Kierkegaard in Lisbon

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3 Kierkegaard in Lisbon

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5 Coordenação José Miranda Justo Elisabete M. de Sousa Kierkegaard in Lisbon Contemporary Readings of Repetition, Fear and Trembling, Philosophical Fragments and the 1843 and 1844 Upbuilding Discourses Centro de filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa 2012

6 Ficha Técnica Título: Kierkegaard in Lisbon Contemporary Readings of Repetition, Fear and Trembling, Philosophical Fragments and the 1843 and 1844 Upbuilding Discourses Autores: José Miranda Justo e Elisabete M. de Sousa Colecção: Acta 17 EDITOR: Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa e Autores, Este livro ou partes dele não poderão ser reproduzidos sob qualquer forma, mesmo electrónica, sem explícita autorização do Editor e dos Autores. FOTOGRAFIA DA CAPA: Manel Justo fotopercepcao.photoswarm.com Revisão de texto: Sara E. Eckerson Glossário: Fernando M. Ferreira da Silva Apoio: Impressão e acabamento: SerSilito-Empresa Gráfica, Lda. Depósito Legal n.º /12 ISBN

7 TABLE OF CONTENTS Contributors Abbreviations Introduction Laura Llevadot At a Graveside: Ethics and Ontology Darío Gonzaléz Patience as the Temporality of Inner Life in Kierkegaard s Upbuilding Discourses Maria Leonor Xavier The Believer s Faith and the Philosopher s Distrust José Miranda Justo From a Differentiation in Times to the Earnestness of Existence. Some Elements of the Three Upbuilding Discourses of 1843 Useful for an Understanding of the Category of Repetition Elisabete M. de Sousa Speaking in Human Terms Carlos João Correia Book Launch of the Portuguese Translations of Repetition and Fear and Trembling Arne Grøn Time, Courage, Selfhood: Reflections on Kierkegaard s Discourse To Preserve One s Soul in Patience Claudia Welz Human Perfection: Overcoming Oneself. A Discussion of Kierkegaard s Four Upbuilding Discourses (1844) with reference to Luther, Heidegger, and Simone Weil. 97 Richard Purkarthofer Being Present to Oneself: Some Remarks on the Role of Optical and Acoustic Imagery in Kierkegaard s Upbuilding Discourses José Miranda Justo Time Determinations in Kierkegaard s Philosophical Fragments Elisabete M. de Sousa Poets as Disciples and as Followers at Second Hand M. Jamie Ferreira Philosophical Fragments in Perspective Marcia Morgan Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, and Critical Theory Maria Luísa Ribeiro Ferreira The via perardua Salvation in Spinoza and Kierkegaard Abstracts in Portuguese /Resumos em Português Index

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9 Contributors Carlos João Correia (PhD, Univ. Lisbon, 1993) is Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Lisbon, where he lectures since He currently coordinates the research line in Aesthetics and Philosophy of Religion in the Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon. He published Ricoeur e a Expressão Simbólica do Sentido, 1999 (Ricoeur and the Symbolic Expression of the Sense), Mitos e Narrativas. Ensaios sobre a Experiência do Mal, 2003 (Myths and Narratives. Essays on the Experience of Evil) and A Religião e o Sentido da Vida: Paradigmas Culturais, 2011 (Religion and the Meaning of Life: Cultural Paradigms); he has co -edited several thematic volumes of essays, the most recent being A Religião e o Ateísmo Contemporâneo, 2009 (Religion and Contemporary Atheism). He is also a member of the Society of Environmental Ethics and the Pali Text Society (Lancaster). M. Jamie Ferreira (PhD, Princeton, 1977) is Carolyn M. Barbour Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Virginia, USA. She has been the recipient of many academic distinctions and grants. Her bibliography is extremely vast, covering a wide range of works in the Kierkegaardian authorship, with a focus on its implication on Religious Studies and for the understanding of correlated authors. She has lectured on the main Kierkegaard conferences over the past three decades and has also been a regular presence on the editorial boards of major publications in Philosophy and Religious Studies. Among her most recent books, Kierkegaard: An Introduction (2008), and Love s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard s Works of Love (2001) stand as landmarks. Maria Luísa Ribeiro Ferreira (PhD, Univ. Lisbon, 1994) is Chair Professor in the Philosophy Department of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Lisbon, where she lectures since She is a member of the Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon (CFUL), has been responsible for several projects, and currently coordinates the research line in Contemporary and Modern Philosophy in CFUL. Four books were published under the project Philosophy in the Feminine (As Teias que as Mulheres Tecem The webs that women weave, 2003; Pensar no Feminino Thinking in the Feminine, 2001; Também há Mulheres Filósofas There are also Women Philosophers, 2001; O que os filósofos pensam sobre as mulheres What Philosohers Think about Women, 1998). On Spinoza and Modern Philosophy, she is the author of Diálogo e Controvérsia na Modernidade Pré crítica, 2005 (Dialogue and Controversy in Pre critical Philosophy); Uma Suprema Alegria, 2003 (A Supreme Joy); Razão e Paixão, 2002 (Reason and Passion); A Dinâmica da Razão na Filosofia de Espinosa, 1997 (The Dynamics of Reason in Spinoza s Philosophy). She is also a member of Sociedade Científica da Universidade Católica; of the working group Benedictus de Spinoza, at the Universidade Estadual do Ceará, Brazil; of Seminário Spinoza, Spain; and of the Association des Amis de Spinoza, France. Kierkegaard in Lisbon, Lisboa, CFUL, 2012, pp. 9-11

10 10 Biographical Notes Darío David Gonzalez (PhD, Univ. Copenhagen, Denmark, 1997) is resident researcher at the Søren Kierkegaard Research Center in Copenhagen, and lectures at the Univ. of Copenhagen. His present research areas include readings of Kierkegaard not only from an aesthetical, but also from a philosophical and/or linguistic perspective (the art of writing, ethics and religion). He has published many articles, edited books and seminars and authored a work on Kierkegaard (Essai sur l ontologie kierkegaardienne. Idéalité et détermination, 1998), and has lectured on many occasions on the Danish philosopher and his implications on not only modern but also contemporary thinkers. He belongs to the Spanish translation team of the works of Kierkegaard, published by Editorial Trotta, and has translated the second part of Either Or and the Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses. Arne Grøn (PhD, Univ. Copenhagen, 1997) is Professor of Ethics and Philosophy of Religion at the University of Copenhagen, as well as co -founder of and professor at the Center for Subjectivity Research. His main areas of research and publications are within the Theory of Subjectivity, Ethics, Philosophy of Religion and Kierkegaard. Among other projects, he is currently working on the hermeneutics of the philosophy of religion (reformulating criticisms of religion and reinterpreting the notion of transcendence) and on a hermeneutical theory of subjectivity and selfhood (clarification of the notion of subjectivity as self -relation; subjectivity, interiority and exteriority (in particular in Kierkegaard and Levinas) and the relation of (self)understanding and the situated character of selfhood. He has countless publications, among articles in periodicals and in books, including The Concept of Anxiety in Søren Kierkegaard, 1994, José Miranda Justo (PhD, Univ. Lisbon, 1990) is Associate Professor in the German Studies Department at the Humanities Faculty of the University of Lisbon. With a PhD on the history of the philosophy of language in the second half of the 18th century (mostly Herder and Hamann), he has studied the close links between the Philosophy of Language, the Theory of Knowledge, Hermeneutics, and Esthetics, as demonstrated in a sequence of articles and communications mainly after 1990, and in various cross disciplinary seminars on the specificity of philosophical language, on Esthetics and Philosophy of Art, on the History of Hermeneutics and on the Theory of Translation. He is a member of the Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon since 1995, has been main researcher in various projects, and is currently the coordinator of the translation team for the works of Kierkegaard. He is the author of Ergon ou Energeia. Filosofia da Linguagem na Alemanha nos Sécs. XVIII e XIX, 1986 (Ergon or Energeia, Philosophy of Language in Germany in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries), and has co -edited several thematic volumes of essays. He has translated German philosophy texts from the 18th and 19th centuries (Hamann, Herder, W. v. Humboldt, Goethe, Novalis, Nietzsche, Marx), as well as German literature (Lenz, Kleist, Rilke, Kafka, among others). He has translated In Vino Veritas (2005) and Repetition (2009) by Kierkegaard. Marcia Morgan (PhD, New School for Social Research, New York, 2003) is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy in Muhlenberg College, Pennsylvania, USA. Her PhD dissertation, entitled The Aesthetic Religious Nexus in Theodor W. Adorno s Interpretation of the Works of Søren Kierkegaard, was published in Her research areas include Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art, Kierkegaard and Existentialism, the Frankfurt School and Critical Theory, and German Idealism (focus on Kant and Hegel). Two books are expected soon, joining several articles already published on these domains. Marcia Morgan is also an active translator of philosophy works, and has regularly lectured on invitation in the USA and Europe. Laura Llevadot Pascual (PhD, Univ. Barcelona, 2006) is lecturer in the Department of History of Philosophy, Esthetics and Philosophy of Culture at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Barcelona. She has researched the category of repetition in Kierkegaard, and her present research areas include contemporary readings of Kierkegaard (ethics, religion and historicity), mainly

11 Biographical Notes 11 Adorno, Derrida and Levinas; and also the philosophy and poetry of Maria Zambrano, concerning the recuperation of difference as criticism to rationalism. She has published many articles, edited books and authored a work on Kierkegaard, and has lectured on many occasions on the Danish philosopher and his implications to modern thinkers. Richard Purkarthofer (PhD, Univ. Vienna, Austria, 2000) has lectured at different universities in Germany and is now Assistant Professor at the University of Wuppertal. He was a member of the team for the publication and commentaries on the works of Kierkegaard (Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter edition) in at the Søren Kierkegaard Research Center in Copenhagen. He was guest scholar at the Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon between January and March He was 2010 Kierkegaard House Foundation Fellow at the Hong Kierkegaard Library (St. Olaf College, Northfield, MN, USA). He belonged to the initial ( ) editorial board of the new German translation of the Works of Kierkegaard (Deutsche Søren Kierkegaard Edition), of Kierkegaardiana and of the series Texts from Golden Age Denmark (main editor, Jon Stewart). He is the author of Kierkegaard (Leipzig, Reclam, 2005) and has published a string of articles on this philosopher, ranging from philological issues and their implications on philosophical thought, to editorial issues and the aftermath of Kierkegaard s editions. Elisabete M. de Sousa (PhD, Univ. Lisbon, 2006) is main researcher at the Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon since Her PhD dissertation in Literary Theory was published in 2008 (A Prática Crítica de Berlioz, Kierkegaard, Liszt e Schumann The Practical Criticism of B., K., L. and S.); in the case of Kierkegaard, the work highlights the philosopher s knowledge of music, the role music plays in some aspects of his thought, and his direct acquaintance with the musical criticism of Berlioz and Schumann, and the performative nature of Liszt as virtuoso. She has published several articles and lectured on these topics in Portugal and abroad, and also on the relations between music and literature, as well as on Kierkegaard s reception of the thought of Friedrich Schiller. She is a member of the translation team for the works of Kierkegaard; she has translated Fear and Trembling and is currently working on the translation of Either/Or. Claudia Welz (PhD, Univ. Zürich, 2007) is now Associate Professor at the Faculty of Theology, University of Copenhagen, where she teaches Ethics and Philosophy of Religion, and a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Danish National Research Foundation s Center for Subjectivity Research. She studied Theology and Philosophy in Tübingen, Jerusalem, Munich and Heidelberg. As a PhD student, she was affiliated with the Institute for Hermeneutics and Philosophy of Religion at the University of Zurich. She has received the John Templeton Award for Theological Promise for her dissertation Love s Transcendence and the Problem of Theodicy, Further, she is the author of Vertrauen und Versuchung, 2010 (Belief and Temptation) and the editor of Despite Oneself: Subjectivity and its Secret in Kierkegaard and Levinas, 2008, and co -editor of Trust, Sociality, Selfhood, Maria Leonor L. O. Xavier (PhD, Univ. Lisbon, 1994) is Associate Professor at the Philosophy Department of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Lisbon, where she lectures mainly in the area of Medieval Philosophy. She is also a member of the International Society for the Study of Medieval Philosophy (SIEPM), of the Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon (CFUL), where she has coordinated several projects, and of the Portuguese Society of Medieval Philosophy (SPFM). She is the author of three books on Medieval Philosophy, and translated Petrus Hispanus and Tomás Galo into Portuguese. She has recently edited two volumes of essays, A Questão de Deus (The Question of God), 2010 and 2011, the result of a major project under her coordination at CFUL.

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13 Abbreviations of Søren Kierkegaard s works used in the volume BA CA CI CD CUP1 The Book on Adler, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, The Concept of Anxiety, ed. and trans. by Reidar Thomte, Princeton: Princeton University Press, The Concept of Irony, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, Christian Discourses, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, CUP2 Concluding Unscientific Postscript, vol. 2, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, DIO DVS EO1 EO2 Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, Either/Or I, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, Either/Or II, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, EUD Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, FT/ R Fear and Trembling. Repetition, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, JP Søren Kierkegaard s Journals and Papers, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, vol. 1-6, Bloomington/London: Indiana University Press, KJN Kierkegaard s Journals and Notebooks, Vol. 2, Journals ee -KK, ed. By M. J. Cappelørn, A. Hannay, D. Kangas, B. H. Kirmmse, V. Rumble, K. Brian Söderquist and G. Pattison (vol. editor), Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, Kierkegaard in Lisbon, Lisboa, CFUL, 2012, pp

14 14 Abbreviations of Søren Kierkegaard s works used in the volume M The Moment and Late Writings, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, Pap. Søren Kierkegaards Papirer, vol. i -xi, 3 ed. by P.A. Heiberg, V. Kuhr and E. Torsting, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag ; 2nd. edition, ed. by N. Thulstrup, vol. xii -xiii supplements by N. Thulstrup, vol. xiv- XVI. Index by N.J. Cappelørn, Gyldendal: Copenhagen, PC PF PV Practice in Christianity, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, Philosophical Fragments, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, The Point of View, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, SKS Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, ed. Søren Kierkegaards Forskningscenteret, vols. 1-55, Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, SLW SUD SV1 WA WL Stages on Life s Way, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, The Sickness unto Death. A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, Samlede Værker, ed. by A.B. Drachmann, J.L. Heiberg, and H.O. Lange, vol. i -xiv, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag, Without Authority (including The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air, Two Ethical Religious Essays, Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, An Upbuilding Discourse, Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays), ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, Works of Love, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

15 Introduction Kierkegaard in Lisbon reunites a number of essays mainly focused on the contemporary reception of Kierkegaard in philosophical, literary and anthropological studies, and on the discussion of the implications of Kierkegaard s approach to categories like time, the self, the human, faith, governance, particularly in the author s first period of production; special emphasis is given to Fear and Trembling, Repetition, Philosophical Fragments, the Upbuilding Discourses, and At the Graveside. As a whole, this collection of essays, written by scholars coming from varied academic backgrounds, all of them with solid previous research on the author, addresses and challenges the existing literature in several areas of study and research on the Danish philosopher, by making use of differentiated, but complementary, modalities of reflection. Kierkegaard in Lisbon is the end result of a number of events along 2010 and 2011 which saw the first presentation of these essays, namely, conferences and seminars held by the Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon, CFUL) and hosted by the Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, and coordinated by the editors of the present volume, José Miranda Justo and Elisabete M. de Sousa, who are members of the Portuguese translation team for the works of Kierkegaard (with Susana Janic). These conferences and seminars have become a regular feature of the research and translation work developed at CFUL, and supported by the Portuguese Foudation for Science and Technology (Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia, FCT); the events are intended to develop and consolidate the holistic approach that is the actual guiding thread of different tasks involved in the translation of Kierkegaard. In fact, three orders of complex categories conflate in the author s oeuvre the esthetic, the ethic and the religious; in the present approach, not only is their coexistence accepted, but it is also taken as the illuminating and aggregating element. Accordingly, translation and research have been carried out in close connection and conceived as reflection in progress, and the choice of the topics and the works chosen for the essays naturally correspond to the volumes under translation and/or recently published. Laura Llevadot Pascual, Maria Leonor Xavier, José Miranda Justo, Elisabete M. de Sousa and Darío Gonzalez were the speakers at the conference on April, 30 th 2010, which also saw the book launch of the translations of Repetition and Fear and Kierkegaard in Lisbon, Lisboa, CFUL, 2012, pp

16 16 Introduction Trembling, respectively, A Repetição and Temor e Tremor; included in this volume is Carlos João Correia s presentation of the two volumes. Arne Grøn and Claudia Welz were in Lisbon on October, 22 nd 2010; and M. Jamie Ferreira, Marcia Morgan, Elisabete M. de Sousa and José Miranda Justo delivered papers on May, 5 th Richard Purkarthofer was resident invited scholar at CFUL during the first three months of 2011, and his essay condenses a substancial part of the seminars he held in Lisbon; Maria Luísa Ribeiro Ferreira s contribution also dates from this period. The 2010 conferences were mainly focused on the treatment of issues rising from the reading of the Upbuilding Discourses. In At a Graveside: ethics and ontology, Laura Llevadot examines the connection between the ethical and the ontological, the edifying and the philosophical, as patent in Martin Heidegger s appropriation of Kierkegaard, in an attempt to clarify the role of the edifying in the thought of the German philosopher. In Patience as the Temporality of Inner Life in Kierkegaard s Upbuilding Discourses, Darío Gonzaléz, based on Kierkegaard s use of patience and expectation within the complex relation of the self with both temporality and eternity, explores the thematic and structural connections between this characterization of the soul and the theory of temporality exposed in The Concept of Anxiety. Providence is the main topic of Maria Leonor Xavier s essay, entitled The believer`s faith and the philosopher`s distrust, whose aim is to discern a personal approach to the question of harmony or disharmony between a philosophically admissible idea of God and the belief in a provident God. In his first essay ( From a differentiation in times to the earnestness of existence. Some elements of the Three Upbuilding Discourses of 1843 useful for an understanding of the category of repetition ), José Miranda Justo contrasts a quick, brief time identified with rashness and hastiness, and with the work of strict understanding with the protracted, distended time of love and of slow understanding, so as to present the constitution of meaning capable of accounting for the connection between the slow time of repetition and the concept of meaning (or sense). In Speaking in Human Terms, Elisabete M. de Sousa presents Harold Bloom s considerations on the question of genius, as well as the implications of Bloom s remark on the determinant role of the negation of seeming realities for the interpretations of the Danish philosopher s text. The brief communication by Carlos João Correia contains a number of considerations regarding the merit of the work developed by the translation team and the expected impact of these translations. The 2010 October Conference featured Time, Courage, Selfhood: Reflections on Kierkegaard s Discourse To Preserve One s Soul in Patience, by Arne Grøn, who developed the idea that an edifying discourse can be philosophically stimulating, by means of exploring the topic of subjectivity present in both dimensions of Kierkegaard s work, namely its implication in edification. And also, Human Perfection: Overcoming Oneself. A Discussion of Kierkegaard s Four Upbuilding Discourses (1844) with reference to Luther, Heidegger, and Simone Weil by Claudia Welz, who discussed the normativity of human selfhood, especially on one common motif: human perfection versus self -deception. The second year of the project produced a set of six presentations and the ensuing articles. In Time Determinations in Kierkegaard s Philosophical Fragments, José

17 Introduction 17 Miranda Justo continues the discussion of the previous distinction established between a slow, protracted time and a quick time, taking now into account the category of paradox, in its original context, and as the determining factor in the category of instant. Elisabete M. de Sousa demonstrated Harold Bloom s understanding of Philosophical Fragments, giving special emphasis to his debt to the thought of the Danish philosopher in what concerns the fundaments of his theory of the anxiety of influence. In Philosophical Fragments in Perspective, M. Jamie Ferreira considers four perspectives in transcendent revealed religion in Philosophical Fragments: revelation as Love, revelation as Truth, revelation as Leap/Passion/Gift, and revelation in relation to Socratic subjectivity. Marcia Morgan s essay, Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, and Critical Theory, takes Kierkegaard s conception of the subject as one of the most viable models of socio -political activism in the twenty -first century (mainly Martin Matuštík), hence proving just how relevant Kierkegaard is to a critical theory of society today. In The via perardua Salvation in Spinoza and Kierkegaard, Maria Luísa Ribeiro Ferreira confronts the two philosophers, analyzing the dynamics of passion in the itinerary of salvation; she gives special attention to Kierkegaard s mentions of Spinoza s philosophy, especially in Philosophical Fragments. As for Richard Purkarthofer, in Being Present to Oneself: Some Remarks on the Role of Optical and Acoustic Imagery in Kierkegaard s Upbuilding Discourses, he discusses the implications of this type of imagery for an accurate interpretation of the philosophical and anthropological content of the discourses, in what regards Kierkegaard s thought on the constitution of the human self. A final word to express our thanks to all the authors for their contributions and support, to Professor Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos, at the time Director of the Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon, for all his interest and supportive help, and to Professor António M. Feijó, the dean of the Faculty, for hosting the project and the events.

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19 At a Graveside: Ethics and Ontology* Laura Llevadot University of Barcelona The title of this paper refers to the relations between Kierkegaard and Heidegger on the question of death, specifically the question of one s own death. It has already been pointed out 1 that many aspects of the existential analysis of death that Heidegger sets out at the beginning of the second section of Being and Time appear to be based on the meditation on death developed by Kierkegaard in his occasional discourse At a Graveside. The fact that in a footnote just before the start of this section Heidegger says, in reference to Kierkegaard, that there is more to be learned philosophically from his edifying writings than from his theoretical ones 2 seems to point directly to this text, in which unlike others such as Works of Love Kierkegaard does not take into account the death of the Other, i.e. the relationship of the survivor with the deceased, but, like Heidegger in Being and Time, insists on the need to think one s own death. Given that the similarities between the two texts are not limited to expressing the need to think one s own death but reach the point where Kierkegaard s words echo through Heidegger s text, in some cases even literally, Kierkegaard s influence on the early Heidegger at least if we are allowed to maintain this distinction has frequently been examined. For example, the relations between Kierkegaard and Heidegger can be analyzed from an interpretative position which Heidegger himself favors, as we will see, according to which Heidegger secularizes Kierkegaard s thoughts on religion, this meaning that, from a certain perspective, Heidegger would be credited with raising to the level of philosophical thought what in Kierkegaard still has elements of religious or edifying thought. As far as the texts we are dealing with here are concerned, it has been said that Heidegger secularizes the Kierkegaardian dying to immediacy through his conception of Dasein as being -for -death. 3 It could * This paper has been made possible by the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation. Research Project: El horizonte de lo común. Entre una subjetividad no personal y una comunidad no identitaria, FFI (FISO). 1 See Michael Theunissen, The Upbuilding in the Thought of Death: Traditional Elements, Innovative Ideas, an Unexhausted Possibilities in Kierkegaard s At a Graveside, in International Kierkegaard Commentary, 9 & 10, edited by Robert Perkins, Mercer: Mercer University Press, 2006, pp See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, Oxford: Blackwell, 1962, p. 494; henceforth referred to as BT. 3 See Hubert L. Dreyfus and Jane Rubin, Appendix: Kierkegaard, Division II and Late Heidegger, in Dreyfus, Hubert L., Being in the world: A commentary on Heidegger s Being and Time, Division 1. Cambridge, Mass: MIT, 1991, p Kierkegaard in Lisbon, Lisboa, CFUL, 2012, pp

20 20 Laura Llevadot be deduced from this that Heidegger makes Kierkegaard acceptable to the 20 th century, that his existential analysis purges all the stiffness from the religious dogma that survives in Kierkegaard s text. However, it is also possible to understand it as meaning the opposite, by reading Kierkegaard against Heidegger and then saying that by ontologizing Kierkegaard s existential categories, Heidegger depletes the latter s thought of its ethical import, central to the focus on personal edification. 4 This second reading would solve the problem of the relations between Kierkegaard and Heidegger by defending the edifying, the ethical, as opposed to a constantly abstract ontology that Kierkegaard would have denounced out of hand. Although as Kierkegaard scholars we would be tempted to subscribe to the second interpretation, it would nevertheless be worth our while to spend time on analyzing this connection between the ethical and the ontological, the edifying and the philosophical, which Heidegger s appropriation of Kierkegaard has brought about. In his existential analysis of death, Heidegger himself points out what differentiates his ideas from any edifying meditation: Nor is anything decided ontically about the other -worldly and its possibility, any more than about the this -worldly ; it is not as if norms and rules for comporting oneself towards death were to be proposed for edification. But our analysis of death remains purely this -worldly in so far as it interprets that phenomenon merely in the way in which it enters into any particular Dasein as a possibility of its Being. (BT 292) For the second time within a few pages Heidegger refers to the edifying. The first time he does this is to say that it is in Kierkegaard s edifying discourses that the philosophical should be sought, while the second is to distinguish his phenomenological analysis of death from any discourse for edification. Without yet entering into the distinction between the edifying and the discourse for edification that Kierkegaard will establish, it is clear that Heidegger places the edifying on the side of the ontic like all Kierkegaardian thought in order to legitimize his analysis as strictly ontological. The aim of this paper is to reconsider this relationship between the edifying and the ontological based on a parallel rereading of the two texts. This is not so as to defend Kierkegaard against Heidegger or vice versa, but rather an attempt to clarify what the role of the edifying in post -metaphysical thought might be, assuming it still has a place there. To achieve this aim I will first carry out a brief analysis of the similarities in subject and approach that can be found in the occasional discourse At a Graveside and the first chapter of the second section of Being and Time, Dasein s Possibility of Being -a -whole, and Being -towards -death. We will then need to obtain a definition of the edifying to enable us to understand the difference between Kierkegaard and Heidegger as regards their meditation on death. Finally it will be shown that the difference between the ontological in Heidegger and the edifying in Kierkegaard 4 See Patricia J. Huntington, Heidegger s Reading of Kierkegaard Revisited. From Ontological Abstraction to Ethical Concretion, in Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, edited by Martin J. Matuštík and Merold Westphal, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995, p.44.

21 At a Graveside: Ethics and Ontology 21 does not lie in the fact that the former is devoid of any ethical consideration but in its position with regard to knowledge. 1. Echoes A parallel reading of the occasional discourse At a Graveside and the existential analysis of death in the second section of Being and Time enables us to appreciate a clear difference in tone, in discursive form, but also a similarity in subject and approach that cannot be ignored. It is not simply that some themes are repeated but that Heidegger appears to draw direct inspiration from Kierkegaard s text to approach the problem of death in the same way, i.e. the need to think it, to think it as one s own death, rejecting both the everyday way and the abstract way of confronting death, and even in defining it as indeterminable. Let us look one by one at these aspects which are repeated almost literally: 1.1. Thinking death Both texts coincide in pointing out the need to think death, along with the priority of this thought over any conception of life. Heidegger explicitly states that the existential interpretation of death takes precedence over any biology and ontology of life; (BT 291) the ontology of Dasein is superordinate to an ontology of life, and here Heidegger stresses the term superordinate. The question of death therefore needs to be explained before life can be defined one way or another. Any ontology of life is set on an unquestioned pre -conception of death that existential analysis sets out to clarify as a preliminary step towards any thematization of the life of Dasein. The ethical side of this methodological priority is also revealed when Heidegger acknowledges that what guides the analysis is a possible authenticity of its existence, (BT 311) and that this, in turn, lies in the possibility of authentic Being -towards- death (BT 304) as an existentive possibility of Dasein. We also find the thought of death taking priority over the thought of life in Kierkegaard s text: Life s earnestness is earnest, and yet there is no earnestness unless the external is ennobled in one s consciousness; in this lies the possibility of illusion. The earnestness of death is without deception, because it is not death that is earnest but the thought of death. (DIO 74-75) This distinction between the earnestness of life and the earnestness of death that Kierkegaard establishes, according to how they relate to the external and the internal, serves to prioritize the thought of death over the thought of life. Although, through awareness, the external may be uplifted the tasks of life, for instance and we may try to internalize our mode of life, self -deception is always possible and there is always a chance that the occupations themselves may be confused with the earnestness of the inner being. The thought of death, on the other hand, teaches what is earnest: to be precise, it teaches what is earnest in life. It is the thought of death that gives earnestness to life in the first place, transforming it by virtue of its retroactive power. (DIO 98) In this sense

22 22 Laura Llevadot thinking death is superordinate to thinking life not as a methodological precaution but as an ethical requirement. One can only learn what is earnest in life by virtue of the earnestness of the thought of death, which must retroactively transform our mode of life One s own death In order for the thought of death to bring earnestness to life, in this discourse Kierkegaard believes as Heidegger does that that thought must refer to the death of oneself and not the death of the other. Unlike in the penultimate chapter of Works of Love, entitled The Work of Love in Recollecting One Who is Dead, where he establishes the relationship with the deceased as a criterion for measuring the capacity for loving one s neighbor, in At a Graveside Kierkegaard distinguishes explicitly between witnessing someone else s death and thinking about one s own: there is sheer sorrow when the dead person was one of yours; ( ) but even if it was your child, even if it was your beloved, and even if it was your one and only guide, this is still a mood; and even if you would willingly die in their place, this is also a mood, and even if you think that this is easier, this is also a mood. Earnestness is that you think death, and that you are thinking it as your lot, and that you are then doing what death is indeed unable to do namely, that you are and death also is. (DIO 75) The death of someone else, someone we have loved, fills us with sorrow and despair, but the sorrow is not earnestness, but that which prevents us from achieving it. For this reason Kierkegaard contrasts earnestness against mood in this text, because mood does not allow us to think about the death of oneself, about death as something assigned to us as individuals which, when we think of it as our own, must transform our mode of life. Mourning the deceased, the elated fancy, prevents us from reaching that earnestness which would teach us just how to control those feelings. The distinction Heidegger makes between dying [Sterben] and demise [Ableben] seems to be based on the Kierkegaardian distinction between the earnestness and the mood brought about by the death of the other, i.e. the dead person. The dying of the Others is not something which we experience in a genuine sense; at most we are always just there alongside ; (BT 282) Dying is something that every Dasein itself must take upon itself at the time. By its very essence, death is in every case mine, in so far as it is at all. (BT 284) What Heidegger will call the way in which the deceased has Dasein -with or is still -a -Dasein [Nochdaseins] (BT 260) with those who are left behind belongs to the ontic aspect of the demise. The deceased is the one who has stopped living, the dead person, with whom we have a certain type of relationship depending on our cultural roots. Research into how this relationship is lived would, according to Heidegger, fall to psycho -ethnology and in no way to fundamental ontology. On the contrary, fundamental ontology must deal with the death of the self, death as that which is assigned to Dasein as an individual.

23 At a Graveside: Ethics and Ontology Epicurean maxim In so far as it concerns thinking death of oneself, both Kierkegaard explicitly and Heidegger implicitly must reject the Epicurean maxim whereby death should not be feared given that when it is, I am not, and when I am, it is not. Kierkegaard comments that: This is the jest by which the cunning contemplator places himself on the outside. (DIO 73) If Kierkegaard had previously rejected the relationship with the deceased as the proper place to think death because the sorrow, the mood, prevented earnestness, it is now abstract thought that is accused of preventing earnestness as well, by reducing to a logical contradiction that which should actually transform the entire life. By using logic and jest, abstract thought is able to avoid the need to think one s own death, though this tactic is as futile as emotional excess, seeing that death is assigned to us equally as individuals, whether or not we want to think about it. In fact, as already pointed out, it is a question of doing exactly the opposite of what Epicurus suggests, a question of being where death also is through the earnestness implied by thinking death, and that is when: you are then doing what death is indeed unable to do namely, that you are and death also is. (DIO 75) Without referring explicitly to Epicurus, Heidegger makes the same criticism. Certainly death is the opposite of existence when I exist death does not and vice versa. However, this logic of opposites is neutralized when it is understood that death is a phenomenon of life hence the possibility of phenomenological analysis and that death belongs to Being -in -the -world. (BT 295) Heidegger can define Dasein as being -for -death precisely because he does not consider death as an event, a reality, something that happens although it may not yet have done so as Epicurus sees it but as the ownmost possibility of Dasein, a possibility that is always there, that defines it in its character of ownmost possibility, that forms part of its existence. Like Kierkegaard, Heidegger wants death to be considered by the living as the ownmost possibility assigned to them as individuals, which an abstract conception of it as a real event yet to happen would not allow Improper death From the above analysis it follows that Kierkegaard and Heidegger will aim to contrast their respective ways of thinking death against those which they both consider to use Heidegger s terminology improper ways of dying and of conceiving death. Kierkegaard is clear in this respect: To die is indeed the lot of every human being and thus is a very mediocre art, but to be able to die well is indeed the highest wisdom of life. Wherein lies the difference? In this, that in the one case the earnestness is the earnestness of death, in the other is the earnestness of the mortal being. And the discourse that makes the distinction cannot, of course, address itself to the dead but to the living. (DIO 76) There would therefore be a way of dying like everyone and an own way of dying, to die well, and the difference between the two lies in the earnestness attached to the person who dies as an individual rather than as a member

24 24 Laura Llevadot of a species which by definition is mortal. The occasional discourse At a Graveside indeed aims at making a difference between the two ways of thinking death. Hence Kierkegaard speaks of death s decision, that is, the decisive character of death for the self. Understanding death as an irrevocable decision which happens to the living takes the place of all poetic, imaginary, symbolic and abstract considerations which reduce thought on death to a mood or to learned generalities that muddle thought without involving the subject. Heidegger will in the same way aim at thinking dying beyond the improper way in which death is conceived in the everyday. Indeed, in the definition of the everyday as the impersonal sphere of the self, there are echoes of the Kierkegaardian idea of the death of the mortal. In the same way that Kierkegaard rejects thinking death generically, Heidegger aims to show how the publicity of everydayness strips death of its character of own possibility from Dasein. And it is not to be taken lightly that Heidegger should use the same example as Kierkegaard when he says: This evasive concealment in the face of death dominates everydayness so stubbornly that, in Being with one another, the neighbours often still keep talking the dying person into the belief that he will escape death and soon return to the tranquillized everydayness of the world of his concern, (BT 297) which seems to paraphrase Kierkegaard s text: the challenge of earnestness to the living is to think it, to think that all is over. This is the difficult thing, because even in the moment of death the dying person thinks that he still might have some time to live, and one is even afraid to tell him that all is over. (DIO 79) Hence both Heidegger and Kierkegaard condemn the evasive concealment of death in everydayness which prevents facing its decisive character Indeterminacy. The similarities between the two texts are not, however, limited to the way they set out the need to think death and to think it in contrast to various improper ways, as we have seen up to now. Even as regards the characterization of death as indeterminable, Heidegger again seems to cover Kierkegaardian thought point by point. What At a Graveside aims to show is the decisive, indeterminable, inexplicable character of death. Heidegger in turn characterizes dying as the ownmost possibility, non -relational, not to be outstripped, certain and indefinite. The ownness and irrespectiveness of death refers to what Kierkegaard was pointing to when he insisted on thinking oneself dead rather than thinking about the death of another. The insuperability is a reworking of what Kierkegaard understands by the decisive character of death, although Heidegger will link it to co -being with others. But the certainty and indeterminacy by which Heidegger characterizes dying directly duplicates Kierkegaard s reflection on the indeterminable, certain character of death. Kierkegaard states in his discourse that: The certainty of death determines the learner once and for all in earnestness, but the uncertainty of death is the daily or at least the frequent or necessary surveillance that watches over the earnestness only this is earnestness. (DIO 95) The certainty of death refers to the fact that the living can be absolutely sure that death will arrive. There is nothing more certain for the living. Regardless

25 At a Graveside: Ethics and Ontology 25 of whether this living thing is a productive tree or a barren one, it will surely die, (DIO 93) and that is why death is indifferent to the particular characteristics of the living. At the same time, however, it is absolutely uncertain when this will happen; often when least expected, when one is on the point of finding a solution, then death comes. When one seeks it, on the other hand, when one is tired of living, then one has to wait for death. This dual character is what makes it indeterminable: So death is indefinable [ubestemmelig] the only certainty, and the only thing about which nothing is certain. (DIO 91) Heidegger includes this idea when he defines the certainty as holding death for true (BT 309) on the part of Dasein, which will enable him to define Dasein as being -for -death. He also repeats Kierkegaard by characterizing the ownmost possibility of Dasein as indefinite, (BT 284) understanding by this that the when in which the utter impossibility of existence becomes possible remains constantly indefinite. (BT ) It is precisely this indeterminacy that will allow Heidegger to establish anguish as the affective disposition that reveals to Dasein its inclination towards death, and therefore its originary ontological condition that the fear of death hides. We can therefore see that the similarities in subject and approach between the two texts enable the Kierkegaardian influence of At a Graveside on these pages of Being and Time to be established fairly conclusively. However, our interest here is not so much to establish this influence historiographically, but rather to see what exactly there is that makes both texts radically different. Heidegger s note on Kierkegaard s edifying discourses just before he begins his analysis of death, along with his explicit rejection of the edifying at the core of the analysis, appear to indicate that what separates him from Kierkegaard is precisely this appeal to edification. Heideggerian meditation would, on the contrary, show an explicit desire to carry out a phenomenological analysis to enable Dasein to be analyzed without holding up to Dasein an ideal of existence with any special content or forcing any such ideal upon it from outside. (BT 311) However, it is not certain that Heidegger locates the edifying in the same place as Kierkegaard, and neither is it certain that no specific ideal of existence is to be found in his analysis. It is in the debate on the edifying that we will be able to see the distance separating the two texts beyond their indisputable internal resonance. 2. The edifying Despite what Heidegger says, the difference between At a Graveside and the first chapter of the second section of Being and Time cannot lie in the secular, apparently neutral, character of the latter. When Heidegger says that his existential analysis of death is to be found in the here and now and that it is not a question of proposing norms for behaviour in the face of death, he is thereby aiming to make a distinction between his own analysis and edifying discourse, understanding that the latter does propose rules and norms for behavior in the face of death and thematize the beyond and its possibility. But Heidegger has read Kierkegaard and knows very

26 26 Laura Llevadot well that At a Graveside, although it may be considered an edifying discourse as he himself seems to agree, does not propose rules for behavior in the face of death and neither does it thematize the beyond. If the edifying is understood to be a normative, prescriptive discourse laden with religious assumptions, then it must be recognized that At a Graveside is not of the sort. Perhaps what is happening here is not that Heidegger has misunderstood the sense of the edifying in Kierkegaard, but that his prime concern is to distance himself from Kierkegaardian discourse so as to be able to say that his own discourse is without proposals, a strictly phenomenological analysis in which Kierkegaardian reflection is purged of all theological contamination. Hence Heidegger will state that: Methodologically, the existential analysis is superordinate to the questions of a biology, psychology, theodicy, or theology of death. (BT 292) This methodological priority of the ontological over the ontic (which will include the edifying, the theological and Christian anthropology) is woven throughout the text. Thus the idea that the analysis of death in Being and Time carries out a secularization of Kierkegaard s discourse may actually originate from Heidegger himself, who would take the credit for rising to the level of ontological meditation what would otherwise remain in the realm of merely ontic investigation. Nevertheless, the difference between the two texts cannot lie here firstly because it is not certain that the existential analysis is not laden with religious assumptions, as Derrida has tried to show, 5 but above all because what Heidegger scornfully calls the edifying in no way coincides with Kierkegaard s conception of it, especially since Kierkegaard is very careful to distinguish between what Heidegger tries to match: the edifying and the religious. Let us first look at what Kierkegaard understands by edifying to enable us then to decide whether or not At a Graveside can be considered an edifying discourse. Only on the basis of this analysis will we be able to find a criterion for distinguishing between the two texts that will not depend on the simplicity of the Heideggerian differentiation between the ontological and the ontically edifying In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript it can be read that: Not every upbuilding truth is Christian; the upbuilding is a wider category. (CUP 256) Kierkegaard therefore distinguishes between the Christian and the edifying. Christian discourse would only be a case of edification. In fact what Climacus is concerned to do in this text is to point out that the three edifying discourses of 1848 are thus called in order to distinguish them from sermons, i.e. those discourses given by the authority of a parish pastor that would stress religious categories. However, Climacus states that these discourses use only ethical categories of immanence, not the doubly reflected religious categories in the paradox. (CUP 256) Christian discourse therefore deals with Christian categories such as incarnation, paradox, sin, etc., and it is an indirect discourse inasmuch it uses double reflection. The edifying discourse, Kierkegaard 5 Derrida, Jacques, Aporias. Dying. Awaiting (one another at) the Limits of Truth, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993, pp. 58ff.

