How To Understand The Security Environment In European States

Transcription

1 2013 Airbus Military CESAR SANCHEZ LOPEZ EF [HANDBOOK - COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY - 8 TH HIGH LEVEL COURSE ALCIDE DE GASPERI /2013 ] [...]

2 FOREWORD For more than 10 years, the Common Security and Defense Policy has been one of the crucial topics within the European Union, in particular because this policy reflects the ambitions of the Union and its Member States to be more active, more consistent and more capable. The Union launched its first crisis management mission in Since then the Union has deployed over 20 civilian and military missions and operations on three continents. From the start of its operational engagement, the EU has tried to present its ability to deploy both civilian and military instruments together as its particular strength, which is one of the main features of its comprehensive approach to crisis management. Training in general is an important aspect of such successful operational engagement and following its comprehensive approach, training in civil-military co-ordination and co-operation is a special requirement for the EU which needs to be met through special training and combined civilian and military participation. The European Security and Defense College is providing such training at the strategic level with a mixed civil-military participation in all its courses and is so playing a significant role in the implementation of the EU s comprehensive approach to crisis management. The challenges and risks the Defense and Security sector is facing nowadays in Europe, and its implications for the EU CFSP and its global leadership, must be tackled from a more comprehensive approach. The EDTIB (European Defense and Technology Industrial Base) role must be enhanced beyond from its traditional supply management. Increasingly important today, this traditional focus on the supply must evolve to a more active involvement in the demand definition and harmonization processes. Further engagement in the discussions and decision making processes in the EU arena and with other key public stakeholders is paramount step for the success of this process. This handbook on CSDP, compiled during my participation in the HLC in the ESDC, mirrors this approach and thus provides a sound documentation for professionals and officials dealing with strategic aspects in the field of the European Security and Defense sector and beyond. It is also a hope that it will also help to promote a better and comprehensive understanding of the Common Security and Defense Policy, and its implication for the Industry. César Sánchez López Airbus Military - Strategy and GID 2

3 PREFACE The overall aim of the High Level Course (HLC) is to promote a common European security culture among senior officials dealing with strategic aspects in the field of CFSP/CSDP and to form a European security and Defense community able to contribute to the further development of CSDP and to cooperate effectively with the various actors in the field of CSDP through: Updating course participants' knowledge of the developing EU Defense and security architecture, the comprehensive nature of the CSDP as a key tool of CFSP, and its complexity and interlocking structure; Facilitating discussion on EU policies and their implementation in the overall context of the international environment; Providing a forum for further CSDP development, keeping in mind the long-term objectives set for this policy area by the Treaty on European Union. A major feature of the course is to promote networking among course participants and with lecturers and faculty members. 3

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5 CONTENT 1 AKU 1 - HISTORY AND CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY General description CHAPTER 1 - The Origins of European Co-Operation in the Security and Defense Field Introduction SETTING AN AMBITIOUS AGENDA - FROM THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY TO THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION The European Defense Community The Western European Union SOWING THE SEEDS OF EUROPEAN COOPERATION: FROM THE DAVIGNON REPORT (1970) TO THE PETERSBERG TASKS European Political Cooperation Linking the WEU and the EU DEVELOPING THE EU'S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: FROM MAASTRICHT TO NICE The Treaty on European Union (TEU) The Treaty of Amsterdam, The Treaty of Nice, CHAPTER 2 - The development of European Security and Defense Policy Introduction LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY (ESDP) The Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defense, St. Malo, Cologne European Council Meeting, 3-4 June Helsinki European Council Meeting, December Santa Maria da Feira European Council Meeting, June LINKING CFSP AND ESDP/ CSDP Complementary objectives The Lisbon Treaty and CFSP/CSDP The evolution of EU foreign policy Basic Time-line of Events AKU 2 THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

6 General description Learning objective Bibliography & Other Sources CHAPTER 1 Before the ESS Strategic Divisions The EU Treaty Provisions Strategic Indications Unique Features Need for a Strategy CHAPTER 2 Adoption of the ESS in A Favorable Context The Drafting Process Basic Orientations Framework for Consensus CHAPTER 3 - Summary of the ESS The Security Environment Strategic Objectives Policy Implication CHAPTER 4 Main Characteristics of the ESS Recommended Reading The GPG Approach Haves and Have nots Long Term vs. Short Term Challenges The Keys for Implementation CHAPTER 5 The Role and impact of the ESS A New Type of Power A Positive Power The Role of the ESS The Impact of the ESS CHAPTER 6 Prospects of Revision Recommended Reading A Report on Implementation

7 Questions for the Future AKU 3 ROLE OF EU INSTITUTIONS IN THE FIELD OF CFSP / CSDP General description CHAPTER 1 - EU institutional structures involved in the field of CSDP EU INSTITUTIONS COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY (CFSP)/ COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY (CSDP) EUROPEAN COUNCIL COUNCIL EUROPEAN COMMISSION EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT CHAPTER 2 - High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy MULTIPLE ROLES AND TASKS SUPPORTING INSTRUMENTS & STRUCTURES EU s EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE CHAPTER 3 - EU Council roles in the field of CSDP CSDP CAPABILITIES CSDP MISSION SPECTRUM CONDUCTING CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS CHAPTER 4 - European Commission s external activities EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND CFSP CO ORDINATION WITH THE COUNCIL S CFSP/CSDP ACTIONS AND OBJECTIVES CHAPTER 5 - European Parliament roles in the field of CFSP/CSDP COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY / COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY LEGISLATIVE PROCESS LEGISLATIVE CO DECISION PROCEDURE CHAPTER 6 - Financing CSDP FUNDING MILITARY OPERATIONS START UP FUND AKU 5 EU CRISIS-MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT General description Reading Directions

8 Learning content Bibliography & Other Sources CHAPTER 1 Historical Context of Capability Development Introduction Landmarks and Engagements CHAPTER 2 Mechanism and Actors Capability EU Capability Development Availability of capabilities for EU crisis management Actors in the EU s capability development process The specific case of Military Rapid Response and the Battle groups CHAPTER 3 Military Capability Development Introduction The Process Military Capability Requirements EU Capability Development Shortfall implications and further action Capability Development Plan Process Continuity Military Capability Development Areas Lessons Learned from the HLG 2010 process EU NATO military capability development co operation CHAPTER 4 - European Defense Agency Enhancing European Defense Capabilities: The EDA Approach Why a European Defense Agency? EDA in the CSDP Institutional Landscape Mission and functions EDA s Strategic Framework Results Projects Results Invest More Together in Defense R&T Results Market CHAPTER 5 - Civilian Capability Development

9 Introduction Civilian Capability Development Process Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG 2008) Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (CHG 2010) Personnel Quality & Training Concepts in Support of EU Civilian Crisis Management Civilian Capability Management Tool Wider Co operation and Co ordination Civilian Headline Goal 2010 Perspectives CHAPTER 6 - Perspectives for EU Crisis Management Capabilities The Challenges of the Present Permanent Structured Co-operation Perspectives of Civilian Capabilities From Capabilities to Operations and Missions AKU 6 PLANNING FOR CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS General description Learning content Bibliography & Other Sources CHAPTER 1 - About Planning Introduction Functions of Planning Levels of Planning Types of Planning Planning Procedures Enabling Success CHAPTER 2 - Advance Planning Purpose of Advance Planning Who Does What? CHAPTER 3 - Crisis response Planning Crisis Response Planning for Military Operations Crisis Response Planning for Military Operations Crisis Response Planning for Civilian Operations

10 5.5 CHAPTER 4 - Introduction to Operational Planning Command Options Force Generation Operational Design Approaches Operational Design Tools CHAPTER 5 - Challenges and Prospects AKU 7 THE IMPACT OF THE LISBON TREATY ON THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY General description Learning Content CHAPTER 1 - The Origins of the Lisbon Treaty The Laeken Declaration The Constitutional Treaty The Lisbon Treaty CHAPTER 2 - Changes in the EU Framework Major Changes European Parliament European Council Council of the European Union The European Commission CHAPTER 3 - Impact on the Common Security and Defense Policy Major Changes Recommended Reading CHAPTER 4 - Major Challenges as Regards Implementation Introduction The EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy The European External Action Service (EEAS) Assistance and Solidarity Clause CSDP Operations Permanent Structured Cooperation The creation of Permanent Structured Cooperation Institutional Structure of Permanent Structured Cooperation Definition of Criteria for entry to Permanent Structured Cooperation

11 The contribution of the European Defense Agency CHAPTER 5 - Conclusions and Reflections What s next? Conclusions AKU 8 NON-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THEIR MEANS OF DELIVERY General description Learning Content Selective Bibliography A. Proliferation phenomenon B. Nuclear proliferation C. Biological & chemical proliferation D. Ballistic missile proliferation E. EU against the proliferation of WMD F. Export Control Regimes CHAPTER 1 - Risk and threat assessment at regional and international levels Introduction Motivations of proliferating countries Nuclear proliferation: historical perspective Nuclear proliferation: current situation Nuclear proliferation: global characteristics Nuclear proliferation: ongoing crises Nuclear proliferation: medium and long term risks Chemical proliferation Chemical proliferation: new threats Chemical proliferation: allegations Biological proliferation Ballistic missile proliferation Cruise missiles CHAPTER 2 - Political and legal multilateral instruments Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

12 NPT Review Conference (NPT RevCon) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) IAEA Effective Safeguards Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) The Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT) Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) The Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) United Nations Security Council Resolution Other multilateral instruments relating to WMD non proliferation CHAPTER 3 - EU Policy against the Proliferation of WMD EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD Active role in support of multilateralism WMD clause in relations with third countries NPT balanced approach required Nuclear non proliferation Strengthening export controls Complying with and promoting UNSCR EU support to international security initiatives EU in the G Chemical Weapons Biological weapons Ballistic missiles Non proliferation actions within the EU CHAPTER 4 - The European export control regime Introduction Export control regimes general characteristics Implementing export control regimes European control regimes European industrial actors

13 News & Updates AKU 9 THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE General description Learning Content CHAPTER 1 - Climate Science and Physical Impact Carbon Dioxide Heat Trapping Burning Fossil Fuels Impact of Global Temperatures Rise For details, see also the following recommended readings CHAPTER 2 - Climate change as a threat multiplier of existing tensions and its contribution to instability The International System and Climate Change Climate Change disproportionate impact on the most vulnerable areas The Threat of Mercantilism Risk and International Security For details please see the following recommended readings CHAPTER 3 - Climate Security in the Context of Security Planning Evolution of climate change in European and national security strategies An example of climate change incorporated at the national security level Defense approaches to addressing climate change and environmental issues UK MOD climate change strategy US Quadrennial Defense Review French MOD environment action plan European Defense Agency For details, please see also the following recommended readings AKU 10 EU MEDIATION AND DIALOGUE CAPACITIES General Description CHAPTER 1 - Introduction DEFINITIONS Styles of Mediation Levels of Mediation and Multi Track Approaches CHAPTER 2 EU engagement in high level mediation and dialogue

14 EU Political and Development Actors EU Security Actors CHAPTER 3 EU support for mediation and dialogue led by others Promoting Mediation Providing Technical Support Providing Financial Support Exerting Leverage on the Parties Creating an environment that is conducive to a settlement CHAPTER 4 The EU Concept s guiding principles and recommendations for strengthening mediation and dialogue capacities PRINCIPLES RECOMMENDATIONS CHAPTER 5 Other organizations engaged in peace mediation Countries or States The United Nations (UN) Other Regional Organizations NGOs/Private Diplomacy Organizations AKU 11 AN INTRODUCTION TO GENDER-SENSITIVE OPERATIONS General description Learning Content Some useful links CHAPTER 1 - Introduction to UN Security Council Resolution , what do these four digits mean? Facts and figures International Commitments International Commitments CHAPTER 2 - Gender sensitive peacekeeping = Effective Peacekeeping Multiple Approaches The Policy Cycle Roles and Responsibilities Pre-deployment training Accountability

15 11 APPENDIX Summary of Acronyms Summary of Definitions

16 1 AKU 1 - HISTORY AND CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY General description This Autonomous Knowledge Unit gives an overview of the historical and geopolitical context within which developed the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (re-named Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), under the Lisbon Treaty). Specifically, it outlines the evolution of European foreign policy cooperation - emphasizing the key political and diplomatic events that led to the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and of the ESDP. 1.2 CHAPTER 1 - The Origins of European Co-Operation in the Security and Defense Field Describes the origins of foreign policy cooperation in Europe and examines early attempts to establish a European Defense Community and the creation of the Western European Union. It also identifies relevant concepts unveiled in EU treaties and in European Council summit meetings Introduction The origins of the security and Defense architecture of Europe can be found in the post-world War II situation. Starting in the late 1940s, a number of initiatives set the stage for increased cooperation across Europe. Examples include the launch of the U.S. sponsored Marshall plan in 1947, the signing of the Franco-British Treaty of Dunkirk (1947) containing a clause of automatic armed assistance, the signing of the Brussels Treaty (1948) sowing the seeds for a Western European Union, and the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington (1949). With the gradual emergence of the Cold War, the first European institutions in this field had a pronounced Euro-Atlantic dimension. The desire to avoid future wars in Europe also played a key role for institutional development. The European Coal and Steel Community created in 1951 placed strategic resources under a 16

17 supranational authority. It would later serve as a model for the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community established in 1957 through the Treaty of Rome. The three communities were merged in 1967, highlighting the trend towards legal arrangements to move European co-operation forward. Follow-on treaties would develop closer collaboration in the area of security and Defense, culminating with the Treaty of Nice in Setting an ambitious agenda - from the European Defense Community to the Western European Union The European Defense Community On 9 May 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman pronounced a plan calling for the "Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole [to] be placed under a common High Authority". Inspired by the French economist Jean Monnet, the Schuman Plan sought to lower the potential for conflict in Europe by placing the control of these strategic resources at the supranational level. The Schuman Plan also underscored the importance of a "united Europe" to enable peaceful relations. The Schuman Plan led to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 through the Treaty of Paris. It included Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The breakout of the Korean War in June 1950 made it urgent to find a solution for a contribution by the newly created West Germany to the West's Defense efforts. Inspired by the Schuman Plan, Jean Monnet (then serving as head of France's General Planning Commission) proposed the creation of a unified European army. French Prime Minister Rene Pleven officially tabled a plan for 17

18 "the creation for the common Defense of a European army under political institutions of the united Europe" in October This common army would respond to a European Defense minister, be financed by a common budget and placed at the disposal of the unified Atlantic command. Known as the European Defense Community, it would include Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany The Western European Union The conception of the Western European Union (WEU) dates to the Brussels Treaty signed on 17 March Known as the Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense, it calls for the member countries to assist each other in case one is "the object of an armed attack in Europe". The signatories of the Treaty were Paul-Henri Spaak (Belgium), Georges Bidault (France), Joseph Bech (Luxembourg), Baron von Boetzelaer (Netherlands), and Ernest Bevin (United Kingdom). The Modified Brussels Treaty, 1954 Image credit: Ministère des Affaires étrangères - Service photographique However, the WEU was not formally created until the signing of the modified Brussels Treaty on 23 October The treaty came in the wake of the failed European Defense Community. Signed in Paris, it also included Germany and Italy. The treaty modified the original Brussels Treaty by incorporating controls and ceilings on armed forces and armaments production. It also added a new Article IV, based on Article V of the original Brussels Treaty, which recognized NATO's prime responsibility for protecting Europe. 18

19 It became rapidly clear that a substantial portion of the WEU's portfolio overlapped with that of other international institutions such as NATO and the Council of Europe. Over time, the WEU saw many of its functions transferred away to these organizations. As a result, the WEU gradually entered a dormant phase, focusing on lower profile activities such as monitoring arms production and armaments stocks. An external presence was nonetheless facilitated through the WEU Assembly with its status as the sole European parliamentary assembly with a mandate to monitor Defense issues Sowing the seeds of European cooperation: From the Davignon Report (1970) to the Petersberg tasks European Political Cooperation At the time the WEU entered a dormant phase, the European Community (EC) began to explore ways in which to harmonize members' foreign policies. While the Treaty of Rome does not contain any reference to cooperation in foreign policy nor, a fortiori, in the field of security and Defense, the idea of some form of political cooperation began to appear in the informal framework of the meetings of the European heads of state and government. At the Hague Summit held in December 1969, European leaders instructed their respective foreign ministers to examine the feasibility of closer integration in the political domain. In response, foreign ministers introduced the idea of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the Davignon Report from October Also known as the Luxembourg Report, it defined its objectives (harmonization of positions, consultation and, when appropriate, common actions) and its procedures (six-monthly meetings of the Foreign Affairs Ministers, quarterly meetings of the 19

20 Political Directors forming the Political Committee). Overall, the EPC aimed to facilitate the consultation process among EC Member States. On 13 October 1981, the EC foreign ministers adopted the London Report on EPC. It noted that although the EPC excludes Defense issues, it could extend to "certain important foreign policy issues concerning political aspects of security". To give some substance to EPC, the report introduced crisis procedures to enable the organization of emergency meetings within 48 hours if needed and provided the rotating Presidency with a team of officials of the preceding and following Presidencies ("troika" formula). At the Stuttgart European Council held in June 1983, the heads of state and government of the Member States of the EC issued a Solemn Declaration on European Union. Known as the Stuttgart Declaration, it set the stage for the future Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Finally, the Single European Act, signed in Luxemburg and The Hague in February 1986 (at twelve, given the accession of Greece, then Spain and Portugal), incorporated the EPC into the Treaties. The parties agreed to "endeavor jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy" and to develop "a European identity in external policy matters". The Act provided a legal framework to the EPC structures and procedures as well as to the European Commission's role. With the signing of the Single European Act, a secretariat was set-up in Brussels under the Presidency's authority to prepare and follow up on European Council meetings. The consistency between EPC, operating on consensus, and Community processes was likewise strengthened. 20

21 Linking the WEU and the EU In the 1980s, the Western European Union received new impetus. During the 1987 Hague Platform, WEU members reaffirmed the obligations of the modified Brussels Treaty and posited the idea of defining common positions on security policy matters. In 1988, the WEU carried out its first military operation. Known as Operation Clean-Sweep, it coordinated mine clearance along a 300- mile corridor around the Strait of Hormuz. Additional missions were carried out in the 1990s, including a naval operation in the Adriatic (Sharp Guard), a police and customs operation (Danube Operation), and a police operation in Mostar in 1993 on behalf of the European Union. Among the WEU's last missions was a Multinational Advisory Police Element sent to Albania in 1997 to train local police forces. WEU Membership (by membership category) Associate Associate Members Observers Members Partners (1954) (1992) (1992) (1994) Czech Republic Austria Belgium Bulgaria (1999) (1995) France Hungary (1999) Denmark Estonia The signing of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in Maastricht in 1991 opened the door to closer collaboration between the EU and the WEU. In the TEU, the WEU is recognized as "an integral part of the Germany Iceland Finland (1995) Latvia development of the Union." According to Article J.4 of the Greece (1995) Norway Ireland Lithuania TEU, the WEU is "to Italy Poland (1999) Sweden (1995) Romania elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Luxembourg Turkey Slovakia Netherlands Slovenia (1996) Portugal (1990) Spain (1990) United Union which have Defense implications." Reflecting a closer relationship with the EU, the WEU Headquarters was relocated from London to Brussels in Kingdom 21

22 In 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers met in Petersberg (outside Bonn) and outlined a new operational role for the organization. Ministers declared the WEU's readiness to make available military units for a range of tasks: "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking." Collectively, these became known as the Petersberg tasks. With the gradual incorporation of WEU assets and functions into the European Union - such as the WEU Satellite Centre (now the EU Satellite Centre) and the Petersberg tasks - the WEU once again plays a limited role in the European security domain. As a result, EU-WEU relations are currently less dynamic and intensive, even though the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy / Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union is double-hated as the Secretary-General of the WEU. The WEU presently houses a small Secretariat-General in Brussels with residual functions. Nonetheless, the WEU Assembly, now also known as the European Security and Defense Assembly, continues its activities through its committees and bi-annual plenary sessions. In addition, the WEU is still the guarantor of Article V on collective self-defense of the Modified Brussels Treaty. In 1996, the WEU was involved in the establishment of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO. According to the Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Berlin, the ESDI would "permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU." The arrangement was significant, as it accommodated a "European pillar" within the Alliance, 22

23 facilitating the identification of capabilities that were separable - but not separate - and that could be used in WEU-led operations. Moreover, as ESDI could rely on the newly established concept of Combined Joint Task Forces, it also served to limit potential duplication. The groundwork laid via ESDI would eventually serve as a template for the Berlin Plus Arrangements adopted in 2003 between NATO and the EU Developing the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: from Maastricht to Nice The Treaty on European Union (TEU) The Treaty on European Union - often called the Maastricht Treaty - was signed in Maastricht (the Netherlands) on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November Using the Single European Act as its departure point, the Maastricht Treaty created a single institutional framework (the European Union) based on three pillars. These pillars encompass community affairs (1st pillar), common foreign and security policy (2nd pillar), and justice and home affairs (3rd pillar). In spite of a single institutional framework, the roles of institutions in the decision-making process differ considerably according to the pillar and policy area. In the 2nd and 3rd pillars, an intergovernmental approach to policy making prevails. However, it should be noted that the European Commission is "fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security policy field" (art. J9) and "may refer to the Council any question relating to the common foreign and security policy and may submit proposals to the Council" (art. J8). Overall, CFSP aims to enhance the EU's ability to address the growing number of challenges at the international level, identifying five principal objectives. 23

24 CFSP is more far-reaching than European Political Cooperation in at least four ways. First, it breaks new ground - Article J.4 of the TEU states that CFSP includes "all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common Defense policy, which might in time lead to a common Defense." Second, the Maastricht Treaty introduces a new legal instrument - the Joint Action - in support of the CFSP decision-making processes. A Joint Action enables the mobilization of EU assets (human, financial, etc) to reach Council-defined objectives. Third, CFSP encourages a closer consultation and co-ordination process, explicitly calling for national policies to be consistent with Common Positions. Lastly, and as noted earlier, European leaders agreed at Maastricht that the WEU forms an integral part of the development of the EU, tasking it to elaborate and implement EU decisions and actions with Defense implications The Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997 The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed on 2 October 1997 and entered into force on 1 May Building on the Treaty of Maastricht, its main contributions in the area of CFSP relate to institutional arrangements and the decision-making process. With respect to institution-building, the Treaty of Amsterdam created the post of a High Representative for the CFSP to be held by the Secretary-General of the Council of the EU (henceforth Council). The Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR) serves to improve the efficiency and consistency of the CFSP by assisting with the formulation, processing, and implementation of decisions. In support of the SG/HR's work, the Treaty of Amsterdam established a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (now known as the Policy Unit) to provide the Council 24

25 with an early warning capability. The Policy Unit also facilitates joint analysis, thereby strengthening the EU's capacity to support a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Lastly, the Amsterdam Treaty supported closer institutional relations between the EU and the WEU - including the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks into the TEU - with a view to the integration of the WEU into the EU, "should the European Council so decide." In the area of decision-making, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the concept of constructive abstention. This mechanism makes it possible for an EU Member State to abstain in a CFSP-related vote in the Council without blocking a unanimous decision. The Amsterdam Treaty also introduced a new legal instrument to enhance coherence in the Union's external action: the Common Strategy. These may be used to specify a political objective and the resources needed to achieve the objective(s). To date, a limited number of Common Strategies have been formulated, including one on Russia (1999), Ukraine (1999) and the Mediterranean (2000) The Treaty of Nice, 2001 The Treaty of Nice was signed on 26 February 2001 and entered into force on 1 February Coming in the heels of the St. Malo Declaration (1998) and numerous European Council meetings focusing on crisis management capabilities (treated in greater detail in the next section), the Treaty of Nice formalized European Security and Defense Policy by bringing it into the EU's institutional structure. For example, in line with the December 2000 European Council held in Nice establishing the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee, and the EU Military Staff, the Treaty of Nice formally tasked the PSC to "monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council." In addition, the PSC is to "exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations." In some areas of decision-making, the Nice Treaty extends the use of qualified majority voting. For example, the Council may now rely on qualified majority voting when concluding international agreements under the second pillar, specifically those needed to implement a joint action or common position. Likewise, the concept of enhanced cooperation, introduced by the Maastricht 25

26 Treaty, is extended to the second pillar for the implementation of relevant joint actions or common positions. Enhanced cooperation allows a number of Member States (at least eight are required - nine under the Lisbon Treaty) that wish to work more closely on a specific area to do so. Under the second pillar, however, enhanced cooperation may not have military or Defense implications. 1.3 CHAPTER 2 - The development of European Security and Defense Policy Presents the establishment of ESDP, its relation to CFSP, and how both policies might evolve Introduction Aceh Monitoring Mission, 3rd Phase of Decommissioning, Nov Photo credit: Council of the EU While the European Union identified ambitious objectives in the area of external security and Defense in 1992 through the Maastricht Treaty, it would not be until the late 1990s, in the aftermath of the wars of secession in the Balkans, that concrete provisions were introduced to endow the EU with tangible crisis management capabilities. Following the St. Malo Declaration in 1998, numerous European Council summit meetings defined the military and civilian capabilities needed to fulfill the Petersberg tasks. Examples include the Helsinki European Council Meeting (1999), which laid the foundations for the Headline Goal 2003, and the Santa Maria da Feira European Council Meeting (2000) which identified four civilian priority areas. In 2003, ESDP became operational through the initiation of the first ESDP missions, giving policy-makers additional guidance on how to further develop CFSP and ESDP. Based on these and other 26

27 developments, the Lisbon Treaty offers several provisions to increase the Union's coherence in the field of external security, signaling the movement towards a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) Laying the foundations for European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) The Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defense, St. Malo, 1998 A Franco-British summit was held in French port city of St. Malo on 3-4 December It was a turning point in European public diplomacy, with the UK and France jointly underlining the growing need for greater European engagement in the areas of security and Defense. The St. Malo Declaration calls on the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use these forces, and a readiness to do so in order to respond to international crises. In line with previous formulations, these capabilities should not challenge the role of NATO as EU Member States should act "in conformity with the respective obligations in NATO". Recommended Reading "Joint Declaration on European Defense" - issued at the Franco-British Summit in Saint Malo on 4th of December, 1998 Texte en francais disponible ici You can either access the external link to the document by clicking on the title above or go back to "Reading Directions" and click the document icon. After reading the document you can come back to this page. To better understand the context surrounding the St. Malo Declaration; it is useful to briefly summarize some of the key British and French motives behind it. From the British perspective, an 27

28 important foreign policy concern during the post-world War II period was to maintain and strengthen the transatlantic link between Europe and the US: The United Kingdom saw itself as a bridge-builder between the two continents. However, the security system changed fundamentally after the Cold War. After the bloodshed in the Balkans, the British government came to the conclusion that the EU had to take on more responsibility for security and Defense. Furthermore, Tony Blair's election as prime minister marked a fundamental shift in the United Kingdom's approach to Europe. Blair favored a policy of constructive engagement within European institutions. And in the field of security and Defense, the United Kingdom could offer both credibility and leadership. France, like the United Kingdom, was convinced that after the Cold War domestic stability and integration into the EU no longer sufficed to ensure security in Europe. Moreover, a core objective of French foreign and security policy had long been to create a (relatively) autonomous European security and Defense policy to balance the US and complement NATO. France also hoped that such a policy would lead to a more equitable transatlantic partnership. After St. Malo, a number of European Council meetings from the late 1990s onward focused on providing ESDP with the necessary tools to strengthen crisis management capabilities Cologne European Council Meeting, 3-4 June 1999 At the June 1999 European Council meeting held in Cologne (Germany), EU heads of state and government reiterated the message contained in the St. Malo Declaration, calling on the EU to acquire the necessary means and capacities to engage in EU-led crisis management operations. Serving as the stepping stone for ESDP, they also made it clear that the EU's efforts in this area should not challenge the role of NATO as the basis of collective Defense of all NATO members. The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) aims to give the European Union the means to assume its responsibilities in the fields of crisis prevention and management, in accordance with 28

29 the principles of the UN Charter. The Presidency Report states that "necessary arrangements must be made in order to ensure political control and strategic direction of EU-led Petersberg operations." To do so, the report identifies the need "for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning." It foreshadowed the need for, among others: A permanent body in Brussels (Political and Security Committee). An EU Military Committee consisting of Military Representatives making recommendations to the Political and Security Committee. An EU military Staff and a Situation Centre. Other resources such as a Satellite Centre and an Institute for Security Studies Helsinki European Council Meeting, December 1999 The December 1999 Helsinki Summit focused mainly on the development of the EU's military crisis management capability. It called on EU Member States to "be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks." The annex provides further details on the development of military capabilities, including the need for forces that are "militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements." The specific operational requirements for the Petersberg tasks are provided in the Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue. Voluntary national contributions were pledged at the 2000 Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels, and a pool of more than 100,000 personnel and approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels was constituted. Despite some qualitative shortfalls, the EU declared ESDP operational at the December 2001 Laeken European Council meeting, stating that the EU was "capable of conducting some crisismanagement operations". This position was confirmed in May 2003 by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) which declared that "the EU now has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls" in the military sphere. 29

30 Santa Maria da Feira European Council Meeting, June 2000 The Feira European Council meeting concentrated on the development of the EU's civilian crisis management capabilities. Appendix 3 of the Annex identified four priority areas for civilian crisis management: Police Strengthening the rule of law Strengthening civilian administration Civil protection It should be noted that additional civilian priorities were added in later years. These include monitoring, support for the EU Special Representatives, and the set-up of civilian response teams. Within the police category, concrete targets were specified. By 2003, EU Member States were to be able to provide up to 5,000 police officers to international missions. Of these, up to 1,000 police should be available for deployment within 30 days. At the Goteborg European Council meeting held in Sweden on June 2001, additional targets were identified for the remaining categories. In the area of rule of law, Member States were to be able to contribute up to 200 personnel "adequately prepared for crisis management operations in the field of rule of law" on a voluntary basis. Consisting of legal, judicial, and prosecution experts, such an element would be deployable within 30 days. In the area of civil protection, "Civil Protection intervention teams" consisting of up to 2,000 individuals were to be available by 2003 in response to major natural, technological, or environmental emergencies. In addition, 2 to 3 assessment and/or co-ordination teams made up of 10 experts should be available for deployment within 3-7 hours. Lastly, in the domain of civilian administration, no numerical targets were provided. Instead, the Goteborg European Council identified the need for a "pool of experts able on a voluntary basis to take on assignments within civilian administration." All targets were later declared to be met. At the Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference held in Brussels on 22 November 2004, it was confirmed that "Member States have well exceeded the concrete targets set by the European Council." 30

31 Linking CFSP and ESDP/ CSDP Complementary objectives There were clear links between the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense Policy. Both serve to fulfill the EU's foreign policy objectives, and as shown in the following diagram, ESDP was subsumed under the wider umbrella of CFSP. In addition, CFSP and ESDP were to complement each other, with CFSP concentrating on foreign policy objectives at the strategic level while ESDP enabling the EU to execute crisis management operations on the ground. With respect to ESDP, it is essential to underline that it included both military and civilian dimensions. Many (erroneously) believe that ESDP only covers military missions. In fact, as of 2008, the majority of ESDP missions have been civilian in nature. Moreover, given the EU s strong emphasis on civil-military co-ordination and its recognition that the new security threats cannot be addressed through military means alone, many late ESDP crisis management operations include both military and civilian components, even if they are not used simultaneously or in proximity. While there are links between CFSP and ESDP, they are not fully synchronized. From a historical perspective, when CFSP was established under the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s, there was no formal ESDP. Ironically, when the first ESDP missions were launched in 2003 providing a strong push forward for the ESDP CFSP was static due to differing European positions on the war in Iraq. Thus, while ESDP was progressing rapidly, the same was not the case for CFSP The Lisbon Treaty and CFSP/CSDP The Lisbon Treaty was signed on 13 December 2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009 after all EU Member States including Ireland following a second referendum on 2 October

32 ratified it. The Treaty provisions pertaining to CFSP and ESDP are by and large identical to the ones present in the failed Constitutional Treaty. Those provisions are about institutions, the scope of activities that the EU will be able to perform under the new Treaty, and decision-making processes. a. Institutions The Treaty renames ESDP as the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), to which it dedicates a full section. CSDP is presented as an 'integral part of the common foreign and security policy', and shall 'provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets', that can be used 'on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security'. Several institutions or positions falling within the CFSP/CSDP framework are established, with the aim of enhancing the institutional coherence and the overall effectiveness of EU action. Among the key new positions is the post of President of the European Council and that of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Elected by the European Council by a qualified majority for a term of two and a half years, renewable once, the President of the European Council will 'ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy'. The former Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy was elected the first President of the European Council on 19 November As such, he is responsible for chairing the European Council, drive its work, and act as a consensus-builder within it. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is appointed by the European Council, acting on a qualified majority vote, and with the agreement of the President of the Commission. The first holder of this position is Ms. Catherine Ashton, a British national and former Trade Commissioner. The post merges the two positions of High Representative for CFSP (held by Dr. Javier Solana between ) and of Commissioner for External Relations (held by Benita Ferrero-Waldner between 2004 and early 2010) and symbolizes the disappearance of the pillar structure. The High 32

33 Representative also acts as Vice-President of the European Commission, giving the European Parliament a say on his/her appointment as the Commission is accountable to the Parliament. In her new position, Ms. Ashton represents 'the Union for matters relating to CFSP', conducts 'political dialogue with third parties on the Union's behalf', and expresses 'the Union's position in international organizations and at international conferences.' She also chairs the Foreign Affairs Council (a new format of Council meetings, separate from the General Affairs Council), while one of her representatives chairs meetings of the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Overall, the new High Representative contributes to the preparation of CFSP and ensures its implementation (art.13a). The High Representative will be assisted by a European External Action Service (EEAS) that 'shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States.' (art.13a) The EEAS will be sui generis, distinct from the Commission and the Council Secretariat, but bodies such as the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capacity (CPCC), and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) should be part of the EEAS. European Commission Delegations become EU Delegations and are part of the EEAS. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the division of tasks between the President of the Council and the High Representative, as well as the responsibilities that each will assume, are not clearly specified and are expected to be shaped in practice by the two incumbents. Likewise, the role of the President of the Council vis-a-vis the still existing rotating presidencies is to be further clarified. Formally, the creation of these positions puts an end to the rotating presidency in foreign affairs. At the institutional level, the Lisbon Treaty also formally endorses the creation of the European Defense Agency, operational since 2004 with the mandate of harmonizing Defense spending, supporting Defense research, and assisting member states to meet the capability commitments (art.28d). Finally, the Treaty gives the EU a single legal personality (art.46a), something previously enjoyed only by the European Communities. 33

34 b. Scope of activities The Lisbon Treaty contains provisions on the activities of the EU in the fields of foreign and security policy. In terms of missions, the Treaty formally endorses the extension of the socalled 'Petersberg Tasks', that now include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization' (art.28b). These tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by 'supporting third states in combating terrorism on their territories'. The Treaty also extends the concept of 'enhanced co-operation' to all EU policy areas, including CSDP (art.10). 'Enhanced co-operation' - which allows EU Member States that wish to work more closely together to do so - can be established by the Council and requires at least nine member states participating in it. 'Enhanced cooperation' differs from 'permanent structured cooperation' (see below) in that the latter is permanent and deals with Defense matters, while the former can be activated in all EU policy areas and on a non-permanent basis. The Treaty also unveils new mechanisms or commitments. For example, the Lisbon Treaty makes it possible for a group of Member states 'which are willing and have the necessary capability' to implement a task, within the Union framework, 'in order to protect the Union's values and serve its interests' (art. 28A 5 and 28C). The EU-led Artemis operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or the deployment of a battle group provides examples of such tasks. In the same vein, flexibility in the CSDP field is encouraged by the establishment of permanent structured co-operation (art.28). EU Member States 'whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework' (art.28a6). This aims at allowing Member States (with no minimum number of countries involved) that are willing to move forward in the field of military cooperation to do so without being hindered by others. The Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation refers to a 'new stage in the development of the European Security and Defense Policy'. The Battle group Concept provides an example of what a permanent structured cooperation could look like, but other types of military cooperation are foreseen, leading to the debate about a "hard core" Europe 34

35 or a two-speed Europe. At the financial level, the Treaty establishes a 'start-up fund' aimed at allowing for urgent financing of initiatives in the framework of CFSP and EU-led missions that cannot be charged to the Union budget (art.28 3). Finally, political and military solidarity among EU Member States is boosted by the inclusion of a mutual assistance clause (art.28a7), and a 'solidarity clause' (Title VII, art.188r1). The mutual assistance clause is inspired by the Western European Union Treaty's clause. It states that 'If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter'. The importance of the clause is watered down by the provision stating that it 'shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and Defense policy of certain Member States', in reference to the role of NATO and its collective Defense provisions. The 'solidarity clause', which was introduced in the context of the terrorist attack in Madrid in March 2004, states that 'The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster.' (art.188r1) c. Decision-Making Process The unanimity rule prevails in the CFSP/CSDP decision-making processes, and the Treaty confirms that 'Decisions relating to the common security and Defense policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously' (art.28 A4). However, exceptions are introduced in the Treaty. In particular, decisions pertaining to 'permanent structured co-operation', the procedures for setting up and administering the 'start-up fund', or the appointment of the High Representative, are adopted by qualified majority. On the other hand, the unanimity rule remains when deciding on the launch of a mission. In practice, this 35

36 means that states involved in permanent structured co-operation may not launch an operation on behalf of the EU without having the formal approval of all EU Member States. These different provisions aim at giving CFSP and CSDP more coherence and visibility. They lay out a framework but most provisions are still unclear as to their practical implications and political sensitivities. Implementation and the passage of time will play key roles in clarifying what is possible and how it impacts on the way the EU conducts its foreign affairs and security policy The evolution of EU foreign policy Over time, policy-makers have stressed the importance of enhancing the coherence not just between CFSP and CSDP, but across all foreign policy-related tools. In fact, several provisions in the Lisbon Treaty aim to improve the coherence across the EU's three pillars. How CSDP and CFSP might evolve? The evolution of CSDP is partially visible in its two roadmaps: the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 and the Headline Goal 2010 (which focuses mostly on military capability development). Both headline goals identify the need for rapid response capabilities, consistent with the establishment of Civilian Response Teams and EU Battle groups. They also emphasize the importance of qualitative aspects of capability development such as interoperability among military forces or advanced levels of training for civilian staff. Both headline goals incorporate a systematic review process to ensure that the EU achieves the capabilities needed to address current and future risks. Aerial surveillance during the EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission May 2008 The evolution of CSDP is also subject to external factors. Examples include the future demand for CSDP operations, the level of financial/ manpower resources made available for CSDP operations, 36

