en-eu-SD IKV PAX CHRISTI (The Netherlands)

Transcription

1 en-eu-SD IKV PAX CHRISTI (The Netherlands) THE GERMAN COALITION AGREEMENT OF 24 OCTOBER 2009 ON WITHDRAWAL OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM GERMANY Translation of letter to Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs IKV Pax Christi is the joint peace organisation of the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) and Pax Christi Netherlands Mr M.J.M. Verhagen Minister of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs PO Box EA The Hague Re: German coalition agreement on withdrawing nuclear weapons from Germany Date: 29 October 2009 Dear Mr Verhagen, Shortly after the 15 October 2009 debate and vote in the Dutch Parliament (House of Representatives, or Tweede Kamer ) on nuclear weapons and nonproliferation, there has been an important development in Germany with mayor consequences, also for the Netherlands. On 15 October you were not willing to make a statement on behalf of the Dutch Government on the desirability of withdrawing American nuclear weapons from Europe, since such a statement could be counterproductive to (non-specified) negotiations. Last weekend, in the coalition agreement between CDU/CSU/FDP, the new German Government committed itself to the withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from Germany. The crucial sentence in this agreement is: "In diesem Zusammenhang sowie im Zuge der Ausarbeitung eines strategischen Konzeptes der NATO werden wir uns im Bündnis sowie gegenüber den amerikanischen Verbündeten dafür einsetzen, dass die in Deutschland verbliebenen Atomwaffen abgezogen werden." 1 In the coalition agreement the phrase "In diesem Zusammenhang ( in this context ) refers, among other things, to the new German Government s explicit support for President Obama s policy for a world free of nuclear weapons; the 1 Provisional translation: In this context and in the course of developing a (new) Strategic Concept of NATO we will, both in the Alliance and towards the American allies, strive for (perhaps better: commit ourselves to, or: pusue) the withdrawal of the remaining nuclear weapons from Germany. 1

2 desirability of intermediate steps in reaching this goal; and the necessity of introducing a new dynamics to arms control and disarmament at the May 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. The media including the German media have so far paid little attention to this development. However, we consider that it will have far-reaching consequences, also for the Netherlands. More specifically: 1. Germany has traditionally been the key country in NATO. One of the reasons why American nuclear weapons were distributed among several member states (today five are left) when they were stationed in Europe in the 1950s, was that it was politically unthinkable to have nuclear weapons stationed solely on German territory. The same reasoning still applied when the controversial NATO decision was made in 1979 to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. But conversely, it is also politically unthinkable that allies like the Netherlands retain nuclear weapons on their territory if they are removed from Germany. (Though Turkey may have a different view). The German decision therefore, by definition, brings the presence of American nuclear weapons in the Netherlands into question. 2. Experts are now considering ways in which Germany could continue to participate in nuclear sharing in NATO without having nuclear weapons on its soil. We do not think this is possible. Storing nuclear weapons in the US during peacetime and flying them in when needed is not a realistic option. After all, as successor to its dual capable Tornado, Germany has chosen the non-dual capable Eurofighter. This means that after replacement in the next decade there will no longer be German aircraft capable of carrying nuclear bombs (and there are no American aircraft in Germany with a nuclear task). Naturally, Germany can continue to be a member of NATO s Nuclear Planning Group. But even if NATO maintains a nuclear sharing policy, without German involvement it will be completely different. It is difficult to imagine that the Dutch role would then remain unchanged. 3. The new German Government has emphasized that it wants to pursue the withdrawal of nuclear arms in the NATO debate on the new Strategic Concept. This makes Germany the first (and right away also the most important) NATO country to publicly make such a statement. By doing so the German Government has done precisely what you declined to do on behalf of the Dutch Government on 15 October. It is also in line with NATO Secretary General Rasmussen s promise for transparency during the preparation of the Strategic Concept. Other countries are now invited to state their position as well. This is particularly important for member states, like the Netherlands, with nuclear weapons on their territory. 4. At the same time, Germany s key role in NATO means that the international context of the Dutch debate has changed dramatically since this weekend. This is another reason why the debate in our own country has entered into a new phase. 5. The decision is especially surprising as a similar proposal by Minister of Foreign Affairs Steinmeier (SPD) was rejected out of hand by Chancellor 2