27 At a Graveside: Ethics and Ontology 27 tells us, at least in the case referred to, uses ethical categories. Therefore, following the indications in Lectures on Communication, it must also be an indirect discourse. Thus what distinguishes both types of discourse is not the type of communication in both cases this must be indirect as it is directed towards the inner being but the type of categories that the text in question a spoken text directed to a listener, as the name of the discourse indicates brings into play. This link between the edifying and the ethical will be pointed out again by Anti -climacus in The Sickness unto Death. The preface notes the dual scientific and upbuilding character of the text, which is for edification, and in the course of this reflection on the basis of the book it is stated that: It is precisely Christianity s relation to life (in contrast to a scholarly distance from life) or the ethical aspect of Christianity that is the upbuilding. (SUD 5) In both cases, in other words, in both the edifying discourse and the text for edification as is the case of The Sickness unto Death, which assumes Christian categories the edifying is related to the ethical. The edifying, according to Anti -climacus, behaves in the way a physician speaks at the sickbed. They are therefore words that do not cure directly but bring comfort, words directed to the person who needs them, vitally linked to what the listener needs to hear. But what exactly is the ethical that characterizes the edifying? Is it the first ethic suspended in Fear and Trembling or the second ethic expressed in Works of Love? The concept of edification is extensive, as Climacus says. It characterizes those discourses and texts which in their ethical vocation are aimed at the individual infinitely interested in his own actuality, (CUP 324) whether or not Christian in the usual sense. If the edifying is put up in clear opposition to something, that something is the scientific, the objective investigation seeking knowledge. Thus Anti -climacus will say: All Christian knowing, however rigorous its form, ought to be concerned, but this concern is precisely the upbuilding. Concern constitutes the relation to life, to the actuality of the personality, and therefore earnestness from the Christian point of view; the loftiness of indifferent knowledge is, from the Christian point of view, a long way from being more earnest Christianly, it is a witticism, an affectation. Earnestness, on the other hand, is the upbuilding. (SUD 5-6) If we now try to clarify the characterization of the edifying, whether or not Christian, we can say that it is characterized by worry, concern in relation to one s own life, the ethical link with the actuality of the person. In other words, the edifying is the earnestness defined in a way that excludes objective science just because of its supposed objectivity, which does not mix with the subjective actuality of the individual. The ethical that characterizes the edifying is therefore earnestness, i.e. the relation of the discourse with the subjective actuality of the receiver. The edifying therefore does something with this subjectivity: the edifying builds up. And here we need to look at the distinction between building up and building that Kierkegaard sets out in Works of Love. There we can read that: To build up is formed from to build and the adverb up, which consequently must receive the accent. Everyone who builds up does build, but not everyone who builds does build up. (WL 210) Building up means building something from a base, raising something upwards as indicated by the prefix op, but starting from the very foundations, digging deep.

28 28 Laura Llevadot On the other hand, one can build without building up, without digging deep, without starting from the foundations. Thus one can build an attic, another floor on top of an existing one, or castles in the air, but that is not building up. One does not build up castles in the air. This is the difference between the edifying discourse which builds up from the foundations, and the scientific discourse which builds without digging deep, without rooting itself in the subjective actuality of the individual. Therefore, what up to this point seems to distinguish the edifying from the scientific discourse concerns the ethical, earnestness and the desire to build up from the foundations. But Kierkegaard adds one last distinction that bursts forth from within all the others: love. There is no word in the language that in itself is upbuilding, and there is no word in the language that cannot be said in an upbuilding way and become upbuilding if love is present. (WL 213) In other words any discourse can be edifying i.e. ethical, involved in the life of the living, rooted in the depths of one s subjectivity as long as it is expressed with love. Even scientific discourse, which is the furthest removed and against which the concept of the edifying seemed to have been devised, is now seen in a different light: Yet knowledge and the communication of knowledge can indeed also be upbuilding, but if they are, then it is because love is present. (WL 215) One could therefore conclude that the edifying does not exist as a discourse type. There is no type of discourse, not even the so -called edifying discourses, that can encompass the concept of the edifying, which therefore transcends not only the Christian but also the type of text known as discourse So is At a Graveside an edifying discourse? In those metadiscursive places in which the text speaks with itself, it does so by using the terms unauthorized discourse, (DIO 73) godly discourse, (DIO 76) godly meditation [Betragtning] (DIO 78) or, as its title seems to indicate, occasional discourse. In fact, this discourse is not even an occasional discourse, but more like an occasional discourse which lacks an occasion: Occasional discourses, as it could be called, notwithstanding that it does not have the occasion that makes the speaker and makes him an authority or the occasion that makes the reader and makes him a learner). (DIO 5) The occasion of a funeral is what this discourse on death lacks, the funeral that would mean it was an authorized parish priest who would utter the discourse, that would turn the reader into a learner. But in this discourse, as in the other two that make up the book, it is the reader who like the bridegroom has to bring the occasion along with him. (DIO 5) What is certain is that this is not a Christian discourse. This discourse on death neither talks about the immortality of the soul, nor about the beyond, nor about any other ideas related to death which would immediately be connected with a sermon one might expect from a parish priest on the occasion of a funeral. In contrast to what Heidegger would have us believe, this discourse does not consider death from the perspective of the beyond. Instead, the imaginary funeral, the occasion of the death of the other that the reader must bring along with him, calls for meditation on death from the here and now. Like Heidegger s phenomenological analysis

29 At a Graveside: Ethics and Ontology 29 which interprets that phenomenon merely in the way in which it enters into any particular Dasein as a possibility of its Being, Kierkegaard s discourse focuses on death from the perspective of the living, who must remain alone with death and think himself and death at the same time. (DIO 73) So what exactly is edifying about this discourse? Although At a Graveside does not meditate on a preceding theme like the other discourses that include the adjective edifying in the title seem to do, it can still be seen as an edifying discourse in the sense that we have defined it so far. 6 The edifying does not necessarily have to take up the preceding theme to illustrate the assumptions of Christian religious language as Vergote sustains. 7 As we have seen, the edifying is characterized by earnestness, a desire to build up from the foundations and love. The fact that At a Graveside makes constant appeals to the earnest indicates that it is a discourse directed towards the receiver s inner being and, as stated in the preface, aimed at appropriation. (DIO 5) In fact the earnestness and the building up from the foundations are woven together in this text through the indirect way in which they are expressed. Among so much text of indirect communication, among so much discourse without authority, At a Graveside never says anything doctrinal Heidegger would say ontic about death precisely because that would be to betray the earnestness aimed at. When Kierkegaard analyses death as decisive, indeterminable and inexplicable, he does not do it in a positive way. Instead, for each of these determinations, he first puts forward the most common image of death as entirely plausible, then, once the reader is convinced by the explanation, the image is reversed in order to show that the earnestness of death is not actually captured faithfully by that image, and finally the reader is turned in towards himself, left alone with his meditation, so that it will be he himself who creates the sense that the text in any case cannot give. Thus, at the end of the text it is said that the discourse will refrain from any explanation (DIO 100) and explicitly avoid any production of knowledge: My listener, it perhaps seems to you that you learn very little from this discourse, you perhaps know much more yourself, and yet it may not have been futile if the conception of death s decision has been the occasion to remind you that knowing a great deal is not unconditional good. (DIO 101) Hence, when Kierkegaard for example gives death the characterization of indeterminable due to the equality it achieves in erasing all the differences of life, he again in fact takes up an image that has also been used in poetry, equality as the eradication of differences, as death comes for everyone equally the rich and the poor, the generous and the selfish, the one who has meditated on death and the one who had forgotten that death existed. (DIO 85) Jorge de Manrique would say something similar in the Coplas a la muerte de su padre (Ode on the Death of his Father): There all are equal. Side by side/ The 6 This is also the way it is understood by Michael Theunissen, op. cit., pp See Henri -Bernard Vergote, L oeuvre édifiante de Søren Kierkegaard, Kairos, n. 10, 1997, pp

30 30 Laura Llevadot poor man and the son of pride. Lie calm and still. 8 The indeterminacy of death is therefore something that is commonly accepted and in principle the discourse would contribute with nothing, had it stopped there. However, Kierkegaard reverses this image when he says that for the one who is tired of diversity, for the needy, for the wronged, for the abused, the envious, the loser and the suffering infirm, the thought of equality in death must be a great consolation, knowing that in the end all of us will be equal and life will no longer be able to hurt with its differences it is supposed to be as alleviating as the cooling of snow for the hidden fire of resentment. (DIO 86) It appears, then, that both the one who consoles himself with the eradicating equality of death because he cannot stand the diversity of life, and the one who clings to the difference of life and cannot stand the indeterminacy surrounding his death, will both succumb equally to the mere mood, and do not think earnestly of death. What then is earnestness? Kierkegaard s answer in this text is repeated time and again for each of the characterizations given: Earnestness, then, understands the same thing about death but understands it in a different way. (DIO 89) In this case, earnestness understands the same as mood does, that death is indeterminable and makes us all equal, but it understands it because earnestness teaches that equality before God should be sought in life itself. The thought of the equality of death teaches whoever thinks it earnestly to imbue the difference with equality, to rise himself above the difference and find the humility of equality. It is in this way that the thought of the indeterminacy of death imprints its retroactive power on life. But it is the reader who must appropriate this thought and learn from it, trying to raise himself above mere mood. It is in this way, through this textual process which first confirms and then denies, so as to leave in the end the reader alone with his meditation, that this discourse edifies, in other words, digs deep to build up from the foundations, instead of showering the reader with abstract thoughts about death. Earnestness, which understands the same but in a different way, affects the subjectivity of the reader, taking the common images of death away from him so as to leave him alone with the thought without image which must be appropriated. It is in this sense that At a Graveside can be considered an edifying discourse, not as a specific type of text, but as a text whose ethical character takes the form of edification. It can now be understood that the thesis that claims that the analysis of death in Being and Time carries out a secularization of the occasional discourse At a Graveside cannot be sustained at all. There is nothing in At a Graveside to be secularized because, although it may be considered to be an edifying text, it is not actually a religious discourse, but an ethical one. What characterizes this text, unlike Heidegger s, is that, being edifying, the aim is to convey earnestness, i.e. the appropriation by the individual of a thought without images that must have retroactive power on his mode of life. That is why the negativity of the text, the indirect way it is expressed, is what in any case differentiates it most clearly from Heidegger s text. 8 Cf. Jorge de Manrique, Ode on the Death of his Father, in Anthology of Spanish Poetry, edited by John A. Crow, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1979, p. 23.

31 At a Graveside: Ethics and Ontology 31 However, there is still the possibility of understanding that, in this case, what happens is that Heidegger has ontologized Kierkegaard s edifying discourse, cutting it off from its ethical roots. Heidegger would have eliminated the edifying from his reflection on death, this time in a wide sense, stripping it of its originary sense. But this interpretation runs aground on the question that would need to be asked as to whether it is still possible to set the ontological in opposition to the ethical. Does saying that Heidegger has ontologized Kierkegaard not imply retaining the Heideggerian distinction between the ethical and the ontological? We will finish by looking at this question. 3. Originary ethics and edification From a Kierkegaardian perspective it would be relatively easy to show that, in the existential analysis of death in Being and Time, Heidegger has repeated Kierkegaard s text but eliminated all its ethical roots. 9 If, instead of looking at how the ontological is set against the ethical and the religious as ontic considerations in Being and Time, we look at the later reflection in the Letter on Humanism where Heidegger aims to prevent his first great work from still being read as metaphysical, we will find the following statement which seems to go further than the considerations we have mentioned so far: Thinking that questions the truth of being and therefore determines the habitation of the essence of human being in derivation from being is neither ethics nor ontology. Hence the question about the relation of each to other no longer has a basis in this domain. 10 (BW ) Here it would appear that Heidegger is saying that the thinking of being of which Being and Time consisted should be considered as neither an ethical reflection nor an ontological one. The understanding up to now was that the ethical was exceeded by the ontological which preceded it and that, by virtue of its ontic character, the ethical was excluded from the reflection put forward in Being and Time. But here it appears that Heidegger is also against the ontological. In what sense should this statement be taken? The use of the terms ontology and ethics is really understood here in the same way as the differentiation between the theoretical and the practical. In fact, some lines further on Heidegger will say: This thinking is neither theoretical nor practical. It comes to pass before this distinction. (BW 236) Thus, the ontological is understood here as that theoretical description of being that will try to understand it through conceptual abstraction, while the ethical is defined by the norms of action and rules of behavior deriving from that theoretical 9 See: Huntington, P. J., op. cit., and M. T Mjaaland, Autopsia. Self, Death and God after Kierkegaard and Derrida, Kierkegaard Studies. Monograph Series, vol. 17, edited by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Berlin, New York, Walter de Gruyter, 2008, p See especially pp in Martin Heidegger, Letter on Humanism in Basic Writings, London: Routledge, 1978; henceforth referred as BW.

32 32 Laura Llevadot conception. From this perspective, criticism of Heideggerian analysis for ontologizing Kierkegaard s ethical discourse would be neutralized as Heidegger is trying to think against both concepts, the ontological and the ethical, especially when he says that This thinking, then, is not first of all ethics, because it is ontology. (BW 235) If it can be said that the phenomenological thinking that takes place in Being and Time, including the analysis of death, is neither ethics nor ontology, it is because it considers itself as fundamental ontology and as originary ethics. By fundamental ontology, Heidegger would understand that it strives to get back to the essential grounds on which thinking the truth of being originates. (BW 235) These essential grounds are precisely Da -sein as being -there, as habitation. It is no longer a question of man understood as a rational or spiritual animal who would choose one ethical convention or another, but man understood as that place in which being is revealed, man understood as habitation, and that is precisely the ethical character of this fundamental ontology. Originary ethics would be that which considers the true habitation of human beings, then that thinking which thinks the truth of being as the primary element of human beings, as something which exists. (BW 235) We see how the ontological and the ethical join together here in the same concept and the same experience of thinking which is set against the ontogical understood as theory and the ethical understood as practice. Fundamental ontology is not without ethics as it thinks of itself as fundamental and originary ethics. 11 From this point of view, which is Heidegger s, fundamental ontology cannot be accused of stripping the ethical from Kierkegaard s discourse unless the ethical in Kierkegaard is conceived as practice preceded by an ontology or a Christian anthropology. 12 However, we have seen that the character of the edifying is set against this conception of the ethical. The edifying is ethical because it builds up from the foundations, because it appeals to earnestness and appropriation, not because it proposes norms and rules of behavior. And it is still surprising that, after having rejected it, Heidegger should reintroduce this idea of edification in his concept of building where he is still stating in the Letter on Humanism that thinking builds upon [baut an] the house of being, (BW 236) where building [bauen] means dwelling [Buan], cultivating [collere] and raising up of edifices [aedificare], i.e. upbuilding. 13 In fact, the fundamentalist aim of the analysis in Being and Time is connected to this digging from the foundations that Kierkegaard thematizes in Works of Love. Nevertheless it needs to be asked to what extent the fundamentalist aim of fundamental ontology as originary ethics builds up from the foundations, digging deep, and to what extent the existential analysis of death builds up from the grounds in the Kierkegaardian sense, i.e. it is a question of finding out to what 11 That is the basic claim of Joanna Hodge in Heidegger and Ethics, Routledge: London and New York, This is what Schrag says: As Heidegger s ontological and existentialist descriptions can arise only from ontic and existential experience, so Kierkegaard s ontic and existential elucidations express an implicit ontology., in Calvin O. Schrag, Existence and Freedom: Towards an Ontology of Human Finitude, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1961, p Martin Heidegger, Building, Dwelling, Thinking, in Basic Writings, op. cit., p. 329.

33 At a Graveside: Ethics and Ontology 33 extent Heidegger s existential analysis can be considered edifying, once the idea of the edifying as a discursive type has been excluded and once the Heideggerian concept has been stripped of the edifying. Wherein lies the difference between Heidegger s existential analysis of death and Kierkegaard s discourse At a Graveside? As we have tried to show, the difference is not that Heidegger secularized Kierkegaard in his reflection on death, precisely because At a Graveside is not a religious discourse; there is no religious category in this text capable of being secularized. In fact the subject of immortality, which Heidegger uses as a counter -example in Being and Time, has for him absolutely nothing to do with Kierkegaard s text. Neither can it be said that Heidegger stripped Kierkegaard s reflection of its ethical and edifying character so as to confine himself to ontologizing what Kierkegaard says specifically, because from Heidegger s point of view his existential analysis is indeed ethical in an originary sense, in the specific sense of building, of inhabiting, and therefore also of edification. It can in some way be said that both texts are legitimate attempts to think death in a non -metaphysical way, i.e. without assuming any knowledge of death and without admitting any particular belief. The ethical, in both discourses, tries to transcend any moral consideration. However, the two texts do this in different ways. The existential analysis tries to provide a basis for thinking which precedes knowledge. The idea of methodological and ontological precedence is a constant in the text we are dealing with. For Heidegger it is a question of achieving an existential conception of death. (BT ) The aim of the analysis then is to reach a conception of death which precedes any knowledge content, whether biological, psychological or theological. Another question, as Derrida says, is undoubtedly whether the so -called ontological content surreptitiously reintroduces, as ontological repetition, any theorems or theologoumena to compete with so -called established and dependent disciplines Judeo -christian theology, among others, but also all anthropologies that stem from it. 14 Kierkegaard s occasional discourse, on the other hand, does not try to precede knowledge but actually assumes it. What the reader must learn from this discourse is that knowing a great deal is not an unconditional good. (DIO 101) Where Heidegger s discourse tries positively to establish a basis, where for Heidegger it is a question of reaching and forging a positive conception of death that precedes any knowledge, that is where Kierkegaard s meditation is shown in its most radical negativity, as it does not try to forge any fundamental conception of death; his building up from the foundations does not attempt to obtain originary knowledge concerning completeness of the human being. On the contrary, Kierkegaard s meditation on death in At a Graveside deconstructs all assumed knowledge piece by piece, every image of death, leaving the reader alone to face the only question that death poses him while living: whatever your conception of death, whatever the knowledge you believe in, whatever the mood that accompanies this knowledge, death is the master that puts your knowledge to the test with its Up to here, not 14 See Jacques Derrida, Aporias. Dying. Awaiting (one another at) the Limits of Truth. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993, pp

34 34 Laura Llevadot one step further; then it is concluded, not a letter is added; the meaning is at an end and not one more sound is to be heard all is over. (DIO 78-79) What is missing in Heidegger s text for it to be edifying in the strict sense, for it to dig deep into the reader s subjectivity and fill him with earnestness, is precisely the decision. Death s decision is what Kierkegaard time and again reminds us of. This cancels out any ontic knowledge much more radically than seeking the originary, since it puts knowledge to the test at every moment without providing any alternative concept to believe in. There is no existential conception of death in At a Graveside but an invitation to consider existentially the same concept of death given by knowledge, whether it be ontic or ontological. Earnestness, then, understands the same thing about death but understands it in a different way, (DIO 89) in a decisive way. In At a Graveside, as always in Kierkegaard, the decision suspends knowledge. If At a Graveside can be considered an edifying discourse, it is because, by virtue of its negativity, it makes the reader internalize the decision, appropriate death s decision that overthrows assumed knowledge with no pretension to being originary. This is the ethical: the decision that assumes and eliminates all knowledge. It is because Kierkegaard assumes knowledge instead of preceding it like Heidegger that he does not surreptitiously reintroduce Judeo -christian theologoumena and their ethics, but by accepting them, choosing them and deconstructing them when he believes it necessary, he goes beyond them to transform them into individual decision. The edifying in At a Graveside is the decision, the ever negative invitation to understand existentially what positive knowledge understands abstractly and/ or symbolically. If from a Heideggerian perspective ontic knowledge is the result of a metaphysical vision that takes the world as image, then the edifying, which deconstructs the images in order to lead from knowledge to the decision, is what makes the Kierkegaardian text a post -metaphysical text. As At a Graveside shows, the ethical in this discourse, as edifying, is not the rules of conduct and behavior in the face of death that would derive from a previous ontology, but neither is it a question of an originary understanding of human habitation it is that the ethical aspect of the discourse lies in the decisive character that death must imprint on the mode of life of the living. Kierkegaardian earnestness must therefore be distinguished from Heideggerian originariness. This is where the difference between the edifying ethical and the originary ethical lies.

35 Patience as the Temporality of Inner Life in Kierkegaard s Upbuilding Discourses Darío González University of Copenhagen The last Upbuilding Discourse from 1843 and the first one from 1844 are based on the text of Luke 21:19, a short sentence that the New English Translation renders: By your endurance you will gain your lives. The version of the Bible quoted by Kierkegaard uses the word Sjæl soul to translate literally the Greek psychas. In fact, it would not be wrong to interpret this term as the life of the soul, psychic life, or the soul as the principle of individual life. To gain one s soul means to save one s own life or, as indicated in the title of the following discourse, to preserve one s soul. All the emphasis of the sentence, however, is put on the expression patience. Insofar as it covers both the moment of acquisition and the process of preservation, patience condenses the tension in which salvation constitutes itself. In patience, the life of the soul is both received as a gift and proposed as a task. Although the simple word patience seems to direct our attention to the temporal condition of existence, the religious understanding of patience as a tension between a gift and a task suggests that this existence transcends itself towards the dimension of eternity. According to the Christian view, to save one s own life means to save it for eternity. To gain and to preserve one s soul is to discover and secure the eternal validity of one s spiritual life. The central problem described by Kierkegaard in the discourses from this period is the same he discusses in the third chapter of The Concept of Anxiety, the problem concerning both the experience of time and the anticipation of eternity. But the relation between the two works is perhaps more complex than that. Not by chance the unfinished manuscript of the book on anxiety was put aside by its author at the beginning of the year 1844, probably the moment in which he begins to write the discourse To Preserve One s Soul in Patience. In the last pages of the discourse To Gain One s Soul in Patience, human soul is characterized as a self -contradiction, the self -contradiction in the contradiction between the external and the internal, between the temporal and the eternal. (EUD 172) In The Concept of Anxiety, we read that [m]an [ ] is a synthesis of psyche and body, but he is also a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. (CA 85) The pseudonymous author of the treatise on anxiety defines as a synthesis the same relation between time and eternity that the author of the Upbuilding Discourses defines as a contradiction, or, more precisely, as the self -contradiction in the contradiction. Here and in other passages, it is not at all surprising that the psychological investigation sketched in Kierkegaard in Lisbon, Lisboa, CFUL, 2012, pp

36 36 Darío González The Concept of Anxiety finds its complement in the religious anthropology of the Discourses. As we will attempt to show, the notions of anxiety and patience delimit a field of inquiry focused on the ethical dimension of existence, a field within which ethics itself coincides with a reflection on temporality. 1. The moment and the interpretation of sensuousness After comparing the two formulations of the anthropological synthesis that are relevant for the examination of the notion of anxiety psyche and body, on the one hand; the temporal and the eternal, on the other Kierkegaard immediately notices their difference: In the former [synthesis], the two factors are psyche and body, and spirit is the third, yet in such a way that one can speak of a synthesis only when spirit is posited. The later synthesis has only two factors, the temporal and the eternal. Where is the third factor? And if there is no third factor, there really is no synthesis, for a synthesis that is a contradiction cannot be completed as a synthesis without a third factor (CA 85) The connection between these lines and the last discourse of 1843 can be strictly localized at the end of the question quoted above: Where is the third factor? In other words, how to qualify the open synthesis of the temporal and the eternal? The reading of the Discourses based on Luke 21 provides us with the principle we are looking for. Patience, the virtue of patience in which one gains and preserves one s soul seems to be the factor that completes the contradiction between the temporal and the eternal, the passion that transforms the contradiction into something that concerns the individual as an individual. Interestingly enough, the word patience does not appear in The Concept of Anxiety. In this treatise, the synthesis that is not a complete synthesis, the contradiction that is not yet fully determined as such, the contradiction between the temporal and the eternal is only mentioned in order to introduce another category, namely the category of the moment [Øieblikket]. The moment is that ambiguity in which time and eternity touch each other, and with this the concept of temporality is posited. (CA 89) The central position of the concept of the moment in the treatise on anxiety is indicated at the beginning of the third chapter: In individual life, anxiety is the moment to use a new expression that says the same as was said in the previous discussion, but that also points toward that which follows. (CA 81) The previous discussion Kierkegaard refers to is the one concerning the qualitative leap by which the real self is posited. (CA 79) Thus, the temporal structure of the moment corresponds both to the experience of anxiety in individual life and to the leap through which the self becomes real. 1 The qualitative leap is precisely the re -qualification of the 1 This ambiguity is stressed in different ways within the theories that, from Kierkegaard to Heidegger and Lacan, focus on the phenomenon of anxiety as a privileged expression for the truth of existence. Kierkegaard makes it clear in the last chapter of the treatise, Anxiety as Saving through Faith, based on the assumption that anxiety is freedom s possibility. (CA 155) Cf. HEIDEGGER:

37 Patience as the Temporality of Inner Life in Kierkegaard s Upbuilding Discourses 37 psycho -physical synthesis as a spiritual synthesis, a re -qualification that consists, on the one hand, in interpreting the contradiction between the soul and the body as an individual reality, and that makes possible, on the other hand, to interpret sensuousness as sin. Here it is important to understand in which sense sinfulness corresponds to what we call a spiritual interpretation of sensuousness. Kierkegaard himself affirms that sensuousness as such is not sinfulness. (CA 80) Spirit, however, can see it as sinfulness. What makes possible to see sensuousness as sinfulness is the fact that spirit transposes sensuousness from the simple level of presence the body as something merely present to the soul to the temporal complexity of the moment. Such a complexity is, in a way, indicated in the statement according to which the moment is an ambiguity. [hiin Tvetydige] (CA 89) The same transposition could be explained, as Kierkegaard does it in the first chapter of the book, on the basis of the biblical narrative. In this case, the simple present character of the body with respect to the soul is called innocence, whereas the interpretation of that presence as guilt presupposes that spirit is already there as language. If spirit is able to re -qualify the sensuous relation of the soul to the body, it is because the synthetic power of spirit is essentially rooted in language. 2 If the first manifestation of anxiety takes place in innocence, it is precisely because innocence can indeed speak, inasmuch as in language it possesses the expression for everything spiritual. (CA 45) Language is what transposes mere presence into the ambiguity of the moment, opening in the same act an imperceptible gap between the elements of the synthesis. Determined by the ability to speak, the moment in which anxiety appears is the moment of interpretation, a moment that repeats itself every time spirit tries to operate its synthesis. The correspondence between the two syntheses can be now properly assessed as the connection between spirit and the moment: As soon as the spirit is posited, the moment is present. (CA 88) But language is that by virtue of which the unifying principle of spirit and the duplicity of the moment Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its ownmost potentiality -for -Being that is, its Being free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. (In Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinso, Oxford: Willey -Blackwell, 1978, p. 232) In a similar fashion, while Kierkegaard observes that anxiety consumes all finite ends and discovers all their deceptiveness, (CA 155) Lacan characterizes anxiety as that which does not deceive. (In Jacques Lacan, L angoisse. Le séminaire. Livre X. Texte établi par Jacques -alain Miller. Paris: Seuil, 2004, pp. 90ff; henceforth referred as LACAN.). 2 We might say of spirit what Peter Fenves says of anxiety: The ontological register of anxiety is not psychology, since the body is as responsible for the misrelation as the soul; the register is rather language as such, language as it distinguishes itself, always unsuccessfully, from mental concepts on the one hand and the bodily field of primary referents on the other. (In Peter Fenves, Chatter: Language and History in Kierkegaard, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993, p. 76) But the couple concept/referent, considered as a static relation, constitutes only one of the aspects of what language really is. More than a set of referents, the body affected by language is already the body of anxiety, a body marked by the ambiguity of the moment, a body touched by spirit and, thus, both feared and desired in its significant character. More than the semantic substance of thinking, the body affected by language is always caught in a game of signifiance, a process within which sense, as Roland Barthes would say, is sensually produced. (Roland Barthes quotation in Le plaisir du texte, Paris: Seuil, 1973, p. 82.).

38 38 Darío González stand in relation to one another. In fact, language itself is what opens the ambiguity of sensuousness, but language is also what discovers the life of the spirit in that ambiguity. It is precisely on the basis of this double function of language that the ethics of patience must be understood. Before we turn our attention specifically to the notion of patience, let us remark that the two syntheses mentioned in The Concept of Anxiety the psycho -physical synthesis and the synthesis of time and eternity are parallel to the contradiction between the inner man and the outer man described in various passages of the Upbuilding Discourses. As we read in one of the texts on patience, the inner man [det indvortes Menneske] is the one to whom expectancy belongs. (EUD 222) In 1843, an entire discourse had been devoted to the commentary of the expression to be strengthened in the inner man. (EUD 79ff) The biblical verse from which those words are taken (Ephesians 3:16) contains a reference to spirit, in this case the spirit of God as the power that grants the needed strength. Apart from this and other numerous applications of the same phrase, the discourse The Thorn in the Flesh is the one in which both expressions the inner man and the outer man appear together: What about the suffering in which the soul battles through to faith or the one in which faith is victorious over the world? What about the pain in which hope is born or that in which it becomes unshakable? What about the process of being consumed in which self -love breathes its last until love learns to know God, or what about the wretchedness in which the external man fades away until the inner man untangles itself from the corruption? (EUD 330) The last one of these questions is actually a variation on Paul s sentence: For this cause we faint not, but though our outward man perishes, yet the inward man is renewed day by day. (2 Corinthians 4:16) The distinction between inward and outward being, however, is not the only element of Paul s anthropology we can recognize here. The fourth chapter of the second letter to the Corinthians deals, albeit indirectly, with patience, with the patient comprehension of the fact that affliction [ ] is but for a moment. (4:17) and with the admonition to look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen. For the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal. (4:18) In the same chapter, the allusion to suffering and affliction is linked to a reflection on the flesh of the believer, the one who is always bearing about in the body the dying of Christ, so that the life [ ] of Jesus might be made manifest in our mortal flesh. (4:10-11) What is the relation between this notion of flesh and the psycho -physical synthesis that, in The Concept of Anxiety, defines one of the conditions of human existence? How can our mortal flesh be related to the event of salvation that is, the salvation of the soul for eternity rather than to the objects of the world? Once again, the comparison of the different syntheses described by Kierkegaard helps us to understand to which degree his anthropology challenges and is itself challenged by the traditional philosophical account of subjectivity as an ego essentially deprived of any intentional reference to a world. The very notion of a synthesis of psyche and

39 Patience as the Temporality of Inner Life in Kierkegaard s Upbuilding Discourses 39 body, as Michel Henry observes, is interpreted by Kierkegaard within a system of thought which is still classical, namely the modern dualism attributed to Descartes, a dualism based on the duplicity of appearing [la duplicité de l apparaître]. 3 The initial duplicity of psyche and body implies that the soul [ ] perceives the external under the aspect of an objective body whose configurations, whose parts, whose limbs, whose organs and multiple particularities, inasmuch as they do not have anything in common with what the soul originally experiences, only can appear to it as incomprehensible or even absurd determinations. (ibid.) 4 We could add that the need of a third term, the need of a unifying principle in the psycho -physical synthesis, is precisely the need of making sense of the absurd, the concrete need of comprehending this body and, through it, a world which is not yet my world. Up to this point, Henry s analysis can certainly contribute to a philosophical understanding of the problems involved in Kierkegaard s theory of anxiety. The metaphors used by Kierkegaard in his definition of anxiety, however, lead us to think that spirit is already there, mysteriously sustaining the synthesis before its accomplishment, desiring this incomprehensible body, grasping the possibility of an appropriation of the external. Anxiety itself is a qualification of dreaming spirit, and as such it has its place in psychology. Awake, the difference between myself and my other is posited; sleeping, it is suspended; dreaming, it is an intimated nothing. (CA 41f) The nothingness of anxiety is an expression of the fact that, as soon as spirit is active as a third term, the body can no longer be fully recognized as an object among other objects. The body, as we have seen, is no longer present to the soul. But this nothingness this not -being -anything -present is at the same time an intimation of the difference between spirit and its other. Although the treatise on anxiety does not say much about this other the other of spirit or with respect to spirit a long chain of passages authorizes us to understand that Kierkegaard refers to sexual difference. Posited by spirit, 5 human sexuality implies the difference 3 In Michel Henry, Incarnation: Une philosophie de la chair. Paris: Seuil, 2000, p. 280; henceforth referred as HENRY. 4 The important notion of duplicity of appearing refers, in Henry s phenomenology, to the double experience of the body as something that is both visible and invisible. On the one hand, the body presents itself to us in the world and is interpreted as an object of the world; on the other, the invisible body is the living body, a body I grasp not from the world but from inside. In this sense, what Kierkegaard calls anxiety is described by Henry as a sort of estrangement of the principle of life in which the soul, which is also to say our living flesh (HENRY 280), is sensed from outside, from the world. Henry himself finds in Kafka s Metamorphosis a rigorous exposition of Kierkegaard s concept of anxiety. 5 Cf. CA 48: The consequence [of the fall] is a double one, that sin came into the world and that sexuality was posited; the one is to be inseparable from the other. This is of utmost importance in order to show man s original state. If he were not a synthesis that reposed in a third, one thing could not have two consequences. If he were not a synthesis of psyche and body that is sustained by spirit, the sexual could never have come into the word with sinfulness.

40 40 Darío González between, let us say, spirit as a self and spirit as an other. Before this difference is posited, before the re -qualification of sensuousness, spirit only dreams on it, which is to say that it only dreams on itself as a self. But it is precisely here that anxiety is defined as a relation to the possibility of the synthesis. Dreaming spirit does not seem to have anything to desire, anything to expect, anything to fear except from its own possibilities. In this sense, it would not be wrong to affirm that spirit already desires, expects, fears something: it desires, expects, and fears itself. This is the apparent contradiction that leads the author of The Concept of Anxiety to the analysis of the temporal structure of the synthesis. In innocence, dreaming spirit is caught in a sort of present time, but that present time is already disturbed by the presentiment of an unsolved synthesis. 6 Anxiety is there as an intimated relation to the future. Thus, the very idea of temporality implies that spirit is constantly waking up from its dream, transforming its nothingness into something, retrieving its possibilities in something external to itself. What Kierkegaard tries to tell us in the third chapter of The Concept of Anxiety is that spirit, understood as the synthesis of psyche and body, is not only a given synthesis but also a synthesis that must constitute itself in a certain relation to temporality. 2. Comprehending temporality. The tension between something that is given and something that must be acquired, between the gift and the task Gave and Opgave is a permanent motif in Kierkegaard s works. In the Upbuilding Discourses from 1843 and 1844, the same tension appears as a qualification of patience, the patience in which, according to the biblical text, one is supposed to gain one s soul. Here, the question is to determine to which extent the individual already possesses his or her soul: [I]f a person possesses his soul, he certainly does not need to gain it, and if he does not possess it, how then can he gain it, since the soul itself is the ultimate condition that is presupposed in every acquiring, consequently also in gaining the soul. Could there be a possession of that sort, which signifies precisely the condition for being able to gain the same possession? In the external sense, there is no such possession. The person that possesses the external does not need to gain it in fact, he is even unable to do that. He can give away what he possesses and then see whether he can gain the same thing again; he can use what he possesses to gain something new, but he cannot simultaneously possess and gain the very same thing. If there is any question of such a possession, then it must be found in the internal. If it is not to be found in the external as such, then it is not to be found in the temporal 6 We use the word presentiment in the sense suggested by Jacques Lacan: Anxiety is this cut this clean cut [cette coupure nette] without which the presence of the signifier, its functioning, its furrow in the Real is unthinkable this cut insofar as it opens itself and lets appear [ ] the unexpected, the visit, the news. This is well expressed by the term presentiment, which is to be understood not only as the presentiment of something, but also as the pre -sentiment, what precedes the birth of a sentiment. (LACAN 92)

41 Patience as the Temporality of Inner Life in Kierkegaard s Upbuilding Discourses 41 as such either, since, more closely defined, it was actually temporality that made it impossible to possess and to gain the external simultaneously, because that which is in the moment either is or is not, and if it is, then it is not gained, and if it is gained, then it is not. (EUD 163) This is the self -contradiction that, according to Kierkegaard, temporality does not understand, (ibid.) namely the contradiction that would consist in the claim that something external is possessed and gained at the same time. Apart from the fact that Kierkegaard uses now a biblical expression soul in order to characterize the internal, the contradiction at issue coincides with the problem of spirit as described in the treatise on anxiety. What is supposed to be gained in patience is nothing other than the inner life of spirit itself, an inner life that if we put it in the terms of both The Concept of Anxiety and the Discourses is the tension between the temporal and the eternal or in the terms of the Discourses the tension between gaining and possessing. Kierkegaard allows this last analogy when he affirms that the eternal is pure possession: only a something possessed that cannot be gained any more than it can be lost. (EUD 163) In spite of its quasi -logical and deceivingly abstract formulation, Kierkegaard s argument in the above quoted passage is constructed upon a series of biblical references in which most of the terms are deeply ambiguous. This is particularly the case of the notions of temporality and the temporal. The difficulty of speaking in strict terms about temporality and about its relation to the eternal becomes evident in the section from The Concept of Anxiety in which Kierkegaard introduces the concept of the moment, a figurative expression he says that is not easy to deal with. (CA 87) Actually, the problem is already visible at the very beginning of his exposition of the second synthesis. Shortly after having posed the question about the absent third factor of the synthesis between the temporal and the eternal, Kierkegaard opens a more specific discussion through another question: What, then, is the temporal? (CA 85) This appears to be the crucial issue in a context in which as it is suggested in the subtitle of the book the psychological phenomenon of anxiety is to be used as the guiding criterion for the investigation of a dogmatic notion, namely the notion of hereditary sin. The question of temporality what, then, is the temporal should perhaps be rephrased as follows: What is the temporal as such, before or independently from its synthesis with the eternal? Is it in any case possible to define or even to experience temporality without presupposing the contradiction between the temporal and the eternal? To answer these questions affirmatively would imply to accept the determination of time as a succession based on the distinction between the present, the past, and the future. From the beginning of his discussion Kierkegaard declares that [t]his distinction, however, is incorrect if it is considered to be implicit in time itself, because the distinction [between the present, the past, and the future] appears through the relation of time to eternity and through the reflection of eternity in time. (CA 85) The statement repeats itself a few pages later: only when temporality is posited, only if time constantly intersects eternity

42 42 Darío González and eternity pervades time, only then the above mentioned division acquires its significance: the present time, the past time, the future time. (CA 89) Let us notice that the whole section of The Concept of Anxiety devoted to the problem of temporality is a variation of Hegel s arguments regarding the absence of the dimensions of past and future in the pure now of Nature. Kierkegaard s application of those arguments makes perfect sense if we consider them against the background of the ethico religious turn of the very notion of temporality in both The Concept of Anxiety and the Upbuilding Discourses. As Hegel puts it, in nature where time is a Now, being does not reach the existence of the difference of these dimensions; they are of necessity, only in subjective imagination, in remembrance, and fear or hope. 7 A corollary of those remarks is that the remembrance of the past, the fear of something present, and the hope of something future cannot be the object of an ontological investigation based on the determinations of nature. A similar thesis is exposed by Kierkegaard: Nature as spatial determination exists only immediately. (PF 79) Nature s imperfection is that it does not have a history, and its perfection is that it nevertheless has an intimation of it (namely, that it has come into existence, which is the past; that it exists, which is the present). (PF 76) Thus, the concrete phenomenon of temporality can only be described as a spiritual phenomenon. In Kierkegaard s terms, the difference between nature and spirit implies that spirit transforms nature into sensuousness, that is, into something that can be interpreted as sin: [T]ime has no significance at all for nature. Only with the moment does history begin. By sin, man s sensuousness is posited as sinfulness and is therefore lower than that of the beast, and yet this is because it is here that the higher begins, for at this point spirit begins. (CA 89; BA 392) In this last case, it is obvious that the phenomenon of temporality is taken in its existential and ethico- religious dimension. Temporality is that character of sensuousness by virtue of which the sensuous can be spiritually posited as sin. Only spirit remembers its past, fears its present, hopes its future; only spirit has a history; but history begins with sin. The history of sin is nothing but time itself insofar as it constantly intersects eternity, an eternity that constantly pervades time. The notion of temporality applied in the Upbuilding Discourses is basically the same, with the important difference that now Kierkegaard does not focus on the interpretation of sensuousness as sinfulness but, rather, on the life of the soul and on the acquisition of its eternal validity. In accordance with the biblical terms upon which the author of the Discourses addresses the reader, another aspect of temporality comes to light: not just a history of spirit as the history of sin but, more importantly, the life of the soul as faith, expectancy, and patience. Even the two Discourses from 1843 that bear the title Love Will Hide a Multitude of Sins are, rather than discourses on sinfulness, discourses on love as an anticipation of forgiveness, on love as the passion that does not look back to the multiplicity of sin. Here the metaphor of the moment lends itself to a completely different interpretation of the temporality of existence: How would the eye [Øie] that loves find time for a 7 See G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Nature, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970, p. 36.