37 the speed at which new capabilities are acquired, the EU's relations with third states and international organizations, and EU-specific developments such as enlargement. With some over twenty CSDP missions either executed or currently underway, a number of lessons have been identified which likewise impact the evolution of CSDP. The evolution of CFSP is not as clear cut as that of CSDP. While the linkage to CSDP is likely to be strengthened as policymakers strive to increase the coherence among tools in the foreign policy arena, the actual level of "common" foreign policy across the range of EU Member States remains to be seen. Given the volatile nature of politics, CFSP is more likely to evolve in a non-linear fashion, with periodic improvements marked by occasional dips as external challenges complicate the formulation of a common policy Basic Time-line of Events Year Event 1945 End of World War II 1946 Churchill's speech at the University of Zurich calling for a United States of Europe 1947 Launching of the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) 1948 Signing of the Brussels Treaty 1949 Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty 1950 Unveiling of the Schumann Plan Outbreak of the Korean War 1951 Signing of the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 1954 Failure of the European Defense Community Signing of the Modified Brussels Treaty formally creating the WEU 1955 Establishment of the Warsaw Pact 1956 Suez Canal Crisis 1957 Signing of the Treaties of Rome 1961 Construction of the Berlin Wall 1969 The Davignon Report introduces the idea of European Political Cooperation 37

38 1975 Adoption of the Helsinki Final Act 1983 Stuttgart Declaration ('Solemn Declaration') 1986 Signing of the Single European Act 1989 Fall of the Berlin Wall 1990 Signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1992 Signing of the Treaty on European Union (in force 1993) 1993 Official creation of the EUROCORPS 1996 Reinforcement of ESDI within NATO at the Berlin Summit 1997 Signing of the Amsterdam Treaty (in force 1999) 1998 Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defense (St. Malo) 1999 Cologne and Helsinki European Council Meetings lay the foundations for ESDP 2000 Santa Maria da Feira European Council 2003 Adoption of the European Security Strategy Adoption of the Berlin Plus Arrangements 2004 Headline Goal 2010 / Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (updated in 2007 to CHG 2010) 2009 Entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on the European Union. New institutions, scope of activities, and decision-making in CFSP/ CSDP 38

39 2 AKU 2 THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY General description AKU2 is dedicated to the study of the European Security Strategy (ESS). It consists of an introductory part, of 6 chapters focusing on relevant aspects of the ESS, and of a concluding part Learning objective After reading Chapter 2 Adoption of the ESS in 2003, you are strongly recommended to read the text of the European Security Strategy A Secure Europe In A Better World The European Security Strategy, approved by the European Council held in Brussels on 12 December 2003 and drafted under the responsibilities of the EU High Representative JAVIER SOLANA. English version, French version Before the start of Chapter 4 Main Characteristics of the ESS you are recommended to read: Sven Biscop, The ABC of European Union Strategy Ambition, Benchmark, Culture (Egmont Paper No. 16). Brussels, Egmont, 2007 At the beginning of Chapter 6 Prospects for Revision you are recommended to read: EU Council, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy Providing Security in a Changing World Brussels, December and at the end of Chapter 6 Prospects for Revision you are recommended to read: Sven Biscop (ed.), The Value of Power, the Power of Values. A Call for an EU Grand Strategy (Egmont Paper No. 33). Brussels, Egmont, 2009 (pages 1 13 highly recommended). 39

40 Bibliography & Other Sources The following sources were consulted during the preparation of AKU2. Should you wish to deepen your understanding of ESS aspects covered in the AKU2, please feel free to explore them upon completing this AKU. Sven Biscop, The European Security Strategy A Global Agenda for Positive Power. Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing, Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson (eds.), The EU and the European Security Strategy Forging a Global Europe. London, Routledge, Alyson Bailes, The European Security Strategy An Evolutionary History (Policy Paper No.10), Stockholm, SIPRI, 2005 at Roland Dannreuther and John Peterson (eds.), Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations. London, Routledge, Bastian Giegerich, European Security and Strategic Culture. National Responses to the EU s Security and Defense Policy. Baden Baden, Nomos, Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defense Policy in the European Union. Basingstoke, Palgrave, Christoph O. Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture. Changing Norms on Security and Defense in the European Union. Basingstoke, Palgrave, Asle Toje, The 2003 European Union Security Strategy: A Critical Appraisal, European Foreign Affairs Review, 10, 2005, 1, pp For a broader documentation on CSDP related subjects, whenever necessary, you are invited to visit the CSDP Knowledge-base at CHAPTER 1 Before the ESS EU evolutions and context which led eventually to the EU s Security Strategy Strategic Divisions When ESDP (now CSDP) was created in the wake of the 1998 Franco British meeting in St Malo, there was strong agreement on the need to tackle the military means, but there consensus ended. Member States differed widely on the political strategic dimension, a debate which goes far beyond ESDP, beyond the CFSP even, but which concerns the whole of EU external action, across the pillars. What should be the scope of the EU s foreign and security policy ambitions? What degree of autonomy should the EU have? And what then should be the precise role of the military instrument in EU external action? Even on the assessment of the security environment, Member States differed, with threat perceptions being influenced by individual States proximity to specific unstable regions. Because of these deep running divisions and in order not to lose the momentum, it was decided to push through with those elements on which an agreement existed, 40

41 i.e. the means and institutions of ESDP, assuming that once these were in place the strategic debate would inevitably have to follow The EU Treaty Provisions European Union: Maastricht Treaty document, February 7, Online Photograph. Encyclopedia Britannica Online. 26 May 2008, Accordingly, following the December 1999 European Council in Helsinki, where the Headline Goal was defined, the EU started building military and civilian capabilities for crisis management, without possessing an overall strategic framework for its external action. In Article 11, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) does define the objectives of the CFSP, but these are statements of principle rather than policy objectives and hence far too general to provide a framework for daily policy making. As to the role of the military instrument, the TEU stipulates which types of operations the EU can launch, by including the Petersberg Tasks, but it provides no guidelines as to the circumstances under which the use of the military instrument can be considered Strategic Indications That is not to say that EU external action has been completely ad hoc. Over the years, a distinctive European approach to security has emerged, which can be characterized as integrated, multidimensional or comprehensive. A comprehensive approach is particularly characteristic of EU policy with respect to its neighboring States, which it attempts to integrate in an encompassing network of relations: witness the Stability Pact for the Balkans, the Euro Mediterranean Partnership, and the successful transition of Central and Eastern Europe, probably the most significant European achievement since the start of the European integration project itself. Under 41

42 the heading European Neighborhood Policy, this approach has now been adopted as an enhanced framework for relations between the EU and its neighbors Unique Features , OHR/EUSR ASHDOWN and EUPM Police Commissioner FREDERIKSEN talk to returnees in front of the mosque of Mujkanovici in Kozarac area (Prijedor municipality) where an explosive device was thrown. Credit The Council of the European Union When it comes to long term policies, this comprehensive approach has emerged as the predominant characteristic of EU external action. The EU s profile is that of an actor which seeks to influence the international environment in the long term, which operates mainly through economic, diplomatic and ideological power and via multilateralism, and which is inspired not only by material interests, but also by norms and ideas. A number of implicit strategic assumptions have guided EU policy in this regard; this represents an important acquis. Yet these assumptions needed to be substantiated and policy areas needed to be integrated in order to arrive at a framework for maximally consistent, coherent and effective external action Need for a Strategy For when the EU is confronted with acute crises, such as the one in Iraq, these implicit assumptions have proved to be insufficient to arrive at a common policy. More often than not, the EU has failed to achieve consensus on how to respond to such crises, even when the instruments and means to do so were at hand. A clear cut strategy should be able to avoid internal divides and ensure the EU s participation in international decision making. Thus the taboo on strategic 42

43 thinking at European level needed to be broken and the strategic concepts of the individual Member States some more, others less elaborate aligned. A strategy would not only provide the reference framework that is needed for day today policy making. It should also determine the instruments and capabilities that are being developed, rather than the other way around. This is especially so with regard to ESDP: the EU s ambitions and the role it sees for the military instrument should guide force planning at the EU level. 2.3 CHAPTER 2 Adoption of the ESS in 2003 The favorable context that allowed ESS elaboration and consensus on its basic principles A Favorable Context It seems as if the intra European crisis over Iraq finally provided the stimulus that made a breakthrough possible toward a European Security Strategy. On the one hand, the Member States supporting the invasion would have been motivated to demonstrate that the EU does care about the security threats perceived by the US and that the transatlantic Alliance is viable still. Hence the similarity between the threat assessment in the ESS and the 2002 US National Security Strategy (NSS), which must be seen as a political message to Washington, and the strong emphasis in the ESS on transatlantic partnership. On the other hand, the Member States opposing the invasion would have been equally eager to show that even though the threat assessment is to a large degree shared with the US be it perhaps not the perception of the intensity of the threat there are other options available to deal with these threats. The context of mid 2003 partially also favored the adoption of the ESS: the successful conclusion of the European Convention and the grand and then still promising undertaking to draw up a Constitutional Treaty created a climate in which the elaboration of a strategy seemed more feasible than before. Prominent members of the Convention, such as Wim van Eekelen, former WEU Secretary General, had explicitly called for the formulation of a strategic concept. The summer of 2003 also witnessed the first EU military operation without the use of NATO assets and outside of Europe: Operation Artemis in the DRC (12 June 1 September). 43

44 The Drafting Process At the informal meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council in Greece on 2 and 3 May 2003, High Representative Javier Solana was thus rather unexpectedly tasked with producing a draft strategic document. At its meeting in Thessaloniki (19 20 June), the European Council welcomed the document submitted by Solana, A Secure Europe in a Better World, and charged him with taking the work forward with a view to completing a strategy by its next meeting. The EU then organized three seminars, in Rome (19 September), Paris (6 7 October) and Stockholm (20 October), bringing together officials from the Member States, the future Member States and the European institutions, as well as experts from the academic world, NGOs and the media. This innovative process allowed the High Representative to collect comments and suggestions from a wide variety of actors and observers, number of which found their way into the final European Security Strategy, which was duly adopted by the European Council meeting on 12 December At the same time, drafting by a select group of high level collaborators of Solana, rather than by committee and involving Member States delegations, ensured a concise and very readable document. 44

45 Basic Orientations Issues discussed. The main reason why these partly contradictory motivations led to results is that the EU was able to build on an extensive foreign policy acquis. Many of the strategic choices contained in the ESS were already evident as emerging strategic orientations in actual EU policies. Rather than adopting a fundamentally new orientation, to a large extent therefore the ESS must be seen as the codification of existing foreign policy guidelines. In other words, although the context of the Iraq crisis would suggest a deep division between Member States, the ESS actually builds on a strong consensus on the basic orientations of EU foreign policy. Indeed, the real intra European divide over Iraq did not concern the substance and principles of policy. Based on an assessment of past policies, it can safely be argued e.g. that all Member States agree that in principle the use of force is an instrument of last resort which requires a Security Council mandate. As in 1999, the real issue at stake was still the nature of the transatlantic partnership. If the US reverts to the use of force in a situation in which the EU in principle would not do so, or not yet, what then has priority for the EU: steering an autonomous course, based on its own principles, or supporting its most important ally? Besides, it should not be forgotten that on a number of foreign policy issues the EU had already unanimously taken positions contrary to those of the US, e.g. on the ICC, on the Kyoto Protocol and on various trade issues Framework for Consensus If the motivation to effectively pursue this codification and draft the document was context specific, the ESS itself thus is not. Because it builds on the past, on existing guidelines established during ten years of CFSP, and even before, the ESS has been able to transcend the context of its adoption. It thus has the potential to have a durable impact on the future of EU foreign policy making, as is testified to by its omnipresence in EU foreign policy documents. Codification creates 45

46 a framework from which it is afterwards more difficult to depart; it circumscribes the room for maneuver of future policy making. EUROPEAN COUNCIL INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE, Brussels, 12 and 13 December 2003 Credit The Council of the European Union To the extent that the ESS will now effectively function as a reference framework for daily decision making in all fields of foreign policy, it will promote consistency and the emergence of a strong strategic culture. The fact that the ESS, as a European Council declaration, is politically rather than legally binding is of less importance in this context. Naturally, the ESS is not perfect. It can only build on consensus in areas where that existed. On a number of issues it remains particularly vague because consensus was absent or not yet strong enough. Many issues are mentioned in the ESS, because not to do so would have invoked strong criticism, but no more than that: no real choices are made on notably the nature of the transatlantic partnership and the degree of autonomy of the EU as an international actor. This divide remains a fundamental obstacle to a fully cohesive and resolute CFSP. Nevertheless, the ESS does contain a number of clear choices and thus certainly has the potential to serve as a strategic framework for EU foreign policy. 2.4 CHAPTER 3 - Summary of the ESS The provisions of the Strategy: security environment, strategic objectives and policy implications The Security Environment Under the heading of global challenges, the starting point of the analysis of the security environment is the impact of globalization. On the one hand, globalization has brought freedom 46

47 and prosperity to many people, but others have perceived globalization as a cause of frustration and injustice. Globalization has increased European dependence and so vulnerability on an interconnected infrastructure, in transport, energy, information and other fields ; as a consequence of globalization, the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked. The ESS then goes on to specify a number of the worrying features of this globalized world: poverty; disease, especially AIDS; competition for scarce resources, notably water; global warming; migratory movements; and Europe s energy dependence. In the second part of the analysis of the security environment, which recognizes that large scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable, a jump is then made to the identification of five key threats, which are seen as being closely interconnected: Terrorism, for which Europe is both a target and a base ; the ESS notes that terrorism arises out of complex causes, including the pressures of modernization, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies ; Proliferation of WMD, potentially the greatest threat to our security, which in the most frightening scenario could be acquired by terrorists; Regional conflicts, both worldwide and at the borders of the EU, which impact on European interests directly and indirectly and which can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure ; State failure, which undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability and which can be associated with obvious threats, such as organized crime or terrorism ; Organized crime, an internal threat with an important external dimension, such as cross border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons as well as gemstones and timber; organized crime can have links with terrorism and is often associated with weak or failing states Strategic Objectives Addressing the threats is the first of three strategic objectives outlined in the ESS, which first lists the initiatives which the EU has already taken in this field: The European Arrest Warrant, measures addressing terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal assistance with the US; The EU s long standing non proliferation policies, highlighting its commitment to strong and verifiable multilateral treaty regimes; Its interventions to help deal with regional conflicts, notably in the Balkans, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The ESS then outlines the approach which the EU will continue to pursue in dealing with the key threats, taking into account the nature of these threats and the exigencies of the new globalized security environment. In an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as 47

48 those that are near at hand, therefore the first line of Defense will often be abroad ; this statement confirms that the EU cannot be but a global actor. The new threats are dynamic and spread if they are neglected, therefore conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early. None of the new threats is purely military, nor can any be tackled by purely military means, therefore prevention will require the application of a mixture of instruments. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi faceted situations, it is stressed. Building security in our neighborhood is the second strategic objective. Even in an era of globalization, geography is still important, the ESS points out: neighbors who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on our borders all pose problems for Europe. Therefore a ring of well governed countries must be established, with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations. This is to be achieved through partnership and action in the political, economic and cultural spheres as well as in the security field. This ring of friends or neighborhood is seen to include: The Balkans, where Europe s substantial achievements must be consolidated; Our neighbors in the East, to whom the benefits of economic and political cooperation should be extended; The Southern Caucasus; The Mediterranean or the Euro Mediterranean Partnership. As final strategic objective, the ESS names the establishment of an international order based on effective multilateralism, i.e. a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule based international order. The centre of that system is the UN, hence equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority. The institutional architecture further comprises global organizations like the WTO and the international financial institutions on the one hand, and regional organizations such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union on the other hand. The transatlantic relationship, of which NATO is an important expression, is also defined as a core element; it is in the EU s bilateral interest, but also in that of the international community as a whole. 48

49 Through this network of regimes and institutions, what amounts to global governance must be pursued, which implies: spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights, as well as assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures. As it is highlighted in the ESS: The best protection of our security is a world of well governed democratic states. But the ESS also emphasizes that for international organizations, regimes and treaties to be effective, the EU must be ready to act when their rules are broken ; hence States that have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society are reminded that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union Policy Implication The EU has instruments in place that can work effectively, but should make a contribution that matches [its] potential. Therefore under the heading of policy implications, in its final chapter the ESS calls for an EU that is more active, more capable, more coherent and works with others. More active means that the EU should develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention, in order to act before countries around us deteriorate, when 49

50 signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise what the ESS calls preventive engagement. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. In order for the EU to become more capable, foremost is the need to further transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces and to enable them to address the new threats. To that end, the ESS also calls for more resources for Defense and more effective use of resources, as systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads, and, in the medium term, increase capabilities. Other fields mentioned are civilian resources, diplomatic capacity and intelligence sharing. Under the heading of more coherent, the ESS states that the challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities, for diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda an unambiguous call for a comprehensive approach, which should also embrace the external activities of the individual Member States. Finally, the ESS states that the EU will be working with partners, and this both through multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through partnerships with key actors. The former are listed in the paragraph on effective multilateralism ; the latter are deemed to include first of all the US and Russia, and then also Japan, China, Canada and India, as well as all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support. 2.5 CHAPTER 4 Main Characteristics of the ESS The main characteristics discussion in the Global Public Goods perspective and under the long vs. short term priority challenge Recommended Reading Sven Biscop, The ABC of European Union Strategy Ambition, Benchmark, Culture (Egmont Paper No. 16). Brussels, Egmont,

51 The main characteristic of the ESS is its comprehensive, integrated or holistic nature, i.e. the integration of all dimensions of foreign policy, from aid and trade to diplomacy and the military The GPG Approach This comprehensive approach can be conceptualized through the notion of Global Public Goods (GPG), which emerged in the context of the UN at the end of the 1990s. Starting point is the assumption that there are a number of goods that are global or universal in the sense that it is generally felt at least in Europe that every individual is entitled to them. If to a certain extent the definition of the core GPG is a political and normative choice, many elements have been recognized as being universal beyond any doubt, notably in the field of human rights. Like in the human security approach, the individual is the point of reference. These goods are public in the sense that their provision cannot be left to the market but should be supervised by government at the different levels of authority (local, national, regional and global). These core GPG can be grouped under four broad headings: physical security or freedom from fear ; economic prosperity or freedom from want ; political freedom or democracy, human rights and the rule of law; social wellbeing or access to health services, to education, to a clean and hazard free environment etc Haves and Have nots These GPG are strongly interrelated: ultimately, one cannot be ensured or enjoyed without access to the other; the four categories are therefore equally important. Effective global governance means ensuring access to GPG; a system that fails to provide the core GPG lacks legitimacy. Global stability, and therefore the security of all States, depends on the availability of sufficient access to the core GPG. Rather than terrorism, WMD or other military threats, the most important threat is the ever growing gap between haves and have nots, a gap which can be best expressed in terms of access to the essential GPG. While this gap and the feelings of exclusion, marginalization and frustration resulting from it certainly do not justify conflict, they do help to explain it, which is a prerequisite for prevention and resolution of conflicts. The gap between haves and have nots is foremost among the challenges of the globalized world, because it is a threat of a systemic nature, i.e. it results from the malfunctioning of, and impacts on, the global order itself. 51

52 For unless mechanisms of governance are created or rendered more effective that can alleviate this situation, at a certain level of inequality, the resulting political upheaval, and extremisms of all kinds, economic uncertainty and massive migration flows will become uncontrollable. Because of this interdependence GPG are non exclusive, like true public goods: ultimately maintaining our access to GPG requires improving others access. Since it denies access to core GPG to a large share of the world s population, the status quo is not an option Long Term vs. Short Term Challenges Against this background, specific politico military challenges do stand out. They include regions of chronic tension and long standing disputes and conflicts, failed States and civil wars, proliferation of WMD and excessive militarization, and terrorism. These challenges directly threaten people, States and regions. They have to be tackled head on, but as they are symptoms of the dark side of globalization, effective global governance, improving access to GPG, must be pursued at the same time as the key to preventing such threats. Of course, the strength of the causal relationship amongst, on the one hand, the gap between haves and have nots in the broadest sense and, on the other hand, specific politico military issues differs from case to case. Nonetheless, in the long term no durable solution of politico military problems can be achieved unless the stability of the world system itself is assured The Keys for Implementation The keywords when implementing a comprehensive or holistic approach, based on the notion of GPG, are integration, prevention and multilateralism. At the heart of the approach is integration. Because the core GPG are inextricably linked together, action must be undertaken to address all of them simultaneously and in a coordinated fashion, by all relevant actors, in all fields of external policy, putting to use all the instruments at their disposal, including trade, development, the environment, police, intelligence and legal cooperation, diplomacy, and security and Defense. 52

53 First contacts between EUFOR Tchad/RCA troops and villagers Credit The Council of the European Union Although policies in all of these fields must be integrated under the same overall objective of increasing access to GPG, in order to avoid contradictory actions being undertaken, each policy should continue to operate according to its own rationale and dynamic. Securitization, i.e. the instrumentalization of non military dimensions of external policy in function only of hard security concerns or freedom from fear, must be avoided, for it ignores the intrinsic importance of the other GPG. An integrated approach deals with all GPG simultaneously, but does not require that all issues must be put under the label of security. On the contrary, although this may raise their importance in the eyes of States, it also blurs the distinctions between policy areas. Poverty or HIV/AIDS are of a different nature than terrorism, proliferation or conflict: they can be life threatening but they do not imply a threat of violence and cannot be tackled by politico military means. Accordingly, rather than including all challenges under the label of security, issues must not be dealt with as security threats unless they pose an effective threat of violence. In that sense, the ESS has perhaps not really been aptly named. It really is a foreign policy strategy, or grand strategy rather than just a security strategy. By thus addressing the root causes of conflict, a policy oriented on the core GPG emphasizes structural conflict prevention. This presents a formidable challenge: it implies dealing with more issues, related to all the core GPG, at an earlier stage, before they become security threats. Effective prevention is much more than mere appeasement: it demands a proactive stance, aiming to change circumstances that induce instability and conflict. A policy oriented on GPG will thus in fact be quite intrusive, which can make it rather contentious with the target countries. But as it is in the very nature of GPG that pursuing them is in the mutual interest of all concerned, it is at the same time a very positive approach, contrary to other, threat based strategies. For whom rather 53

54 than against whom is the question that determines policy. The sincere pursuit of GPG will bring greatly enhanced legitimacy. As effective action in all policy fields concerned requires the cooperation of a wide range of actors at many different levels, a GPG oriented policy implies multilateralism: an intricate web of States, regimes, treaties and organizations, i.e. multi level governance, implicating all levels of authority in a coordinated effort to improve people s access to GPG. Although in the spirit of human security the individual is taken as point of reference, the State indeed remains a primary partner, for no effective arrangements can be made with weak and failed States. Third States must therefore be seen as partners for cooperation rather than as mere subjects of EU policies; the aim is to influence rather than to coerce, to use the carrot rather than the stick. There will be cases where the use of force is inevitable, for not all actors are amenable to preventive initiatives and security threats will arise. But in the framework of multilateralism, the use of force can only be a measure of last resort to be mandated by the Security Council. In those cases, the legitimacy acquired through the pursuit of GPG can be capitalized upon. 2.6 CHAPTER 5 The Role and impact of the ESS The role and impact of a strategy for a new type of power, with a constructive approach A New Type of Power The ESS unequivocally expresses the EU s ambition to be a global actor and as such can be seen as a mission statement. This global ambition is not limited to aid and trade, areas in which the EU has long been a global power, but includes the politico military dimension. The military is however an instrument of last resort. The emphasis is on a holistic approach, putting to use the 54

55 full range of instruments, through partnerships and multilateral institutions, for a permanent policy of prevention and stabilization. Does this approach constitute a European way that makes the EU into a distinctive type of power? Is the EU a power at all, a notion which the ESS itself does not mention? Yet, implicitly the ESS certainly expresses the EU s ambition to be a global power, although in reality the united will to act on that is lacking all too often still. Nevertheless, the EU does influence events and developments worldwide, certainly in the economic sphere, also in the sphere of norms and values, and much less consistently but increasingly so in the politico military sphere. The comparison with the indeed much more purposive and resolute American power hides the fact that after the US the EU is generally seen as the world s second power or who else would that be? Part of the reason why the perception is often distorted is that the EU consciously uses its power in a different way than the US, preferring persuasion over coercion, multilateralism over unilateralism, and diplomacy over the military. Different characterizations of the EU have been provided: a soft power, preferring non military instruments; a civilian power, aimed at changing the international environment rather than expanding its interests (or at milieu rather than possession goals ); a normative power, a model for others in terms of norms and values; a transformative power, seeking to export its own political, social and economic model; or a tranquil power ( puissance tranquille ), averse to power projection A Positive Power All of these catch part of what the EU is doing. The core of EU strategy is indeed to transform others by exporting its own model. Linking together political, economic and social reform and security cooperation through partnership and conditionality, this holistic approach, if it is effectively implemented, is actually very proactive and intrusive. Being a model for others to emulate is not sufficient to be a power. Power cannot be tranquil but implies the will to actively shape events and developments, in casu to proactively promote what according to the political choice made by the EU are the core Global Public Goods (GPG). Furthermore, hard power, from economic sanctions to military intervention if necessary, is part of the EU toolbox, as an emergency brake in case of grave human rights violations, the invocation of the responsibility to protect (R2P), and threats to peace and security. The EU s distinctiveness lies perhaps in the positive, indeed progressive tone of its project. Rather than being threat based, it is constructive, 55

56 aimed at achieving positive objectives, which are of course in the enlightened self interest of the EU that is what policy is about but which also directly benefit others and thus express a feeling of responsibility for and solidarity with the have nots. In that sense, the EU could also be described as a positive power The Role of the ESS Because it so clearly expresses the choice for the holistic approach, the ESS at the same time is more than a mission statement or expression of ambition. It really is a strategy in the broad, public management meaning of the term: a policy making tool which, on the basis of EU values and interests, outlines the long term overall policy objectives to be achieved and the basic categories of instruments to be applied to that end, which serves as a reference framework for day to day policymaking in a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex international environment, and which guides the definition of the means i.e. the civilian and military capabilities that need to be developed. The ESS is indeed not a strategy in the narrow, military sense of the term. Nor was it meant to be: in spite of its misleading and perhaps mistaken title, rather than a security or Defense strategy it is an international or foreign policy strategy that addresses the whole of external action. As on the international scene it is much more than a military actor, no useful analysis of EU strategy can be limited to military strategy. Such a foreign policy strategy, or grand strategy, is of course not an operational document, but has to be translated into sub-strategies, policies and actions including a military strategy for each dimension of foreign policy. This applies to the US National Security Strategy (NSS) as well; both the ESS and the NSS are at the very top of the hierarchy of documents. In fact, if the ESS is read together with the many existing documents e.g. on the Neighborhood, Africa, terrorism, WMD that de facto are sub strategies to the ESS, the EU probably has a much more explicit strategic concept than many of the individual Member States The Impact of the ESS The choice for the holistic approach is not a new, let alone a revolutionary one. Rather the ESS is the codification of a strategic orientation that had already emerged through the practice of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which came into being ten years before its adoption and which in turn had its roots in European Political Cooperation (EPC) of the 1970s 1980s. Herein lies the strength of the ESS: it represents a fundamental consensus between the Member States, 56

57 the roots of which go much deeper than the temporary circumstances surrounding the documents adoption. Withdrawal of the Indonesian National Armed Forces from Aceh, Indonesia, September 2005 Credit The Council of the European Union Nevertheless there was a chance that the ESS would disappear soon after its adoption, that it would be nothing more than a one off demonstration of regained unity after the intra European divide over Iraq, a step of high symbolic value but with little impact on actual policy making. A stratagem rather than a strategy... The ESS has proved to be too evoking a document for that to happen however. It is indeed one of the most spread and read EU documents among the general public and frequently appears on reading lists at colleges and universities around the world. Within the EU, in many policy documents and decisions on different aspects of foreign policy, especially those relating to the CFSP and the CSDP, the guidelines fixed by the ESS are constantly being referred to, as in the speeches by the High Representative and in the discourse of EU representatives generally. The ESS also serves as the connecting thread throughout the courses of the ESDC. In the decision making process, the European institutions as well as a number of Member States make good tactical use of the ESS: the more convincingly a proposed initiative can be linked to it, the more difficultly it can be opposed. That does not mean that the ESS is always first on policy makers minds when policies have to be designed and decisions made. In many cases, its presence is implicit and it is de facto being implemented, precisely because it is an expression of continuity in EU foreign policy practice. But even though it is not always explicitly referred to, the codification of this strategic orientation in the ESS is important, because it strengthens its status and makes it more difficult though not 57

58 impossible to transgress the boundaries of this reference framework, and thus promotes coherence and consistency. Because the ESS has remained so present in the official discourse and in the academic and political debate, it has effectively become the benchmark to judge EU performance. This certainly holds true for third States and organizations: even if it would want to, the outside world would not allow the EU to forget the ESS, which it reads as a binding statement of what the Union aims to achieve and which therefore generates demands and expectations. The ESS has thus very much become part of the identity of the EU. It is true to say however that the links between the ESS and daily policy making could have been more explicit. That would have required clearer institutional ownership, e.g. entrusting the High Representative and the Policy Unit with the implementation and further development of the ESS, and setting explicit deadlines for reporting. 2.7 CHAPTER 6 Prospects of Revision The need to answer questions of implementation in ever changing circumstances Recommended Reading EU Council, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy Providing Security in a Changing World Brussels, December 2008 European Council, Brussels, December 2008 Credit The Council of the European Union In the fall of 2007 French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt put a revision of the ESS on the agenda as an objective for their upcoming Presidencies. This idea did not meet with universal enthusiasm. While not everybody was convinced that the ESS was already in need of updating, some also feared that too divisive debates would be provoked, particularly on 58

59 Russia, and that the EU would end up with a worse rather than a better document. Hence the somewhat cautiously expressed mandate given to High Representative Javier Solana by the December 2007 European Council: to examine the implementation of the Strategy with a view to proposing elements on how to improve the implementation and, as appropriate, elements to complement it. The debate was concluded by the adoption of a Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy Providing Security in a Changing World by the December 2008 European Council, which decided to leave the text of the ESS itself untouched. The Report does not replace the ESS, but reinforces it and the ESS remains in force A Report on Implementation That the European Council decided to leave the ESS untouched should in itself not be a reason for disappointment. If the EU today is not the global power that it could have been, it is not because its strategy is not valid, but because it has been half hearted in implementing it. All of the so called new threats and challenges are already mentioned in the ESS. It could indeed say more about Russia, climate change or energy, but adding a few words here and there is not what matters most implementation does. If anything, the Georgian crisis confirms the EU strategy of engaging global actors like Russia by pulling them into the multilateral system, just like the financial crisis confirms the need for effective multilateral rules and institutions in the economic sphere. This is not a call for complacency though. It is not sufficient to have a strategy one must then also do strategy. On the positive side, Solana did not allow the debate to be hijacked by the events of August 2008 strategy should not be about the last thing that happened to occur, but about fundamental interests and principles and long term objectives. The Report provides a concise overview of implementation and confirms the holistic and multilateral approach. Interestingly, it mentions human security: We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity. Absent from, though implicitly present in the ESS, human security, can be a useful organizing concept, binding everything together and explaining the core aim of the EU s holistic approach as a global actor: making sure that every individual, 59

60 everywhere, has access to physical security, economic prosperity, political freedom and social wellbeing. To realize this for its own citizens is the fundamental interest of the EU; to realize it for citizens worldwide is the means to defend that interest and a positive objective in its own right at the same time. EU NAVFOR Somalia: Frigate PSARA, Force headquarters of EU NAVOR Somalia, December 2008 Credit The Council of the European Union The Report ends with a firm call to action: To build a secure Europe in a better world, we must do more to shape events. And we must do it now. But it offers little in terms of concrete recommendations. Nor did the European Council provide a follow up mechanism to ensure that implementation of the ESS would be stepped up and the linkages between the ESS and decision making enhanced. That would require more political courage, more as well as better capabilities, and, in a number of areas, the definition of clearer sub strategies to the ESS Questions for the Future As it is, the broad approach of the ESS has rightly been reaffirmed in the Report, but offering little in terms of recommendations for the future, the Report creates an impression of unfinished business. This the EU can ill afford now that the Lisbon Treaty has changed the institutional set up, NATO has launched a strategic debate to which an EU contribution is essential, and the EU risks being overshadowed by the much more purposive emerging powers or BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China). The ESS mostly tells us how to do things (in a holistic, preventive, and multilateral way), but needs to be translated in more specific objectives: what to do? The following priority areas require 60

61 the identification of specific EU interests and the definition of concrete objectives, in order to direct policies and actions: The Neighborhood: What is the desired end state of the Neighborhood Policy? Can only democracy create a consensual value based community and thus safeguard our interests, or will democratization create such upheaval that our interests would be damaged? Only when our interests and red lines are clear can a true strategic partnership with Russia be pursued. Enlargement: A successful instrument so far, further enlargement is determining for relations with Russia and for the geopolitical position of the EU and cannot proceed therefore without strategic debate. Regional objectives: A reluctance to discuss interests and join up the different European presences, from aid and trade to diplomacy, has undermined policies towards Central Asia, the Gulf and Africa. Other regions too, such as Asia, Latin America and the Arctic need a thorough assessment of EU interests to determine whether or not our presence should be stepped up. Global and institutional objectives: The EU must sharpen its view about the multilateral architecture, reconciling reform with increased effectiveness of EU representation. That should inform a really strategic use of its strategic partnerships with the BRICs, the existence of which too often seems more important than their content. Conflict resolution and crisis management: A white book should define Europe s ambition as a security actor. Regardless of whether in a specific case Europeans deploy under the flag of CSDP, NATO or the UN: which types of operations must European forces be capable of, which priority regions and scenarios require intervention, and which is the scale of the effort to be devoted to these priorities? Finally, and perhaps most importantly, how autonomous does the EU want to be as an actor vis à vis the US? A more detailed discussion on the future of the European Security Strategy can be found in: Sven Biscop (ed.), The Value of Power, the Power of Values. A Call for an EU Grand Strategy (Egmont Paper No. 33). Brussels, Egmont, 2009 (pages 1 13 highly recommended). 61

62 3 AKU 3 ROLE OF EU INSTITUTIONS IN THE FIELD OF CFSP / CSDP General description AKU3 is dedicated to the role of EU Institutions in shaping the Union s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its subsequent Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). It consists of an introductory part, of 6 chapters focusing on relevant institutions and mechanisms, and of a concluding part. 3.2 CHAPTER 1 - EU institutional structures involved in the field of CSDP Short overview of the EU Institutions involved in policy shaping and decision making in the field of CFSP/CSDP. The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009 when the European Community was replaced by the European Union which succeeds it and assumes all its rights and obligations. The Treaty on European Union keeps the same name and the Treaty establishing the European Community becomes the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Now you are invited to read a summary of the changes brought by the Treaty Click on the icon EU INSTITUTIONS Article 13 of the TEU states that the Union s institutions (in the strict sense) in general will be: 62

63 COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY (CFSP)/ COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY (CSDP) As Article 42 (1) TEU states, the CSDP is an integral part of the CFSP. It provides the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use those assets on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. The following institutions are involved in shaping the CFSP/CSDP and will be discussed here: EUROPEAN COUNCIL Article 15 (1) TEU states that: The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political directions and priorities thereof. It shall not exercise legislative functions. Article 15 (2) TEU states that The European Council shall consist of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, together with its President and the President of the Commission. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall take part in its work. Pursuant to Article 15 (3) TEU The European Council shall meet twice every six months, convened by its President. When the agenda so requires, the members of the European Council may decide each to be assisted by a minister and, in the case of the President of the Commission, by a member of the Commission. When the situation so requires, the President shall convene a special meeting of the European Council. 63

64 President of the European Council, Herman Van ROMPUY Credit The Council of the European Union Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Council became an institution. It does not exercise legislative functions in the sense of creating EU Law (e.g. directives and regulations) but adopts recommendations and decisions that are politically binding on the EU Member States governments. A new political figure has come onto the scene since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon: the permanent President of the European Council. Under Article 15 (5) TEU The European Council shall elect its President, by a qualified majority, for a term of two and a half years, renewable once. In the event of an impediment or serious misconduct, the European Council can end the President s term of office in accordance with the same procedure. At their informal meeting in Brussels on 19 November 2009, ahead of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, EU Heads of State or Government agreed on the election of Mr Herman Van Rompuy as the President of the European Council. He was subsequently formally elected on 1 December On 1 March 2012, the EU heads of state or government unanimously re elected Herman Van Rompuy as president of the European Council for a second term of two and a half years, from 1 June 2012 to 30 November Herman Van Rompuy was also designated as president of the Euro Summit for the same term of office. Read more about the President of the European Council here Click on the icon 64

65 Pursuant to Article 15 (6) of the Treaty on European Union, the President of the European Council: Chairs it and drives forward its work; Ensures the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the General Affairs Council; Endeavors to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council; Presents a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the European Council. Also, he shall, at his level and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy The European Council is assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council. The staff of the General Secretariat is therefore at the President disposal. The President has his own private office. Source: med.dk/bil/billedereuropean council4.gif COUNCIL There is only one Council (of the EU), which can meet in different configurations. The Council configurations can be extended or limited in numbers by the Heads of State or Government. 65

66 On Council configurations please explore the Council website section. Article 16 (7) TEU states: A Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States shall be responsible for preparing the work of the Council. (see also Article 240 TFEU), thus re affirming the role of COREPER (the abbreviation for this committee). Source: mannheim.de/webpics/e07minrat.gif In the post Lisbon TEU, the General Affairs Council (GAC) and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) are the only Council formations which are explicitly mentioned. The Foreign Affairs Council elaborates the Union s external action on the basis of strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and ensures that the Union s action is consistent. (Article 16 (6) TEU, 3 rd sentence). The General Affairs Council shall ensure consistency in the work of the different Council configurations. It shall prepare and ensure the follow up to meetings of the European Council, in liaison with the President of the European Council and the Commission (id., 2 nd sentence). The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative, shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies and shall cooperate to that effect (Article 21 (3) TEU). The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), who is also one of the Vice Presidents of the European Commission, chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, contributes through proposals towards the preparation of the CFSP and ensures implementation of the decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council. The HR is assisted by the European External Action Service (EEAS). 66

67 EUROPEAN COMMISSION Relating to external affairs, the Commission manages and implements EU external relations policies other than the CFSP (e.g. development) and the budget (incl. the CFSP budget) and also represents the EU on the international stage, except on CFSP issues and where the Treaties provide otherwise, for example by negotiating agreements between the EU and other countries. The Commission services co operate with the European External Action Service (EEAS) which was formally launched on 1 January The role of the EEAS is to support the High Representative in fulfilling the mandate to conduct the EU s CFSP. As part of this, the EEAS has 140 Delegations and Offices around the world. For over 50 years, these Delegations and Offices have acted as the eyes, ears and mouth piece of the European Commission vis à vis the authority and populations in their host countries. The EEAS is a functionally autonomous European Union body although its activities are legally bound to be consistent with other policies of the EU. This is achieved partly by the High Representative also having high office in two of the EU s key institutions in this field, being a Vice President of the European Commission with responsibilities for External Relations and President of the Foreign Affairs Council. The EEAS diplomatic service also supports High Representative Catherine Ashton in these capacities EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT The European Parliament generally exercises functions of political control and consultation as laid down in the Treaties, and, jointly with the Council, exercises legislative and budgetary 67

