DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION

Transcription

1 In the Matter of: BEFORE THE HEARING BOARD OF THE ILLINOIS ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION "(LED AUP - 1 f0f J ATTY REG &DISC CDmm CHICAGO DARREN ANTHONY FISH, Commission No. 2013PR00065 Attorney-Respondent, No RESPONDENT'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT Now comes Respondent, DARREN ANTHONY FISH, by his attorney, SAMUEL J. MANELLA, and in response to the Administrator's Complaint, states as follows: Allegations Common to Counts Ithrough III 1. Between February 2010 and approximately November 2010, Respondent as the sole owner of a law firm operating under the name, "Law Offices of Darren A. Fish." As part of his practice, Respondent offered services to clients that included modification of the terms of mortgage loans and foreclosure defense. Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 1 of Allegations Common to Counts I through III. 2. Foreclosure Defense Program, LLC ("FDP"), a New Mexico limited liability company (and later known as Foreclosure Defense Group ("FDG")), advertised for, solicited, and contacted individuals it determined may need assistance in modification of the terms of their mortgages.fdg advertised that

2 it referred clients to its "national network of litigating attorney firms" who "practiced mortgage relief and foreclosure defense litigation"who in turn provided a "full service defense." On or about February 2010, Respondent entered into a "Database Services Agreement" with FDG, which stated, in part, the following: "FDP will perform initial potential client intake by gathering data on a list of pre- approved questions submitted by Fish, and by gathering documents, in the public domain and otherwise, as requested by Fish, and putting those documents together in a structure as directed by Fish. This data shall include but not necessarily be limited to: client's foreclosure case number; foreclosing bank, county of the case, court calendar and courtroom number of the case, contact information for plaintiffs' attorneys, and certain basic clerical intake data. FDP will organize client interview and provide office space for Fish by mutual schedule for Fish to meet clients and review their files. FDP will provide Fish with remote software access, which they will maintain at their cost on their servers, said software enables Fish to effectively docket motions, keep track of deadlines, keep message contact with client, and other basic clerical technical support that a reasonable law practice would need." Respondent admits in part and/denies in part the allegations contained in Paragraph 2. Modifications were not part of the services that FDG participated in other than to obtain documents. FDG did assist in obtaining, scanning and organizing documents in a manner for review. A client management, communication and document registry was created and intended to provide client/attorney unfettered access to documents, communication with each other and document communications initiated and completed.

3 3. The Database Services Agreement as described in paragraph two, above, further provided that Respondent would pay FDG $400 per month for each client for whom Respondent utilized FDG's services until the time that the attorneyclient relationship terminated. Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 3 of Allegations Common to Counts I through III. 4 Mark Laskowski ("Laskowski"), a non-attorney, signed the Database Services Agreement on behalf of FDG on February 3,2010. Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 4 of Allegations Common to Counts I through III. 5. Respondent was not involved in the interviewing, hiring or training of the employees of FDG, did not routinely work in the same physical office space as FDG employees, nor did Respondent monitor the telephone conversations between FDG employees and potential clients. Respondent denies he was not involved in the training of FDG employees, and that he did not work routinely from the same physical office and did not monitor telephone conversations between employees and potential clients as alleged in Paragraph 5 of Allegations Common

4 to Counts I through III. Respondent admits the balance of Paragraph 5 of Allegations Common to Counts I through III. 6. Between February 2010 and the beginning of 2011, representatives of FDG took calls from individuals responding to FDG solicitation letters. During those calls, FDG employees requested information from the potential clients regarding their mortgages as initially directed by Respondent. The representatives then completed a client intake form and referred individual s to Respondent for a consultation. Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 6 of Allegations Common to Counts I through III. 7. Between February 2010 and the beginning of 2011, Respondent received approximately referrals per month from FDG. Of those referrals, Respondent agreed to represent approximately clients each month. Those individuals whom Respondent agreed to represent would be required to pay Respondent certain legal fees. From those legal fees Respondent collected, Respondent paid FDG $400 per month for services relating to-the referral, until the representation concluded. Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 7 of Allegations Common to Counts I through III.