43 Patience as the Temporality of Inner Life in Kierkegaard s Upbuilding Discourses 43 backward look, since the moment [Øieblik, glance of the eye] it did so it would have to let its object go! How would the ear that loves find time to listen to the accusation, since the moment it did so it would have to stop listening to the voice of love! (EUD 74) 8 Kierkegaard tells us again the story of the woman who was a sinner in order to show how that voice of love becomes audible in the moment of anxiety: There was a moment of anxiety; what she had suffered in solitude, her grief, the accusations of her own heart, became even more terrible, because her heart was well aware that its charges had endorsement in the face of the Pharisees. But she went on, and in beating the enemy she beat herself to calmness, and when she had found rest at Jesus feet, she forgot herself in her work of love. As she wept, she finally forgot what she had wept over at the beginning; the tears of repentance became the tears of adoration. (EUD 76) There is in this passage an echo of Kierkegaard s reference to repentance in the introduction to The Concept of Anxiety: Sin, then, belongs to ethics only insofar as upon this concept it is shipwrecked with the aid of repentance. (CA 17) The story of the woman who was a sinner is a concrete example of the shipwreck of first ethics and of the transition to a new ethics. The later ethics does not consist in a new set of moral principles but in the transformation of a life in its wholeness. As soon as she moves from the ethics of accusation to the ethics of repentance, she forgets herself in order to gain her own soul, even when the oblivion of herself does not imply the denial of her sins but, on the contrary, as Kierkegaard would put it in The Concept of Anxiety, in the penetrating consciousness of actuality, of the actuality of sin. (CA 20) This penetrating consciousness is the condition of what he calls the new ethics. 3. Patience, repetition The transformation of the self is also the subject of the two Discourses devoted to the virtue of patience. The dogmatic notion of sin is not explicitly mentioned in this context, but it becomes clear that one can only gain one s soul by taking it away from the power that possesses it, namely the power of the world. 9 The philosophical 8 This is one of those passages in which we get the impression that Kierkegaard is carefully choosing every one of his words. The rhetorical question How would the eye that loves find time refers to a real lack of time, as if the temporality of love of patience, of hope were a time without time or, at least, a time before the external history of the ego. A similar expression is used in The Concept of Anxiety: Ethics must not permit itself to be distracted by the babble that it is useless to require the impossible. For even to listen to such talk is unethical and is something for which ethics has neither time nor opportunity. (CA 17) 9 This motif is also developed in the discourse Strengthening in the Inner Being, which is initially a reflection on Paul s captivity in Rome as an image of the soul s captivity in the world. EUD 90: he who possesses the whole world and thanks God is strengthened in the inner being [i det indvortes Menneske]. Then he will rejoice in quite another way than the fortunate person does, because he who has the whole world and is as one who does not have it has the whole world otherwise he

44 44 Darío González interest of these discourses consists in their ability to describe the need of an effective transformation of the self on the basis of its phenomenological structure. Thus, the soul that a human being is supposed to gain in patience is situated in a threefold relation to itself, to the world, and to God: Insofar as he then gains his soul, the world possesses it. But the world possesses it unjustly, since it is his possession. In its deceitfulness, the world expresses this contradiction thus, that he possesses the world. His gain, then, is a legitimate gain, insofar as he gains his possession. But whose possession, then, is his soul? It is not the world s, since illegitimate possession is no possession; it is not his, for he of course must gain it. Consequently, there must still be a possessor. This possessor must possess his soul as legitimate property but nevertheless must not possess it in such a way that the person himself cannot gain it as his legitimate possession. Therefore, this possessor can be none other that the eternal being, than God himself. (EUD 166) It would be wrong to read these lines as a sort of rational deduction of the idea of an eternal being, the idea of God as the eternal possessor of the soul. As in other passages from the Upbuilding Discourses, what Kierkegaard attempts to do here is to reconstruct, with the help of biblical terms, the mutual connection between the elements implied in the phenomenon of the ethical transformation of a human life. From a purely rational point of view, it is obvious that he is moving in circles, perhaps because the phenomenon he tries to describe is itself a circle, namely the acquisition of something that is already given. The whole argument is nothing but the development of the same self -contradiction [ ] between possessing and gaining the same thing in the same moment. (ibid.) In The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard refers to that phenomenon as repetition. The new ethics the ethics of repentance, of love, of faith, of hope can only be philosophically exposed as a science whose essence is transcendence or repetition. (CA 21) In the Upbuilding Discourses, he chooses patience as the category that designates both transcendence and repetition, the unity of what is unjustly possessed by the word, eternally possessed by God, and what is to be gained by a human being. Consequently he gains if he actually does gain his soul from God, away from the world, through himself. (EUD 167) But this threefold structure of patience which could easily be presented once again as the synthesis of the eternal and the temporal in human life is also the threefold relation that constitutes the soul. Between the illusory possession of the world and the gaining of itself from the eternal, a human soul is nothing but patience. This is what Kierkegaard suggests in the last pages of the Four Upbuilding Discourses from 1843: But what, then, is a human soul? If you impatiently ask someone else this question, you will scarcely find the answer, nor are you, as it seems, on the right road. Or is it not a manifestation of impatience that one person hurries forward to explain to everyone else what the soul is and that a second person waits impatiently for him to explain it, that the hearer impatiently expedites the speaker s explanation and then in turn becomes is possessed by the world. Then he rejoices in all the good gifts, but he rejoices even more in God and with God, who gave them.

45 Patience as the Temporality of Inner Life in Kierkegaard s Upbuilding Discourses 45 impatient because he finds it inadequate? [ ] To know what a human soul is, what this means, is still a long way from beginning to gain one s soul in patience, and it is a knowledge that exhibits its difference from that gaining inasmuch as it does indeed grow in impatience. (EUD 172) We should examine more closely the rhetorical construction of this Discourse. On the one hand, a human being is supposed to gain his soul in patience. On the other hand, the very distinction between patience and impatience over -determines the question concerning the being of the soul. Everything happens as if a certain phenomenology of patience had taken the place of the ontological characterization of the human soul. The question of patience repeats itself, it is itself a repetition, and this repetition destroys any attempt to approach the question of soul in terms of knowledge or self -knowledge. 10 Kierkegaard is perfectly aware of this fact when he points out to the double inscription of the notions implied in his investigation: To gain his soul in patience. When we put the words together and consider how a person will be able to comply with them, the first requirement is that he have the patience to understand that he does not possess himself, that he have the patience to understand that a gaining of his own soul in patience is a work of patience, and that he therefore ought not to pay attention to the passion that rightly thinks that it can grow only in impatience. The words inculcate this in a twofold way by containing in their brevity a redoubling repetition [fordoblende Gjentagelse]. They admonish one to gain one s soul in patience, and they admonish one to gain it. This word alone contains and admonition to patience. (EUD 169f) The repetition of the word, or, said more properly, the repetition contained in these words to gain in patience expresses already the difference between the knowledge and the possession of one s soul. By virtue of the same repetition, all knowing that is unrelated to a gaining is incomplete and deficient, inasmuch as a person still does not know how he becomes, since he becomes through the gaining, and even in association with the gaining he remains deficient, for we still do not know what we shall become. (EUD 173) This last sentence taken from the First Epistle of John is, by the way, a new admonition to patience, and so are most of the biblical thoughts quoted and developed by Kierkegaard in his Upbuilding Discourses. The art of writing upbuilding discourses is the art of repetition. Moreover, the redoubling repetition of patience can only be the subject of a discourse in which the individual is addressed in his or her individuality. In The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard had said something similar about the proper way of discussing the nature of sin: sin is the subject of the sermon, in which the single individual speaks as the single individual to the single individual. (CA 16) Perhaps this idea should be completed by saying that sin finds its proper place only in the context 10 A similar consideration leads Kierkegaard to refuse the identification of sin and selfishness in chapter II of The Concept of Anxiety, since this identification would imply that the human self is something purely given to itself in self -consciousness rather than being both something given and something to be acquired. According to Kierkegaard s view, on the contrary, it is by sin and in sin that selfishness comes into being [at det Selviske vorder]. (CA 79).

46 46 Darío González of an admonition to patience. Only the ethics of patience is able to comprehend the moment of sin without transforming it into a state of the soul. At this point it becomes clear why the author of The Concept of Anxiety says that sin is not a state, as the persistent observation of psychology would lead us to believe. Only the experience of patience illuminates the mysterious temporality of inner life, only patience transcends mere observation which is always the observation of presence towards the penetrating consciousness of something that repeats itself in the depths of spirit Words beyond knowledge There is a strict parallelism between the question posed by Kierkegaard in Chapter III of The Concept of Anxiety: What, then, is the temporal? (CA 85) and one of the questions posed in the Upbuilding Discourses: What, then is a human soul? (EUD 172) Their similarity is not only a matter of grammar. A certain de -substantialization of the notion of soul corresponds to what might be called the effective de -formalization of time. Temporality is not the formal condition of an experience the form of inner sense, the form of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state [unsers innern Zustandes], as Kant defines time. 12 Temporality is, rather, the meaning of the experience of ourselves, an experience in which nothing can be fully described as a state. In this sense, Kierkegaard s allusions to the temporality of patience can be compared with Levinas arguments on the same subject: in the synthesis operated by patience, the life of the soul is not knowledge or self -knowledge understood as the presence of the self with respect to itself, but what Levinas calls ageing, viellissement: Temporalization as lapse, the loss of time, is neither an initiative of an ego, nor a movement toward some telos of action. The loss of time is not the work of a subject. Already the synthesis of retentions and protentions in which Husserl s phenomenological analysis, through an abuse of language, recuperates the lapse, bypasses the ego [se passe de Moi]. Time passes [se passe]. This synthesis which occurs patiently, called with profundity passive synthesis, is ageing. It breaks up under the weight of years, and is irreversibly removed from the present, that is, from re -presentation. In self -consciousness there is no longer a presence of self to self, but senescence Cf. CA 15: If sin is dealt with in psychology, the mood becomes that of persistent observation [ ] The concept becomes a different concept, for sin becomes a state. However, sin is not a state. [ ] As a state [Som Tilstand] [ ] it is not, but de actu or in actu [according to actuality or in actuality] it is, again and again. 12 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith, New York: St Martin, 1965, p In Emmanuel Levinas, Than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. by Alfonso Lingis, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991, p. 51f; see also Autrement qu être ou au delà de l essence, Paris: Kluwer Academic, 2008; henceforth mentioned as OTHERWISE.

47 Patience as the Temporality of Inner Life in Kierkegaard s Upbuilding Discourses 47 The lapse of time or temporalization as lapse is, in Levinas phenomenology, no longer the time of being but the time that concerns me. (ibid.) Patience is for Levinas an expression of the radical passivity of the synthesis of time as ageing or senescence in contrast with the idea of an active synthesis operated by the ego. In spite of all the differences and difficulties that come to light when Kierkegaard is read from the perspective of Levinas, it would be interesting to investigate the particular role that the motif of ageing and age difference age as difference plays in the Upbuilding Discourses. A first and decisive reference to this issue is found in the discourse Strengthening in the Inner Being : Through every deeper reflection that makes him older than the moment [ældre end Øieblikket] and lets him grasp the eternal, a person assures himself that he has an actual relation to the world, and that consequently this relation cannot be mere knowledge about this world and about himself as a part of it, since such knowledge is no relation, simply because in this knowledge he himself is indifferent toward this world and this world is indifferent through his knowledge of it. Not until the moment when there awakens in his soul a concern about what meaning the world has for him and he for the world, about what meaning everything within him by which he himself belongs to the world has for him and he therein for the world only then does the inner being [det indvortes Menneske] announce its presence in this concern (EUD 86). 14 This passage condenses a number of notions with which we are already familiar: the moment, the eternal, the soul, the world, the question concerning its meaning, the awakening. The task of becoming older than the moment consists in transcending the illusion of an external and immediate relation to the world, in moving towards the inner life of the soul. In Kierkegaard s terms, aging is not the simple passing of time, if by time we understand the time of the world. The one who becomes older than the moment is the one who patiently relies on the power of the eternal, as if aging itself were not the process that starts with our birth and ends with our death but, rather, the overcoming of the present time towards eternity. We could easily deduce from these remarks a complete conception of temporality as a phenomenon of spirit. As in The Concept of Anxiety, concrete temporality is not the accumulation of time defined as the succession of past, present, and future. (CA 85) What concerns the individual is first of all the temporal experience of a moment whose ambiguity can only be transcended in the direction of inwardness. In a similar fashion, the second Discourse from 1844, Patience in Expectancy, focuses on the figure of Anna, the devout woman who, according to the Gospel, was well on in years but never left the temple, the woman who waited for the fulfillment of the prophecies. Anna s expectancy is just the temporal formulation of the phenomenon of faith not faith as a volitional act, not faith as an active relation to something, but, rather, faith as patience. Her patient expectancy consists in relating herself to the 14 The seeming coincidence between Levinas statement: the time [that] concerns me and Kierkegaard s allusion to the individual s concern becomes less obvious when we consider other acceptations of the Danish noun Bekymring ( concern, preoccupation, anxiousness ), or even its morphological connection to Kummer ( grief ).

48 48 Darío González future as the dimension of temporality in which the eternal manifests itself. The future, as Kierkegaard writes in The Concept of Anxiety, is the incognito in which the eternal, even though it is incommensurable with time, nevertheless preserves its association with time. (CA 89) In general terms, patience is for Kierkegaard the expectancy of the eternal in time, or time itself as expectancy of the eternal. But that expectancy of the fullness of time is also the lapse in which the ego forgets itself, the difference of the individual s presence to itself. The future as incognito is the future with respect to a present which is not the present of self -knowledge or self -representation. We should conclude that the present that has eternity as its future is not at all a present understood as a single point in the infinite succession of time. The concrete temporality of an expecting existence is, rather, a lapse, as Levinas would say, which is irreversibly removed from the present. (OTHERWISE 52) It is true, however, that Kierkegaard, at least in the treatise on anxiety, conceives of that lapse as a time pervaded by eternity. Aging is the expectancy of a spiritual synthesis marked by the contradiction of a psyche and a body, the patient anticipation of a spiritual power whose role is to spell out that contradiction as a synthesis. The anticipation of eternity is what disrupts the illusory simplicity of the present time, reintroducing the question of the meaning of what seemed to be an object of disinterested knowledge. The question of meaning, the opening of a process of interpretation is what makes impossible to localize the principle of life among the visible objects of the world. Thus, the principle of our own life is supposed to be gained in a certain relation to the invisible. Here again, Kierkegaard s phenomenology of patience cannot be fully distinguished from his exegetical reading of some biblical motifs: The person who knows his soul sees himself in a mirror, but he can forget what he looks like, as the Apostle James says, and therefore what he goes on to say is pertinent here: that the one who hears the Word properly is the one who does it. [ ] Therefore knowledge of one s own soul, if one wants to regard it as a gaining, is a self -deception, because even in its greatest completeness it sill is but a hint of what manifests itself in its definiteness during the gaining. (EUD 173) The one who gains his or her own soul is not the one who sees him or herself in the mirror of knowledge, but the one who does the Word. A curious variation of the same metaphor taken from the Apostle James the Word as a mirror appears at the end of the Preface to the Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions from Perhaps that Preface can be read as an epilogue to the Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses and as a clarification of what patience is about: The meaning lies in the appropriation. Hence the book s joyous giving of itself. [ ] recognition in a mirror is only a fleeting acquaintance and thus a misunderstanding but to see correctly and not want to forget what the mirror is incapable of effecting, that is the appropriation, and the appropriation is the reader s even greater, is his triumphant giving of himself. (DIO 5) The individual s relation to a certain Word and the ethical appropriation of the meaning of that Word is precisely what fills the gap between the temporal and the eternal. Such appropriation is not just a matter of knowledge. Rather, it implies that

49 Patience as the Temporality of Inner Life in Kierkegaard s Upbuilding Discourses 49 something is really transformed. The Word evocated by the author of the Discourses is the mirror in which the individual should be able to see, not what he or she is in the present time, but his or her temporal becoming and transformation. The emphatic use of the expression the Word [Ordet] in the Upbuilding Discourses gives Kierkegaard the possibility of addressing the reader without cutting the circle already drawn by his biblical references. The Word is sometimes a specific sentence, a saying repeatedly quoted with various accents and devoted to the comprehension of different individual situations. Thus, the words of the apostles and the words of the patriarchs prolong themselves in a discourse that limits itself to the task of giving them an additional resonance. Only an additional resonance, indeed, since the reader of the Discourses is supposed to have heard those words in advance, either explicitly in previous discourses or, in a modified form, within the historical totality of language in which he or she is immersed. 15 It is in any case a word or a saying that hides no secret wisdom. (EUD 111) 16 Having renounced the double dignity of the pastor and the teacher, 17 the author of the discourses does not want to convey the reader into any new knowledge. His goal, by contrast, is to awake in the reader the ability of recognizing his or her own possibilities of life. In fact, the recuperation of the biblical language is not the only form of repetition that the unauthorized author of the Discourses has in mind. The Word itself is presented in its repetitive movement. If the new ethics alluded to by Kierkegaard in The Concept of Anxiety is, according to its definition, a second philosophy based on transcendence and repetition, (CA 21) it goes without saying that this ethics implies a new relation to language. The self transcends and repeats itself in a certain relation to the Word, but the Word is already transcendence and repetition. The individual who, in patience, gains his soul from God, away from the world, through himself (EUD 167) is also the one who receives the Word from God, away from the world, through himself, the one who is quick to hear, slow to speak. (EUD 32, 125) Inasmuch as spirit actualizes its synthesis in language, inasmuch as language itself transcends the duplicity of sensuousness towards the unity of spirit, patience is a way of speaking and a way of hearing. The ethics of patience addresses the individual as an open synthesis, as mortal flesh, but it discloses at the same time the unifying power of spirit. 15 Cf. the idea of a word implanted in the soul, according to the verse of the epistle of James on which are based the second, seventh, and eight discourses from 1843: Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above [ ]. Therefore [ ] receive with meekness the word that is implanted in you and that is powerful for making your souls blessed. (James 1:17-22; EUD 32, 125) The first line of the comment on the expression the word that is implanted in you [Ordet, som er implantet i Eder] at the end of the seventh discourse reads as follows: Then he receives «what is implanted there,» consequently that which was there before he received it [ ]. (EUD 139). 16 This last remark is specifically applied to Job s saying: The Lord gave, the Lord took away; blessed be the name of the Lord, undoubtedly one the eminent examples of the language of patience which is to say the language of transcendence and repetition in the Old Testament and in Kierkegaard s Discourses. 17 As we know, Kierkegaard calls these texts discourses, not sermons, because he does not have the authority to preach, and upbuilding discourses instead of discourses for upbuilding, because he by no means claims to be a teacher. (EUD 5).

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51 Providence: The Believer s Faith and the Philosopher s Distrust Maria Leonor L. O. Xavier University of Lisbon Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon The issues of divine existence and providence From a strictly intellectual point of view, the issue of providence is not the prior issue that refers to God, since it is preceded by the issue of the very existence of God. The question of providence is only posited when one previously or indisputably accepts that God, or Gods, exist(s). Accordingly, it is only within the vast premise of theism that this issue may arise. The atheist principle and its confrontation with theism in any given point in history the French eighteenth century (Diderot, Voltaire, Jean Meslier), the German nineteenth century (Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche), the Portuguese early twentieth century (Basílio Teles, Raul Proença) or the early twenty- first century in the United States (Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett, Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens) push the issue of providence to a second level, although the aforementioned may cast doubt on theism internally, just as we intend to clarify philosophically in this essay. The ancient polytheist Greek world did not ignore the issue of providence, as philosophy well shows: although the existence of Gods was not actually discussed on its own, philosophy integrated the meaning of the divine critically by questioning, specifically, divine providence: are Gods beings who are interested in human affairs and the destiny of humanity or are they not? Amongst the ancient Greek philosophies, a few of them support this idea, like Platonism and Stoicism, whereas some are against, like Epicureanism and Aristotelianism. The philosophies which deny divine providence by keeping the divine and the human apart are those closest to atheism: Epicureanism is the alleged ancient forerunner to modern atheism and Aristotelianism, despite the highly unlikely synthesis produced by the genius of Thomas Aquinas between Aristotelianism and Christianity. In truth, the issue of providence, if not the foremost question about God, is definitely a crucial one, very close to the question of God s existence, and likely to undermine, or even to compel, a review of the rational resolution on this issue, something that has assumed a principal role in philosophical speculation about the subject of God. Historically, the question of God s existence only gained such priority once the Greek philosophical tradition got intertwined with the monotheisms of other religions, which bring to us a God revealed through chosen prophets and divinely inspired writings. In fact, the three major Western religions of revelation Judaism, Kierkegaard in Lisbon, Lisboa, CFUL, 2012, pp

52 52 Maria Leonor L. O. Xavier Christianity and Islamism crossed the path of the living tradition of Greek philosophy very early on. There are pioneering milestones amongst these decisive interchanges for the subsequent history of philosophical and religious thought, such as Philo of Alexandria who platonized Judaism, or the Patristics who platonized Christianity, or finally Al -Kindi that set the dialogue between Aristotelian and Neoplatonic philosophy and Islamic theology. Consequently, the legacy of Greek philosophy continued to be paramount within each of these religious traditions. In each one of them, the philosophical frame of mind of these thinkers was to not accept the notion of a God of revelation or of faith as rationally obvious, since they were against the idea of a God postulated by a rational understanding of the world, like Aristotle s God, but instead a God proclaimed to exist outside reason, which accounts for the philosophical effort to prove God s existence that came into being in the history of each of the three main Western monotheisms. Actually, this stands as an effort to rationalize revelation, since the viewpoint of philosophical criticism was felt within the three monotheist traditions. Although it serves religious apologetics, the speculative endeavor of the rational proofs of God s existence already comprehended, from an intellectual point of view, the atheist hypothesis. Such a hypothesis could not help being part of the very act of formulating the question of God s existence. Meanwhile, such rational proofs render the existence of God into a derived thesis, or a claim of the attributes proper to the divine essence, or a thesis on features of a global vision of the world. Taking into consideration the ways as seen from the world, one can conceive it as a chain of causes and effects, in accordance to various types of causation (efficient or final), or as a diversity of natures with distinct degrees of perfection: whatever the cases, the philosophy of proofs determines that one stops at a first one, be it a first cause or an extremely perfect nature, by means of rational aversion to actual infinity, the most common conviction in ancient and medieval philosophy. The concept of God thus resulting from these two types of proofs does not require one to include a provident attribute: a first cause can be merely a first cause, hence its action does not have to comprehend the universe of its mediate effects, especially the ones set furthest; an extremely perfect nature, if it is impassive, in itself an ancient attribute of perfection, does not have to provide for the needs of imperfect natures. However, it is possible to admit infinite series of successive and perishable causes, as shown by human generation, a case in which, once the parents have perished, the children keep their ability to breed, and thus the action of subsequent causes is not hindered by the disappearance of previous causes. This possibility weakens the thesis of the necessity of a first cause. Therefore, a philosopher from the transition of the Middle Ages to Modernity, William of Ockham, inclined to be skeptical and theologically cautious, proposes to overcome the fallibility of traditional arguments for causality using his way of conservation. This way depends on the specificity of the cause conserving its effect, which can be differentiated because it remains and cannot perish along the duration of its effect, whether this is immediate or mediate. If the world is a chain of causes conserving their effects, and if this chain is infinite, it will then be presently infinite, seeing that the conserving causes do not succeed each other; instead, they remain concomitantly

53 Providence: The Believer s Faith and the Philosopher s Distrust 53 to their effects, both the immediate and the mediate. Nevertheless this is what is rejected by this philosopher from the threshold of Modernity, because of the very same ancient and medieval aversion to actual infinity. It is therefore pertinent to have a first conserving cause of the world, that may not be unique or eternal, but that cannot fail to be provident. Out of the conserving way, in the tradition of the proofs of God s existence, comes the concept of a provident God. This inclusion of providence in the rational defense of God s existence offers a philosophically plausible frame for the very issue of divine providence, which we formulate this way: can divine providence be extended to each individual in particular, or does it only attend to the conservation of the world as a whole? Can divine providence be a case of a single or of a global providence? The path within faith Believers do not believe in anything but a particular divine providence. What meaning could there be in their prayers if they did not believe that God can help them in moments of hardships and needs? Without the belief in a particular divine providence there would not be space for pleading in prayer. But where does the belief in a particular divine providence come from? Among all living beings, naturally equipped as they are for their endeavors in the struggle for survival and for adapting to their environments, the human being is the one that best perceives the uncertainties of his survival and the certainty of his death. We can even characterize the human being by means of the cruel awareness of the precariousness of his condition what we usually call in philosophy conscience of finitude. In order to face the limitations of his fragile condition, the human being built civilizations and in them developed social protection systems, and also systems to control environmental menaces, well illustrated as they are by those implemented by modern science and technology; but he also developed ideological systems that allow for the protection of the certain and uncertain in existence, such as the ones coming from long ago with the cultural heritage of various peoples, their religious traditions included. In spite of the high standards of well -being reached by modern civilization in several parts of the globe, significantly diminishing the material hardships of human life, nevertheless, former ideas of wealth and destiny, luck and misfortune, good and evil, providence and chance been overcome ideas where we have culturally learnt to think about the vulnerability of our condition: wealth is unexpected and bipolar, it is what suddenly turns a situation around; destiny is not to be fought, it inexorably falls upon us, obstructing any of our whims for self- determination; luck and misfortune are fortuitous resulting from an aleatory crossing of causes; good and evil are intentional, they expose our ability to intervene, either for what we avoid enduring or for what we strive to do; providence as opposed to chance is protective, it is what watches over us beyond ourselves. Among all these, here described impressionistically, is the idea of providence that allows for making the other ideas relative, integrating them as partial aspects. This is what Boethius

54 54 Maria Leonor L. O. Xavier does in his Consolation of Philosophy, one of the oldest and best known Consolations of Philosophy. The idea of providence is therefore a very appealing idea to rise to the challenge of understanding human life. We find it in the believer s faith in a particular divine providence. The first motivation of the believer to believe in a particular divine providence is the protection of his own life, this meaning that health is usually the main priority in his prayers. Afterwards, there comes the supplying of his needs and even the satisfaction of his worldly desires concerning human affection, material goods, social status, professional success, etc. The believer relies on divine providence for the tiniest details in his life. The belief in a particular divine providence is primitively egocentric. The believer believes he is in God s hand, as if God had a hand just for the believer himself. This egocentric state of the believer s faith stands out in circumstances related to catastrophe -like situations. Take for example the case of a passenger who unwillingly and by a series of last minute random events ends up missing a flight in a plane that later crashes and kills all its occupants: upon realizing that the moment of his certain death had been postponed, that passenger gives testimony of what his feeling of being the preferred target of divine providence is, granting to God the fact that he made it out alive. It is not rare to witness similar testimonials under identical circumstances. Such testimonials however bring about outrage in the non -believer who then asks: the other passengers that perished in the accident, were they then neglected by the same divine providence? In fact, that believer s testimonial is so self -centered that unwillingly excludes all care for the other. Hence, be it by means of the scandal felt by the non -believer or by means of any inner admonishment of his conscience, the believer is led to rid his faith of all selfishness and to include the welfare of the other in his prayers. The hand of divine providence has to be a collective hand. It cannot be particular without being universal. The belief in a particular providence that is not universal is not morally bearable. The believer s faith is an ethically self -vigilant path. In the meantime, and going back to catastrophe -like scenarios, it is known that when there are survivors, they tend to feel responsible for the destiny of the non -survivors, and as a result receive psychological support whenever possible. But where does this feeling of guilt, apparently exceeding reasonable limits, come from? It is like an abscess of moral conscience that cannot be explained by the crude plain facts. Why should survivors feel guilty because they could not help others? They are all defenseless victims faced with the strength of the catastrophe. But the survivors still feel guilty for not being able to assist others, as if they had not willed to do it. This seems inappropriate, preposterous, unless it is an outbreak of our own conscience of un -love, or of the love we do not usually feel for each other. Catastrophic situations arouse that kind of guilty conscience of our un -love for others resulting from what we cannot do for them, as if we had willed not to do it. Believer and non -believer alike may suffer from such guilt, as if both of them were agents of a failed providence, divine or merely human. Let s follow the believer s path. He seeks to overcome the mortification of his guilt, for his wanting actions and will, de -centering his own will and submitting

55 Providence: The Believer s Faith and the Philosopher s Distrust 55 himself entirely to divine will. Now the believer silences all requests for himself and for the others, and his praying gives place to worship that is no longer silent speech, but is instead the inner hearing of God s will. Now the believer no more expects anything for himself, or for others, from divine providence, he just wants to do God s will. When he substitutes divine will for his own, his faith is purified from all selfishness. Faith thus means absolute self -renunciation and unconditional submission to God. The path that leads the believer to this level of faith is the path of the perfection of faith. By self -renunciation, the believer gets free of himself, relinquishing his worldly affections, ties and interests, which is in fact freedom. But this is not a freedom that alienates the believer in his human condition and that puts him in a state of ethereal delight. It is rather the freedom of the believer ready for sacrifice and martyrdom and which is, therefore, a contra naturam freedom that hails victory in the believer s struggle against the vital inclination of his nature, since it is detachment from life itself and from the most beloved beings, not to be attained without the deepest anguish and the most excruciating suffering. This is what we find in the steps of doubt and misery which make Abraham s path on his way to sacrifice his son Isaac, according to Fear and Trembling by Søren Kierkegaard. Abraham accepted God s will, God spared Isaac but Abraham lost his joy after his ordeal, because he could have sacrificed his son as if he was willing to do it, as if he had not loved him. Many and various causes, much more earthly than what faith in God is, have led many men and women to martyrdom and to sacrifice what they hold dearest. All those causes are humanly understandable even if not everyone is willing to die for them. Abraham s case is distinct: never did he understand his path or the reason why God asked him to sacrifice Isaac. Abraham s faith is incomprehensible. But Kierkegaard understands Abraham s faith. Only a religious thinker like himself can understand Abraham s faith. Nevertheless, philosophy is not confessionally compromised and understands the doubts and the loss of joy felt by Abraham better than his faith does. Whereas the path to faith may be understood as a way to reach human perfection, ethically demanding and liberating us from mundane affection, the extreme ordeal Abraham s faith was subjected to is not only opposed to the usual ethical patterns pertaining to common sense but it also upsets rational conscience, cultivated philosophically to be close to the values of human dignity and divine goodness, as it truly is. In fact, Abraham s and God s conduct alike defy those values: on one side, Abraham behaves himself as a compliant subject submitting his own will to the most cruel command of his Lord, but unworthy of understanding it; on the other side, how can one avoid comparing Abraham s God to a sovereign willing to test the fidelity of his subjects to the limit? The resemblance cannot be disguised. There is too much anthropomorphism in the conception of God, implied in Abraham s unconditional faith. Such an anthropomorphic God who does not project the best in man has two ruinous consequences: the dispossession of the human being by stimulating in him submission without questioning, and the superior provision of all his suffering. First of all, self -depletion through the sacrifice of personal will is a commandment common to several ideals of religious life, but philosophy, having for centuries

56 56 Maria Leonor L. O. Xavier recommended rational discipline, is mistrustful. Actually, the set of ideals ruling over resignation to oneself and to one s will make believers vulnerable to powers exerting control over people and their individual wills. Therefore, such ideals do not consent to our expressing of a philosophical agreement. Moreover, a God who subjects the human being to huge trials without understanding His designs as with Abraham and the sacrifice of his own son, or as with Job to extreme neglect and poverty inconceivably transforms His providence into a providence of the suffering. As a matter of fact, the path within faith ends up leading the believer to accept all the ordeals diseases, handicaps and other losses as an expression of God s will. The believer suffers because God so wishes. God s impenetrable justifies the suffering of the believer. Protective providence which motivates the believer has from the start been transcended into an inconceivably penalizing providence. Such providence conflates the conformation of a few and the rebellion of others, it makes faith, or encourages denial; and while remaining close to bipolar fortune, it distances itself from any kind of rational ideal, prone to philosophical consent.

57 From a Differentiation in Times to the Earnestness of Existence. (Some elements of the Three Upbuilding Discourses of 1843 useful for an understanding of the category of repetition.) José Miranda Justo University of Lisbon Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon 1. It is well known that on October 16 th 1843, three volumes put on paper by Søren Kierkegaard came out in Copenhagen: Three Upbuilding Discourses, under his own name, Fear and Trembling, signed Johannes de silentio, and Repetition, under the name Constantin Constantius. What I shall propose here is only a combined reading of a few relevant passages of the first of the Three Upbuilding Discourses and some moments of Kierkegaard s Repetition, where Constantius goes further in his theoretical remarks on the category of repetition. The first two discourses of the Three Upbuilding Discourses exhaustively explore the passage of the first Letter of the Apostle Peter (4:7-12), where the Apostle states that love will hide a multitude of sins. The two discourses result in a brilliant exercise, upbuilding as well as hermeneutical, around the theme of love, that is to say, on caritas. The text from Chapter 13 of the first letter of the Apostle Paul to the Corinthians is then summoned to play a crucial role, mainly on the first discourse, where it becomes a real mechanism for the potentiating of interpretative possibilities. It so happens that there are multiple elements, namely in the first discourse, that allow us to detect a double structure of time which seems to underlie Kierkegaard s category of repetition. To start with, the whole is made to depend on a basic distinction between two forms of temporality: in opposition to the quick, brief time of mere understanding, subordinated to immediate interest, we find, on the other side, the long, slow, protracted time of amorous intelligence, where repetition efficiently works. Such a mechanism, destined as it is to differentiate between times and rhythms, cannot obviously be confused with any literary device or biblical remission, merely capable of rendering the necessary metaphors to a rhetorical development of what is the homiletic texture of the discourses. What actually matters is to underline the philosophical content that can be detected in this asymmetrical distribution of times, which, in a way, is due to Kierkegaard s deliberate reconfiguration of the type of phenomenology that Hegel constructs for the spirit, since in opposing the uniformity of Hegelian time new factors emerge that insistently render more complex all analytical Kierkegaard in Lisbon, Lisboa, CFUL, 2012, pp

58 58 José Miranda Justo possibilities thus opening up territory for experimental thinking in Kierkegaardian psychology, and for the philosophical conceptualization which is its counterpart. It is true that in the Three Upbuilding Discourses here at stake there are no explicit references to the concept of repetition, 1 but it is also true that several occurrences of the distinction between slow time and quick time are to be found, with direct consequences for the understanding of the category we propose to clarify. 2 In the initial section of the first discourse, (EUD 61) we find a paradigmatic passage: When rashness lives in the heart, a person is quick to discover the multiplicity of sin, then he understands splendidly a fragmentary utterance, hastily comprehends at a distance something scarcely enunciated. When love lives in the heart, a person understands slowly and does not hear at all words said in haste and does not understand them when repeated because he assigns them [i.e. can only assign them] a good position and a good meaning; he does not understand the long angry or insulting verbal assault, because he is waiting for one more word that will give it meaning. There is an explicit distinction between two rhythms: on the one hand, we have hastiness in comprehension, the celerity of rashness, words said in haste, and on the other, the slowly understanding, waiting for the right moment (kairos) when exact meaning arises. The efficiency of such a distinction is also clear: the first series is connected to a type of understanding which is quick and unconsidered apprehension, and also to the multiplicity of sin, that is to say, to the disjointed dispersal of meaning (or sense); the second series, in turn, is connected to love (in the sense of caritas), but also to an interpretative attitude toward the other s speech, that is posited as the capacity to find the good position and the good meaning in the words of the other, and also, as the intense, yet simultaneously expectant, desire for meaning. Three topics of obvious philosophical relevance emerge here: (1) the constitution of meaning, (2) the opposition between understanding and caritas, taken as different dispositions for meaning (i.e. for different modes of meaning), and (3) the topic of multiplicity. We shall start by analyzing the two latter issues in their functional interaction and leave the first for a later moment in this paper. Understanding, 3 as it is dealt with in the first pages of the first discourse, is seen as a faculty which is by itself limited: understanding, on its own, has action 1 Such a reference occurs in fact in the last discourse of the Four Upbuilding Discourses of 1843, To gain one s soul in patience (EUD 169) where Kierkegaard uses the expression a redoubling repetition. In the Three Upbuilding Discourses here at stake the only time the term repetition is used it has a negative meaning as we shall see further on. 2 Although in a sense not coincident with the one we adopt here, Randall G. Colton rigorously establishes the importance of the Three Upbuilding Discourses of 1843 for an enlarged understanding of the category of repetition: Perception, Emotion, and Development in Kierkegaard s Moral Pedagogy, in: Robert L. Perkins (ed.), Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 5, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 2003, especially pp On the problem of understanding in its relation with rationality from the point of view of Kierkegaard s reading of Hegel see Matthew Dickerson Hejduk, Hegel, Kierkegaard and the Limits of Rationality, Dissert., University of Dallas, 2006, especially Section II, pp. 156ff. See also David

59 From a Differentiation in Times to the Earnestness of Existence. 59 on the level of the immediacy of brief time, and consequently, it presents two negative characteristics (two modalities of negation) which will mark the difference of understanding in relation to love; on the one hand, understanding abuses what it intends to imprison, and on the other, it remains on a level of indetermination, that is to say, it doesn t reach the necessary degree of determination to attain the singularity, peculiar to the constitution of meaning. If understanding is capable of transforming good into evil, it is due to its lack of power to act over the multiplicity of sin ; understanding is far from hiding (or erasing) the multiplicity of sin; not only does it repeat multiplicity, it also makes multiplicity more multiple: When an appetite for sin lives in the heart, the eye discovers the multiplicity of sin and makes it even more multiple [ ]. When the anxiety of sin lives in the heart, the ear discovers the multiplicity of sin and makes it even more multiple. (EUD 60) Hence, understanding plays a strictly negative role, and its negativity fails even to render justice to the old equation between negatio and determinatio: instead, it multiplies indetermination, since what understanding is apparently determining increases in its deficit of meaning, grows in its presence of evil, and drastically narrows that territory of the productivity of meaning that we might call life, a point to which we return in the second part of this paper to see how Constantius articulates life and repetition. Strictly speaking, only the desire for meaning life is capable of overcoming indetermination, capable of introducing unity into multiplicity, capable of hiding a multitude of sins and of translating evil into good. (EUD 61) We shall consider later on how this determination takes place in the experience of singularity and how it produces an effect of singularity. First we shall consider how love stands opposite to mere understanding in order to create a superior possibility of comprehension. In its actual philosophical incidence i.e., not from a strictly theological point of view, caritas, being as it is desire for meaning, is first of all affection. We have seen that understanding, taken on its own, is negation, and in this sense it is a kind of active violence that also denies the primordial role of passivity. Passivity, in the rigorous sense of the verb pathein, is the condition for all meaning and all living which manifests itself through the positing of meaning, the poiein. Now the mode of existence of passivity taken as a condition for the productivity of meaning, for the production of the unity that overcomes multiplicity and for the type of action which is to be found only after it works precisely on the same side of the above mentioned extended time. Extended time is thus the condition of the condition. Once we have filled in this complex set of conditions we are able to understand how and where repetition works. Repetition, in its superior sense, is after all the slow operation which favors (instead of causing) the sudden moment of an emergence of meaning, that brings to mind what a later philosophical language will call the phenomenological reduction. J. Gouwens, Understanding, Imagination, and Irony in Kierkegaard s Repetition, in Robert L. Perkins, Fear and Trembling and Repetition, International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 6, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1993, pp. 283ff.

