MONITOR JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Transcription

1 MONITOR JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Volume 12, Number 1 Winter 2006 THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY

2 Questioning the Efficacy of Israeli Targeted Killings Against Hamas Religio-Military Command as a Counter-terrorism Tool Adam E. Stahl Palestinian terrorist activity throughout the al-aqsa Intifada, which began in September of 2000, had a direct impact on Israel s counter-terrorism policies. Since the onslaught of the Intifada the government of Israel has authorized various methods to counter the threats from Palestinian terrorist organizations such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. A security barrier was erected as one way to respond to the continual wave of suicide bombings, cross-border infiltrations, and other belligerent actions aimed at harming Israelis. The practice of Assigned Residence, coupled with an increase in Israeli Defense Force (IDF) incursions into Palestinian-controlled territory represented additional efforts to deter Palestinian terror activity. 1 Arguably the most controversial counter-terrorism tool that Israel utilizes is targeted killings, which bring forth a myriad of issues on the legality, morality, and efficiency of such counter-terrorism methods. The purpose of this paper is to briefly examine the efficacy of this counter-terrorism tool when employed against the religio-military leaders of Hamas. Israel has proven that Hamas s spiritual guides are not immune from targeted killing operations, raising questions as to whether Israel s policy of hitting a terror organization s religiomilitary leadership is in fact an efficient tool in preventing terrorist attacks. What is a targeted killing? Before questioning the efficiency of Israel s targeted operations against Sheik Salah Shehade and Sheik Ahmed Yassin, two case studies utilized in this paper, one must understand what constitutes a targeted killing. Currently, a ADAM STAHL is a recent graduate of the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel. He carries a double BA in International Relations and Conflict Resolution with a focus in Security Studies. He is planning on pursuing his Master s Degree in International Relations in Fall Adam is currently working as a research assistant for Dr. Isaac Kfir of the Lauder School of Government.

3 56 The Monitor - Winter 2006 collectively agreed upon definition of a targeted killing does not exist. Targeted killing carries various definitions, all of which are contingent upon on the specific wording of the definer. The Israeli Security Establishment (ISE) employs an offensive and preventative military tactic referred to as sikul memukad, or focused foiling. 2 The more common expression, targeted killing, has no place within ISE terminology. 3 In addition, the ISE does not consider a focused foiling to be the same as an assassination. Colonel Daniel Reisner, head of the International Law Section of the Israeli Army Legal Division, argues, Assassination is not a legal term, at least not in international law. 4 And according to one analyst at the Terrorism Intelligence Centre, This seems accurate, as the word assassination does not appear in the United Nations Charter, the Geneva Conventions, Hague Conventions, international case law, or the Statute of the International Criminal Court. 5 Yet humanitarian organizations openly refer to Israel s focused foiling operations as assassinations and therefore illegal. How is sikul memukad defined given that it is neither referred to as a targeted killing nor an assassination? An Israeli focused foiling operation aims to prevent future acts of belligerence against Israelis by killing an individual or group of individuals suspected of terrorist activity, while Israeli targeted killings have pinpointed Palestinian terrorists for elimination due to past attacks. The logic concerning the elimination of Palestinian terrorists for past attacks is rooted in the belief that the terrorists continued existence represents a future threat to Israeli lives. The international human rights organization Amnesty International applies its own definition of what a targeted killing represents. Amnesty deems the ISE s offensive targeted operations against Palestinian suspected terrorists as being equivalent to a policy of state assassination and refers to the targets as Palestinian suspects rather than known Palestinian terrorists (which is precisely what targeted killings are utilized for). 6 Here, Amnesty chooses to utilize the term assassination, which is the equivalent of political murder or extrajudicial killings. In addition to defining a targeted killing, Amnesty also describes its view of the consequences stemming from Israeli assassinations, in that, The use of state assassinations by Israel against Palestinian suspects is undermining the rule of law and fuelling the cycle of violence in the region. 7 Here, not only is Amnesty implying that the cycle of violence is continuously in motion due to Israel s military targeted actions (i.e. it is viewed as counterproductive), but also asserting that Israel is overtly breaching international humanitarian law by targeting Palestinian terrorists.

