A logical approach to role-based access control in a distributed environment
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1 A logical approach to role-based access control in a distributed environment Université Paul Sabatier, IRIT COPS - February 2008
2 Motivation Express access control policies in distributed systems. Take into consideration the RBAC structure with its extensions to include role hierarchy, delegation, separation of duties and obligations in a structured manner. Express the dynamic aspect of a policy (evolution in time)
3 Motivation Express access control policies in distributed systems. Take into consideration the RBAC structure with its extensions to include role hierarchy, delegation, separation of duties and obligations in a structured manner. Express the dynamic aspect of a policy (evolution in time) We present a language based on a set of rules (static rules and dynamic rules).
4 Outline
5
6 Description of the language Domain: D = S, R, A, O where S = set of subjects, R = set of roles, A = set of actions and O = set of objects. Security state: S = Ω, Π such that Ω Π with: O(s, r, a, o) Ω subject s has in S the obligation to execute action a on object o through role r P(s, r, a, o) Π subject s has in S the permission to execute action a on object o through role r
7 Static policy We define A formula φ := A φ φ where A is P(s, r, a, o) or O(s, r, a, o) A static clause based on D is an expression of the form A φ
8 Static policy We define A formula φ := A φ φ where A is P(s, r, a, o) or O(s, r, a, o) A static clause based on D is an expression of the form A φ Example P(x, user, read, file) P(x, user, write, file) x has the permissions to read the file through role user if he/she has the permission to write on the file through role user.
9 Definition A static policy SP is a finite set of static clauses based on D S = SP iff for all interpretations I for D and all static clauses A φ in SP, if S, I = φ then S, I = A.
10 Stateful security policies Problem: Starting from a security state S Some actions are permitted in S A user executes a subset A of these permitted actions These changes may affect the security state We have to specify these changes.
11 Dynamic clause A dynamic clause is an expression of the form: φ (ψ 1, ψ 2 ) where - φ, ψ 1 and ψ 2 are conjunctions of permissions and/or obligations
12 Dynamic clause A dynamic clause is an expression of the form: φ (ψ 1, ψ 2 ) where - φ, ψ 1 and ψ 2 are conjunctions of permissions and/or obligations Read: if all permissions/obligations in φ are true in S then if all the actions in φ are executed then ψ 1 will be true in the next state S else ψ 2 will be true in the next state S else the rule is not applied.
13 Definition An access control policy based on D is a tuple P = SP, DP Transition For all subsets A of Π we define the transition S A DP S iff for all I and all dynamic clauses φ (ψ 1, ψ 2 ) in DP, if S, I = φ then either A, A, I = φ and S, I = ψ 1 or A, A, I φ and S, I = ψ 2 S = SP
14 Example P(Mary, cardiologist, operate, patient) P(Mary, cardiologist, operate, patient) (O(Mary, cardiologist, follow up, patient), ) Mary has the permission to operate on a patient through role cardiologist (P(Mary, cardiologist, operate, patient) is in S) then
15 Example P(Mary, cardiologist, operate, patient) P(Mary, cardiologist, operate, patient) (O(Mary, cardiologist, follow up, patient), ) Mary has the permission to operate on a patient through role cardiologist (P(Mary, cardiologist, operate, patient) is in S) then if the action operate is executed Mary obtains the obligation to follow up on patient through role cardiologist (O(Mary, cardiologist, follow up, patient) true in S )
16 Example P(Mary, cardiologist, operate, patient) P(Mary, cardiologist, operate, patient) (O(Mary, cardiologist, follow up, patient), ) Mary has the permission to operate on a patient through role cardiologist (P(Mary, cardiologist, operate, patient) is in S) then if the action operate is executed Mary obtains the obligation to follow up on patient through role cardiologist (O(Mary, cardiologist, follow up, patient) true in S ) if this action is not executed nothing happens ( true in S ).
17
18 Role Activation User-role relations Permission-role relation Obligation-role relation
19 User-role relations Example To have the permission of playing a role: can play(s, r) can play(mary, Doctor) expresses that Mary has the permission to play the role doctor
20 User-role relations Example To have the permission of playing a role: can play(s, r) can play(mary, Doctor) expresses that Mary has the permission to play the role doctor Example To be active in a role: is active(s, r) can play(mary, Doctor) (is active(mary, Doctor), ) If Mary chooses to activate role Doctor, Mary becomes active as a doctor.
21 Permission-role and Obligation-role relations Acquire perm (s, r) assigns the permissions for the role r to a subject s. Acquire obl (s, r) assigns obligations for the role r to a subject s.
22 Example Acquire perm (x, Doctor) is active(x, Doctor) Acquire obl (x, Doctor) is active(x, Doctor)
23 Example Acquire perm (x, Doctor) is active(x, Doctor) Acquire obl (x, Doctor) is active(x, Doctor) Permission and obligation acquisition P(x, Doctor, a, o) Acquire perm (x, Doctor) O(x, Doctor, a, o) Acquire obl (x, Doctor)
24 Role Hierarchy In RBAC A role is a set of permissions associated with a set of users A role hierarchy is such that a subject acquires permissions to a role r if: the subject is a member of role r, or the role r is junior to the subject s role.
25 Role Hierarchy In RBAC A role is a set of permissions associated with a set of users A role hierarchy is such that a subject acquires permissions to a role r if: the subject is a member of role r, or the role r is junior to the subject s role. In our model: A role is a set of permissions and obligations associated with a set of users Two hierarchies (permissions and obligations)
26 Hierarchy relative to permissions A cardiologist is likely to inherit the permissions for the role doctor but less likely to inherit the obligations for the role doctor.