60 60 José Miranda Justo In the context of the quoted passage, repetition seems to occur only in its poor sense, as simple reproduction of the same, leaving us at the level Kierkegaard names the multiplicity of sin ( When love lives in the heart, a person [ ] does not hear at all words said in haste and does not understand them when repeated because he assigns them [any words] a good position and a good meaning. ) But there s no doubt that productive repetition winks at us amidst the interrelation between the two last assertions in that passage: if, no matter how much the words repeat themselves, a man filled with caritas does not superiorly understand what can only be understood hastily and in an inferior way by a man living in hastiness, on the other hand, it is no less true that a man filled with caritas waits, in repetition, for one more word, which in the exact moment of accumulation will allow him to intuit a meaning until then unattainable, in other words, will allow him to ascend to the sudden constitution of a kind of meaning that assumes the form of a singular illumination. 4 Though for many readers of Kierkegaard the evidence provided by the philosopher s statements on the question of the singular and singularity, namely in the texts assembled in The Point of View, is taken for granted, there is nonetheless a curious shortage of critical bibliography on what we might call the analytics of the singular, which might render the philosophical effectiveness of this category explicit. In this circumstance, we will only underline two constituting aspects of this issue: first, the radical difference between the singular and the particular; and second, the effect of the experience of singularity in what concerns the sudden inflexion necessary to the extreme newness of meaning production. These two sides of the question shall in turn take us to the discussion of the Kierkegaardian issue of freedom. The singular emerges not only as opposed to the general, but also opposed to what is strictly particular. 5 Let us begin by saying that the particular is exactly that part of our experience that does not communicate, that part that only communicates with other particulars, inasmuch as the general may subsume a group of particulars. Hence, a particular experience does not add any productivity at all beyond the generalizing task of the understanding; in a way, it provides the violence of understanding with amorphous material, without which that same understanding cannot perform its function, a function that consists in forgetting what is particular in the particular, and in working exclusively with the remaining general. Conversely, the singular is the decisive factor that puts into question the effectiveness of generalization; the singular, by completely escaping the reductionist task of understanding when operating in the narrowness of its exclusiveness, is what compels our creative faculties to work in a new direction distinguished from that of 4 The suddenness of the constitution of meaning as a revelation from the future is pointed out by Edward F. Mooney in his introduction to the latest English translation of Repetition: S. K., Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs, transl. by M. G. Piety, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. viii. 5 See José M. Justo, Um Argos a Norte. J. G. Hamann: experiência da singularidade e periferia da Filosofia [ An Argus to the North. J. G. Hamann: Experience of Singularity and the Periphery of Philosophy ], an appendix to J. G. Hamann, Memoráveis Socráticas [Portuguese translation of Socratic Memorabilia], Lisboa: CFUL, 1999, pp. 108ff.

61 From a Differentiation in Times to the Earnestness of Existence. 61 mere understanding. We might say that the singular is an obstacle in our thinking, thus compelling our thought to change direction. Changing direction is therefore the inner kernel of the question of the relationship between the singular and meaning this takes us back to Hamann s notion (but also Nietzsche s) 6 that a gain in sense or meaning always amounts to substituting an image for another image, that is to say, always depends on the effectiveness of metaphorical transposition (metapherein). Now, the topic of singularity reaches its highest point when one conceives its deep relation to the topic of alterity: and the explicit relation elaborated by Kierkegaard between alterity and singularity, as it is posited in the Preface to the Three Upbuilding Discourses of 1843, may only be understood in all its implications, if we are able to set it within an explicit conception of the constitution of meaning. 7 If the one who by no means claims to be a teacher, just as he refuses that he has authority to preach, may say that his writing is looking for that single individual ( hiin Enkelte ), his reader ( my reader ), who is that favorably disposed person who reads aloud to himself what [the author = I] write[s] in stillness, and by doing so in his mood rescues the captive thoughts that long for release, in such a way that the author can call him his refuge and add that this reader does more for the author than the author for him, (EUD 53) if this is so, it is certainly because that other singular is absolutely indispensable in order to set a dialogical relation, upon which the increase in meaning pursued in the discourses gains form. Extended time that fosters the possibility of replacing an insufficient image by a suddenly illuminating image is not a time of loneliness or seclusion; conversely, it has to be a time of multiplying interpretative possibilities, a time of waiting, at the same time passively and actively, a time in which dialogical exchange, though still created and sustained fictionally within the multiplying potentialities contained in writing, is the truly enabling factor for the effect of radical novelty which the process results in. (We can also thereby understand, in the whole of Kierkegaard s production, the heuristic role similarly played by the pseudonym production, since it is similarly dialogical and experimental.) 8 To sum up the process we have been describing, we can say that repetition is the slow mechanism of quantitative accumulation which, by means of the re -configurating and re -orientating experience of the singular namely in the dialogical relation, allows at a certain moment for that qualitative transfiguration that is entitled to be named as constitution of meaning. However, if it is true that this process, as we have seen, decisively includes passivity, it is no less true that it does not confine itself to passivity, since in that case 6 Hamann, Aesthetica in nuce, 1762, Sämtliche Werke, vol. II, p. 197; Nietzsche, Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne, Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. I, p. 879f. 7 The topic of alterity in its relationship to the category of repetition is dealt with in its philosophical implications by Niels Nymann Eriksen in Kierkegaard s Category of Repetition, A Reconstruction, Berlin, New York: W. de Gruyter, 2000, pp See José M. Justo, Polinómio -Kierkegaard. Apresentação de um segmento de experimentação em pensamento [ Polynomial -Kierkegaard. Presentation of a Segment of Experimentation in Thought ], an appendix to Kierkegaard, in vino veritas [Portuguese translation of the first part of Stages in Life s Way], Lisbon: Antígona, 2005, pp. 177ff.

62 62 José Miranda Justo there would be no form of productivity, and very probably, we would be in the non- communicating domain of the particular. On the contrary, if passivity is a condition of the process, quantitative accumulation should be seen as the desiring effort that develops the passive affection in its pre -configurative efficiency and gives passivity its necessary complement. Kierkegaard is explicit in what concerns the complex that comprehends passivity and activity in the accumulating process he calls observation ( Betragtning : denoting something as to produce observations ): all observation is not just receiving, a discovering, but also a bringing forth [Frembringe]. (EUD 59) For that very reason, the philosopher comments, we need a disposition (let s say of our Gemüt / animus ) favorable to productivity, a disposition which does not consist merely in a form of receptive attention, but that should instead reveal itself as a tending inclination toward productivity, that is to say, what we may call an effective desire for meaning. Now, this desire that concedes to repetition the necessary orientation to its own productivity is only possible, if the subject is able to take difference as a starting point in order to reach that amplified form of difference which is the constitution of meaning; and taking the difference as a starting point means precisely to start with a choice that is favorable to the inclination to desire. As Kierkegaard says, it is all about understanding that the productivity of observation, taken to the extreme, depends on freedom: [ ] the more the object of observation belongs to the world of spirit, the more important is the way he himself [the subject of observation] is constituted in his innermost nature, because everything spiritual is appropriated only in freedom; but what is appropriated in freedom is also brought forth. (EUD 60) We can thus realize how freedom can be understood as the radical condition for the productivity of repetition When Constantin Constantius, in the opening paragraph of Repetition, establishes the opposition between recollection (anamnesis) and repetition by claiming that [ ] as they [the Greeks] taught that all knowing is a recollecting, modern philosophy will teach that all life is a repetition, (R 131) there are consequences to be drawn from this initial statement. 10 When Constantius apparently reverses the logic of recollection and puts forward repetition as the modern symmetrical category to the Greek one, he is moving from the level of knowledge, strictly speaking, to a thoroughly different level: life. It might thus be said that we don t have a mere inversion here but an 9 On the relationship between freedom and repetition see Dorothea Glöckner, Kierkegaards Begriff der Wiederholung, Eine Studie zu seinem Freheitsverständnis, Berlin, New York: W. de Gruyter, 1998, especially pp On the theoretical outline of the problem of repetition in Constantius conception see Arne Grøn, Repetition and the concept of repetition, in: Topicos, Universidad Panamericana, México, pp

63 From a Differentiation in Times to the Earnestness of Existence. 63 actual transposition to a different genus. (We shall see to what extent this metabasis is connected to the initial remarks on the Greek theme of movement (kinesis)). It thus seems necessary to go beyond the understanding of repetition, as aimed at a prospective horizon of meaning constitution, which was our goal in the first part of the present paper. The question that ought to guide us now is the following: what does it mean, then, to substitute life for knowledge? A first approach to the issue involves quite a direct answer: neither Kierkegaard, nor his pseudonyms, are interested in a reflection that separates cognitive activity from life experience, in order to study the former autonomously, to a lesser or higher extent. In Kierkegaard, we don t find anything that may be labeled as the problem of knowledge. And this is a logical consequence of Kierkegaard s critical positioning towards the system: the aim here is far from any kind of systematic organization of a philosophical building, with specific levels or compartments although communicating with one another. For Kierkegaard, to focus philosophical reflection on the issue of knowledge would consequently bring an effect of alienation: philosophy would emerge entirely as an artificial academic structure, far from what really matters: salvation, or in laicized terms, the detection or the construction of a meaning to life. And this is exactly why it is life, and not knowledge, that is here wholly understood as repetition. However, the problem tends to become more complex when we examine the statement: all life is a repetition. (R 131) Why all life? At first glance, and despite understanding the effectiveness of repetition for the constitution of meaning, it might sound reasonable to understand that there is repetition and non -repetition, and to realize that the fundamental decisions concerning the ethics of meaning might have to do with the issue of free choice between non -repetition and the productivity of repetition. But that is not the case. For Kierkegaard fully understands that non- repetition, instead of being a legitimate truth of things themselves (of certain things in themselves), is instead a certain understanding of the things, a point of view on things; as hermeneutics, it is undoubtedly poor, but it is nonetheless active: a negative dispersive understanding, that multiplies sin. One finds here at stake two ways of understanding things, and the abovementioned freedom is also the freedom of choice between these two paths. Now, if the good choice is the choice of repetition, what reasons may be accounted for? They would most certainly have to do with the promise of meaning that repetition installs. But how does the promise of meaning tell us that we can indeed find a meaning, and that we can deal with that meaning, as the kind of guaranteed life orientation that we use to call truth? In a way we can say that this happens simply because repetition carries in itself its own reiteration. Repetition is after all the modern version of the circular typology that Kierkegaard knew very well from pietistic tradition and, in particular, from reading Hamann. In the heart of repetition, one finds the constructive role of analogy, that is, man s surest guide below, in the words of the poet Edward Young, quoted by Hamann in a note to his Socratic Memorabilia Sämtliche Werke, vol. II, p. 61; Engl. translation: Socratic Memorabilia, in Gwen Griffith Dickson, Johann Georg Hamann s Relational Metacriticism, Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1995, p. 379.

64 64 José Miranda Justo Analogy, however, by being the very movement of thought, allows to understand in its own process the deep reason for Constantius critique of Hegelian mediation, and consequently, the motive that lies behind his saying, repetition is the interest of metaphysics. (EUD 149) Analogy operates on the level of extended time, and this is also the level of small movements. Hegelian mediation stands out as the central element of a broad movement, the dialectical movement and its ambition for synthesis. Contrariwise, in repetition, analogy takes place on a level of minimal differences: to repeat the detail in order that one may come closer to the possibility of exhausting its signification. When Constantius summons Heraclitus against the Eleatics, he does so to support kinesis, interpreted not as a perpetual cosmological movement, but instead, as the movement of thought itself, the kind of movement that operates within what Leibniz would call small perceptions, and this may be the reason why Constantius says that the philosopher from Hannover was the only modern thinker to have an intimation (EUD 131) of the meaning of repetition. Minimal differences are thus the seminal factor of the meaning to which thought aspires, and the weaving of the web of minimal differences that repetition allows for is the interstitial net that modern metaphysics needs in order to be able to escape from the limitations of the Hegelian category of transition (EUD 149) in which the projection of the leap is so to speak, deadly, and to escape from the ethnical view of life that is to say from a pagan comprehension of life which doesn t contemplate faith, in the sense that belief in the possibility of meaning that has not yet been demonstrated is the humus that vivifies all the process of meaning constitution. 12 With this consideration, it seems that the movement of thought can indeed be grasped briefly in the formula repetition and difference, as long as difference is conceived above all as minimal difference and as progressive configuration of a web of minimal differences. There is, however, a last aspect of the category of repetition that should be underlined. Constantin Constantius says: Repetition that is actuality and the earnestness of existence. The person who wills repetition is mature in earnestness. This is my private opinion [Separat -votum] [ ]. (R 133) Separat -votum may also be translated as special vote or voting statement. And in another passage, Constantius says that repetition is the watchword [Løsnet] in every ethical view; repetition is conditio sine qua non for every issue of dogmatics. (R 149) Watchword and voting statement are linguistic acts that are used here to establish a scope for the appraisal of the ethical interest of repetition. The watchword either points at a guidance or at something that allows us to enter a reserved domain that is to say, repetition is the fundamental guidance that must be kept at sight, in order to attain the exact moment of the decision for the ethical choice which in Kierkegaard is above all the choice of oneself; but at the same time it is the key that opens up 12 On the relationship between faith and repetition see Mark L. Taylor, Ordeal and Repetition in Kierkegaard s Treatment of Abraham and Job, in: George B. Connell and C. Stephen Evans (eds.), Foundation s of Kierkegaard s Vision of Community, New Jersey, London: Humanities Press, 1992, especially pp. 43ff.

65 From a Differentiation in Times to the Earnestness of Existence. 65 the path to the domain of the ethical. On the other hand, the voting statement, while indicating the conclusive gesture of the decision process, also means the proposition that condenses the exact choice process. Hence, watchword and voting statement are expressions that suggest a coherent connection between ethical choice and earnestness of existence. (R 133) To become mature in earnestness is to develop the necessary conditions for the practice of freedom in order to make a choice in meaning, which is the choice for a comprehension of existence, a singular comprehension that can then emerge as universal, and that synthesizes the interest that man places in his ethical life. If that clarification of the ethical interest doesn t take place, in Kierkegaard s view, there won t be any possibility of moving on to the tasks of dogmatics. This step eventually allows us to understand the options of Kierkegaard s thought, where not only is the interest of metaphysics at stake, but also the interest of dogmatics; both interests develop within the process of repetition, taking the singular as the point of departure so as to attain a universal meaning. The maturity and the earnestness mentioned by Constantius are thus the last embodiment of the protracted time with which we began these reflections on the relation between meaning and the category of repetition.

66

67 Speaking in Human Terms Elisabete M. de Sousa Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon Harold Bloom repeatedly refers to Kierkegaard s speculative enterprise as the immense difficulty of becoming a Christian in a society ostensibly Christian, 1 thus adding a more dramatic, if not pathetic tone, to Kierkegaard s late admission that my entire work as an author revolves around becoming a Christian in Christendom. (PV 90) According to Bloom, it is Kierkegaard s stance as a religious writer that provides a logical explanation not only for his individual plight and his production as a whole, but also for the indelible stamp of despair 2 and even for the fierceness of his attack on the Church: Kierkegaard, another [the other previously mentioned is Jesus] master of irony (which he called indirect communication ), remarked in his Judge for yourself!: Christianity has completely conquered that is, it is abolished! [JFY 188] Evidently, the Danish sage meant that you could become a Christian only in opposition to the established order. 3 In a commentary on chapter A a) α) Infinitude s Despair is to Lack Finitude in The Sickness unto Death, (SUD 30-33) Bloom also draws a parallel between the widespread principles of religious belief that proclaim that an increase in knowledge past certain bounds may bring sin, and Kierkegaard s awareness that every increase in consciousness means an increase in despair. 4 This kind of parallel allows him to picture Kierkegaard as someone destined to live under two inevitable despairs: the despair of having failed to become oneself, or the still greater despair of having become oneself. 5 Bloom takes self -consciousness, anxiety, knowledge, sin, and despair, as the essence of Kierkegaard s outstanding speculative thought and of his poetic art, as both the object and the substance of his activity as an author, in a manner that sets him afar from other more literary prone commentators. All the elements I mentioned are systematically taken as the necessary component in order to elucidate Kierkegaard s poetics and thought, and on the other side, they are also used as a fundamental basis for his theory, and practice, of literary criticism. Even when Kierkegaard is seen 1 See Introduction, in Søren Kierkegaard, Modern Critical Views, ed. and introd. by Harold Bloom, New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1991, pp. 1-4, here p See Harold Bloom, Genius: A Mosaic of One Hundred Exemplary Creative Minds, New York: Warner Books, 2003, p. 199; hereafter GENIUS. 3 See Harold Bloom, Jesus and Yahweh: The Names Divine, New York: Riverhead Books, 2005, p See Harold Bloom, Shelley s Mythmaking, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959, p See Harold Bloom, Essayists and Prophets, New York: Chelsea House Publications, 2005, p. 66. Kierkegaard in Lisbon, Lisboa, CFUL, 2012, pp

68 68 Elisabete M. de Sousa under the same light as other great European romantics, as having lived in [t]he night world of the Romantic demonism and religiosity, this is what opens the way for Bloom to single out Kierkegaard s personal despair as a manifestation of the dark path of inwardness trailed by many romantics, and at the same time, as one of the factors that compelled him to move forward (even when moving forward is moving inwards) in order to pursue the ultimate quest of becoming a Christian instructed only by the Christ himself. (GENIUS 200) Although Bloom s best known commentary among Kierkegaardian scholars is probably [w]hatever he may have yearned for, he was a genius and not an apostle, as he surely knew, (ibid. 202) the truth is that Bloom never lets the genius overlook the apostle. Despite taking him less [as] a religious writer than as a poetic speculator, in his opinion, Kierkegaard together with Nietzsche may endure as the critic of religiosity. (ibid. 196) Moreover, Bloom adds that Kierkegaard could not have appreciated the terrible irony that, for most of us, he is a literary genius, despite his intense spiritual aspirations, and though praising his religious insights, he firmly states that the works which matter for literary tradition are his fascinating meditations upon seduction, repetition, and the dark night of the soul, dominated by his irony, inventiveness, and psychological acuity. (ibid. 197) I propose now to analyze the implications of another statement by Bloom concerning Kierkegaard s production: Negation of seeming realities in an ostensibly Christian society is the essence of Kierkegaard s genius. (ibid. 199) This remark seems to me if not more fitting, at least more challenging, as not only does it link both sides of the question, but it also takes the seeming realities beyond the context of the attack upon Christendom, as we shall see, by analyzing some of the modes of seeming realities in Repetition, Fear and Trembling, and Upbuilding Discourses. Let s first consider what Bloom understands by Kierkegaard s genius. Among the several kinds of genius classified in Genius: a Mosaic of One Hundred Exemplary Creative Minds, Kierkegaard is placed under the edge of Binah, that is, intellect in a receptive mode, an intelligence not so much passive as dramatically open to the power of wisdom. (ibid. xiii) On its own, the statement already stands as an interpretation of his creativeness, together with the reasons put forward for lining him up in the same panel as Nietzsche, Kafka, Proust and Beckett; 6 Bloom explains how they are all united by their condition as extraordinary knowers of the breaking of the light, for being visionaries with an exacerbated spirituality (ibid. 191) in other words, they stand for actualizations of creative minds, combining in a high degree the drive to be a vox clamantis in deserto, with full poetic enthusiasm and the breadth of a long distance runner. Not surprisingly, in the section dedicated to Kierkegaard, Bloom inserts a quote from The Moment on the thunderstorm quality of the genius: 6 Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Kafka, Proust and Beckett are included in the first sequence (Lustre 5), while Molière, Ibsen, Chekhov, Wilde and Pirandello are included in the second (Lustre 6). The Lustres refer to the conditions of shining by reflected light, the gloss or sheen that one genius imparts to another, when juxtaposed in my mosaic. (GENIUS xv).

69 Speaking in Human Terms 69 Geniuses are like a thunderstorm: they go against the wind, terrify people, clear the air. / The established order has invented various lightning rods. / And it succeeded; it succeeded in making the next thunderstorm all the more serious. (M 204) Bloom reiterates that Kierkegaard might see Christ as such a thunderstorm genius, (GENIUS 199) and cites a second longer passage, also from The Moment, where the comparison of the Christian to the genius exploits the virtues of the extraordinary and the ordinary, applied to the nature of the genius and to the freedom of the Christian, with the well -known conclusion that Christians are more rare than geniuses: That not everyone is a genius no doubt everyone will admit. But that a Christian is even more rare than a genius this has knavishly been consigned to oblivion. // The difference between a genius and a Christian is that the genius is nature s extraordinary; no human being can make himself into one. A Christian is freedom s extraordinary or more precisely, freedom s ordinary, except that this is found extraordinarily seldom, is what every one of us should be. Therefore God wants Christianity to be proclaimed unconditionally to all, therefore the apostles are very simple, ordinary people, therefore the prototype is in the lowly form of a servant, all this in order to indicate that this extraordinary is the ordinary, is open to all but a Christian is nevertheless something even more rare than a genius. (M 180) The second citation, however, is less targeted at the question of Kierkegaard s geniality than at the difference between the genius and the apostle, an issue that is discussed by Bloom in a rather indirect but distinct manner. In part, this relies on the fact that, in Bloom s analysis, one actually finds common features in speech and act that bring the verbal and behavioral pattern of the disciples close to the thunderstorm quality of the genius, since this quality and recollecting forwards lie in the core of Bloom s claim that [t]he disciples mode of repetition is the perpetual renewal of their prospect for becoming a Christian, in the sense that in Christ s words they receive Christ s love both from themselves and for mankind. (GENIUS 200) Hence, for Bloom, the disciples mode of repetition becomes a form of poetical misprision in the face of Christ s words, making them act out as Christ s mediation agents, this meaning that they misread the words of Christ, and are thus authors of a personal and necessarily curtailed or truncated version of the words of Christ, instead of providing faithful transcriptions of his actual message. In accordance, the disciples posit themselves as poetic creators in their Primal Scene of Instruction, 7 and do not fit into the terms defined for the apostle in The Difference between the Genius and the Apostle on the contrary, for Bloom, the apostles, to use Kierkegaard s words in his essay, fit into transitory authority in the sphere of immanence. (WA 99) Moreover, Bloom draws our attention to Kierkegaard s awareness of this kind of poetical misprision, when he comments on the initial prayer of The Changelessness of God, (M 269f) which is described as poignant in the contrast expressed in the anguished mode of the Christian faced with the God s non -changeability and the infiniteness of His love, and the actual content of the sermon s text [James 1: 17-21]. (GENIUS 99f) 7 See my article in this volume, Poets as Disciples and as Followers at Second Hand, pp

70 70 Elisabete M. de Sousa But genius does not mean exactly the same thing for Bloom and for Kierkegaard in this essay, where the genius is an esthetically concerned creator and has only immanent teleology. (WA 105) Bloom s concept is more akin to other metaphorical uses of thunderstorm in Kierkegaard s texts, evoking energeia, be it of a demiurge poet, or of God as creator, especially in the writings. In Diapsalmata just like birds fly low during a thunderstorm, the soul and mood of the poet is oppressed and cannot breed any thought, (EOI 29) and in Stages in Life s Way, a sky cleared by a thunderstorm is the analogy for the good spirits presiding over the Married Man s elaborations on marriage. (SLW 183) In The Works of Love, it still represents the intervention of God(s) in mankind, since the Christian is taken as someone standing as an individual above the conflicts of paganism: The one who looks down from the top of a mountain and sees clouds below is he disturbed by the sight, is he disturbed by the thunderstorm raging below in the low- lying regions of the earth? Christianity has placed every human being that high lest he should damage his soul by becoming arrogant over or by groaning under the dissimilarity of earthly life. (WL 69-70) The word may naturally evoke the frequent representation of the voice and will of God by thunder and lightning in the Old Testament, or, as it is more explicitly alluded to in the Postscript, (CUP 366) call to mind Luther s epiphany on the occasion of a thunderstorm but the key to understand it remains the announcement of clearer skies, in the sense of gaining insight into something. In Repetition, in the last three letters signed by the Young Man (and also in a commentary by Constantius), another layer of meaning is introduced, when thunderstorm steps in so as to take the place of what human language and thought cannot account for in God s intervention in the life of man. In the letter dated Jan. 13 th, the effect of the thunderstorm starts by denoting that God s wrath is over and the Lord and Job have come to an understanding, to be immediately followed by the claim that the fact that Job received everything double is a case of repetition. The Young Man praises its benefits for the one who is rebuked, but also adds that when thought and language fail to provide an explanation, there is need for a thunderstorm. He repeats the same explanation in order to determine when repetition has occurred, and here the implications of repetition and the thunderstorm quality are coincident, since repetition is now considered to take place when every thinkable human certainty and probability were impossible. (R 212) The next letter, dated Feb. 17 th, finds the Young Man more eager for a thunderstorm than for repetition: And yet I would be happy and indescribably blessed if the thunderstorm would only come, even if my sentence were that no repetition is possible. (R 214) The announced effect of the thunderstorm would be a radical transformation of his previous mood he would be fit to be a husband, and for this he will be held up to ridicule in Constantius subsequent Incidental Observations. But in the beginning of his last letter, in the Young Man s reaction to his beloved s marriage, we have again a concurrent incidence of thunderstorm and repetition : the shock caused by such news reunites the Young Man with himself, and once again his commentaries on his present situation collate the impossibility of thinking about human certainty and probability, because

71 Speaking in Human Terms 71 the actual facts overcame all the previously posited possibilities. (R 220) In textual terms, the thunderstorm mood and effect is placed at a higher level than human thought, and there can gradually be detected two levels running dialogically throughout the text, with the ability to express two degrees of certainty and probability, and simultaneously to go beyond the limits of human language, thus giving rise to the emergence of seeming realities. This kind of seeming realities can also be spotted in the prefaces to the Upbuilding Discourses, where instead of the intervention of thunderstorm, we have now two physical levels, the ground and the sky, used as borderlines to create a tridimensional reality where the reader as single individual, the author and the book successively overlap each other s territories, with each of them apparently occupying its own space on its own level, but reversing their original inhabiting spaces and thereby also reversing the traditionally assumed roles of the author, of the reader be it the single individual or not and of the book. The whole is obtained by means of repetition, in a bombastic succession of prosopopeiæ, which themselves metaphorically represent the possibilities and impossibilities of human understanding and the limits of human language. In the prefaces from the 1843 books (EUD 5, 53, 107) the tasks of the reader, the author and the book are defined in terms that are enlarged and reshaped in the second cycle, (EUD 179, 231, 295) in the 1844 books. In the first preface, the author is repeatedly described as someone who remains concealed, in expectation, whereas the single individual s favorable disposition sets the putative reader in motion; furthermore, the author remains on the same ground level of the lonely path trailed by the book which cannot be seen, just like the author, until it is spotted by the single individual, figured here as a flying bird. But the gap between their respective levels collapses in two ways: once the reader finds it and picks it up, the book, figured as a flower, bridges up the distance between the reader and the author, and on the other hand, it is the first plan presented, i.e., the ground level firstly inhabited by the book and its author, that is taken in a figurative sense, whereas the bird taking the flower (and so on) is described as the result of a real visual perception, though a mental one; thus, the whole contributes to rank the author as someone with the ability to see what may be beyond the capacity of human common perception. In the second preface, another gap surfaces, this time between the author and the book; the author is physically kept apart from the book by a door, but he remains as contented as the single individual s disposition is favorable. The book is now more actively engaged in seeking his reader, and it is the reader who stands at a higher level than the author, literally and metaphorically, by releasing the thoughts imprisoned in the words, since he is capable of breaking the spell of the author s words, and of being a refuge. In the third preface, the author sets himself even further apart from the reader and from the book, suggesting that the author of the little book is giving way to a higher authorial instance, as he sends [the little book] out and stands far off to such a point that he expresses uncertainty about the rightness of the paving of the way, something that had supposedly been accomplished by the former two books; on the other side, the role of the single individual as reader remains stable he is still taken as a good home, a step above the refuge metaphor in the second preface. However, the closing analogy

72 72 Elisabete M. de Sousa between the triad book -author -reader and the triad gift -widow -God, taken from the widow s alms story in the Gospel of Mark (12: 41-44), resets the interplay between the three, since it allows, first, for the book to be as poor as his author is, but nonetheless as being and having enough for his own physical and spiritual support, and second, it allows for the reader to stand as God does in the widow s story: he is the one who can transform a gift by sanctifying and giving it meaning. In the prefaces to the three 1844 books, the triad book -author -reader gains a double dimension: on the whole, all the parts show a more ethical and religiously prone profile, though each one in particular avidly seeks to build its own identity on the identity of the other ones involved. In a nutshell, in the first of these prefaces, the book takes from the author, in the second, it is the reader s turn to take from the author and in the third preface, the reader s identity overlaps the identity of the author and the content of the book. I shall briefly explain how this takes place, in order to draw the necessary conclusions so as to make way for my reading of the most famous of all repetitions in these prefaces, as well as in the prefaces of the Upbuilding Discourses on Imagined Occasions, i.e., Kierkegaard s dismissal of authority. In the first 1844 preface, the book gains human qualities, as well as the typical attributes of the author: it left something out, it has forgotten nothing, keeps hope in the world, but not in the uncertain, has negative expectations about its reception, may benefit from suffering, provided there is some balance between the suffering and the benefits and, last but not the least, the desire to find its reader is taken as the wish of the author for the single individual. As for the reader, he is now invested with divine -like discernment and determines the fate of the book: he accepts it in its correct meaning (takes with the right hand what is given with the right hand) and in his good will and wisdom finds the opportune time to use it for the benefit and joy of the author, who is totally in absentia: he neither takes part in the reading aloud, nor in the spell breaking of the words encrypting his thoughts. This is further developed in the next preface, when the single individual as reader takes over the role of a self -conscious author, all the more so since the doubts expressed here concerning the ambiguity and the dubious perfection are the kind of remark one would expect to come from a commentator rather than from an author; in this context, such doubts are overruled by the capacity of the reader to be interested, to inflame words and thoughts, to turn discourse into conversation, the result being that the author is forgotten and the work is granted perpetuity. In the final preface, the book is even less fearful of any obstacles in its journey, but on the other hand, the book now becomes the messenger that calls so many repeated times that he might pass by unacknowledged, hadn t it been for the single individual as reader who takes the book into herself; this book, as it happened before, is now part of the reader and never returns to its author again and here lies the author s joy. And now the author s joy brings us back to the opening sentences that I now quote: Although this little book (which is called discourses, not sermons, because its author does not have authority to preach, upbuilding discourses, not discourses for upbuilding, because the speaker by no means claims to be a teacher). (EUD 5) The joy of an author that has repeatedly claimed that he is in hiding, watching

73 Speaking in Human Terms 73 from a distance, sending the book into the world, seeking a single individual to use as refuge and a good home, may well result from the fulfillment of his first goal, related as it is to his initial presentation as author someone who had resigned from ecclesial authority, and from any didactical purpose for his writings. In fact, his authority is figured as absolutely transitory, to the point that it can be transferred to the book and to the reader, as we shall see. The author didn t write a book to edify, it is by essence of the book that is edifying; hence, when the reader completely takes the book into herself, the author s instance is definitely taken as separate from the book, thereby enabling the reader to reach the status of representative of the category of single individual, and the book, its self -sustained status of edifying. If we now recall the comparison between the genius and a thunderstorm, it is the reader that now manifests the ability to clear the air, to go against the wind, in sum, to be an agent of transformation, as it is stated in the third and fifth prefaces. The transformation operated by the reader as single individual is, again, a double fold process; on the one hand, the reader is invested with a redeeming factor, as the collapse of the book into the reader prevents the book and its governing religious content from becoming a lightning rod in the established order; and on the other, it runs parallel to the edifying effect of the book upon the reader, obtained as it is by inflaming its thoughts to the point that discourse between the author and the reader becomes conversation between the reader and his self -consciousness as single individual. This is often re -instated, I believe, by the idiom menneskeligt talt, syntactically used as a set phrase meaning commonly said or more simply said, but more often denoting what at tale menneskeligt does, that is, to speak humanly so that everyone can understand you. However, in the English and Portuguese languages, this humanly speaking sadly misses the quality of double -sign it retains in Danish, explaining its plasticity and the operational role it plays, obviously depending on the context. Its plasticity reaches a peak in density in Repetition and Fear and Trembling, especially taking into account the actual dimension of the texts, although I shall also consider here occurrences in Upbuilding Discourses and in The Concept of Anxiety. In this work, to speak humanly is posited as an art that, among other things, is the opposite of speaking from the chair or the pulpit, in the sense that here one risks being faced with two equally valid chains of arguments, in terms of their respective consistency: The whole question of the significance of the sexual, as well as its significance in the particular spheres, has undeniably been answered poorly until now; moreover, it has seldom been answered in the correct mood. To offer witticisms about the sexual is a paltry art, to admonish it is not difficult, to preach about it in such a way that the difficulty is omitted is not hard, but to speak humanly about it is an art. To leave to the stage and the pulpit to undertake the answer in such a way that the one is embarrassed by what the other says, with the result that the explanation of the one is revoltingly different from that of the other, is really to surrender all and to place upon men the heavy burden, which one does not oneself lift a finger to relieve, finding meaning in both explanations while the respective teachers continually expound the one or the other. (CA 67)

74 74 Elisabete M. de Sousa In Repetition, as in a great number of occasions in Fear and Trembling, it is used to circumscribe the limits of what is humanly possible to do under certain circumstances. Curiously enough, two occurrences in Repetition present what might be described as the lower and the higher borderlines of what is humanly possible ; in the letter dated Oct. 11 th, the Young Man says: Someone imprisoned on bread and water is better off than I am. Humanly speaking, my observations are the poorest diet imaginable; (R 203) and in the introductory text of Part II, Constantius says of the Young Man: And this is the way the matter should be stated if he does not want to fool himself. He still firmly believes that, humanly speaking, his love cannot be realized. He has now come to the border of the marvelous; consequently, if it is to take place at all, it must take place by virtue of the absurd. (R 184f) The Young Man also uses this idiom in its more common sense, but nonetheless hinting at the limits of human thought: Was it not fortunate that I did not go through with your ingenious, admirable plan. Humanly speaking, it may have been cowardliness on my part, but perhaps now Governance can all the more easily help me. (R 213) In Fear and Trembling, we find all these uses next to many more: humanly speaking versus inhumanly speaking, to speak humanly and to speak inhumanly, humanly speaking (together with human calculation ) in opposition to by virtue of the absurd. In de silentio s Problemata, the dualities in the seeming realities are already, by essence, so clearly distinct from each other, that the expression acts as a sort of presentification deictic: there is Abraham and de silentio, the knight of faith and the knight of resignation, and the impossibility to understand by human reasoning what is done by virtue of the absurd. Among other occurrences, especially in Expectoration from the Heart, one reads: I wonder if anyone in my generation is able to make the movements of faith? If I am not mistaken, my generation is rather inclined to be proud of doing what it probably does not even believe me capable of that is, the imperfect. My soul balks at doing what is so often done talking inhumanly about the great, as if a few centuries were an enormous distance. I prefer to speak humanly about it, as if it happened yesterday, and only let the greatness itself be the distance that either elevates or judges. (FT 34) The same applies to: It is against my very being to speak inhumanly about greatness, to make it a dim and nebulous far -distant shape or to let it be great but devoid of the emergence of the humanness without which it ceases to be great, for it is not what happens to me that makes me great but what I do, and certainly there is no one who believes that someone became great by winning the big lottery prize. (FT 64) It was by translating that I first became interested in finding out how the expression was gradually used to question the possibility of understanding, instead of merely fostering possibilities of understanding, as it more commonly does. This takes place even when it is apparently being used with the lowest of profiles, such as this case: Humanly speaking, [Abraham] is mad and cannot make himself understandable to anyone, (FT 76) or this other statement: The moment the knight executed the act of resignation, he was convinced of the impossibility, humanly speaking; that

75 Speaking in Human Terms 75 was the conclusion of the understanding, and he had sufficient energy to think it. (FT 47) The situation may even get more problematical when de silentio uses to think inhumanly, in his commentaries on the Virgin Mary, as a result of the act of listening to someone speaking inhumanly: And yet, how do we speak of her? That she was the favored one among women does not make her great, and if it would not be so very odd for those who listen to be able to think just as inhumanly as those who speak, then every young girl might ask: Why am I not so favored? (FT 65) In Upbuilding Discourses, the uses of humanly speaking and to speak humanly can be approximately divided into three types: 1. To speak clearly so that humans understand what something is really about, acting as a kind of barrier between the words, acts, or divine intentions and how far our understanding can reach. This is applied to explain Abraham s behavior, (EUD 66) or to account for the divine equality which burns in the difference, without consuming it. (EUD 143) And also to contrast a desirable emotional slowness of man with the effect of quick understanding that the words of God may produce in our mind. (EUD 138) Or to bring the disciples understanding capacity to the level of the reader s. (EUD 396) And finally to re -inverse Moses and the Israelites strength or weakness. (EUD 312) 2. it can be used to emphasize the conversational tone, denoting more clearly said, in simpler terms, only that this time it drastically widens the gap between what lies in the divine words, acts, or intentions, as they are generally explained by amplification in the discourses at stake, and what can be understood by humans. This is the case of the contrasting of two ways of following God s will, with humanly speaking being introduced by yet perhaps it did not happen this way. (EUD 366) And also in the differentiation between two degrees of reasons for excuse and praise. (EUD 284) I would single out its use in order to underline the difference between God s time and human time, with humanly speaking set as a parallel to the God to whom he prays is human, has the heart to feel humanly, the ear to hear a human being s complaint. (EUD 387) 3. it can also be used not only to enhance the possibility of using two types of language to deal with the same subject, but also to grant to everyday metaphorical language a deeper meaning and eloquence than what is commonly credited, in fact giving rise to a human metaphorical language that responds to God s language of paradoxes. The first example concerns the demonstration of the hardships faced to acknowledge the need of God and puts side by side a chain of argumentative propositions and the wisdom contained in the current metaphorical use of to drink a bitter cup. (EUD 306) In the second example, the deranged sense of faith is twice explained as a foolish business arrangement. (EUD 395f) 4. Finally, it may definitely leave the company of speak to join think, reflect, or to give a quality to the effect of hearing, of reading aloud, or

76 76 Elisabete M. de Sousa of listening, thereby enhancing the handicaps, or the uncertainties, of human elaborations versus the clarity of the meaning of God s word, as in the contrasts between (a) Let us for a moment speak foolishly and in a human way and too old to nourish childish ideas about God, too mature to think humanly about him, (EUD 37) or (b) between being certain through grace and the uncertainty of this type of certainty. (EUD 269) To sum up, such seeming realities installed as they are in the prefaces to The Upbuilding Discourses, and in the subtleties of the use of menneskeligt talt, surface as a correlate to the edifying essence of the discourses, and contribute to leaving the author and the single individual in the sphere of immanence, sharing an authority that always remains transitory, something that actually grants permission to the author to bid farewell in the sixth preface; in fact, he is no longer needed, since the reader has recognized the apparent dual realities, has transmuted discourse into conversation, has left behind any misunderstandings about himself, and has reached a level of understanding that hopefully will allow him to transfigure himself in God, a sign that he prays aright. (EUD 400) Moreover, it also demonstrates the consistency of Kierkegaard s view when he labeled Upbuilding Discourses as indirect communication: everything is cast into reflection, and when illusion is involved, consequently something that must first be removed, direct communication is inappropriate. (PV 8) In terms of pure receptivity, it is definitely not a question of filling an empty jar as direct communication does, since when illusion is involved, consequently something that must first be removed, direct communication is inappropriate. (ibid.) Had the discourses been called sermons, had the author not resigned from any kind of practice of a divine authority, then the whole enterprise would have failed. Or humanly speaking, when it comes to making a single individual out of a reader by a process of self -edification which increases his self -awareness to the point that he will be able to remove illusion from his practice as a Christian, it is a case for indirect communication.