4 Questioning the Efficacy of Israeli Targeted Killings 57 Amnesty International (Israel-Section) holds that, Extrajudicial killings are killings which can reasonably be assumed to be the result of a policy at any level of government to eliminate specific individuals as an alternative to arresting them and bringing them to justice. These killings take place outside any judicial framework. 8 Here, Amnesty assumes that the Israeli government prefers killing suspects to apprehending them. This view, according to the Israeli Shin Bet, is inaccurate. 9 One high-ranking Shin Bet officer has stated, I prefer, when it s possible, to arrest. When you are able to arrest someone you become privy to information, to intelligence. It cannot be done in every case [arrest]. After all, dead men tell no tales, and Israeli intelligence prefers tales to targeting. Israeli legal expert Professor Amnon Rubenstein adds that there has never existed a situation in which the Palestinian Authority has fully complied with any ISE requests for arresting suspected terrorists. 10 Therefore, the burden of apprehension falls on Israel s shoulders. When apprehension proves infeasible, offensive surgical strikes become the next best (of the worst) options. 11 Issues of Legality The issue of and discourse on legality becomes more complex when considering the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, the Fourth Geneva Convention. The 1949 agreement focuses on a number of issues concerning civilians in wartime. This paper is concerned specifically with the Convention s reference to murder. The Convention explicitly states that murder is forbidden by the Geneva Conventions, both in cases of internal conflicts wounded combatants civilians in occupied territories civilians in international conflicts...and civilians in internal conflicts. 12 Here, murder is equivalent to assassination; in the eyes of advocates of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), this is analogous to a targeted killing. However, in respect to the Fourth Geneva Convention s definition of murder it is crucial to question how many Palestinian combatants are wounded as Israel performs a targeted killing, and moreover, it may seem troublesome to many to refer to known Palestinian terrorists or even those who aid terrorists as civilians. The Convention also states that murder by treacherous means or perfidy is illegal. Since the onset of the al-aqsa Intifada the ISE has acted overtly in carrying out focused foiling operations. The use of an apache helicopter firing a missile in broad daylight may be defined as treacherous but not perfidious.

5 58 The Monitor - Winter 2006 Do Israeli targeted killings against Palestinian terrorists violate any of the international legal guidelines? According to IHL expert Michael Booth, It depends. 13 Booth holds that when a conflict is absent, and a state-sponsored transnational assassination occurs, international law has been breached. Should an international armed conflict be present, then specific rules are applied to the new scenario. Is the al-aqsa Intifada not an armed conflict or possibly a low intensity war? According to Professor Amnon Rubenstein, the al-aqsa Intifada, which began in 2000, is a belligerent action tantamount to war. 14 Harvard University law professor Alan Dershowitz has stated that it is perfectly proper under the laws of war to target military leaders on the enemy side. The Israeli government considers the armed conflict with the Palestinians to be a belligerent armed conflict, thus allowing Israeli Security Forces to carry out specific operations that are in line with international law. In spite of widespread popular belief, the goal of a targeted killing is not the death of the terrorist. The nucleus of the policy is to prevent harm to Israeli citizens. Though the death of the suspected terrorist is a desired result, the goal of preventing terrorism is the critical element of the policy. The former head of Israel s Mossad, Shabtai Shavit, states, sikul is to deter, which means ideologically and normatively, to prevent and to deter your enemy from perpetrating future attacks in order to kill your people. 15 According to this view, the focus in focused foiling refers to prevention of terrorism and not the death of the target. Dr. Boaz Ganor, the head of the International Policy Institute for Counter-terrorism (ICT) states, A nation fighting against terrorism attacks an individual, or a group of activists within an organization, who are engaged in initiating, directing, preparing, recruiting, training or aiding in attacks, for the purpose of killing or at least neutralizing the terrorist. 16 In other words, an individual is not eliminated for the sake of elimination but rather in order to prevent future belligerence. Ganor s view coincides with Shavit s observation that individual offensive action (targeted killing) is utilized for the purpose of prevention and not simply for elimination of an individual. 17 Despite the emphasis put on the ongoing legal discourse on Israel s policy of targeted killings, examining whether these operations are truly preventative and thus efficient in reducing terrorism is equally critical. If a targeted killing is deemed legal yet fails to prevent terrorism then the debate will shift from legality to effectiveness (or lack thereof). Moreover, if a Palestinian terror organization is headed by spiritual leaders involved in the decision-making

