Contents. Acknowledgements Table of Cases Table of Legislation

Transcription

1 Acknowledgements Table of Cases Table of Legislation ix xix xxix 1. Introduction 1 I. The Disintegration of the Modern Law 1 A. A Very Brief History 1 B. Implications of the Development of the Modern Law: The Role of Policy 3 C. Implications of the Development of the Modern Law: The Role of Principle 8 D. Less Realistic Views 11 E. Defining Policy Narrowly 17 II. An Alternative 19 A. History Revisited 19 B. Strategy and Methodology 21 (i) General Strategy 21 (a) Interpretive Legal Theory 21 (b) Reflective Equilibrium 25 (c) Transparency, Policy, Judicial Decision Making and Reflective Equilibrium 28 (ii) Applying the Methodology to the Law of Negligence 28 (a) The Principled Approach 28 (b) The Modern Law 30 (c) An Internal, not External, Analysis 34 (iii) Format of the Book 36 III. Concluding Remarks Corrective Justice, Negligence and Tort Law 41 I. Spheres of Morality 42 II. The Form of Corrective Justice 45 III. Corrective Justice, the Principled Approach and the Role of Judgement 46 IV. Corrective Justice and the Definition of Principle and Policy 50 V. The Apolitical Nature of Corrective Justice 52 VI. Two Potential Objections 55 A. The Incompleteness Objection and the Right of Corrective Justice 56

2 xii Contents (i) The Incompleteness of Corrective Justice 56 (ii) The Incompleteness of the Principled Approach 61 (iii) The Rights Base of the Law of Negligence and Corrective Justice 63 (iv) The Rights Base of the Law of Negligence and Distributive Justice 66 (v) Conclusion 69 B. The Inconsistency Objection: Corrective Justice and the General Law of Tort The Standard of Care 73 I. The Distinction between Action and Mere Behaviour 74 II. The Objective Standard 78 A. Justifying the Objective Standard 79 B. Who is the Ordinary Reasonable Person? 84 C. The Objective Standard and Corrective Justice 86 D. Adjusting the Objective Standard 87 III. Reasonable Care 96 A. The Leading Cases 96 B. The Standard of Care and Corrective Justice 103 C. Summary 106 D. Problematic Cases 106 E. Conclusion 111 IV. Strict Liability and Corrective Justice 111 V. Recent Legislation Duty and Remoteness 115 I. The Duty of Care 115 A. The Nature of the Duty of Care 115 (i) Winterbottom v Wright 115 (ii) Donoghue v Stevenson 118 (iii) Palsgraf 123 B. The Duty of Care and Corrective Justice 128 II. Remoteness of Damage 129 A. The Nature of Remoteness 129 (i) Polemis 129 (ii) The Wagon Mound (No 1) 131 B. Remoteness and Corrective Justice 132 C. Remoteness, the Injury and the Accident 133 (i) The General Approach 133 (ii) The Chain of Events 137 (iii) The Extent of the Claimant s Injury 139

3 xiii (iv) Remoteness and Judgment 140 (v) Hughes v Lord Advocate Again 142 III. The Role of Reasonable Foreseeability in Duty and Remoteness 143 IV. Illustrations of Duty and Remoteness 145 A. Liability to Rescuers 145 B. Not-yet-existent Claimants 148 C. Novus Actus Interveniens 149 (i) Case Law 149 (ii) An Alternative 156 D. The Exception: the Thin Skull Rule 162 V. Conclusion Modern Approaches to the Duty of Care 167 I. The Anns Approach 167 A. The Development of the Anns Approach 167 B. Criticism of the Anns Approach 170 II. The Incremental Approach 182 A. The Formulation of the Incremental Approach 182 B. The Incremental Approach and the Neighbour Test 183 (i) Proximity and Reasonable Foreseeability 183 (ii) The Incremental Approach and Policy 187 C. Incrementalism and Justification 190 D. Conclusion 193 III. Vulnerability: A New Approach? 194 IV. The Modern Approaches and the Place of Tort Law within the Law of Obligations 195 V. Comparing the Approaches 197 VI. Conclusion Misfeasance, Nonfeasance and the Rights Base of the Law of Negligence 205 I. The Traditional Understanding of the Distinction between Misfeasance and Nonfeasance 205 A. Acts and Omissions 205 B. Justification for the Act/Omission Distinction 209 II. The Rights Base of the Law of Negligence 210 A. Primary Rights and Injuries 210 B. Primary Rights and the Structure of the Law of Obligations 212 C. Standard Objections 214 III. The Distinction between Misfeasance and Nonfeasance 217 IV. Conclusion 222