5 8. At all times alleged in Counts I through VIII of the complaint, Respondent deposited the monthly fees and costs paid by each client pursuant to the attorney-client agreements into his business operating account ending in the four digits 5722, at TCF Bank, titled 'The Law Office of Darren Fish," or into his business operating account ending in the four digits 3047, at North Community Bank, titled "Law Offices of Darren A. Fish." Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 8 of Allegations Common to Counts I through III. COUNT I (Sharing legal fees with a non-attorney, lack of diligence, improper and excessive fee, failure to communicate and failure to return an unearned fee - Kazimierz Birkos) 9. On or about March 10, 2010, Respondent agreed to represent Kazimierz Birkos ("Birkos"), an FDG referral, in a mortgage foreclosure action. At that time, a judgment of foreclosure had previously been entered on the property, in which Birkos had an interest, located on Superior Street in Chicago, Illinois ("the Superior Street property"), and the Superior Street property had been sold at a judicial sale on March 8, Respondent also agreed to represent Birkos in attempting to obtain a modification to his mortgage terms on a second property, in which he had an interest, located on North Oketo in Chicago, Illinois ("the Oketo property").

6 Respondent admits the allegations contained in the first two sentences of Paragraph 9 and further answering states that he denies that he was attempting to obtain a modification, but in fact he was seeking a restructuring of the original loan in contrast to a modification as alleged in Paragraph 9 of Count I of the 10. On or about March 10, 2010, Birkos signed an attorney-client agreement and paid Respondent his requested fee of $495 for "upfront costs of litigation." Pursuant to the agreement, Birkos also agreed to pay Respondent a purported "monthly classic retainer" ("the retainer") of $750. Finally, the agreement provided that if Respondent obtained a reduction in the principal amount of Birkos' loan, Birkos agreed to pay Respondent a contingency fee equaling up to 20% of the total amount of any reduction. On or about March 10, 2010, Birkos paid Respondent $1,245 in cash, representing costs and one month of the retainer. Respondent denies that the retainer was a "purported" retainer, and admits the allegations contained in the balance of Paragraph 10 of Count I of the 11. On or about March 31, 2010, Respondent, or someone acting at his direction, caused to be filed an emergency motion to vacate the default judgment in the foreclosure matter relating to the Superior Street property, Indymac Bank

7 F.S.B. v. Kazimierz Birkos, et ai, case number 2008 CH (Cook County Circuit Court). On or about May 18, 2010, the court entered an order denying Respondent's motion, and entering an order for possession of the Superior Street property in case number 2008 CH After May 18, 20 10, Respondent took no further action on Birkos' behalf concerning the Superior Street property. Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 11 of Count I of the 12. On or before September 16, 2010, Respondent, or someone acting at his direction, requested that agents working on behalf of Certified Forensic Loan Auditors, LLC ('CFLA"), perform a "forensic loan audit" or review of Birkos' mortgage loan documents from his purchase of the Oketo property to determine whether Birkos' lender complied with state and federal mortgage lending laws and produce a report of its findings in relation to the Oketo property. Respondent received the forensic loan audit from CFLA on or before September 16,2010. Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 12 of Counts I of the 13. At no time did Respondent provide a copy of the forensic loan audit report relating to the Oketo property to Birkos for his review, input or discussion.

8 Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 13 of Count I of the 14. On at least ten occasions during Respondent's representation, Birkos telephoned Respondent's office requesting the status of the loan modification for the Oketo property. On a few of those occasions, a non-attorney employee of Respondent's law firm advised Birkos that everything was "ok" and that "No news [was] good news." Respondent neither admits nor denies due to insufficient knowledge, but further answering states that protocols were in place that all clients be contacted no less than twice a month regardless of activity in a matter, as alleged in Paragraph 14 of Count I of the 15. At no time did Respondent, or anyone on his behalf, contact Birkos to discuss his case, review his records and/or discuss his legal objectives. Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 15 of Count I of the Complaint and further answering, states that in addition to phone communications, each month Mr. Birkos had attorneys and staff available to him to update and/or discuss his matter upon request as he made payments.

9 16. On or about February 18, 2011, Paul Fine, an associate attorney at Respondent's firm, sent a request to Wells Fargo, Birkos' mortgagor for the Oketo property, requesting a modification of the terms of Birkos' mortgage. Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 13 of Count I of the 17. On or about March 3, 2011, Respondent sent a letter to Wells Fargo stating that his office had been retained by Birkos to negotiate a restructuring of Birkos' loan. Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 13 of Count I of the 18. At no time after March 3, 2011, did Respondent, or anyone on his behalf, take any further action on behalf of Birkos in relation to the modification of the Oketo property mortgage. Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 13 of Count I of the 19. Between March 2010 and June 2011, Birkos paid in cash Respondent's requested $750 "monthly classic retainer," for a total of $12,495. From that amount, and during the same period, Respondent paid FDG $400 per month for Birkos' referral, pursuant to the Database Services Agreement.