6 Questioning the Efficacy of Israeli Targeted Killings 59 process in carrying out terror attacks, can these religious leaders become legitimate targets of Israeli focused foiling operations? Offensive Surgical Strikes: Going After the Religio-Military Command From the mid-20 th century, international rules pertaining to war have remained nearly unaltered; the Geneva Conventions have only been ratified twice since Do the laws of armed conflict still remain suitable for a world facing post-modern terrorism emanating from non-state actors? Today, the world is witnessing a rise in spiritual leaders as the ultimate decision-makers within religious-based terrorist organizations, making them the ultimate threat. Israel s former head of the Mossad, Shabbtai Shavit, views spiritual leaders within Palestinian terrorist organizations as legitimate targets, claiming that targeting them is both preventative and efficient. Shavit states that Hamas s former spiritual leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin represented the peak of the hierarchical structure of Hamas. Though elderly and in a wheelchair, Sheik Yassin was charismatic and convincing. His words were verbal weapons that caused massive destruction and death over the course of the first four years of the al-aqsa Intifada. Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz has stated that to target spiritual leaders involved in terrorism is perfectly legitimate and lawful under the laws of war. 19 Professor Galia Golan provides a different perspective. [Targeted killings] are generally proven to be ineffective as a new leader is always ready to take the place of the former. Professor Golan believes that such killings are counterproductive since they only produce greater hatred. That is, the elimination of spiritual leaders only intensifies hatred towards Israelis, producing retaliatory attacks and hindering the peace process. 20 Professor Michael Scharf concurs that focused foiling operations are counterproductive in that they embolden enemy morale via martyrdom. 21 Scharf, like many advocates of International Law, refers to Israel s use of focused foiling operations as assassinations. He calls for other avenues to be utilized by the ISE, such as approaching Palestinian terrorists as criminals, arresting them, and using courts. Following these views by high-ranking security officials and distinguished academics, a critical question remains: Have Israeli focused foiling operations against Hamas s religious-militant command reduced terrorism against Israeli civilians? The most logical approach to answering this question

7 60 The Monitor - Winter 2006 is to examine the statistics from the targeted killing operations against Sheik Salah Shehade and Sheik Ahmed Yassin. Both leaders represented two of the highest-ranking religio-militant commanders of Hamas. If the operation resulted in a decline in terror activity then proof must be discovered. Harakat al-muqawamah al-islamiyya: HAMAS Hamas is a three-tier terrorist organization. At the top of Hamas s structure lies the religious command followed by the socio-political division, and subsequently the military wing, known as the Izz al Din al Qassam Battalions. Since the beginning of the al-aqsa Intifada in 2000, Hamas s Qassam battalions have successfully targeted Israeli civilians and IDF soldiers, as well as various foreigners. The exact number of Hamas victims is impossible to determine, as numerous Palestinian terrorist organizations have simultaneously claimed responsibility following a terror attack. As of late 2004, statistics show that the IDF and the Israeli General Security Services (GSS) have killed over 460 Hamas members by targeted killings and gun battles. 22 Sheik Salah Shehade Sheik Salah Shehade was long associated with terrorism. As an influential military and religious leader, Shehade rebuilt Hamas in the West Bank and offered religious justification and the operational green light for terrorist attacks against Israelis. 23 Shehade represents how the religious command in Hamas is directly linked with military operational decisions in carrying out terrorist attacks. The ISE identified Shehade as having directed dozens of attacks, killing over 200 Israeli civilians and more than 15 Israeli soldiers, all within a period of 24 months. 24 Israeli government officials made a number of requests to the Palestinian Authority for his arrest, but none ever succeeded. According to Moshe Ya alon, Israel s former Chief of Staff, it was only after learning that an IDF-mounted operation to arrest Shehade would not be possible that Israeli decision-makers ordered the targeted killing. 25 Shehade was killed on July 22, 2002, when a 1-ton bomb fell on the apartment building he was occupying in Gaza City. While the exclusive target was Sheik Shehade, 14 civilians including nine children were killed in the operation. Can the Shehade operation be viewed as a success? If the death of Sheik Shehade were the sole objective then clearly the operation would be regarded as successful. However, the death of Shehade was only one element of an operation to ultimately prevent future attacks.