68 functions (Article 14 TEU). Its role in relation to the CFSP is laid down in Article 36 TEU. This provision also tasks the High Representative with working with the European Parliament: the HR regularly consults the EP on the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP, incl. CSDP, informs it on how this policy evolves, and will ensure that the views of the EP are duly taken into consideration. 3.3 CHAPTER 2 - High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy The role, functions and tasks of the High Representative in the field of CFSP/CSDP. Ms. Catherine ASHTON, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Credit The Council of the European Union At the informal meeting in Brussels on 19 November 2009, ahead of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, EU Heads of State or Government reached a political agreement on the appointment of Ms Catherine Ashton as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Ms Ashton was subsequently appointed by the European Council with the agreement of the President of the Commission. Her term of office (five years) coincides in principle 68

69 with the Commission s term of office. This appointment was made pursuant to Article 18 (1) TEU: The European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission, shall appoint the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The European Council may end his term of office by the same procedure. The High Representative is also a Vice President of the European Commission and is subject, together with the President of the Commission and the other members of the Commission, to a vote of consent by the European Parliament. Read more on the Union s High Representative here Click on the icon MULTIPLE ROLES AND TASKS The High Representative exercises, in foreign affairs, a number of functions which were previously exercised to some extent by the six monthly rotating Presidency, the High Representative for the CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations. The post of the High Representative is designed to enhance the consistency and unity of the EU s external action. According to Articles 18 and 27 of the Treaty on the European Union, the High Representative: Conducts the Union s common foreign and security policy (Article 18 (2) TEU); Contributes by her proposals to the development of that policy, which she will carry out as mandated by the Council, and ensures implementation of the decisions adopted in this field (Article 18 (2) TEU); Presides over the Foreign Affairs Council (Article 18 (3) TEU and Article 27 (1) TEU); Is one of the Vice Presidents of the European Commission. She ensures the consistency of the Union s external action. She is responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union s external action (Article 18 (4) TEU); Represents the Union for matters relating to the CFSP, conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union s behalf and expresses the Union s position in international organizations and at international conferences (Article 27 (2) TEU); Exercises authority over the European External Action Service and over the Union delegations in third countries and at international organizations. Further tasks and functions encompass also: International representation of the EU, in particular on CFSP issues (without prejudice to the role of the President of the European Council at his level); Proposing the Appointment of EU Special Representatives; Head of the European Defense Agency (EDA); Chair of the board of the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS) and of the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC). 69

70 In fulfilling this extensive mandate, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, is answerable to respectively the European Council and the European Commission SUPPORTING INSTRUMENTS & STRUCTURES The High Representative is assisted by a European External Action Service (EEAS) and has authority over 140 Delegations and Offices of the Union in third countries and to international organizations. She benefits from the support from the Council and Commission services, as appropriate. Under Article 33 TEU The Council may, on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, appoint a special representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues. The special representative shall carry out his mandate under the authority of the High Representative. For details on EU Special Representatives please explore the dedicated Council website section (Click on the left icon) EU s EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE Article 27 (3) TEU, introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, constitutes the legal basis for the External Action Service (EEAS) and the Council decision on the organization and functioning of the EEAS. It states that: In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. The organization and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission. 70

71 The decision on the EEAS was adopted by the Council on 26 July The EEAS helps the High Representative ensure the consistency and coordination of the Union s external action as well as prepare policy proposals and implement them after their approval by Council. It also assists the President of the European Council and the President as well as the Members of the Commission in their respective functions in the area of external relations and ensures close cooperation with the Member States. The EEAS is composed of single geographical (covering all regions and countries) and thematic desks, which continue to perform under the authority of the High Representative the tasks executed by the relevant parts of the Commission and the Council Secretariat before Trade and development policy as defined by the Treaty remain the responsibility of relevant Commissioners. EEAS staff is appointed by the High Representative and is drawn from three sources: relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council, of the personnel of the Commission and of national diplomatic services of the Member States. In order to enable the High Representative to conduct the CSDP, the EU s crisis management structures are part of the EEAS while taking full account of their specificities. These include the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the Military Staff (EUMS). The EEAS is a service sui generis, separate from the Commission and the Council Secretariat. It has autonomy in terms of administrative budget and management of staff. The EEAS has its own section in the EU budget, to which the usual budgetary and control rules will apply. The former Commission s Delegations and Offices around the world became Union delegations under the authority of the High Representative and are now part of the EEAS structure. Delegations contain both regular EEAS staff (including Heads of Delegation) and staff from 71

72 relevant Commission services. All staff work under the authority of the Heads of Delegation. EU delegations work in close cooperation with diplomatic services of the Member States. They play a supporting role as regards diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries upon request of Member States. Effective consultation procedures were established between the EEAS and the services of the European Commission with external responsibilities, including those in charge of internal policies with significant external dimensions. For more details on the EEAS please explore its website. (Click on the image at left) 3.4 CHAPTER 3 - EU Council roles in the field of CSDP Role of the Council and Member States in making decisions related to, providing capabilities for, and engaging in CSDP missions and operations. Under Article 42 (4) TEU, decisions relating to CSDP shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate. This is consistent with decision making in the CFSP more generally: Article 31 (1) TEU provides that: Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where this Chapter provides otherwise. Lisbon Treaty seals Credit European Commission 72

73 However, abstentions do no prevent the adoption of a decision. Moreover, a constructive abstention can be used by Member States, pursuant to Article 31 (1), second subparagraph TEU, which provides that: Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where this Chapter provides otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded... When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent at least one third of the Member States comprising at least one third of the population of the Union, the decision shall not be adopted CSDP CAPABILITIES According to Article 42 (3) TEU, Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of CSDP, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make them available to the CSDP ; Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities and those member States whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation and which fulfill the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out in the protocol on permanent structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (Article 46 (1) TEU).... the Council shall adopt a decision establishing permanent structured cooperation and determining the list of participating Member States. The Council shall act by qualified majority after consulting the High Representative. (Article 46 (2) TEU). Any participating Member State which wishes to withdraw from permanent structured cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council, which shall take note that the Member State in question has ceased to participate. (Article 46 (5) TEU). 73

74 The Lisbon Treaty Protocol on Permanent Structured Co operation further elaborates on the permanent structured cooperation. You may wish now to read a short policy analysis on Permanent Structured Co operation: Sven BISCOP and Jo COELMONT, Permanent Structured Cooperation In Defense of the Obvious, Royal Institute for International Relations, Security Policy Brief No. 11, (Click on the left icon) CSDP MISSION SPECTRUM According to Article 42 (1) TEU, the CSDP shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets which the Union may use on missions outside the Union for peace keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. These tasks in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making and post conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their countries. (Article 43 (1) TEU). Relating to these task, the Council shall adopt decisions..., defining their objectives and scope and the general conditions for their implementation. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and constant contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks. (Article 43 (2) TEU) CONDUCTING CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS Relating to these task, the Council shall adopt decisions..., defining their objectives and scope and the general conditions for their implementation. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and constant contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks. (Article 43 (2) TEU). 74

75 Pursuant to Article 38 TEU: the Political and Security Committee [PSC] shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative, the political control and strategic direction of the crisis management operations and The Council may authorize the Committee, for the purpose and for the duration of a crisis management operation, as determined by the Council, to take the relevant decisions concerning the political control and strategic direction of the operation. The PSC normally meets twice a week in Brussels. The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Unions values and serve its interests (Article 42 (5) TEU). In that case, within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, Those member States, [which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task,] in association with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task. (Article 44 (1) TEU). Those Member States which are participating in the task are obliged to keep the Council regularly informed of its progress on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. They shall also inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and conditions determined for the task in the decisions referred to in paragraph 1. In such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions. 3.5 CHAPTER 4 - European Commission s external activities Brief presentation of European Commission s external activities and their co ordination with the Union s Common Foreign and Security Policy. The European Commission is independent of national governments. Its job is to promote the general interest of the Union and take appropriate initiatives to that end (see Article 17 TEU). It inter alia: Drafts proposals for new European laws, which it presents to the European Parliament and the Council. Is the EU s executive arm in other words, it is responsible for implementing the decisions of Parliament and the Council. That means managing the day to day business of the European Union: implementing its policies, running its programmes and spending its funds. With the exception of the CFSP and other cases provided for in the Treaties, it ensures the Union s external representation. Oversees the application of Union law under the control of the Court of Justice. 75

76 Like the Parliament and the Council, the European Commission was set up by the EU s founding treaties. A new Commission is appointed every five years EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND CFSP Under the pre Lisbon TEU, the Commission was fully associated with CFSP (ex Article 27 TEU). The post Lisbon TEU no longer includes this provision but the Commission is still involved in the CFSP. It has the right to support an initiative by the High Representative and in some cases to submit a joint proposal, but no longer has an independent right of initiative on CFSP issues. It participates in decision shaping, including in the Political and Security Committee (PSC) which is the linchpin of CFSP. The Common Security and Defense Policy which is an integral part of CFSP, was given a range of crisis management functions. Some of these are clearly military, and here the Commission s role is primarily to strive towards ensuring that non CFSP activities which accompany or follow on a military crisis operation proceed smoothly and coherently. Others are civilian. The Commission has a greater role in civilian missions, in particular through its responsibility for implementing the CFSP budget, from which these missions are normally funded. The budget is implemented by the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) under the High Representative acting as Vice President of the Commission. In addition, the Commission may carry out activities in other EU policy areas than the CFSP, which may contribute to crisis management, e.g. as part of development policy or humanitarian aid. Furthermore a whole range of topics which come up in CFSP directly affect policies implemented by the Commission. These include terrorism, sanctions policy, human rights and democracy. The Commission has specific tasks in all these areas, and in some it has its own instruments. 76

77 One example: For more details on the Commission s role in external activities, including Development and Cooperation (DEVCO/EuropeAid), Enlargement, European Neighborhood Policy, Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), Humanitarian Aid and Civilian Protection (ECHO), Trade. please consult the European Commission central web page. (Click on the above image) CO ORDINATION WITH THE COUNCIL S CFSP/CSDP ACTIONS AND OBJECTIVES As mentioned earlier in this learning unit, coordination of all EU external activities is crucial to ensure consistency. Article 21 (3) TEU emphasizes the role of the Council and the Commission in order to ensure consistency in the field of external actions as follows: The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect. 77

78 As Article 42 (4) TEU states, decisions relating to CSDP shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate. The Lisbon treaty aims to contribute to greater efficiency and coherence of the EU s external action and security policy. It has given the tools to develop a more comprehensive, integrated approach and make the EU more effective as a world player. It created the post of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who conducts the EU s CFSP. It gave birth to the EEAS to assist the High Representative in the preparation and conduct of her policy. All this supports the development of a coherent EU strategy to prevent and tackle crisis and make use of all the available tools, diplomatic, economic, developmental, humanitarian and crisis management in a coordinated manner, so that they complement and reinforce each other. In crisis management, the missions and operations are instruments serving a more global policy and a common political objective. During the last years, closer links with the geographical desks and with relevant EU Commission services through reinforced coordination processes were developed. The Crisis Platform structure, at the management level, is a very useful tool in that respect as are the crisis management coordination meetings at the staff level. However, such triangular cooperation between the 3Ds diplomacy, development and Defense/security was created, i.e. the geographical desks, crisis management structures and the Commission. Shaping the comprehensive approach also involves the working more closely with partners such as the UN, NATO, the African Union and third countries, in order to pool EU efforts better and combine EU instruments. 3.6 CHAPTER 5 - European Parliament roles in the field of CFSP/CSDP The consultation and budgetary control functions of the European Parliament in CFSP/CSDP. 78

79 European Parliament session Credit European Commission The European Parliament consists of 751 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) including the President of the European Parliament. The number of MEPs cannot exceed 751 and the breakdown of parliamentary seats between Member States will be digressively proportional. The Treaty of Lisbon also stipulates that no Member State can have fewer than 6 or more than 96 seats. As Article 14 (3) TEU states, The members of the European Parliament shall be elected for a term of five years by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot. Pursuant to Article 14 (4) TEU: The European Parliament shall elect its President and its officers from among its members. The European Parliament also... shall elect the President of the Commission. Article 14 (1) TEU. Pursuant to Article 14 (1) TEU, The European Parliament shall, jointly with the Council, exercise legislative and budgetary functions. It shall exercise functions of political control and consultation as laid down in the Treaties. The European Parliament also... shall elect the President of the Commission. Article 14 (1) TEU. The EP s Committees include the Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET), with subcommittees on Human Rights (DROI) and Security and Defense (SEDE) and Development (DEVE) COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY / COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY The CFSP shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The CFSP shall be put into effect by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by Member States,... The specific role of the European Parliament and of the Commission in this area is defined by the Treaties. (Article 24 (1) TEU). 79

80 According to Article 36 TEU The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and Defense policy and inform it of how those policies evolve. He shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. Special representatives may be involved in briefing the European Parliament. The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it and to the High Representative. Twice a year it shall hold a debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy, including the common security and Defense policy. Sometimes the EP expresses its views and opinions on certain foreign and security policy issues via resolutions. These are usually prepared by reporters and pass through the relevant EP committee(s). There may also be declarations of prominent members of the EP. In addition, in the areas of CFSP/CSDP the European Parliament exercises its budgetary powers. The budgetary control function mainly relates to the CFSP budget for CSDP civilian missions and other EU external actions funded from the CFSP budget. It also covers the European External Action Service (EEAS). Furthermore, Article 10 of the Protocol (No. 1) on the role of national parliaments in the European Union (to the Treaty of Lisbon) provides that: A conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs may submit any contribution it deems appropriate for the attention of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. That conference shall in addition promote the exchange of information and best practice between national Parliaments and the European Parliament, including their special committees. It may also organize inter-parliamentary conferences on specific topics, in particular to debate matters of common foreign and security policy, including common security and Defense policy. Contributions from the conference shall not bind national Parliaments and shall not prejudge their positions. 80

81 For details on European Parliament external activities please explore the dedicated website. (Click on the left icon) LEGISLATIVE PROCESS The European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union are involved in the law making process at EU level. Decisions in the area of CFSP/ CSDP are taken by the Council and they are now all called Council Decisions (they include the former Joint Actions ); such Council Decisions are not legislative acts. Directives and regulations are the main forms of EU law, applicable to all EU Member States. New legislation is generally proposed by the European Commission, but it is the Council and the European Parliament that pass the laws. EU Law in general is subject to the ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 294 TFEU), now based on the co decision principle (sometimes still called the co decision procedure ). The CFSP budget approval falls under this legislative procedure LEGISLATIVE CO DECISION PROCEDURE In this procedure, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the Parliament shares legislative power equally with the Council. In the meantime the co decision procedure applies to most EU law making. This procedure gives the European Parliament the opportunity to negotiate directly with the Council in a conciliation committee, composed of equal numbers of Council and Parliament representatives, and in which the Commission also takes part. This only happens in the event of lack of agreement on a proposal. Once this committee has reached an agreement (time limit 6 weeks), the text is sent once again to Parliament and the Council so that they can finally adopt it as law. The Council and the European Parliament have six weeks to adopt the legislative act. The Council generally takes a decision by qualified majority, while the European Parliament has to approve the legislative act by a majority of the votes cast. However, if the Council and the European Parliament do not both approve the legislative act within the time limit of six weeks, the proposal is automatically rejected. Conciliation is becoming increasingly rare. Most laws passed in co-decision are, in fact, adopted either at the first or second reading. 81

82 3.7 CHAPTER 6 - Financing CSDP Brief overview of the funding mechanisms for CSDP civilian missions and military operations. 82

83 Unless the Council unanimously decides otherwise, civilian crisis management operations are funded from the CFSP budget, which is established following the budgetary procedure laid down for the Union budget. The Union s CFSP budget was grew from approx. 35 million Euros prior to 83

84 2004 to approx 280 million in Operations with military implications or Defense operations cannot be financed from the Union budget. For the common costs of such operations, the Council of the EU established a special mechanism (ATHENA) in March 2004 (see below). The Treaty of Lisbon introduced a provision stating that: The Council shall adopt a decision establishing the specific procedures for guaranteeing rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget for urgent financing of initiatives in the framework of the common foreign and security policy, and in particular for preparatory activities for the tasks referred to Article 42 (1) and Article 43. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament. (Article 41 (3), first subparagraph TEU) FUNDING MILITARY OPERATIONS ATHENA was set up by the Council on 1 March This mechanism administers the financing of common costs of EU operations and charged to the Member States in accordance with their GNP. A review is foreseen after every operation and at least every 18 months respectively. ATHENA is managed by a Special Committee (SC) composed of representatives of EU States (contributors). The European Commission attends the SC meetings. he Operations Commander is the authorizing officer for the operation he commands. Where there is no Operations Commander, ATHENA s administrator is the authority officer. Member States have the choice either to pay contributions in anticipation of a possible rapid reaction operation or to pay within five days. 84

85 For details on the Athena mechanism please explore the dedicated EU Council website pages. (Click on the left icon) START UP FUND Article 41 (3) TEU, an innovation inserted by the Treaty of Lisbon, provides that: Preparatory activities for the tasks referred to in Article 42 (1) and Article 43 TEU which are not charged to the Union budget shall be financed by a start up fund made up of member States contributions. The Council shall adopt by a qualified majority, on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, decisions establishing: The procedures for setting up and financing the start up fund, in particular the amounts allocated to the fund; The procedures for administering the start up fund; The financial control procedures. When the task planned in accordance with Article 42(1) and Article 43 cannot be charged to the Union budget, the Council shall authorize the High Representative to use the fund. The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this remit. 85

86 4 AKU 5 EU CRISIS-MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT DISCLAIMER The views expressed in this AKU DO NOT represent the official position of EU Institutions General description The theme of AKU5 is the study of the European Union s Crisis Management Capability Development (CMCD). It consists of an introductory part, of 6 chapters focusing on relevant aspects of the CMCD and a concluding part Reading Directions Before starting Chapter 5 Civilian Capability Development, you are strongly recommended to read: Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference, Civilian Headline Goal 2010 Conclusion document, Brussels Click on the icon Before starting Chapter 6 Perspectives for EU Crisis Management Capabilities, you are strongly recommended to read: EU Council, Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities Brussels, December Click on the icon Learning content AKU5 will touch upon the following aspects of the CMCD: Chapter 1 Context and history policy rationale and the landmarks of the EU crisis management capability development in the context of increasing CSDP missions and operations. Chapter 2 Mechanism and actors basic notions and the overall capability development mechanism, with the major institutional actors role within it. Chapter 3 Military capability development military capability development process and basic documents, and discussion of results and associated co operation with NATO. 86

87 Chapter 4 European Defense Agency role and place of EDA in the military capability development process, and presentation of its major action lines and results. Chapter 5 Civilian Capability Development civilian capability development process and basic documents, and discussion of results and associated wider co operation. Chapter 6 Perspectives for EU crisis management capabilities impact on capability development of the possible future mechanisms for permanent structured co operation in the Defense field and the trend toward harmonization of EU civil military capability development Bibliography & Other Sources The following sources were consulted during the preparation of AKU5. Should you wish to deepen your understanding of aspects of EU crisis management capability, please feel free to explore them after completing this AKU. EU Council document, Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP, EU Council Press Office, Development of European Military Capabilities, Factsheet, Brussels, July 2009, EU Council Press Office, European Security and Defense Policy: the civilian aspects of crisis management, Factsheet July 2009, Civilian Crisis Management Capabilities Reference documents of the EU Council Military Crisis Management Capabilities Conclusions du Conseil sur la Politique europeenne de securité et de défense (PESD), Novembre 2008, a: For a broader documentation on CSDP related subjects, whenever necessary, you are invited to visit thecsdp Knowledge-base at CHAPTER 1 Historical Context of Capability Development Introducing the policy rationale and the landmarks of the EU crisis management capability development in the context of increasing CSDP missions and operations Introduction... A more capable Europe is within our grasp, though it will take time to realize our full potential. Actions underway (...) take us in the right direction. To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for Defense and more effective use of resources are necessary. Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads and, in the medium term, increase capabilities. In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos. We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations. Stronger diplomatic capability: we need a system that combines the resources of 87

88 Member States with those of EU institutions. (...) The EU NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organizations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century.... European Security Strategy December 2003 The above quotation encapsulates the policy rationale, the conceptual basis, and the action framework shaping the development of the EU s crisis management capabilities. December 2003 Credit The Council of the European Union Developing EU capabilities for global crisis management is an evolving process, which started early, from the beginning of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). This context was shaped by landmark events and by the EU s operational engagements Landmarks and Engagements 1999 Amsterdam Treaty In accordance with the Amsterdam Treaty, the so called Petersberg Tasks cover humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace keeping tasks, and combat forces tasks in crisis management, including peace making. The crisis management tasks have subsequently been specified also to include joint action in the field of disarmament, counseling and support in military matters, conflict prevention and post conflict stabilization Helsinki European Council The Council concluded the European Union should have the autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU led military operations in response to international crises in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The action by the Union will be conducted in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and the principles and objectives of the OSCE Charter for European Security Helsinki Headline Goal The Member States agreed to put at the Union s disposal by 2003, on a voluntary basis, forces capable of carrying out the tasks set out in Article 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union in operations up to army corps level ( to troops) with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. The forces should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, with their deployment sustainable for at least a year. 88

89 2000 Feira European Council The Member States identified 4 priority action areas for civilian aspects of crisis management: (1) Police, (2) Rule of Law, (3) Civil Administration, and (4) Civil Protection European Security Strategy The European Security Strategy, which was approved in December 2003 and implementation assessed in December 2008, provides a framework for the Union s security policy action. The EU s common interests, strategic goals and capability requirements are determined based on the security environment and threat assessments Start of the first EU CSDP mission EU Police Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina (EUPM) Arrival at the EUPM HQ (from left to right): Commissioner Sven FREDERIKSEN, SG/HR Javier SOLANA, OHR/EUSR ASHDOWN January 2003 Credit The Council of the European Union Mar Dec 2003 EU Military Operation in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Concordia) Jun Sep 2003 EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis) Dec 2003 Start of EU Police Mission in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Proxima) 2004 Military Headline Goal 2010 In order to bring the EU s capability development in line with the ambitions set out in the European Security Strategy, the European Council endorsed, in June 2004, a Military Headline Goal with a 2010 horizon and an Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP. Dec 2004 Start of the EU Military Operation in Bosnia Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) 2004 Establishment of EDA The European Defense Agency was established under a Joint Action of the Council of Ministers on 12 July 2004, to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European Defense capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the Common Security and 89

90 Defense Policy as it stands now and develops in the future Civilian Headline Goal 2008 EUPOL COPPS Daily activity February 2006 Credit The Council of the European Union The Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP of June 2004 defined measures to be carried out in order to develop and operationalise civilian capabilities, including work on a consolidated Civilian Headline Goal. This work began in the second half of 2004 and led to the endorsement by the European Council, in December 2004, of the Civilian Headline Goal Thus, the European Council put both military and civilian capability development on separate parallel tracks. Jul 2004 Jul 2005 EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia (EUJUST Themis) Apr 2005 Start of EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC) (EUPOL Kinshasa) Jun 2005 Start of EU Security Sector Reform mission in DR Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) Jul 2005 Start of EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX) Jul 2005 Start of EU Support to AMIS (Darfur) Sep 2005 Dec 2006 Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) Nov 2005 Start of EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories (EU BAM Rafah) Dec 2005 End of EU Police Mission in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Proxima) Dec 2005 Jun 2006 Start of EU Police Advisory Team in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPAT) Jan 2006 Start of EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) Apr 2006 Nov 2006 EU Military Operation in RD Congo (EUFOR RD Congo) 2007 Civilian Headline Goal 2010 At the ministerial Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference of 2007, EU Ministers have decided to adopt a new headline goal for civilian crisis management capabilities, the Civilian Headline Goal

91 (Credit German Navy) EU NAVFOR Atalanta prevents hijacking, 4 March 2009 Credit The Council of the European Union Jun 2007 Start of EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) Jun 2007 End of EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC) (EUPOL Kinshasa) Jun 2007 Start of EU Police Mission in RD Congo (EUPOL RD Congo) Dec 2007 End of EU Support to AMIS (Darfur) Feb 2008 Start of EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO) Feb 2008 Mar 2009 Military Operation in Chad & RCA (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) Jun 2008 Start of EU Mission support of Security Sector reform in Guinea Bissau (EU SSR Guinea Bissau) Oct 2008 Start of EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) Start of EU Military Operation against piracy off the Somali coast (EU NAVFOR Somalia) Nowadays, the EU is operating a full set of concepts, structures, and procedures toward meeting the crisis management capability objectives set in the two Headline Goals for The following chapters will look into the details of this current picture. 4.3 CHAPTER 2 Mechanism and Actors Presents the basic notions and the overall capability development mechanism, together with the major institutional actors role within it Capability Fig What makes a capability? To achieve its goals, particularly to meet its requirements for crisis management operations, the EU needs Member States contributions in military and civilian capabilities. EU crisis management capabilities are understood as the overall set of means (including 91

92 manpower, equipment, concepts, organization and procedures), at a quantitative and qualitative level, required to enable the successful conduct of a CSDP mission or operation (Fig 5.2.1) EU Capability Development The EU s Capability Development Mechanism (CDM) was adopted in 2003, taking into account the Berlin Plus agreement. Its aim is to enable the European Union to encourage the achievement of the Member States capability commitments and to evaluate them, as well as, if necessary, to revise the actual capability goals. The CDM operates in four areas: Definition of military capabilities required to deliver meet EU objectives, and of the MS potential contributions to meet these requirements; Identification of potential shortfalls and evaluation of progress made to solve them; Remedying shortfalls (essentially MS responsibility, but which can be facilitated e.g. EDA on military capability shortfalls); Ensuring coherence, transparency and mutually reinforcing development of capability requirements common to the EU and NATO. The mechanism is based on two core principles: The autonomy of EU decision making; The voluntary nature of Member States contributions. In order to avoid duplication, civil military synergies are sought wherever possible between the civilian and military capability development processes, while fully respecting their specificities. Work focuses in particular on concrete areas including dual use capabilities (transportation, logistics, medical support, space, communications ) and horizontal civil military domains such as training and intelligence Availability of capabilities for EU crisis management The implementation of the EU s civilian and military Headline Goals is voluntary in two respects: First, to the extent that the declared contributions to the respective catalogues comprise only that proportion of national armed forces or civilian personnel/units which individual Member States are prepared to commit freely in response to the identified requirements; this does not constitute a binding commitment in the event of potential crisis situations. Second, to the extent that making assets available in a concrete crisis situation requires a further case by case decision at national level. Member States are free to decide upon their actual commitments to real operations and missions. 92

93 Actors in the EU s capability development process Following the core principles of crisis management capability development, the key actors within this process are Member States. At EU level, in various supervising and supporting roles, the major actors involved are shown below (Fig 5.2.2): The Political and Security Committee (PSC), under the auspices of the Council, assumes responsibility for the political direction of the development of military capabilities, taking into account the type of crisis to which the EU wishes to respond. It should be noted in this regard that the PSC also exercises, under the Council s authority, political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations. As far as the development of military capabilities is concerned, the PSC receives the opinion of the EU Military Committee assisted by the EU Military Staff. You can read the Council Decision establishing the PSC here. The EU Military Committee (EUMC) is the source of military advice based on consensus. It is the forum for military consultation and cooperation between the EU Member States in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. It provides military advice and makes recommendations to the PSC, at the latter s request or on its own initiative, acting within guidelines forwarded by the PSC, in particular on the elaboration, assessment and review of capability objectives, according to agreed procedures. You can read the Council Decision establishing the EUMC here ( The Political Military Group (PMG) is the preparatory working party of the PSC, assisting it with political and military issues and ensuring the co ordination and coherence of CSDP military aspects. Within its preparatory and co ordination role, the PMG helps ensure improvements to the EU s military capability development processes. The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) is the working party of the Council, established to ensure co ordination, coherence, pooling of resources, and to disseminate lessons learned and best practices in non military EU crisis management missions. Within its role, the CIVCOM helps ensure improvements in the crisis response capabilities of the European Union that are available both for EU missions and those led by other international 93

94 organizations. The preparatory document on the establishment of a civilian crisis management committee is available here. ( Preparatory%20document%20CESDP%20-%20Committee.pdf) The Council General Secretariat (CGS). As a permanent and independent European public service, the Council General Secretariat (CGS) assists the Council, under the responsibility of a Secretary General appointed by the Council. Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) This directorate was created on 16 November 2009 headed by a Deputy Director General. CMPD is responsible for the politico strategic level planning of CSDP civilian and military missions, and also for supporting the various aspects of CSDP development. It represents an integrated capability, seeking to develop and exploit the synergies between the civilian and military elements of CSDP as part of the comprehensive approach to crisis management. This includes military and civilian capability development functions, planning functions, partnerships with other crisis management international actors, and other horizontal issues, dealt with in integrated civ mil teams. CMPD also provides support to Council bodies on CSDP related issues. EU Military Staff (EUMS) the EU Military Staff (EUMS) is to perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for missions and tasks referred to in Article 17(2) of the TEU, including those identified in the European Security Strategy. In particular, the EUMS contributes to the process of elaboration, assessment and review of the capability goals, taking into account the need, for those Member States concerned, to ensure consistency with NATO s Defense Planning Process (DPP) and the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP) in accordance with agreed procedures. It works in close coordination with the European Defense Agency. You can read the Council Decision establishing the EUMS here. ( After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, at this stage work is in hand toward the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) as a permanent autonomous European public service under the authority of the new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission. The EEAS is to include (amongst other Commission and CGS bodies) the present EUMS and CMPD. 94

95 Follow the news on EEAS here. The European Defense Agency (EDA is an EU Agency under Pillar 2. It operates under the authority and the political supervision of the Council, to which it provides regular reports and from which it receives regular guidelines. It is open to participation by all Member States, and currently works with 26 of them owing to Denmark s opting out on CSDP. The Head of the EDA is the Secretary General High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. There is more on the EDA in Chapter 4. You can read the Council Joint Action establishing the EDA here. ( Fig EU Crisis Management capability development major actors The specific case of Military Rapid Response and the Battle groups Military Rapid Response is in itself an important ability to address acute crises, and an important instrument in the EU s crisis management tool box. Military Rapid Response is the acceleration of the overall approach which encompasses all interrelated measures and actions in the field of intelligence collection, decision making, planning, force generation and deployment, together with the availability of assets and capabilities, and potential Command and Control (C2) options, in order to enable a swift and decisive military response to a crisis. The overall time, from the Council decision to launch an operation, until operations commence in the Joint Operations 95

96 Area (JOA), should not exceed 30 days. Military Rapid Response represents an ambition and not a capability as such. The EU military Rapid Response concept was updated in January 2009 in order to consider military response in all three environments; maritime, land and air in general terms, and also how a Joint Military Rapid Response could be delivered. Work on examining the contribution that naval and air forces can make to CSDP rapid response operations has resulted in the adoption by the EUMC in late 2007 of a Maritime Rapid Response Concept and an Air Rapid Response Concept. Battlegroups represent the EU s capability to deploy forces very rapidly, which is a key aspect of the Headline Goal They provide one possible answer to situations requiring a military rapid response and are a specific case to be considered in the planning phase and force generation process for an operation and are not part of the capability development process. Already by 1 January 2007, the EU had acquired full operational capability to conduct two rapid response operations of the size of a Battle group (BG) of men, which can be launched almost simultaneously. Since then, Member States have been taking turns to make permanently available to the EU two BGs which remain on standby for six months and can be deployed in the framework of a rapid response operation for a maximum of four months. A Battle group Coordination Conference is organized every six months to receive new offers from Member States and update the standby roster. It is for the Member States concerned to resolve any difficulties concerning compatibility with their commitments to other organizations, in particular in the NATO Response Force (NRF). You can read more on BG here ( 96

97 4.4 CHAPTER 3 Military Capability Development Explains the military capability development process and its basic documents, and discusses results and associated co operation with NATO Introduction In June 2004, EU Member States (MS) set themselves a new military Headline Goal 2010 (HLG 2010) built upon the Helsinki Headline Goal with a view to capturing the new security paradigm which was reflected in the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted in December According to the new Headline Goal, the EU should be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action to the whole spectrum of Crisis Management Operations (CMO) The Process The current military capability development process was distilled within the implementation of HLG Based on the policy vision of the European Security Strategy, under the political direction of the Council, in brief it encompasses (fig ): The formulation of military capability requirements, leading to the Requirements Catalogue. The voluntary force contribution offers, leading to the Force Catalogue. 97

98 The evaluation of contributions against current requirements, with identification of shortfalls in the Progress Catalogue, as well actionable conclusions for CMO and for future capability development, formulated in the Capability Development Plan. The current process is seen as rather linear and open, adjustable to the real life changing environment at all stages, therefore no mechanical repetition (cycling) can be foreseen. In the following, the process triggered by the adoption of the HLG 2010 will be described in more detail Military Capability Requirements The process of developing EU military capabilities within the framework of the HLG 2010 started with the elaboration of five Illustrative Scenarios, including planning assumptions, in order to cover the possible spectrum of military operations (including concurrency options): Separation of Parties by Force (SOPF) Stabilization, Reconstruction and Military Advice to Third Countries (SR) Conflict Prevention (CP) Evacuation Operation (EO) Assistance to Humanitarian Operations (HO) From these, a Detailed List of Required Capabilities (DLRC) that the EU should have at its disposal was produced. Generic Force Packages identifying the type of force groupings the EU would require to solve the crises, and a list of Reference Units (RU) were added to form the Requirements Catalogue 2005 (RC 05) listing in detail the actual types of units, resources and assets required (fig 5.3.2). Fig The HGQ is the Information Gathering (IG) Tool used in the HLG 2010 process in support of the EU Military Capability Development Process. The HGQ is based on the NATO NDPASS 2004 to 98

99 maintain a certain level of compatibility between the EU process and NATO DPP. This was developed in 2005 through technical cooperation between EU and NATO staffs EU Capability Development MS were then asked to what extent they could offer assets and resources to meet these requirements. This was done through the Headline Goal Questionnaire (HGQ). The scrutinizing methodology offered MSes the opportunity to conduct the necessary Self Assessment of their contributions. In order to have a better view of the capabilities contributed a Clarification Dialogue was held. These steps (Fig ) led to the development of Fig the Force Catalogue 2007 (FC 07), which describes the capabilities made available by MSes in qualitative and quantitative terms. It provides a view of the military capabilities available by Shortfall implications and further action The FC 07 is the basis for EU shortfall identification. Briefly, the Progress Catalogue identifies shortfalls by comparing requirements with contributions (see fig ) Fig

100 The operational risk reflects the impact of the capability shortfalls identified (risk level) against the characteristics of small scale/rapid response, medium scale/long endurance, large scale/limited duration operations and concurrencies. This was achieved by reflecting the key parameters, which were expressed and encapsulated in the Illustrative Scenarios and the associated Strategic Planning Assumptions (SPA). These parameters constitute the first dimension for the weighting of the capability shortfalls for an analytical approach to prioritization. In addition, the level of operational risk per capability shortfall had to be considered in conjunction with the likelihood of using a capability in each scenario and concurrencies in order to provide an initial orientation for the capability shortfalls. This further step allowed the identified capability shortfalls to be arranged into three groups. The most critical ones apply to the areas of survivability, deployability and information superiority. It provides a structured Assessment of Capability shortfalls and an Evaluation of their potential implications for all military tasks associated with crisis management operations. This informs MSes short to medium term capability planning decisions and represents the fundamental added value of the Progress Catalogue. The risks from qualitative shortfalls will be present across the spectrum of operations whereas the risk from quantitative shortfalls increases with the increase in scale or with concurrency. In summary, the current military capability development process can be summarized as in fig

101 Capability Development Plan In parallel to the development of the Progress Catalogue, the EDA participating Members States (pms) decided in December 2006 to prepare a Capability Development Plan (CDP), through EDA and in close cooperation with the EUMC. The CDP is a shorter to longer term, comprehensive and dynamic tool to assist their decision making processes in Defense investment and the development of future military capabilities (see fig ). The Progress Catalogue represents a cornerstone for the CDP, providing the baseline of capability shortfalls and associated risks derived from the HLG2010. In June 2008 the CDP suggested to MSes some actionable conclusions to address the shortfalls. The CDP provides the framework for assisting MSes to reach decisions on capability development from a shared global picture. The period since mid 2008 has already provided some indication of how far MSes are willing to commit themselves in a shared capability development at EU level Process Continuity To establish a first prioritization, the capabilities grouped according to their core shortfalls were condensed into capability areas as they are expressed in the HLG 2010 (Survivability, Information Superiority, Based on the results of the PC 07, the EUMC decided to establish a First Prioritization, which reflects collectively established priorities for capability development in the short to medium term within the context of 101

102 Sustainability, Protection, Command, and Engagement Effectiveness). This grouping was utilized in order to be answerable to the ambition established in the HLG 2010 and also to compile additional information in a structured way. For further elaboration in the framework of the CDP these groups can be translated into the HLG 2010 and associates them with higher or lower importance within the Critical (capability shortfalls, which have the highest impact on the most scenarios and result in a High or Very High operational risk see fig 5.3.7). Intermediate (capability shortfalls which carry a moderate impact on most established IDTs. scenarios or carry a Very High operational risk The capability groups were confronted via their core shortfall with the Additional Information in order to validate the weighting of capability shortfalls as established in the Initial Orientation and draw observations for the continuing only in a concurrency situation) and Minor (remaining capability shortfalls, which impact on a limited number of scenarios/concurrencies and/or only carry a limited impact) groups. process. Fig In addition, a EUMC Study on Interoperability was conducted. The purpose of the study was to assess the interoperability issue in the framework of HLG 2010 from an EU military perspective, with a view to contributing to capability development. The study identified 78 EU Interoperability Requirements. The results have a clear focus on conceptual issues. EU future efforts within the 102