10 Respondent admits payments were made by Mr. Birkos up to and including September 2010 by Mr. Birkos for his legal services as alleged in Paragraph 19 of Count I of the Respondent has no record showing payments made past September 2010, so Respondent denies that he was paid a total of $12,495. Respondent denies that payment to FDG was for a referral. 20. Respondent did not perform sufficient work or incur sufficient costs which would entitle him to retain the $12,495 he received from Birkos. Respondent denies the allegation contained in Paragraph 20 of Count I of the 21. As of July 8, 2011, Respondent had not communicated the status of his actions to Birkos, and as a result, on that same date, Birkos filed a charge with the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission requesting termination of the representation and a refund of the unearned fees and costs paid to Respondent. ANSWER; Respondent denies that he had not communicated the status of his actions to Birkos. Respondent admits a charge was filed as alleged in Paragraph 21 of Count I of the Respondent denies the balance of Paragraph 21 of Count I of the 22. As of April 8, 2013, the date on which the Inquiry Panel voted that a complaint be filed in this matter, Respondent had not issued a refund of the 10

11 unearned legal fees or costs paid by Birkos. Respondent admits that a refund of payments was not made as alleged in Paragraph 22 of Count I of the Respondent denies that these fees were unearned. 23. By the reason of the conduct outlined above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct: a) failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client, in violation of Rule 1.3 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; b) failure to reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished, failure to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and failure to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, in violation of Rule 1.4(a)(2-4) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; c) failure to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation, in violation of Rule 1.4(b) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; d) making an agreement for, charging and collecting an unreasonable fee, in violation of Rule 1.5(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; e) failing to hold property of clients in the lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property, in violation of Rule 1.1S(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; 11

12 f) failing to deposit in a client trust account funds received to secure payment of legal fees and expenses, in violation of Rule 1.1 S(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; g) upon termination of representation, failure to refund any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred, in violation of Rule 1.16(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; h) failure to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client, in violation of Rule 3.2 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; i) sharing legal fees with a non-lawyer, in violation of Rule 5.4(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; j. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct k. conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; and I. conduct which tends to defeat the administration of justice or bring the courts or legal profession into disrepute. Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 23 (a) through (I) of Count I of the 12

13 COUNT II (Sharing legal fees with a non-attorney, lack ofdiligence, improper and excessive fee, failure to communicate and failure to return an unearnedfee -Jadwiga Bielecka) 24. On or about March 20, 2010, Respondent agreed to represent Jadwiga Bielecka ("Bielecka"), who was referred to him by FDG, in a mortgage foreclosure action. On that date, Bielecka signed an attorney-client agreement and paid Respondent his requested fee of $495 for "upfront costs of litigation." Pursuant to the agreement, Bielecka also agreed to pay Respondent a purported "monthly classic retainer" of $700, which payments would be automatically debited from Bielecka's checking account held at Harris Bank. Bielecka paid Respondent a total of $1,195 on March 20, 2010, representing costs and one month of the retainer. Respondent admits that he agreed to represent Jadwiga Bielecka but neither admits nor denies that FDG referred her to him due to insufficient knowledge as alleged in the first sentence of Paragraph 24 of Count II of the Respondent admits the allegation in the second sentence of Paragraph 24. Respondent denies the retainer was "purported" as alleged in the third sentence of Paragraph 24 and admits the balance of said Paragraph 24 of Count II of the 25. Respondent had no further communications with Bielecka regarding her foreclosure matter after their initial meeting on March 20,

14 Respondent denies the allegation contained in Paragraph 25 of Count II of the 26. On or about June 22, 2010, attorneys on behalf of JPMorgan Chase Bank caused to be filed a complaint to foreclose mortgage against Bielecka in the Circuit Court of Cook County. The Clerk of the Court docketed the matter as JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Jadwiga Bielecka, case number 2010 CH Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 26 of Count II of the 27. On or about August 31, 2010, Respondent caused to be filed his appearance on behalf of Bielecka in case number 2010 CH Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 27 of Count II of the 28. At no time did Respondent, or anyone acting at his direction, file an answer or other responsive pleading on behalf of Bielecka in case number 2010 CH Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 28 of Count II of the 29. Between May 20, 2010 and October 20, 2010, Bielecka continued to pay the "monthly classic retainer" of $700 for Respondent's services, pursuant to 14

15 the attorney-client agreement. Between April 2010 and October 2010, Respondent paid FDG $400 per month for the Bielecka referral pursuant to the Database Services Agreement. Respondent admits the allegations contained in the first sentence of Paragraph 29 of Count II of the Respondent neither admits nor denies the allegation contained in the second sentence of Paragraph 29 of Count II of the Complaint, as Respondent has no records indicating this client was a product of FDG marketing, but does deny any payments were made to FDG for referrals, as alleged in Paragraph 29 of Count II of the 30. On or about October 1, 2010, attorneys on behalf of JPMorgan Chase caused to be filed a motion for entry of an order of default and judgment of foreclosure and sale in case number 2010 CH Respondent received service of the motion shortly thereafter. ANSWER; Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 30 of Count II of the 31. At no time did Respondent respond or object to the motion for entry of and order of default and judgment of foreclosure and sale in case number 2010 CH