27 Hierarchy relative to permissions A cardiologist is likely to inherit the permissions for the role doctor but less likely to inherit the obligations for the role doctor. We define an order on roles relative to permissions Definition r 2 < perm r 1 says that role r 1 can inherit the permissions associated with role r 2.
28 Example Rules is active(mary, cardiologist) doctor < perm cardiologist intern < perm doctor Acquire perm (x, r 1 ) Acquire perm (x, r 2 ) (r 1 < perm r 2 )
29 Example Rules is active(mary, cardiologist) doctor < perm cardiologist intern < perm doctor Acquire perm (x, r 1 ) Acquire perm (x, r 2 ) (r 1 < perm r 2 ) Consequences: Acquire perm (Mary, cardiologist) Acquire perm (Mary, doctor) Acquire perm (Mary, intern)
30 Delegation Definition Executing an action by delegation is to execute it on one s behalf. Two types of delegation Allowing an entity to be delegatee of a role by action p delegate Forcing an entity to be delegatee of a role by action o delegate
31 We suppose: P(x, r, p delegate, y) Acquire perm (x, r 1 ) can play(y, r 2 )
32 We suppose: P(x, r, p delegate, y) Acquire perm (x, r 1 ) can play(y, r 2 ) Example P(x, pers assistant, p delegate, y) Acquire perm (x, cardiologist) can play(y, intern)
33 We suppose: P(x, r, p delegate, y) Acquire perm (x, r 1 ) can play(y, r 2 ) Example P(x, pers assistant, p delegate, y) Acquire perm (x, cardiologist) can play(y, intern) Mary is a cardiologist, she has the permission to delegate the role personal assistant to an intern. Mary s personal assistant is sick and she wishes to delegate this role to the intern John
34 Delegating a role P(Mary, pers assistant, p delegate, John) (P(John, pers assistant, d play, John), )
35 Delegating a role P(Mary, pers assistant, p delegate, John) (P(John, pers assistant, d play, John), ) When Mary executes the action p delegate John acquires the permission P(John, pers assistant, d play, John)
36 Delegating a role P(Mary, pers assistant, p delegate, John) (P(John, pers assistant, d play, John), ) When Mary executes the action p delegate John acquires the permission P(John, pers assistant, d play, John) P(John, pers assistant, d play, John) (is active(john, pers assistant) O(John, pers assistant, write, report), ) If John accepts the delegated role then he will be active in the role personal assistant but he will have an additional obligation to write a report on his work.
37 Delegation revocation Mary s personal assistant recovers from his sickness Mary stops the delegation by choosing not to execute the action p delegate John loses all the privileges of the delegates role at the next state.
38 Conclusion Relations of core RBAC can be encoded We can express hierarchies (for permissions and obligations) Delegation: we can dynamically alter the role inheritance relation and the user-role assignment. We can also express static and dynamic separation of duty and synchronization of actions.
39
40 Example The information in the client information file cannot be accessed without the client authorization. The client can grant authorization to a file that he/she owns. A clerk is responsible for receiving and identifying the client. A clerk can modify data in the client information file if he/she has access to the file.
41 Views and Context The need to add new entities: Add the entity View: The View is an entity that gathers objects of the same type Views are used to express a policy on objects that share the same characteristics. Example: A file John info.doc is an object in the View file. Is a(john info.doc, file)
42 Add the entity Context: The context describes the constraints or relations between the subject, action and object within a permission (or obligation) Example: Ownership is a context that associate the ownership of the object to the subject. Define(x, client, own, f, file, Ownership) name(x) = owner(f ) name is an attribute for the subject and owner is an attribute for the object.
43 Policy Define: A set of facts of the form P(r, a, v, c) A general rule perm(s, r, a, o, v, c) is active(s, r) is a(o, v) P(r, a, v, c) Define(s, r, a, o, v, c) Dynamic rules of the form φ (C 1, C 2 ) where φ is a conjunction of perm, or is active C 1 and C 2 are conjunctions of perm, is active, is a or
44 Example In static policy The permissions of executing an action by a role on a view are stated: P(client, send, signature, ownership) P(clerk, receive, signature, Access) P(clerk, access, file, Access) P(clerk, receive, signature, Access) P(clerk, modify, file, Access) P(clerk, access, file, Access) Define(s, r, a, o, v, Access) is active(x, client) name(x) = owner(o)
45 In dynamic policy The permissions of executing an action by a subject in a role on an object in a view are acquired perm(x, client, send, o, signature, ownership) (perm(y, pre clerk, receive, o, signature, Access), ) perm(y, post clerk, access, o, file, Access) perm(y, post clerk, modify, o, file, Access), )
46 Observations An action in a dynamic rule is executed by a subject on an object The execution of an action can lead to another permission
47 State transition: Modeling of a workflow
48 State transition: Modeling of a workflow Static rules P(R 1, move, step1, context) P(R 2, move, step2, context) P(R 1, move, step1, context) P(R 3, move, end, context) P(R 2, move, step2, context)
49 State transition: Modeling of a workflow Static rules P(R 1, move, step1, context) P(R 2, move, step2, context) P(R 1, move, step1, context) P(R 3, move, end, context) P(R 2, move, step2, context) Dynamic rules perm(s, R 1, move, t, step1, context) (is active(s, R 2 ) is a(t, step2), ) perm(s, R 2, move, t, step2, context) (is active(s, R 3 ) is a(t, end), )
50
51 Conclusion We described a language capable of expressing a policy that can evolve over time according to the actions performed by users We presented how we can express RBAC and its extensions into our language We gave example of an extension to a more complex environment involving views and contexts
52 Future work Test the expressive power of the language and possible extension via examining a case study Examine the notion of communication between roles Extend the language to support temporal constraints
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