103 area of Comprehensive Approach are assessed to give most added values. In addition, efforts in the areas of establishing a Common Operational Picture and conceptual development regarding Joint Fire Support, Joint Targeting and Joint Embargo Operations are assessed as bringing value Military Capability Development Areas The aim of the CDP, worked out in close cooperation between the EDA, the EUMC and the Member States, is to provide the latter with evolving information which could facilitate their decision making in the context of national capability choices, stimulate their cooperation and facilitate the launching of new joint programmes which overcome present and future EU shortfalls. It aims at providing guidelines for future work in the fields of research and technology, armaments and industry and will form the cornerstone of the EDA s activities. However, it will not under any circumstances be a supranational plan: it is created by and for the Member States. When the initial CDP was worked out, the following were taken into consideration: The consequences of Headline Goal 2010, based in particular on the conclusions of the 2007 Progress Catalogue and other information useful for decision making concerning the management of shortfalls, such as the capability analyzed in the framework of Civilian Headline Goal 2008, proceedings conducted in the context of other pillars of the European Union or additional capability or assets that could be made available to the EU in an operation calling upon common NATO capabilities and assets; An estimate of the capability required in 2025, on the basis of research into foreseeable developments of global strategic contact, available technology and potential threats; Current plans and programmes announced by the Member States; Lessons learned from operations with regard to capabilities. This plan is moreover one of the components of a longer term objective: ensuring convergence of Member States capability scenarios. From the initial CDP conclusions, Member States selected a first tranche of 12 selected actions to be addressed first (see also Ch.4, EDA): Measures to counter man-portable air Defense systems Computer network operations Mine counter measures in littoral sea areas Comprehensive approach military implications Military human intelligence and cultural/language training Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance architecture Medical support Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear Defense Third party logistical support Measures to counter improvised explosive devices 103

104 Increased availability of helicopters Network enabled capability (NEC) Other actions resulting from the CDP could be initiated at a later stage. In addition, emphasis was laid on the need to ensure the best possible coordination with similar work carried out by NATO. An Update of the Force Catalogue was finalized in April 2009, establishing the FC 09. The main conclusions in the new prioritization 2009 is that the conclusions from the PC 07 remains valid and the EU can conduct the full spectrum of military ESDP operations within the parameters of the Strategic Planning Assumptions, with different levels of risks caused by recognized shortfalls. The most critical shortfalls still apply in the areas of survivability, deployability, and information superiority. The EUMC Prioritization of Capability Shortfalls 2009 represents the current EUMC guidance for addressing capability shortfalls identified within the context of the HLG Together with the Lessons Learned from Operations and the Interoperability Study, this will form the EUMC input to the update of the EDAs Capability Development Plan Lessons Learned from the HLG 2010 process 104

105 The majority of the lessons identified recommendations are taken into account in the Headline Task Force Work programme for the first semester of 2009 (e.g. Interoperability Study, Measurement of Progress, IG Tool) and have been reported in the Single Progress Report I/2009. The first Lessons Learned (LL) report provides the toolbox, taking into consideration the ongoing development in both EU and NATO, and the requirement to establish a common language for capability development within the EU as well as to produce a common IG Tool, available to both organizations used for the different planning processes in EU and NATO. The added value of this toolbox is in the structured linkage between the tasks established in the GETL, the required capabilities and their associated Reference Units with the respective description (capability statements and structure). This linkage is compatible with the tools used in NATO, allowing the harmonized use of language between both organizations, giving MS a composite picture of their individual contributions. The final report on Lessons Learnt from the HLG 2010 process (to include the results stemming from the assessment and evaluation phases) will be reported by mid 2010 after the finalization of the current ongoing measurement of progress and reviewing of priorities. Addressing Critical Shortfalls an example Strategic Transport The Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP of June 2004 defined measures to be carried out in order to develop and operationalise civilian capabilities, including work on a consolidated Civilian Headline Goal. This work began in the second half of 2004 and led to the endorsement by the European Council, in December 2004, of the Civilian Headline Goal Thus, the European Council put both military and civilian capability development on separate parallel tracks. The Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP of June 2004 defined measures to be carried out in order to develop and operationalise civilian capabilities, including work on a consolidated Civilian Headline Goal. This work began in the second half of 2004 and led to the endorsement by the European Council, in December 2004, of the Civilian Headline Goal Thus, the European Council put both military and civilian capability development on separate parallel tracks. Meeting between Jaap de Hoop 105

106 Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, and Javier Solana, Secretary General of the Council of the European Union and High Representative for the CFSP Credit The Council of the European Union EU NATO military capability development co operation The Nice European Council has set three specific aims for EU Capability development: To enable the EU to monitor and facilitate progress towards the honoring of undertakings to achieve the overall goal, in both quantitative and qualitative terms; To enable the EU to evaluate and, if necessary, to review its defined capability goals in order to meet the requirements of the full range of Petersberg tasks in the light of changing circumstances; To help achieve consistency between the pledges undertaken in the EU framework and, for the countries concerned, the force goals agreed to in the context of NATO planning or the Partnership for Peace (PARP). To achieve these aims, an EU Capability Development mechanism has been set up. It defines the EU military capability development process. It also contributes to ensuring consistency between the pledges undertaken in the EU framework and, for the countries concerned, the Force/Partnership goals agreed to in the context of NATO planning or the PARP, as well as to ensuring mutual reinforcement of the EU s headline and collective capability goals and those of NATO where they overlap. The setting of political goals and guidance affecting capability development will fully respect the political autonomy of EU and NATO decision making. 106

107 An EU NATO Capability Group was established in order to ensure the transparent and coherent development of capabilities and provide a forum for addressing where relevant, from the strategic point of view, the overall coherence and complementarily of proposed specific goals, commitments and priorities. It is up to the EU, NATO and Member Nations of both organizations to draw conclusions from the Group s discussions, as appropriate, in the further development of respective goals and capabilities. You can read HERE the background note to Berlin Plus Arrangements ( 11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf) You can read HERE a synthesis on NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations ( %20EU- NATO%20Consultation,%20Planning%20and%20Operations.pdf) 4.5 CHAPTER 4 - European Defense Agency This Chapter will present the role and place of the European Defense Agency (EDA) in the EU military capability development process, outlining its mission and functions, as well as the major action lines and results Enhancing European Defense Capabilities: The EDA Approach 107

108 Why a European Defense Agency? Improving Military Capabilities = EDA s Raison d Être Fragmentation in Europe: National military requirements > diverging demand National R&T + procurement > different equipment National Defense industry > national production Effects: Operations: lack of standardization and interoperability Defense budgets: waste of money Industry: lack of adaptation to a competitive market Some key data: 23 different types Armored Fighting Vehicles 16 national naval shipyards (US: 3) 53% spent on personnel (US: 20%); approx. 21% spent on investment (US: 36%) approx. 85% of Defense R&T and 80% of equipment procurement = national military deployed (US: ) EDA in the CSDP Institutional Landscape 108

109 Mission and functions EDA s Strategic Framework Capability Development Plan Overall strategic tool, driving R&T, Armaments and Industry Connecting short, medium and longer term capability needs Not a Force Plan, but telling in what future Capabilities to invest 12 prioritized actions (incl. helicopters, C IED, MMCM) European Defense R&T Strategy In what technologies to invest & how to do this better Armaments Co operation Strategy How to develop effective and efficient armaments co operation programmes European Defense Technological and Industrial Base Strategy Future European industrial landscape Results Projects Helicopters: training, Future Transport Helicopter Air Transport: European Air Transport Fleet Unmanned Air Vehicles/UAV: insertion into normal airspace; MIDCAS project (Sense & Avoid technologies) EU Network Enabled Capability/NEC: civil military connectivity Multinational Space based Imaging System/MUSIS: next generation European military earth observation satellites Maritime Surveillance: networking; civil military (Wise Pens) Airworthiness: common EMARs (saving billions) Biological Defense: detection & monitoring (Bio EDEP program) Third Party Logistics Support (TPLS) Platform EU Satellite Communications Procurement Cell Intelligence Pilot Courses (OSINT and others) 109

110 Results Invest More Together in Defense R&T New Formula: Joint Investment Programme (JIP) Fund instead of project > more money, higher speed contracting Competition instead of juste retour > more open market Consortia instead of national > European R&T networking Two JIPs Up & Running JIP Force Protection: 20 countries, 55m (+ additional money industry) JIP Innovative Concepts and Emerging Technologies: 11 countries, 16m European Framework Cooperation for Security and Defense Research Systematic synchronization of civilian security, space and Defense research Results Market Code of Conduct Defense Procurement Covering Art. 296 EC Treaty (exempting common market rules), now Art. 346 Run through Electronic Bulletin Board Defense governmental Defense contracts with value > 1m Active since 1 July 2006: 470 contracts published Approx. 260 contracts awarded under competition; value nearly 4 bn; of which 29% awarded cross border Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain Covers industry to industry (sub) contracts Active since 1 April 2007 Code of Conduct on Offsets Transparency, not an end to offsets 100% ceiling (as of 1 Oct. 2010) Active since 1 July CHAPTER 5 - Civilian Capability Development Explains the civilian capability development process with its basic documents, and discusses results and associated wider co operation. Before the start of Chapter 5 Civilian Capability Development, you are strongly recommended to read Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference, Civilian Headline Goal 2010 Conclusion document, Brussels Click on the icon Introduction In order to bring the EU s capability development into line with the ambitions set out in the European Security Strategy, the European Council endorsed, in June 2004, a Military Headline Goal 110

111 The Action Plan defined measures to be carried out in order to develop and operationalise civilian capabilities, including work on a consolidated Civilian Headline Goal. This work began in the second half of 2004 and led to the endorsement by the European Council, in December 2004, of the Civilian Headline Goal Thus, the European Council put both military and civilian capability development on separate parallel tracks, where the civilian process was to take place over a shorter timeframe (2008) than the military process (2010) Civilian Capability Development Process The civilian capability development process has so far gone through 2 stages, defined by the set targets for EU civilian crisis management capabilities: the Civilian Headline Goal 2008, followed by the Civilian Headline Goal Together with the CHG 2010, a Civilian CSDP Capability Planning Process has been agreed (see diagram above). 111

112 The CHG process is seen as adapting from one CHG to the next in response to realities and needs, as perceived by Member States (MS). Within each CHG stage, the process involves a yearly update on targets with a situation report, thus keeping the CHG process sharp, transparent and responsive. It is overseen by the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC), supported by the EU Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). In order to achieve the successive CHG targets, a number of analytical methodologies were developed, challenges identified, and management tools implemented Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG 2008) Capability planning under the CHG 2008 was based on virtual planning scenarios ( illustrative scenarios ) representing a selection of possible situations calling for EU action under CSDP. 112

113 Subsequently, a detailed list of personnel required for possible civilian CSDP missions to be launched in those situations was established, and EU Member States were invited to indicate personnel that could potentially be made available. A comparison between the Member States indications and the capabilities required provided a comprehensive picture of the actual state of EU preparedness for civilian CSDP missions. Certain non EU states (Canada, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine) were also invited to indicate, under the CHG 2008, their possible contributions to civilian CSDP. Some scenarios called for the deployment of ambitious large scale civilian CSDP missions. This large scale approach was consistent with the CHG 2008 mandate, which stipulated that the EU must be equipped to conduct several civilian CSDP crisis management missions concurrently, calling on different capabilities, including at least one large civilian substitution mission at short notice in a non benign environment. (EULEX KOSOVO type). 113

114 The establishment of a comprehensive list of required capabilities for possible civilian CSDP missions was a central achievement of the CHG It provided, for the first time, a detailed qualitative overview of civilian functions required to meet ambitions deriving from the European Security Strategy. The list contained core elements of job descriptions for mission personnel. It allowed the EU to convert the blunt instrument of target numbers only into a precision tool to match anticipated civilian CSDP mission needs with professional profiles Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (CHG 2010) After thoroughly evaluating the progress made with the CHG 2008 and the challenges ahead, at the ministerial Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference of 2007, EU Ministers decided to adopt the new Civilian Headline Goal 2010 for civilian crisis management capabilities. On the basis of this guidance, the CHG 2010 started in 2008 by reviewing illustrative scenarios, assessing new required capabilities and surveying civilian capabilities. Under the CHG 2010, the following priority objectives were set: Strengthening the EU s capability to plan and deploy several missions at the same time, in particular in rapid response situations; Continuing to develop suitable management tools for efficiently mobilizing capabilities needed for civilian missions; Improving training for personnel likely to be deployed on missions, and continuing to strengthen civilian response teams; Developing the administrative, financial, logistical and human resources aspects of the mission support function, including by seeking to optimize the synergy between civilian and military assets; Developing national strategies to facilitate the deployment of mission personnel and encourage exchange of good practices between Member States; Strengthening coherence and synergies between CSDP missions and other European Union instruments; Introducing a proper feedback system for CSDP civilian missions. 114

115 While keeping the proven planning methodology, the CHG 2010 s added value is mainly in terms of new, more comprehensive scenarios, better exploring of cooperation and co ordination inside and outside the EU, but also in developing and implementing specific new concepts and civilian capability management tools, as well as addressing more quality issues at all levels. Moreover, the CHG 2010 sets the military and civilian capability development processes on a synchronized track, which inherently facilitates synergy Personnel Quality & Training In civilian crisis management under CSDP, training as a vehicle for quality improvement is especially important because the majority of the personnel originates from national civil services and is seconded by Member States governments to EU missions on a temporary basis. The background of these personnel tends to lie in national rather than international deployment, and crisis areas may constitute a challengingly new working environment. Furthermore, CSDP is a relatively new political reality that is going through a phase of important transition and growth. The list of required capabilities emanating from the CHG process provides a detailed overview of all personnel categories involved. This important source of information can be used as a basis for systematically matching specific earmarked personnel categories with available training opportunities. A comprehensive catalogue of training opportunities is available under the EU Training Programme in CSDP, which is a rolling multi annual (3 year) list of all planned training activities in the field of CSDP provided by the EU and individual Member States. This is but one example of how quality improvement can be systematically pursued at both EU and national level Concepts in Support of EU Civilian Crisis Management Another strand of work under the CHG involved the development of new concepts and capabilities. An initial concept was agreed for civilian mission support, i.e., the more managerial aspects of civilian CSDP missions such as finance, human resources, procurement, logistics, medical care/evacuation, communication and information systems, information technology and security. The EU has designated this concept as initial because further conceptual development is deemed necessary to simplify procedures, notably in view of more rapid deployability of civilian CSDP missions. 115

116 A concept was also agreed for Civilian Response Teams (CRTs). The CRT capacity is essentially a tool for quickly gathering information on political crisis for the benefit of EU political decision making, which may also be deployed to provide instant support for agreed EU political crisis management actions. The CRT pool comprises up to 100 named experts nominated by Member States, potentially deployable at 5 days notice for a total duration of up to three months. Experts in the CRT pool receive specific training financed by the European Commission. Work has also been undertaken on rapidly deployable police elements, notably Integrated Police Units (IPUs) and Formed Police Units (FPUs). This concerns, inter alia, the transition of rapidly deployable police elements that are under temporary military responsibility to a civilian chain of command, and the coordination between rapidly deployable police elements and rule of law elements. Work on these issues is ongoing Civilian Capability Management Tool The Civilian Capability Management Tool (CCMT) is a database to support future EU civilian capability development and to considerably expedite civilian CSDP mission planning and preparation. 116

117 Its concept and development is based on CHG 2008 findings, on real life experiences from past CSDP missions and on the EU Training Programme in the Field of ESDP. Starting from the CHG 2008 List of Required Capabilities, the first elements of the CCMT are already operational. In terms of mission personnel, it should facilitate the matching of specific personnel categories (defined via the standard job description catalogues) with available training opportunities. In terms of mission equipment, the CCMT will provide an assessment mechanism of needs vs. provision with which to expedite mission preparation, while drawing on lessons identified and sharing good practices. In terms of decision making, the CCMT will provide a catalogue of agreed concepts and a decision progress indicator, both of which are expected to expedite the EU decision making process in a transparent manner Wider Co operation and Co ordination The CHG process is taking into consideration capabilities across the EU institutions and explores synergies with international organizations (IOs), non EU States and non governmental organizations (NGOs). Crisis situations cannot be labeled as military or civilian per se. In order to be prepared for the widest possible range of situations, the EU capability planners should ensure compatibility and complementarities between EU civilian and EU military capabilities and coordinate their work where possible. In order to increase coherence, civilian and military capability development could be based on a single set of common illustrative scenarios containing identical parameters. 117

118 This said, the respective processes, whilst in the future possibly based on the same scenarios, would remain technically distinct in order to take account of the respective specific capabilities needed for civilian and military crisis management. Work in this field is ongoing. Coherent use of the European Commission s and Member States civilian instruments is of key importance to an overall improvement in the EU s capacity to act. The European Commission has been fully associated in the CHG process, in which its representatives actively participate. Training of the CRTs was developed with the financial support of the European Commission. To this effect, partners in the European Community Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management closely cooperate with the EU Council Secretariat. All assets and capabilities registered in the database of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism were presumed to be available also for civil protection interventions in the framework of CSDP, unless Member States explicitly excluded them. The CHG 2008 process fostered a useful exchange of views between the EU and International Organizations (IOs), non EU partner States and NGOs. This enhanced the EU s understanding of the capabilities, best practices and experiences of these actors and of their views and expectations as regards cooperation with the EU. As set out earlier, certain non EU States (Canada, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine) were invited to indicate the capabilities they would be able to contribute to possible future civilian crisis management actions in the framework of CSDP. It was understood that their contributions were to be considered as supplementary to the overall EU capacity rather than an integral part thereof. In the framework of the CHG 2008 process, the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) acted as the EU s principal interlocutor with European Peacebuilding NGOs, networks of NGOs and think tanks active in the field of peace building, which share an interest in promoting sustainable peace building policies among decision makers in the EU. 118

119 Civilian Headline Goal 2010 Perspectives Most personnel in civilian crisis management missions under CSDP are seconded by EU Member States. Consequently, the wide range of different ministries, services, judicial councils, etc., involved in the secondment process directly influences the EU s capacity to act. It was therefore important to ensure that the CHG process findings, ranging from the conceptual to the very practical, would find their way into Member States national administrations. To this end, Civilian Capability Improvement Conferences were held in 2005, 2006 and These Conferences a kind of intermediate evaluation at ministerial level enabled ministers to guide the CHG 2008 process and to enhance its political visibility. Several Member States managed to translate recommendations and guidelines emanating from the CHG process into practical terms, often resulting in closer cooperation between the different stakeholder ministries involved. Clearly, the CHG 2010 is not only about numbers. Several Member States declared that they have created structures to facilitate the recruitment, training, deployment, etc., of personnel. It is clearly a task for the EU to facilitate and promote equal preparation of Member States so that all may usefully contribute to civilian CSDP. The CHG 2008 has certainly achieved encouraging results in this respect but more needs to be done. 4.7 CHAPTER 6 - Perspectives for EU Crisis Management Capabilities Discusses the impact on capability development of the possible future mechanisms for Permanent Structured Co operation in the Defense field, and the trend toward harmonization of EU civil military capability development. 119

120 Before the start of Chapter 6 Perspectives for EU Crisis Management Capabilities, you are strongly recommended to read EU Council, Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities Brussels, December Click on the icon The Challenges of the Present The efficiency problem of Europe s armed forces is well known: of an impressive overall number of over two million men and women in uniform in the EU 27, only a meager 10 to 15% are estimated to be deployable. The causes are manifold: the low cost effectiveness of a plethora of small scale capabilities, unnecessary intra EU duplications, the presence of large numbers of quasi non deployable conscripts, capability gaps in terms of enablers (strategic transport, command, control and communications), and, although all EU Member States are conscious of the challenge and are implementing measures, slow transformation nonetheless from territorial Defense to expeditionary warfare. The question must be asked whether the existing mechanisms, in CSDP as well as NATO, are sufficient to achieve the required transformation within a reasonable timeframe. The primary cause of this problematic state of affairs is the still almost exclusively national focus of Defense planning, while capability gaps at the aggregate EU and NATO level are being ignored. Therefore, the only way to achieve the quantum leap that is necessary to realize Defense transformation is through pooling which, by reducing intra European duplications, can produce much more deployable capabilities within the current combined Defense budget of the EU Permanent Structured Co-operation From that point of view, Permanent Structured Co operation, the new mechanism to be established by the Lisbon Treaty for those Member States whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions (Art. 28A 6), has enormous potential. For the first time, enhanced cooperation between a group of Member States in the field of Defense will be possible within the Treaty. One could argue that the solutions to Europe s capability conundrum are in 120

121 effect well known the question is whether PermStrucCoop can be the platform that convinces the Member States to implement them. PermStrucCoop can be a very flexible instrument, allowing all EU Member States to participate, if they so choose, at their own level of means, in the way that they choose: Member States wanting to take part can formulate an expression of interest. Such a declaration would outline, in broad terms, what contribution, of what size, in what timeframe might be considered. The aim should be for each participating Member State to generate additional usable capabilities, either in one or more specific shortfall areas as identified in the Progress Catalogue, and/or through force packages covering several capability areas, and/or with regard to longer term, future capabilities in the light of the trends identified in the EDA s Capability Development Plan (CDP). Simultaneously, the participating Member States, with the support of the EDA, can agree on criteria for participation that apply to each specific contribution, regardless of size, in terms of deployability, sustainability, interoperability and per capita investment in equipment. An additional criterion might be actual participation in operations (regardless of the framework, EU, NATO, UN or ad hoc). To be avoided are general budgetary criteria, such as spending 2% of GDP on Defense: laudable though they may be, they are also unrealistic and will not generate additional capabilities in the short to medium term. The EDA can then assess the opportunities for different forms of cooperation and pooling in the light of Member States declared intentions, allowing Member States to decide which contributions they will offer on a national basis and which in cooperation, in their preferred format, with other Member States. Pooling of forces offers the greatest added value. Member States can contribute national squadrons or battalions to a multination fighter force or army division, while everything above and below that (command & control, logistics, maintenance, training) could be fully integrated and located at a reduced number of bases, thus creating huge synergies and effects of scale. The World War II RAF can serve to illustrate the model: comprising clearly identifiable Belgian, Dutch, Czech and Polish squadrons, it obviously did not have a separate Belgian airfield or Polish logistics... The beauty of PermStrucCoop is its flexibility however: each Member State can participate in the way it prefers. This process will result in a set of concrete capability objectives, to be achieved by pre identified units, some national, some multinational, in an agreed timeframe. The EDA is responsible for monitoring progress and assessing contributions against the agreed criteria and the evolving needs, as well as continuously updating and proposing opportunities for cooperation, in the light of the CDP. It is important that the EDA should be empowered by the Member States to play this role to the full, in order to realize the potential of PermStrucCoop Perspectives of Civilian Capabilities In the civilian area, Member States are taking initiatives to each create a pool of trained experts, from police, justice and other sectors. Deployability remains an issue though: while for the military expeditionary operations are the core business, for the various civilian institutions it is an ad hoc task, to be undertaken in addition to national duties, usually against the background of national claims for more police on the street, etc. Even though the demand for civilian deployments is continually increasing, it will be difficult therefore to substantially increase the numbers. One 121

122 option that may be considered is the recruitment by the EU itself of a central pool of civilian experts, in order to always have a minimal capacity available. One possible approach to making civil military capability development more effective is illustrated bellow. Harmonizing EU Civil Military Capability Development beyond HG/ CHG 2010, Explanatory note accompanying the EU Council Swedish Presidency s invitation to the dedicated expert seminar of September 2009 here ( nising%20civ-mil%20capability%20development%20beyond% pdf) From Capabilities to Operations and Missions PermStrucCoop is not the silver bullet that will solve all the problems of Europe s military. But because it is in the Treaty and Member States therefore have to consider whether and how to make use of it, it presents a window of opportunity to further CSDP. If a critical mass of Member States willing to go ahead with PermStrucCoop can be found, the desire to be in will probably lead many others to participate. Once in, peer pressure and the need to avoid exclusion for ceasing to fulfill the criteria should stimulate Member States efforts. The only carrot that can stimulate Member States to set demanding criteria in the first place however is the one that should appeal to Finance Ministers: the potential of increasing the efficiency of the Defense budget. PermStrucCoop is not an end in itself, but a means towards generating more deployable forces which in turn is only a means towards deploying Europe s forces in the service of global peace and security. Ultimately therefore, even if the capabilities are available, political willingness, to commit troops where necessary and to act as the EU is the key. But the more integrated Europe s military capabilities will be, the more EU Member States will be pushed to act as one. 122

123 5 AKU 6 PLANNING FOR CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS General description This AKU concerns planning for CSDP crisis response missions and operations. This is shorthand for saying this discussion is about the planning of CSDP military operations and civilian missions, with a focus on the political and strategic level. The AKU6 consists of an introductory part, of 5 chapters focusing on relevant aspects of the planning mechanism and a concluding part Learning content AKU6 will touch upon the following aspects of the CSDP mission planning: Chapter 1 About Planning planning functions, levels, type of planning and procedural foundations at EU political and strategic level. Chapter 2 Advance Planning the purpose and types of advance planning and who is doing what at the EU political and strategic level. Chapter 3 Crisis response Planning sequence of events and documents for planning CSDP military operations and civilian crisis response missions. Chapter 4 Introduction to Operational Planning operational level command options, force generation process and operational design tools, which further shape the outcome of the CSDP mission planning process. Chapter 5 Challenges and Prospects directions and challenges in the likely development of the EU s mission planning practice and procedures. During your study, it is highly recommended that you read the following: *.*.* Draft EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning, Council General Secretariat 13983/05dated 3 November Click on the icon * * * EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level, Council General Secretariat 10687/08 dated 16 June Click on the icon * * * EU Concept for Force Generation, Council General Secretariat 10690/08 dated 16 June 2008, pages 6 7. Click on the icon * * * Draft guidelines for improving Force Generation for civilian ESDP missions, Council General Secretariat. 8276/09 dated 1 April 2009, pages 3 7. Click on the icon 123

124 In support of your study you are advised to consult the following annexes: A. List of Abbreviations used in this AKU (here). B. CSDP Planning Documents referred to in this AKU (here) Bibliography & Other Sources Should you wish to deepen your understanding of the topics covered in this AKU, you may consider exploring the academic literature on the subject. For this purpose, you can make use of the bibliography below. * * * Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management, Council General Secretariat11127/03 dated 03 July 2003 (here) Grevi, Giovanni, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane, European Security and Defense Policy: The First Ten Years ( ). Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies. web.pdf > An overall view of the institutional architecture and workings of the ESDP plus an overview of every ESDP operation conducted so far. Gross, Eva EU and the Comprehensive Approach. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS Report 2008:13). > A critical assessment of where the EU stands in pursuing civil military coordination. Hansen, Annika Against all Odds The Evolution of Planning for ESDP Operations: Civilian Crisis Management from EUPM onwards. Berlin: Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF Study 10/06). Evolution_of_Planning_for_ESDP_Operations_11.06.pdf > A more detailed discussion of planning civilian operations. Kem, Jack D Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade. 3rd ed. Kansas: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. > An introduction to campaign design and operational planning tools. Korski, Daniel and Richard Gowan Can the EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe s Civilian Capabilities. London: European Council on Foreign Relations. /documents/civilian crisis report.pdf > A critical audit of the EU s civilian crisis capabilities. Mattelaer, Alexander The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations The Case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA. Brussels: Institute for European Studies (IES Working Paper 5). > A detailed discussion of the planning cycle of one individual operation and what it implies for the planning of military operations in general. Another major source of information on the planning of operations is military doctrine. One reference document course participants may find particularly useful is the following: Joint Doctrine Publication 3 40 Security and Stabilization: The Military Contribution. London: Ministry of Defense. E72C 445E 8246 D11002D7A852/0/jdp_3_40_nov09.pdf 124

125 For a broader documentation on CSDP related subjects, whenever necessary, you are invited to visit the CSDP Knowledge base at edu.be 5.2 CHAPTER 1 - About Planning General discussion introducing the planning functions, levels, types of planning and procedural foundations at EU political and strategic level Introduction CSDP military operations and civilian missions (in generic terms CSDP missions when not otherwise specified) range from short term crisis management to long term stabilization, and from small advisory teams to large military or civilian deployments. In organizational terms, these are complex undertakings. The EU deploys soldiers as well as civilians to address the causes of conflict or at least mitigate its consequences. One useful place to start when considering planning for these missions is the question: what is the purpose of mission planning? Functions of Planning In this context, planning serves two distinct functions: a procedural one as well as a conceptual one. 125

126 Firstly, planning serves to structure and enable an efficient organizational process. Preparing to conduct CSDP operations involves a wide range of different actors. Planning procedures dissect this complex process into small steps that provide a temporal as well as a functional framework. In other words, it provides the answers to the question who has to do what, when and where? Secondly, planning provides the context in which operations are designed in conceptual terms. This is the creative process, in which a planner should determine how an operation can achieve or at least contribute to the political objectives. It is important to keep in mind this twin function of planning: the final purpose is not merely to launch an operation. It is about launching operations that deliver the intended political results Levels of Planning CSDP mission planning is conducted at several levels. The EU institutions in Brussels the Council of the EU and all its supporting structures represent the political and strategic level. This is the level where the political objectives of CSDP missions are determined and the appropriate resources are committed. In other words, it is the level at which strategic guidance is formulated and political control is exercised. This guidance and control reaches the mission/operation via the EU chain of command. This chain of command normally features strategic and operational levels. The military or civilian strategic level is just below the political level. This military or civilian strategic level is designed to translate political guidance into operational terms, provide outline planning for the operation before it is deployed and subsequently facilitate dialogue between the political and operational levels. The operational level covers overall coordination and management of a CSDP mission or operation once it is deployed on the ground. The tactical level covers direct 126

127 action on the ground. In addition to these conventional, detailed chains of command, there is room for ad hoc arrangements when a different structure has to be tailored to a specific action. At the political and strategic level the main focus of this AKU planning assumes the form of an iterative dialogue between the political authorities and the staff tasked with the actual planning. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is the working body of the political authority, whereas various branches within the European External Action Service (EEAS) each play their part in the actual planning work. The PSC receives advice from the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and from the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). This dialogue starts with very general ideas of CSDP action and gradually works its way up to a detailed operational plan ready for execution, then continues with mission execution (including, if necessary, plan review) and termination aspects. As it is an iterative process, it allows the political authority to exercise political control and provide strategic guidance on a continuous basis Types of Planning It is common practice to consider two types of planning: advance planning and crisis response planning. Advance planning concerns planning for potential future scenarios with the aim of reducing response time if an actual crisis should materialize. It is only when a specific crisis has been identified and the Political and Security Committee has agreed that EU action is appropriate that the switch is made from advance planning to crisis response planning. Advance planning thus relates to continuous planning for potential crises, whereas crisis response planning concerns the development of a response to an actual crisis Planning Procedures In the aftermath of the European Council meeting in Nice in December 2000, the so called Crisis Management Procedures laid down the reference framework for planning CSDP missions and operations. As a living document, the Crisis Management Procedures (CMP) were updated continuously over the following few years. The 2003 version serves as the basic reference document (doc # 11127/03). However, a number of additional documents have been drawn up that provide more detailed guidance on mission planning along military or civilian lines. The most relevant are: 127

128 The EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level (doc # 10687/08). The EU Concept for Military Command and Control. The EU Concept for Force Generation (doc # 10690/08) 1. The draft EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning (doc # 13983/05). The draft Guidelines for the Command and Control Structure for EU Civilian Operations in Crisis Management. The draft guidelines for improving Force Generation for civilian CSDP missions (doc # 8276/09). EU SSR Guinea Bissau: Ingore Border Police, 25 June 2009 After the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was set up. This heralded a major organizational change in the way the EU responds to international crises. At the time this AKU was last revised procedural revisions were still underway and it is likely that new reference documents will be forthcoming in the near future. New developments include for example the establishment of an EEAS Crisis Management Board and Crisis Response System. As an intellectual discipline, mission planning has its historical roots in military affairs. Centuries ago, military campaigns already required great effort to manage issues such as logistics, intelligence and lines of communication. Later on, much of the military vocabulary made its way into the civilian world. Civilian crisis management constitutes a policy area that is highly experimental in nature and for which there are practically no external sources on which to draw. However, there are 10 years practical experiences in CSDP missions. Nevertheless, no consensus has yet emerged amongst the different Member States as to what should be the final form of these civilian planning concepts. As planning doctrine represents the codification of past experience, it is always a moving target that must evolve to take new realities into account. 1 Force generation is the process whereby Member States commit assets and capabilities to an actual operation. It will be discussed in greater detail in chapter

129 Enabling Success The following chapters focus on the procedural mechanisms for planning CSDP missions and operations, to make for an efficient organizational process. It should be kept in mind that the process should not be confused with the final product. Procedures do not provide the conceptual content of how an operation can achieve its political objectives. Good planning is more than ticking a few boxes: it requires creative imagination on the part of planners! There is no definite recipe for how to make an operation or mission yield the desired results. CSDP missions and operations take place in a complex and constantly changing political environment. Understanding the context and thinking creatively about how to influence the situation at hand will be essential to developing planning products that enable success. Planning procedures and conceptual tools can foster this process, but they should not be treated as the Holy Scripture. They are guidelines to enable effective action; they do not constitute an objective in their own right. Advance Planning is conducted to allow the EU to Advance Planning deal with potential crises. Advance Planning is sub divided into two categories: Generic and Contingency. Civil Emergency Planning CEP CEP is a national (host nation) civil responsibility. Its planning parameters can vary from country to country. During the crisis management process, CIMIC facilitates, within security constraints, co ordination of military plans with existing CEP plans (National, UN and NATO). CEP might affect freedom 129

130 of movement and actions, and the military plan must take into account the need to protect the civil population, as well as the need to maintain vital functions of society. It is thus essential that CIMIC elements establish links with the relevant CEP agencies and determine how planned and implemented CEP measures will affect EU led CMO. Contingency planning is the production of detailed planning documents for potential operations where Contingency Planning the planning factors have been identified or have been assumed. They include an indication of resources needed and the deployment options. They may form the basis for subsequent planning. Generic Planning is the production of basic planning documents for potential operations where Generic Planning some planning factors have not yet been fully identified or have not been assumed. It identifies the general capabilities required. Under the military direction of the EUMC, the Op Cdr, assisted by the EUMS, will be responsible for Military Operational Planning, including the coherence of plans developed at subordinate levels. Military Operational Planning It includes the production of a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the production of a full Operation Plan (OPLAN). Furthermore, the Op Cdr is responsible for elaborating a set of Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the Force Activation Process including the elaboration of the Statement of Forces Requirement (SOR). Military Planning is an iterative process which Military Planning needs to analyze all relevant factors to determine the military mission. At the Political and Strategic 130

131 level this will include analysis of the implication of political objectives, desired end state, restraints and constraints as well as an analysis of the capabilities needed, in order to develop potential military options balanced against those capabilities offered or potentially available. Planning for the preparation and conduct of Operational Planning military operations at strategic, operational and tactical level. 5.3 CHAPTER 2 - Advance Planning Introducing the advance planning purpose and types, and describing who does what at the EU political and strategic level Purpose of Advance Planning The purpose of advance planning is simple: it is to be prepared for all kinds of eventualities. One of the defining characteristics of crisis situations is that they tend to develop very quickly and leave only limited time to develop an adequate policy response. The main function of advance planning is to reduce the response time needed when a crisis occurs. Of course, some of this is highly sensitive from a political point of view. The point is to be prepared for eventualities: advance planning should not trigger the anticipated events or indicate that EU action may be forthcoming before the political decision has been taken. The culture of contingency planning is being developed only very slowly. 131

132 Advance planning can be divided into two sub disciplines: generic planning and strategic contingency planning. Generic planning involves drawing up generic concepts as well as catalogues of what capabilities are available for pre identified standard scenarios. Strategic contingency planning involves the ongoing monitoring of the security environment, drawing up country books (i.e. travel guides for crisis management purposes ) and contingency plans to inform political decision making Who Does What? Generic planning covers a wide range of topics. It includes the development of concepts relating to how the CSDP system is supposed to work. But it also includes more detailed work in terms of generic scenarios. For example, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) has developed five illustrative scenarios for military crisis management (see figure). These are for developing generic force packages that are used as benchmarks in the EU crisis management capability development process. Contingency Planning. The EEAS Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD), supported by the EUMS and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), is in the lead for contingency planning. This normally takes the form of policy papers for consideration by the Political and Security Committee and other advisory bodies. In the narrow sense of the word, contingency plans take the following form: if event X were to occur in country Y, the EU could respond by means of Z. It is about planning for events that would trigger a crisis situation before these events have occurred, and these events may very well never happen. Contingency plans can also concern more practical issues such as deployment options and logistical feasibility studies. Once an emerging crisis has been identified, it leads to the immediate mobilization of all relevant EU resources in accordance with the EEAS Crisis Response System. This may also involve the 132

133 dispatching of fact finding missions (FFM) to collect information with a view to considering possible EU action. In all of the practices described above, the political authorities are mostly in a reading mode, digesting all the input produced by the planning community. Most advance planning documents are food for thought products. The two exceptions in this regard are the concepts describing how the EU goes about its business, which require political approval, and the option papers proposing EU action, which require a political decision. The conclusion that EU action is appropriate constitutes a mandate for the development of a number of consecutive planning documents. 5.4 CHAPTER 3 - Crisis response Planning Explaining the sequence of events and documents for planning CSDP military operations and civilian missions. For explanations, examples and templates of the planning documents mentioned in this chapter, please consult Annex B here ( In response to the outbreak of a crisis, the EU planning process can be broken into three main phases: the establishment of an EU wide strategic approach, a CSDP planning phase, and an implementation/review and closure phase. In order to establish an EU wide strategic approach, the Member States or the EEAS can initiate the drafting of a single strategy or framework document in line with the EEAS Crisis Response System. This may lead to a subsequent decision taken by the Member States in the Political and Security Committee (PSC) to deem CSDP action appropriate. This marks the official start of the crisis response planning sequence that eventually leads to a detailed operation plan, ready for execution. The first step is the development of a Crisis Management Concept by the EEAS CMPD. At this stage it is not necessarily clear whether the eventual action will be of a military or civilian nature, or both. Beyond this point, however, the procedures for planning military operations and civilian missions start to diverge although this is an issue that the 2012 review of the Crisis Management Procedures seeks to address. For this reason, the details of the military and civilian planning processes are presented separately. However, the logic of developing a CMC as a first step, 133

134 strategic options in an (optional) second step and operational planning documents in a third step stays the same. A clear and concise statement of the line of action Concept of Operations CONOPS chosen by a commander in order to accomplish his mission. Crisis Management Concept CMC A conceptual framework describing the EU s overall approach to the management of a particular crisis, addressing the full range of EU activities (diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, military) and may include the definition of politico military objectives for any possible military activities. The crisis management concept is an important tool to ensure the coherence and the comprehensiveness of possible EU actions by taking account of the range and scale of the different instruments available to the Union. Initiating Military Directive IMD On the basis of the Military Strategic Option selected by the Council, the EUMS will prepare a draft Initiating Military Directive, which will be submitted to the EUMC for consideration, endorsement and advice before being presented to the PSC for approval. Once approved by the PSC, the EUMC will authorize the IMD for the Op Cdr. While the content of the IMD will, to some extent, depend on the particular circumstances of each crisis, it will normally provide a clear description of political objectives and the envisaged military mission to contribute to these objectives. It should also include any political limitations and assumptions that the Op Cdr should take into account during CONOPS and OPLAN development. This directive should as well contain any politically desirable supporting tasks that the Council has 134