16 Respondent admits the allegation contained in Paragraph 31 of Count II of the 32. In about early November 2010, Bielecka contacted Respondent on three separate occasions and requested a status of her matter. Respondent received Bielecka's requests, but did not respond to her requests. As a result, Bielecka terminated the representation and requested a refund of the unearned fees paid to Respondent. Respondent denies the allegations contained in the first two sentences of Paragraph 32 of Count II of the Complaint, and further states that multiple appointments were set and opportunities were offered to discuss in detail. Respondent neither admits nor denies the third sentence due to insufficient knowledge. 33. In or about November 20I0, Bielecka caused the automatic debit of the "monthly classic retainer" fees from her checking account to cease. Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 33 of Count II of the 34. On or about November 22, 2010, Respondent caused to be filed a motion for withdrawal and agreed withdrawal of attorney in case number 2010 CH 2671, which was granted on December 17,

17 ANSWER; Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 34 of Count II of the Complaint 35. Respondent did not perform sufficient work or incur sufficient costs which would entitle him to retain the $5,395 he received from Bielecka. Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 35 of Count II of the 36. As of April 8, 2013, the date on which the Inquiry Panel voted that a complaint be filed in this matter, Respondent had not issued a refund of the unearned legal fees or costs paid by Bielecka. Respondent admits that a refund of payments was not made as alleged in Paragraph 36 of Count II of the Respondent denies that these fees were unearned. 37. By reason of the conduct outlined above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct: a. failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client, in violation of Rule 1.3 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; b. failure to reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished, failure to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and failure to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, in violation of Rule 1.4(a)(2-4) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; 17

18 c. failure to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation, in violation of Rule 1.4(b) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; d. making an agreement for, charging and collecting an unreasonable fee, in violation of Rule 1.5(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; e. failing to hold property of clients in the lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property, in violation of Rule 1.15(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; f. failing to deposit in a client trust account funds received to secure payment of legal fees and expenses, in violation of Rule 1.15(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; g. upon termination of representation, failure to refund any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred, in violation of Rule 1.16(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; h. failure to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client, in violation of Rule 3.2 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; i. sharing legal fees with a non-lawyer, in violation of Rule 5.4(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; j. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; k. conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; and I. conduct which tends to defeat the administration of justice or bring the courts or legal profession into disrepute. Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 37 (a) through (I) of Count II of the COUNT III (Sharing legal fees with a non-attorney, lack ofdiligence, improper and excessive fee, failure to communicate and failure to return an unearned fee - Allen &Antoinette Edmundson) 18

19 38. On or about May 20, 2010, Respondent agreed to represent Allen and Antoinette Edmundson ("the Edmundsons"), who were referred to him by FDG, in a mortgage foreclosure action and potential loan modification. At the time of the representation, a motion for judgment of foreclosure against the Edmundsons was pending in case number 2009 CH 20022, filed before the Circuit Court of Cook County. AMSWER' Respondent admits that Respondent agreed to represent the Edmundsons in a potential loan modification, and denies the balance of allegations contained in Paragraph 38 of Count III of the Complaint 39. On or about May 20, 2010, the Edmundsons signed an attorneyclient agreement and paid Respondent his requested fee of $750 for the cost of a forensic loan audit to be performed. The Edmundsons also agreed to pay Respondent a purported "monthly classic retainer" of $750. Finally, if Respondent obtained a reduction in the principal amount of the Edmundsons' loan, the Edmundsons agreed to pay Respondent a contingency fee equaling up to 20% of the total amount of any reduction. The Edmundsons paid Respondent a total of $1,000 on May 20, 20 I 0, and an additional $500 shortly thereafter, representing costs and one month of the retainer. Respondent denies that the retainer was "purported" and admits the balance of the allegations contained in Paragraph 39 of Count III of the 40. At no time after May 20, 2010, did Respondent, or anyone acting 19