8 Questioning the Efficacy of Israeli Targeted Killings 61 From September 25, 2000 until Shehade s death on July 22, 2002, Hamas successfully carried out nearly 40 attacks on Israeli civilians and soldiers. The 40 attacks produced over 900 injuries and over 200 deaths. 26 These attacks included non-suicidal terrorism tactics, such as sniping, rocket fire, and knifings. However, suicide terrorism was clearly the most effective weapon in Hamas arsenal, both in cost and fatalities. Seventeen suicide attacks were carried out during this period, which caused 175 of the 200 fatalities. During the 12 months following Shehade s death, the MIPT Terrorism Data Base reports that the number of attacks perpetrated by Hamas increased by 10, from 39 to 49. However, does an increase in attacks necessarily mean that the prevention of terrorism was unsuccessful? The total number of attacks represents one element of the entire equation. When examining the number of injuries and deaths during this one-year period, it becomes clear that the fatalities from these attacks substantially increased, though the number of injured Israelis decreased. During these 12 months, the total number of injuries stood at 439; the total number of Israeli deaths are reported to be Comparing this 12-month period to the previous 24 months in which Shehade was in command, the number of injuries fell by 473, while the death total from Hamas s attacks increased by 58 to a total of 94. Interestingly, the number of suicide attacks during this one-year period totaled eight, yet those eight attacks resulted in 298 injuries (from 439) and 58 deaths (from 94). These statistics, from a 36-month total, hardly show any common pattern as the number of Hamas attacks, injuries, and deaths vary greatly. However, they do allow for conclusions to be hypothesized. One year following the targeted killing of Salah Shehade, Israel witnessed an increase in the total number of attacks, though suicide terrorism declined. Israeli deaths rose nearly threefold during this period. Did the targeted killing of this spiritual leader result in prevention on any level? One could argue that the decrease in the total number of suicidal terror attacks following Shehade s death proves that Israeli forces were successful in preventing terrorism. It can also be argued that Hamas experienced a certain amount of disarray resulting from Shehade s elimination. Yet it is not possible to measure just how large or effective the power vacuum became once Shehade was removed. The issue of any organizational disarray that did occur is subject to conjecture and cannot be understood by statistics. One can argue that prevention was not obtained since the death toll increased substantially. Moreover, one can deduce that the decrease in total injuries and the increase in total deaths may prove that Hamas-perpetrated terror attacks

9 62 The Monitor - Winter 2006 actually became more precise and effective. When asked if the targeted operation against Salah Shehade was productive, one former senior officer in Israel s GSS stated, My answer is yes; it was productive because Shehade represented an important role; he was a key leader within the Hamas movement who continued to direct countless attacks against Israelis, which led to the deaths of hundreds. 28 When asked if Shehade s elimination threw the organization into disarray, the same senior GSS officer stated that organizational chaos did not occur. The answer is no, no it didn t Still, one of the keys of counter-terrorism is to take the key players out of the game I know for sure, by looking at the picture from Hamas point of view, that after the death of Salah Shehade, Gaza became a vacuum, an operational vacuum; no one was able to rise to the leadership position. This type of disarray was beneficial to us. However, it is important to remember that the question is not how beneficial organizational disarray was for the ISE but rather whether Shehade s death aided in the reduction of terrorist attacks on Israelis; the statistics do not prove this to be true. The statistics show that during the 12-month post-shehade era, Hamas s suicide terrorism decreased, but the number of dead Israelis increased as did attacks. In this case, it would be difficult to claim that the ISE was successful in preventing terrorism, as more Israelis lay dead than during the previous year. Sheik Ahmed Ismail Yassin On March 22, 2004, Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the founder and spiritual leader of Hamas, was killed by an Israeli Air Force (IAF) helicopter gunship. 29 The wheelchair-bound religious leader of Hamas wore no military uniform, no identifiable insignia of any army, and carried no physical weapon. How, then, was Yassin considered a grave threat? According to Shabtai Shavit, the enemy of today is structured differently from the enemy of the past. Yassin represented the top of the hierarchy of Hamas. Shavit states, He was not only the preacher but also the visionary. Yassin was directly involved in setting missions and involved in almost all operational decisions. He gave the blessing for nearly each and every terror attack. Why should he be immune? Is it because he is old, religious, and in a wheelchair? According to this view, the religious diatribes of Yassin are as dangerous as any physical weaponry carried by a Hamas foot soldier. To the former head of the Mossad, His words have more force than a man on two legs that stutters. 30 From July 22, 2003 to July 22, 2004, 55 Hamas-perpetrated attacks