3 Merkel (CDU) in April. It had been known for some time that FDP leader Westerwelle was also in favour of withdrawal of the nuclear weapons but it seemed unlikely that CDU and CSU would agree. The German coalition of Christian Democrats and Liberals is now going much further towards nuclear disarmament than the Dutch coalition of Christian Democrats and Socialists. It is likely that consultations will take place among the German and Dutch sister parties. These may influence the position of the CDA, CU and VVD. 6. The decision is also important for the debate within the US Government and the US Congress on the future of the B61 bomb. This last remaining American nuclear weapon in Europe urgently requires modernisation, according to the US Department of Energy responsible for it. The response of NATO allies to the German decision will influence the American debate. 7. For the Dutch debate it is quite relevant that the German decision is linked to the need for a successful NPT review and the debate on the new Strategic Concept, but not to negotiations. We think this is wise. As we argued in our letter of 27 August to the Dutch Parliament directed at the 10 September parliamentary committee meeting: negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons will be extremely complicated and time-consuming and could be the best guarantee for not having them abolished. Considering the major imbalance between the number of American and Russian tactical arsenals, it would probably mean involving the conventional (im)balances and the British and French nuclear weapons. The political weight of a withdrawal decision with a view on the May 2010 NPT review is much greater than the political weight of these weapons as a dubious trump card in negotiations whose nature and objective are still unclear. 8. Within NATO a German Alleingang (go-it-alone policy) has always been considered undesirable, whether it concerned disarmament or armament. Last weekend Chancellor Merkel was quick to state that now too Alleingang is not an option. But advocates of nuclear sharing who felt reassured by this are mistaken. Minister of Foreign Affairs Westerwelle will want to implement his commitment, which was included in the coalition agreement only after much effort. In the upcoming debate within NATO he will put pressure on other NATO member states with American nuclear weapons on their territory. The sooner the Netherlands expresses its support for the German commitment, the greater the chance of success in getting other countries to follow. 9. The German decision is the first real European act of support for the new US policy. Until now, Europe has been lagging painfully behind in the new political dynamics. Neither NATO nor the EU has explicitly declared its support for President Obama s new policy towards zero. In your 14 July 2009 letter to the Dutch Parliament you regretted the divisions within the EU. The Netherlands itself has gone further than NATO and the EU and supports the new policy. This was demonstrated early on by your own speech to the Netherlands Atlantic Association of 27 March 2008, in which you supported the January 2007 appeal by Kissinger c.s. Moreover, the Netherlands is very active in the field of non-proliferation, and (among other issues) the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. But the Netherlands has 3

4 never faced up to the consequences of itself being one of the world s fourteen countries with nuclear weapons on its territory. Now for the first time a NATO member state is facing up to the consequences for itself. As this state is Germany, the key member state of NATO, there is all the more reason to follow. Your objections of 15 October are no longer tenable in the light of the German decision. The political dynamics have changed dramatically. 10.We are convinced that had the German decision been made a week earlier this would have had an enormous impact on the 15 October Dutch parliamentary debate. We were disappointed that this debate did not result in clear statements on a) the desirability of a stronger EU policy on non-proliferation, and b) a clear Dutch commitment in NATO for withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from Europe and for an end to nuclear sharing. We do, however, see that some progress has been made. Nuclear weapons are back on the political agenda; the government party PvdA has clearly expressed its wish for withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe; and we have noted more willingness on your part to address the subject of nuclear weapons in NATO than in April 2009 when you were dismissive in your reactions to questions from the SP. But thanks to the new German policy, more political scope has now been created in the international arena. On the basis of the arguments outlined above, IKV Pax Christi would ask you to reconsider your 15 October standpoint and give your support to the new German policy. We would be pleased to discuss this with you in person. In the coming days we will contact your secretariat to discuss the possibility of a meeting. If we cannot meet we would be most grateful to receive your written response to the issues outlined above. Yours sincerely, Jan Gruiters Director Abbreviations and acronyms political parties: German political parties: CDU: Christian Democratic Union CSU: Christian Social Union FDP: Free Democratic Party (liberals) SPD: Social Democratic Party Germany Dutch political parties: CDA: Christian Democratic Appeal CU: Christian Union PvdA: Labour Party (social democrats) 4

5 VVD: People s Party for Freedom and Democracy (liberals) 5