20 at his direction, discuss the Edmundsons' case with them, review their records and/or discuss their legal objectives. Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 40 of Count III of the 41. Between May 20, 20 I 0 and February 2012, the Edmundsons paid the "monthly classic retainer" of $750 for Respondent's services, pursuant to the attorney-client agreement. During this same period of time, Respondent paid FDG $400 per month for the Edmundson referral pursuant to the Database Services Agreement. Respondent admits that Edmundsons made monthly capped payments for legal services provided as alleged in the first sentence of Paragraph 41 of Count III of the Respondent denies the allegation contained in the second sentence that payments towards FDG were for referral and denies payments towards FDG's services extended beyond December 2010, when the services by FDG were terminated. 42. At no time between May 20, 2010 and February 2012, did Respondent, or anyone acting at his direction, file an appearance, answer or any other responsive pleading on behalf of the Edmundsons in case number 2009 CH

21 Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 42 of Count III of the 43. Between May 20, 2010 and February 2012, the Edmundsons' file was assigned to at least six different attorneys in Respondent's office. During that time, the Edmundsons left numerous messages requesting information regarding their case without receiving responses to their inquiries. Respondent admits multiple attorneys were assigned as team to work cases; protocol was two associates, one senior associate and Supervising Attorney and/or Respondent. As one or more rotated through the team another would be assigned as backup into the team. This ensured no one would be caught flat footed and unprepared should it be assigned to only one attorney. Respondent terminated Mr. Brydges Supervisory position in July, 2011 when Respondent was of the opinion he was failing to meet Respondent's strict protocols set in place. Respondent denies responses to clients' inquiries were not made as alleged in Paragraph 43 in Count III of the 44. Between May 20, 2010 and February 2012, the Edmundsons continued to receive correspondence directly from their lender regarding opportunities to restructure the current terms of their mortgage. On each occasion when Mrs. Edmundson received a letter from the lender, she contacted Respondent's office and Respondent, or someone acting at his direction, instructed Mrs. Edmundson to disregard the letters. 21

22 Respondent neither admits nor denies the allegations in the first sentence of Paragraph 44 due to insufficient knowledge. Respondent denies the allegations contained in the second sentence Paragraph 44 of Count III of the 45. On or about February 14, 2012, Wendy Fawcett ("Fawcett"), an associate attorney at Respondent's law firm, sent a letter to the Edmundsons requesting that they complete a loan modification application packet which she would then submit to their lender. Shortly thereafter, the Edmundsons completed and returned the documentation. Respondent, nor Fawcett, nor anyone acting at the direction of Respondent, submitted the completed documentation to the Edmundsons' lender. Respondent admits the allegations contained in the first two sentences of Paragraph 45 of Count III of the Complaint Respondent denies the balance of allegations contained in Paragraph 45 of Count III of the 46. On or about March 30, 2012, Fawcett sent a letter to the Edmundsons advising them that their home was still in foreclosure, and that they needed to discuss the firm's filing of an appearance and answer in case number 2009 CH

23 Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 46 of Count III of the Complaint 47. On or about March 30, 2012, the Edmundsons terminated Respondent's representation of them and requested a refund of the unearned fees and costs paid to Respondent. Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 47 of Count III of the Complaint and further answering, states continued discussions, phone calls and in person meetings were held with the Edmundsons despite their non-payment on and through October Respondent did not perform sufficient work or incur sufficient costs which would entitle him to retain the $17,250 received from the Edmundsons. Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 48 of Count III of the 49. As of April 8, 2013, the date on which the Inquiry Panel voted that a complaint be filed in this matter, Respondent had not issued a refund of the unearned legal fees or costs paid by the Edmundsons. Respondent admits that a refund of payments was not made as alleged in Paragraph 49 of Count III of the Respondent denies that these fees 23

24 were unearned. 50. By reason of the conduct outlined above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct: a. failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client, in violation of Rule 1.3 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; b. failure to reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished, failure to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and failure to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, in violation of Rule 1.4(a)(2-4) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; c. failure to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation, in violation of Rule 1.4(b) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; d. making an agreement for, charging and collecting an unreasonable fee in violation of Rule 1.5(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; e. failing to hold property of clients in the lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property, in violation of Rule 1.15(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; f. failing to deposit in a client trust account funds received to secure payment of legal fees and expenses, in violation of Rule 1.15(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; g. upon termination of representation, failure to refund any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred, in violation of Rule 1.16(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; h. failure to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client, in violation of Rule 3.2 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; i. sharing legal fees with a non-lawyer, in violation of Rule 5.4(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; j. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; 24