10 Questioning the Efficacy of Israeli Targeted Killings 63 occurred. These attacks killed 64 and injured The 55 attacks included suicide and non-suicide attacks. 32 The majority of the attacks constituted rocket fire into the territories and Israel-Proper, and only nine constituted acts of suicide terrorism. The total number of suicide attacks, when compared to the total number of overall terrorist activity, is much smaller, though the number of subsequent deaths was extremely high. The nine suicide attacks produced 47 of the 64 deaths for the entire year. Compared to the previous year, attacks increased by six, yet the total number of fatalities decreased by 30. Here, it is crucial to note that it was during this specific 12-month period that the IAF carried out a successful focused foiling operation against Sheik Ahmed Yassin. From July 22, 2003 (exactly one year following Shehade s elimination) until one day prior to the targeted killing of Yassin (March 21, 2004), Hamas successfully carried out 32 terrorist attacks, of which 7 were suicide operations. The 32 attacks left over 50 people dead. Seven suicide terrorist attacks during this eight-month period constituted 45 out of the total death toll of 52. From Yassin s death on March 22, 2004 to July 22, 2004 (the date marking the 2-year anniversary of Shehade s elimination) there were 21 attacks, 12 deaths, and 35 injuries. For this four-month period, when Hamas was without its spiritual command, the total number of suicide attacks was two, with a death toll of two. However, in the 6-month period prior to Yassin s death (September 2003-March 2004) there were 4 suicide attacks with nearly 30 fatalities. Observing the above statistics one can view that attacks were high while the spiritual leaders were still in command, even though suicide attacks were low. From July 22, 2004 until July 22, 2005, a period during which Hamas lacked an influential spiritual command, attacks led by the group totaled 350, a dramatic increase of 299 terrorist attacks. The total number of suicide attacks was four, which caused 28 deaths and 106 injuries. The number of suicide attacks, compared to the previous year, decreased by five, and the total number of deaths caused by suicidal terrorism declined by 19. Though the total number of attacks increased exponentially, the total number of deaths decreased severely: attacks rose by 299 but deaths fell by 27. Therefore, what is witnessed is a rise in less-effective non-suicide attacks by Hamas following the deaths of both religious leaders. Clearly, Hamas s motivation to carryout attacks was high, as witnessed by the sheer number of attacks carried out. However, their capabilities had been compromised, leading

11 64 The Monitor - Winter 2006 to poorly executed attacks and a lower death toll. Here, one may argue the case for success in terrorism prevention. Another claim might be that terrorism was not prevented as attacks increased in number even though capabilities were clearly affected as the attacks became less lethal. Moreover, if one of the elements behind eliminating spiritual leaders is to remove a terrorist organization s motivation, then this method was a clear failure as motivation remained high. The Crucial Question Given the statistics surrounding the targeted killings of both Shehade and Yassin, the crucial question remains whether focused foiling operations against Hamas s religious command caused an eventual increase in less-effective attacks and a decrease in total Israeli deaths. The answer seems to be a highly inconclusive maybe. Moreover, if the targeted killings of Shehade and Yassin were effective, the results were certainly not immediate. The deaths of the two religious commanders did cause some internal organizational disarray; however, any organizational chaos that developed from the targeted killings does not necessarily conclude that terrorism was prevented. In fact, there were numerous reasons for the eventual decrease in Hamas s capabilities to carry out effective attacks. One cause for the decline in Hamas s capabilities to carry out largely fatal attacks stemmed from focused foiling operations specifically aimed at the Izz al-din al-qassam Brigades and not the religious command. In a four-year period, from September 2000 until April 2004, Israeli forces carried out just over 190 targeted killings against Palestinian terrorist activists. Fifty percent of those targeted killing operations were aimed at Hamas. 33 The military wing consists not only of the bombers themselves but also the limited-in-number bomb engineers who are central in determining a bomb s effectiveness. Each targeted killing of an engineer irrefutably affected Hamas s capabilities, which may explain why even with an increase in attacks, the death toll declined though this occurred only after Yassin had been eliminated. Focusing on the military wing of Hamas may help prove the case for targeted killings overall, but it does not contribute to determining the effectiveness, if any, of targeting Hamas s religious command. From the onset of the al-aqsa Intifada, the ISE has carried out a multitude of counter-terrorism operations. The erection of the security fence helped to decrease overall terrorist activity. According to Nancy Appel of the Anti- Defamation League, The simple fact is that the fence works. So far in 2004,

