Public Key Management Details The module does not support key entry. The module supports entry of passwords for authentication, and these parameters are not distributed outside the cryptographic boundary. When the user initiates the Forgot Password procedure from the application, the module will overwrite all keys and CSPs with new values. Data encrypted with the overwritten Data Encryption Key cannot be decrypted. When the Crypto Officer authenticates and issues a command to zeroize the device, all keys and CSPs will be zeroized, and the module will be decommissioned. Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology Company, Inc. Page 17 of 21
18 2.11 Self Tests The module includes an array of self tests that are run during startup and periodically during operations to prevent any secure data from being released and to ensure all components are functioning correctly. In the event of any self test failure, the module will output an error dialog and will shutdown. No keys or CSPs will be output when the module is in an error state. The module does not support a bypass function. The following sections discuss the module s self tests in more detail Power On Self Tests Power on self tests are run upon every initialization of the module and if any of the tests fail, the module will not initialize. The module will enter an error state and no services can be accessed by the users. The module implements the following power on self tests: SHA 256 KAT HMAC SHA 256 KAT RSA 2048/SHA 256 Signature Verification KAT AES 256 ECB Encrypt and Decrypt KATs AES 256 CBC Encrypt and Decrypt KATs AES 256 XTS Encrypt and Decrypt KATs HMAC SHA 256 DRBG KAT RSA 2048/SHA 256 Signature Verification for Firmware Integrity Check The SP PBKDF KAT is currently not required per IG D.6. The module performs all power on self tests automatically when the module is initialized. All power on self tests must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The Power on self tests can be run on demand by rebooting the module. An operator can discern that all power on self tests have passed and FIPS mode is enabled via normal operation of the module, presentation of the GUI interface, and observing the LED blinking slowly at hertz during initialization and read/write activity to the module. If the module fails a POST, the module will not be connected to the host system and the USB D+/D pins will be isolated. In this case, the module will not be initialized and no critical security parameters will be available. The LED will blink rapidly at 16 hertz. Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology Company, Inc. Page 18 of 21
19 Conditional Self Tests Conditional self tests are test that run continuously during operation of the module. If any of these tests fail, the module will enter an error state. The module can be re initialized to clear the error and resume FIPS mode of operation. No services can be accessed by the operators. The module performs the following conditional self tests: Continuous RNG test run on output of DRBG o Because there is 16 byte random number output after calling RNG each time, there are two calls to generate the AES 256 key. The test is run with each call. Continuous test on output of DRBG seed mechanism (HW RNG) Firmware Load Test (RSA 2048 Signature Verification) If the module fails a conditional self test, the module will not be connected to the host system and the USB D+/D pins will be isolated Mitigation of Other Attacks The module does not mitigate other attacks. Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology Company, Inc. Page 19 of 21
20 3 Guidance and Secure Operation This section describes how to configure the module for FIPS approved mode of operation. Operating the module without maintaining the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS approved mode of operation. 3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance General Guidance The Crypto Officer must not disclose passwords and must store passwords in a safe location and according to his/her organization s systems security policies for password storage. 3.2 User Guidance Module Initialization and Configuration The User must configure and enforce the following initialization procedures: 1. Verify that the firmware version is 3.05 and the application version is The firmware version 3.05 is validated for FIPS approved mode of operation. Run the application (version 4.0.0) which is located on the CD ROM partition of the device. Initialize the device following the instruction on the user interface and log into the device. Click on the Kingston icon in the system tray to bring up a pull up menu and select About DT4000 option. Then, the following screen will show the firmware and application versions. Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology Company, Inc. Page 20 of 21
21 2. When the module is initializing in FIPS mode, the LED will blink slowly at hertz. After module initialization occurs, and the partition is mounted, the LED will blink at hertz while read/write activity is occurring. 3. Do not disclose passwords and store passwords in a safe location and according to the organization s systems security policies for password storage. Note that when the module is plugged into to a host machine for the first time, the User will create a password, and the module will be formatted. Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology Company, Inc. Page 21 of 21
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