4 xiv Contents 7. Economic Loss 223 I. Consequential and Relational Economic Loss 223 A. The Modern Approaches 223 B. The Principled Approach 232 (i) Indeterminate Liability 233 (ii) Ultramares 234 (iii) Donoghue v Stevenson, Nonfeasance and the Rights of Tort Law 237 C. The Principled Approach to Relational Loss 239 D. The Principled Approach to Consequential Loss 246 II. Pure Economic Loss 250 A. The Building Cases 250 (i) The Principled Approach 250 (ii) The Policy-driven Approaches 252 (iii) The Risk to the Owner s Person and Property and Risk to Others 256 B. The Disappointed Beneficiary Cases 260 III. Economic Loss, Primary Rights and the General Law 267 IV. Economic Loss in Negligence and the Economic Torts 269 V. Conclusion Negligent Misrepresentation and Assumption of Responsibility 273 I. The Negligence Model 274 A. Candler v Crane Christmas & Co 274 B. The Anns Test and Negligent Misrepresentation 276 C. The Incremental Approach and Negligent Misrepresentation 281 D. Rejection of the Negligence Model 282 II. The Assumption of Responsibility Model 284 A. The Judgment in Hedley Byrne 284 B. The Role of Assumption of Responsibility in Negligent Misrepresentation 287 (i) Disclaimers 287 (ii) Causal Conversations 291 (iii) Special Skill 292 (iv) The Purpose of the Representation and the Person for whose Benefit the Statement was Made 293 C. Perceived Difficulties with the Assumption of Responsibility Model 298 (i) The Pigeonhole Argument 298 (ii) The Role of Proximity 299 (iii) The Role of Reasonable Foreseeability 299 (iv) The Role of Reliance 300

5 xv (v) The Role of Negligence 301 (vi) Criticisms of the Notion of Assumption of Responsibility 303 D. Conclusion 310 III. Negligent Misrepresentation and the Private Law 311 IV. The Right of Spring Nonfeasance and the Liability of Public Bodies 321 I. Nonfeasance in General 321 A. The Scope of the Rule 321 B. Assumptions of Responsibility and Nonfeasance 333 II. The Liability of Public Bodies 335 A. General Theory 335 (i) The Liability of Public Bodies where, Prima Facie, a Common Law Primary Right has been Violated 335 (ii) The Liability of Public Bodies where, Prima Facie, a Common Law Primary Right has not been Violated 337 B. Case Law Defences 341 I. Contributory Negligence 341 II. Volenti Non Fit Injuria 345 A. The Two Parts of the Defence 345 B. Willing the Harm 349 C. Consenting to the Risk of the Harm 357 D. The Volenti Defence and Rescuers 365 III. Illegality 372 A. Gala v Preston 372 B. Cory J in Hall v Hebert 377 C. Corrective Justice and Illegality: Weinrib and McLachlin J in Hall v Hebert Wrongful Birth, Wrongful Conception and Nervous Shock 385 I. Wrongful Birth 385 II. Wrongful Conception 386 A. Case Law 386 B. The Law of Negligence 389 C. Recovery under an Assumption of Responsibility 402 III. Nervous Shock 404 A. Primary Victims 404 B. Secondary Victims 407 C. Nervous Shock and the Rights of the Claimant 409

6 xvi Contents 12. Causation 413 I. Why Causation? 413 II. The Nature of Factual Causation 415 A. Case Law: The But For Test and its Alternatives 415 B. The NESS Test and the Targeted But For Test 418 (i) Introducing the Tests 418 (ii) Problems with the Targeted But For Test 419 (iii) Problems with the NESS Test 422 C. The Nature of Factual Causation in Outline 425 D. Exploring Factual Causation 427 III. Liability in Cases of Over-determination 431 A. The Problem 431 B. Negligence and Nominal Damages 433 C. Wright on Damages 434 D. The Claimant s Rights and Factual Causation 435 E. Applying the Theory to More Complex Fact Patterns Proof and Uncertainty 445 I. The Burden of Proof 446 II. Uncertainty over whether the Defendant was Negligent 447 III. Uncertainty over Factual Causation 453 A. The Principled Approach to Factual Uncertainty 453 B. Applying the Principled Approach to Cases of Factual Uncertainty 465 (i) McGhee 465 (ii) Wilsher 472 (iii) Fairchild 472 (iv) Scientific Uncertainty and Uncertainty in General 489 IV. Loss of a Chance 492 A. The Problem: Gregg v Scott 492 (i) Lord Nicholls Main Argument 493 (ii) Lord Nicholls Secondary Argument 494 (iii) Lord Hoffmann s Main Argument 496 (iv) Lord Hoffmann s Secondary Argument 497 B. What Does it Mean to Say that There Was a Chance? 498 (i) The Argument from Quantum Physics 499 (ii) Free Will 502 (iii) Loss of Chance and Factual Uncertainty 503 C. Another Kind of Loss of a Chance 504

7 xvii 14. Conclusion 507 I. Corrective Justice and Legal Change 507 II. Policy and Principle: Rediscovering the Law of Negligence 512 Bibliography 517 Index 527