12 Questioning the Efficacy of Israeli Targeted Killings 65 no Israelis have reportedly been killed or wounded by suicide bombings in areas protected by the fence the security barrier has resulted in a 90 percent reduction in terrorism originating from the northern West Bank, where the fence has been constructed, compared to previous years since the beginning of this second wave of Palestinian terrorism. 34 The reduction of fatal attacks by the end of 2005 may be attributed to daily IDF incursions into Palestinian-controlled territory. In April 2002, the IDF initiated the largest military operation in the West Bank since the Six Day War: Operation Defensive Shield. According to an Israeli Cabinet Communiqué, Israel will act to defeat the infrastructure of Palestinian terror in all its parts and components; to this end, broad action will be undertaken until this goal is secured. 35 The broad action included entering cities and villages that had become centers of Palestinian terrorism, arresting suspects, cutting off finance to organizations, collecting and destroying weaponry and infrastructure such as bomb-making laboratories, and targeting anyone who aimed to harm IDF soldiers or Israeli civilians. Strict curfews and roadblocks also effectively aided in reducing Hamas s capabilities. Conclusion Israeli targeted operations against Hamas s religious command need not be viewed as illegal or as ineffective. This is not to say that there are not disadvantages to this policy; for there are many, such as collateral damage and heavy international condemnation. However, and this is critical, what needs amending is not the Israeli policy of targeted killings as a counter-terrorism tool; rather, there must be amendments made to International Humanitarian Law (IHL). These important legal guidelines are not complimentary to the world of post-modern terrorism in the twenty-first century. The laws within these legal guidelines have not been amended to meet the newest challenges of stateless terrorism. The fact that a terrorist organization lacks a sovereign state or a national standing army does not make it any less of a threat to international peace and security. The laws are unclear as to how a state is able and obligated to deal with terrorism emanating from a stateless terrorist organization. These stateless terror organizations, such as Hamas, pose dangers just as threatening as terrorism stemming from sovereign states. Irrefutably, International Humanitarian Law should always be applied to the protection of Palestinian civilians during wartime and peacetime, but the same need not apply to Palestinian terrorists, whose explicit goal is the targeting of civilians and

13 66 The Monitor - Winter 2006 the destruction of the State of Israel. Israeli civilians also deserve protection, and that is precisely what the policy of focused foiling provides. So long as Palestinian terrorists continue to engage in terrorism against Israeli civilians they will rightfully remain legitimate targets for elimination. Twisting IHL in an attempt to protect Palestinian terrorists will negatively distort the true essence of these important legal guidelines and it will not divert Israel from targeting those deemed eligible for elimination. To many, the Israeli targeted operation was viewed as state-sponsored terrorism, which led to the intentional deaths of over a dozen Palestinians, only one of whom was deemed a terrorist. Though the collateral damage was both tragic and severe despite the storm of international condemnation that quickly reached Israel s political shores, no laws had been broken and no guidelines breached. The Shehade operation is an event that has become a counterterrorism lesson to be learned from, and questions of legality continue to resonate from the operation. The targeted operation against Shehade, widely condemned as disproportionate, was not an illegal military action; rather, it was carried out as a justified act of self-defense. 36 When focused foiling operations are utilized as a lone counter-terrorism tool against Hamas s religious command, any proof of efficacy seemingly cannot be determined. Whilst the targeted killing of Shehade was successful, in that his death was ensured and therefore his direction of terror attacks came to an end, the one-ton bomb utilized for the operation killed 14 civilians, including nine children. As the statistics show, terrorist attacks and deaths increased following Shehade s elimination, hardly a case for successful prevention. However, this in no way concludes that targeted killings are ineffective. In fact, the combination of focused foiling and other counter-terrorism policies are useful tools in preventing future acts of terror against civilians. Targeting Palestinian terrorists directly engaged in terrorist attacks is viewed by some as different from the targeting of spiritual leaders, who use words rather than weapons. However, words can be and often are utilized as weapons. The spiritual leaders give guidance and religious approval to the deliverers of these weapons. It is known that Sheik Yassin gave his approval for countless terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians. Shavit was correct when he stated that Yassin s words were more powerful than physical weaponry. Spiritual leaders are able to manipulate potential suicide terrorists with charismatic religious authority. These leaders represent the key element of the entire religious-based terrorist equation. They cannot continue to be viewed as untouch-