25 k. conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; and I. conduct which tends to defeat the administration of justice or bring the courts or legal profession into disrepute. Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 50 (a) through (I) of Count III of the COUNT IV (Lack ofdiligence, improper and excessivefee, failure to communicate and failure to return an Unearned fee -James & Sandra Patrick) 51. On or about February 18, 2010, Respondent agreed to represent James and Sandra Patrick ("the Patricks") in a predatory lending complaint against the Patricks' mortgagor, EMC Mortgage Corporation ("EMC"). On that date, the Patricks signed an attorney-client agreement and paid Respondent his requested fee of $1,250 for "upfront costs of litigation." The Patricks also agreed to pay Respondent a purported "monthly classic retainer" of $750, which payments would be automatically debited from the Patricks' checking account held at JPMorgan Chase Bank. The Patricks paid Respondent a total of $2,000 on February 18, 2010, representing the costs and one month of the retainer. Respondent admits the first two sentences of Paragraph 51 of Count IV of the Respondent denies the retainer was "purported" and admits the balance of the third sentence in Paragraph 51 of Count IV of the Complaint Respondent denies the last sentence of Paragraph 51 of Count IV of the 25

26 52. On or about May 11, 2010, Certified Forensic Loan Auditors, LLC sent a forensic loan audit report to Respondent which was prepared on behalf of the Patricks in relation to the mortgages for their real property located in Plainfield, Illinois. Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 52 of Count IV of the 53. Between May 11, 2010 and August 5, 2010, the Patricks did not receive any information from Respondent regarding the results of the forensic loan audit report or any other information advising them of the progress of their case. Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 53 of Count IV of the 54. On or before August 5, 2010, Mr. Patrick telephoned Respondent's office requesting the status of the audit. On that date, Kellie Reynolds ("Reynolds"), an associate attorney at Respondent's firm, who had received Mr. Patrick's message, sent an to Respondent requesting "some direction as to the next step for this audit" because she wanted to be informed prior to returning Mr. Patrick's call. Respondent received Reynolds' , and responded by requesting that Reynolds meet with him the following Monday, August 9, 2010 to discuss the audit. 26

27 Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 54 of Count IV of the Complaint, and further answering states that Kellie Reynolds was a supervising attorney and not merely an associate. 55. On or about August 5, 2010, Reynolds sent an to the Patricks advising them that she had recently been assigned their file and that the audit had been completed. Reynolds stated she would provide them with more information after meeting with Respondent the following Monday to discuss their strategy and next action to be taken on their case. Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 55 of Count IV of the 56. Respondent did not meet with Reynolds the following Monday, August 9, 2010, to discuss the status of the Patricks' audit. Respondent neither admits nor denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 56 of Count IV of the Complaint due to insufficient knowledge and demands strict proof thereof. 57. On or about August 12, 2010, Reynolds sent another to Respondent requesting that he contact the Patricks regarding the status of their audit. Respondent received the , but did not reply to Reynolds' or telephone the Patricks. 27

28 Respondent neither admits nor denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 57 of Count IV of the Complaint due to insufficient knowledge. 58. On or about August 25, 2010, Reynolds sent another to Respondent requesting that he contact the Patricks to discuss the audit. Reynolds explained to Respondent that Mr. Patrick was upset and wanted a return call. Respondent received Reynolds' shortly after it was sent. Reynolds also ed Mr. Patrick and explained that, although she was assigned to his file, she was not processing or reviewing forensic loan audits. She explained that she left a message for Respondent and his assistant, "Tony," to call Mr. Patrick as soon as possible to discuss the audit. Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 58 of Count IV of the 59. In the evening ofaugust 25, 2010, Reynolds sent a second to Respondent stating that she didn't have any records relating to the Patricks' audit. She requested that Respondent look into the matter and contact Mr. Patrick. Respondent received Reynolds' and replied to Reynolds by stating the following, "[t]he audit was completed, henrcvd [sic] a copy and negotiations are in full swing." 28

29 Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 59 of Count IV of the 60. Respondent's statement to Reynolds that "negotiations are in full swing" was false and was intended to mislead Reynolds and the Patricks. Respondent knew that the statement was false because Respondent had not entered into any negotiations with the Patricks' lender or proceeded in any manner since receiving the forensic audit report from Certified Forensic Loan Auditors, LLC. Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 60 of Count IV of the 61. Between approximately August 25, 2010 and August 30, 2010, Mr. Patrick continued to attempt to speak with Respondent regarding the status of the audit. Respondent received Mr. Patrick's messages, but did not respond to Mr. Patrick. Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 61 of Count IV of the 62. On or about August 30, 20 I 0, Reynolds sent the following to Respondent: "Mr. Patrick is still waiting from last week for a return call from you. 29