135 directed the EU s military forces to be prepared to take. Operation Plan OPLAN A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation plan is usually used instead of order in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order Crisis Response Planning for Military Operations Step one: Within the EEAS the CMPD is in the lead for drafting the CMC. The EUMS will provide extra military expertise as required. Once the draft CMC is submitted to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) for political consideration, first the CIVCOM will analyze the draft and submit to the PSC its advice and recommendations. The EUMC, supported by the EUMS, will also provide military advice on the draft CMC. On the basis of these multiple sources of advice, the PSC will agree upon the final version of the CMC before forwarding it (via COREPER) to the Council for approval. Step two: Following the approval of the CMC by the Council, the PSC may request if deemed advisable the EUMC to issue a Military Strategic Options Directive, whereby the EUMS is instructed to prepare military strategic options (MSO). These MSOs generally reflect different levels of ambition in terms of resources and military tasks. They are prioritized by the EUMS in 135

136 terms of feasibility and acceptability of risk. The EUMC evaluates these MSOs and provides military advice to the PSC. The Commission can provide input on relevant accompanying measures such as in the area of development and humanitarian aid, etc... The PSC in turn evaluates these options from a political perspective and drafts a decision on the preferred strategic option. This suggestion is forwarded to the Council, which decides by unanimity whether or not to take action. This decision is formally executed by means of a Council Decision, which is drafted on behalf of the Council in the Relex Counselors Group, (with contributions from relevant institutional actors) Crisis Response Planning for Military Operations Step three: Once the Council Decision has been approved, the PSC issues political guidance for the operational planning. The PSC issues guidance as necessary for the EUMC to direct the EUMS to draft the Initiating Military Directive (IMD). The IMD includes those directives required by the OpCdr to enable him to draw up the necessary planning documents. The PSC approves the IMD before the EUMC authorizes its release to the Operation Commander (OpCdr) designated in the Council Decision. The OpCdr (supported by his Operation Headquarters OHQ) then develops the operational planning documents: the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), including guidelines on the use of force and the Statement of Requirements (SOR), and afterwards the Operation Plan (OPLAN). This process will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4. In short, a CONOPS is a concise outline of the operation, whereas an OPLAN represents a detailed script of the operation. Both the CONOPS and 136

137 the OPLAN have to be agreed by the PSC and approved by Council. Once the OPLAN has been approved by the Council and all the required resources have been made available via force generation, the operation can be launched. The full process of planning military CSDP operations can be summarized as in the above sketch. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the planning line may be adapted to the circumstances at hand and to the time available. See on the left the theory vs. practice table, illustrating the planning line in actual operations. The 2012 review of the Crisis Management Procedures, furthermore, seeks to reduce the number of steps required, e.g. by making the development of strategic options optional and introducing a fast track procedure based on the compression of CONOPS and OPLAN into a single document. Concordia Artemis Althea EUFOR RD Congo EUFOR Tchad/RCA Atalanta CMC MSOD MSO IMD CONOPS OPLAN For more details on crisis response planning for CSDP military operations, please read. * * * EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level, Council General Secretariat, 10687/08, dated

138 Crisis Response Planning for Civilian Operations Step one: Within the EEAS the CMPD is tasked with drafting the CMC. The CPCC will provide extra civilian expertise as required. The civilian options contained herein are reviewed in detail by CIVCOM. CSDP civilian capabilities include police, rule of law, civilian administration, civil protection, monitoring and mission support. The PSC agrees upon the CMC and forwards it to the Council for approval. Step two: Within the EEAS, the CPCC is tasked with the development of civilian strategic options (CSOs). Similarly to MSOs, these will reflect different levels of ambition in mandated tasks and required resources. The Commission provides input on accompanying measures within its remit. CIVCOM comments upon these CSOs or PSOs and the PSC chooses which option to pursue. This again requires the formal approval of the Council. Again the 2012 CMP review is likely to make this step optional only. Step three: The CPCC is also charged with writing the CONOPS, as the Director of CPCC is normally the overall Civilian Operations Commander. As the financial arrangements for funding civilian missions, an important planning tool, should be indicated in the Council Decision, in this 138

139 case the CONOPS precedes the Council Decision (in contrast to the military operation planning sequence). The civilian CONOPS is commented upon by CIVCOM and agreed upon by the PSC, and finally adopted by the Council. At this point in time, the Council Decision can be passed, including the selection of a civilian Head of Mission (HoM) and the budget ( financial statement ). Subsequently the HoM develops the CONOPS into a fully fledged OPLAN. The 2012 CMP review, furthermore, may end up shifting responsibility for the civilian OPLAN to the Civilian Operations Commander this streamlining civilian and military procedures and at the same time ensure that civilian HoMs and their teams are involved in the early planning stages from CONOPS onwards. 5.5 CHAPTER 4 - Introduction to Operational Planning Introducing the operational level command options, force generation process, and operational design tools, which further shape the outcome It is an oft repeated maxim that a good planner should be aware of what goes on at the levels above as well as below that where he or she happens to be. For this reason, the present chapter will introduce some basic concepts used in operational planning as well as the major crosscutting issues that extend over several levels Command Options EUFOR Tchad/RCA Medal parade at the OHQ 20 March 2009 Credit: EUFOR Tchad/RCA As explained earlier, the relevant EEAS services conducts advance planning (including early assessment of operational matters) for CSDP operations and missions. However, the detailed preparatory work and planning will be done by those authorities that are designated to command the operation or mission. In a nutshell, the machinery in Brussels decides the menu, after which 139

140 the Operation Commander can start doing the shopping and the cooking. As anybody with cooking experience can attest, it is always useful to have a good match between grocery shopping and cooking. For this reason, the following overview of command options is provided. For civilian missions, the institutional command set up is fairly straightforward. The early planning work (CMC development) is led by the CMPD with input from CPCC, after which planning authority shifts to the Director of CPCC, as permanent civilian operations commander. The CPCC normally drafts the strategic options. Following Council approval it develops the CONOPS for the chosen strategic option. By means of a Council Decision, the Council appoints a Head of Mission, who drafts the OPLAN. The Head of Mission is entrusted with operational control of all the mission s capabilities and resources. He or she embodies the operational level of command and reports back to the Director of CPCC. The situation is more complex for military operations. The CMPD and the EUMS draft the planning documents at the political and strategic level. Afterwards, planning and command authority needs to be given to a military strategic Operation Commander (with supporting operation headquarters) that is designated in the Council Decision. In this regard, there are three distinct possibilities for provision of the Operation Headquarters: Operation Headquarters provided by a Member State for an EU operation > National headquarters that are activated for an EU operation and subsequently multinationalised by means of augmentee personnel from all the Member States participating in the operation. Five Member States (France, Germany, the UK, Italy and Greece) have declared such headquarters to be available. So far, three have been used in practice: the French OHQ was used for operations Artemis and EUFOR Tchad/RCA, the German OHQ was used for EUFOR RD Congo and the British OHQ is currently being used for the counter piracy operation Atalanta. 140

141 EU OHQ at SHAPE (NATO strategic headquarters) following recourse to the NATO command structure and designation of NATO s DSACEUR as EU Operation Commander. > via the Berlin Plus mechanism, the EU can request NATO to make use of its integrated command structure. An EU military operation would then be commanded by the Deputy Strategic Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR). The position of DSACEUR is always filled by a European four star general. This command option has been used twice in practice, namely for Operation Concordia (in FYROM) and Operation Althea (in Bosnia). Operations Centre within the EUMS > this can only be used for autonomous operations, in particular where a joint civil/military response is required, and when no national headquarters are identified. When activated (as currently the context of the Horn of Africa) it is staffed by double hated personnel from the EUMS as well as by personnel seconded from the Member States (see HERE more on EU Ops Centre). Before proceeding to the next heading, you are strongly recommended to read: *.*.* EU Concept for Force Generation, General Secretariat of the Council, doc /08, dated 16 June 2008, pages 6 7 Click on the icon Force Generation Force generation is the process whereby Member States make the assets and capabilities required for a CSDP operation available to the Operation Commander or Head of Mission. Force generation runs parallel to the operational planning process. During the development of the CMC, indicative contribution meetings can be held to provide an early indication of the willingness of the Member States to provide resources for the operation or mission that is being planned. The formal start of force generation, however, is the approval of the CONOPS. A CONOPS normally contains a Statement of Requirements (SOR). This is a shopping list of all the capabilities that are needed to execute the mission, encompassing human, material and financial resources. In a series of force generation conferences the Member States sit around the table and provide the assets the OpCdr or HoM asks for. What is important to keep in mind is that the statement of requirements is a wish list: the Member States will not necessarily provide everything that is asked for. It is up to the OpCdr or HoM to decide whether all the mission critical requirements have been provided. Only at that point in time can the operation be launched. More on force generation for civilian missions in *.*.* Draft guidelines for improving Force Generation for civilian ESDP missions, General Secretariat of the Council, doc. 8276/09, dated 1 April 2009, pages 3 7 icon Click on the 141

142 Operational Design Approaches Mission planning is not only about structuring an organizational process. The eventual missions and operations also need to be designed on a conceptual level. Any CONOPS or OPLAN is intended to link the use of resources to the desired political outcomes. The designing of operations already starts on the political and strategic level, even if most of the work will need to be done at the military strategic or operational levels. After all, the CMC contains the blueprint of the ensuing strategic options, and these are in turn the blueprints of the eventual CONOPS. The design of missions and operations is a creative process: there are no silver bullets in what is inevitably a complex exercise in linking ends and means. Nonetheless, doctrinal planning tools can help with this process. There are essentially two different ways of approaching operational design, depending on whether one starts the process with the means or the ends. The first can be labeled the programmes based approach. Here one starts with what is given. Planners will receive a certain amount of resources and capabilities as well as political guidance on what decision makers want. One can thus try to shape the use of these resources into a number of programmes that can each play a positive role in pushing the conflict situation in the right direction. This is a bottom up process of using the resources that are given to foster progress, or at least to facilitate conditions that may lead to progress. The advantage of this approach is that it can always be applied, regardless of the level of resources that are available. In essence, the programmes based approach boils down to an attempt to make the best use of the resources one has been given. It can be labeled a process based approach because the end state is not necessarily clear. The second can be labeled the objectives based approach (common in Western military doctrines). In this approach, operational design starts with an analysis of the mission s desired end state and objectives, and then reverse engineers what needs to be done in order to achieve those objectives. In a second stage, one can determine what resources are needed in order to do so, and arrive at the Statement of Requirements (SOR) Operational Design Tools There are many conceptual tools available to facilitate the objectives based operational design. In management literature, one will often read about SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, 142

143 opportunities & threats). In military doctrine, the most common tools for operational design are centre of gravity (CoG) analysis, decisive points and lines of operation. Centre of gravity analysis is a methodology to identify the sources of strength of any conflict actor. The centers of gravity (one s own and the opponent s) have certain capabilities, requirements and vulnerabilities that need to be protected against or that can be exploited. Points from which such a centre of gravity may be threatened can be linked into lines of operations, i.e. series of decisive points that serve to neutralize or protect any actor s centre of gravity. In this way, an operational design aimed at defeating or protecting any given actor can be visualized as in the above picture. Several lines of operations connect decisive points and converge towards an actor s centre of gravity, the neutralization or protection of which in turn constitutes (part of) the desired end state. In order to allow for more complex operations (or to be prepared for contingencies), one can introduce branches and sequels to the lines of operation as well as phase the operation in time. More on operational design tools in Kem, Jack D Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade. 3rd ed. Kansas: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at CHAPTER 5 - Challenges and Prospects Concluding discussion on directions and challenges in the likely Over the past years, the EU has launched more than 25 crisis management and stabilization operations of both a civilian and a military nature. It has also developed an elaborate procedural framework for planning such operations. It should be kept in mind that this planning model is only an enabler for effective action: the process should not be confused with the product. Planning procedures tend to be short circuited or tailored to fit the planning cycle of the crisis at hand. Conceptual planning tools can structure and facilitate the planning dialogue yet they can never fully replace the creativity and ingenuity required from the planning staff. On the other hand, a procedural planning model has important merits in that it structures an inherently messy dialectic process. In so doing it provides a reference framework for checking whether all key elements of sound planning are present. The presence of a shared reference framework in the form of conceptual planning tools serves the purpose of codifying professional expertise. Furthermore, it makes the planning process less dependent on mere personalities. 143

144 (From left to right) Mr. Jose Luis RODRIGUEZ ZAPATERO, Spanish Prime Minister Mrs. Catherine ASHTON, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Mr. Jerzy Buzek, President of the European Parliament Credit The Council of the European Union The CSDP mission/operation planning procedures and realities are not perfect especially as the current system is undergoing major reform by its incorporation into the EEAS. Although the EU often prides itself on developing a comprehensive approach towards crisis management, the integration of civilian and military tools remains limited. The establishment of the CMPD constituted an important step forward in this process. Existing civil military integration is focused on the joint development of the CMC. Afterwards, the planning process becomes stove piped along civilian or military lines. Perhaps most importantly, it should be kept in mind that the EU s various instruments for conducting foreign policy continue to be distributed between the EEAS and the European Commission. This means that even a fully integrated CSDP still leaves out a large amount of the EU s potential. With the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is expected to move towards a more integrated approach to crisis management. The institutional architecture for planning CSDP operations is therefore likely to undergo further changes. This could include, for example, the setting up of a permanent EU Operational Headquarters. That said, it remains equally true that the CSDP is a highly innovative policy domain. Especially the civilian crisis management instruments constitute a policy tool that is still experimental in nature. An operational planning culture is now being exported beyond the ranks of the military. This opens up the prospect of developing more versatile and dynamic tools for managing international crises. Whether this potential will bear fruit in practice will it depend both on political willingness to think out of the box and on well trained personnel. If this AKU has at least made a minor contribution to that crucial second factor, one will be in a good position to conclude mission accomplished. 144

145 6 AKU 7 THE IMPACT OF THE LISBON TREATY ON THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY General description AKU7 is dedicated to the study of the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the Common Security and Defense Policy. It consists of an introductory part, of five chapters focusing on relevant aspects of the Lisbon Treaty, and of a concluding part Learning Content AKU7 will touch upon the following aspects of the Lisbon Treaty: Chapter 1 The Origins of the Lisbon Treaty From Laeken to Dublin, the evolution of the Treaty. Chapter 2 Changes in the EU Framework An overall insight into the key changes introduced by the Treaty into the EU framework. Chapter 3 Impact on the Common Security and Defense Policy The analysis of the major changes introduced in Security and Defense. Chapter 4 Major Challenges as regards Implementation An in depth analysis of the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in the areas of Security and Defense. Chapter 5 Conclusions and reflections In which direction is the Union going in the areas of security and Defense? What are its goals? 6.2 CHAPTER 1 - The Origins of the Lisbon Treaty From Laeken to Dublin, the evolution of the Treaty The Laeken Declaration In order to understand the Lisbon Treaty, we must first reflect on its Constitutional origins, which are based on the 2001 Laeken Declaration. Under the Belgian Presidency, the EU acknowledged the existence of two major challenges, the democratic challenge facing Europe, and Europe s new role in a globalised world. This statement also acknowledges the expectations of Europe s citizens, and asks for reforms in the European Union. This vision will influence the design of and desire for a 145

146 Constitution. The new draft Constitution required more intervention by the Union in the areas of external relations and security and Defense. The aim was also to define the areas of exclusive competence of the Union vis á vis its Member States and areas of shared competence. Shortly after the declaration, representatives of Member States (MS) present in Laeken and 12 membership candidates began a process to examine the challenges faced by a future European Constitution The Constitutional Treaty The ceremony of the Lisbon Treaty. Source: content /uploads/2008/04/tratadolisboa.jpg The Constitutional Treaty defined for the first time the system of competences of the Union, while reviewing the Union s institutional structure to make it more democratic and efficient. Concurrently, the Fundamental Rights Charter, the flag and anthem, were formally included in the Treaty. Another innovation was the end of the system of pillars of the Union, which started in Maastricht and which was intended to simplify the decision making process in the EU. Simultaneously, the Constitutional Treaty was designed to be used as an easy to read text, replacing the previously used technique of treaty amendments, thereby bringing EU citizens closer to the EU institutional framework. The need to simplify the EU set of treaties is not new. In fact, the question of the EU Treaty s intelligibility to the average citizen has been a topic for discussion since the debates on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. When creating the European Union, the Treaty absorbed but did not extinguish, the previous three European Communities. So, the Maastricht Treaty had become a complex tangle of rules, which was difficult to understand and comprehend. This is 146

147 clearly one of the causes of the separation between EU citizens and EU institutions. The Constitutional Treaty was also intended to remedy this situation. The Constitutional Treaty was signed in Rome on October 29th, 2004 by twenty five Member States, and has been ratified by eighteen of them. However, the process was interrupted by the negative referenda in France and the Netherlands. Much has been written about the real political reasons for the refusal, but to the majority of the authors, those refusals are not related to the Constitutional Treaty, and were really a demonstration of an internal discontent with their own governments. This decision led the EU into a political impasse. The solution was found at the European Council in June 2007, where the Portuguese Presidency received a mandate to draft a Reform Treaty, less ambitious than the constitution, but with the aim of addressing the Laeken challenges. Thus, during the Portuguese Presidency, the Lisbon Treaty was signed on December 13th, The Lisbon Treaty The entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1st, Source: content/uploads/2008/06/lisbon treaty summit1.jpg The first big difference between the Lisbon Treaty and the Constitution is the shape. The Constitutional Treaty would have merged the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community. The Treaty of Lisbon chooses to keep the two documents separate, amending the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Lisbon also takes out of the Treaty the references to the 147

148 symbols of the Union, the flag and the anthem, and also does not refer explicitly to the principle of the primacy of Community law over national law of Member States. In the same way, the Charter of Fundamental Rights is removed from the body of the Treaty. However a reference to this document is made, proclaiming that the Union recognizes the principles set out in the latter. The Lisbon Treaty was finally ratified by all EU MS. The Hungarian legislature was the first to approve the treaty, on December 17th, In 2008 the Irish referendum blocked the ratification of the treaty, which raised several questions regarding its future. Still, this decision was reversed in a second referendum in 2009, and the Treaty was finally approved. The Czech instrument of ratification was the last to be deposited in Rome on 13 November 2009, leading to its entry into force on 1 December The Lisbon Treaty is therefore aimed at increasing democracy within the Union, improving its functioning and, at the same time, increasing the EU capability to cope with global challenges, taking Europe into the 21st century. Laeken Declaration, which you can download now. Click on the icon 6.3 CHAPTER 2 - Changes in the EU Framework An overall insight into the key changes introduced by the Treaty in the EU framework Major Changes The most important conceptual changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty concern the EU s legal personality, enabling the Union to speak and express itself as one entity; the choice of the ordinary legislative co decision process, thereby increasing the legitimacy of Union acts from a democratic perspective; and the clarification made regarding the competences of the Union, in particular the distinction between exclusive jurisdiction (the establishment of competition rules, monetary policy, customs, common commercial policy, conservation of marine biological resources and negotiation of international agreements when they involve an EU legislative act), and shared jurisdiction with MS (internal market; agriculture; fishing; economic and social cohesion; environment; consumer 148

149 protection; European transport network; energy; freedom, security and justice). In the areas of research and development, outer space, and as well development and humanitarian aid, the EU has the competence to act independently, without taking away the States ability to function independently. At the institutional level, two institutions are recognized and formally incorporated in the Union: the European Council and European Central Bank. Just as in the Constitutional Treaty, the pillars system established in Maastricht is also abolished under the Treaty of Lisbon, which has repercussions for the institutional decision making process European Parliament Herman van Rompuy, President of the European Council. Source: ewebeditpro4/upload/vanrompuy-officialpix2.jpg The European Parliament is limited to 751 Members (MEPs), including its the President, representing 492 million European citizens, compared with the previous figure of 785. The European Parliament also strengthens its competences through the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision), with the result that it now works even more closely with the Commission and with the Council when it comes to approving the EU budget European Council The European Council is now formally integrated into the institutional framework of the EU, and its main duty is to give the necessary overall political direction to the Union. It maintains its emergency brake system, under which EU MS can block a decision by invoking fundamental issues regarding their sovereignty. With this new Treaty, the European Council also has a permanent President, with a two and a half year term, renewable once. The impact of this new post on Security and Defense issues will be analyzed in Chapter

150 Council of the European Union Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Source: The Council represents the Member State governments and takes different configurations pending on the issue to be discussed. With the Treaty of Lisbon, the General Affairs and External Relations Council formally splits into two a General Affairs Council and an External Relations Council. The first will have the responsibility of working with the European Council and the Commission. The Foreign Relations Council will deal exclusively with the External Relations of the Union, and will be chaired by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Another significant change in the Council is the new voting system, where qualified majority voting (QMV) is applied in more areas, maintaining the current proportions. However, from November 1st, 2014 the rules will change and a decision must be approved by at least 55% of Member States, representing 65% of the population The European Commission José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission. Source: The European Commission is an autonomous body of the EU. Its main functions are to prepare and submit to the European Parliament and the Council new legislative proposals, implementing its decisions, and to ensure compliance with Community law, with the support of the European Court of Justice. The Treaty of Lisbon details the powers of the Commission, but in general terms does not alter them. What it does do is change the Commission s configuration. Upon unanimous 150

151 decision by the European Council, from 2014, the Commission should be reduced by 2 / 3 of the number of Member States, including the President and the High Representative, allowing greater consistency and efficiency. One other change in the Commission is that the High Representative is also the Vice President of the Commission, and his nomination as Vice President has to be approved by the Parliament. This whole construction is at least sui generis, when one considers that the Lisbon Treaty is intended to reform and clarify the responsibilities of the Union. In practice, the system created will require greater coordination and cooperation between institutions. The existence of checks and balances could bring a greater consistency to EU policy but, on the other hand, in the event of a crisis, could lead to paralysis. In the next chapter we will analyze in depth the impact on Security and Defense issues. You can read more about the European Institutional Framework here: eu/institutions bodies/index_en.htm 6.4 CHAPTER 3 - Impact on the Common Security and Defense Policy The analysis of the major changes introduced in the Security and Defense Major Changes After having reviewed the most important changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, this section will concentrate on the major changes introduced in the Security and Defense area. Following the logic of the earlier analysis, we will start by addressing the differences between the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty, now focused on Security and Defense. In fact, the French and Dutch rejection was not linked to the ESDP/CSDP. Thus most of the content of the Constitutional Treaty remained unchanged in the Lisbon Treaty except in semantic terms. In semantic terms, the Lisbon Treaty changes the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Also, the High Representative is now named High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, being also the Vice President of the European Commission with responsibility in the Commission for the Commission s External Relations. Another important innovation widely discussed is the creation of Permanent Structured Cooperation in the security and Defense area. In addition, it includes the solidarity 151

152 clause and assistance clause, and creates an EU External Action Service. Later on we will focus on each of these items in particular. The Treaty also makes a specific reference to NATO, stating clearly that the CSDP should respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common Defense realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In addition to the Petersberg tasks, the Lisbon Treaty broadens the spectrum of missions that the EU can undertake, such as joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making and post conflict stabilization, including supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their own territories. These new missions will provide better alignment between the European Security Strategy and its implementation report for 2008 and the missions revitalized by the treaty. Another innovation is the recognition of the legal personality of the Union. Not having an immediate impact in the area of security and Defense, in the long run this change will allow the Union to apply for membership of international organizations. We can only speculate on this issue, but it allows the EU to become a UN member. Regarding the decision making process, and although the pillar structure is formally abandoned in the Treaty, some safeguards have been taken regarding the decision making process in the areas of Foreign Policy and Security and Defense. Another innovation is the inclusion in the Treaty of the European Defense Agency, which leads us to conclude that Member States aim to strengthen the Agency s role, in relation to the capacity building of the Union Recommended Reading The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and ESDP, by Sophie Dagand, you can download now. Click on the icon 152

153 6.5 CHAPTER 4 - Major Challenges as Regards Implementation An in depth analysis of the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in the areas of Security and Defense Introduction In this chapter we intend to analyze the implications of the existence of a High Representative, the establishment of an External Action Service of the Union with the solidarity and assistance clauses as well as the Permanent Structured Cooperation, and to assess their impact on the EU CSDP The EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy The High Representative (HR) will chair the Foreign Affairs Council, leading the dialogue on behalf of the Union, expressing its position in international organizations. The High Representative will also contribute with proposals in the area of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, giving consistency and coherence to the Union s Common Foreign and Security Policy. In the HR s capacity as the Commission s Vice President (VP), increased coordination with the Commission is expected. Some issues may arise in this current configuration. The HR/VP is bound to follow the decisions of the Council, has a hierarchical link with the President of the Commission, and, a political responsibility before the Parliament, as Vice President of the Commission. We can also reasonably predict the amount of work that the High Representative and Vice President of the Commission will have. To deal with this issue, the HR/VP will have two deputies, one for the post of Vice President and one for the post of High Representative. However, this current configuration will bring greater coherence to EU Foreign Policy, allowing the Council and the Commission to work more closely, and, thereby, increasing the number of tools and the consistency of the Union The European External Action Service (EEAS) The creation of this new post of HR/VP, coordinating all the EU Foreign Policy, needed to be supported by a single service that concentrated all the information regarding EU s external relations. Therefore, this is an indispensable tool for the HR/VP. 153

154 The Lisbon Treaty does not define in great depth the skills or the organization of the Service, stating briefly that the EEAS will be composed of officials from both the Commission and Council, and will cooperate with the diplomatic missions of the Member States. We are expecting that the Commission s and the Council s services dealing with external relations to be merged in the EEAS. There are also currently around 128 EU delegations, which employ about 7000 staff, representing the Union vis á vis third countries. These delegations will come into the External Action Service, and it is expected that efficient lines of communications will be created between them, as well as with the diplomatic missions of the Member States. This new tool is expected to enhance both EU and MS diplomatic missions. EU Delegations are expected to work with MS diplomatic missions, reinforcing the synergies between both entities. For many MS do not have the capacity e.g. due to their size to have a diplomatic mission, the EEAS can provide an antenna. Another possible approach is to co locate/integrate certain services of the External Action Service and diplomatic missions of Member States, thereby reducing the number of support staff needed to operate a full mission (in theory multiplied by 27). Although a concrete implementation model is still to be developed, and will surely have a variable geometry in order to adapt to each case, it is likely intended to become a powerful tool that can be used both by MS and by the EU as such. As early as January 1st, all 136 Commission Delegations were renamed EU Delegations. Of those 136, 54 were already given new powers in line with the new names, taking on the role (previously carried out by the national diplomatic mission of the Member State holding the six month EU presidency) of coordinating the work of the Member States diplomatic missions to those countries. Similarly, the heads of these new delegations were also empowered to speak on behalf of the EU as a whole. Eight of the new model units are in Europe: Armenia, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland and Ukraine. Twelve are in Asia and the Pacific Ocean area: Afghanistan, Australia, China, East Timor, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Thailand and Vietnam. Many more are in Africa: Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 154

155 Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zimbabwe and the delegation to the African Union in Addis Ababa Assistance and Solidarity Clause The Mutual Assistance Clause is defined thus by the Treaty: If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and Defense policy of certain Member States. In accordance with this article, MS have an obligation of aid and assistance, but they may decide internally what kind of help to offer. MS that also belong to NATO were not forgotten, the Treaty stating that commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective Defense and the forum for its implementation. Unlike the provision of mutual assistance, which is automatic, the Solidarity Clause s application has to be triggered by a demand from the competent authorities of the State where a terrorist attack or a natural or man made disaster has taken place, in order to become effective. In this case, the Council may decide by qualified majority, except where Defense issues are concerned, in which it shall act unanimously. The Solidarity Clause raises an interesting question. On the one hand, this clause is related to civil protection units and assistance within the Union. Yet, what would be the scenario if a country were so damaged by a terrorist attack or an earthquake that it needed military and police assistance? There is no consensus among scholars regarding this issue, due to lack of details in the text of the clause. This somewhat vague explanation also stems from a lack of unanimity among the Member States, thus not contributing to the definition of the issue. The Treaty of Lisbon does not change by itself the Union into a military alliance. The current clauses are largely symbolic, and are useful because they clearly define the objective the EU wants to achieve. 155

156 CSDP Operations At first glance the Lisbon Treaty has no implications for the development of CSDP operations. However, after closer observation, we found two minor amendments. The first appears to us in Article 42, paragraph 5, which states that the Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union s values and serve its interests. Article 44 paragraph 1 states that these Member States, in association with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task. The words entrusts the execution of a task lead us to understand the planning and the definition of command and control tasks hitherto performed by the Council. If this is also the Council s interpretation, we can say that it opens the door to a streamlining of procedures for Command and Control. As we have seen in AKU6 Planning Missions and Operations, this is still a very bureaucratic and slow path, which by definition does not address the need for speed and confidentiality needed in this process Permanent Structured Cooperation One of the most debated issues within the academic community has been the creation, with the Treaty of Lisbon, of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PermStrucCoop). The Lisbon Treaty provides that Member States whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. For its creation, the Treaty does not provide any minimum number of participants, nor does it provide any convergence criteria, opting for structural definition, and leaving to future negotiations most of the details. On the structural definition, the Treaty states that PermStrucCoop is created by a qualified majority voting (QMV) decision of the Council. Once established, if a Member State fails to comply with the criteria, participants may also by QMV arrange for its suspension. However, in practice, all other decisions within PermStrucCoop will be taken unanimously. The creation of this instrument is seen as the answer to some of the major problems of the EU in the area of Defense. Currently the EU has around two million soldiers. However, it is estimated 156

157 that only 10 to 15% are deployable for missions outside of Europe. The causes of this situation have long been known, inter alia the low cost effectiveness of capacity development at national level, the existence of duplication in terms of the 27 Member States, even the existence of a large number of conscripts who cannot serve outside the country, and almost no inter operable means of projection and strategic command and control. PermStrucCoop will allow a deepening of EU MS integration in the areas of Defense, therefore allowing them to be more cost efficient The creation of Permanent Structured Cooperation Under the Treaty of Lisbon, within three months of notifying the Council by a group of MS interested in developing deeper cooperation, and after the High Representative is heard, the Council will act by QMV to establish PermStrucCoop. Any MS which later wants to join the PermStrucCoop shall notify the Council and High Representative. The Council then and after consulting the High Representative will act by QMV to allow that MS into PermStrucCoop, basing its decision in meeting the criteria of Articles 1 and 2 of the PermStrucCoop Protocol. With this agreement no MS has a veto capability on the creation, inclusion or exclusion of another MS in PermStrucCoop. All other decisions are taken by unanimity among the participants Institutional Structure of Permanent Structured Cooperation As mentioned above, PermStrucCoop is established by the Council, but only the participating MS have the ability to make decisions. Thus, we can only deduce that the MS not participating in the PermStrucCoop may attend its meetings, but without voting power, like the Eurogroup in the ECOFIN. However, a pertinent question is the level of involvement in PermStrucCoop of the ESDP structures established well before and kept within the Lisbon Treaty institutional architecture. What will be the role of the Political and Security Committee and the European Union Military Staff in PermStrucCoop? Similarly, only by analogy with the Eurogroup, the preparatory meetings of these bodies in order to address issues related to the PermStrucCoop will have the participation of all MS, but only those who are a part of the PermStrucCoop will be able to vote. 157

158 Definition of Criteria for entry to Permanent Structured Cooperation The definition of criteria for entry to permanent structured cooperation is hardly mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol 10 to the Treaty of Lisbon. In particular, paragraph 1 states that PermStrucCoop is open to any Member State that is committed to: (a) Proceeding more intensively to develop its Defense capacities through the development of its national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and in the activity of the Agency in the field of Defense capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defense Agency), and (b) Having the capability to supply by 2010 at the latest, either at national level or as a component of multinational force groups, targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as a battle group, with support elements including transport and logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 43 of the Treaty on European Union, within a period of five to 30 days, in particular in response to requests from the United Nations Organization, and which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days and be extended up to at least 120 days. The definitions even if without great detail of the targets in a) and b) are themselves quite demanding. The first question we might raise is still about conditionality. Is it a) and b), or a) or b)? Another interesting point is that the protocol does not specify the criteria for participation in CSDP missions and operations, which means that PermStrucCoop will focus mainly on capacity building. By taking this option, EU keeps the door open for participation in CSDP missions and operations of MS not participating in the PermStrucCoop The contribution of the European Defense Agency The European Defense Agency will have a key role as regards capability building within PermStrucCoop. This agency has great potential to assist, define and monitor the criteria of the PermStrucCoop. It s expected that the EDA will be pivotal for the institutional implementation of PermStrucCoop, similar to the role played by the Commission in controlling and monitoring the convergence criteria of the euro zone. 158

159 6.6 CHAPTER 5 - Conclusions and Reflections In which direction is the Union going in the areas of security and Defense? What might be its goals? What s next? There is not much to be told about a treaty that has only now entered into force. However, it seems important at this stage to provide some reflections on the possible future of European integration. Firstly, one should note that the Lisbon Treaty does not aim at creating a State or a European Super State, nor is it intended to be the last revision of the founding treaties. Therefore, the Lisbon Treaty is not an end in itself but a means to achieve greater coherence in the functioning of the European Union. First, we would like to focus on how the fact of sharing capabilities does not reduce, but increases the sovereignty of States. Currently, many States have no capability to initiate an operation of some duration on an independent basis. Therefore, the sovereignty issue is already somewhat illusory. However, by sharing, the EU MS can develop skills, increase the efficiency of their Defense budgets, and therefore, increase their capability to act. To this end, it seems important to share Command and Control and Logistics Support structures. From this viewpoint, the next step for the EU is the establishment of permanent Command and Control facilities, which will support the growing number and diversity of CSDP missions and operations. This will require solid command and control structures with a parallel, or integrated, civilian component. This does not mean a zero sum EU relationship with NATO, nor do we advocate a duplication of NATO structures in Europe, but rather an adjustment or a rationalization of existing structures. 159

160 Conclusions EU Flag in the ATALANTA Operation. Source: We would not like to conclude this AKU without stating some brief conclusions. The first one is that there are three major constraints that will define the success (or failure) of the Treaty of Lisbon. The first is the need to win the hearts and minds of the Europeans. To this end, the EU must be able to explain to its citizens the importance of the steps that we are now taking. Second, the Union cannot isolate itself from NATO. The success of a future European Defense integration also involves capacity building in partnership with NATO. Third, and most importantly, the Union must continue to develop and strengthen its capacities for crisis management, showing that it is able to cope with future challenges. We would also like to point out that the development of a common security and Defense does not necessarily require the development of a common foreign policy. The best example that the Union has of this duality is the EULEX Mission in Kosovo. In this particular case, despite publicly known differences in the foreign policy of the EU MS, divided between those who recognize and those who do not recognize the sovereignty of Kosovo, the EULEX mission in Kosovo did not have encounter objections from any MS. Therefore, when CFSP fails, CSDP may be the factor that unites EU MS as a whole in terms of political motivation. In conclusion, we believe that the Lisbon Treaty establishes a number of innovations in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy, and particularly in area of the Common Security and Defense, both through the institutional approach and through the decision making process. The creation of a High Representative (with three hats ), an External Action Service and Permanent 160

161 Structured Cooperation appear to be the most important innovations that will surely have a major impact on the future of the European Union. Recommended Reading European Defense beyond the Lisbon Treaty, pages 49 to 61 of the paper European Defense in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty by Bruno Angelet and Ioannis Vrailas, you can download now. Click on the icon 161

162 7 AKU 8 NON-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THEIR MEANS OF DELIVERY General description AKU8 deals with the current important aspects of non proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, from a European perspective Learning Content AKU8 will touch upon the following aspects of WMD non proliferation: Chapter 1 Risk and threat assessment at regional and international levels Overview of the current situation and prospects for nuclear, chemical, biological and ballistic missile proliferation, with a brief analysis of motivations, characteristics and typical cases. Chapter 2 Political and legal multilateral instruments Presentation of the most important WMD political and legal multilateral instruments relating to non proliferation, and description of their role, evolution, characteristics and perspectives. Chapter 3 EU Policy against the Proliferation of WMD Summary of the EU objectives and policy in the field of non proliferation, with an illustration of its positions, activities to support implementation, and funding efforts worldwide. Chapter 4 Export control regimes Brief explanation of the international and European export control regimes, differentiating between the international structures and the EU structures relating to export controls and identifying the principles that govern an export control regime. The chapter also highlights some of the most obvious improvements observed in the European export control regime as progressively set up by the successive legal acts Selective Bibliography 7.2 A. Proliferation phenomenon Joseph Cirincione et al., Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second Edition Revised and Expanded, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005 Shirley A. Kan, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues, New York, Nova Science Publishers, 2010, page

163 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2010 Internet resources: UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) Select full text from Bulletin de l Observatoire de la Non Prolifération, CESIM Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists The Nonproliferation Review, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies 7.3 B. Nuclear proliferation J.C. Archambault, C. Grand, X. Pasco, B. Sitt, Dynamique des pouvoirs proliférants Pour une nouvelle approche interdisciplinaire, Annuaire Français de Relations Internationales, Ed Bruylant, Vol.3 (2002), pp Nuclear black markets: Pakistan and the rise of proliferation networks, a net assessment, IISS report, May 2007 Scott Sagan, Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb, International Security, No. 3, Vol. 21, Winter 1996/97 Statutes of IAEA, NSG, INFCIRC 154, 166, 540, CTBT Internet resources: FAS Strategic Security Blog 163

164 Global Security Newswire 7.4 C. Biological & chemical proliferation Olivier Lepick et Patrice Binder, Les armes biologiques, Que sais je?, PUF, 2001 Claude Meyer, L arme chimique, Ellipse, 2001 Edward M.Spiers, Chemical and Biological Weapons, Reaktion Books, London, 2010, page 222 Patrick Berche, L histoire secrète des guerres biologiques, 2009, Editions Robert Laffont Statutes of BTWC and CWC Internet resources: ChemBio Weapons and WMD Terrorism News Archive 7.5 D. Ballistic missile proliferation Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Report No 10, Dennis Gormley, Missile Contagion, Greenwood Publishing, May 2008 Steven Hildreth, Iran s Ballistic Missile Programs: an Overview, CRS report, February 2009 Iran s Nuclear and Missile Potential, EastWest Institute report, 2009 Iran s Ballistic Missile Capabilities. A Net Assessment, IISS report, 2010 Daniel A. Pinkston, The North Korean Missile Program, Strategic Studies Institute, February 2008 Mark Stokes and Yan Easton, Evolving Aerospace Trends in the Asia Pacific Region, Project 2049 Institute, May 2010 Theodore Postol, A Technical Assessment of Iran s Ballistic Missile Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 164

165 Internet resources: Stéphane Delory, État de la menace balistique des pays proliférants, Recherche & Documents N o 02/2010, FRS Robert H. Schmucker and Markus Schiller, The DPRK Missile Show, A Comedy in (Currently) Eight Acts (draft) ArmsControl Wonk (blog) in Global Security Newswire MTCR Guidelines 7.6 E. EU against the proliferation of WMD Internet resources: EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2003) New lines for action by the European Union in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems (December 2008) Note on the implementation of the WMD clause (January 2009) Council Decision 2010/212/CFSP of 29 March 2010 relating to the position of the European Union for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons European Council Conclusions (June 2010) Declaration on Iran, annex II, pages F. Export Control Regimes Quentin Michel, The evolution of weapons of mass destruction. Export control regime: from export control list to catch all clause, in Studia Diplomatica Vol. LIII LV, n o 5 6, 2002 Quentin Michel, The European Union Export Control Regime: Comment on the Legislation: article by article, European Studies Political Science Department Faculty of Law and Political Science Liege University, January 2010 Internet resources: 165