77 Book Launch of the Portuguese Translations of Repetition and Fear and Trembling Carlos João Correia Universidade de Lisboa Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon I would like to start by expressing my gratitude for the kind invitation to present, on the occasion of this day Conference on the Upbuilding Discourses, the publications of the Portuguese translations of Kierkegaard s works, A Repetição [Repetition] and Temor e Tremor [Fear and Trembling]. This invitation is all the more commendable since it was put forward by the scientific editors, Professor José Miranda Justo in the case of Repetition 1 and Dr. Elisabete M. de Sousa for the edition of Fear and Trembling. 2 These two volumes, now published by Relógio d Água in partnership with the Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa [Philosophy Center of the University of Lisbon] and the Søren Kierkegaard Research Center of the University of Copenhagen, are enlisted in a project centered on the Danish philosopher, approved by the FCT and supervised by Professor José Miranda Justo. I must confess that initially this invitation took me by surprise, due to the fact that besides not being proficient in the Danish idiom, the mere idea of a religion beyond the limits of simple reason and Kierkegaard would certainly agree with me on this, though for opposite reasons... seems just utterly absurd to me. And yet, the reflection I have undertaken in the last few years has a clear Kierkegaardian connotation. As underscored by Kierkegaard, the way Western thought has thematized the experience of being, which is trivially present both in the life of an insect and in the mystery of incarnation (Kierkegaard s words), was always put into perspective from the third person s view (that is, from the undue transmutation of the question who? to the question what (is it)? ), whose corollary is necessarily the wish for neutral, systematic, perfectly credible objectivity in the scientific interpretation of the world, but deprived of any meaning when we try to grasp the mere experience of being. As recently stressed by the American philosopher Thomas Nagel, a thinker for whom the last word 3 in human communication can only be reason, the idea familiar to us is a conception of the world as simply existing, seen from no particular perspective, no privileged point of view as simply there (...), this center -less world contains everybody (...). There seems to be something about it that cannot be included 1 Søren Kierkegaard, A Repetição [Gjentagelsen], ed., trans. and notes by José Miranda Justo, Lisboa: Relógio d Água, Søren Kierkegaard, Temor e Tremor [Frygt og Bæven], ed., trans. and notes by Elisabete M. de Sousa, Lisboa: Relógio d Água, See Thomas Nagel, The Last Word, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, Kierkegaard in Lisbon, Lisboa, CFUL, 2012, pp

78 78 Carlos João Correia in such a perspective -less conception the fact that one of those persons (...) is the locus of my consciousness, the point of view from which I observe and act on the world. 4 In fact, we are so used to the thematic act of being as if it were the mere determination of a previous essence, that we have forgotten that such a perspective is deeply restrictive in what concerns the understanding of life, i.e., of what it is to be a human being. Quoting the Danish thinker, in his Journals, ( ) for a particular animal, a particular plant, a particular human being, existence (to be or not to be) is very crucial; a particular human being is certainly not concept -existence. (Pap. X.2 A 328) And in the sequence of simple but crucial questions posed in Repetition, Where am I? What does it mean to say: the world? ( ) Who am I? ( ) How did I get involved in this big enterprise called actuality? (R 200) The simultaneous edition in Portuguese of Repetition and Fear and Trembling is all the more justified since these two seminal works from Kierkegaard were both published on exactly the same day, October 16 th, As underlined by José Miranda Justo and Elisabete M. de Sousa, in both respective introductions, on that very same day the Danish thinker published yet another book, Three Edifying Discourses. However, there is still more. As mentioned in both introductions, between the years of 1843 and 45 (the so called indirect communication period following his youth works, the most important one being On the Concept of Irony), Kierkegaard publishes fifteen titles, at the very least a surprising feat, revealing a frantic writing and study activity, quite in contrast with the public dandy persona, a flâneur, that the philosopher openly wanted to flaunt to his former fiancée, Regina Olsen, since the time when he broke off their engagement on October 11 th 1841 prior to his departure to Berlin with the expressed purpose of attending Schelling s lectures. The intimate relation between the two works goes further beyond the extrinsic fact of having been published on the same day. They were both written by two distinct Kierkegaardian pseudonyms Constantin Constantius in the case of Repetition and Johannes de silentio in Fear and Trembling. These are clearly works whose reflection is focused on two central characters of the Bible, Job in Repetition s instance, and Abraham in Fear and Trembling. The link between the two works is so pronounced that, as pointed out by Elisabete M. de Sousa, the end of the book dedicated to the first Patriarch is directly articulated with the beginning of the study on repetition. After reflecting ironically over the fact that Heraclitus, the philosopher of becoming and of movement, had as his most faithful disciple someone who transformed his famous saying that one cannot go into the same river twice in the Eleatics claim that denies movement, by adding that not even once would that be possible, Repetition begins with a set of considerations about movement and with the cynical refutation of the Eleatics school by Diogenes who, without saying a single word, emphatically moved himself from one side to the other. As we are told in the Introduction to Fear and Trembling, about Kierkegaard s self -reflection on his work: we confirm that Johannes de silentio introduces himself as a dialectically reduplicated author. He is an author in double reflection twice potentiated; he is the lyrical dialectic 4 See Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 56.

79 Book Launch of the Portuguese Translations of Repetition and Fear and Trembling 79 philosopher -poet who comes out of the silence of Diogenes s body language in order to demonstrate another way of refuting Heraclitus s eleatic sentence with acrobatic leaps rising himself so flawlessly that the figures he performs fix themselves during the very leap (Temor e Tremor 24), precisely, we add, by announcing the leap that faith actualizes in itself. Now, let s first focus our attention on Repetition (probably written before Fear and Trembling). It is a peculiar work in formal terms. In his Journals, Kierkegaard presents it as an odd and curious book. Intelligently enough, he articulates the densest metaphysical and speculative reflection with the narrative and ludicrous burlesque description, culminating in an intense epistolary exchange, particularly the one with a young man in love who fears the corrosive effect of repetition on his love affair, repetition associated with ethical duty. The reader would see the error of believing he stands before an auto -biographical work, no matter the amount of biographical data found in this book. As he also states in his Journals ( ) after my death no one will find the slightest information (this is my consolation) about what has really filled my life. (Pap. IV A 85) In philosophical terms, what is this work about? As the title clearly suggests, it is about the very idea of repetition. The work bears indeed the full title Repetition, a Venture in Experimental Psychology. It must be pointed out that the author rejects any natural connotation of the category of repetition, and his anger against the reviewer s interpretation suggesting this is well known. Repetition is concerned with spiritual life and never with nature s cycles. According to Kierkegaard, Leibniz was the only modern philosopher who has had an intimation of this. (R 131) And we have good reason to say so. On one side, we should never forget it, Leibniz was the philosopher of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. In simple terms, this principle tells us that two substances cannot be distinguished solo numero, i.e., by means of the so -called numerical identity. In effect, if two beings had the same intrinsic properties, they would then be one and the same being. Therefore, we may conclude that nothing can be said to be exactly the same thing, which means that the repetition of the same does not make part of this world s ontological structure. As later George Steiner would say in his autobiography, referring explicitly to Kierkegaard: No repetition of measurement, however closely calibrated, in whatever controlled vacuum it was carried out, could ever be perfectly the same. It would deviate by some trillionth of an inch, by a nanosecond, by the breadth of a hair itself a teeming immensity from any preceding measurement. (...) Did I guess that there could be no perfect facsimile of anything, that the identical word spoken twice, even in lightning- quick reiteration, was not and could not be the same? (...) Existence thronged and hummed with obstinate difference like the midges around the light -bulb. Who can number the clouds in wisdom? Or who can stay the bottles of heaven? [Job 38:37] 5 And George Steiner adds how this intuition brought him closer to Kierkegaard (ibid. 3) and his suspicion towards the system grew, possessed by Blake s holiness 5 See George Steiner, Errata. An examined life, London: Orion Books, 1997; henceforth STEINER.

80 80 Carlos João Correia of the minute particular, by the dizzying knowledge that there are in chess, after the initial five moves, more possibilities than atoms in the universe, I have found myself isolated from the now -dominant turn to theory. (STEINER 6) Repetition does not rank in nature s order; at most, one can say that if repetition does exist, it is just of the irrepeatable itself of the difference or rather, as Leibniz perceived in his New Essays, there is an inter -expression which makes the singular become a distinct degree of the same perfection. Repetition productive repetition is of the spiritual order, as emphasized by Kierkegaard, and the best way to understand it is to see it prima facie as the reverse of anamnesis, of the Platonic recollection and of romantic nostalgia, repetition and recollection are the same movement, except in opposite directions, for what is recollected has been, is repeated backward, whereas genuine repetition is recollected forward. (R 131) But as shrewdly pointed out by José Miranda Justo, in the Introduction to the work, it is not a mere inversion but an actual transposition to a different genus. And what different genus is that? As underscored by the scientific editor, what is at stake is life, the life of the spirit. If the issue was just a mere inversion, one could say that Kierkegaard s and Proust s solutions were very similar. As it has already been frequently repeated, the starting point of Repetition and of In Search of Lost Time is very similar. 6 In the case of the Danish thinker s work, it is the case of a thought experiment in thinking (R 53) on the occasion of what the philosopher calls, an investigative journey (R 150) on his return trip to Berlin and his repetition of a set of past experiences. As stated in the text, being so pensively nostalgic (R 171) rendered true repetition impossible, I became so furious, so weary of the repetition that I decided to return home. My discovery was not significant, and yet it was curious, for I had discovered that there simply is no repetition and had verified it by having it repeated in every possible way. (R 171) The former project came up to him as, ( ) a dream from which I awoke to have life unremittingly and treacherously retake everything it had given without providing a repetition. (R 172) The same question is recurrent in Proust s research (La recherche) in dramatic terms. Time is lost twice, not only because it translates the irreversibility (non -repetition), but also due to experiences and feelings thereby associated, which seem completely lost in a voluntary remembrance/repetition. The same happens when the narrator projects into the future the possibility of repeating a projected idea in actual life. For example, the narrator dreams of his vacation trip to Balbec in Normandy. The images he kept of Balbec came from an old book of his. And, thus, before starting his journey, he entertained his mind not only by visiting the main church, but also by picturing a misty coastline covered in haze, surrounding the sea that in his dreams stood fearsome and sublime. When he finally arrives in Balbec, not only does the Normand gothic church looks uninteresting, but he also faces a petty place. Facing this learning of disillusion, the perception of the eternal failure of the idealized image which feeds desire, Proust s answer will go through and ahead of that future remembrance /repetition, which only artistic 6 See Marcel Proust, À l ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs, À la Recherche du Temps Perdu, vol. 1, Paris: NRF, 1918.

81 Book Launch of the Portuguese Translations of Repetition and Fear and Trembling 81 creation, as material inscription of the spiritual force of involuntary memories, allows to actualize. Repetition is possible but only in the domain of art. In Kierkegaard s case, productive repetition does not have much to do with the Proustian aesthetic sentimental feature in which simple daily actions such as the repeated tasting of a madeleine stands for the open sesame of the human spirit to the extra -temporal nature of creative life. On the contrary, in Kierkegaard s instance, repetition has more to do with life in its religious facet: Repetition that is actuality and the earnestness of existence. (R 133), adding afterwards an imperative which immediately leads us to an association with the Nietzschean eternal return. The person who wills (my italics) repetition is mature in earnestness. (ib.) Kierkegaardian repetition is neither melancholic nostalgia nor hope, but rather the act of spontaneity re -conquered in the instant whilst atom of eternity or, in other words, in that single experience which is not a mere particular, in that sudden constitution of meaning, referred by José Miranda Justo (Introduction, A Repetição 15) or still in that singular illumination. As explained to us by the scientific editor, repetition is the slow mechanism of quantitative accumulation which, by means of the re -configuring and re -orientating experience of the singular ( ) that qualitative transfiguration that is entitled to be named as constitution of meaning, (Introduction 17) in a word we might add Job s final experience. Let s now look at the other work. The edition of Fear and Trembling is particularly well -timed in the current context of the philosophy of religion. To a certain extent, it can be said that Kierkegaard (or his pseudonym Johannes de silentio) anticipates a cluster of reflections presently set in the field of the history of religions, the philosophy of religion and ethics. In the past, this work from the Danish philosopher, considered by many as his masterpiece,was essentially seen in the context of a reflection on the nature of the sacred. The nearly phenomenological description made by Kierkegaard of the so -called knight of faith (or of Abraham if you prefer) stood as the purest expression of the unsettling side of the sacred -religious, the numinous, in the sense that Rudolf Otto gives to this term in his well -known study. The sacred would be the near -sublime apprehension of existence, inasmuch as it articulated two dimensions: the fascinating and the uncanny, this unheimlich being very close to the description made by Kierkegaard of what he names as being religious or sacred horror. Although this is still entirely actual, the story of Isaac s sacrifice by the hands of his father in a word, the experiment in thought studied by Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling is the object of intense debate. On one side, religion historians I recall for example Karen Armstrong 7 subscribe to the same principle of the Danish thinker. Isaac s sacrifice fits into a radically different register from that of the kind of sacrifice performed in a pagan culture. One of the crucial moments in Fear and Trembling is precisely the philosopher s distinction between Abraham s decision and Agamemnon s attitude, who sacrifices his daughter, Iphigenia, as a way of obtaining the gods concession and the triumph 7 See Karen Armstrong, The Great Transformation: the beginning of our religious traditions, New York: Knopf, 2006; referred as ARMSTRONG.

82 82 Carlos João Correia of the Achaeans. Agamemnon s attitude is tragic, but heroic, in sacrificing what he holds most dear for the sake of general good. Regarding the Greek warrior s gesture, there may be catharsis, tears and even resentment (Oresteia). Abraham s attitude is radically different. He is a foreigner in a foreign land, even though it is the Promised Land. Far from sacrificing his particular interest for the universal, it is quite the opposite he sacrificed the ethical, the plan of universality and of reason, making himself an exception, in an attitude of absolute solitude, without mediation, without seeing at any moment his action attenuated in terms of consolation. As the historians of religions have underscored, the sacrifice of the first born was one of the most common and intelligible acts in the midst of pagan cultures, in the ancient world, a firstborn child was often regarded as the property of a god, and had to be returned to him in human sacrifice. The young blood restored the deity s depleted energies and ensured the circulation of power in the cosmos. (ARMSTRONG 94) This sacrifice was part of the law of reciprocity, of the reciprocal gift, that makes the worldview of traditional cultures. But Abraham s gesture, offering his son in holocaust, i.e., in sacred sacrifice, revealed an uncanny side of God or Elohim. The sacrifice of the son of God no longer fits the cycle of debits and credits intrinsic to paganism and, as shown by René Girard, 8 it is still an unfortunate but dominant reading amidst the most conservative readings of Christianity. In Isaac s case, Israel s Elohim was not just a friendly voice, he could nevertheless reveal himself as arbitrary and cruel. There opened a ditch, a separation, a split in religious terms never seen before until then between God and the world. In turn, the suspension of the ethical, admirably described by Kierkegaard, is today the object of redoubled reflection, namely in philosophical contrast with the vision offered by Plato in Euthyphro (10a), in accordance to which good is not defined by divine will but is instead desired by the gods because it is intrinsically good. It is important to underline that in the vision of Fear and Trembling, faith appears in contrast with resignation. According to Kierkegaard, while the resigned one abandons the world and renounces the temporal as a means of gaining the eternal, on the contrary in this reading, Abraham never stands as a blind and passive servant. The paradox of faith lies in the fact that he is very much aware of the contradiction, but never ever loses confidence in God. As outlined in the Introduction by Elisabete M. de Sousa, we know that Johannes de silentio admitted that no matter how long he beholds and admires the knight of faith, he cannot reproduce his movements Johannes is the knight of resignation. (Temor e Tremor 21) And with insightful intuition, she puts Johannes side by side with the figure of resignation in the poem Resignation by Schiller, referred to in the very text of Fear and Trembling, (R 102) in the episode of Sarah and Tobite. I conclude now this presentation with the words of the scientific editor of this work, the dialogue he holds with that figure of eternity ends with the intervention of an invisible genius, whose voice reveals to him that on the path trailed by men there are two flowers, hope ( Hoffnung ) and joy ( Genuß ), and one who chooses to pick up one cannot have the benefit of the other. (Temor e Tremor 21-22) Johannes s 8 See René Girard, Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde, Paris: Grasset, 1978.

83 Book Launch of the Portuguese Translations of Repetition and Fear and Trembling 83 faith, and not Abraham s, is that of the hope he collected and does not entitle him to ask for more. As a last remark to my presentation, I would like to mention that the editors used as source -text, the Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter edition, having checked the main European translations of both works. The Portuguese publishing world, the Philosophy Center and, in particular, its scientific editors ought now to be congratulated.

84

85 Time, Courage, Selfhood: Reflections on Kierkegaard s Discourse To Preserve One s Soul in Patience Arne Grøn Danish National Research Foundation: Center for Subjectivity Research & Ethics and Philosophy of Religion, Faculty of Theology, University of Copenhagen Edification and Subjectivity In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger reduces Kierkegaard s influence to three foot -notes. However, one of these foot -notes can serve as a point of departure here for a journey which will lead us back to key issues in Sein und Zeit such as concern and temporality. In this foot -note, Heidegger claims that there is more to be learnt philosophically from Kierkegaard s edifying discourses than from his theoretical works (with the exception of The Concept of Anxiety). 1 This claim may come as a surprise. If one is looking for a philosophical approach in Kierkegaard, his pseudonymous works seem to be the obvious choice. They contain direct reflections on philosophical issues, such as subjectivity and temporality; indeed, one of the pseudonymous works, the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, coins the very concept of existence as the way humans are being situated as humans. Moreover, in their form the pseudonymous writings experiment with questions and different perspectives on how humans are situated in living their lives. By contrast, Kierkegaard s edifying discourses appear to speak within a given religious framework. This leaves us with two questions. How can an edifying discourse be philosophically challenging (as indicated in Heidegger s remark)? 2 What makes an edifying discourse edifying? I ll begin with the second and end with the first question. But this offers only the framework for discussing what is at issue here: how are we to understand human subjectivity? This is the pivotal question which comes in between beginning and end. Let me briefly indicate what I have in mind. To be edified concerns one s sense of self in relating to others and to the world in between. To edify concerns one s sense of the other. Maybe even more important, the need for both (to be 1 Daher ist von seinen erbaulichen Schriften philosophisch mehr zu lernen als von den theoretischen die Abhandlung über den Begriff Angst ausgenommen, in Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1972, 235 A. 2 Let us leave aside the question whether a philosophical discourse could be or indeed should not be edifying. There is a point in saying that Kierkegaard s edifying discourses are not philosophical treatises. Kierkegaard in Lisbon, Lisboa, CFUL, 2012, pp

86 86 Arne Grøn edified and to edify) testifies to what is at stake in our human ways of relating to others and to the world namely the courage to live the life which is ours. Put in more exegetical terms, my suggestion is to discuss the question of subjectivity, associated with Kierkegaard s pseudonymous writings, in the context of his edifying discourses. More systematically, the idea is that the difficulties we face when we seek to understand the subjectivity implied in edification challenge a philosophical account of human subjectivity. What makes an edifying discourse edifying? The edifying character of a discourse is a matter of the how of the discourse. If what is said is to be edifying, it must concern the one to be edified. What should be edifying cannot be put forward as something to be taught and learnt, one being the teacher, the other the one to learn. This means that not only Kierkegaard s pseudonymous works, also his edifying discourses deal with the question: how is it possible to communicate about ethical and religious questions which concern each of us in our own ways of relating to others and the world we more or less share? Kierkegaard seeks an answer in an indirect communication which aims at the addressee as the one who is to give her own response. How is it possible to communicate inwardness? Inwardness here means how we relate to that which concerns us. To edify requires seeing the other as the one who is to live her life in relating to others and to a shared world. However, this implies a dialectics of vision: the edifying is about how the one to be edified is being seen in view of how she sees herself. An edifying discourse must, in its very form, indicate what it means to edify. It must address its reader or listener as someone to be edified. What is implied in this: as someone to be edified? To edify or to build up means to give hope to and to give courage to another human being. This implies that what we do can affect the other in her ways of relating to her life. Yet, an act can only edify if it points to the other herself, or, to be more precise, it can only edify if she comes to hope and to have courage. Although edification seems to fall on the side of the one edifying, it concerns how the other to be edified relates to her life or to herself in living her life. But why is a human being to be edified? The critical point is that a human being can lose the courage to be herself in living her life. She can despair. 3 Yet, as someone who can despair she is already a self. This is the self implied in as someone to be edified. As someone who can despair a human being can be someone to be edified. What are the implications for understanding human subjectivity? In discussing this question we should not leave behind the opening question about the form of the edifying discourses. The how of the discourse first and foremost means: how the discourse addresses its reader or listener. In order to be edifying the discourse must, in the very act of communication, in addressing its 3 Therefore, there is an intricate relation between Kierkegaard s The Sickness unto Death (the analysis of despair and selfhood) and his Works of Love (reflections on love as edifying).

87 Time, Courage, Selfhood: Reflections on Kierkegaard s Discourse To Preserve One s Soul in Patience 87 reader, take its addressee as a self. 4 Thus, subjectivity is in question in the very form of the edifying discourse: how does the discourse see the addressee seeing herself? But this only opens up the field of questions indicated in the title of my paper. I ll discuss these issues time, courage, and selfhood as questions of human subjectivity in interpreting the second of the two edifying discourses from 1844 entitled To Preserve One s Soul in Patience, published in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses. My reason for selecting this discourse is that it focuses on the danger to which an edifying discourse responds. This danger to lose one s soul and the task of preserving one s soul, in patience, point to the selfhood of the addressee as a human being: as a self relating to itself. Let us dwell a bit more on how the edifying discourse and indeed edification implies subjectivity in its very form. The how and the what of the edifying discourse are intertwined. What the discourse says must be of concern for the reader. It deals with questions which must involve the one reading the discourse so that they are questions the reader can ask for herself. The subjectivity of the addressee implies that she is concerned. However, she is not simply concerned. To be concerned is a matter of how we are so (concerned). But whether and how we are concerned affects how we live our life. The reader is addressed as someone who is to understand herself through the question of concern. She is addressed as concerned in her mode of being (to put it in Heidegger s terms) so that she can be concerned in and about how she actually lives her life. This is reflected in the way the edifying discourse points to, or designates, its addressee. As Kierkegaard s prefaces to each of the collections of discourses from 1843 and 1844 tell, the discourse seeks its reader as that single individual [hiin Enkelte]. (EUD 179) What is implied in this gesture? It reminds the reader of herself or himself. The discourse takes the reader as a subject it even elaborates on what this implies. The reader is taken into the discourse as its reader, as this singular individual. This is a both universalising and singularising move: each and everyone can be its reader, but only as oneself and no other. Thus, the discourse addresses its reader as a subject, not only as the one to read, but also as the one concerned in reading. However, turning the reader into the subject of discourse in the double sense of the one to read and the one (to be) concerned is a rather complicated enterprise. In the context of the one relating to the other in edification, the question is: must the one writing the discourse seek to disappear as a subject in order to let the reader appear as the one concerned? Implied in the discourse being edifying is that the one writing or speaking (den Talende) is not a teacher (as the Preface says, EUD 179). Rather, the speaker is to be included in the discourse as addressee, too. Yet, does this not mean that the thou as addressee disappears? How are the one addressing and the one being addressed situated in their relating to each other? Does edification include both so that the one speaking is also to be edified? 4 The discourse thereby turns itself into a sort of subject. Important is, however, that the discourse only performs or acts by way of the addressee being designated or pointed to as a subject.

88 88 Arne Grøn These questions indicate that the edifying discourses are not easily described in terms of being either monological or dialogical. What is remarkable is that they deal with inwardness as a common field of questions and questioning. There is a kind of universality to the edifying discourses. We share the condition of being singular individuals. This comes forth in the move permeating the discourses the move towards the question: what it is to be human. In response to this question, the edifying discourses point to what we already are: a self, oneself. Yet, the discourses are not on anthropology, nor on theory of selfhood. Rather, they show what is implied in the questions which anthropology and theory of selfhood seek to answer: what it is to be a human being, and to be a self. Let us now turn to the discourse To Preserve One s Soul in Patience. To Preserve One s Soul The prelude of the discourse (EUD ) leads the reader to the theme: To Preserve One s Soul in Patience. It takes an effort to understand what it means to preserve one s soul. Indeed, the whole discourse is about this understanding which in itself requires patience. Reading is already a matter of patience in coming to understand. The discourse begins by pointing to the moment of decision, from the outside as it were: How someone in the hour of danger and in the moment of terror displayed a strength of soul that might truly be called wondrous has often been witnessed with amazement and told with admiration. (EUD 181) The discourse then addresses the reader as an observer: If you have never seen this, my listener, you have nevertheless heard about it. You may have heard how someone had thoughtlessly frittered away his life and never understood anything but wasted the power of his soul in vanities, how he lay on his sick bed and the frightfulness of disease encompassed him and the singularly fearful battle began, how he then for the first time in his life understood something, understood that it was death he struggled with, and how he then pulled himself together in a purpose that was powerful enough to move a world, how he attained a marvellous collectedness for wrenching himself out of the sufferings in order to use the last moment to catch up on some of what he had neglected, to bring order to some of the chaos he had caused during a long life, to contrive something for those he would leave behind. (EUD 181) How is the reader situated? In having heard about someone who, facing death, has pulled himself together in a purpose that was powerful enough to move a world, we the readers may also come to understand something, that is, to think for ourselves: being reminded that we are also going to die we may come to see the life we live and to pull ourselves together in living our life. This motif 5 death as detour to life is only touched upon in the discourse, but later it is unfolded in the last of the Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions entitled At a Graveside (DIO 5 The motif figures prominently in Heidegger s Sein und Zeit in terms of Vorlaufen zum Tode.

89 Time, Courage, Selfhood: Reflections on Kierkegaard s Discourse To Preserve One s Soul in Patience ) and in a discourse in Works of Love, The Work of Love in Recollecting One Who Is Dead. (DIO ) Let us note how Kierkegaard accentuates the role of understanding in dealing with the moment of decision. Coming to a decision which concerns our life requires that we come to understand with resoluteness. This already indicates that the moment of decision is about the context in which we take the decision. It is about our life taken as a whole. Pointing to the moment of decision is only a first move in the discourse. It is followed by a remarkable further shift in focus which figures as the turning point in the discourse. This is announced as follows: However, if a person discovered the danger while all speak of peace and security. (EUD 182) What is required is not only to come to the moment of decision, but to discover and to come to understand the danger. What danger? As the discourse notes: the dangers can be very diverse. (EUD 183) It continues: People are prone to pay attention to earthly dangers. (ibid.) We may object: are not all dangers earthly in so far as we humans live an earthly life? What is meant by the contrast: eternal danger? To cut a long story short, let me suggest that the eternal danger concerns our attitude towards earthly dangers. It concerns how we deal with our human condition in terms of the shortness of life and the certainty of death. (EUD 184) So, since life is uncertain, there is something one desires to preserve, desires to keep safeguarded for oneself. (ibid.) We desire to preserve what matters to us. But what is truly worth preserving? We may think that this is simply what matters to us, but what does simply matter to us? Even the way we take ourselves is open to question. It is in this perspective we must understand the turning point of the discourse. It is about the one reading being turned toward herself in relating to the world. It is about what is truly worth preserving, and what else could that be but a person s soul? (EUD 185) However, the discourse has not yet reached its pivotal theme: to preserve one s soul. To understand what this means requires that we realise what the danger is. If a person wants to safeguard his earthly goods he can seek to find an out -of -the -place place in the world where he can safely deposit his treasure. (EUD 186) Here the critical difference between earthly dangers and the eternal danger comes to the fore: But if a person wanted to preserve his soul in that way he would indeed have lost it. (ibid.) Why? If we deposit ourselves, for example in having our soul saved in the way we see the world, this is something we do. Depositing one s soul is already a matter of how we are ourselves in relating to the world. If we want to secure our soul, in keeping ourselves out -of -place or untouched by what happens to us or by what we do, we do something to ourselves which would affect us so that we, by that very act, would lose ourselves. We would not be able to understand what it means that we are ourselves implied in the very act of safeguarding ourselves. If the person seeking to preserve his earthly goods dared not deposit it, but carried it around with him day and night and in this way ran the risk of losing it at every moment, it would be terrible. But this is the way we have our soul: we risk at every moment to lose it because we carry the danger around with us. What then is the danger? It is to lose one s soul, and this concerns one s way of relating to oneself,

90 90 Arne Grøn or, rather, the self -relation implied in relating to oneself. If we would say that the soul is the only certainty and that, although people can take away everything else, they still allow a person to keep his soul, (ibid.) we have not yet discovered the danger which one should respond to in preserving one s soul. The danger is only to be discovered if one is being anxious about preserving [one s] soul. (ibid.) If one would take one s soul as the safe hiding place an out -of -the -world place in the world one ignores that this very act of hiding and taking oneself is about one s soul. Therefore, we only come to understand what it means to preserve one s soul if we realise that we carry the danger with us, the danger of losing our soul. If we would speak in those terms, we may be tempted to think that we lose our soul through something that happens to us. But would we then lose our soul? The implicit claim in the discourse is that to lose one s soul is not something that happens to us. Only we can lose our soul. Why? Again, we must try to unpack what it means to speak of one s soul. It is a matter of how we take ourselves in taking what happens to us. The danger, then, against which one must preserve one s soul, is that we can betray ourselves. This is an almost formal indication (to use Heidegger s term). In order to understand what is implied we are to fill in the indication: to betray oneself. We may object: if losing one s soul is not something that happens to oneself, in that it is caused by what affects oneself, this would leave us unaffected. This is a quite common way to misunderstand inwardness. To insist that only we can lose our soul (it does not happen to us) does in no way imply that what happens to us is of no concern to us. On the contrary, what happens to us affects us, and because it concerns us, we are concerned. In order to understand what it means to lose one s soul we should wonder: how is it possible, in the first place? The possibility of losing one s soul has to do with how we are concerned. We can lose ourselves in being concerned. This is implied in speaking of preserving one s soul. How then does one preserve one s soul? There is only one means, the discourse claims, and this means is patience. (EUD 187) Why? In Patience Patience is already required in coming to understand what is truly to be preserved and what the danger definitely is. To preserve one s soul in patience that is, through patience to ascertain what it is that one is to preserve. (EUD 187) What is meant by patience? The Danish word is Taalmodighed which can be spelled out as: the courage (Modet) to endure or to bear (til at taale). What is it that one is to endure or to bear in patience? We are to endure what happens to us. This is probably what first comes to our mind. To endure what happens to us may require courage. However, we are not only to endure what happens to us, but also to bear what we do. Does this take courage? At least it often demands patience to carry through what one has set out to do. But what about carrying the weight of what one has done? This may also take courage in that this weight is to be carried in living one s life. In all of these cases in enduring what happens to us, in carrying through

91 Time, Courage, Selfhood: Reflections on Kierkegaard s Discourse To Preserve One s Soul in Patience 91 what one has decided to do, and in bearing the weight of what one has done we deal with time. Patience as Taalmodighed is the courage to endure time and to bear oneself in time. And in the context of the discourse, as it takes time to come to understand, it also takes the courage of patience to understand what the danger is. It requires that we have the courage to bear ourselves. The discourse claims that a person gains his soul in no other way than by preserving it, and therefore patience is the first and patience is the last, precisely because patience is just as active [handlende] as it is passive [lidende] and just as passive as it is active. (EUD 187) It may be confusing that patience is depicted as a subject outside the subject, as it were: patience does something to us. At the end of the discourse Kierkegaard comments: We have spoken as if patience were outside a person; we are well aware that this is not so. And nevertheless I ask you [ ] was it nevertheless not so at times, when concern and your labouring thoughts piled up deliberations that were of no benefit except to give birth to new deliberations, that then the plain, simple, but nevertheless forgotten words of patience prodded you from another direction, was it not as if patience stood on the outside. (EUD 202) When patience is as active as it is passive, and vice versa, it is the person who is acting and who is suffering. It is the person herself who is to preserve her soul. If patience is the means to preserve her soul, the person herself is in patience. Why then is it necessary to depict patience as a force outside the person? Even if, or rather because, we are to be patient, patience is not something we can simply do or enact. Whether we are patient is a matter of how we relate, from moment to moment. It is about enduring time and about bearing ourselves, but this is difficult. We are engaged in the long battle with an indefatigable enemy, time, and a multifarious enemy, the world. (EUD 192) In this battle it is easy to become impatient. If we are impatient, how do we then become patient? We do not just decide to be patient and then become so. Instead we are reminded to be patient, for example through words of patience prodded us from another direction. Although it is our patience (we are the ones to be patient), patience also comes to us, as a sort of gift. In patience we struggle with time and with ourselves in time, for example with our wishes and expectations. In patience, we are not just patient, but seek to be patient in enduring time. Patience concerns how one relates, or takes oneself, in relating to the world and to others. But this is what preserving one s soul is about. It is about self relation in time. In seeking to preserve one s soul one relates to oneself in realising that one also carries the danger against which one is to be preserved. In preserving one s soul, one is the one to preserve, but also the one to be preserved. The discourse To Preserve One s Soul in Patience, then, is about self -preservation, but seen in this radical perspective that concerns what it is to be a self: being a self, we can lose ourselves. Again, how is this possible? We lose and gain ourselves in and through what we otherwise do. There can be specific acts of betrayal which means that we betray ourselves, but we can also lose ourselves, little by little. The critical point is that self -preservation in the sense of preserving

92 92 Arne Grøn one s soul is to preserve oneself against oneself. It is to be true to oneself, (EUD 190) which again is a matter of how we place ourselves in and through what we do. How then is patience or being reminded to be patient edifying? The demand to endure can in itself be edifying in that it breaks off concerns that can turn into worries in an almost self -encircling movement. However, what is edifying is not only the demand to endure, but also the experience of patience. It is the experience that it is possible to bear oneself in and through time. In a deep sense, then, the theme of the discourse on preserving one s soul in patience is time: it is how to deal with time to which we are ourselves exposed: What indeed is this existence, where the only certainty is the only one about which nothing can be known with certainty, and that is death? (EUD 195) Temporality 6 In sum, the discourse To Preserve One s Soul in Patience deals with the radical possibility which is inherent in selfhood: to lose and to gain oneself in time, as self -relation in time. There are even unapparent ways of losing oneself, in letting oneself be diverted in time, in that time comes in between. (EUD 188) For example, we deal with time in wishing and in intending, and the danger is to come to live in wishing (EUD 189f) and in intending, (EUD 190f) as it were. If doing so, we tend to avoid bearing ourselves in time. It takes patience to preserve one s soul because we are related to ourselves in time, from moment to moment, in relating to the world and to others not least in wishing and having a purpose. Whereas there are unapparent ways of losing oneself, it takes an effort to gain and to preserve oneself. Still, whether we succeed in gaining and preserving ourselves is a matter of being patient, in relating to time, from moment to moment. Although time and how we as selves are temporal is a key issue in the edifying discourse on preserving one s soul, the discourse is not a philosophical treatise on temporality. It deals with the problem of time as it is experienced by a human being subjected to time. We are subjected to time as subjects facing the question: what do I make out of myself? In and of itself, time does not reveal what edification means, but, as the edifying discourses show, there is a crucial connection between edification and the problem of time. What edification means, can only be understood in the light of the problem which time presents to human beings in their being human. The discourses seek to illuminate experiences of time, experiences in which time presents itself as a problem in the first place. This indirect method may be called phenomenological in that the edifying discourses describe experiences of time by articulating and, to some extent, analysing ways of relating to time. In order to bring the problems in question closer to the reader, the discourse seeks to bring into view what it talks about. There is method to 6 Cf. my article: Temporality in the edifying discourses, Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook 2001, New York, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001, pp

93 Time, Courage, Selfhood: Reflections on Kierkegaard s Discourse To Preserve One s Soul in Patience 93 it: bringing into view is necessary because we humans tend to overlook what is closest to us, our own ways of relating. The discourses are in this sense also expeditions into inwardness as a land of trouble still to be discovered (to speak in Augustinian terms). Arguing for a phenomenological approach also implies that we need to ask from the beginning, as it were: what if inwardness is a relationship to time or relating to time? Patience is the means to preserve one s soul because patience is to endure time and to bear oneself in and through time. Therefore, the discourse performs a shift in focus from the moment of decision to moments of decision. Resoluteness becomes a matter of patience. Decision is stretched out in time, in enduring time. Still, we may wonder: why does the discourse make this displacement from the moment of decision to decision in time? Because the danger against which we are to preserve ourselves is a danger which accompanies us all the way as the possibility of betraying ourselves. In accentuating the task of preserving one s soul in patience, the discourse indirectly points to the decision which takes place from moment to moment, maybe without us noticing. This is also the danger to which the discourse responds: that we can lose ourselves through what we do without realising what we do. The negative background is to be read into the positive claim that the critical decision is taken from moment to moment: If patience has helped until now, then it is appropriate to use its assistance again in order to understand in all quietness that the most crucial issues are decided slowly, little by little, not in haste and all at once. (EUD 199) Courage and Concern Patience and expectancy 7 are ways of relating to time. Underlying or rather implicit are concern and courage. Patience is courage, expectancy draws on concern. Courage and concern are deep ways of relating in that they are about, and at stake in, how we relate to time. To lose courage in the sense of the courage to be oneself in living one s life is to lose one s soul. What then about concern? The edifying discourse addresses its reader as a concerned being. We are beings for whom things matters. We are affective beings in being concerned, or, rather, being concerned is how we deal with our being affective. But concern is ambiguous. A human being is, in her mode of being, concerned, and yet she can be captured by her own concerns. Not only did he lose his soul who danced the dance of pleasure until the end, but also the one who slaved in worry s deliberations and in despair wrung his hands night and day. (EUD 187) Worry s deliberations is in Danish Bekymringens Overveielse, that is: the one being concerned (bekymret) can enslave herself in her concerns or worries. As the discourse observes, a human being is in danger in being exposed to time and the world. We can be diverted in time and be absorbed in the world, thereby not coming to lead our own life. Yet, we do not simply lose ourselves. We only do so ourselves. We only lose ourselves to the world if we let ourselves be diverted in time and be absorbed in the world, that is: in what we take to be the world. 7 Cf. the second of the two edifying discourses from 1844, Patience in Expectancy, in EUD

94 94 Arne Grøn Patience as the courage to endure can be considered as a counter -act, directed against ways of letting oneself be diverted or absorbed. However, patience is not a specific act, but a way of relating through our acts, from moment to moment. Furthermore, it is directed against the danger which we, as selves, carry around with us: to give up ourselves or to despair. Here, concern enters the picture again. The danger of losing oneself does not just consist in letting oneself be diverted or be absorbed, but in trapping oneself in what one is doing, in being concerned. Against this, patience consists in re -directing one s concern, as the concern to preserve one s soul. The task in preserving one s soul, then, is to keep one s spirit or courage, or to preserve oneself in preserving one s courage. This indicates how the addressee of the edifying discourse is seen as a human being. As humans we are, in a critical sense, courage. Being courage, one is exposed: one s inner one s relation to oneself can be affected by what happens to oneself. In losing courage, one can come to despair, that is: one can come to give oneself up. But the discourse points to this danger in the intensified form: not only is one, in giving oneself up, the one who gives up; we can also betray oneself so that we lose our soul in and through what we are ourselves concerned about and striving for. Therefore, to preserve one s soul to remain true to oneself demands that one also struggles with oneself. Negativity and Edification Edification appears to seek out what is positive and to indulge in a positive or even moralistic rhetoric. This is one reason for making the claim, as Hegel does, that philosophy should not be edifying. But as we have seen, edification in Kierkegaard deals with negativity. It depends on a negative detour. 8 We only understand the edifying character of the discourse if we see what the discourse is a response to. As the discourse on preserving one s soul in patience shows, the edifying discourse responds to the radical possibility of losing oneself in time, by trapping oneself in concerns and by losing the courage to be oneself in living one s life. In reading the edifying discourse, we should be attentive to the field of questions in which we as readers are situated. What a philosophical reading of the discourse can do is to focus on this field of problems to which the discourse responds. The discourse deals with these problems in an existential mode, as problems which a human being encounters in seeking to understand the life she is living. We, the readers, are addressed as humans concerned about what it is to be human. The discourse on preserving one s soul in patience accentuates the task of coming to understand oneself, and it does so in an indirect and negative way which is remarkable. First, the human condition is marked by uncertainty; humans are exposed to time and can be subjected to a loss which affects them in the way they live their lives. Second, the discourse leads the reader to ask where the danger lies. The point is not to deny that we are exposed to dangers in terms of a loss which will change our life. Rather, 8 Cf. Arne Grøn, Subjektivitet og negativitet: Kierkegaard, Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1997.