30 I return all of his voice and s, but I am not a substitute when a client specifically wants to talk to you. Thank you!" Respondent received Reynolds' and replied to Reynolds' by stating, "(h]e is at top of list for calls." Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 62 of Count IV of the 63. On or about August 30, 201 0, Reynolds sent an to Mr. Patrick and attached a copy of the forensic loan audit report. She also explained that she had left "an aggressive message" for Respondent to contact him immediately. She asked that Mr. Patrick contact her if he did not receive a call from Respondent by the next day. Shortly thereafter, the Patricks' file was reassigned to Susan Fallon, another associate attorney in Respondent's law firm. Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 63 of Count IV of the 64. On or about September 2, 20 I 0, Respondent sent a 'Demand and Notice of Rescission" letter to Encore Credit Corporation and Mortgage Direct, Inc., the Patricks' original mortgagor. Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 64 of Count IV of the 30

31 65. On or about October 21, 20 I 0, James Brody ("Brody") from American Mortgage Law Group, P.C., counsel for Mortgage Direct, Inc., sent a letter to Respondent denying and rejecting the bases and validity for the purported rescission primarily because Mortgage Direct, Inc. transferred the loan prior to the first payment and therefore never serviced the loan. Respondent received Brody's letter shortly after it was sent. Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 65 of Count IV of the 66. On or about January 13, 2011, EMC Mortgage Corporation ("EMC"), which had become the mortgage servicer for the Patricks' loan, provided certain documentation regarding the Patricks' mortgage to Respondent. Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 66 of Count IV of the Complaint, as communications between EMC and Fish Brydges had been ongoing. 67. At no time after the receipt of the documentation from EMC did Respondent, or anyone acting at his direction, take any further action on behalf of the Patricks. Respondent denies the allegation contained in Paragraph 67 of Count IV of the 31

32 68. Between approximately September and January 2011, the Patricks continued to call Respondent's office on a weekly basis to check on the status of their matter. At no time did Respondent respond to the Patricks' messages. In or about January 2011, the Patricks ceased further automatic debits to their checking account for the purported "monthly classic retainer" fee payments of $750. As of that date, the Patricks had paid Respondent a total of $9,500. Respondent admits the allegations contained in the first sentence of Paragraph 68 of Count IV of the Respondent denies the allegation in the second sentence and denies the retainer was "purported". Respondent admits the balance of Paragraph 68 of Count IV of the 69. In or about April 2011, the Patricks terminated Respondent's services and requested a refund of the unearned fees and costs. Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 69 of Count IV of the 70. Respondent did not perform sufficient work and incur sufficient costs which would entitle him to retain the $9,500 received from the Patricks. Respondent denies the allegation contained in Paragraph 70 of Count IV of the 71. As of April 8, 2013, the date on which the Inquiry Panel voted that a 32

33 complaint be filed in this matter, Respondent had not issued a refund of the unearned legal fees or costs paid by the Patricks. Respondent admits that a refund of payments was not made as alleged in Paragraph 71 of Count IV of the Respondent denies that these fees were unearned. 72. By the reason of the conduct outlined above, Respondent has engaged in the following misconduct: a. failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client, in violation of Rule 1.3 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; b. failure to reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished, failure to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and failure to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, in violation of Rule l.4(a)(2-4) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; c. failure to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decision s regarding the representation, in violation of Rule I.4(b) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; d. making an agreement for, charging and collecting an unreasonable fee, in violation of Rule I.5(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; e. failing to hold property of clients in the lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property, in violation of Rule 1.15(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; f. failing to deposit in a client trust account funds received to 33

34 secure payment of legal fees and expenses, in violation of Rule 1.15(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; upon termination of representation, failure to refund any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred, in violation of Rule 1.16(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; h. failure to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client, in violation of Rule 3.2 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; i. conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; j. conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; and k. conduct which tends to defeat the administration of justice or bring the courts or legal profession into disrepute Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 72 (a) through (k) of Count IV of the COUNT V (Lack ofdiligence, improper and excessivefee, failure to communicate and failure to return an unearned fee -Ralph Borushek) 73. On or about February 24, 2010, Ralph Borushek ("Borushek") received a letter on Respondent's letterhead advising Borushek that he may qualify for a reduction of the principal balance owed on his real property located on Kenilworth Avenue in Wilmette, Illinois. The letter directed Borushek to call to "speak to one of 34