166 Council Regulation No 428/2009 of 27 August 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual use items European Commission Trade, Dual use including links to the Member States national authorities Fact sheet, Dual use export controls in the European Union, December CHAPTER 1 - Risk and threat assessment at regional and international levels Overview of the current situation and prospects for nuclear, chemical, biological and ballistic missile proliferation, with a brief analysis of motivations, characteristics and typical cases Introduction The concept of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) came into being after World War II. It was first used in 1947 by the United Nations Commission on Conventional Armaments to distinguish so called conventional weapons from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and all weapons capable of producing comparable effects. The concept has been strongly debated ever since, but has nevertheless been very widely adopted. It should be noted that it entails a number of fine distinctions. WMDs are commonly distinguished from the less lethal weapons of mass disruption, the typical example of which is a radiological or dirty bomb. Moreover, nuclear terrorism threat analyses distinguish in particular between the acquisition of fissile material for the manufacture of an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) and the use of radiological materials for the manufacture of a dirty bomb or Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD). The concept of Proliferation is more recent. In the diplomatic language of the 1950s, the terms proliferation and dissemination were used without distinction for both conventional and non conventional weapons. It was not until the early 1960s, with the start of negotiations on the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), that the concept of proliferation became a major international security issue. This led to the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution of 31 January 1992 proclaiming that WMD proliferation is a threat against peace and security. More 166

167 recently, proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery were recalled in UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in 2004 and Resolution 1887 in 2009 as a threat to international peace and security Motivations of proliferating countries A variety of studies on the motivations leading a State to proliferate were conducted in the 1990s. This was a decade that witnessed at once active implementation of non proliferation measures (signature of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993, effective since 1997, extension of the Non Proliferation Treaty for an indefinite period effective since 1995, and subsequent efforts towards its universalisation, adoption of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, etc.), enforced disarmament and counter proliferation action (disarmament of Iraq, South Africa and Libya) and the emergence of a new wave of secondary proliferation, nuclear and ballistic for the most part (Indian and Pakistani tests in 1998, North Korean ballistic and nuclear tests, revelations on the existence of a proliferation network orchestrated by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan, Iranian nuclear proliferation crisis, growth of ballistic proliferation in several regions of the world, particularly in the Middle East and Northeast Asia, etc.). The literature in English on the proliferation phenomenon (S. Sagan, K. Waltz, P. Lavoy, T. Ogilvy White in particular) has focused on the development of reference models and standards (security standards, internal policies) that have been implemented in France since GSPP approach identifies seven decisive factors: National resources Historical and strategic context Type of political regime Personal history and characteristics of the country s leader International dependencies and alliances Internal power elites and mediators Public opinion These models and standards were based on a geo socio psycho political (GSPP) approach proposed by a special working group devoted to the analysis of the proliferation decision making dynamics within a proliferating State. All the studies on WMD proliferation indicate the essentially regional nature of acquisition decisions (Israel) and de proliferation decisions (South Africa, Brazil and Argentina). 167

168 Nuclear proliferation: historical perspective The history of nuclear proliferation can be divided into three periods: : Bilateral arms race, emergence of the nuclear proliferation threat, birth of the nuclear non proliferation regime; : Implementation of the nuclear non proliferation regime; : New wave of nuclear proliferation, emergence of counter proliferation efforts Nuclear proliferation: current situation The current situation regarding nuclear weapons can be summarized in three groups: 1. Nuclear weapon States (NWS) recognized as such by the NPT (States having conducted nuclear tests prior to 1 January 1967), and parties to the NPT (USA, Russia, UK, France, and China) 2. Non nuclear weapon States (NNWS) having ratified the NPT (currently 184 States), including some non nuclear States protected under a security umbrella within the framework of an alliance with a nuclear State (NATO members, Japan, South Korea) and non nuclear States in Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ) the entire southern hemisphere is currently covered by NWFZ agreements. North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, but the grounds for invoking the withdrawal clause in Article X of the NPT are still subject to controversy. 3. Nuclear weapon States not having signed the NPT often referred to as de facto nuclear powers (Israel, India and Pakistan) Nuclear proliferation: global characteristics The nuclear proliferation phenomenon exhibits five global characteristics: 1. A multifactor phenomenon (motivations): There is no single nuclear proliferation factor, but rather a combination of factors to be considered until successful nuclear testing has been conducted. Since 1942, a total of approximately 30 States have seriously considered equipping themselves with nuclear weapons at one point or another, and half of them have made significant investments for this purpose. 168

169 2. A reversible phenomenon (most frequent case): Cases of de proliferation are considerably more frequent than cases of proliferation. Here again, multiple factors are involved: international law and the need to be recognized as a responsible international actor within the international community, pressure from an allied country (South Africa), peaceful regime change (South Africa), cost and feasibility of nuclear programmes (Indonesia), pressure and internationally enforced disarmament (Iraq), internal opposition (Sweden), etc. 3. A complex phenomenon (mechanisms): The new wave of nuclear proliferation since the 1980s, identified with the disclosure of the A.Q. Khan network, has shed light on the complexity of the phenomenon. The questions now considered concern funding, financial transactions, industrial connections and the dissemination of scientific knowledge and technologies in a world far more open than it was 20 years ago as a result of globalization. 4. Importance of the national resources factor: At global level, the nuclear proliferation phenomenon is essentially linked to the possibility of acquiring fissile material, and to the possibility of acquiring and developing associated technologies. Nuclear proliferation programmes require extensive mobilization of critical national resources for many decades: human resources (top level scientists and industrialists), infrastructures and equipment, funding, energy, and time. This situation increases the importance of the national resources factor when analyzing the phenomenon. Therefore, the suspicions or even allegations of proliferation (as is currently the case with Myanmar) associated with the renewed interest in civil nuclear energy among a number of States (edge strategy) need to be put very much in perspective. Moreover, once a country has acquired nuclear weapons, it will still need to allocate a large amount of its national resources annually to maintain its nuclear arsenal, to secure it and keep it safe, and to train its strategic forces. 5. An essentially subjective phenomenon (analysis of standpoints): Nuclear proliferation is considered as a risk (report submitted by Henry Stimson in 1945) or a threat (Western position since the end of the Cold War). Nuclear proliferation is part of a standpoint? And can be used as an argument and an instrument Nuclear proliferation: ongoing crises When assessing nuclear risks and threats at regional level, three ongoing crises are identified: 169

170 Open proliferation path: Iran Iran is a classic example of a country suspected of nuclear and ballistic proliferation, in violation of its obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions and under the terms of the safeguards agreements concluded with the IAEA. The development of Iran s civil nuclear programme is based on a framework of nuclear proliferation: its uranium enrichment equipment (IR 1 centrifuges) was acquired from the Khan network in the 1990s, and its enrichment efforts are themselves in violation of four successive UN Security Council resolutions calling for a cessation of operations. Iran s nuclear programme, declared as geared toward civilian needs (fuel intended for the planned Darkhovin plant), could actually cover a military programme intended to produce limited quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU). IAEA inspection efforts have led to the following conclusions: First of all, on site inspections of Iran s declared uranium enrichment facilities revealed no violations of NPT obligations since Secondly, the implementation of an undeclared production strategy in violation of the safeguards agreements (modified code 3.1) was revealed by the discovery of the Fordow site. Finally, strong suspicions remain regarding the development of a military programme (project 111 devoted to nuclear weapon directed activities, signs of a covert programme for producing a nuclear weapon, etc.). The Iranian nuclear proliferation strategy seems to be based on acquiring the expertise needed to enrich uranium to weapon grade levels, while simultaneously acquiring knowledge of how to build a nuclear weapon. The different steps adopted (3.5% enrichment for civilian fuel production, and subsequent production of 20% enriched uranium ostensibly to fuel research reactors) may be precursors to achieving a nuclear threshold capability. In any case, such ambiguities illustrate the loopholes in the current IAEA comprehensive safeguards system (by which a large number of States are still bound). The implementation of the additional protocol and the modified code 3.1. would give much stronger assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. 170

171 Syria Syria emerged as a potential nuclear proliferator after the destruction of a suspect site by the Israeli Air Force at Deir Al Zour on 6 September The site was allegedly home to a nuclear reactor in construction, of North Korean origin, designed to produce plutonium. Syria agreed to an on site IAEA inspection with great reluctance, after leveling the site. The inspection, combined with the verification of declared facilities, revealed the presence of undeclared androgenic nuclear material. The Syrian authorities continue to refuse to cooperate with the IAEA in order to identify the origin of the uranium particles found at the Deir Al Zour site. They also refuse to cooperate on the issue of relations with North Korean entities and on the origin of certain equipment observed at the Deir Al Zour site. The IAEA is still forbidden access to sites adjacent to Deir Al Zour. Finally, the inspections conducted in the MNSR facility have compelled Syria to reveal the undeclared acquisition of uranyl nitrate (resulting from the purification of yellow cake, used to produce uranium tetrafluoride). Nuclear proliferation outside the framework of the NPT: North Korea North Korea is an example another classic case, that of nuclear proliferation outside the framework of the NPT. North Korea has been developing a nuclear programme since the 1960s. In 1992, it ratified the NPT but did not allow the necessary safeguards. The framework agreement of 1994 made it possible to determine the progress of the North Korean nuclear programme and to partially interrupt its development (the investigations conducted led to the identification of activities relating to the production of plutonium but did not eliminate doubts about the production 171

172 of enriched uranium). With the implementation of the KEDO programme, it was believed for a long time that North Korea perceived its nuclear programme as a tool for national preservation, as well as a negotiating tool (the dismantling of uranium production infrastructures having been associated with the creation of a civil nuclear programme and with the implementation of an economic assistance programme to prevent the collapse of the regime). However, North Korea s withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 (justified by the hardening of the US position in response to Pyongyang s violations), the two nuclear tests conducted in 2006 and 2009, and North Korea s inflexibility throughout the six party negotiation process all tend to show the importance of nuclear weapon possession for the stability and the survival of the regime, and the durability of the Kim dynasty. Moreover, this crisis further illustrates China s ambiguous behavior vis à vis the nuclear proliferation phenomenon. Finally, the case of North Korea shows that the poorest nations have the minimum capacity required to develop technologies allowing the production of nuclear devices with outside help. The exact origin of these devices remains to be demonstrated, with various signs suggesting the possibility of technological cooperation with other nuclear States Nuclear proliferation: medium and long term risks When considering medium and long term nuclear proliferation risks, very close attention must be paid to proliferation contagion and the domino effect. This applies particularly in: the Middle East in the event of Iranian acquisition of a nuclear first strike capability (e.g. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey), and Southeast Asia (possibly) in the light of the evolving strategic balance in the region (weakening of US safeguard policies in particular, and emergence of a more aggressive Chinese position) Chemical proliferation While nuclear proliferation requires large specific investments, chemical and biological proliferation can take advantage of existing industrial and academic assets and can become rampant. Nevertheless, the problem in the chemical field is quite different from the problem in the biological field, owing largely to the fact that the Chemical Weapons Convention has a dedicated regime of verification implemented by an international organization (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons OPCW). 172

173 The destruction of declared stocks of chemical weapons and infrastructure used for the production of prohibited chemical products is not sufficient to eliminate all risks. Moreover, scientific developments increase the challenge posed by industrial facilities with a low proliferation potential. This is particularly the case with production facilities not producing substances that are prohibited (toxic agents) or subject to inspection (precursors) and facilities producing low quantities of such substances. It is currently estimated that out of 5,225 such facilities, identified as Organic Chemical or Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPF) in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 10 to 15% possess technical characteristics making them potentially usable for proliferation purposes. The globalization of chemical production systems and the development of systems facilitating mass production within smaller infrastructures (i.e. multi criteria facilities, micro reactors) significantly accentuate the problem. Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPF) Definition given in the CWC: facilities that over the past calendar year have synthetically produced over 200 tones of defined organic chemical compounds not listed in a table; facilities comprising one or more plants that over the past calendar year have synthetically produced over 30 tones of a defined organic chemical compound not listed in a table and containing phosphorous, sulfur or fluorine Chemical proliferation: new threats The associated risks are increasing mainly because the technologies implemented are creating new prospects for misuse. Combinatorial chemistry (which consists in combining molecules to create new ones) is undergoing a revolution because of the implementation of high throughput screening and parallel synthesis methods. Moreover, the toxicity of compounds coming from combinatorial chemistry can be tested quickly by using lab on a chip devices. In addition, the use of micro reactors, which are very small, and basic production units could facilitate the implementation of highly furtive programmes. Thus, in addition to the existing threat of nations illicitly building up chemical warfare agent stocks, a wide spectrum of new threats is emerging. For instance, the synthesis of new chemical agents, possibly produced with precursors not subject to inspection by the OPCW, may bypass the verification procedures Chemical proliferation: allegations There are strong allegations that Syria is pursuing an offensive chemical programme. There were also allegations that Iran, which is a State Party of the CWC (and also the BTWC), has a stock of vesicant and possibly neurotoxic agents, and is pursuing a vectorization strategy in cooperation with Syria. China and Myanmar are also subject to recurring suspicions, as is North Korea, which is 173

174 still suspected of possessing the most extensive chemical warfare programme, and which has allegedly vectorized various types of agents on ballistic missiles Biological proliferation In the bio and bio synthetic area, advances in genetic engineering and chemical synthesis of genes and whole genomes might allow the creation of novel organisms in the future. The use of biotechnologies is less and less limited (e.g. high tech companies and pharmaceutical industries). The rapid pace of scientific developments in the field of biotechnology is increasing the risk of diversion (for example, in the bio and biosynthetic area, the use of high potential sequencers could allow the development of new biochemical warfare agents). The application of biotechnologies in the military sphere is probably no longer beyond the reach of States which would illicitly embark on the development of biological warfare programmes. However, this is still not the case for non governmental terrorist groups. The BTWC does not yet have any verification regime. BTWC States Parties have agreed to put confidence building measures in place, which are submitted annually on a voluntary basis and are intended to increase transparency and confidence between States Parties. The number of countries possibly engaged in developing biological weapons remains limited. A number of States located in unstable regions have not yet ratified the BTWC, causing concern to the international community (e.g. some think tanks are of the opinion that Syria and Egypt may possess stocks of vectorized agents). However, there is no reliable evidence proving that both countries have successfully weaponized biological agents in an effective delivery system) Ballistic missile proliferation Ballistic missile proliferation has been defined as a threat to international peace and security by UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1887 and by several UNGA Resolutions, especially those referring to The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (commonly abbreviated HCOC). UN Security Resolution 1929 (2010) also addresses ballistic missile proliferation in Iran. Ballistic missiles developed or acquired by proliferating countries tend to affect regional balances considerably. Such States often attempt to acquire more substantial 174

175 indigenous design and production capabilities (i.e. allowing evolution and adaptation of missile forces) before adopting positions likely to significantly transform the established relationship with major powers. In most proliferating States, reverse engineering of SCUD missiles has served as the foundation for implementing the first such industrial programmes. As for Pakistan, it received assistance from China on more sophisticated missile systems (M 9 and M 11). Progress in acquiring indigenous industrial capabilities is clearly perceptible in North Korea and Iran. The liquid fuelled ballistic missiles currently in service in Iran (Shahab 1 and 2 based on SCUD B and C technology, and Shahab 3 and Ghadr 1 based on North Korean No Dong technology) are more or less copies of North Korean models. In the field of solid fuel, over the past 25 years Iran has procured a series of licensed solid propellant production lines and developed an indigenous industrial infrastructure that is robust and capable, accumulating the knowledge needed to support future endeavors. The rapid growth of Iranian expertise in both ballistic and space programmes, which are, to some extent, dual activities, strongly suggests the existence of at least initial cooperation with foreign entities. States not benefiting from such extended foreign assistance experience genuine difficulties when attempting to modernize their missiles at national level, most of them being technically incapable of surpassing SCUD technology. It is nevertheless probable that the growing demand from supposedly non proliferating States for in depth conventional strike capabilities is contributing to promoting the proliferation of missile technologies. The most blatant example of this is the cooperation between China and Turkey on a short range ballistic missile system (P 611). North Korea s development of an intercontinental range missile (Taepo Dong 2) remains erratic, and Iran barely has the industrial capacity to develop delivery vehicles capable of reaching the fringes of the European continent (2500 km). A genuine threat is nevertheless emerging at regional level, particularly in the Persian Gulf. However, the main objective of proliferating States may be first and foremost to achieve strategic dissuasion against nations perceived as hostile, rather than to acquire battlefield capability. In this respect, it is imperative to increase the constraints on the dissemination of missile technologies and to strengthen treaties and regimes dedicated to those constraints. Technical constraints associated with the design of medium range 175

176 ballistic missiles ( km) remain for the moment an extremely limiting factor for proliferating States and have a very negative impact on their programme development Cruise missiles Finally, it should be stressed that the risks of proliferation of cruise missile technology have been largely underestimated although these weapon systems are capable of delivering both conventional and non conventional payloads (nuclear, chemical or biological). The number of indigenous developments of such systems in proliferating States is increasing regularly; the performances of those new cruise missiles (performance and payload) could very well affect regional balances in the coming decades. 7.9 CHAPTER 2 - Political and legal multilateral instruments Presentation of the most important multilateral political and legal instruments relating to WMD non proliferation, with their role, evolution, characteristics and perspectives Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a landmark international treaty. It recognizes the P5 (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) as nuclear weapon States. All other signatories undertake not to acquire nuclear weapons. In return all parties commit to general and complete disarmament (with no time frame) and all parties have the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. These three mutually reinforcing pillars constitute the NPT s grand bargain in order to: Prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology; Further the goal of achieving general and complete disarmament pursuant to Article VI of the NPT; Promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in In total, 189 countries have joined the Treaty, as of June 2010 (Taiwan has also adhered to the Treaty but is not officially counted). 176

177 NPT Review Conference (NPT RevCon) The NPT Review Conference (RevCon) is a five yearly meeting at which signatories review progress made since the previous RevCon and agree on action to strengthen the Treaty s implementation. The 2010 RevCon took place in New York from 3 to 28 May and a Final Document was agreed, with an action plan which, for the first time, presented concrete proposals on all three pillars of the Treaty. The adoption of a final Document was in itself a success. It reiterated the commitment of the whole international community to the international non proliferation regime. Since it entered into force, the NPT has served the world well. The number of States with nuclear weapons remains in single digits and global stocks of nuclear weapons are at their lowest since the 1950s. However, the NPT has come under unprecedented pressure. Most countries believe that the original grand bargain on which the NPT was founded remains fit for purpose and is the basis for a win/win outcome for all NPT States parties. The 2005 RevCon was widely perceived to be a failure, as no final document was agreed. The 2010 RevCon marked both a reaffirmation of the States parties collective commitment to the Treaty and its core principles and a balanced mandate for action to strengthen the NPT International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) The IAEA is a UN agency created in 1957 (click on the icon for the IAEA website). Following the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968, the IAEA became the instrument for verifying that the peaceful use commitments made under the NPT or similar agreements are kept, through performing what is known as its safeguards role. Under the NPT, governments around the world have committed to three common objectives: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; pursuing nuclear disarmament; and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT has made it obligatory for the entire non nuclear weapon States Parties to submit all nuclear material in nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, and to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency. 177

178 Safeguards are a set of activities by which the IAEA seeks to verify that a State is living up to its international undertakings not to use nuclear programmes for nuclear weapon purposes. The safeguards system is based on assessment of the correctness and completeness of the State s declarations to the IAEA concerning nuclear material and nuclear related activities. States enter into safeguards agreements with the IAEA, submitting nuclear materials, facilities and activities to the scrutiny of IAEA s safeguards inspectors. IAEA verification helps to provide assurance that such items are not diverted or misused in order to assemble nuclear weapons and that no items required to be declared under safeguards are undeclared. This, in turn, helps to allay security concerns among States with respect to the development of nuclear weapons. The IAEA s safeguards system aims to provide assurance not only that declared material is not diverted, through more effective international safeguards, but also to provide assurance that there are no undeclared nuclear activities IAEA Effective Safeguards Under a safeguards system that is based on INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) alone, the capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities is limited. IAEA inspections have focused on declared nuclear material, and were centered on strategic points in declared facilities. The developments in the 1990s prompted the IAEA to develop and implement new measures Strengthening the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Safeguards The discovery in the early 1990s of a clandestine nuclear weapons development programme in Iraq demonstrated the need to further strengthen the IAEA safeguards system in order to increase the likelihood of detecting possible undeclared nuclear activities. Also prompting such improvements was the experience gained in verifying South Africa s dismantlement of its nuclear weapons programme, and the verification challenges encountered in the Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK). designed to improve its ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and nuclear related activities. The strengthened safeguards system, based on comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols to those agreements, has established a new and higher standard for effective, cooperative verification of States nuclear undertakings. Under an Additional Protocol (based on INFCIRC/540 (corr.)), which is the key to the strengthened safeguards system, a State is required to provide the IAEA with broader information covering all aspects of activities relating to its nuclear fuel cycle, including research and development and uranium mining. States must also grant the Agency broader access rights and enable it to use the 178

179 most advanced verification technologies. Specific measures provided for in an Additional Protocol include: Information about, and access to, all aspects of States nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mines to nuclear waste and any other locations where nuclear material intended for non nuclear uses is present; Short notice inspector access to all buildings on a nuclear site; Information on the manufacture and export of sensitive nuclear related technologies and inspection mechanisms for manufacturing and import locations; Access to other nuclear related locations; Collection of environmental samples beyond declared locations when deemed necessary by the IAEA. With wider access, broader information and better use of technology, the Agency s capability to detect and deter undeclared nuclear material or activities is significantly improved. For that reason, successive IAEA Directors General have underlined, most recently at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, that without an Additional Protocol, the Agency cannot do its work in a credible manner. Ultimately the strength of the IAEA safeguards system depends upon three interrelated elements: The extent to which the IAEA is aware of the nature and locations of States nuclear and nuclear related activities; The extent to which IAEA inspectors have physical access to relevant locations for the purpose of providing independent verification of the exclusively peaceful intent of a State s nuclear programme; The will of the international community, through the United Nations Security Council, to take action against States that are not complying with their safeguards commitments to the IAEA. 179

180 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was signed in 1996, although the CTBT has been signed by 182 States and ratified by 153, it has still not entered into force. It will enter into force when the 44 countries possessing nuclear research reactors and electronuclear power plants on their territory will have ratified it. To date, China, Iran, Israel, and the United States are among the countries that have signed but not yet ratified the treaty. The DPRK, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Syria have not signed the treaty. It prohibits all nuclear explosions and establishes an extensive verification regime to monitor compliance with this obligation. The CTBT Organization s Preparatory Commission (comprising the Signatory States) and Provisional Technical Secretariat are based in Vienna. Work is underway on building the International Treaty Monitoring System consisting of seismic, hydro-acoustic, infrasound and radionuclide stations and an on-site inspection capability. Further details of the Treaty and its current status can be found on the CTBTO website (Click the icon) The Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT) Negotiations have not yet been launched on a treaty; such an agreement might prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear explosives and the production of such material outside of international safeguards. Such a treaty might extend verification measures to fissile material production facilities (i.e. enrichment and reprocessing) that are not currently subject to international monitoring. An FMCT ban on un safeguarded production of fissile material would place a quantitative constraint on the amount of fissile material available for use in nuclear weapons. In December 1993, the UN General Assembly passed a consensus resolution (48/75L) on cut off, calling for the negotiation of a non discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The resolution called for the IAEA to provide assistance in examining verification arrangements. In March 1995, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) agreed by consensus to establish an Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate to negotiate a cut off treaty based on the 1993 UN General Assembly resolution. In 2009, all parties at the Disarmament Conference 180

181 agreed on a Working Programme and in May 2010, at the Non proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, NPT parties reaffirmed the urgent need to negotiate and conclude the treaty called for in Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) supplements the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) see Article IX. The CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997, and is often regarded as one of the most successful disarmament and non proliferation treaties currently in existence. The CWC bans the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and requires the destruction of existing weapons or stockpiles by fixed deadlines under strict international monitoring and verification procedures. It also prohibits the use as weapons of any chemical substance, including industrial ones. As of June 2010, 188 States have acceded to the CWC, with only 7 States (Signatory Parties: Israel, Myanmar; non State Parties: DPRK, Somalia, Angola, Syria and Egypt) remaining outside of the regime. One third of the 8.6 million chemical munitions and containers covered by the Convention and one third of the world s declared stockpile of approximately 71,000 metric tons of chemical agent have been verifiably destroyed. The US and Russia hold the biggest stockpiles to be destroyed. The latest deadline by which declared chemical weapon stockpiles must be destroyed is 29 April 2012, although now it is known that this deadline will not be met. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is the implementing body of the CWC. The OPCW is responsible for ensuring that the provisions of the CWC are implemented, including those on international verification of compliance with the Convention, and for providing a forum for consultation and cooperation between States Parties. 181

182 Further information on the CWC and the work of the OPCW can be found on the OPCW website (click on the icon) Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which supplements the Geneva Protocol, entered into force on 26 March The 1925 Geneva Protocol (Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare) prohibited the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare. The Protocol was drawn up and signed at the conference for the supervision of international trade in arms and ammunition, which was held in Geneva under the auspices of the League of Nations from 4 May to 17 June 1925, and it entered into force on 8 February As of June 2010, there are 163 States Parties, 13 Signatory States, and 19 non State Parties. The BTWC effectively prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of biological and toxin weapons and is a key element in the international community s efforts to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The 6th Review Conference in December 2006 agreed an Intercessional Work Programme to strengthen the Convention. Annual meetings discuss and promote common understandings on national implementation (2007), bio-safety and bio-security, awareness raising, education, outreach and codes of conduct (2008), capacity building in the fields of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and containment of infectious diseases (2009), and assistance in cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons (2010). The BTWC 7th Review Conference (RevCon) in 2011 will consider renewing this intercessional work programme. The annual meetings are chaired in rotation by representatives of the three recognized BTWC regional groups (Non Aligned Movement NAM, Eastern European Group EEG, and Western European and Others Group WEOG)). The 6th Review Conference also agreed to create and fund an Implementation Support Unit (ISU) within the Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) of the United Nations Office in Geneva. The ISU is to support the work of States Parties: During the Intercessional process; In the comprehensive implementation and universalisation of the Convention; Through the exchange of confidence building measures (CBMs). 182

183 The 7th RevCon in 2011 presents an opportunity to further strengthen the convention and will, in this regard, allow States Parties to consider key issues such as progress made on the implementation of their obligations under the Convention and new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. The RevCon will also provide an opportunity to look at the Implementation Support Unit s performance and consider renewing its mandate. States Parties are tasked to consider the intercessional work programme and the outcome of the four annual rounds of meetings and decide on any further action. Finally, the 6th Review Conference agreed that the implementation of the CBMs merited further comprehensive attention at the Seventh Review Conference. More information about the BTWC and ISU can be found at The Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) There is no treaty regulating ballistic missile proliferation. However, the HCoC, brought into effect in 2002, is one of the very few multilateral instruments dealing with ballistic missile proliferation. 130 States are already signatories of the Code. Its aim is to bolster efforts to curb ballistic missile proliferation worldwide. It is not an export control regime, but a voluntary international instrument instituting transparency building measures (TCBMs) and confidence building measures (CBMs); these include the submission of annual declarations detailing a subscribing State s annual activity in the field of ballistic missiles and space launches. The second part of the CBM is the submission of pre launch notifications (PLNs) before the launch of a ballistic missile or space launch vehicle. This provides information on the date, direction and launch of the missile or the space launch vehicle. The HCoC does not cover cruise missiles. It is intended to supplement, not supplant, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), as it has a very different purpose: the MTCR is an export control regime; the HCOC is an international code of conduct with transparency and confidence building measures. The HCOC was approved by UN General Assembly resolutions 60/62 in 2005 and 63/64 in Indeed, a resolution supporting the Code is traditionally adopted every two years at the UNGA (the last traditional UNGA Resolution on the HCOC was adopted in 2008). The United States has regularly provided the HCOC with annual reports but it has never supplied PLNs, and Moscow stopped notifying HCOC members of its ballistic missile launches in

184 However, the United States has recently agreed (May 2010) to provide PLNs for the majority of its ballistic missile and satellite launches. The HCoC does not formally employ staff, nor does it have a budget. However, Austria serves as the Immediate Central Contact (Executive Secretariat) and therefore coordinates HCOC information exchange. The current Chair of the Code is France which will conduct outreach activities on behalf of the subscribing States, in order to promote the Code and its universalisation. This will include efforts to increase compliance with the confidence building measures and to increase membership (as of June 2010, 130 countries had subscribed). More information can be found atwww.hcoc.at G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction The G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction was set up at the G8 Summit in 2002 as a 10 year initiative to address non proliferation, disarmament, counter terrorism and nuclear safety issues. The G8 committed to rise up to USD 20 billion. Although the initial focus was on Russia and Ukraine, projects have been progressively undertaken globally and with support from some 14 non-g8 partners. The 2009 G8 summit in L Aquila released a statement on non proliferation Click on the icon Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was launched by President Bush in Krakow in May 2003, as a fresh element in the international community s efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials. The increasingly aggressive efforts by proliferators to stand outside or to circumvent existing non proliferation norms, and to profit from such trade, continually require new and stronger action by the international community. The PSI seeks to involve all States that have the ability and willingness to take steps to stop the illicit trafficking of such items at sea, in the air, or on land. All actions taken in support of PSI are consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law, existing treaties, regimes and frameworks, including United Nations Security Council Resolution

185 The PSI is not a formal institution, nor is it a treaty organization. PSI participants are committed to a set of interdiction principles to improve their efforts to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non state actors of proliferation concern. PSI Supporting Activities The Statement of Interdiction undertake a range of supporting activities: they Principles, agreed in Paris in September 2003, have been participating in exercises - principally calls on all nations concerned with WMD but not exclusively military in nature - both to trafficking to: interdictions Undertake effective measures, either and to develop their own alone or in concert with other states, for capabilities to conduct the full range of activities interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD related cargo associated with interdictions. Around four major Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information exercises are conducted each year, with a major Work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities to accomplish these gaming exercise about every eighteen months. objectives and work to strengthen international law and frameworks Workshops with industry are held about once a Board and search suspect vessels flying their flags, and consent under the appropriate year. These activities are overseen by the circumstances to the boarding and searching of their own flag vessels by other states Operational Experts Group (OEG), a group of 20 Require suspect aircraft that are transiting their airspace to land for inspection, countries (soon to be 21) including 10 EU and deny aircraft transit rights through their airspace Member States, which brings together officials Prevent their ports, airfields, or other facilities from being used as transshipment from the Ministries of Defense, the Armed points for WMD related cargo. As of June 2010, 97 countries Forces, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, have legal advisers, law enforcement officers and expressed their support for this statement of principles. Besides actual collaborative interception of illicit WMD-related trafficking, PSI participants demonstrate collective will to undertake Intelligence representatives. The OEG meets once a year to discuss proliferation-related issues, including legal, law enforcement, intelligence and exercise planning. The most recent OEG was held in Miami in May 2009 and 185

186 the next one will be in Japan in September United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 In 2004, the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, adopted the first Security Council Resolution devoted to non proliferation: UNSCR UNSCR 1540 calls on UN member states to enact legislation and to take effective measures to prevent non State actors, and terrorist groups in particular, from obtaining weapons of mass destruction. UNSCR 1540 also obliges States to report on measures they have taken to fulfill the substantive requirements of the resolution. In addition, UNSCR 1540 established an ad hoc committee ( the 1540 Committee ) to receive States reports and in turn to report to the Security Council on implementation of the resolution. Select here the full text of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 of 2004 Click on the icon Other multilateral instruments relating to WMD non proliferation The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the global standard setter on countering money laundering and terrorist financing. There are 40 standards on money laundering (ML) and 9 special recommendations on terrorist financing (TF). The 34 FATF members (as of June 2010) are assessed on their compliance with the standards through a peer review process. The FATF has not set standards on proliferation financing (PF) but in 2008 its mandate was expanded beyond money laundering and terrorist finance to consider other emerging threats, including PF. In February 2010, the plenary adopted a report on the fight against proliferation financing. At the plenary session in Amsterdam (June 2010), the FATF decided to work on an Action Plan on the basis of the proposals in the report. The FATF is currently considering this issue and work is ongoing. More details can be found on the FATF website at: gafi.org/ Multilateral instruments relating to export control: a number of multilateral instruments relating to export control have a bearing on international transfers of WMDs and their means of 186

187 delivery, as well as of WMD related materials, equipment and technologies. While these instruments will be discussed in Chapter 4, it is worth briefly mentioning now: The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG): set up in 1992 (and derived from the London Club created in 1985), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a group of 46 nuclear supplier countries (as of June 2010) that seek to limit nuclear proliferation through the implementation of two sets of guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear related exports. The Zangger Committee (ZC) formed in 1971 as an informal group with 37 members (as of June 2010), all of which are party to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The ZC was formed out of a desire by major nuclear suppliers to reach a common understanding of how to implement the NPT clause on the transfer of fissionable material and/or related equipment or technologies. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR): created in 1987 by the G7, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a voluntary association of 34 countries as of June 2010, which share the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and which seek to coordinate national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing their proliferation. The Australia Group: an informal forum of 41 participants (as of June 2010) which, through the harmonization of export control lists and guidelines, seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons CHAPTER 3 - EU Policy against the Proliferation of WMD Summary of the EU objectives and policy in the field of non proliferation, with an illustration of its positions, implementation supporting activities, and funding efforts worldwide EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD In 2000, Europeans were divided over the US led invasion of Iraq, where no weapons of mass destruction were found in the end. At the same time, paradoxically, there was a growing awareness that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems among State and non State actors poses an increasing threat to international security. Europeans were quick to recognize this threat. The EU and its Member States has traditionally been a major donor in the field of non proliferation and disarmament, contributing a total of EUR 550 million to various assistant programmes in the period In 1999, for example, the Council adopted a Joint Action with a budget of nearly EUR 9 million to help Russia and Newly Independent States in the destruction of chemical weapons and the storage and disposal of plutonium. 187

188 The EU is actively supporting the strengthening of the global non proliferation regime and in particular the multilateral treaty based system. This includes support for international conventions, treaties and other instruments (e.g. NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT, FMCT, UNSCR 1540, and HCOC) and international organizations (e.g. UN, IAEA, CTBTO, OPCW). The EU policy is to pursue universalisation of international instruments, to enhance their national implementation and to assist and cooperate with third countries in achieving these goals. The EU is also taking internal measures to comply with international non proliferation obligations and strengthen its own CBRN prevention and response capacity. But it was not until 2003 that the Council instructed the EU High Representative, in association with the European Commission and the Political and Security Committee, to draw up a broader strategy with concrete objectives to guide EU action in the field of non proliferation and disarmament. In December 2003, the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy, A secure Europe in a better world. This strategy identifies five key challenges to international security: terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, State failure and organized crime. The proliferation of WMD was defined as potentially the greatest threat to European security. In parallel, the European Council adopted a Strategy against Weapons of Mass Destruction defining three main principles for EU action in this field: effective multilateralism, prevention and cooperation. These key policy orientations are expressed in European Council Strategies, Council Conclusions, Decisions and Joint Actions as well as in Council and European Commission Regulations. Here you can read the EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD (December 2003) The EU contributes to the effective functioning of the international non proliferation regime through regular voluntary contributions by EU Member States to international organizations and international initiatives. The EU provides significant support through the CFSP budget and relevant Community instruments, such as the Instrument for Stability Active role in support of multilateralism In its relations with third countries, the EU carries out regular political dialogue at the level of Council Working Groups (CONOP non proliferation, CODUN global disarmament and arms 188

189 control, DUWP dual use) with the US, Russia, China, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Ukraine, Brazil and Egypt. These meetings take place once or twice a year between officials representing the services of the High Representative of the Union and the country concerned. Non proliferation issues are regularly discussed at ministerial meetings with third countries and are included in Summit Declarations and other relevant documents WMD clause in relations with third countries On the basis of instructions issued by the Council in November 2003, the EU has been including a specific article/clause referring to non proliferation of WMD in its contractual agreements with third countries. The clause, usually referred to as the WMD The first paragraph of the WMD clause refers to the commitment of the parties to respect and fully implement their existing obligations in the field of nonproliferation and disarmament. The second paragraph refers to the cooperation commitments between the parties involving taking steps to sign, ratify, or accede to, as appropriate, and fully implement other relevant international instruments and to establish a system of export controls for dual use goods, including end use controls on dual use technologies and effective sanctions for breaches of these controls. The third paragraph refers to the establishment of a regular political dialogue between the parties. clause, has been negotiated with more than 100 countries and has been included in all the relevant mixed agreements (Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, Association Agreements, etc.) and political agreements that the EU has negotiated with third countries. Here you can read the Note on the implementation of the WMD clause (January 2009) When adopting the WMD clause, the EU agreed a standard text for this article. The first paragraph of the WMD clause is considered an essential element of the agreement of which the WMD clause is part. This means that any breach of the provisions under this paragraph can lead to the immediate suspension of the agreement by one of the parties. The EU has decided that this essential element should be systematically included in the WMD clause and in the Human Rights clause. 189

190 The adoption of the WMD clause between the EU and third countries has served as the legal basis for the provision of assistance by the EU to help countries implement their national obligations under international non-proliferation and disarmament instruments NPT balanced approach required The EU continues to regard the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, and an important element in the future development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes. Whereas the EU is united in the field of non proliferation, there are certain differences of opinion with regard to disarmament and nuclear energy. In fact, the EU position is said to provide a good compromise for a wider NPT audience since it combines the views of Nuclear Weapon States, non Nuclear Weapon States, NATO countries, countries not militarily aligned, countries promoting or using nuclear energy and countries opposed to its promotion. Member States agreed on a comprehensive EU position for the 2010 NPT Review Conference held in New York in May 2010 (see reference document). Here you can read Council Decision 2010/212/CFSP of 29 March 2010 relating to the position of the European Union for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Click on the icon The EU successfully promoted a substantive and balanced outcome of the Review Conference, in particular the adoption of concrete action plans on all three pillars of the NPT disarmament, non proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The EU and its Member States will work on the implementation of the NPT Review Conference outcome, including the understandings reached on the Middle East providing for the organization of an international conference in 2012 on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The EU has offered to organize a preparatory seminar in order to facilitate this process. 190