95 Time, Courage, Selfhood: Reflections on Kierkegaard s Discourse To Preserve One s Soul in Patience 95 the discourse re -directs the vision of the reader: in seeking to preserve what we are concerned about we can overlook an even more critical danger. This is the danger which we carry around with us, which is difficult to understand. Self -understanding in this sense takes patience. It takes patience to understand what it means that we, as humans, can lose ourselves, and that this is our own possibility. What makes it possible to speak edifyingly, and what is implied in this form of communication? In a sense, it is precisely the negative possibility which makes an edifying discourse possible. The addressee the one to be edified is a concerned being. She can be addressed in her concern for that which matters to her. In being thus concerned, she can be affected so as to lose her courage. But as the discourse on preserving one s soul in patience calls attention to we are situated with ourselves, so that we can be affected not only by the loss we experience, but by ourselves, even in our concern for safeguarding what matters to us. The edifying discourse takes the one to be edified as a self, but it also elaborates what is implied in this: as selves, relating to ourselves, one can lose one s soul, but as selves, we can also be given the courage to preserve oneself in patience, that is, to bear oneself. Selfhood Let me conclude by focusing on our guiding question of selfhood. The edifying discourse addresses its listener or reader as someone to be edified. What is implied in this gesture? In communicating, it points to the act of communication and to the act of understanding. But the discourse can only indicate (formally, as it were) the act of understanding which is left to the reader. In addressing the reader, it uses a sort of detour, speaking first of someone we might have heard of, then of what it is to be a human being, and, finally, it speaks directly to the reader, as a thou. What is the implication? As we have seen, the edifying discourse addresses the reader as someone who is concerned, but how we the readers are concerned is again left open. We are situated in an imaginative field of possibilities in which to orient ourselves. Yet, in and through these possibilities the question of what it is to be a human being resonates. As humans, we are concerned by what happens and what may happen to us. What are we to make out of ourselves? The critical point is what we can make out of ourselves. Thus, we can be captured by ourselves in our concerns. We can lose ourselves precisely in and through the ways we are concerned. If we, in order to be able to accept ourselves, are concerned about becoming something other and something more than who and what we are, we are in despair, according to The Sickness unto Death. Or, in the words of the edifying discourse, we are not true to ourselves. We may argue that it is not defined or fixed who we are, and that we are defined by the fact that we can change. Yet, in changing we are the one who changes and the one to change. If we do not bear through what we decide to undertake, we do not define ourselves, but keep ourselves in possibilities. We can lead ourselves astray both by defining ourselves in terms of possibilities and by not seeing our possibilities. How

96 96 Arne Grøn are possibilities our most own (to use Heidegger s term)? In the edifying discourse we the readers are already committed by ourselves. It may be difficult to find out how, but this is about coming to understand oneself rightly. (EUD 188) Rightly need not imply that there is a pre -given standard for understanding oneself. Rather, it is about the way one understands oneself whether one appropriates oneself, that is: acknowledges oneself or not as the one to answer for oneself. In understanding oneself rightly, one can also come to understand others, as it is indicated in the discourse. As we have seen, this gives a clue to understanding why patience is the means to preserve one s soul. In patience one struggles with time and with oneself in time. Patience concerns self -relation in time. What one is to understand in understanding oneself is that one is the one to endure and to bear oneself. And this requires patience. How, then, can an edifying discourse be philosophically challenging? The edifying discourse on preserving one s soul in patience challenges a philosophical account of selfhood. It pushes the question of selfhood to the point: how we are selves is a matter of what we can do to ourselves. The critical insight is that one only preserves one s soul against oneself. One carries the danger around with oneself, the danger of losing oneself in giving oneself up (despairing), in self -enclosing concern, and in losing the courage to acknowledge oneself. These possibilities have to do with our being subjected to time. We change without wishing and intending to change, but we also change in and through what we do and we can do so without recognising ourselves. Therefore, if we want to give an account of selfhood it is not sufficient to describe structures of being concerned, as Heidegger does. The question is how we are ourselves implied in being concerned. Not only can we fall, we can also capture ourselves in being concerned. Therefore, concern and courage go together. To preserve one s soul appears to be another way of formulating that a human being is concerned about itself. However, the negative approach of the edifying discourse seeking to understand what the danger is that makes the task of preserving one s soul crucial indicates that being a self is complicated in its very structure of being concerned in ways of relating. The radical possibility of losing oneself is inscribed in the structure of being a self that is concerned. The edifying discourse on preserving one s soul is to be understood in response to this difficulty in being oneself. This is not least what makes it philosophically challenging. 9 9 This study was funded by the Danish National Research Foundation. I would also like to thank José Miranda Justo for helpful comments to an earlier version of this paper.

97 Human Perfection: Overcoming Oneself A Discussion of Kierkegaard s Four Upbuilding Discourses (1844) with Reference to Luther, Heidegger, and Simone Weil Claudia Welz University of Copenhagen Introduction: The normativity of human selfhood and the problem of self deception The topic of the following considerations is the normativity of human selfhood. Our respective views of human existence form and inform the ways we see each other and ourselves. We are selves that evaluate themselves in the light of the tasks we have set ourselves. Our personal identity, self -image or self -understanding is tied to our self -assessment. This normative aspect of self -understanding concerns not just what we wish to be or ought to be but first and foremost what we already are. What we are includes our ideals and our factual failures. Our existence harbors the possibility of developing ourselves in the direction of our ideals or of falling short of these ideals. As Martin Heidegger has put it in Being and Time, human being is a being -possible (Möglichsein). (SZ 1 31) We can become aware of what we can and what we can t. Moreover, we can relate to the awareness of our abilities and the limits that our inability imposes on us. We relate to ourselves in approving or disapproving of ourselves. This happens whether we think about it or not, for we evaluate ourselves through our feelings, too. Especially the so -called self -conscious (and the same time other -conscious ) emotions of guilt and shame, pride and humility are telling. They tell us how we see ourselves as related to others and to the goals that we achieved or missed. Being mirrored by one s emotions can be painful. We might want to conceal ourselves instead of facing the image they portray of us. Yet, would we succeed in concealing ourselves? As Søren Kierkegaard points out in one of his Upbuilding Discourses, a human being can try to conceal him -or herself, but nonetheless, the witnesses are there. (EUD 350) Kierkegaard explains that these witnesses are one s thoughts. Further, every person is his or her own eyewitness. Every person monitors what he or she is feeling, perceiving, deciding, thinking, and doing. Self -witnessing is not only a matter of reflecting about oneself, but also a matter of being -reflected by oneself. Kierkegaard explicitly mentions conscience, which is, as it were, an inner mirror that marks moral judgments by means of involuntary self -appraisal. (EUD 1 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1993; henceforth mentioned as SZ. Kierkegaard in Lisbon, Lisboa, CFUL, 2012, pp

98 98 Claudia Welz 351) According to Kierkegaard, conscience makes the guilty one his own informer and helps him with eternity s memory. (ibid.) Here it seems as if one could not escape the judgment of one s conscience. However, Kierkegaard is well aware of the fact that one might betray oneself. He asserts that the human heart is very deceitful. (EUD 297) It is not by sheer chance that the problem of self -deception is prominent in precisely the texts that deal with deepened self -knowledge. In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard clarifies: The arrangement is such that through the conscience the report promptly follows each guilt, and the guilty one himself must write it. But it is written with invisible ink and therefore first becomes clearly legible only when it is held up to the light in eternity while eternity is auditing the consciences. (SUD 124 / SKS 11, 235) Thus, self -deception cannot be precluded in this earthly life, but it will be impossible in eternity. Under conditions different from those of our temporal existence, what has been concealed will become disclosed. Then everyone will deliver his or her own record of everything committed and omitted. (Welz, SECRET ) 2 Still, for the time being, we have the time to deceive ourselves. Now, it is the peculiarity of self -deception that it is likely to dissolve as soon as one becomes aware of it. One cannot aim at deceiving oneself without thereby subverting the self -deception. The one who consciously chooses self -deception as a goal will fail, for, in order to remain goal -directed, one must remember what it is that one wishes to forget. If one knows that one is deceiving oneself, one also knows that there is more to oneself than that which one likes to present of oneself. Then one also has some idea of what it is that one tries to cover up. Thus, although self -deception is motivated, it is normally not intended or chosen in any explicit sense. But what happens if one embarks on the opposite strategy and aims at avoiding self -deception? Can one be sure that one achieves this goal? My guess is that Kierkegaard would have answered: no, one cannot, because it is characteristic of self -deception that it betrays even the best of our intentions. In what follows, I will focus on the Four Upbuilding Discourses from August Kierkegaard has dedicated them to his father. They are internally connected and share at least one motif: human perfection versus self -deception. In my analysis of these discourses, I will proceed in three steps. First, I will explore how Kierkegaard describes self -deception. What does it consist in? This will indirectly give us a clue about Kierkegaard s idea of human perfection, which is the second issue to examine. Is there anything we can do in order to come to know ourselves truly, and how can we learn to face what we would rather wish to ignore? In a third step, I will concentrate on the inner struggle that this learning entails. Here Kierkegaard s position will briefly be confronted with alternative positions. 2 Cf. Claudia Welz, Keeping the Secret of Subjectivity: Kierkegaard and Levinas on Conscience, Love, and the Limits of Self -understanding, in Despite Oneself. Subjectivity and its Secret in Kierkegaard and Levinas, edited by Claudia Welz and Karl Verstrynge, London: Turnshare, 2008, pp ; henceforth referred to as SECRET.

99 Human Perfection: Overcoming Oneself 99 My working hypothesis is that self -deception in Kierkegaard can concern anything that is relevant for the constitution of one s self -identity and that human perfection is linked to the capability of overcoming oneself, i.e., overcoming the self that has reasons to deceive itself. Overcoming oneself, however, is preceded by a struggle in which one has to distance oneself from negative possibilities inherent in oneself. 1. Overcoming supposed self sufficiency The first of the four discourses is entitled To Need God Is a Human Being s Highest Perfection. As I understand it, it is a discourse on the perfection of overcoming self- sufficiency. This might sound surprising. Is it not an advantage to be independent and not to need more than what oneself is able to provide? 1.1. Self deceiving self importance Kierkegaard s criticism is not directed at the endeavor not to bother others. However, he criticizes the one who is all too eager to take high -mindedness in vain and is proud of needing only a little while using much. (EUD 297) One might deceive oneself about how much one needs, and one might become self -important when thinking that one needs only a little. Kierkegaard illustrates this by the person who threw away his possessions in order to test himself but only renounced vanity by means of an even greater vanity. (EUD 299) Another example is the case that one suffers a loss that is imposed on oneself, a loss one has not chosen, which leads one to the opposite form of self -importance: instead of overestimating what one can, one might underestimate one s capacity of bearing that which happens to oneself. So take away from him: wealth and power and dominion, the treacherous obligingness of false friends, the submissiveness of desires to the whims of wish, the triumphs of vanity over idolizing admiration, the flattering attention of the crowd, and all the envied grandeur of his appearance. (EUD 298) This person might easily be driven into despair. Yet, Kierkegaard admonishes of the danger that one s despair, too, can become a way of deceiving oneself. Here he refers to Job s response to his friends and his growing despair about the catastrophe that ruined his life. Kierkegaard comments that the ice and snow of despair create the deceptive mountain torrent and accordingly the caravan shifts its course, proceeds into the desert, and perishes (Job 6:15-18). (ibid.) To despair is to do oneself a disservice due to one s evaluation of one s own situation, which rules out that matters can be mended. The one who has despaired has given up. However, in giving up, one overlooks that rescue is still possible though maybe not in one s own power. In a journal entry from 1844, the year in which he was sketching the discourses, Kierkegaard noted down: A human being s highest achievement is to let God be

100 100 Claudia Welz able to help him. (JP I 54; Pap. V B 198, n.d.) It is implied that God can help us only when we admit that we cannot help ourselves. Thus, self -deception either includes the grandiose illusion that one can always manage things on one s own and that every man is the architect of his own fortune; or the despairing illusion that one cannot manage things, even if God helps. Both forms of self -deception include self -importance, either making one s willed renunciation or one s unwanted suffering central. As opposed to these forms of self -deception, Kierkegaard s discourse reminds us of the verse from 2 Corinthians 12:9, where Paul writes that the Lord said to him: My grace is sufficient for you, for my power is made perfect in weakness. Correspondingly, Kierkegaard s imperative statement is: Then be contented with the grace of God. (EUD 300) However, if the grace of God is the most glorious of all, the statement does not express modesty. Quite the opposite, and that s why Kierkegaard exclaims: what brashness to be willing to be contented with the most! (EUD 301) He compares this odd way to talk with someone who gives the destitute person a penny, admonishing him to be contented with it, although this penny made its receiver the possessor of the whole world. (EUD 301) Kierkegaard then clarifies that the grace of God has no evidence in favor of itself. Therefore, its glory is not obvious, and therefore, being contended with the grace of God requires faith in the invisible instead of belief in oneself Self annihilation as perfection Now, if someone believes that he lacks only the means, then he still believes in himself, (EUD 306) whereas, if someone understands that he is nothing in himself, he can surrender himself to grace. (EUD 307) Surrendering oneself to grace, then, means becoming oneself in terms of what one is not already by oneself. It means becoming who one has not been before. Kierkegaard defines human perfection accordingly. Yet, how can one understand that one is nothing in oneself if one at the same time knows that one is someone characterized by something? How can one become nothing in oneself? It is noteworthy that becoming nothing in oneself is not the same as becoming nothing. If one became nothing, one would cease to exist. Becoming nothing while staying alive, this means something different. It means remaining someone, though someone who does not remain in him - or herself. Becoming nothing in oneself involves the reference to a relation. In relation to another, one can understand that one is nothing in oneself. However, the relation Kierkegaard points to is a specific relation: the God- relationship. In relation to God only not just in relation to oneself or another human being, one can view oneself as nothing in oneself in the sense that one is capable of nothing without God. This sounds a bit exaggerated, for everyone is capable of something, be this something appreciated or not. If we take Kierkegaard s claim in line with his critique of self -deceiving self -importance, we could reformulate the claim as follows: viewing oneself as nothing in oneself means viewing oneself as

101 Human Perfection: Overcoming Oneself 101 nothing significant, i.e., as someone who is not capable of something significant. If uttered by someone who has a great talent, such a view might give the impression of false modesty. Yet, Kierkegaard s claim is even more radical. It is directed against the preservation of any prideful thoughts and feelings because, as soon as a person becomes aware of his or her humility, the person is no longer humble. Presumably in order to avoid this dilemma, Kierkegaard interprets human perfection as equivalent with self -annihilation. Human pride is threatened by the insight that one is in need. Kierkegaard explains that, with respect to earthly goods, to the degree that one needs less, the more perfect one is. However, in a human being s relationship to God, it is inverted: the more one needs God, the more perfect one is. (EUD 303) Kierkegaard affirms that to need God is tied to the conviction that oneself is capable of nothing. (EUD 307f) This radical incapability is explicated in respect to the external and to the internal world a split which is not unproblematic. Despite one s incapability, one is supposed to overcome oneself. How can this be possible? Regarding the external world, Kierkegaard claims, When we speak of overcoming oneself by oneself, by this expression we really mean something external, so that the struggle is unequal. (EUD 319) Kierkegaard then gives some examples of this unequal struggle. We shall praise a person when someone who has been tempted by worldly prestige conquers himself so that he no longer reaches out for it; when someone who feared life s dangers drives out his fears [ ]; when someone who has lost his bold confidence overcomes himself to the point that he stands his ground and does not retreat from the place of decision. (EUD 319f) Kierkegaard s argument is that one can well overcome oneself in relation to something external, but not in relation to oneself. In a rhetorical question, he asks: How can I be stronger than myself? (EUD 319) One can resist oneself to some extent, but this is not the same as overcoming oneself. However, matters become more complicated when one notices that the internal is intertwined with the external. Burning ambition, fear or confidence is, on the one hand, directed at something specific that is in the world. On the other hand, it is one s own ambition, fear or confidence, for it is oneself relating to the world ambitiously, fearfully, or confidently. Thus, it does not remain external to oneself. The struggle takes place in the inner and the outer world such that these are not two separate worlds, but one single world, the world in which a human being s existence unfolds as being -in -the -world. If one struggles with oneself, one s relations to the world, to others with whom one shares this world and to things in this shared world, are affected by this struggle. Nonetheless, Kierkegaard s point is that the circumstances in which one struggles cannot determine the result of one s struggle if one struggles primarily with oneself. But is it, then, oneself who determines the result? Kierkegaard emphasizes that it is an exhausting, a terrible struggle, when life at God s direction casts a person out to be strengthened in this annihilation that knows no delusion, permits no evasion, occasions no self -deception, as if he would be capable of more under

102 102 Claudia Welz other circumstances. (EUD 309) Thus, one cannot escape the conclusion that it is not oneself who can control the outcome. One is, as it were, cast into circumstances which make one s incapability or nothingness obvious in a fundamental way, such that it becomes clear that one would not do better in any other situation. What is the lesson of this struggle, and in what sense can one be strengthened by becoming nothing also in one s own eyes? At first sight, it seems as if one were completely powerless and as if this were the lesson to learn. Even so, one is nothing more and nothing less than the instrument of the annihilation. (ibid.) Is it someone else playing on this instrument? If the annihilation is not just a being -annihilated, if it deserves to be called a self -annihilation, oneself must also play a role in it. Otherwise there could not be a struggle. On Kierkegaard s view, to comprehend this annihilation is the highest thing of which a human being is capable. One is to struggle in order to become nothing, nothing before God. By contrast, the one who wants to become something is deceived about the destination of human life. But why is it so decisive to become nothing? Isn t this a loser mentality? It is, in a sense. Yet, in this context, losing means winning. One loses one s self -importance. Instead, one gains the awareness of God s presence. For Kierkegaard, human self- knowledge is inseparable from knowing God. One only gets to know God if one knows that one is capable of nothing at all and cannot undertake the least thing without God s help. (EUD 322) The one who knows that he or she could do nothing without God becomes conscious of God. (EUD 323) God and man correspond to each other when humans know that they are helpless creatures and that God is capable of all things. (EUD 310) Kierkegaard takes Moses as an example. He was capable only of submitting everything to the Lord. (EUD 311) However, this correspondence or complementarity between God and man dissolves as soon as humans think they are able to take care of themselves and are in this sense self -sufficient The struggle of in capability Kierkegaard claims that one must tear oneself loose from any such delusive view. But this is just as difficult as tearing oneself out of a dream without making the mistake of continuing the dream: dreaming that one is awake. (EUD 313) The difficulty is that the person s real self seems to him so far distant that the whole world seems much closer to him (ibid.) The more profound self -knowledge begins with a shock: instead of becoming the master, to become one in need; instead of being capable of all things, to be capable of nothing at all. (EUD 314) Here too, it is difficult not to dream that one is doing this transformation by one s own power. Nonetheless, one s power is involved, if only to the extent that one can become aware of its limits. The struggle is paradoxical, a struggle of in -capability. In order to find oneself capable of nothing at all, one must be capable of putting oneself to the test. Kierkegaard describes this struggle as a conflict between two selves, the so -called first self versus the deeper self. (EUD ) The first self craves for happiness and wants to be someone in the world. Yet, it is summoned back from the surrounding world by the deeper self that depicts this external world as dubious and inconstant.

103 Human Perfection: Overcoming Oneself 103 If everything can be changed in a moment, then the temporal cannot be a criterion for one s self -evaluation. Kierkegaard does not exclude the possibility that the first self submits to the deeper self and that they are reconciled. (EUD 316) In this case, the shared mind has been diverted away from the external, but this is still only the condition for coming to know oneself. (EUD 317) As Kierkegaard portrays it, human self -knowledge is attained only when someone comprehends his or her incapability. The incapability is not limited to specific tasks. Rather, it is a global incapability that applies not only to what one does but also to what one is. One is and one can do nothing. Yet, this nothing affects everything with which one has to do, regardless of the outcome. Kierkegaard claims that even someone who is successful is totally incapable. This is a position that can hardly be defended philosophically, for it seems self -contradictory. If one can do something like, e.g., struggling with oneself and thereby gaining a new self -understanding, one cannot at the same time be completely incapable of doing anything. Let us have a look at the diametrically opposed position, namely Heidegger s description of human freedom. For Heidegger, being is being -capable. Ich bin is supposed to mean ich kann I am means I can, not only in a restricted realm but basically and in general. (PGZ 412f, 433) 3 One s very existence implies that one can be there: Dasein means Sein können. (SZ 143, 303) Paul Ricoeur takes up the Heideggerian I can in describing the moral constancy of a self that performs its capacities. (OA 305) 4 In addition, Ricoeur speaks of a capacity and a power to fail, from which evil arises. (FM 141, 145f) 5 Ricoeur follows Heidegger in interpreting the concept of fallibility by the concept of capacity a combination that leads to the image of man as l homme faillible who is nonetheless l homme capable. These are positions that challenge Kierkegaard s idea of a homo non capax who constantly has to receive what he can and what he is. Ricoeur concedes that our capacities are due to a gift we could not give to ourselves. 6 Yet, the point at issue is not the origin of our capacities, which will never be at our disposal, but rather the ambiguities of our in -capacity, of simultaneous capability and incapability. The reason why Kierkegaard defends a paradoxical position is to be found in the pragmatics of language. We should not forget that his texts are not philosophical dissertations but upbuilding discourses that are to move their reader. The goal of the intended movement is that the reader overcomes a certain self -understanding. Instead of understanding him - or herself as someone important who can achieve what he or she wills, the reader shall become nothing. Becoming nothing does not mean that one 3 Cf. Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. Marburger Vorlesung Sommersemester In: Gesamtausgabe II. Abteilung: Vorlesungen , vol. 20, ed. by Petra Jaeger, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, Cf. Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. by Kathleen Blamey, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992; henceforth mentioned as OA. 5 Cf. Paul Ricoeur, Fallible Man, trans. by Charles A. Kelbley, New York: Fordham University Press, (1986) 2002; henceforth mentioned as FM. 6 Cf. VI 484, where Ricoeur writes that human freedom is contingent and incarnate and constitutes itself in receiving what it does not produce values, capacities, and sheer nature.

104 104 Claudia Welz shall kill oneself and thereby become no one. Rather, it means that one as the person one already is shall see oneself differently. Hence, self -annihilation is a hermeneutical enterprise. The aim of the struggle is not that one gets paralyzed but built up. The new self -understanding that is built up conveys that one is someone who needs God. A person who needs God is more than he or she can do and more than he or she can understand of him - or herself. Whatever he or she may achieve, the achievement is not due to his or her own capability. Rather, it is due to a surplus received from outside of him - or herself, out of a relationship that is not due to the person s own deeds and surpasses this person s possibilities. Overcoming one s supposed self -sufficiency involves relating to oneself in a way that acknowledges the crucial role of the Other who supports one s life to the extent that one would not be alive without Him. 2. Overcoming one s despondency The second of the four discourses is entitled The Thorn in the Flesh. Following 2 Corinthians 12:7, the discourse describes the suffering of the apostle Paul who is not permitted to remain in the third heaven but must return to himself. Said in Kierkegaard s own words, the discourse is both about an escape, about rescue from the snare of relapse and about how strength collapsed in weakness, distrust scared away all help, despondency desponded of every hope, how the past [ ] again stood there with its demand. (EUD 344) Paul has to struggle with painful memories of his past as a persecutor of the Christians. He is wounded for the rest of his life with a recollection that festers in the flesh like a thorn. (EUD 340) The question is how he could overcome despondency Self deceiving zeal and subsequent self accusation Paul s present despondency has its roots in the time when he raved against the Christians in the time before he himself became a Christian. At that time, Paul was called Saul, and Saul was a zealot. Kierkegaard disqualifies his zeal as self- deception: Surely Saul thought his zeal was an ardor pleasing to God oh, but precisely this, this having to catch himself or be caught in a self -deception such as that, and consequently having to repent of what he regarded as pleasing to God [ ]: to have to repent of the best that one has done [ ]! (EUD 341f) Paul s repentance expresses that he, in one sense, had become a new creature, he had not just changed his name, but in another sense he was still the same man. (EUD 341) He still carried his past with him. He still continued to be the one responsible for what he had done. And he could not exclude the possibility of again being caught in self -deceiving zeal only for something else. For this reason, Paul s zeal was followed by self -accusation. The self -accusation was mitigated when he was outside himself, liberated, rescued from himself to himself. (EUD 338) In this state the past was powerless to condemn him. But as soon as he returned to himself, Paul accused himself again, and the past again got

105 Human Perfection: Overcoming Oneself 105 the kind of claim upon his soul that, according to Kierkegaard, no repentance can entirely redeem, no trusting in God can entirely wipe out, but only God himself in the inexpressible silence of beatitude. (ibid.) These words suggest that Paul could not do anything against the terror spread by his bad conscience Hope as perfection This impression is intensified when one reads Kierkegaard s warning against wanting to play the hero. He claims that no one enters the kingdom of heaven without suffering (EUD 331) and that the thorn in the flesh is a reminder that even the one who grasps at the highest is still only aspiring to it. (ibid.) Sorrow and comfort belong together. (EUD 332) Deep pain is the contrast and successor to supreme blessedness. (EUD 328) There is change. But the apostle knows that this change is beneficial to him, and that this thorn in the flesh is given him so that he will not be arrogant. (EUD 329) What, then, is human perfection in regard to suffering? Is it simply the acceptance of it? This would be a form of resignation. And resignation does not help against rebellious thoughts that ponder the past. Paul s suffering has to do with what Kierkegaard calls the thraldom of temporality : To have been made rich in God, inexpressibly so, and now to be broken down to flesh and blood, to dust and corruption! To have been himself present before God and now to be forsaken by God, forsaken by himself, comforted only by a poor, demented recollection! (EUD 337) The experience that there is a change also in God is one of the variations that made Paul suffer. He was no longer assured that nothing would be able to separate him from God s love. He suffered from God -forsakenness as a separation that is more severe than death, since death only separates a person from the temporal and therefore is a release, whereas this separation shuts him out from the eternal and therefore is an imprisonment. (EUD 337) Only the eternal can make one forget the past because it can fill the soul entirely. By contrast, time passes and reinforces the past when it comes again as future, more terrifying than ever. According to Kierkegaard, highest life never attains its perfect form in time, for there is no security in time. (EUD 339, 343) Thus, on its way to perfection, human life must be directed to the eternal, everlasting, unchangeable. Temporal anxiety must be consumed just as cowardliness must perish in the desert of expectancy. (EUD 345) If one expected terrible things to come, one could not lose one s anxiety and cowardliness. If one expects the good, one hopes. Hope connects one with the good that is beyond time and that is expected to come into one s temporal life. Someone who, like Paul, suffers from self -accusation in regard to his past can find comfort in the future only when relating to it in hope. In hope, one is re -connected with what one misses in the present The struggle of in activity The insight that hope is the remedy for despondency is one thing; another thing is the question of how to obtain and to preserve hope. Is it one s own fault if one despairs

106 106 Claudia Welz instead of continuing to hope? Despair (de speratio) is the giving -up of hope (spes). As such, it entails an activity, for it is oneself giving up, even though that which makes one despair might have happened without oneself having done anything that could have provoked the event. Giving up hope means to become separated from the eternal, from the good beyond time that can enter and transform one s temporal life. For Kierkegaard, it is clear that in the world of spirit, the only one who is shut out is the one who shuts himself out (EUD 335) since all are invited. Interestingly, Kierkegaard states that for Paul, the spirit had become a thorn in the flesh. (EUD 336) This way, Paul s struggle was a purely spiritual struggle in which he had only himself to deal with. One could object that it was God who had forsaken him. This implies that Paul also had to struggle with God. However, if hope is per se the bond to the eternal, it seems that it also depended on whether Paul held on to hope for God becoming present to him again. If God s becoming -present in fact depends on oneself hoping, it is plausible that Paul indeed had to deal with himself in his despondency. The despondent one has to overcome him - or herself in the sense that he or she has to overcome the tendency to despair that (s)he him - or herself nourishes. Hence, the preservation of hope is at least not independent of human agency. Now, if one reads Kierkegaard s considerations on hope and despair in comparison with their background in Reformation theology, it is conspicuous that Kierkegaard deals with the problem in an unconventional way. In an excursus to Psalm 5 with the title De spe et passionibus in Operationes in psalmos ( ), Martin Luther defends the thesis: Non in operibus, non in rebus aliis, sed in spe pura cor hominis laetatur. (WA.A 2, 282) 7 In claiming that the human heart rejoices not in works or other things but in pure hope, Luther criticizes the view that Petrus Lombardus held, namely that hope is a certain expectation of a reward springing out of merits. As Luther sees it, Lombardus view is the ruin of all theology. (WA.A 2, ; LC 266) On Luther s view, hope is not a human work, but rather the work of God s word, i.e., of God s promise: opus verbi seu promissionis. (WA.A 2, 316; LC 286) The cause of despair is trust in one s own works and resistance against the hope that rests in God s mercy alone. (WA.A 2, 291; LC 262) Luther and Kierkegaard agree that despair is due to oneself insofar as it is oneself resisting hope. However, do they also agree on how a human being can obtain hope? Luther distinguishes sharply between ordinary virtues that may be perfected by doing (agendo perfici) and the so -called theological virtues, i.e., faith, love, and hope, that are perfected only by suffering (patiendo), by being passive under the divine operation. (WA.A 2, 317; LC 287) The idea is that God is working in the human being and infusing or communicating his grace so that the human being may find (obtinebit) faith, love, and hope. (WA.A 2, 300; LC 268) Thereby, the human soul is 7 Martin Luther s here quoted are: De spe et passionibus in: Operationes in psalmos ( ), Teil II: Psalm 1 10 (Vulgata) [Archiv zur Weimarer Ausgabe der Werke Martin Luthers, vol. 2], edited by Gerhard Hammer et al., Köln/Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1981, pp , referred to as WA.A 2; and Concerning Hope and Sufferings in: Luther s Commentary on the First Twenty Two Psalms, trans. by Henry Cole & John Nicholas Lenker, Sunbury, Pennsylvania/Minneapolis, Minnesota: Kessinger, 1903, pp , referred to as LC.

107 Human Perfection: Overcoming Oneself 107 being acted upon, being moved, being carried along by the Spirit, formed, cleansed, and impregnated by the Word of God. (WA.A 2, 317f; LC 288) 8 Paradoxically, it is the passive life (vita passiva) that works hope. (WA.A 2, 302f; LC 270f) Luther uses some drastic metaphors to illustrate this: man is formed by hope like a vessel from the hand of the artificer, (WA.A 2, 320; LC 289) lying passive in the hand of God like clay in the potter s hand. (WA.A.2, 320; LC 290) As he sees it, it is by growing hope that we are conformed to the divine likeness. (ibid.) Yet, the context in which hope is obtained is a spiritual conflict. Luther asks rhetorically: But who can endure any tribulation without hope? (LC 266) His question presupposes that one needs hope in order to stand the test. However, the greatest affliction, the heaviest (gravissima) of all temptations consists precisely in hopelessness. Here the struggle is about hope. Luther imagines that the weak and infirm conscience may say, But suppose I cannot hope, 9 and thus find my despair unsurmountable? (WA.A 2, 309; LC 278f) Luther answers that that is not despair when thou desirest not to despair and grievest that thou dost despair, it is only the trial and temptation of hope [spei tentatio]. (ibid.) It follows that despair is a matter of fact: having given up hope. As long as one tries not to give up hope, one has not yet despaired, although under the tribulation it may appear as if one had no hope at all, for one cannot feel it any longer. (WA.A 2, 300f; LC 268) In such a situation, it is especially tempting to give up the hope that one cannot give oneself. Hope is a gift, but in affliction it loses its experiential character as a gift. One might be misled into thinking that one has lost the gift. Therefore, Luther s advice is to pray for hope. (WA.A 2, 309f; LC 279f) So it seems as if we could do nothing in order to obtain hope, but something in order not to give it up. The question is, however, whether obtaining hope does not also require at least a minimal form of activity, namely consenting in one s passivity while God works: letting -God -work. Philipp Stoellger has rightly argued that the parenesis that prompts one s letting -be overlooks das Tun in allem Lassen. 10 We cannot let it be without actively withdrawing ourselves from doing something in order to let it be. What, then, is the meaning of the vita passiva that Luther advocates? In a soteriological sense, our redemption happens mere passive, i.e., without our help. Yet, soteriological passivity does not imply ethical passivity. Rather, our acting just as our letting -be on the ethical plane result from our soteriological passivity. Thus, to struggle for hope is a struggle for inactivity that nonetheless as struggle needs one s commitment and therewith one s activity. This insight is only implied in Luther s theology. It is Kierkegaard who has spelled out the consequences of such an approach. He has not focused on obtaining hope, which is, as it were, not our own business, but rather on preserving hope, which is without doubt our business. 8 Luther uses the Latin words passio, raptus, motus, quo movetur, formatur, purgatur, impraegnatur anima verbo dei. The translation becomes imprecise where in his divinis virtutibus (in these divine virtues) is translated with in these divine matters. 9 The English translation renders sperare as believe which is, again, a mistake. 10 Cf. Philipp Stoellger, Passivität aus Passion: Zur Problemgeschichte einer categoria non grata (Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie 56), Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010, p. 306.

108 108 Claudia Welz In preserving hope, we preserve what we cannot give to ourselves. The struggle for hope and against despair entails acts, while hope itself is God s work in us. Hence, the struggle that aims at overcoming despondency is a struggle of in -activity, a struggle that entails activity and inactivity at once, though not in the same respect. Here the hyphen in the word in -activity indicates, again, the simultaneity of opposites. Yet, in contrast to the struggle of in -capability, it is not a paradoxical struggle. 3. Overcoming pride and cowardliness The third of the four discourses is entitled Against Cowardliness. It is a discourse on the perfection of adopting a resolution in the struggle against those forces in oneself that keep one undecided: pride and cowardliness, which, on Kierkegaard s view, are one and the same. (EUD 354) At least they have the same effect: they delay our decisions and actions. The danger of self -deception lies in this delay Self deceiving delay Kierkegaard first outlines the origin of the self -deceiving delay: it can come about by admiration or other distractions from one s task. (EUD 348) Admiring someone else s excellence or imagining oneself carrying out fantastic deeds can keep oneself from doing what is necessary. Kierkegaard forswears deception and reminds us of the fact that it is wretched to have an abundance of intentions and a poverty of action, to be rich in truths and poor in virtues. (EUD 350) We have to do what we can. The first step to doing it is to come to a resolution. Kierkegaard s discourse can count as an exhortation in this direction. It outlines three ways in which cowardliness can impair or prevent resolute agency. First, cowardliness advertises the continued striving and opposes precipitousness, immaturity, and haste but then the victim realizes that it is too late. That s why Kierkegaard argues that the continued striving must have a beginning: resolution [Beslutning] is the beginning, and yet it takes its name from its knowing that a conclusion [Slutning] is coming. (EUD 357) In order to be able to begin, we need to get some glimpse of the end to which we begin. But here again, cowardliness interferes, and this is the second point. Cowardliness teaches that everyone ought to strive for a high and far -off goal. (EUD 361) It wants to deal with the important (EUD 365) and makes deceptive phantoms rise. (EUD 356) It leads one to believe that there is no reason to hurry. Pride has, so to say, a finger in the pie, for it is more difficult to begin quietly because it is less prestigious, (EUD 358) and rejecting everything is a much prouder thing than beginning with little. (EUD 359) Cowardliness not only manipulates the beginning and the goal of one s striving, but also the execution of one s resolution. The third point is that it prevents a person from doing and accomplishing the good to which he or she has attached him - or herself in a resolution. (EUD 363) In this case, there is regression, but cowardliness satisfies itself through the deception

109 Human Perfection: Overcoming Oneself 109 of pride (EUD 365) by placing the regression at a distance. As past, the wasted time does not seem so long or empty and barren as it would if it were to be lived through again as imminent future. (EUD 366) Thus, cowardliness is also allied with forgetfulness that provides relief when one has missed one s chance Resolution as perfection By contrast, human perfection lies in the resolution that overcomes undecidedness. Prima facie it seems as if Kierkegaard wanted to praise the resolution as such, regardless of its content. For instance, he recommends coming to a resolution because the resolution joins a person with the eternal, breaks the spell of habit, cuts off troublesome thoughts, and supports even the weakest beginning. (EUD 347) In addition, it can give coherence to human life. (EUD 364) Kierkegaard even understands resolution as a saving means. (EUD 352) Yet, upon closer examination it becomes clear that he does not advocate resoluteness as such, no matter what one has decided. Kierkegaard indicates a criterion for what makes one s resolution a good resolution. The one who is resolved to do the good is ready to sacrifice everything in the service of the good. (EUD 367) Still, having some idea of the good and the wish to dedicate oneself totally to it, this is not enough to qualify one s resolution as a good one. What is determining is the attitude in which one adopts a resolution. Even someone adequately equipped to transform the world if he wants to do it on his own account is not even as important in the eyes of God as a sparrow of the air. (ibid.) As in the first of the four discourses, Kierkegaard again puts forward a critique of self -invented importance. On his view, the good resolution involves one s awareness of being an unworthy servant, (EUD 368) i.e., someone who is capable only of something that is as good as nothing. Otherwise one would see oneself as someone who is indispensable for the good to be realized. In this case, one would overestimate one s contribution. Kierkegaard here comes back to the contradistinction between pride and humility that he developed already in the first discourse. However, the focus of the struggle he examines now is slightly different, as he adds another aspect to it The struggle of selfishness and selflessness, self love and self hatred Kierkegaard first takes up his earlier polemic against the selfishness inherent in pride, which made him argue for self -annihilation in the first discourse. In the third discourse he points out that false pride involves a high conception of one s own worth; and being unworthy is precisely what the coward cannot admit to be. However, when struggling against cowardliness, one requires the confession of one s own unworthiness. (EUD 353) Given that one has confessed one s unworthiness, this does still not preclude that one silently remains selfish despite one s unpretentiousness. This case adds a new aspect to the discussion insofar as selfishness, as it were, works undercover. Kierkegaard mentions the temptation to shut oneself in with the good in silence, not to defend oneself with a word but take one s secret into the grave. (EUD 371)

110 110 Claudia Welz The case Kierkegaard has in mind is the case that one suffers misjudgment. He claims that it is easy to become more self -important even if one does not correct the judgment that casts a shadow on oneself: one does not judge others, but wants one s deeds to judge them. (EUD 372) Yet, by means of a little confession, one could at least have mitigated the misunderstanding. (EUD 373) If one does not confess the good that one has done, one can thereby mislead others just as much as when one gives a good account of oneself that is a bit too good. Kierkegaard unmasks what might underlie understatements: Silence and indifference to everything can also conceal a bad conscience, which still has this expression of the good, that it will simply suffer its punishment. We are speaking here not of hypocrisy, which wants to appear better, but of the opposite, a hatred of oneself that wrongs the person himself so that he is merely inventive in increasing his own torment. But hatred of oneself is still also self -love, and all self -love is cowardliness. (EUD 374) What is especially of interest here is that self -hatred is traced back to suppressed self- love which might covertly be present even in self -damaging or self -destructive acts. What seems to be a struggle against oneself turns out to be a struggle for oneself, although its effects are deeply ambivalent. At stake is self -acceptance in spite of one s unworthiness one s unworthiness that is ignored in pride and exposed in humility. Kierkegaard s account of two forms of despair in The Sickness unto Death, namely in despair to will to be oneself and in despair not to will to be oneself, (SUD 20, 47ff) is foreshadowed in this discourse. Self -acceptance is jeopardized by direct or indirect, overt or hidden self -rejection. Kierkegaard encourages the one who is assailed by self- doubts to do the good before people, not with downcast eyes: acknowledge it even though you are ashamed because you always feel your own imperfection and lower your eyes before God! Venture it in trust to God, you who endured your punishment and did not flee the judgment of conscience. (EUD 375) The judgment of conscience plays a crucial role in self -evaluation. Yet, Kierkegaard puts its impact into perspective with reference to God s judgment that can counteract one s self -condemnation. This view is challenged by Simone Weil s considerations about love, humility and self -effacement that have been collected in Gravity and Grace. 11 In contrast to Kierkegaard, Weil is of the following opinion: No one loves himself. Man would like to be an egoist and cannot. This is the most striking characteristic of his wretchedness and the source of his greatness. [ ] We do not have to acquire humility. There is humility in us only we humiliate ourselves before false gods. (WEIL 61) Weil finds that self -love is exclusively a divine attribute. God can only love himself while we can only love something else. (WEIL 62) How is that to be understood? Can God only love himself because he has created everything and grounds all existence and, therefore, cannot love anything which would not be his own? 11 See Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, trans. by Emma Crawford & Mario von der Ruhr, London/ New York: Routledge, 2002; henceforth referred to as WEIL.