35 our representatives and see if you can save $464, " Respondent admits that an unauthorized letter was sent that Respondent had no knowledge of sent by someone Respondent has come to learn was Charlie "Chuck" Mangold as alleged in Paragraph 73 of Count V of the 74. Within a few days of receiving Respondent's letter as described in paragraph 73, above, Borushek telephoned Respondent's office at the number provided on the letterhead and spoke with an individual who identified himself as "Chuck." Borushek explained to "Chuck" that he had two mortgages on his property and was seeking to have the principal, interest, or both reduced. "Chuck" requested that Borushek send copies of his closing documents and tax returns to Respondent for review. Respondent denies that the telephone number on the letterhead was his telephone number as alleged in the first sentence of Paragraph 74 of Count V of the Respondent neither admits nor denies the allegations in the remainder of the paragraph due to insufficient knowledge. 75. On or about March 3, 2010, Borushek sent a letter to "Chuck" via facsimile at the number provided on Respondent's letterhead. Borushek attached copies of his closing and tax documents, as previously requested by "Chuck." Borushek further provided "Chuck" with a telephone number at which he could be reached during the day. 35

36 Respondent neither admits nor denies due to insufficient knowledge as alleged in Paragraph 75 of Count V of the Complaint due to insufficient knowledge and demands strict proof thereof. 76. On or about April 6, 2010, Respondent agreed to represent Borushek in a predatory lending complaint against his mortgagor. On that same date, Borushek signed an attorney-client agreement and paid Respondent his requested fee of $2,500 for "upfront costs of litigation." Borushek also agreed to pay Respondent a purported "monthly classic retainer" of $500. Respondent admits. Mr. Borushek contacted his Hinsdale office and said he wanted to come in and discuss his case. It was then Respondent found out he had been in contact with a "Chuck Wilson" whom Respondent had no idea who that was as alleged in Paragraph 76 of Count V of the Respondent explained his entire process and informed him clearly that regardless of what he may have heard or read that reality was reductions would be sought through restructuring. 77. At no time after April 6, 2010, did Borushek personally meet or speak with Respondent to discuss his case, review his records and/or discuss his legal objectives, nor did Borushek receive any further correspondence from Respondent. 36

37 Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 77 of Count V of the Complaint 78. On or about May 15, 2010, Borushek sent a check in the amount of $500 to Respondent representing the payment of the "monthly classic retainer" for that month. Respondent admits a payment was made but it was not a monthly retainer as alleged in Paragraph 78 of Count V of the Complaint and further answering states $3000 was the entire fee. 79. Beginning in mid-may 2010, Borushek began making telephone calls to Respondent's office and leaving messages requesting that Respondent or "Chuck" contact him regarding the status of his case. Respondent received Borushek's messages, but at no time were Borushek's calls returned. Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 79 of Count V of the Complaint 80. On or about June 10, 2010, Borushek sent an to "Chuck" complaining about what he considered to be Respondent's lack of communication, and requesting that someone telephone him or he would request a refund of his legal fees. At no time did Borushek receive a response to his June 10,

38 Respondent neither admits nor denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 80 of Count V of the Complaint due to insufficient knowledge, but demands strict proof thereof. 81. On or about June 17, 2010, Borushek sent a letter to Respondent complaining about what he considered to be Respondent's and "Chuck's" lack of communication, and requesting that someone telephone him or he would request a refund of his legal fees. Respondent received Borushek's letter shortly thereafter. At no time did Respondent respond to Borushek's June 17,2010 letter. Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 81 of Count V of the 82. On or about September 8, 2010, Madeleine Podesta ("Podesta"), an attorney in Respondent's law firm, sent an to Borushek in which she attached a forensic audit report, dated May 13, 2010, relating to Borushek's first and second mortgage s. Podesta requested that Borushek review the report and contact her with any questions, or, if he didn't have any questions, she would contact him in a few weeks. Respondent admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 82 of Count V of the 38

39 83. After reviewing the forensic audit report, Borushek discovered that much of the documentation which he had previously provided to Respondent was listed as missing. Borushek telephoned Respondent's office and left messages requesting that someone contact him to discuss the matter, but did not receive a response to his messages. Respondent neither admits nor denies the allegations contained in the first sentence of Paragraph 83 of Count V of the Complaint due to insufficient knowledge. Respondent denies the allegations contained in the second sentence of Paragraph 83 of Count V of the 84. On or about January 10, 2011, Borushek sent an to Podesta requesting that she forward the to Respondent. In his , Borushek complained that the forensic audit report provided to him indicated much of his mortgage information was missing or incomplete, even though he had previously provided Respondent with all requested documentation. Borushek offered to pay $500 for the cost of the report, but requested a refund of the remaining $2,500 paid to Respondent. Podesta responded to Borushek by stating that she had forwarded his to Respondent and the office manager, and that one of them would contact Borushek. Respondent received Borushek's January 10, as forwarded from Podesta. At no time did Respondent, nor anyone on his behalf, respond to Borushek's . Respondent admits that an was sent as alleged in Paragraph 84 of Count V 39