191 Nuclear non proliferation The EU continues to be very active in the nuclear non proliferation field, in particular through cooperation with international organizations in charge of verification activities. The strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system remains a key priority for the EU. The EU cooperates closely with the IAEA on strengthening global nuclear security. Since 2004, the EU has become the major contributor to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) and more than EUR 30 million have been committed to it. Through the IAEA NSF, the EU supports nuclear security projects in almost 100 countries in order to prevent, detect and react to risks posed by nuclear terrorism. The EU also supports efforts to promote the concept of multilateral nuclear approaches, including through the establishment of an IAEA controlled nuclear fuel bank, to which the EU has pledged a financial contribution of up to EUR 25 million. The EU continues to promote the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) through diplomatic efforts, in particular in the Annex II States whose ratification is required for the Treaty s entry into force. The EU has also made a series of financial contributions since 2006, amounting to more than EUR 10 million, for projects to strengthen the monitoring and verification capabilities of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). 191

192 Another important priority for the EU is to launch negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons (Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty, FMCT) and its verification provisions. The EU is keeping a close eye on regional proliferation crises. Iran The EU is actively involved in efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. On the basis of the double track approach, combining incentives with pressure, the EU High Representative has been involved since 2004 and has been leading efforts since 2006 to bring Iran back to meaningful negotiations about its nuclear programme. (See here the Declaration on Iran, European Council Conclusions of June 2010, Annex II, pages 14 15). Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea The EU continues to support the Six Party Talks process, the objective of which is the de nuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The EU remains ready to contribute once an appropriate solution has been found. In the past, the EU contributed to the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and to IAEA monitoring activities in the DPRK Strengthening export controls The EU WMD Strategy highlights the importance of strengthening export control policies and practices concerning dual use items, which can be used for both civil and military purposes. The control of exports of these items is governed by Council Regulation No 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual use items. This Regulation is directly applicable in EU Member States. Items listed in the Regulation cannot leave EU territory without an export license granted by the competent authorities of the Member States see the next chapter for more details. The EU list of controlled items is based on control lists adopted by the international export control regimes: the Australia Group (AG), 192

193 the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The EU is promoting the participation of all EU Member States in all export control regimes, given the existence of the single market and the fact that Regulation No 428/2009 is legally binding in all 27 Member States. Currently, those EU Member States which are outside some of the regimes are not aware of denial notifications issued by non EU participants. This situation could create a loophole in the EU s ability to implement controls effectively, thus increasing the risk of unintended transfers of technology. Consultations are continuing with those third countries which are reluctant to accept new participants Complying with and promoting UNSCR 1540 UN Security Council Resolution 1540/2004 (select full text from here) and subsequent resolutions 1673 and 1810 have given a strong legal basis for, and further impetus to, the EU s efforts to prevent proliferation by explicitly addressing illicit trafficking and procurement networks, and in particular, the involvement of non state actors, including terrorists, in the proliferation of WMD technology. The EU has been active in ensuring the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 both internally (inter alia through regular updates of the Council Regulation on dual use export controls) and externally, by promoting the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 in third countries (regional seminars together with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, assistance for the submission of national reports and for the enhancement of national capabilities, etc.). Beyond its comprehensive programme of assistance on dual use export control, the EU will invest EUR 300 million in the period in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) cooperation with third countries. The EU s objective is to develop a strong regional approach, in line with UNSCR 1540 requirements, through the creation of regional CBRN centers of excellence in partnership with the countries concerned. The goal is to establish regional networks that would mobilize national, regional and international resources to develop a good CBRN policy at national and regional level. It would cover all aspects of CBRN policy, such as export control, border monitoring, safety and security, illicit financing, and engagement of the scientific community. 193

194 EU support to international security initiatives In addition to treaties and international export control regimes, other initiatives are also supported by the EU. The EU and its Member States have subscribed to the Principles of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). The EU has observer status within the GICNT, but it has not so far acquired status within the PSI. The EU will participate actively in the follow up process of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit of April 2010, where the European Council President represented the EU EU in the G8 The EU participates in G8 activities and discussions on non proliferation and disarmament issues. Since the establishment of the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in 2002, the EU has committed nearly EUR 1 billion to its programmes. The EU supports the extension of the Global Partnership beyond 2012 and its geographical and thematic expansion beyond the former Soviet Union. Several EU Member States are also donors at national level Chemical Weapons The EU continues to promote the universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which must be duly matched by the full and effective implementation by all States Parties of their obligations under this Convention. This will enhance the capability to effectively prevent and respond to acts of terrorism involving toxic chemicals. The EU has noted with concern that the final extended deadline of 2012 for the total destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles will not be met. Reinforcing the verification regime will be another crucial challenge in the coming years. The EU is providing significant political and financial support to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in order to meet its policy goals, particularly with regard to universalisation and full implementation of the CWC. Since the first Joint Action in support of the OPCW, adopted by the Council in 2004, 21 States have signed and ratified the CWC, bringing the number of States Parties to 188. Council Decision 2009/569/CFSP adopted in 2009 allows the continuation of intensive targeted assistance to the OPCW, including a specific Programme for Africa. 194

195 Biological weapons The EU strongly supports the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the main multilateral instrument in reducing the threat from these weapons of mass destruction. The EU has adopted two Joint Actions in support of the BTWC. The first ran from 2006 to 2008 and implementation of the second started in Under the current Joint Action, the EU is carrying out a series of activities which are being implemented by the BTWC Implementing Support Unit (ISU). They have four goals: universalisation of the Convention; national implementation of the Convention; promotion of Confidence Building Measures (CBM); and support for the BTWC inter session process. The concrete projects include awareness raising seminars and financial grants to enable training and visits by authorities of countries not yet party to the BTWC to EU Member States authorities. The EU also provides assistance to interested States Parties in such matters as drafting legislation, including criminal law provisions, and administrative measures. Increasing the number of CBM declarations and providing assistance for their submission continue to play an important role in monitoring States Parties compliance, in the absence of a verification mechanism. Finally, workshops are organized on inter session topics in order to enable the best possible preparation of the next Review Conference in In 2008, the Council adopted a Joint Action in support of World Health Organization (WHO) activities in the area of laboratory bio safety and bio security. This Joint Action supports the implementation of the BTWC and of the International Health Regulations, which constitute an important framework for promoting bio security and bio safety. Actions include regional outreach workshops focusing on bio risk reduction management and strengthening the security and laboratory management practices against biological risks in a specific country. The first country selected is Oman. International cooperation and assistance in the field of bio security and bio safety is also provided through the Instrument for Stability. Projects to reduce the risk of biological incidents and misuse include: 195

196 Strengthening bio safety and bio security capabilities in Russia and in Central Asian countries through training of personnel; The establishment of a network for the control of health, security threats and other bio security risks in countries in the Mediterranean basin. This project, called EpiSouth, seeks to strengthen preparedness at national and regional levels; Support for the Ukrainian Anti Plague Station (UAPS) in Simferopol to secure the existing facility and to build a new one to improve safety and security practices Ballistic missiles The EU strongly supports the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, the only multilateral instrument on confidence building and transparency in the field of ballistic missiles. In order to make EU support more tangible, a Council Decision in support of the HCOC was adopted in The activities are aimed at supporting the universality of the Code, implementation of the Code and enhancement and improved functioning of the Code Non proliferation actions within the EU The fundamental security issue of WMD proliferation was given a new dimension by the Council in 2008 with the adoption of the action plan, New lines for action by the European Union in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Here you can read New lines for action by the European Union in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems (December 2008) Click on the icon The main objective is to make non proliferation a cross cutting priority in EU and Member States policies, to identify best practices and to encourage better coordination. In November 2009, the Council adopted an EU CBRN Action Plan in order to enhance preventive, detection and response measures against CBRN threats and risks. The implementation of key actions started in

197 7.11 CHAPTER 4 - The European export control regime This chapter aims at enabling the course participant to describe and differentiate between the international and EU structures related to export controls and identifying the principles that govern an export control regime. It also enables the participant to distinguish some of the most visible improvements observed in the European export control regime as progressively set up by the successive legal acts Introduction Although the principle of a restriction free international trade is set as a worldwide economical and political objective, the development of different peaceful nuclear, biological and chemical applications, such as power generation or pharmaceutical and chemical industries, is constrained by the potential risk of diversion to military applications. Therefore, in order to reinforce the non proliferation mechanisms, trade in weapons and dual use items is not subject to the restriction free principle which applies to ordinary goods and services. Specific security motivated exceptions have been set at international level, such as Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade adopted in The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which organizes the common commercial policy of the European Union (Article 207), and indirectly implements Article XXI, has included similar exceptions allowing Member States to restrain trade exchanges between Member States (Article 36) and towards third States (Article 346). Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (As set by the Lisbon Treaty) Article 36 (ex Article 30 TEC) The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public 197

198 security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (As set by the Lisbon Treaty) Article 346 (ex Article 296 TEC) 1. The provisions of the Treaties shall not preclude the application of the following rules: (a) no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security; (b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the internal market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes. 2. The Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, make changes to the list, which it drew up on 15 April 1958, of the products to which the provisions of paragraph 1(b) apply. Article 207 (ex Article 133 TEC) 1. The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalization, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. The common commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union s external action. 2. The European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt the measures defining the framework for 198

199 implementing the common commercial policy. These internationally agreed exceptions not only concern products that are specifically designed to be integrated into the structure of a weapon, which are sometimes designated by the term defense material, but also those which, even though they are primarily designed for civilian use, can be diverted to a military purpose and contribute to the elaboration of WMDs. These products are usually known as dual use items. The similarly important risk they represent for the proliferation of these WMD has therefore to be kept in mind by all exporters Export control regimes general characteristics Generally, export control rules consist in politically binding guidelines and procedures, also known as soft law (adopted by a group of States which are usually the main suppliers) and various legally binding Treaties and other instruments adopted at international level or at EU level. The basis for the nuclear export control regime is the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which requires States Parties to apply export controls (Article III (2)). Similarly, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) include provisions on export controls. Numerous export control regimes, notably the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group in the nuclear field, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual Use Goods and Technologies, and the Australia Group in the chemical and biological fields, have established common control lists, principles and parameters for the purpose of governing international transfers of proliferation sensitive items. Controls on some of the potential means of delivery of these weapons are dealt with in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The Zangger Committee was formed in It is an informal group and has 38 members (as of 199

200 November 2011), all of which are party to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The ZC was formed out of a desire for major nuclear suppliers to reach a common understanding on how to implement Article III, paragraph 2, of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty: Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non nuclear weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article. (IAEA safeguards as described in Article III). Set up in 1992 (and derived from the London Club created in 1985), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a group of 46 nuclear supplier countries (as of November 2011) that seek to limit nuclear proliferation through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear related exports. The first set of Guidelines (Trigger List) governs the export of items that are especially designed or prepared for nuclear use. The second set of Guidelines (Dual Use List) governs the export of nuclear related dual use items and technologies that can make a major contribution to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity, but which have non nuclear uses as well. The Wassenaar Arrangement was established in 1994 and replaced the Western COCOM export control regime. As of November 2011, it has 40 participants who seek to promote transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual use goods and technologies. It establishes lists, called control lists, of those items that may contribute to the preparation of weapons of mass destruction. The Australia Group (AG) is an informal forum, created in 1985, of 41 participants (as of November 2011) which, through the harmonization of export control lists and guidelines, seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons. Coordination of national export control measures allows Australia Group participants to fulfill their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to the fullest extent possible. Created in 1987 by the G7, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a voluntary association of 34 countries as of November 2011, which share the goals of non proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and which seek to 200

201 coordinate national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing their proliferation. The MTCR rests on adherence to common export policy guidelines (the MTCR Guidelines) applied to an integral common list of controlled items (the MTCR Equipment, Software and Technology Annex). All MTCR decisions are taken by consensus. (Click header for the MTCR website) All of these regimes aim to counter the risk of proliferation by addressing the roots of proliferation through the transfer of sensitive products; in other words, they set an export authorization requirement. In order to do so, they all contain, as common elements, definitions of the targeted items, of the conditions and of the criteria for authorizing exports. Their approach to defining the items to which particular attention should be paid is to establish lists of sensitive items that are regularly reviewed in order to adapt them to the evolution of technologies and products. The Nuclear Supplier Group for example, which brings together the 46 main exporting States, has drawn up two different lists: a list relating to the nuclear material, also called a trigger list, and another list relating to dual use items. It must be pointed out that, since international trade in these products originates from a limited number of exporting States, the various regimes usually have similar membership Implementing export control regimes The various regimes set a certain number of conditions and criteria to be implemented by the participating States authorities when examining the request for an export authorization. The conditions are objective and contextual elements that can be verified. For example, for nuclear exports, the NSG requires, as a general condition for supply, that the importing State have a Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement in force with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The European Union, as stated in the Strategy, proposes to make transfers subject to ratification of an Additional Protocol, in order to improve the efficiency of the verifications by the Agency. The criteria for dual use exports are more subjective than the conditions and must be considered on a case by case basis by the national authorities taking the decision, for example the commitment of the importing State in combating the proliferation of WMDs. With UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), which aims to prevent proliferation by States and non-state actors, the implementation of export control mechanisms became a universal legal obligation for all States, including those not party to the NPT. The EU attaches great importance to 201

202 the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 as it would amount to effective implementation of the key principle of multilateralism set out in the Strategy. In 2008, the Council adopted Joint Action 2008/368/CFSP, with a budget of EUR , to enhance the capacity of officials responsible for managing export controls in third countries. Workshops were organized for border, customs and regulatory officials in six geographical regions (Africa, Central America, Mercosur, the Middle East and Gulf Regions, the Pacific Islands and South East Asia) to discuss the national and international legal framework, regulatory controls (including licensing provisions, end user verification and awareness raising programmes) and enforcement (including commodity identification, risk assessment and detection methods). The Commission, acting in the framework of the EU s external relations, has also been very active in the promotion of export controls. Under the Instrument for Stability launched in 2007, in which the proliferation of WMDs was identified as a major threat, the EU set up a cooperation programme for third countries on export controls. Programmes on dual use items are implemented by the German Licensing Office BAFA, as mandated by the Commission. For more details, see: outreach.info. Regarding the European Union more specifically, it should be noted that all Member States participate in the NSG and the Australia Group, but some Member States remain outside other export control regimes because of opposition by third countries. The EU is working towards the early accession of all Member States to the MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement to ensure the proper functioning of the single market. The European Commission participates in two regimes: the Australia Group and the NSG. Owing to the large number of EU parties, the action of the Union is fundamental for these regimes European control regimes The international requirements prescribed by the various regimes, however, are implemented in Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 27 August 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual use items and by the Joint Action of 22 June 2000 (2000/0401/CFSP) concerning the control of technical assistance related to certain military end uses. The controlled items are based on control lists adopted by above mentioned international regimes. 202

203 Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 is directly applicable in the Member States click on the icon to read the text. The Member States competent authorities are responsible for the practical implementation of this Regulation. Despite its title, the Regulation covers not only dual use items but also all goods which can be used both for non explosive uses and to assist in any way in the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction or other nuclear explosive devices. Inserting this provision appeared to be necessary insofar as for nuclear equipment and technology, the definition of dual use is slightly different and distinguishes between items especially designed for nuclear use and items not especially designed for nuclear use. The Regulation establishes a certain number of principles. In the first place, it distinguishes between export from a Member State to a third country and transfer between two EU Member States. Owing to the common market within the EU, the transfer of a sensitive item is, in principle, exempted from an authorization, unless the transferring Member State s national security interests are threatened by, notably, the possibility that the item may be re exported to a third country, or the item is included in a list of very sensitive dual use items. However, this latest exemption to the common market principle is in practice limited by the possibilities given to the Member States to issue general licenses authorizing the transfer of some of these sensitive items. The various authorizations defining the European export control regime Name of the authorization Definition in Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 Individual export authorization An authorization granted to one specific exporter for one end user or consignee in a third country and covering one or more dual use items. Community General Export Authorization (CGEA) The authorization must be requested in the Member State in which the exporter is established. An export authorization for exports to certain countries of destination available to all exporters who respect the conditions of use as listed in Annex II [of Regulation (EC) No 428/2009]. Annex II: Parts 1 & 2 define the list of items for which the CGEA is issued. Part 3 defines the list of countries for which the CGEA is issued. Global export authorization No complementary authorization is required from the Member States authorities. An authorization granted to one specific exporter in respect of a 203

204 category of dual use item which may be valid for exports to one or more specified end users and/or in one or more specified third countries. National general export authorization The authorization must be requested in the Member State in which the exporter is established. An export authorization granted in accordance with Article 9(2) and defined by national legislation in conformity with Article 9 and Annex III c [of Regulation (EC) No 428/2009]. The authorization must be requested in the Member State in which the exporter is established. Annex III c: the authorization must be published in the national official journal and notified to the European Commission. The regime is currently under review and the revision, which will enter into force in 2012, creates six European Union General Export Authorizations (EUGEA) replacing the Community General Export Authorization (CGEA). These EUGEAs will cover dedicated items, specific destinations and specific operations. The Regulation covers not only exporting and transferring activity but also tangible and intangible exports or transfers, such as the transmission of information and technologies. In addition, the Regulation defines the transit of items and brokering, as an intermediary activity, and imposes controls on them European industrial actors Nevertheless, as in the previous Regulation (1334/2000) and in different international regimes such as the NSG, the European Union has set up mechanisms to apply controls to items not listed and scenarios outside the prescribed criteria. These mechanisms are called catch all clauses and allow the national authorities to impose a prior authorization requirement on exports of items not listed if they have reason to suspect that they may be diverted for a use incompatible with the objective of non proliferation or the protection of human rights. They also require an industrial operator to ask for an authorization if it itself suspects that the item it intends to export may be diverted. The European Union export control regime is therefore characterized by an increase in the political responsibility of industrial actors for non proliferation of WMDs. This dynamic may even trigger developments in the structure of the exporting industries because they will in the future be increasingly encouraged to set internal compliance programmes, even if Regulation (EC) No 204

205 428/2009 has already made the implementation of internal compliance programmes a criterion when exporters apply for a global export authorization. These programmes are intended to prompt exporters themselves to evaluate the threat that their activity may subsequently represent for non proliferation; they are, therefore, in line with the spirit that presided over the introduction of catch all clauses News & Updates Up to date information on non proliferation of WMD and related issues Centre d Étude de Sécurité Internationale et de Maîtrise des Armements Click on the icon for the monthly bulletin FR Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Click on the icon EN The Nonproliferation Review James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Click on the icon EN FAS Security Strategy Blog Click on the icon EN Global Security Newswire Click on the icon EN 205

206 8 AKU 9 THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE General description AKU9 introduces the most important aspects of the security implications of climate change, including elements of climate science, physical impacts of climate change and its threat multiplier consequences in global security, as well as possible approaches to European and national security planning from a climate security perspective Learning Content AKU9 will touch upon the following aspects of the current climate change debate: Climate Science and Physical Impact. The chapter represents a summary of climate science and the physical impacts of climate change. After the study of this chapter (incl. the study of the recommended reading files), the reader should be able to recognize the evidence of climate change and describe what the impacts will be. Climate change as a threat multiplier of existing tensions and its contribution to instability. The chapter discusses the various threat multiplier effects of climate change, which in turn generate new risks in a globalised world. After the study of this chapter (incl. the study of the recommended reading files), the reader should be able to enumerate the existing tensions and weaknesses in regions of instability on which climate change is a threat multiplier, and explain how this could impact on broader global security. Climate Security in the Context of Security Planning. The chapter reviews how the security risks related to climate change are considered in the security and defense awareness at European and some national levels, outlining also some alternative approaches in this direction. After the study of this chapter (incl. the study of the recommended reading files), the reader should be able to identify climate change linked risks to European security and summarize EU and national possible approaches and actions. 8.2 CHAPTER 1 - Climate Science and Physical Impact The chapter represents a summary of climate science and the physical impacts of climate change. After the study of this chapter (incl. the study of the recommended reading files), the reader should be able to recognize the evidence of climate change and describe what the impacts will be Carbon Dioxide Heat Trapping Carbon dioxide is a heat trapping gas. More carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere will inevitably warm the planet. Globally, the 10 warmest years on record have come after The 206

207 last decade ( ) was the warmest in the whole temperature record, since Natural variation cannot explain the increase in global temperature over the past 50 years Burning Fossil Fuels Burning fossil fuels is a major contributor to CO 2. CO 2 levels in the atmosphere have gone up 38% since pre industrial times, to 387 parts per million (ppm). Rising levels of greenhouse gases are directly linked to human activity like burning fossil fuels and clearing forests. Data from ice cores verifies this. CO 2 concentrations are now at their highest level for at least 800,000 years. There is international consensus, informed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), that to avoid the worst impacts of climate change, global average temperature rise must not exceed 2 C compared to pre industrial times. Based on historical emissions, the global temperature average has risen by 0.7 C. Beyond the 2 C threshold, the risks to our global security and prosperity are too great because our capacity to adapt sufficiently is too uncertain. A 2 C temperature rise is equivalent to ~450 ppm of CO 2. Even if we stopped releasing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere tomorrow, the planet would continue to warm for several decades because of the time it takes the Earth s climate system to remove the CO 2 from the atmosphere and the slow response of the oceans. We are already committed to 1.4 C degrees of warming above pre industrial times. Reducing long term global emissions now will help avoid the risks of the worst climate impacts in the future. Higher concentrations of CO 2 in the oceans increase the acidity of seawater, threatening marine ecosystems. The world s oceans are a major source of protein for millions of people in the world Impact of Global Temperatures Rise Higher global temperatures will: Affect crop yields in all regions of the world. An average global temperature rise above 3 C will very likely decrease total food production. Exacerbate the availability of freshwater in some already water stressed regions in the context of higher total world population. By 2080, under a moderate 207

208 population growth projection, close to 3 billion people could be living in water stressed areas. The Middle East, Central Asia and Mediterranean basin would be particularly badly affected. Make more regions of the world at risk from infectious diseases such as dengue and malaria. Warmer temperatures and higher humidity provide hospitable environments for some disease vectors such as the Asian Tiger Mosquito, whose population has expanded into Italy, southern France and the US, bringing West Nile disease as far North as the Canadian border. Affect coastal regions and low lying areas. As the global temperature rises, the warming oceans will continue to expand. Water stored in polar ice sheets and glaciers will also melt into the oceans. The combination of these two processes results in rising average global sea levels. Low lying, densely populated regions such as the Brahmaputra and Mekong deltas are most at risk. The impacts of storm surges are more likely to be catastrophic in these regions as a result of higher sea levels For details, see also the following recommended readings... International Panel for Climate Change, Geneva, Switzerland, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers Met Office, Exeter, UK Climate Science Explained (Clic k on the logo) British Crown copyright 2010, the Met Office (Click on the logo) Foreign & Commonwealth Office, UK The Impact of a Global Temperature Rise of 4 C Google Earth layer (Click on the logo) 8.3 CHAPTER 2 - Climate change as a threat multiplier of existing tensions and its contribution to instability The chapter discusses the various threat multiplier effects of climate change, which in turn generate new risks in a globalised world. After the study of this chapter (incl. the study of the recommended reading files), the reader should be able to enumerate the existing tensions and weaknesses 208

209 in regions of instability on which climate change is a threat multiplier, and explain how this could impact on broader global security. We live in an era of globalization based in, but extending far beyond the economic sphere, to encompass ideas, migration, asymmetric security threats and access to key strategic resources, including water, food and energy. Increasing globalization provides greater opportunity and efficiency. But because the system is closely woven, it also creates the risk that local shocks will have global, systemic impacts. The recent financial crisis is a foretaste. Our national and European security is built on the stability and continuance of this global system The International System and Climate Change The stability of the global economic system depends on the reliable supply and access to key resources, such as energy, food, water, and raw materials. These pillars of security are already under stress in our tightly wound globalised world; demographic trends alone suggest that there will be around 3 billion more mouths to feed by 2050, with concurrent pressures on these pillars. However, climate change multiplies the stresses, threatening the reliability of access to each and therefore global stability: Food: Global demand for food is expected to increase by up to 70% by Already, as a reaction to fears about rising food insecurity, we are seeing so called land grabs by countries and multinational companies, who are buying or leasing land to secure food and, indirectly water. These moves may exacerbate the global food security problem through bypassing the global market, potentially pushing up prices and triggering instability in the grower country. In 2008/09 civil anger over such land grabs contributed to the overthrow of three Governments, such as the deal between a Korean company and the Madagascan government which was seen as a key driver for the coup in Water: Severe droughts are predicted to become more prevalent and are already now twice as common as they were in The Middle East and South Asia, already two of the most water stressed regions in the world are likely to experience even greater pressure due to growing populations and reduced water availability. Energy: Energy security is based on a reliable and stable supply of energy; it is already becoming more technically difficult and expensive to extract oil but the global economy is dependent on cheap and reliable access to fossil fuel energy. Rising temperatures could melt the permafrost on which oil and gas pipelines that cross Canada and Siberia are built, an increase in ferocity of tropical storms in big oil producing regions like the Gulf of Mexico and Bay of Bengal could disrupt supply and rising sea levels present new risks to coastal based refining and distribution capacity. Underinvestment in production and infrastructure is already a big risk to our energy security and climate change will place an additional strain on this. 209

210 In addition, the just in time nature of the global trade system means any number of factors can disrupt the regular supply of goods around the world. Climate change poses potential threats to the viability of key maritime choke points, through which flow goods and commodities vital to our economies, by exacerbating underlying sources of tension and instability in the surrounding countries. Likely places where this could happen include the Straits of Hormuz, Suez Canal, Straits of Malacca and Panama Canal (see adjacent illustration) Climate Change disproportionate impact on the most vulnerable areas The impact of climate change on access to food, water and energy in the most vulnerable states risks increasing the fragility of these states. Set against a background of population increases in developing countries which would already stretch capacity to provide basics such as sanitation, healthcare and education, this increases the risks of state failure in a number of regions, including strategically significant regions such as the Middle East and Central Asia, which in turn would increase risk of migration, civil unrest and conflict The Threat of Mercantilism The threats to the bases of stability, set against the background of a more difficult security environment, would challenge the open, rule based international system. The threat to access of 210

211 key resources may drive the world away from a collaborative rules based system for managing international affairs towards a more narrowly competitive, mercantilist approach. Moreover, if left unchecked, given the highly interconnected and complex nature of our global systems, the consequences will be felt far beyond the origin of instability. The impacts will thus be unpredictable in timing and scope. And whilst climate change will cause hard security risks, there are no hard security responses to solve climate change Risk and International Security Whilst the climate is changing, it is impossible to predict the exact rate and timing of key changes. The non linear nature of these changes complicates efforts to quantify the impact of climate change and, this uncertainty, reduces our ability to manage greater risk in the global system, and therefore exposes the global system to greater risk. Given the unpredictable nature of the impacts to which we may have to respond, a strategy based on adaptation to the security risks, rather than avoid the impacts through mitigation of our carbon emissions, would be highly inefficient and unlikely to succeed. The combination of gradual changes, such as decline in crop yields at lower latitudes, and shock events such as flooding, demand even higher levels of resilience from states For details please see the following recommended readings... Center for Naval Analyses, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, 2007 (Click on the logo) Defense Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Strategic Trends Programme: Global Strategic Trends Out to 2040, 4th edition, 2010 Ministry of Defense UK, pp and pp (Click on the logo) German Advisory Council on Global Change, Climate Change as a Security Risk, 2008, Earthscan, pp. 1 6 (Click on the logo) 211

212 Geoff D. Dabelko, Planning for climate change: the security community s precautionary principle, 2009, Climate Change, Volume 96, Numbers 1 2, pp (Click on the logo) 8.4 CHAPTER 3 - Climate Security in the Context of Security Planning The chapter reviews how the security risks related to climate change are considered in the security and defense awareness at European and some national levels, outlining also some alternative approaches in this direction. After the study of this chapter (incl. the study of the recommended reading files), the reader should be able to identify climate change linked risks to European security and summarize EU and national possible approaches and actions Evolution of climate change in European and national security strategies European level The European Security Strategy (ESS), first published in 2003, recognized the challenge posed by climate change to European security through the lens of the consequences for global development and conflict. The ESS acknowledged that Europe s economic and security interests are dependent on wider global economic and security. Security is a precondition for development it noted, going on to say Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. Given Europe s level of interdependency with other parts of the world, through trade and movement of people, it identified climate change as a potential driver of migration out of the most vulnerable regions and create further instability in those places hardest hit. As the security implications of climate change became more widely acknowledged, the EU High Representative, Javier Solana called for a further report on Climate Change and International Security (CCIS) (Commission and the Secretary general/high Representative to European Council, Climate change and international security, 3 March 2008, ref: 7249/08) to investigate the issues and consider the consequences of climate change on international security for Europe s own security. This noted (Secretary General/High Representative to PSC, Climate Change and 212

213 Security: Recommendations on follow up to the High Representative and Commission report on Climate Change and International Security, 8 December 2008, ref: 16994/08): Climate change is best viewed as a threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability. The core challenge is that climate change threatens to overburden states and regions which are already fragile and conflict prone. It is important to recognize that the risks are not just of a humanitarian nature; they also include political and security risks that directly affect European interests. [7249/08, p2.] The CCIS report drew out specific examples of how the impacts of climate change could likely exacerbate existing instability and act as an obstacle to further peaceful development: The attainment of Millennium Development Goals would be at considerable risk because climate change, if unmitigated, may well wipe out years of development efforts. Climate change is viewed as a threat to European security because of the risks arising from: Conflict over resources Economic damage and risk to coastal cities and critical infrastructure Loss of territory and border disputes Environmentally induced migration Situations of fragility and radicalization Tension over energy supply Pressure on international governance Given their vulnerability to a large number of overlapping climate consequences (drought, flooding, sea level rise and increases in extreme tropical storms) and low degree of adaptive capacity, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean and the Arctic were identified as the most climate sensitive countries. In response to these threats, the report identified possible actions the EU could undertake including: Enhancing capacities at the EU level around research, analysis and monitoring, EU multilateral leadership to promote global climate security and cooperation with third countries involving integrating climate resilience and adaptation into EU regional strategies. A further follow up paper (published December 2008) from the High Representative to the Political and Security Committee looked in greater depth at the possible vulnerabilities of geographical regions and proposed: an intensified dialogue with third countries and organizations; more detailed analysis of the security implications at regional level; and the integration of these 213

214 analyses into EU early warning mechanisms, which were subsequently approved by the European Council in December The agenda has been taken forward at a working level by Council Secretariat, DG RELEX, and interested member states comprising of UK, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany. Council Conclusions adopted in December 2009 recommended that the issue moves past narrative and discussion to concrete policies An example of climate change incorporated at the national security level In April 2007, the UK sponsored a debate in the UN Security Council on the security implications of climate change. In March 2008, the first UK National Security Strategy (NSS) of the UK included climate change as one of a series of substantial drivers of instability globally, that would have consequences for the UK. The NSS stated: Climate change is potentially the greatest challenge to global stability and security, and therefore to national security. Cabinet Office, National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, 2008, pp & (Click on the logo) Defense approaches to addressing climate change and environmental issues The need for greater fuel efficiency of defense installations and equipment is becoming increasingly recognized amongst European countries and allied partners. More efficient use of energy means: lower financial costs, greater operational capabilities, less risk to human life, reduced environmental impact including lower CO2 emissions UK MOD climate change strategy The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) produced its own Climate Change Strategy in 2009, updated in 2010, recognizing that climate change would have strategic and operational consequences for its own Defense objectives. The UK MoD s Climate Change Strategy looks at the climate change and energy challenges through both mitigation of its own carbon emissions and adaptation to the threats it is likely to face as a result of climate change impacts. 214

215 UK Ministry of Defense Climate Change Strategy 2010 (Click on the logo) US Quadrennial Defense Review The US Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), published in January 2010 stated that [climate change] may act as an accelerant of instability or conflict placing a burden to respond on civilian institutions and militaries around the world. Like the UK MoD s Climate Change Strategy, the QDR looks at both mitigation of carbon emissions and its own adaptation to the challenges climate change will pose to its operational capacity. The QDR discusses the impacts on the type of operations including increased need for humanitarian and disaster response as well as the benefits of energy efficiency for operations, bio fuels, electric vehicles, a green carrier strike group by 2016 and an innovation fund for new tech. US Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010, pp. iv, xv, 7, (Click on the logo) French MOD environment action plan As part of the Grenelle environment process, the MOD created an environment office in 2008 to oversee the ministry s environment action plan. The plan features 40 measures related to infrastructure (energy usage in buildings), waste and dangerous substance management, water management, transport and procurement. The environment office is responsible for the development, implementation and co ordination of environmental protection for the MOD. It produces an annual environmental audit (emissions, water usage, and volume of waste). Key features of the environmental action plan include: Greening defense equipment by investing 9 million in environmental research for defense equipment; and running 31 eco design arms programmes; 118 million for arms dismantlement; Work with national parks to protect the biodiversity on military land; 19 real estate projects within the High Environmental Quality framework, 7 projects for low energy renovations, two low energy building projects and two positive energy projects; 215

216 Renewable energy projects on military sites European Defense Agency Taken from European Defense Agency s Sustainable Energy Work Strand : The EDA has recognized that there is an urgent need to follow the EU green initiatives in implementation in order to minimize the environmental impact of Crisis Management Operations (CMOs). Increasing the overall energy efficiency of systems will decrease fossil fuel consumption, reducing the logistical footprint while at the same time lessening the system life cycle costs. Adopting a systems approach to increasing energy efficiency for the short and medium/long term, it is the combination of both conventional and alternative, new and old technologies, which together with new conscious ways of consumption that will make the difference. The goal is to reduce the environmental impact whilst retaining reliable energy supply for the safety of personnel and security of operations. In accordance with the EU Renewable Energy Associations initiatives the EDA has already started to investigate how these sorts of power conversion technologies can fit into future crisis management operation. Furthermore, EDA has recently addressed overall energy efficiency on naval platforms and power sources from a component/sub system perspective which, combined with past initiatives in the WEAG on electrified platforms and their components, constitutes a solid body of work. 1 Further information on the Grennelle environment process can be found here: environnement.fr/spip.php?article For details, please see also the following recommended readings... Commission and the Secretary general/high Representative to European Council, Climate change and international security, 3 March 2008, ref: 7249/08. Secretary General/High Representative to PSC, Climate Change and Security: Recommendations on follow up to the High Representative and Commission report on Climate Change and International Security, 8 December 2008, ref: 16994/08. UK Ministry of Defense Sustainable Procurement Strategy (Click on the logo) 216

217 9 AKU 10 EU MEDIATION AND DIALOGUE CAPACITIES General Description This Autonomous Knowledge Unit gives an overview of the different styles and activities of mediation and dialogue, the EU s engagement in such activities, either as mediator or is support for mediation and dialogue led by others. This AKU also provides an overview of the EU s concept on strengthening EU mediation and dialogue capabilities and provides an overview of other organizations engaged in peace mediation. 9.2 CHAPTER 1 - Introduction DEFINITIONS Mediation and dialogue are tools that aim to support communication between two or more parties to a conflict. They are often used together in support of peace processes before, during and after a formal peace agreement has been signed. Dialogue is when disputants (and possibly others) talk together directly, with the objective of improving their understanding of the issues and each other, without necessarily resolving the issues that divide them. Dialogue can also be facilitated by a third party. The definition of dialogue that the EU uses in its 2009 Concept for Strengthening Mediation and Dialogue Capacities (henceforth the EU Concept) is: An open ended process which aims primarily at creating a culture of communication and search for common ground, leading to confidence building and improved interpersonal understanding among representatives of opposing parties, which, in turn, can help to prevent conflict and be a means in reconciliation and peace building processes. Click on the icon to the right to open the document (Required reading). 217

218 In mediation a third party assists the disputants to discuss the issues, with their consent, with a view to finding a solution that both parties agree to. Mediation is differentiated from other forms of third party intervention primarily because it is not premised on force and because the parties maintain a certain degree of ownership over the outcome of the process. The EU Concept also notes that mediation is usually based on a formal mandate from the parties to a conflict. Since dialogue and mediation are so closely associated in practice, many definitions of mediation include dialogue. This is the case with the EU since its Concept uses mediation in a broad sense which is meant to include also dialogue and facilitation Styles of Mediation There are different ways that mediators can use their third party role to find a solution to a problem that divides the parties. These are often categorized into three different styles or models of mediation. For more details, you can consult the document Engaging the EU in mediation and dialogue: Reflections and recommendations by A. Herrberg, with C. Gündüz and L. Davis (2009) by clicking on the icon. 1. Power based, deal brokering mediation This is when mediators bring power to bear on the parties, including the promise or threat of positive or negative incentives. The style of mediation is directive with mediators engaging both in matters of process and substance. This is typically associated with high level peace negotiations and with EU political (CFSP) engagement in them. Indeed, the EU Concept notes that through its political and economic weight and its comprehensive approach... the EU is in an excellent position to provide incentives to the conflict parties. 2. Interest based, problem solving mediation Interest based mediators focus on facilitating a process that generates options for an agreement that satisfy the underlying interests of all parties. The mediator acts as a guardian of the process and sometimes also makes contributions on substance. This kind of mediation is often associated with informal dispute resolution at lower levels. The EU has a history of engaging in this kind of 218

219 dispute resolution directly through its political representatives (EU Special Representatives Heads of Delegation, and, in some cases, Heads of CSDP missions). It also supports this kind of mediation led by others, with financial assistance and political and technical support. 3. Transformative, long term mediation and dialogue Third parties can also mediate or facilitate processes that aim to improve understanding, build relationships and trust and generate new solutions. This kind of intervention can lay the ground work for formal peace talks, can run parallel to them, or can be the key to ensuring that an agreement is implemented. The EU has supported this form of mediation and dialogue through its support for community dispute resolution efforts, peace processes and reconciliation and social cohesion interventions in conflict affected contexts Levels of Mediation and Multi Track Approaches It is common in conflict affected contexts for there to be multiple forms of mediation and dialogue in play at one time, using styles that are adapted to the levels or tracks of engagement. For example, Track 1 refers to official talks at the highest political level. Track 1.5 involves influential leaders from government and society that are not directly involved in the formal high level talks but have the ability to influence them. These can, for example, include business, religious, military and political party leaders and are often informal and confidential. Track 2 mediation efforts typically refer to public processes involving talks between non governmental leaders and track 3 to more local civil society or grassroots actors. In theory, multi track mediation and dialogue processes should be mutually reinforcing with track 1.5, 2 and 3 processes serving to build confidence, strengthen relationships and generate ideas or support for official Track 1 talks between political leaders [Add references and links to academic work including Diamond]. This is borne out by studies that show that peace agreements reached through multi track processes tend to be more sustainable [Academic reference: Wanis St.John, A., and D. Kew The Missing Link? Civil Society, Peace Negotiations: Contributions to Sustained Peace Paper for the forty seventh annual convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego]. The EU engages in and supports mediation and dialogue at different levels: 219