111 Human Perfection: Overcoming Oneself 111 If God alone is all -encompassing, God alone can remain inside himself while encountering a beloved. By contrast, our being has bodily boundaries. When we love someone or something, we come out of our shell, so to say, and are moved towards what moves us. However, does this rule out a self -reflexive movement of love? If the self can become one of the false gods before whom we humiliate ourselves, the answer is no : self -love is not ruled out. Yet, self -love is neither necessarily identical with idolatry nor with egoism. Does not the love of another always include at least some minimal form of self -love in the sense of self -acceptation? Someone who hates him - or herself will hardly overflow with attention for others, since the self -hatred will consume his or her energy. Kierkegaard spotlights what Weil does not thematize: the possibility of a pathological intertwinement of self -love and self -hatred. Kierkegaard and Weil agree on the value of humility as a virtue. However, while the self as unworthy servant in Kierkegaard s sense still has a right to live before God, Weil s advocacy of self -effacement seems to aim at the self s non- existence. Weil s point of departure is the idea of a human -divine identity: My I is hidden for me (and for others); it is on the side of God, it is in God, it is God. To be proud is to forget that one is God. (WEIL 38) This stunning note proceeds from the hiddenness of the I within God to the identification of the I with God. Weil does not connect pride with the awareness of one s oneness with God, but rather with forgetting one s own divinity. However, the assumption that one is divine is far from self -evident, whereas it is plausible that one can be proud of oneself only if one sees oneself as separate from God. Otherwise, if one were inseparable from God, one would have to attribute one s achievements also to God. No achievement whatsoever would truly be one s own. Human pride presupposes that the human being understands him - or herself as independent of God. Someone who knows that he or she owes everything to God will be humble rather than proud. Nonetheless, proudly detaching oneself from God is a possibility that Weil makes explicit: God allows me to exist outside himself. It is for me to refuse this authorization. Humility is the refusal to exist outside God. It is the queen of virtues. The self is only the shadow which sin and error cast by stopping the light of God, and I take this shadow for a being. Even if we could be like God it would be better to be mud which obeys God. (WEIL 40) The spatial metaphors suggest that one can exist outside or inside God and that one can decide at which place one wishes to live. Making oneself an outsider in relation to the divine means putting oneself as an obstacle in God s way and obstructing the light of God, so that it cannot shine through oneself. Broken loose from the oneness with God, one s self casts a shadow. This self is no longer obedient to its creator. Yet, it is the creator himself who allows for the creature s disobedience as part of the freedom granted to it. Humility means remaining within God, obediently. Does this imply that panentheism all being within God is the starting point of the story of human sin, the state before humans have begun falling away from their original identity with God? The sin in me says I. I am all. But this

112 112 Claudia Welz particular I is God. And it is not an I. Evil makes distinctions, it prevents God from being equivalent to all. (WEIL 30) The quote indicates that God is more than someone saying I, although God can encompass those who do say I and who take themselves as particular individuals distinguishable from other beings. Yet, God respects it when a human I emancipates him - or herself from God. Human withdrawal from God and God s withdrawal from his unity with man mark the end of panentheism: God renounces being everything. We should renounce being something. That is our only good. [ ] We participate in the creation of the world by decreating ourselves. (WEIL 33) Weil argues for our self -induced de -creation in response to our tendency to want to be something important. Her critique of self -importance might remind one of Kierkegaard s corresponding critique. However, Weil takes the idea of self -annihilation to its extreme. What she calls de -creation or self -effacement amounts to more than the elimination of egoism: We possess nothing in the world a mere chance can strip us of everything except the power to say I. That is what we have to give to God in other words, to destroy. [ ] Nothing is worse than extreme affliction which destroys the I from outside, because after that we can no longer destroy it ourselves. (WEIL 26) Ultimately, Weil makes a case for self -destruction. Where Kierkegaard wants to help mending our misrelations to God, to other creatures and to ourselves, Weil speaks for self -removal. I must withdraw so that God may make contact with the beings whom chance places in my path and whom he loves. It is tactless for me to be there. (WEIL 41) While the Kierkegaardian struggle is directed against undue self -love and undue self -hatred, Weil s struggle seems to be directed against selfhood as such. One could ask whether this struggle is in the spirit of a creator who, according to Weil, loves the beings he has created. Further, one could ask whether it would not be more consequent to connect the love of God with a non -egoistic form of self -love, granted that Weil herself argues that the self can rightly see itself as divine or at least as belonging to God. It follows that not loving oneself would entail not loving God. Even if Weil regards panentheism as a paradise lost through human sin, she should allow for the sinner s return to God otherwise redemption would be impossible. If redemption shall remain possible and not without me, neither selfish nor self- less, it is advisable not to eliminate oneself, but rather to let God take oneself as an instrument through which he can work, if he wills. The strength of Kierkegaard s account might be the balancing act between the extremes: self -affirmation at others expense and self -rejection at one s own expense. Both extremes unavoidably affect others, too. Kierkegaard has shown that these extremes can be dialectically related to each other. The struggle of overcoming the selfishness in pride and cowardliness can only be won if the self that can resist its selfish inclinations is preserved.

113 Human Perfection: Overcoming Oneself 113 Conclusion: Overcoming oneself self knowledge versus self deception Self -deception presupposes that the self can, as it were, conspire against itself without taking the process as conspiracy against itself. Were one fully aware of it, one could not outsmart oneself. If human perfection consists in overcoming oneself and distancing oneself from this negative possibility within oneself, the question returns that was raised in the beginning: What can we do in order to come to know ourselves truly, and how can we learn to face what we would rather wish to ignore? Section 3 has demonstrated not only that one deceives oneself by not taking a resolution, but also that one, in trying to avoid the resolution, is taken in by not taking the resolution. Thereby, without noticing it, one is taking another resolution, a paradoxical one, namely the resolution not to take a resolution. This shows that we cannot continue being unresolved. In other words: sooner or later we have to deliver ourselves up to the situation in which we are and take a stance, and we will be determined by this stance. This observation has a bearing on the understanding of the process of self- deception: although nobody deceives him - or herself intentionally, unintended self -deception nonetheless involves some intentions, decisions and resolutions even in the attempt to remain on the sidelines. Philosophers of psychology divide over whether self -deceiving action is intentional and whether self -deceivers are morally responsible for self -deception. 12 Kierkegaard s account of self -deception can bring into focus what is ignored in the current debate: the ambiguity of the will in acquiring self -knowledge, and the struggle with oneself when having to position oneself in the world. The demarcation line between self -deception and fickleness is thin. Anton Hügli has tried to keep these phenomena apart by arguing that self -deception is not the same as intentionally not wanting what one actually wants. This condition would correspond to fickleness. For fickleness to become self -deception, we would need more than just a will in conflict with itself. It needs also an intentional not -wanting- to -know -that -one s -will -is -in -conflict. But this intentional not -wanting -to -know, does it not presuppose or assume that I continuously have a consciousness and thus a knowledge of what I do not want to know? 13 (HÜGLI 69 [emphasis added]) Thus, the difference between self -deception and shilly -shallying lies in the dialectical interrelation between willing and knowing, which is performed at the cost of one s self -knowledge about one s conflictual condition. Self -deception disambiguates the ambiguities within oneself. On Kierkegaard s view, self -deception is a kind of insincerity, not an intentional deception, but a confusion about oneself caused by oneself. In a Journal entry from 1847, Kierkegaard illustrates this in comparison 12 For an overview of the debate, see Ian Deweese -Boyd, Self -Deception, in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (November 25, 2008), available online via -deception/. 13 In Anton Hügli, Pseudonymity, Sincerity and Self -Deception, Kierkegaard Poet of Existence, edited by Birgit Bertung, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel, 1989, pp ; henceforth referred to as HÜGLI.

114 114 Claudia Welz with hypocrisy. While a hypocrite is a character who could easily give an account of his or her hypocrisy, a self -deceived person does not understand him - or herself. Since no one is in this condition without being guilty of it him - or herself, it is here correct to speak of insincerity. 14 Can self -deception or insincerity then be removed by wanting truly? If this were the case, will -power could also dissolve or resolve the problem of sin because then the sinner would be free to set him - or herself free despite the fact that sin is self -enslaved freedom. If self -deception corrupts one s sincerity as a rational agent, it is unlikely that one can lift oneself up by one s own bootstraps. If self -deception is in play, this affects one s self -evaluative self -understanding. Human selfhood is characterized by self -understanding that might entail self -misunderstanding. If conscience, the consciousness that the human being has with and against him - or herself, is corrupted due to the darkness about oneself in which one wants to remain, then the mirror of conscience becomes a distorting mirror. While the self -mirroring through conscience is not itself the work of intentional acts, it requires one s wanting- to -have -conscience that which Heidegger called Gewissenhabenwollen. (SZ 270, cf. 58, 60, 62) Otherwise, the self -disclosure through conscience turns into self- occlusion. Again, willing and knowing are intertwined. Here we touch a methodological problem concerning self -understanding. What is the criterion for self -evaluation, if our self -understanding is constantly threatened by self -deception? The very last of Kierkegaard s four discourses suggests that one cannot come to understand oneself rightly on one s own, as if introspection or the comparison with others were sufficient to alter one s mind and to acquire true insights about oneself. The discourse is entitled One Who Prays Aright Struggles in Prayer and Is Victorious in That God Is Victorious. Kierkegaard unfolds here that no deception is possible in relation to God, the searcher of hearts, for he won t hear an improper prayer. (EUD 383) If prayer does not have the right form, it does not reach God s ear at all. Thus, it is impossible that prayer can become a weapon against God. God cannot be manipulated. In turn, God does not manipulate us. Yet, prayer too, involves a struggle. The battleground is the inner being of the person. The issue of the struggle is, on the one hand, for God to explain himself, and on the other hand, a matter of explaining to God what is beneficial for the one who is praying. The outcome is often that one gives up one s wish. God is victorious in the sense that the one praying could not extort fulfillment by his prayers. The one who prays is victorious because he or she has become changed and learned to pray aright, addressing God with words like these: Lord, my God, I really have nothing at all for which to pray to you; even if you would promise to grant my every wish, 14 Cf. HÜGLI 70 with reference to Søren Kierkegaard, Pap. VIII, 2 B 86 (p. 169): En virkelig Hykler er et meget sjeldent Syn især i disse Tider, thi en virkelig Hykler er et Charakteer -Msk. Derimod florerer et andet Bedrag, Selvbedraget, hvorom der dog sjeldent tales. At betegne Selvbedraget som Uredelighed er vistnok sprogligt aldeles i sin Orden. Hykleren kan meget godt gjøre sig selv Rede for sin Uredelighed, men den Selvbedragne er i et Vildrede, og da man aldrig uden Skyld er i Selvbedragets Vildrede med sig selv om sig selv, saa er det just rigtigt at bruge Ordet Uredelighed herom.

115 Human Perfection: Overcoming Oneself 115 I really cannot think of anything except that I may remain with you, as near as possible. (EUD 392) This way, the soul concentrates on one only wish. One s own priorities have changed. In line with the change of what one really wants is the change of one s self- evaluation. Someone who evaluates oneself differently has become transformed. Prayer promotes self -transformation 15 because one becomes acquainted with one s deepest desires and motivations and because one is working through their development and disappointment, one s own responses to this, and the revaluation of one s values. The knowledge about one s self -transformation is gained through the struggle with oneself and the dialogue with someone incorrupt who challenges one s self -image by letting oneself know that one s innermost is seen by him at any time. As the human heart is deceitful, it is not helpful to seek the criterion for one s self -evaluation among humans. Yet, one s self -deception can be revealed before the One who alone can see through one s maneuvers: God, the searcher of hearts. Given the ambiguity of the sinning, self -deceiving will, it is questionable whether one wants to expose oneself to this examination. Simone Weil jotted down the clear- sighted note, We have to try to cure our faults by attention and not by will. The will only controls a few movements of a few muscles. (WEIL 116) Our attention might be caught by what calls for our attention. Yet, we might also turn our attention away from these matters. Where we direct our attention to is not totally independent of what we will. We can turn our mind in one or another direction, although it then inevitably becomes formed by what it attends to. Put in Weil s words: If we turn our mind towards the good, it is impossible that little by little the whole soul will not be attracted thereto in spite of itself. (WEIL 117) In a similar sense, the transformation Kierkegaard describes happens despite oneself, (SECRET ) involving one s will in combating one s own unwillingness. That is the reason why human perfection culminates in overcoming oneself. Yet, will we ever reach perfection? The struggle of overcoming oneself is a lifelong struggle. We might deceive ourselves most when thinking that we are improving our selves and our knowledge about ourselves. Kierkegaard does not advocate any ideology of progress. Rather, he takes a self -critical stance and knows that it is human not to be perfect and nonetheless to strive for the perfection one might or might not reach. Perfection is not simply given to us and, regardless of our efforts, it needs to be received. If we shall reach it, perfection must be given to us just as self -deception must be taken from us C. Claudia Welz, Vertrauen und Versuchung (Religion in Philosophy and Theology 51), Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2010, pp I wish to thank Elisabete M. de Sousa for her thoughtful response to an earlier version of this paper, which I presented at the Centro de Filosofia, University of Lisbon, on October 22, 2010.

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117 Being Present to Oneself: Some Remarks on the Role of Optical and Acoustic Imagery in Kierkegaard s Upbuilding Discourses. Richard B. Purkarthofer A man always believes his eyes better than his ears. Herodotus The purpose of this paper 1 is to illuminate aspects of style, structure, imagery, and philosophical content of Kierkegaard s early upbuilding discourses as compared to some of his later ones. Central to this exposition is the role of optical and acoustic metaphors when it comes to the constitution of the human self. It will be shown that Kierkegaard s emphasis on optical metaphors in the early discourses will give room for a predilection of acoustic ones later on. Moreover, I will offer an interpretation of the term to be present to oneself. As I will argue, this term is not only central to Kierkegaard s anthropology but can be considered a novel contribution to human ontology. In three steps of analysis I will focus on the content of the term, on its form and how these two are reflected in its very style. My analysis of being present to oneself intends to illuminate the rationale of Kierkegaard s change in his application of optical and acoustic imagery which takes place in his development as an author of upbuilding discourses. To do so, I will start out with sketching the role of vision and visual terms in the tradition which is formative for Kierkegaard s thought. The privileged status of vision when it comes to its role for cognition and knowledge in Greek philosophy becomes clear when one considers certain terms that relate to this semantic field. As it were, the gr. verb idein means to see, to behold, to look while the preterite -present of this verb (gr. eidein) means to know. Thus, the very linguistic expression indicates that one knows what one has seen. For this intimate relation between knowing and having seen a host of analogies could be mentioned within the group of Indo -european languages. The central role of vision for Greek philosophy shows also in the archaic terminology for proofs. Thus, the proper 1 A considerable part of the research for the present study has been conducted during my stay as invited visiting scholar at the Centro de Filosofia, Universidade de Lisboa, January through March I would like to express my deeply felt gratitude to the members of the Portuguese Kierkegaard translation team, Dr. Elisabete de Sousa, Susana Janic, and Prof. Dr. José Miranda Justo for inspiring discussions. Moreover, I express my thanks for competent and kind help and support from the office as well as from other employees of the Centro de Filosofia and from Fundação da Ciência e Tecnologia. Kierkegaard in Lisbon, Lisboa, CFUL, 2012, pp

118 118 Richard B. Purkarthofer term for to prove in everyday speech is gr. apophaino, which, together with gr. deiknymi is especially used in mathematical contexts. From mathematical usage these terms found their way into philosophical terminology. Thus, Plato e.g. can write: by showing [gr. to deixai], I understand to put before the eyes. 2 In many instances it is highly probable that proofs for arguments in archaic Greek mathematics and later in philosophy has included a demonstratio ad oculos; drawings of geometrical figures in the sand would provide visual evidence for the correctness of arguments. 3 However, in Greek philosophy even the distrust in knowledge finds its expression in terms of imagery taken from optical perception: the pleasures of eyesight and the desire to look and to consider (gr. skeptesthai) easily leads to skepticism. In the very first lines of his Metaphysics, Aristotle not only notes but also argues for the privileged status of the sense of sight when it comes to knowledge: All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer sight to almost everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things. 4 If anthropologists rightly maintain that the meaning and impact of words derives primarily from bodily experience, then Aristotle s fondness of visual experiences and the predilection for vision is understandable. The eye reaches further than the ear, it reaches even the stars. The eye perceives signals much quicker with the speed of light and it is the only sense organ that has an activity of its own and is able both to send and to receive messages which comprise the basic forms of human communication. However, apart from the communicative role of vision and from its instigative function for the search for knowledge, vision plays also an important ontological role. For Augustine, for example, being means being before the eyes. He understands esse as being present since he interprets it as praeesse which in turn is interpreted as prae sensibus esse being before the senses. Given the precedence of vision over all other senses, Augustine interprets being before the senses as prae oculis esse, being before the eyes. 5 Naturally, these are sweeping remarks about the role of the visual and about optical imagery in Greek and even patristic thought. However, they will serve me as a background for my discussion of the role optical and acoustic imagery plays in some of Kierkegaard s upbuilding discourses. 2 Plato, Cratylus 430e. 3 A good example is found in Plato s Meno 82b -85e. 4 Metaphysics I,1, trans. by W. D. Ross in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1-2, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, vol. 2, p cf. Aurelius Augustinus, Der Gottesstaat / De civitate dei, vol. i -ii, ed. by Carl Johann Perl, Paderborn, München, Wien, Zürich: Ferdinand Schöningh 1979, XI, 3; vol. I, p In this interpretation I follow Wilhelm Kamlah, Christentum und Selbstbehauptung. Historische und philosophische Untersuchungen zur Entstehung des Christentums und zu Augustins Bürgschaft Gottes, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1940, pp. 273f.

119 Being Present to Oneself: Some Remarks on the Role of Optical and Acoustic Imagery 119 Ultimately, as I will argue, Kierkegaard wants to do away with this overwhelmingly significant role of the eye when it comes to its relevance for cognition, communication, and ontology. His intention is to subject the eye to the ear. Given the power of this tradition and Kierkegaard s deepest instinct as a poet, my broad strokes in depicting the significance of vision aim at emphasizing the grandeur of his endeavour. What Kierkegaard is up against may well be gathered from the very first text of Greek prose, where Herodotus tells us the following story of Candaules, King of Sardis: Now Candaules conceived a passion for his own wife, and thought she was the most beautiful woman on earth. To this fancy of his there was an unexpected sequel. In the king s bodyguard was a fellow he particularly liked whose name was Gyges, son of Dascylus. With him Candaules not only discussed his most important business, but even used to make him listen to eulogies of his wife s beauty. One day the king (who was doomed to a bad end) said to Gyges: It appears you don t believe me when I tell you how lovely my wife is. Well, a man always believes his eyes better than his ears; so do as I tell you contrive to see her naked. 6 As the story goes, Candaules forces the horrified Gyges to obey. And Gyges saw the Queen and he knew her. To appreciate Candaules line that a man always believes his eyes better than his ears, one has to contrast it with what Luther has to say about the ear. In his lectures on St. Paul s Epistle to the Hebrews 10:5 (from ) Luther emphasizes the role of the ear and says that humans need no feet nor hands or any sense organs other than the ears. Only the ears are the sense organs of a Christian; solae aures sunt organa Christiani hominis. 7 To appreciate this change of emphasis from eye to ear one has to think of the dwindling of fine arts in the churches of the Reformation and of the glorious history of protestant church music. With this background let us have a look at Kierkegaard s use of vision and optical imagery. He is keenly aware of the active role of the eye mentioned above. In the first of the Three Upbuilding Discourses (1843), he notes that what one sees depends upon how one sees; all observation [Betragtning] is not just a receiving, a discovering but also a bringing forth. (EUD 59) 8 Since vision is said not just to receive but also to bring forth it plays also a certain ontological role. Furthermore, Kierkegaard uses visualizations for certain purposes. In one example from the early upbuilding discourses we can see how a biblical parable gives occasion for such a visualization. Often we find in Kierkegaard s writings poetical passages at the 6 Herodotus, The Histories, Translated with an Introduction by Aubrey de Sélincourt, Penguin: Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1971 [1954], Book I, 8, p Nam si quaeras ex Christiano, quodnam sit opus, quo dignus fiat nomine Christiano, nullum prorsus respondere poterit nisi auditum verbi Dei id est fidem. Ideo solae aures sunt organa Christiani hominis, quia non ex ullius membri operibus, sed de fide iustificatur et Christianus iudicatur., Vorlesungen über den Hebräerbrief (10,5), D. Martin Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, vol. 57, III, Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger: Weimar, 1939, p In several instances I will insert additional Danish terms within square brackets apart from the ones already found in the English translation. Occasionally I will quote the Danish text in footnotes in order to avoid too many linguistic explanations, with references to SV1 and SKS.

120 120 Richard B. Purkarthofer beginning of texts which serve to create the intended mood of its reception. The shockingly beautiful pòemes en prose of the Exordium or rather Attunement [Stemning] at the beginning of Fear and Trembling are well -known examples of Kierkegaard s artistry. (FT 9) Another example is the preface of Sickness unto Death, where with sober terror the stage is set and we are told that its representation must have a resemblance to the way a physician speaks at the bedside of a sick person. (SD 5) However, in the example at hand, the most important visualization is set at the very end of the discourse in order to illustrate what has been developed earlier. To begin with, Kierkegaard emphasizes the active role of visual perception, since, as mentioned above, all observation is not just a receiving, a discovering but also a bringing forth. (EUD 59) We are told that when one person sees one thing and another sees something else in the same thing, then the one discovers what the other conceals. (EUD 67f) At the end of the discourse Kierkegaard sums up what has been said before by conjuring up the parable of the Sinner and the Pharisees from John 8:3-11: Let us dwell once again on this love in order to observe [betragte] the image [Billede] of it that clearly presents itself to the soul [ ] There the sinner stood, surrounded by those who were perhaps even more guilty, who loudly accused her, but love stooped down and did not hear the accusation, which vanished into thin air; it wrote with its finger in order to erase what it itself knew, because sin discovers a multitude [Mangfoldighed] of sins, but love hides a multitude of sins. (EUD 67) Kierkegaard inscribes his thoughts into the parable by visualizing it. By replacing Christ with the love the reader is brought to see how Christ/the love stoops down while the accusations disappear beyond into thin air. Thus, the eye of the beholder is brought to conceal what the Pharisees have discovered. The imagery of the eye takes precedence over that of the ear so that love did not hear the accusation. The next discourse in Three Upbuilding Discourses (1843) proceeds in the very same manner. Again it is a parable at the end of the discourse which serves to sum up and visualize the development of thoughts given previously. Thus, the visualization is presented as a kind of result. In these early discourses, Kierkegaard would agree to the role Aristotle ascribes to sight. In the first of the Four Upbuilding Discourses (1844) Kierkegaard asks: does not the eye aim its arrow outward every time passion and desire tighten the bowstring? (EUD 308) In both cases it is desire that motivates the activity of the eye. Kierkegaard talks also about the capability of a human being to be like a mirror in which he intercepts the world or, rather, the world reflects itself. (ibid.) We can take this to indicate a structural conformity of vision and its object, i.e. the world. Thus, the eye can play a cognitive role since it brings to light many differences between things, as Aristotle puts it. Moreover, according to Kierkegaard the eye aims at these differences and thus at the world and vice versa. However, already in these early upbuilding discourses Kierkegeaard mentions a sense organ which aims at collection and concentration. Whereas the eye relates to differences just as in the first lines of Aristotle s Metaphysics mentioned above

121 Being Present to Oneself: Some Remarks on the Role of Optical and Acoustic Imagery 121 the ear relates to unity and simplicity. Thus, Kierkegaard can speak of the ear that brought the confusion together in unison [Overeensstemmelse]. (EUD 94) 9 To start with, eye and ear are structured in the same way. Both perceive selectively and thus Kierkegaard can say that eye and ear can hide something, which is there anyway. Just as love causes the eye to hide the multitude of sins, the ear hides the differences and thus aims at simplicity. The eye in tacit understanding and connivance with the world aims at manifold differences, simply because of the mutual constitution of the perception and its object. In Works of Love (1847) Kierkegaard makes this point even more clearly: The sensate eyes always see the differences [Forskjellighederne] and look at the differences. (WL 68) 10 But because of the mutual constitution of the perception and its object the eye will never allow humans to find unity; all it will find by looking at things is differences. Kierkegaard s advice to mend matters is quite simple: Well, then, shut your eyes then the enemy looks just like the neighbor. Shut your eyes and remember the commandment that you shall love; [ ] In other words, when you shut your eyes, you do not see the differences [Forskjelligheder] of earthly life [ ] Moreover, when you shut your eyes, your mind is not distracted and confused just when you are supposed to listen to the word of the commandment. When your mind is not confused and distracted by looking at the object of your love and the differences of the object, you become all ears for the word of the commandment. (WL 68) 11 Whereas in the example from the first of the Three Upbuilding Discourses (1843) the optical imagery took precedence over the acoustic one, so that one did not hear the accusation, here it is the other way around; to listen to the word of the commandment relieves one from looking and thus getting stuck with differences which would lead to confusion and distraction. If there is a tension between optical and acoustic perception, between eye and ear in the early upbuilding discourses, the optical will take precedence. However, in the later ones roughly after Postscript (1846) it is the other way around. At the same time we have noticed that the very use of visualizations changed. I would like to argue that this has to do with Kierkegaard s metaphysics of optical and acoustical perceptions. He more and more comes to correlate the eye with differences and distraction whereas the ear is supposed to relate to unity and simplicity. In On My Work as an Author (1851) Kierkegaard gives an account of his own work which is worthwhile to ponder. Here he writes: Christianly, one does not proceed from the simple [det Eenfoldige] in order then to become interesting, witty, profound, a poet, a philosopher, etc. No, it is just the opposite; here one begins and then becomes more 9 Strengthening in the Inner Being. English translation slightly modified, since it translates Overeensstemmelse as harmony; however, harmony is based on differences. Furthermore, Overeensstemmelse connotes Stemme, voice. 10 Det sandselige Øie seer altid Forskjellighederne og seer til Forskjellighederne. (SV1 IX 70 /SKS 9 76) English translation slightly modified. 11 English translation slightly modified; instead of dissimilarities I use the word differences to render Forskjelligheder. Moreover, the Hongs translation takes Ord to be a plural and accordingly render it as words; I take it to be in singular used as plural and render it as word to emphasize its character of unity and simplicity.

122 122 Richard B. Purkarthofer and more simple, arrives at the simple. (PV 7) How the simplicity of det Eenfoldige is supposed to be achieved and how this process relates to our topic of optical and acoustic imagery will be the subject of the following section. In Christian Discourses (1848) the theme of the lilies and the birds in Matthew 6:24-34 plays a dominant role. Part one is entirely dedicated to its interpretation. As we gather from a journal entry, however, Kierkegaard made plans for new discourses on the lilies and the birds already before this book was published. Other entries tell us that he is working on these discourses mainly in March They are to appear under the title of The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air. Three Devotional Discourses on May 14 th of the same year and are dated on Kierkegaard s birthday. 12 In the very first draft for The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air Kierkegaard writes: Of course the lilies and the birds, that is, the sketching of nature will this time have an even more poetic tone and richness of color, simply to indicate that the poetic must be put aside, for when poetry in truth shall fall [ ], it ought to wear its party clothes [Høitidsklæderne]. 13 (Pap. VIII 1A 643, NB4: 154) And no doubt about it, these three discourses are wrapped in Høitidsklæder; they belong to the very best work Kierkegaard has ever written and will find readers as long as the Danish language will be read. It is one of the few writings where Kierkegaard attempts a positive answer to the question of what it is to be a human being. He does so in a subtle dialogue with venerable philosophical traditions and at the same time in a dialogue with his own development as a writer and thinker. Avoiding overt philosophical terminology as well as polemics, Kierkegaard succeeds in achieving a rare harmony of poetic style and philosophical content. In the introductory prayer Kierkegaard makes clear that these three discourses are about what it is to be a human being, that this can be forgotten especially in the company of other people that there is a godly requirement for being a human being and that one can learn it again, step by step, through Silence, Obedience and Joy. (WA 7) To begin with, it might be obvious, what it is to be a human being. Everyone might be supposed to know it. But as Kierkegaard notes: The beginning is not that with which one begins but that to which one comes, and one comes to it backward. (WA 11) This movement corresponds to the one quoted above from On My Work as an Author (1851): one does not proceed from the simple [det Eenfoldige] but if one leaves all the differences of being more or less interesting, witty, profound, more or less of a poet or philosopher, of being more or less wealthy behind oneself one might arrive at det Eenfoldige. (PV 7) However, this world of differences, or, put in another way, these differences of the world are intimately related to the eye, as I have pointed out above. The simplicity of the beginning, on the other hand, is related to the ear. As to induce the movement from the differences to simplicity Kierkegaard accordingly starts out 12 The discourses appear together with the second edition of Either/Or on May 14 th, 1849; cf. S. Kierkegaard s Bladartikler, med Bilag samlede efter Forfatterens Død, udgivne som Supplement til hans øvrige Skrifter af Rasmus Nielsen Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel 1857, p No date, Note written shortly before the publication of Christian Discourses (April 26, 1848), between April 22 and April 24, 1848.

123 Being Present to Oneself: Some Remarks on the Role of Optical and Acoustic Imagery 123 with conjuring up images. This is so not only because of the seductive poetic power of images but also because Kierkegaard supposes his reader to be lost in this world of differences. Duly, then, he reaches out to the reader by making the reader s eye reach out for images: So, then, following the instruction of the Gospel, let us in earnest look at the lily and the bird as the teachers. (WA 10) And a little later Kierkegaard tells us: Let us now look more closely at the lily and the bird from whom we are to learn. (WA 13) We are told to zoom in on the lily, to look and to look more closely. And if we watch carefully enough we will find that the lily indeed all nature is silent and obedient. There is silence out there in nature, even when the day vibrates with a thousand strings and everything is like a sea of sound, we were already told (WA 13): The sighing of the wind, the echoing of the forest, the murmuring of the brook, the humming of the summer, the whispering of the leaves, the rustling of the grass, every sound [Lyd], every sound [Lyden] you hear is all compliance [Adlyden], unconditional obedience [Lydighed]. Thus you can hear God in it [ ]. (WA 25) The movement, then, is from visual imagery to acoustic imagery. Already in the expression let us look at the lily we find an indication of this movement towards simplicity; in Matthew 6:26 and 6:28 we read about lilies both in the Greek and in the Danish translations whereas Kierkegaard talks only of one lily; as if not to be distracted by a multitude of lilies. The decisive movement, however, is from listening to obedience. As we have seen, Kierkegaard is using a figura etymologica: in Danish the connection between sound [Lyd], compliance [Adlyden], and obedience [Lydighed] is quite natural. In English, the relation between to hear, to listen, to obey, and obedience is far less clear. It can be traced, though, if one knows that to obey is related to lat. oboedīre, from ob, to, towards + audīre, to hear, and that obedience is related to lat. audīre to hear, since lat. oboediens is the present participle of the lat. verb oboedīre. In Danish, the relation between lyde to sound, lyde ad, hearken, listen carefully to, adlyde, obey, lydig, obedient, and Lydighed, obedience is much more obvious. And so it is in the language of the New Testament (cf. gr. akouein, to hear, hypakouein, obey, hypakoe, obedience ). Especially in St. Paul s language the ear, listening, and obedience belong together on a lexical and semantic level. This holds true for Kierkegaard as well. We can also notice that the precedence of the eye over the ear which we find in the early upbuilding discourses is reversed in the later ones. Moreover, the tension between the visual and the acoustic we find in the early upbuilding discourses is addressed in a different way in the later ones, most clearly in The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air. In the earlier discourses this tension is resolved by maintaining the precedence of the visual. In our three discourses from 1849 it is resolved through an attempted transformation from one into the other, i.e., by moving from the visual to the acoustic and accordingly from the world of differences to the simple word. Since these three discourses are about what it is to be a human being, that this can be forgotten, and how to learn it again, the movement from eye to ear and to obedience obtains a tremendous urgency for Kierkegaard. In what follows I would like to argue that this movement from differences/eye to simplicity/ear is dictated by the very structure of the human being as Kierkegaard conceives it.

124 124 Richard B. Purkarthofer What, then, does it mean for Kierkegaard to be a human being in the three discourses The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air? Usually Kierkegaard discusses what it is to be a human being in a negativistic approach and attempts to understand being human through exploring how humans fail to be human. However, in these three discourses he attempts a positive answer. Still, he explores the difficulties of being human. Since these discourses focus on the problem of time, these difficulties are to be found in the twofold fact that, on the one hand, one finds oneself in time, in temporality, in history, and, on the other hand, one knows that one will be lost and damned if one allows oneself to be exhausted by temporality. The problem to overcome is that human beings, even though participating in the eternal, are subject to temporality which changes them with the risk that they cannot recognize themselves again and are finally swept away by it. As we will see, Kierkegaard relates this tension between temporality and the eternal intimately with the tension between differences/eye and simplicity/ear. To become a truly human being in the face of disaster and death, it is necessary to be oneself (at være sig selv) and to preserve oneself (at bevare sig selv). 14 In these three discourses being human and being subject to temporality in the face of death are inextricably bound up with each other actually the one means the other! Despite this cursus ad mortem 15 implicit in the temporal structure and its intertwined connections to the constitution of man, it is the duty of human beings to be oneself and to preserve oneself. These two aspects of being a human being Kierkegaard sums up into the formula at være sig selv nærværende (to be present to oneself). (WA 39) This said, we have to inquire what Kierkegaard puts into these words. I will do so in three steps. First, I will have a look at the expression to be oneself. Next, I will discuss the expression to preserve oneself, and finally I will have a look at what it means at være sig selv nærværende (to be present to oneself). This last term is the most important one since it is the definition of the true self for Kierkegaard. Accordingly, I will dwell on it much more than on the other two. However, since being present to oneself presupposes that one succeeds in being oneself as well as in preserving oneself the results of the analysis of these terms have to be integrated into the analysis of to be present to oneself anyway. Another reason for the privileged 14 This I gather from the following passage: if one is a lily it is actually no art to be beautiful, but to be beautiful under these conditions, in such surroundings that do everything to hinder it, in such surroundings to be fully oneself and to preserve oneself, to mock the whole power of the surroundings but no, not mock, the lily does not do this but to be completely free of care in all its beauty! (my emphasis), WA 27; [ ] thi at være deilig, naar man er Lilie, det er egentligen ingen Kunst, men paa det Vilkaar at være deilig, i en saadan Omgivelse, der giør Alt for at forhindre det, i en saadan Omgivelse fuldeligen at være sig selv og at bevare sig selv, at spotte hele Omgivelsens Magt, nei, ikke at spotte, det gjør Lilien ikke, men at være ganske sorgløs i al sin Deilighed! (SV1 XI, 30 / SKS 11, 32). 15 Of course, respectable traditions can be traced in this exposition of the relationship between eternity and temporality in the face of death. Cf. Augustine s combination of a biblical theme with a Greek ontological principle in his description of life as cursus ad mortem in De civitate Dei, XIII, 10 (op. cit. vol. I, p. 860) while insisting on the ontological principle that something is only insofar it remains and is constant ( est autem aliquid, si manet, si constat, De beata vita VIII).

125 Being Present to Oneself: Some Remarks on the Role of Optical and Acoustic Imagery 125 treatment of this third term is the fact that it will reveal Kierkegaard s most important contribution to philosophical anthropology in a nutshell. This said, let us have a look at these expressions. Now, to be oneself refers to the eternal aspect of man: human beings are what they are because of their originality (Oprindelighed), which means that they are what they are out of God s hand. (WA 38) 16 If this were not the case, if there were no originality, one could not despair over not being oneself (as in Sickness unto Death) because one could not fail to be oneself or rather, one could not tell because one would not notice. As far as to preserve oneself is concerned, suffice it to say, that this has to do with temporality: in the face of change and death, one has to strive to become oneself and to remain oneself. The words become and remain indicate sufficiently that the task here has to do with temporality. Indeed, at bevare sig selv could be taken to be Kierkegaard s translation of Spinoza s suum esse conservare or in suo esse perseverare. 17 As we have seen the eternal aspect of what it is to be a human being is expressed in the formulation to be oneself, whereas the temporal one finds its expression in the formula to preserve oneself. In order to combine these two, Kierkegaard uses the expression at være sig selv nærværende (to be present to oneself). This I take to be Kierkegaard s definition of a true self. Now one could object that this definition is tautological and that the definiens already contains the definiendum. I cannot enter into the discussion whether speaking about being always presupposes being and in that sense cannot avoid tautology. However, I would like to draw attention to some aspects of Kierkegaard s formulation which need to be taken into consideration. Again, I will have to include the Danish terms, since translations in this case tend to blur the matter. The question is then how the expression to be is to be (være) present (nærværende) to oneself is to be construed if it is not merely a trite tautology. I will try to answer this question in three steps. First, to be (være) present (nærværende) to oneself could be interpreted epexegetically: to be means upon further investigation being close to oneself. This explanation would find an analogy in Augustine s interpretation of esse as praeesse which is interpreted as prae sensibus esse, and this again given the predominance of vision inherited from Greek philosophy as prae oculis esse. In this case we would have to keep in mind that the expression present conveys the meaning of nærværende only insufficiently. The English expression present is derived from Latin praeesse which means to be in front of and thus conveys a sense of a Greek ontological principle which is connected to vision: being is being in front of, before the eyes, as I have pointed out in the case of Augustine s ontology. But to be a self in front of one self or before oneself would imply a split in oneself which Kierkegaard usually describes as despair (Fortvivlelse denotes the destructive process as well as 16 Further support for this interpretation of the term originality can be found in Sickness unto Death, SD Vd. R. Purkarthofer, Suppose I would die tomorrow. Possible Uses of Kierkegaard s Journals and Notebooks for Research, Kierkegaard Studies: Yearbook, Walter de Gruyter: Berlin and New York, 2003, pp

126 126 Richard B. Purkarthofer the result of being split in two). As is well known, this term denotes not only a kind of psychological dissociation and double -mindedness but also an ontological state of dispersion. This is the reason why Kierkegaard avoids a traditional metaphysics of presence and tries to introduce an alternative. This alternative interprets being as being close (nærværende). But what does this interpretation of being as being close mean for Kierkegaard? To answer this question we have to note that nærværende is derived from the expression være nær, which primarily means to be near, to be close, both with respect to time as well as to space. The derivative nærværende retains this sense of nearness and proximity, even though in this case the twofold sense of being near in space and being near in time becomes more pronounced. As opposed to the expression nuværende, which usually is rendered as present as well, and which exclusively is used in a temporal sense, nærværende is used both in a temporal and spatial sense. 18 However, besides the temporal and the spatial sense of nærværende one has to keep in mind that this expression also conveys a sense of concentration of attention and even of power. This becomes clear when we consider that Kierkegaard uses nærværende as an antonym of fraværende, absent- mindedly, absently, detached, distracted, confused. Thus, in Kierkegaard s writings the expression nærværende conveys often a sense of presence of mind, vigor, intensity, and resilient strength of body and mind. An adequate interpretation of the true self, understood as being present to oneself, has to take heed of the sense of power and intensity the word nærværende has for Kierkegaard. He takes care to point this out in several passages. In The Book on Adler he describes et Nærværende as something which is simple (simpel and eenfoldig) and opposes this to a sense of distance. (BA 96) Then he goes on and uses the expression præsent precisely to emphasize the sense of power: To be totally present [præsent] to oneself is the highest and is the highest task for personal life; it is the power in virtue of which the Romans called the gods praesentes. (BA 106) 19 In The Concept of Anxiety its pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis interprets nærværende as lat. praesens exactly in this sense: The present [det Nærværende] is the eternal, or rather, the eternal is the present, and the present is full [det Fyldige]. In this sense the Latin said of the deity that he is praesens (praesentes dii [the presence of the gods]), by which expression, when used about the deity, he also signified the powerful assistance of the deity. (CA 106) Cf. C. Molbech, Dansk Ordbog indeholdende det danske Sprogs Stammeord tilligemed afledede og sammensatte Ord, efter den nuværende Sprogbrug forklarede i deres forskiellige Betydninger og ved Talemaader og Exempler oplyste, vols. i -ii, Anden, forøgede og forbedrede Udgave, Kiøbenhavn: Gyldendalske Boghandling 1859, vol. II, s.v. Nær, col Det at være sig selv ganske præsent er det Høieste og den høieste Opgave for det personlige Liv, det er Magten, som jo derfor Romerne kaldte Guderne præsentes. ( ) Vd. BA 106 / Pap. VII, 2 B 235 (Cap. IV 3), p Det Nærværende er det Evige eller rettere det Evige er det Nærværende, og det Nærværende er det Fyldige. I denne Forstand sagde Latineren om Guddommen, at han er præsens (præsentes dii), ved hvilket Ord brugt om Guddommen han tillige betegnede hans kraftige Bistand. (SV1 IV, 356/ SKS 4 381).