14 Questioning the Efficacy of Israeli Targeted Killings 67 able. At the same time, it seems that the operations against the spiritual leaders had no immediate effect on the prevention of terrorism. That is, while their words were viewed as weapons, the Israeli response targeted killings to their words and actions did not produce any effective outcome or protection for Israeli citizens, at least not immediately.. Moreover, if targeted killings against Palestinian terrorists are to continue, then it is important for Israel to learn from the United States and other Western nations that utilize the same counter-terrorism tool. Those nations, currently fighting in the War on Terror, have succeeded in convincing many in the global community that targeted killings of religious terror leaders are legitimate under certain and specific circumstances. The Israelis have failed to convince the global community that Sheik Shehade and Sheik Yassin represent common threats to those religio-military commanders targeted by the Americans and others involved in fighting terrorism. The UN Secretary General applauded the targeted killing of Abu Musab al-zarqawi in Iraq yet condemned Israeli attacks on Sheik Ahmed Yassin, which is counterproductive to combined international efforts in fighting terrorism. Accepting only certain targeted killing operations, by calling one a relief and the other an assassination, feeds the motivations of Palestinian terror organizations and repeatedly proves to the Israelis that what is acceptable in the war on terror does not apply to them in the same way it does other nations. Targeted killings may be far from popular, but this policy is in place to protect Israeli civilians from imminent or future acts of terrorism. The results of a targeted killing may not be immediate and could cause a temporary spike in terrorist activity in the short term; however, utilizing focused foiling operations against a Palestinian terrorist organization s capabilities will eventually cause less effective attacks in the long run. It would be wise to remember that advocating a sikul memukad is not about promoting death but rather endorsing the prevention of terrorism and the protection of civilian lives.

15 68 The Monitor - Winter 2006 Notes 1 International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative, Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research. Deportation, forcible transfer and assigned residence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. [updated July 31, 2004, retrieved December 13, 2006]. Available from 2 The use of Israeli Security Establishment, for this paper, represents a cumulative term for any Israeli agency involved in Targeted Killings (Mossad, Shin Bet, and the IDF). Burston, Bradley. Background/Intifada Hebrew, a glossary. Haaretz.com. [retrieved December 13, 2006]. &displaytypecd=1&sidecd=1&contrassid=2. 3 The terms focused foiling and targeted killing are used interchangeably throughout the academic community whilst referring to the same tactic. 4 Söderblom, Jason D. Time to Kill? State-Sponsored Assassination and International Law. World International Community Experts. [updated February 12, 2004, retrieved December 13, 2006]. Available from 5 Ibid. 6 Amnesty Internationl. Israel and the Palestinian Occupied Territories. [updated February 21, 2001, retrieved December 13, 2006]. Available from Index/engMDE ?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES/ISRAEL%2FOCCUPI ED+TERRITORIES. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Shin Bet is Israel s domestic General Security Service (GSS). It is comparable to the American F.B.I. 10 The Palestinian Authority has arrested suspects but these suspects were always released early, without proper prosecution. In the mid-90 s, former Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu coined this action as the revolving door policy. 11 There does, in fact, exist a judicial framework involved in the decision-making process before reaching the conclusion that a targeted killing is necessary. Proper legal steps must be taken and the IDF s Judge Advocate General officially and legally gives his ruling on the matter before any action by the ISE is taken. 12 It should be noted that extrajudicial executions are referred to as murder under the Geneva Conventions. Society of Professional Journalists. Reference Guide to the Geneva Conventions. [retrieved December 13, 2006]. Available from 13 McDonnell, Thomas Michael. Assassination/Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists A Violation of International Law? Jus in Bello. December Pace Law School. library.law.pace.edu/blogs/jib/2005/12/assassinationtargeted_killing.html 14 Rubenstein, Amnon. Personal interview by Adam E. Stahl. April 9, The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel.