220 Mediation activities There are a large number of activities associated with mediation. Some of the most common include: Analyzing the conflict, diagnosing its causes and identifying the parties positions and interests. Designing and convening mediation processes and preparing agendas in consultation with the parties. Facilitating dialogue, negotiations and co operative problem solving by the parties. Pursuing shuttle diplomacy when the adversaries refuse to talk directly to each other. Employing methods to build the parties confidence in negotiations. Identifying common ground between the parties and generating options for overcoming deadlocks. Providing technical advice to inform generation of options in specific substantive areas e.g. on resource management, power sharing, DDR, SSR, land reform, constitutional reform. Helping the parties to forge agreements. Creating opportunities for civil society to contribute to peace talks. Coordinating external actors that have an interest in the conflict but are not participants in the negotiations (e.g. international bodies, donors and neighboring states). Providing information about the peace process to relevant actors, the public at large and communities in the country in conflict. 9.3 CHAPTER 2 EU engagement in high level mediation and dialogue For the EU, mediation and dialogue is seen as a policy tool that can be used both as a tool of first response to emerging on on going crisis situations and as a tool that can be integrated into other conflict prevention, crisis management and peace building activities. The EU has a range of institutional actors engaged in diplomatic, security and development activities linked to peace processes. All of them have at times been directly engaged in mediation and dialogue activities. Examples of how various actors have been engaged in mediation relevant activities are given below EU Political and Development Actors A range of EU institutional actors have been directly involved in formal mediation at the highest political level. These include the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), the President of the European Council, the European Commission (EC), the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) and the EU Delegations. 220

221 More often than not, there is more than one formal mediator and the EU serves as a co mediator in high level mediation teams. This was, for instance, the case with the joint US/EU mediation team of Solana (former EU SG/HR) Léotard (FR) and Pardew (US) in reaching the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) Ohrid Agreement in 2001 and the joint Solana and Kwasniewski (PL) mediation team in the Ukrainian Orange Revolution in An example of high level mediation by the EU Presidency is the lead role played by Sarkhozy and Kouchner (EU Presidency and FR) in the mediation of the cease fire agreement in the 2008 Georgian Russian conflict. The EU has often been represented in formal, longer term peace talks by its EUSRs. For example, EUSRs represent(ed) the EU in status talks for Kosovo from , the Middle East Quartet and the Geneva talks between the parties to the conflict between Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In addition to directly engaging in formal peace talks, the mandates of EUSRs often include a range of tasks linked to mediation and dialogue support. These include, for example, confidence building measures contributing to the settlement of conflicts and/or to the implementation of cease fire or peace agreements and tasks linked to promoting dialogue and facilitating and maintaining close contact with all the parties. For more information on the roles that EUSRs have played in supporting peace processes see Pioneering Foreign Policy: The EU Special Representatives by Giovanni Grevi, EU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot paper No. 106, October 2007]. The European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EU Delegations have also played a direct role in peace mediation in some cases. For example, the, at that time, Commission Head of Delegation mediated the Accord Politique Globale in Togo in More commonly, however, the European Commission supports a range of mediation and dialogue processes led by others in conflict affected areas (see chapter 3) EU Security Actors Formal high level engagement in peace talks is rarely part of a CSDP mission s mandate. Nevertheless, mission leadership has on occasion been called upon to play a formal mediation role. For example, the Head of the Aceh Monitoring Mission was given a mandate to mediate and, if necessary, arbitrate between the parties in relation to the implementation of the disarmament 221

222 aspects of the peace agreement. Similarly, the leadership of EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina is often engaged in informal, high level dispute resolution. Some CSDP missions also support formal dispute resolution mechanisms that relate to security issues, such as the Incidence Prevention and Response Mechanism supported by the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia. In short, although CSDP missions are not typically called upon to mediate in formal peace talks they can engage in mediation between the parties at the highest levels in order to keep the implementation of a peace agreement or a peace process on track. More commonly, CSDP missions play a supportive role. The majority of CSDP missions engage in dialogue and sometimes dispute resolution at the working level (track 1.5 or 2) in order to build confidence and create an environment that is conducive to achieving progress in high level talks led by others. Indeed, the EU Concept calls for more mediation training of CSDP personnel at the field level to ensure that their interaction with local actors is conflict sensitive and can help manage or de escalate local tensions. For more information on how CSDP missions integrate mediation and dialogue in their work click on the icon. 9.4 CHAPTER 3 EU support for mediation and dialogue led by others Although the EU is an actor in mediation in its own right and EU representatives serve as a mediators or co mediators, the EU also often plays a supportive role to mediation and dialogue processes led by others. The EU Concept notes that its supportive role is equally as important as its direct mediation role. Types of EU mediation support include: Promoting Mediation EU statements and positions consistently promote mediation and dialogue as a non coercive response to tensions and conflict. The EU Concept notes that this is based on its own experience as a peace project and its underlying values of human rights and the rule of law. The EU and its member states promote mediation both in relation to particular conflicts but also to build national and organizational capacity to support mediation and dialogue processes. The EU is, for example, a core group member of the Friends of Mediation initiative. 222

223 The core group is comprised of 25 states and seven regional organizations that are committed to promoting a culture of mediation in their national policies as well as regionally and internationally (1). Core group members were active, for example, in promoting support in the UN General Assembly for strengthening the UN mediation capacities and, more recently, for the adoption in 2011 of a UN General Assembly consensus resolution on Strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution. (1) The core group was initiated by Finland and Turkey and includes: Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, the Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania and Uganda. The organizations are: the African Union, the Organization of American States, the League of Arab States, ASEAN, the EU, the OSCE, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the UN (Department of Political Affairs and its Mediation Support Unit) Providing Technical Support In mediation processes led by others the EU can facilitate the process by providing technical support for capacity building and training, logistical support and the provision of substantive expertise to the mediators and the conflict parties. Mediation support has typically been outsourced to specialist consultants, but the EU is in the process of strengthening its in house capacity in this area. As the EU Concept notes, this will involve strengthening its capacity to provide operational support to ongoing mediation and dialogue initiatives, identifying lessons learned and best practice guidance as well as mediation training capacity (also see chapter 3 on the EU Concept) Providing Financial Support The EU often contributes to the funding of formal high level peace processes. For example, it provided financial support for: AU high level implementation Panel for Sudan. ECOWAS led Accra Peace Conference that reached the 2003 peace agreement in Liberia. OAU led talks that led to the Arusha Peace agreement in Burundi. UN/AU joint mediation support team in Darfur. UN Good Offices in Columbia. In addition to providing financial support for formal high level talks, the EU also supports informal, often confidential, talks (track 1.5) designed to influence and support the formal peace processes. For example, it has provided support for parallel informal talks that aim to support the constitution making process in Nepal. It has also supported informal talks that ended up with a 223

224 formal peace agreement. This was, for example, the case with its financial support for the talks mediated by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari with the NGO Crisis Management Initiative that led in 2005 to the Aceh peace agreement. In addition, the EU has also supported mediation and alternative dispute resolution efforts at the community level. These are often implemented by NGOs that specialize in building capacity for community mediation and facilitating dialogue. For example, the EU funded Confidence Building Early Response Mechanism, established in 2010, financed and opened the door for the implementation of some 68 small scale dialogue and development projects between communities in both Georgia and Abkhazia. The two most relevant EU financial instruments that currently support mediation activities are the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and the African Peace Facility (APF). The IfS contains the Policy and Advice Facility that enables the funding, at short notice, of a specific dialogue or mediation initiatives. For example, this facility was used to support dialogue between the Laos government and the Hmong diaspora, facilitated by an NGO. The IfS can also be used to support larger or longer term initiatives under other IfS headings. For example, it has been used to support the UN/AU joint mediation support team in Darfur and, under the long term component, to provide support to strengthen the UN stand by team of mediation experts in the UN Mediation Support Unit. Just as the IfS is used to support capacity building of the UN, the APF provides support to mediation activities and capacity building in the AU and in African sub regional organizations. (For more on how the EU supports the mediation capacity of the UN and African organizations see chapter 5.) Exerting Leverage on the Parties In line with a power based approach to mediation, the EU has sought to leverage its political and economic weight to pressure the parties to reach a negotiated solution. To maximize its leverage, the EU is also often aligned with other influential actors, in some cases represented in groups of friends. This is especially the case in Africa. An example of where the EU used leverage in negotiations in which it acted as co mediator is the US/EU mediated negotiations between Albanians and Macedonians that led to the 2001 Ohrid Agreement. In this case the EU exerted pressure through its alliances with influential external actors. These included the Ukraine the principal source of weapons for the Macedonians as well 224

225 as the US and NATO. For instance, joint statements made it clear that NATO deployment was conditional on progress in the talks Creating an environment that is conducive to a settlement A large number of EU interventions in conflict affected areas are justified in terms of their potential to create the conditions that are more conducive to a political settlement. For example, the EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) is predicated on the assumption that building an effective Palestinian state apparatus and police service is a necessary prerequisite for building confidence in the peace process and a two state solution to the conflict. Similarly, in many post conflict situations, the majority of EU development and security interventions will be designed to support the peace process by providing peace dividends (jobs), promoting security and justice sector reform and implementing specific aspects of a peace agreement. For example, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM BiH), the EU Police Missions in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL PROXIMA/EUPAT in FYROM) and the EU s monitoring missions in Aceh (AMM) and Georgia (EUMM) were all intended to help implement security aspects of a peace agreement. 9.5 CHAPTER 4 The EU Concept s guiding principles and recommendations for strengthening mediation and dialogue capacities In 2009 the Council adopted the Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities. The concept builds on the Secretary General/High Representative s Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy that called for the EU to expand [its] dialogue and mediation capacities. In addition to summarizing how the EU engages in mediation and dialogue, the EU Concept provides guiding principles and proposes a number of ways that EU mediation and dialogue capacities can be strengthened. These are summarized here 225

226 PRINCIPLES Coherence Mediation initiatives need to be undertaken in line with broader EU policy objectives. Comprehensiveness Mediation is part of the EU tool box in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management. The EU should seek to link up the various EU instruments, including multi level mediation initiatives, so as to increase their overall impact. Risk Assessment Mediation initiatives and their potential failure 2 carry reputational risks for the EU. These need to be carefully considered and weighed against the alternatives, including support for mediation initiatives led by other actors. Transitional Justice and Human Rights There is often a tension between the fight against impunity and reaching peace settlements that are acceptable to the conflict parties. EU mediation efforts should nevertheless be in line with the principles of human rights and humanitarian law. Promoting the participation of women The EU should contribute to promoting women s equal and full participation in peace negotiations, peace building, peacekeeping and post conflict reconstruction. 2 This is a significant risk since most mediation initiatives fail. For a statistical analysis of high level mediation efforts that result in peace agreements see [add link to CHD report] RECOMMENDATIONS The 2009 EU Concept includes a number of recommendations for how the EU should strengthen its mediation and dialogue capacities in the following five areas. These are summarized below along with initiatives undertaken to implement them. 1. Strategic and horizontal aspects While all EU actors should support timely EU mediation of mediation initiatives of others, this should constitute an explicit part of the mandate of EUSRs and mediation related tasks should be included in the mandates of CSDP missions. 2. Operational support The EU will strive to improve access to mediation expertise to EU appointed and EU backed mediators. To this end, the EU has established a Mediation Support Group within EEAS. The EU will also explore the feasibility of establishing a roster of experts in mediation process and related thematic areas. This work is being supported by a pilot programme authorized by the European Parliament and by a complementary project supported by the Belgian Foreign Ministry [ The focal point for this work within the EEAS is the Peace building, Conflict Prevention and Mediation Division. 226

227 3. Training Building on existing training practices, training, capacity building and coaching for mediators and their staff need to be further strengthened. Basic mediation skills training should be offered to all staff in CSDP missions/operations or EU delegations, while more in depth, specialized training should be offered to those directly involved in mediation or mediation support. This AKU is one step in this direction. In addition, since 2009 the Commission has supported a number of in house trainings for Commission and EEAS staff in mediation and dialogue skills. Mediation coaching is also offered to new Heads of Delegation. Some CSDP missions, such as EUPM BiH, have also initiated an interactive essentials of mediation training programme for some of their staff. A few EU national training institutions, notably Zentrum für Internationale Frieden in Germany and Folke Bernadotte Academy in Sweden also offer mediation and dialogue trainings for national and international (including EU) staff. 4. Knowledge management The EU aims to strengthen its knowledge management in this area in cooperation with other partners. This will involve gathering best practices and developing guidelines more systematically, including possibly though regular exchanges between mediators. One example of collaboration in this area is the EU s collaboration with UNDP in developing guidelines on issues of process and substance. 5. Outreach and co operation Recognizing the wealth of mediation expertise that exists in other international and regional organizations, in states and in specialist non governmental organizations, the EU will seek to strengthen its own capacities through operational partnerships. The next chapter provides some examples of such collaboration. 9.6 CHAPTER 5 Other organizations engaged in peace mediation There are a range of national, international and private or non governmental organizations engaged in peace mediation. This section briefly introduces some of those that the EU works most closely with Countries or States Historically, representatives of national states have mediated most conflicts at the track 1 level. Some states, such as the US and Norway, have been particularly active. The EU has supported a number of initiatives led by states. For example, it provided financial support to mediation efforts led by Norway in Sri Lanka The United Nations (UN) The UN is the international organization with the most experience in peace mediation. UN mediation is commonly associated with the Good Offices of the Secretary General or UN Special 227

228 Envoys that have a mandate to support high level peace talks. A number of UN regional offices also play a mediation and mediation support role. These efforts and actors are, in turn, supported by the UN Department for Political Affairs (UN DPA). Since 2008, UN DPA also hosts the Mediation Unit. This works closely with the Department s regional divisions to plan and support mediation efforts in the field. It provides advisory, financial and logistical support to peace processes and works to strengthen the mediation capacity of regional and sub regional organizations. UN DPA also manages the United Nations Standby Team of Mediation Experts an on call group of experts established in 2008 that can be deployed individually or as a group to assist mediators from the UN or other organizations in the field. The EU has provided financial support for the UN Mediation Unit. It funds two members of its permanent stand by team. As part of its role in mediation knowledge management, UN DPA maintains the UN Peacemaker Databank, an online support tool for international peacemaking professionals. The databank includes more than 800 documents on peacemaking and mediation including over 300 peace agreements and a growing number of operational guidance notes for mediators. A number of other UN institutional actors also perform mediation or mediation relevant functions. These include resident political missions that have a peace process support function and peacekeeping operations. And, in the majority of countries that do not host UN peace operations, UN country teams headed by UN Special Representatives (UNSRs) provide mediation and mediation support functions. These are, in turn, supported by a joint UN Development Programme (UNDP) UN DPA programme for strengthening national capacities for conflict prevention. The programme provides for political and technical support, notably through the deployment of Peace and Development Advisors, to bolster the preventive diplomacy role of UNSRs and to support the development of local mediative capacity. The EU is in close contact with this programme and has drawn upon their lessons learned when it comes to engaging in dialogue processes. For an overview of the UN s institutional actors and instruments for preventive mediation see the 2011 Secretary General Report to the Security Council on preventive diplomacy. And for more information on UN plans to strengthen its mediation related activities see the 2009 report of the Secretary General to the Security Council. 228

229 Other Regional Organizations Regional organizations are taking on an increasingly active role in mediation and mediation support. The African Union is a case in point. Mediation is one of the functions of the African Union s Peace and Security Architecture and the AU is increasingly active in leading a range of early warning and mediation efforts. For a reflection on the AU s role in mediation and efforts to enhance its capacities in this area (see Towards enhancing the Capacity of the African Union in Mediation by Laurie Nathan). Both the UN and the EU are engaged in efforts to strengthen AU s mediation capacities. For example, strengthening AU mediation capacity forms one element of the UN s AU capacity building programme and much of the work of the UN Mediation Support Unit is dedicated to supporting AU led mediation efforts. Similarly, under the EU African Peace Facility (APF), an Early Response Mechanism has recently been established to support mediation efforts of the AU and other African sub regional organizations. The EU APF also provides for the mobilization of a range of mediation expertise through agencies that manage short term consultancies. Other regional and sub regional organizations are also active in mediation and a number are engaged in processes to strengthen their mediative capacity. This is, for example, the case with the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Organization of American States (OAS), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) NGOs/Private Diplomacy Organizations An increasing number of non governmental organizations specialize in conducting mediation or providing mediation support to others. Well known examples of peace talks prepared and facilitated by international NGOs include the 1992 Mozambique peace accord mediated by the Community of Sant Egidio 3 and the 2005 Aceh Memorandum of Understanding mediated by the Crisis Management Initiative. The EU s collaboration with private diplomacy organizations takes different forms. In some cases it they serve as discrete operational partners, in other cases the EU works with consortia of 229

230 organizations to distil lessons learned and to generate knowledge products and practical guidance. This is, for example, the case with EU support through the Instrument for Stability for an Initiative for Peace building programme that has a cluster of activity to harness research and lessons learned in mediation practice. A far larger number of non governmental organizations engage in community level mediation, which is also sometimes called alternative dispute resolution. These include community based NGOs working on development and reconciliation. For one example, see the Community Mediation programme supported by the Asia Foundation in Nepal. Similarly, it should be stressed that many if not most peace mediation efforts are prepared and/or conducted by so called insider mediators. These are local individuals who are not necessarily impartial but are acceptable to the parties. While some are associated with NGOs, many work in their individual capacity. Such insider mediators are increasingly organized in professional networks or platforms at both national and regional level. One example is the Insider Mediators Platform Africa initiative. 3 This is a Catholic public lay association and is also recognized as an international NGO for its development and peace work. 230

231 10 AKU 11 AN INTRODUCTION TO GENDER-SENSITIVE OPERATIONS General description AKU 11 is dedicated to the importance of women s equal and full participation as active agents in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and post conflict reconstruction and to the EU s commitment to support this. It consists of an introductory part, of 2 chapters focusing on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and its importance for the success of missions and operations Learning Content AKU11 will touch upon the following aspects gender related operations: Chapter 1 Introduction to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 Short overview of the main elements of the UN SCR 1325, the implementation and the international commitments related to it. Chapter 2 Gender in Operations Some practical measures related to the implementation of the UN SCR Before the start of the first chapter we strongly suggest that you read UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 (click on the icons to open) Some useful links UNSCR 1325 UNSCR 1820 Several internet sources where consulted during the preparation of AKU11. Should you wish to deepen your understanding of aspects covered in the AKU11, the following links might be useful: 231

232 Report on the activities of the CSDP missions on celebrating the 10 th anniversary of the UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. Recommendations from the conference Implementing UNSCR 1325 and 1820 in EU missions: Improving immediate and long term security for women French EU Presidency and UNIFEM in cooperation with European Commission. Indicators for the Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security. Comprehensive approach to EU implementation of UN Security Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security. Handbook on Mainstreaming gender and human rights into ESDP compilation of relevant documents. Gender Equality and Women Empowerment in Development Cooperation Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council COM (2007). A comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security. McKay Susan, Women, Human Security, and Peace-building. For a broader documentation on CSDP related subjects, whenever necessary, you are invited to visit the CSDP Knowledge base at -edu.be 10.2 CHAPTER 1 - Introduction to UN Security Council Resolution , what do these four digits mean? Resolution 1325 (2000) was the first United Nations Security Council resolution to specifically address the impact of armed conflict on women, and women s contributions to conflict resolution and sustainable peace. UNSCR 1325 stresses the importance of women s equal and full participation as active agents in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and post conflict reconstruction. It calls on member states to ensure women s equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security. It urges all actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspectives in all United Nations peace and security efforts, including demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR). UNSC Resolution 1325 is non binding as it falls under Chapter VI Pacific Settlements of Disputes of the UN Charter. It does not have any enforcing mechanisms to enforce the resolution, as opposed to Chapter VII Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression. However, the UN Security Council can make decisions under Chapter VII and include resolution 1325, as is the case in several mandates of UN Peacekeeping missions. In such occasions it does obtain a legally binding character. 232

233 The Resolution is furthermore based on binding international law, which means that those who commit crimes against human rights can be brought to court. Since the year 2000 there have been decisions from war tribunals and international courts determining systematic rape during armed conflict constitutes a crime against humanity. With 18 operational paragraphs, UN SC resolution 1325 can be summarized under five key provisions: Increased participation and representation of women at all levels of decision making. Attention to specific protection needs of women and girls in conflict. Gender perspective in post conflict processes. Gender perspective in UN programming, reporting and in Security Council missions. Gender perspective and training in UN peace support operations. Since the adoption of resolution 1325 in 2000, four supporting resolutions have been adopted by the Security Council: 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009) and 1960 (2010). The five resolutions focus on three key goals: Strengthening women s participation in decision making Resolution 1325 calls for strengthening women s agency as peacemakers and peace builders, including their participation in conflict prevention and peace processes, early recovery, governance and in peace operations. Resolution 1889 complements 1325 by calling for the establishment of global indicators to measure progress on its implementation. Ending sexual violence and impunity Resolution 1820 calls for an end to widespread conflict related sexual violence and for accountability in order to end impunity. Resolution 1888 focuses on strengthening leadership, expertise and other institutional capacities within the United Nations and in member states to help put an end to conflict related sexual violence. 233

234 Awareness training of the FARDC on the fight against sexual violence in Camp KOKOLO (RDC) The Council of the European Union Provide an accountability system Resolution 1960 mandates the Secretary General to list those parties credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of sexual violence in situations on the Council s agenda. Relevant sanctions committees will be briefed by the Special Representative of the Secretary General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, and may take action against listed parties. SCR 1960 also calls for the establishment of monitoring, analysis, and reporting arrangements specific to conflict related sexual violence. Together, these resolutions provide a powerful framework and mandate for implementing and measuring change in the lives of women in conflict affected countries Facts and figures Source: UN Women, DCAF In most countries around the world, the different security and justice needs of men, women, boys and girls are not adequately being met. In addition, women and certain groups of men remain excluded from formal peace processes, security decision making and from participation in oversight processes. Though war has always impacted men and women in different ways, possibly never more so than in contemporary conflicts. In contemporary conflicts, as much as 90 percent of casualties are among civilians, most of whom are women and children. While women remain a minority of combatants and perpetrators of war, they increasingly suffer the greatest harm. Civilians account for the vast majority of victims in contemporary wars; those least empowered suffer most. Women s participation in peace negotiations average less than 8 % of the 11 peace processes for which such information is available. Fewer than 3 % of signatories to peace agreements are women. No women have been appointed Chief or Lead peace mediators in UN sponsored peace talks. Sexual violence exacerbates conflict and perpetuates insecurity in the wake of war. It holds entire communities hostage, and has an economic, social, cultural and inter generational impact: women cannot access water points and markets; children cannot safely get to school; war babies are ostracized. 250, ,000 women and girls were raped during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. 20,000-50,000 women and girls were raped during the war in Bosnia Herzegovina in the early 1990 s. 50,000-64,000 internally displaced women in Sierra Leone were sexually attacked by combatants. An average of 40 women and girls are being raped every day in South Kivu, DRC. It is estimated that more than 200,000 women and children have been raped over more than a decade of the country s conflict. Women and girls are targeted as a tactic of war to humiliate, dominate, instill fear in, punish, disperse and/or forcibly relocate members of a community/ethnic group. 234

235 Out of 300 peace agreements for 45 conflict situations in the 20 years since the end of the Cold War, 18 have addressed sexual violence in 10 conflict situations (Burundi, Aceh, DRC, Sudan/Nuba Mountains, Sudan/Darfur, Philippines, Nepal, Uganda, Guatemala, and Chiapas). Women have a legal right to be protected from sexual violence, even in the midst of war, and victims have a right to reparations. Amnesty to sexual violence as an international crime (Art. 7 CEDAW; Rome Statute 8(2) (b) (xxii)) is counter to international law. Peace will not be sustained if the deal is considered unjust or if the accord does not take measures to rebuild the foundations of society. With regard to trials of sexual violence as a war crime, crime against humanity, crime associated with genocide, and use in torture, sexual violence has been the least condemned war crime International Commitments Source: Clingendael, Dutch-Spanish Seminar 2010 There is a growing consensus internationally on the need to apply a comprehensive approach to crisis management and peace building. The same goes for the need to take into account the evident links between security, development and human rights. It also applies to over arching topics such as the role of women in peace and security. European Union High Representative Ashton If women are not active participants in peace building and reconciliation, the views, needs and interests of half of the population in a conflict area are not properly represented. That is simply wrong. It can also undermine the peace. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen All that is needed now to move from policy to action is determined leadership. We all know that women count for peace. But for them to count for peace, they need all of us. UN Under Secretary General for UN Women Michelle Bachelet I am often asked why on earth do I believe that women and girls are a national security issue. Well, I believe it because I know that where girls and women are oppressed, where their rights are ignored or violated, we are likely to see societies that are not only unstable, but hostile to our own interests. United States of America Secretary of State Hillary Clinton Why is gender amongst the priorities of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and NATO Secretary General Rasmussen? The answer is simple; it is a result of increasing insight that it is a 235

236 strategic, effective and a sound investment in a country's stability and economy. However, more than a decade of high level commitments as seen in the quotes above on UNSCR 1325 calling for focused activities that encourage the participation of women on every level of peace missions, as well as in political peace and reconstruction processes, has shown one thing: there are many challenges linked to the Resolution s full and consistent implementation. One of these challenges involves the meeting point of gender concerns and the changing nature of peacekeeping operations: The tendency of peacekeeping personnel to increasingly engage with local non state stakeholders has made cultural awareness and gender sensitivity critical peacekeeping capacities. The efforts being made by the military and civil component of the peacekeeping apparatus into these matters are the key for making UNSCR 1325 operative at the field level, and to the success of the series of UN resolutions. The fairly recent development of guidelines for implementing a gender perspective in peacekeeping missions confirms the international commitment from the European Union, United Nations and NATO. While these directives differ in their target audience and level of detail, as well as their practical implications they all aim to increase the mission s effectiveness International Commitments Four leading guidelines for implementing a gender perspective in operations 1. Council of the European Union, Implementation of UNSCR 1325 as reinforced by UNSCR 1820 in the context of ESDP, 15782/3/08 Rev 3, December Aim: Gender mainstreaming in the area of CSDP [the document refers to ESDP, which is the predecessor of CSDP] is not a goal in itself; the ultimate objective is to increase the EU s crisis management efficiency. This document seeks to ensure gender mainstreaming and implementation of UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1820 from the early planning to the conduct of CSDP operations, including their follow up. The document should be used by all actors involved in planning and conducting CSDP 236

237 missions/operations. It should serve as a reminder and provide concrete examples of what can be done during the different stages of planning, conducting and drawing lessons from CSDP missions/operations. 2. NATO, Advancing Women s Perspectives in NATO Military Organizations, Gender Mainstreaming, and Measures to Protect Women and Girls in Situations of Armed Conflict, Bi SC Directive XX X, 2009 / NATO, Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspectives in the NATO 3. Command Structure Including Measures for Protection during Armed Conflict, Bi SC Directive 40 1, September Aim: Provided to the military organizations and forces in the NATO Command Structure to implement UNSCR1325 to afford the Alliance and NATO led missions and operations the advantage of including female perspectives NATO, encouraging a policy of gender mainstreaming and protecting women and girls during armed conflict. 4. Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support, Integrating a Gender Perspective in the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations, March Aim: To enhance the operational effectiveness of military peacekeeping tasks by serving as a tool to guide practical translation of existing mandates on women, peace and security in the performance of these tasks. They are intended to support military personnel working at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to ensure that the security priorities and concerns of all sectors of the local population women, men, boys and girls inform the planning process as well as the operational activities of the military in its areas of operation. 237

238 10.3 CHAPTER 2 - Gender sensitive peacekeeping = Effective Peacekeeping Multiple Approaches Gender does not mean women, gender means business. Particularly in these financially uncertain times, we need to include everyone. Because it is the right thing to do for women? Yes. Because they deserve equal rights as men? Yes. But, first and foremost, because our societies need active and participating citizens, both men and women. It is not a loss for men, neither a victory for women. Advancing equality is not just relevant for increasing effectiveness in peace keeping, it is also an investment in conflict prevention. Societies where men and women, boys and girls, have equal rights to education, health and economic opportunities are more stable societies. Equality is a global public good. Equality is good business. Without a doubt, the successive UN Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security have had a huge impact on international thinking on peacekeeping. Contrary to ten years ago, it is now widely recognized that peacekeeping is not a gender neutral affair: gender matters for both the internal dynamics of the peacekeeping apparatus itself, as well as for the form and shape of the conflict that is to be resolved. Gender sensitive peacekeeping can refer to the objective to achieve a proportional representation of men and women in peacekeeping forces and in its counterpart: the national security forces (also referred to as a gender balance). It may also indicate the aim to take local gender roles and norms as one of the fundamental parameters in the design and implementation of a peacekeeping operation (gender mainstreaming). Finally, it can be framed as a protection issue that deals with the particular vulnerability of different gender groups in armed conflict. Inclusive Peacekeeping men and women on a mission Full and equal participation of men and women is the basis of a stable society, of economically and politically thriving societies. That is why multinational corporations and banks are investing in attracting women to the top. Simply because 238

239 it means profit. Because diversity at the top, diverse perspectives from both men and women, leads to better decisions. Decisions based on diverse perspectives may prevent new financial crises. This is why the equal participation of men and women in the security forces and in international operations is encouraged. Nevertheless, the figures so far show a different picture: Women s representation in the military segment of UN peacekeeping operations has slightly increased to 3% in 2010; it is still a giant leap away from the 50% target that was set by UN Resolution Three ways in which women s participation can be of added value to peacekeeping operations: 1) Sensitize the army to operate with a broader, more human centered definition of security; 2) Serve as role models for the local population; 3) Have better access to certain segments of the local population. Inclusive analysis of the local security situation During conflict, men and women s roles change. For women, this often means stepping out of traditional (domestic) roles and into the labor market, into the military or rebel forces, become activists, or face the challenges at home as sole head of the household. Lives change during conflict, societies change during conflict. Because of these changes, after the conflict, it is simply impossible to turn back to the situation prior to the conflict. Similarly, men s and women s roles cannot turn back to the pre conflict status quo. A process has started to find a new status quo, one that can potentially be beneficial to the whole population. This is a responsibility of the national authorities, but it is just as much the responsibility of all actors involved to truly engage everyone in rebuilding the country and its institutions, including (peacekeeping) operations. Understanding what men and women want for themselves and for their children, as well understanding what they fear most, helps to gear operations to local needs. Moreover, women expect the 239

240 international community to support them in their efforts to maintain or obtain economically and politically active roles, they expect the international community to address barriers that refrain them from participating. Grasping renewed opportunities for women s participation in rebuilding is inevitable for building a stable society. This implies reaching out to civil society, and in particular to open a dialogue with women, women s organizations and with men. A dialogue, not just by gender advisers, but certainly also by heads of missions be it peacekeeping, military or diplomatic missions. An inclusive dialogue on all issues relevant in reconstruction, relevant to all citizens. Investing in the diverse interests of all citizens means investing in the interest of society and stability. Protection of civilians In 2010, millions of men, women, and children were killed, raped, displaced, injured, or recruited by force in armed conflicts throughout the world. Whether caught in the crossfire or deliberately targeted, civilians too often suffer disproportionately as a result of conflict. What used to be hidden and silent, conflict related rape and sexual violence, has become front page news. We all know countries where rape is rampant, such as in Sudan, the Ivory Coast and of course the Democratic Republic of Congo. Sexual violence is often used in conflicts as a cheap and effective weapon with the intention to demoralize and destabilize. Increasingly, UN Peacekeeping mandates now include protection of civilians in their mandates, and reflect UN SC Resolutions 1820 and 1888 on conflict related sexual violence, hereby responding to the respective protection needs of men and women in conflict situations. The primary obligation to protect civilians affected by conflict lies with national governments and parties to conflict. However, when these actors are unable or unwilling to fulfill this obligation, the international community, in particular the UN Security Council (UNSC) has a responsibility to recognize the plight of civilians caught up in conflict and to take action to protect them. More and more, peacekeeping operations are being tasked to protect civilian populations affected and traumatized by armed conflict, in particular women and children. In this context, the 240

241 prevention of sexual violence, sexual exploitation and abuses remain one of the greatest challenges. Empirical evidence suggests that a gender sensitive approach of personnel serving in crisis management missions and operations, coupled up with adequately gender balanced staff mix, helps to bring better results when it comes to civilian protection. For cultural and religious reasons, having female personnel serving in posts requiring interaction with local women facilitates contacts and allows to carry the tasks in an uncontroversial manner (ex. house and body searches, interviewing victims of sexual trauma, children etc.). Nevertheless, there is increased attention and support for integrating the women, peace and security agenda within the protection of civilians debates. For example, during the Open Debate in the Security Council in May 2011 on Protection of Civilians, 33 out of the 51 statements addressed the gender dimension of the protection of civilians, in particular on protecting women from sexual violence in conflict in armed conflicts including the DRC, Côte d Ivoire, Libya, and Yemen. Protection of Civilians can take many forms: Humanitarian assistance aimed at saving lives, providing basic services, and keeping people safe; Diplomatic initiatives to prevent or resolve conflicts; Military action when peaceful means fail; Challenging violations of human rights and ending poverty, disease, and environmental degradation; Control of the arms trade and reducing the danger posed by guns and explosive weapons The Policy Cycle OXFAM 2011 Source: Clingendael, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Actively engaging men and women, on equal grounds, creating equal opportunities for both men and women, within our own missions and institutions as well as in rebuilding post conflict societies, is a matter of operational effectiveness. 241

242 Peacekeeping and peace building efforts will be more sustainable and lead to more stable societies when men and women have equal opportunities, have their voices heard, and when both are actively engaged in conflict resolution and post conflict reconstruction. Gender cannot be something done on a voluntary basis on the side, but should be integrated into the planning, execution and evaluation of a mission. It starts with a situation analysis. An analysis based on the views and needs of only men, does not properly prepare an operations, as only half the population s security needs are reflected. Particular attention should be paid to the preparatory phase of programming and planning: gender, as an analytical concept, is indispensible when determining criteria for intervention and preparing troop deployment. Yet, this cheap and effective tool is often overlooked in mission planning. Inside Outside Internal aspects External aspects Number of (wo)men, Code of Conduct (internal) Code of Conduct (towards outside) Guidelines, policies, consultation with men and women on the ground, Protection of Civilians Interpretation of mandate, Innovative + flexible thinking Roles and Responsibilities Source: Clingendael, Conflict Resolution Unit Dutch Spanish seminar 2010 A system wide gender mainstreaming effort requires that roles and responsibilities be clearly defined from the earliest stage of the policy cycle onwards. The final responsibility (and accountability) for integrating gender into peacekeeping operations lies with the senior managers and commanders. They should develop operational guidance in terms of commitment, guiding policies and (human) resources. Gender advisors and focal points should be understood as facilitators, catalysts and advisors, not as ultimately accountable for implementing the guidelines in their mission. 242

243 As regards the position of gender advisors, specific attention should be paid to: gender balance (i.e. female and male advisors), hierarchy, and tasks and competences. Gender Advisors in the chain of command In the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations Gender Advisors are placed parallel to the chain of command and at every level. DPKO distinguishes between the strategic, operational and tactical competencies and organizes its gender expertise accordingly. Here, they work under the leadership of both the higher ranking mission gender advisor and the relevant military commander. The leadership of the military component of the UN peacekeeping missions holds final responsibility for ensuring compliance with the guidelines, whereas the Military Gender Advisor is designated by DPKO with responsibility for coordinating and guiding the implementation process. NATO requires its gender advisors to support the work of and report to the commander. It is also the most elaborate of the three about the tasks and competences that gender advisors are endowed with. The EU CSDP directives state that gender advisors are directed by the chain of command. They assign critical tasks to them: Advise during the planning process; take action on sexual and gender based violence. Gender advisors are enabled to communicate directly with appropriate EU structures Pre-deployment training The need for adequate pre deployment gender training can hardly be overestimated, especially for operations where sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) might be an issue. Peacekeepers should be well prepared for their demanding duties in the field and should be sensitive towards local perceptions and concerns. (Peacekeeping) Operations should build on a profound knowledge of local culture, and act with respect for diversity. Troops should be sensitized to the valuable and constructive role women and men can play. This contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the situation, and often times means bridging gaps between international standards and local perceptions. 243

244 Peacekeepers can form the tie between theories and policies on the one hand, and the local population on the other. Nevertheless, an operational mandate is only as strong as the will of the leaders on the ground to implement it. Nonetheless, well trained troops certainly contribute to the ability of those leaders to perform their mandated tasks as diligently as possible. In November 2009, the Council of the EU agreed the document Implementation of UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1820 in the context of training for the ESDP missions and operations recommendations on the way forward, aiming at improving the coherence and quality of pre deployment training for staff deployed in (E/) CSDP missions/operations. It also foresaw to increase the availability and access to gender training, inter alia, through the development of standard elements for a training curriculum on the implementation of the relevant UNSCRs in the (E/)CSDP. (The conclusions were based on an inventory of the EU Member States gender training practices and an expert seminar organized in Brussels in July 2009.) The Council Secretariat organized a first ESDP Gender Advisors and Focal Points meeting in November 2009, allowing for extensive exchange of experiences and networking. A Human Rights and Gender Advisors/Focal Points meeting in July 2010 was part of the Council Secretariat s efforts to facilitate networking among the human rights and gender advisers and focal points, and to identify lessons from CSDP missions/operations to inform the first thematic lessons report in the autumn of 2010 Lessons and best practices of mainstreaming human rights and gender into CSDP military operations and civilian missions. One clear conclusion from the lessons report was the need for basic training on relevant human rights and gender aspects for CSDP personnel. Basic EU/CSDP standard training elements were also further developed in 2010, in a Package of three draft concepts containing minimum standard training elements on Human Rights, Gender and Child Protection in the context of CSDP, also envisaging the development of fully fledged CSDP training modules. 244

245 Accountability Source: Clingendael, Conflict Resolution Unit Proper mechanisms are necessary to ensure that both civilian and military peacekeeping personnel can be held accountable for their conduct. This accountability is two fold and relates to the performance of the (peacekeeping) operation on gender oriented goals (for example, the proportional representation of men and women), as well as the behavior of personnel toward men and women in the host country. Performance based accountability has an internal and an external component. Internally, it must be clear at all levels of the chain of command who is being held accountable for the (lack of) performance on the respective gender related responsibilities. Naturally, senior managers and commanders are ultimately responsible for integrating gender throughout a peacekeeping operation, and their accountability should be incorporated in existing performance based accountability mechanisms. Externally, the local men and women of the host country should be consulted during monitoring and evaluation processes, and enabled to request clarifications. Finally, easily accessible complaint mechanisms are vital to ensuring allegations of gender related violence committed by peacekeepers will be taken seriously and subsequently dealt with. Accountability mechanisms are integrated at different levels by the EU, NATO and the UN. DPKO incorporates performance on gender related goals into the existing accountability structures; it requires all parts of the chain of command to report on their progress. The NATO and ESDP directives however, do not establish provisions to ensure that senior management or gender advisors can be held accountable for (a lack of) progress made on their gender related responsibilities. EU, UN and the NATO all have strict accountability provisions in place regarding allegations concerning gender based violence committed by mission personnel, the so called zero tolerance policy. 245

246 11 APPENDIX 11.1 Summary of Acronyms 246

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250 11.2 Summary of Definitions 250

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