16 Questioning the Efficacy of Israeli Targeted Killings Shavit, Shabtai. Personal interview by Adam E. Stahl. May 17, Herzliya, Israel. 16 Ganor, Boaz. Targeted Killing-The Normative-Moral Dilemma. In The Counter-terrorism Puzzle. London: Transaction Publishers, Ibid. 18 The Geneva Conventions were ratified on 8 June 1977 and adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. The additional protocol relates to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts. See htm. The second ratification occurred in 2005, relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem; 2 countries have since ratified the protocols. See ihl.nsf/full/ Dershowtiz, Alan. Killing Terrorist Chieftains is Legal. Jerusalem Post. [updated April 23, 2004, retrieved December 13, 2006]. Available from: faculty/dershowitz/articles/killingterrorists.html. 20 Professor Galia Golan is Emeritus Professor of Soviet and East European Studies (Hebrew University) and Professor of Government at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya. Notes taken during interview with Professor Golan at the IDC, Herzliya. 21 Guiroa, Amos. Targeted Killing as Active Self-Defense. Project to Enforce the Geneva Conventions. [Updated October 13, 2006, retrieved December 14, 2006]. justicescholars.org/pegc/archive/journals/guiora_targeted_killing_case_west_sp_2005. doc. 22 The academic community uses the terms GSS and ISA (Israeli Security Agency) in referring to the Israeli Shin Bet, Israel s domestic security service. 23 International Policy Institute for Counter-terrorism. Head of Hamas Military Wing Killed in Israeli Military Strike. [updated July 23, 2002, retrieved December 13, 2006] Byman, Daniel Do Targeted Killings Work? Foreign Affairs 85(2): Ibid. 26 The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. The MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB). Terrorist Incidents Reports: Incidents by group: Hamas. tkb.org/incidentgroupmodule.jsp?startdate=09%2f25%2f2000&enddate=07%2 F22%2F2002&domInt=0&suiInt=0&filter=0&detail=0&info=&info=&imageField. x=68&imagefield.y=14&imagefield=filter+results&pagemode=group. 27 Ibid. 28 It should be noted that attacks still continued and the death toll continued to rise even after Shehade was killed. Interview with a senior, high-ranking officer in the Shin Bet, Israel s domestic security services. The interview was conducted on Sunday September 17, 2006, 12:45PM, Tel Aviv. The interviewee has requested that the interview take place on the condition of anonymity. 29 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. IAF Strike Kills Hamas Leader Ahmed Yassin. [updated March 22, 2004, retrieved December 13, 2006]

17 70 The Monitor - Winter 2006 Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism+and+Islamic+Fundamentalism-/Sheikh+Yassin+ killed+in+idf+attack+22-mar-2004.htm. Yassin s two sons were also killed in the attack; both were known for their involvement in terrorist activity against Israel. 30 Shavit, Shabtai. 31 The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. 32 Non-suicidal attacks are represented as roadside bombs, mortar fire, sniping, knifings, and Qassam rocket attacks. 33 The Communiqué was issued on 29 March Zussman, Asaf and Noam Zussman Targeted Killings: Evaluating the Effectiveness of a Counter-terrorism Policy. Bank of Israel-Research Department bankisrael.gov.il/deptdata/mehkar/papers/dp0502e.pdf#search=%22total%20number% 20%2B%20targeted%20killings%20%2B%20Israel% Appel J, Nancy. There s One Reason for Israel s Fence: Suicide Bombers. San Jose Mercury News. [updated July 15, 2004, retrieved December 13, 2006]. Available from adl.org/adl_opinions/international_affairs/sjmercurynews_ htm. 35 Cabinet Secretariat of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Cabinet Communiqué. Issued March 29, Jerusalem, Israel. Communiques/2002/Cabinet%20Communique%20-%2029-Mar The legality of the Shehade operation is not the main point of the essay but it is crucial to understand the Israeli view of self-defense.