127 Being Present to Oneself: Some Remarks on the Role of Optical and Acoustic Imagery 127 In this passage Haufniensis might refer to expressions like lat. praesentem deum (Terence, Phormio, III, 1, 345) or lat. praesentia numina (Horace, Epistles, II, 1, 134) but one has to keep in mind that lat. praesens signifies also powerful, highly efficacious, concentrated and can be used about the soul as well as about poison. In our context it is important to note that, in the two passages quoted, Kierkegaard retranslates, so to speak, nærværende into Latin. On his way back to his own terminology he brings along a term that is enriched by a long tradition of human experience. In this way he expands the scope of nærværende so that it now conveys also the sense of powerful concentration. Generally speaking, this is a kind of procedure we find frequently in Kierkegaard s writings. Entering into a dialogue with tradition in this way often allows him not only to criticize it, but also to reap its harvest and inherit its merits. In Kierkegaard s writings we find a third example of how he enriches the sense of nærværende by the meaning of lat. praesens and at the same time tries to avoid the ontological problems involved in the term present, if it is understood in the sense of lat. prae oculis esse. In Christian Discourses (1848) Kierkegaard writes: The believer is one who is present [en Nærværende] and also, as this word [namely praesens] in that foreign language indicates, a person of power. The self -tormentor is an absentee [en Fraværende], a powerless person. (CD 74) Significantly, as one example of being absent to oneself, he mentions a person in theatrical illusions. The theater is a place for viewing (gr. theatron), i.e. a place where you can look at (gr. theasthai) the things that are before your eyes: prae oculis. Another point worthwhile noting in the passage from The Concept of Anxiety quoted above is Haufniensis identification of the concept of det Nærværende with the eternal. It is obvious that the eternal, understood as present in the sense of lat. prae oculis esse would lead to problems. But even if we interpret nærværende as I have attempted to argue as being near or close both in a spatial and temporal sense, as well as being powerfully concentrated, it needs some more consideration to follow Kierkegaard s identification of det Nærværende with the eternal. In order to see Kierkegaard s point it is opportune to sum up the interpretation of nærværende so far. I will do so by picking up the strands of my exposition of this term, now mainly focusing on the metaphysical issues involved. I have shown that as opposed to fraværende in the sense of absent, confused, distracted, nærværende is concentrated and collected as well in respect to time as to space. As such, an entity that can be called nærværende has nothing which essentially belongs to it outside itself, again both in a temporal and spatial sense. If an entity has nothing outside itself it can be said to be complete, or, as we have seen in the passage in The Book on Adler referred to above, it is simple (simpel, eenfoldig). Further, if an entity is simple and eenfoldig it has no detachable parts. If we take change to consist in adding, taking away or rearranging the parts of an entity it follows that an entity without parts is unchangeable. If an entity is unchangeable, it is always identical with itself and thus it is eternal. This seems to be the argument for Kierkegaard s identification of det Nærværende with the eternal. So far, in this first step of my interpretation of the expression to be (være) present (nærværende) to oneself I have offered an epexegetic interpretation: a closer

128 128 Richard B. Purkarthofer examination of being shows that it means being close to oneself in space and time and being in powerful touch with oneself. Moreover, I have attempted to show that for Kierkegaard a being that is nærværende in this sense is eternal by necessity. The content of the expression nærværende and its metaphysical implications were the object of this investigation. Now I will have a look at the form of the expression under scrutiny. We might be tempted to disregard the formal aspect as a mere matter of literary style. But we should recall that in the Postscript Climacus says of the existing subjective thinker that his communication must in form essentially conform to his own existence. (CUP 80) In communication about existence, style must conform to content and existence itself or as Climacus tells us: The subjective thinker s form, the form of his communication, is his style. (CUP 357) And indeed, I would like to argue, at være sig selv nærværende reflects the structure of being in its very style. I will do so in two further steps. First we have to note that the expression contains forms of være two times, both in an infinite and a finite form. It puts together cf. gr. syntithenai the infinite form of a word and one that is bound to time and thus is finite. This may be taken as an indication that, for Kierkegaard, to be a human being and here I will stretch my point from grammatical terms to ontological terms means to be a synthesis 21 of the infinite and the finite. When we look at the expression to be close to one s being, it contains a repetition of the verb with a change of definiteness. But we have also to note which leads us to the next step of interpretation that the formula contains a repetition of the expression være besides this change of definiteness just mentioned. Why so? Because without repetition nothing can exist (være) in the fullest sense of the word. In one of the Christian Discourses (1848) Kierkegaard writes about being (Væren) and its relation to redoubling [Fordoblelse], which he uses similarly to the term repetition. Sure, in this passage he writes of a specific being that of righteousness but he also makes clear that he is thinking of being (Væren) in general: But the being [Væren] of righteousness has this perfection, that it contains a redoubling [Fordoblelse]; this redoubling that it has within itself is the difference [Forskjellen] 21 As is well known, the synthesis of the finite/temporal and the infinite/eternal plays a major role in Kierkegaard s anthropology as both a term and a concept. It appears already in The Concept of Irony (1841) where Kierkegaard speaks of the synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. (CI 70) The next time we come across the term synthesis in Kierkegaard s published works is in Either/ Or (1843) (EO2 41) and later in Stages on Life s Way (1845), whereas it is treated more fully and with different emphasis and from various angles in The Concept of Anxiety (1844), Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846) (in its most succinct and illuminating form in CUP1 92) and in The Sickness unto Death (1849). However, the concept of synthesis is used not only in Kierkegaard s pseudonymous authorship, but also in the edifying writings, even though it is there clothed in different terminology. Good accounts of this concept will be found in Arne Grøn, Subjektivitet og negativitet: Kierkegaard, Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1997, pp et passim, and in Poul Lübcke, Selvets ontologi hos Kierkegaard, in: Kierkegaardiana XIII, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel, 1984, pp For further remarks on the concept of synthesis see R. Purkarthofer, Eros and Existence in: Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 32:2 (2012), pp

129 Being Present to Oneself: Some Remarks on the Role of Optical and Acoustic Imagery 129 between right and wrong. A being that has no difference whatever in itself is a very imperfect being, in part an imaginary [indbildt] being, such as the being of a mathematical point. A being that has the difference outside itself is a vanishing being; this is the case with the differences of this earthly life, which therefore vanish. The eternal [...] has the difference in itself [...] (CD 208) 22 The definition of the true self given in The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air meets this criterion for being. The true self understood as at være sig selv nærværende is a perfected being insofar as it formally consists of a redoubling that contains a difference the change of definiteness mentioned above in itself. This interpretation is confirmed in Practice in Christianity (1850), where Kierkegaard s pseudonym Anti -climacus bluntly states: And what, then, is it to be a self? It is to be a redoubling [Fordoblelse]. 23 (PC 159) Moreover, in Christian Discourses (1848) he also uses the expression in redoubling [Fordoblelse] to be oneself with reference to truly being oneself. (CD 41) For Kierkegaard, it is exactly this repetition or redoubling which ontologically qualifies a being as true being. In other words, immediate being has no being in the full sense of the word. Only through a breach with first immediacy followed by a repetition can such a redoubling and thus a later immediacy be achieved. Kierkegaard states this when he writes that This unlike the direct and first originality, that the lily and the bird in the strictest sense possess at first hand is the acquired originality. This acquired originality in the lily and the bird is in turn simplicity [Eenfold] (WA 38) Without this movement a human being would be a synthesis, something which is put together without being a synholon, a concrete totality. Kierkegaard holds that if an entity is just put together it has no unity and thus it is not complete, it is not simple (eenfoldig) and thus subject to change from which follows that it is not eternal because it is not always identical with itself, as I have argued above. This is why Vigilius Haufniensis can write: Man is a synthesis of the psychical and the physical; however, a synthesis is unthinkable if the two are not united in a third. This third is spirit. (CA 43) It is the movement of redoubling, then, that would transfigure a synthesis into a synholon, a concrete totality. Or, as Kierkegaard puts it: spirit means a second time, 24 since this third which unites the single terms of the synthesis is spirit. 22 Men Retfærdighedens Væren har denne Fuldkommenhed, at den i sig har en Fordoblelse; denne Fordoblelse, som den har i sig, er Forskjellen mellem Ret og Uret. En Væren, der slet ingen Forskjel har i sig, er en meget ufuldkommen Væren, tildeels en indbildt Væren, saaledes et Punkts Væren. En Væren, der har Forskjellen uden for sig, er en forsvindende Væren; dette er Tilfældet med dette jordiske Livs Forskjelligheder, som derfor forsvinde. Det Evige, Retfærdighed, har Forskjellen i sig, Forskjellen mellem Ret og Uret. (SV1 X, 208f/ SKS ) 23 Og hvad er nu det at være et Selv? Det er at være en Fordoblelse. (SV1 XII, 149/ SKS ). Vd. JP JP 479 / Pap. IX A 20; NB5:18; undated, Cf. JP 1123 / Pap. VIII 1 A 649; NB4:159, This is the inverse movement, which after all is spirit. Spirit is the second movement. This entry is dated May 11, 1848.

130 130 Richard B. Purkarthofer To achieve this second time, this acquired originality which again is simplicity [Eenfold] and thus unchangeability, Kierkegaard prescribes the movement from the eye to the ear. In one of the early upbuilding discourses he states without much ado: People see God in great things, in the raging of the elements and in the course of world history; they entirely forget what the child understood, that when it shuts its eyes it sees God. 25 (TD 31) A few years later he pens down this insight once more: For when I shut my eye I am before God, and then everything is all right [ ] 26 This is not a mere repetition it contains a slight change. I take this change to be a confirmation of the development I have attempted to illuminate: in the first quote Kierkegaard writes that when the child closes its eyes it sees God. It was maybe the awareness of the metaphysical problems of optical metaphors which made him write For when I shut my eye I am before God a few years later, as well as using eye in singular. Closing the eyes leads to being present to oneself. However, it does so by leading from the pleasure of vision to the pain of obedience. As noticed, St. Paul and Luther want us to believe that only the ears are the sense organs of a Christian. In a certain sense, Kierkegaard follows this evaluation, with somewhat different, and according to my opinion, better reasons. His concept of obedience avoids all interference with other people s god -relation. There is no prescription in form or in content as what this obedience relates to. Obedience has only the function to trigger, protect, and guide the process of becoming the self one already is. Sure, in order to instigate this movement as one from the eye to the ear and to obedience, Kierkegaard wraps poetry into its festive garments. But does it fall? As I have pointed out in the case of The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air, the discourse or speech as such starts out by addressing the ear. Then it turns to the eye insofar as it enlarges on the biblical image of the lily and the bird. What the lily then points out is that the reader shall be silent. (WA 17) 27 Thus, the optical imagery reaches its climax and turning point. Because being silent is the condition for being able to listen which again is the only way for being obedient. If the reader follows this imagin(arr)ation he will get back from the imagery of the speech to the acoustic imagery of the ear, of listening and of being obedient (lyde adlyde Lydighed). The problem is just, that the imagery of the ear still is imagery. Even the imagery of the ear addresses the imagination of the eye. It goes without saying, that Kierkegaard is aware of this problem. Thus, he writes: The point of the essentially Christian is that it is presence [det Nærværende]. For this reason no poet and no speaker can portray it, for they use too much imagination. 28 The rhetorics of acoustic metaphors seem to work only through the power of poetic vision. Thus, we might reconsider the story of King Candaules and his lovely wife: A man always believes his eyes better than his ears. 25 The discourse is On the Occasion of a Confession. 26 JP 5997, undated, 1847/ Pap. VIII, 1 A 84; NB:194. English translation slightly modified, since it originally offered eyes whereas the Danish uses the singular. 27 [ ] ved at tie vil den betyde Dig, at Du er for Gud. 28 JP 761, undated 1848/ Pap. IX A 114; NB5:110.

131 Time Determinations in Kierkegaard s Philosophical Fragments José Miranda Justo University of Lisbon Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon Whereas the Greek pathos focuses on recollection, the pathos of our project focuses on the moment, and no wonder, for is it not an exceedingly pathos -filled matter to come into existence from the state of not to be? (PF 21) 1. On former occasions 1 I attempted to demonstrate how Kierkegaard draws an explicit distinction between two modalities of time, namely in the two first Discourses from Three Upbuilding Discourses published on October 16 th 1843, a distinction that is correlated to a criticism on the scope of the understanding; the whole is simultaneously presented as crucial for the determination of the category of repetition and for the characterization of the processes concerning the constitution of meaning. In brief, it is a distinction between a rapid, accelerated time that leaves us at the level of an understanding that is openly deficitary, which is also the plan of multiplicity (of irascibility and of sin ), and on the other side, a slow, protracted time, which is prone to the experience of singularity and to the establishment of a radically new meaning; in addition, this protracted time is also identified with the efficiency let s say, the hermeneutical productive efficiency of love (the Pauline caritas ); such efficiency derives from a pathos that, precisely because it is passivity, gives way to the possibility of a poiein which is unsuspected from the point of view of the swiftness of understanding. As we move on to Philosophical Fragments, such distinction is still present, but it undergoes a noteworthy modification in accordance with Johannes Climacus s particular style of thinking. 2 In truth, this text, intended as it was to combat especially 1 See Introdução, in A Repetição, trans., introd. and notes by José Miranda Justo, Lisboa: Relógio d Água, 2009, and «From a differentiation in times to the earnestness of existence.(some elements of the Three Upbuilding Discourses of 1843 useful for an understanding of the category of repetition.), published in the present volume, pp In fact it would be more exact to say, that it follows the text s mode of thinking, since during its writing, Kierkegaard intended to publish it under his own name, and decided on Climacus only as the book was about to be printed. Kierkegaard in Lisbon, Lisboa, CFUL, 2012, pp

132 132 José Miranda Justo the category of mediation in the recent Danish reception of Hegelian thought, 3 chooses to place itself in the tradition of philosophical language particularly in what concerns the debate of certain concepts in logic, despite doing it in a rather oblique manner, both by means of the irony that pervades the project, as well as by means of the manifest fragmentary nature of the adopted structure. If in the above mentioned Upbuilding Discourses, what was at stake was an opposition between the limits of the understanding and the opening of the subject to a new meaning, what is now in play concerns first and foremost the opposition between rationality and faith, regarding the topic of incarnation. There is no doubt that there exists a parallel between the two situations, since the active idea behind the acceptance of incarnation encloses a radical gain in meaning; however, the two situations do not overlap, because the project of Philosophical Fragments has a specific aim in mind it wants to exclude the possibility of explaining faith from the dominion of rational thinking, that is, it wants to exclude the possibility of a rational mediation for the meaning of incarnation. Hence, from this point of view, the project of Philosophical Fragments is more restrictive than the one we can perceive in the aforementioned two upbuilding discourses; this restriction has to do with accepting that the fundamental combat must be fought within the domain of philosophy itself, and this, as we shall see, implies the use of a device inherent to philosophy, that is, to pursue the determination of the categories in use, especially a certain number of time categories. In a first approach, we start by taking paradox as the core of the problem envisaged by Climacus. The paradox undoubtedly results from thinking, in the same movement, what is historical and what is eternal, incarnation as an event rooted in time and incarnation as the beginning of eternity. (PF 58) However, the topic of the absolute paradox is firstly approached in a very different way. Climacus makes use of a passage from Plato s Phaedrus, where Socrates appears simultaneously as the one who has been eulogized for centuries as the person who certainly knew man best, (PF 37) and as someone who was still far from being quite clear about himself, (id.) that is, far from having fulfilled the imperative contained in the inscription of the Temple of Apollo at Delphi Know thyself. The question of paradox is thus introduced in a Socratic mode. Since now Climacus establishes, all along the text, a deep contrast between the Socratic mode and the Christian mode, and inasmuch as, on the other side, the absolute paradox is crucial for the Christian mode, we are forced to draw the conclusion that paradox is co -extensive to all thinking that can be understood as such. All thinking that deserves to be named as such, that is, productive thinking, must confront the paradox at a certain moment. This is how the way is paved for the scope reached by Climacus in the relation he posits between the paradox and the passion of thought: [O]ne must not think ill of the paradox, for the paradox is the passion of thought, and the thinker without the paradox is like the lover without passion: a mediocre fellow. (PF 37) All thinking that does not consent 3 This point follows Jon Stewart s analysis in Kierkegaard s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp

133 Time Determinations in Kierkegaard s Philosophical Fragments 133 to being penetrated by passion, that is, that evades being penetrated by the moment of passivity generated by paradox, is mediocre. 4 Climacus s formulations namely when he talks about collision as the ultimate passion of the understanding (id.) suggest that when thinking cannot devise its own paradox (the paradox it has to confront itself with), what it does is merely proceed straightforwardly onto the route that was already set from the beginning, thus limiting itself to a succession of repetitions, in the poorest sense of the word. Chapter III in Philosophical Fragments progresses from paradox to the topic of the unknown. But the unknown that the understanding cannot overcome is featured as a frontier : What, then, is the unknown? It is the frontier that is continually arrived at, and therefore when the category of motion is replaced by the category of rest it is the different, the absolutely different. (PF 44) The frontier implies a stop, a suspension. Thought has come across an insurmountable obstacle; thought can neither push it aside, nor delude it. And what takes place beyond the frontier no longer concerns understanding. Understanding, if it could be made to work beyond the frontier, would tackle that which is absolutely different, and as such radically singular and whole on the level of multiplicity (διασπορά) (PF 45). Climacus allows for us to perceive that beyond the frontier, once transcendence is accepted, what is set as the rule does not concern the mere relation subject -object, but instead what one might term the becoming -subject. Faith is a happy passion provided by the paradox. (PF 59) An unhappy passion is no more than pathein, it is strictly suffering, (PF 49) or an unhappy love; (PF 25) as such, it is a condition, nonetheless, a condition that is non -sufficient. It lacks a time that can be called a time of wait, the time of wait that is desire. The happy passion is already the result of a sudden passage a leap (PF 43) from a strict pathein to a pathein/poiein that no longer can be taken as simple abstract thinking, since it manifests the permeability of the subject to his/her own becoming -subject. The time of desiring wait ( the moment of passion, 47) ends in a crucial time determination: the moment. (PF 51) 5 I return now to the topic of slowness. In Philosophical Fragments, Climacus repeatedly underscores a recommendation (although not with exactly identical expressions): We shall take our time after all, there is no need to hurry. By going slowly, one sometimes does indeed fail to reach the goal, but by going too fast, 4 We might add at this point that, for Climacus, the thinking that eludes the underlying paradox between faith and rationality, by means of elaborating on the concept of mediation, so as to find the supposed continuity that would lead from the level of objectivity to the level of the subjectivity of faith, as it is the case in Martensen, is a mediocre thinking, that is, it is incapable of confronting what is fundamental in the challenge it must meet. In Philosophical Fragments, paradox and mediation remain in irreducible opposition. 5 On the distinction between the existential aspect and the ontological aspect of the moment, see Jamie Ferreira, Kierkegaard, Chichester: Wiley -Blackwell, 2009, pp : Climacus emphasizes the historical origin of the Christian faith not only the indispensability of the existential moment in which a potential believer faces the (announcement of the) Paradox, but also the indispensability of the ontological moment in which God comes into time.

134 134 José Miranda Justo one sometimes passes it. (PF 16n.) 6 Pointing out this recommendation appears to be a question of method: in order to take the topics that matter to Climacus into consideration, it becomes necessary to find the right balance in one s speed of thought, so as not to miss the goal, by excess or by default. But what is the ultimate objective? It can be no other than the moment. Nevertheless, once we take into consideration what was said above, there is no place to distinguish the moment from the consideration of the moment; in other words, since the relation subject -object has been overcome, it is impossible to think of the moment as an object of consideration taken by a subject of the investigation; in consequence, the recommendation carries no actual methodological value. Thus, another value has to lie in that recommendation. The issue seems not to be one of isolating the moment as an object, but instead, of knowing how to live with the moment (or with the category of the moment); and since now the moment is decisively important for the becoming -subject, this cannot help carrying along the meaning of living the moment, being face to face with oneself in the being -there in the moment, or of existing in the insistence on the moment. Further on, we shall see how this being face to face with oneself is actually treated as consciousness. From this point of view, the indication concerning the need for slowness is an admonition that anticipates the suspension of thinking, which is typical of the moment; it is kept in mind that the thinking that is suspended is abstract thinking and consequently its separation between subject and object. The slowness recommended by Climacus is the slowing down of the speed of thinking and is designed to open up the way for the acceptance of paradox and to the possibility of the emergence of the desire to ascribe an existential meaning to what transcends the limits of the understanding. In other words, instead of the reflexive continuity of mediation, which perpetuates the distinction between subject and object and reduces the transcendent to the immanent in an unhappy union, Climacus proposes a suspension of thinking, which, by representing the death of abstract thinking, can bring about the intuition in the sense of apprehension without mediation of the moment. Or, in Shakespeare s terms: Better well hanged than ill wed. 2. The style of thought chosen by Climacus, exactly because it is aimed at certain possibilities of the determination of time, requires an antinomic (but not an antithetical) point of departure involving time: Socratic time vs. Christian time, recollection vs. the moment. On the one hand, Socratic time is linear, since recollection merely stands in the opposite direction of the happening and of the forgetting of the ideas which is involved in the happening. On the other hand, Socratic time is uniform; in order that anamnesis takes place, an occasion must be provided for, but such an occasion does not represent a radical cut within time. If the Socratic perspective is adopted, [t]he temporal point of departure is a nothing, because in the same moment 6 See also pp. 20, 25, 47.

135 Time Determinations in Kierkegaard s Philosophical Fragments 135 I discover that I have known the truth from eternity without knowing it, in the same instant that moment is hidden in the eternal, assimilated into it in such a way that I, so to speak, still cannot find it even if I were to look for it, because there is no Here and There, but only an ubique et nusquam. (PF 13) On the contrary, [i]f the situation is to be different that is to say, seen from the perspective of Christian time then the moment in time must have such decisive significance that for no moment will I be able to forget it, neither in time nor in eternity, because the eternal, previously nonexistent, came into existence in that moment. (id.) From this point of view, time is radically non -uniform: the moment has a decisive significance that is, it signals an integral conversion of the meaning ascribed to time, precisely because it makes the eternal come into existence (blive til). In accordance with what we said above about the subject and the moment, we can also say now that the eternal is not a simple object of the subject, but is a becoming -eternal that is correlative to the becoming -subject. But it is pertinent to ask now, how can one grasp this becoming -eternal? How can one accept that, before the moment, the eternal was non -existent, and that it came into existence only with the moment? How can one cope with the expression used further on in the text that epitomizes this problem best the beginning of eternity (PF 58)? The problem of eternity is first and foremost the problem of the consciousness of eternity. [F]or the learner and something similar will later occur with the follower at second hand the news of the day is not an occasion for something else [ ] no, it is the eternal, the beginning of eternity. (58, my italics) Climacus is not dealing here with eternity in abstract. The beginning of eternity is always the beginning for a concrete somebody. The same happens when, immediately after, Climacus introduces such expressions as decision of eternity, eternal consciousness and eternal happiness. (id.) Taking this into consideration, the question of knowing how to qualify the abstract conception of eternity necessarily depends on the category of eternal consciousness, which is, in turn, wholly dependent on the moment and paradox. ( [T]hat the god provides the condition has already been explicated as the consequence of the moment, and we have shown that the moment is the paradox [ ]. (id.)) The possibility of claiming, as it will happen later in The Concept of Anxiety, that the eternal signifies the future, (CA 89) and the possibility of placing this perspective in opposition to the Greek vision of an eternity situated in the past and that can only be entered backwards, (CA 90) result from the significance given to the moment in the emergence of eternal consciousness. Thus, we find ourselves compelled to correlate eternal consciousness with the becoming -subject. As we have already seen, the becoming -subject sets aside the possibility of radically distinguishing between the subject of the investigation (or of discourse) and his/her object. The suspension in time that is required by the moment demands that the mere opposition subject -object is put aside. Thus, the category of eternal consciousness cannot be grasped as a simple object of knowledge of a subject, an object that should be external to that very eternal consciousness or to which eternal consciousness should be external. As consciousness of an

136 136 José Miranda Justo eternity that comes to existence, eternal consciousness is itself something that comes into existence for eternity, just as it is explicitly perceived when Climacus articulates eternal consciousness with eternal happiness. (PF 58) There is no difference between a consciousness of eternity and an eternity of consciousness. The becoming -subject, entailed by the paradox and the moment, entails on its own not a self -representation which would the representation of a separated subject to himself/ herself but what we may call a self -presentation which, by being intrinsic to the apprehension of eternity, qualifies itself as eternal. A consciousness of the eternal is an eternal consciousness, just like it happens in the later statement a condition for the understanding of eternal truth [ ] is eo ipso the eternal condition, (PF 62) once we agree that this statement only gains meaning if we accept that here Climacus is also expressing himself from the point of view of a consciousness that totally adheres to what it is conscious of. However if the eternal comes into existence, it can only happen at a certain historical point. Climacus will carefully argue in order to demonstrate that there is no advantage on the part of the contemporary of that historical event incarnation over the non -contemporary, the follower at second hand. Now, the ultimate significance of this claim is directly connected to the fact that the historical turns out to be eternalized, inasmuch as the eternal is historicized: the paradox specifically unites the contradictories, [it] is the eternalizing of the historical and the historicizing of the eternal. (PF 61) Nevertheless, a problem seems to arise. In the second section of Interlude, entitled The Historical, we read: It is [ ] the perfection of the eternal to have no history, and of all that is, only the eternal has absolutely no history. (PF 76) And in the beginning of that section, the following is also stated: Everything that has come into existence is eo ipso historical, for even if no further historical predicate can be applied to it, the crucial predicate of the historical can still be predicated namely, that it has come into existence. (PF 75) Taken together, these two statements seem to exclude, on one side, the eternal from coming into existence, and on the other side, the possibility of the eternal being historicized and the historical being eternalized. But the perspective adopted by Climacus in the first pages of the Interlude is not the perspective of consciousness. Instead, it is a context where the categories of necessity, possibility, and actuality are discussed, and where coming into existence is considered not from a psychological point of view, but from an ontological one: This change [the change of coming into existence] is not in essence but in being and is from not existing to existing. (PF 73) One has to wait for the Appendix of the Interlude, Application, to find an answer for the problem: The historical is that the god has come into existence (for the contemporary), that he has been one present by having come into existence (for one coming later). But precisely here is the contradiction. In the immediate sense, no one can become contemporary with this historical fact (see above), but because it involves coming into existence, it is the object of faith. It is not a question here of the truth of it but of assenting to the god s having come into existence, whereby the god s eternal essence is inflected into the dialectical qualifications of coming into existence. (PF 87)

137 Time Determinations in Kierkegaard s Philosophical Fragments 137 Therefore in the heart of the problem there is a contradiction: and it points out that such a contradiction identifies itself with the paradox, but here this contradiction is qualified in a specific sense. It is the contradiction between the historical proper and coming into existence and between the eternal character proper and the essence of the god. Such a contradiction exactly because it is identified with an aspect of the paradox does not really have to be solved, though for Climacus, mostly within the context of the thematic and stylistic choices of the Interlude, this contradiction must be displayed, or better, exhibited. If one assents to the fact that the god came into existence, that is, if one has faith in incarnation, an inflection ( flectere ) supervenes, a deviation from the domain of the eternal essence of the god to the domain of dialectic qualifications ( dialektiske Bestemmelser, SKS 4 286) which are appropriate to the coming into existence, that being specific to a modification which is not in essence but in being, (PF 73) and also meaning an inflection into the realm of time qualifications. It is by means of making this inflection explicit that it becomes possible to grasp, through the device of faith, how the eternal, the absolutely a -historic eternal, becomes to be seen as historic, despite the fact that this takes place due to a change of levels from the level of essence to the level of being ( Væren ), a change that actually is the meaning of the inflection itself. But it must be taken into account that, once the device of faith comes into play, a circle is somehow completed, since we thus return back to the level of consciousness. In Climacus, faith is an inalienable part of the eternal consciousness coming into existence. Before concluding, we still wish to underscore that in this context it becomes clear that the device of faith is activated by the coming into existence. The coming into existence of eternity of incarnation, of the god -man, or of the moment demands from consciousness an answer that cannot be provided by mere understanding (in the same way that it also cannot be provided by a speculative process that remains deaf to transcendence). The coming into existence of the god is an historical fact that has a unique quality in that it is not a direct historical fact but a fact based upon a self -contradiction; (PF 87) therefore, it is an historical fact only for faith (id.) not forgetting that faith receives here a highly determined meaning: Here faith is first taken in its direct and ordinary meaning ( belief in Hong s translation) as the relationship to the historical; but secondly, faith must be taken in the wholly eminent sense, such that this word can appear but once, that is, many times but only in one relationship. (id.) However, as we have seen, the coming into existence places us in the domain of time determinations. Faith responds to the coming into existence, but the response takes place in time, due to an imposition set by the coming into existence. If faith is not a knowledge but an act of freedom, an expression of will (PF 83) and this is said of the ordinary meaning, that is, of belief, but it seems equally valid for the eminent sense, that is, for faith, then it is an act of freedom from the point of view of the consciousness of time, namely because belief and faith find themselves crucially dependent on the contradiction between time and eternity, and in human terms such a contradiction cannot be apprehended except from the form of time.

138 138 José Miranda Justo Hence, this act of freedom, in the dependence of time, responds to another freedom, the freedom of the coming into existence, as all coming into existence occurs in freedom. (PF 75) Thus these two freedoms, when set in dialogue, speak a language, which is at the same time the language of time and the language of eternity, and the place where their dialogue occurs is none other than human consciousness that has become eternal consciousness.

139 Poets as Disciples and as Followers at Second Hand Elisabete M. de Sousa Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon The discussion of the relevance of Kierkegaard s input to the theory and practical literary criticism of Harold Bloom (1930 -) commonly loses ground to Nietzsche s or Freud s relevance in Bloom s thought. Despite his acknowledgement of the centrality of the Danish philosopher, especially in The Anxiety of Influence and in A Map of Misreading, Kierkegaard s presence is usually taken for granted, and not debated in the context of the texts named by Bloom as sources. The present essay focus on Harold Bloom s cross reading of the categories of repetition and recollection with the chapters The God as Teacher and Savior and The Situation of the Contemporary Follower from Philosophical Fragments. Bloom s writings are typically intertwined with allusions and side commentaries on a wide range of authors and works, and as a result, the dialogical level of Bloom s texts is extremely high, bringing out the difficulty in deciding where exactly one thinker gives place to another. Bloom does cite Kierkegaard most often leaving the source unmentioned, or the page number, if he mentions the title; moreover, the inverse also occurs, that is, he mentions the source, with no page number, or uses only indirect citations. The next quote stands as a stunning example of a typical blend of texts from different authors, out of which Bloom s own concepts emerge, rooted in the vocabularies and categories from all the sources he relies on, from Freud and Kierkegaard to Nietzsche and Derrida: No contemporary disciple of a great poet then could be truly his precursor s contemporary, for the splendor is necessarily deferred. It can be reached through the mediation of repetition, by a return to origins and the incommensurable Election -love that the Primal Scene of Instruction can bestow, there at the point of origin. Poetic repetition repeats a Primal repression, a repression that is itself a fixation upon the precursor as teacher and savior, or on the poetic father as mortal god. The compulsion to repeat the precursor s patterns is not a movement beyond the pleasure principle to an inertia of poetic pre -incarnation, but rather is an attempt to recover the prestige of origins, the oral authority of a prior Instruction. Poetic repetition quests, despite itself, for the mediated vision of the fathers, since such mediation holds open the perpetual possibility of one s own sublimity, one s election to the realm of true Instructors. 1 We can easily trace here vestiges of The Concept of Anxiety, Philosophical Fragments and Repetition, and further on, I will return to this quotation. These three works are 1 See Harold Bloom, A Map of Misreading, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 58f; hereafter MAP. Kierkegaard in Lisbon, Lisboa, CFUL, 2012, pp

140 140 Elisabete M. de Sousa indeed the ones Bloom more often cites, together with a sentence from Fear and Trembling He who is willing to do the work gives birth to his own father 2 often accompanied by a direct or indirect citation from Nietzsche, in the same line if one hasn t had a good father, then it is necessary to invent one. As the first quotation already pointed out, the anxiety of influence originates in the feeling of belatedness experienced by ulterior strong poets in their agonistic relation to (an)other strong poet(s) who proceeded them. Bloom makes evidence for this by means of a method of reading that consists in taking poems as misreadings of other poems. All texts can then be misread and it is their strength that determines their canonical quality; moreover, all authors of all forms and genres in literature, philosophy and religion, are involved in the process; in addition, the poets agonistic endeavor cannot be separated from the desire to reach immortality, and the anxiety of influence thus generated in each poem, eventually becomes a kind of Scala paradisii for the ephebe (the Bloomian name for the ulterior poet, also called later or young poet): so, the higher the poet climbs up in the stages of anxiety, the more anxious, but also, the stronger he becomes. Two passages in Philosophical Fragments explicitly discuss the issues here at stake, but it should by no means be thought that by themselves they account for Bloom s interpretation and use of this work. They are nonetheless worth mentioning since they provide the basis for the relevant layer of meaning in the Fragments followed by Bloom. These passages deal overtly with the self -representation of the poet as someone unavoidably influenced by others, also positing this self -representation of the poet as the condition for being the spokesperson of humanity. The first is the last paragraph of The God as Teacher and Savior, especially the opening section, where we have a recreation of the Socratic considerations on the poet, taken from various Platonic dialogues: Now if someone were to say, What you are composing is the shabbiest plagiarism ever to appear, since it is nothing more or less than what any child knows, then I presumably must hear with shame that I am a liar. But why the shabbiest? After all, every poet who steals, steals from another poet, and thus we are all equally shabby; indeed, my stealing is perhaps less harmful since it is more easily discovered. If there is no poet when there nevertheless is a poem -this would be curious, indeed, as curious as hearing flute playing although there is no flute player. (PF 35) The second passage is the concluding paragraph of Appendix, where the same issues of the above quotation are exposed, this time raising the philosopher and the poet to the same height, in what concerns borrowing from others and their quality as representatives, or heirs if you prefer, of human thought: But someone may be saying, You really are boring, for now we have the same story all over again; all the phrases you put in the mouth of the paradox do not belong to you at all.. Ah, my dear fellow, what you say does not pain me as you perhaps 2 FT 27. Bloom s source: Fear and Trembling, trans., introd. and notes by Walter Lowrie, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1941, p. 34.

141 Poets as Disciples and as Followers at Second Hand 141 think it does; no, it pleases me immensely, for I admit that I trembled when I wrote them down. I could not recognize myself, could not imagine that I, who as a rule am so diffident and fearful, dared to write anything like that. But if they are not my phrases, tell me, whose are they? Nothing is easier. The first is from Tertullian; the second from Hamann; the third from Hamann; the fourth, from Lactantius, is often quoted; the fifth from Shakespeare s comedy All s Well That Ends Well, II, 3; the sixth is from Luther; and the seventh is a line in King Lear. As you see, I do know my business and know how to catch you with the stolen goods. (PF 53) These passages also help us understand why Kierkegaard is introduced as the great theorist of the Scene of Instruction. (MAP 56f) In Bloom s theory, the Primal Scene of Instruction is at the heart of the misreading of the precursor s poem by the young poet, and serves as the point of departure for the ephebe s striving to become a greater poet than his precursor. The next quote is less tinted by the philosophical background that permeated our first citation, but it has the advantage of letting us follow Bloom s reasoning when it comes to name the stages of anxiety; in my reading, it also provides evidence of Bloom s interpretation of The God as Teacher and Savior: [A] Primal Scene of Instruction [is] a model for the unavoidable imposition of influence. The Scene really a complete play or process has six stages, through which the ephebe emerges: election (seizure by the precursor s power); covenant (a basic agreement of poetic vision between precursor and ephebe); the choice of rival inspiration... ; the self -preservation of the ephebe as a new incarnation of the Poetical Character ; the ephebe s interpretation of the precursor; and the ephebe s revision of the precursor. Each of these stages then becomes a level of interpretation in the reading of the ephebe s poem. 3 The presentation of the revisionary ratios in The Anxiety of Influence and in A Map of Misreading is more complex, both in the respective descriptions and in the development of the concept of misreading. Clinamen is the first and it is poetic misreading or misprision proper, resulting from the young poet s intention of improving the text of the precursor. Tessera is the second stage and the task is now a question of completing the text of the precursor. Kenosis, the third, moves in the opposite direction of the first two ratios, since it implies discontinuity in the text of the ephebe as it had been presented until now, in accordance with a new stance: the young poet now wants to empty himself of the precursor. Daemonization, the fourth stage, reveals the later poet s willingness to go beyond the precursor s text. The last two ratios leave the precursor completely behind; in askesis, the self -purgation of the later poet puts him in solitude, in his relation to the precursor; and in apophrades the later poet s text completely takes over the precursor s poem, in such a way, that the reader is left with the sensation that the texts of precursor seem to have been written by the later poet. 3 See Harold Bloom, Poetry & Repression: Revisionism From Blake to Stevens, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976, p. 27.

142 142 Elisabete M. de Sousa A few of the characteristics typified in the above descriptions find excellent examples in a recurrent stylistic feature in all the authors in the authorship. I refer to the habit of introducing an episode, an anecdote, a story, most often as an example, or to move the discussion further, and then to announce that he is going to introduce a little modification or a gentle twist, and in various degrees, the modification introduced may end up in the production of an entire set of variations on the original episode, or in quite a different one. This is rarely valued either because we got too used to them, or because we pay too much attention to the what and forget about the how. If we recall now Bloom s favorite quote of Kierkegaard He who is willing to do the work gives birth to his own father, and keep in mind that in Fear and Trembling we are faced with an incredible amount of recreations of episodes and stories, not to mention the allusion to innumerable biblical, literary, and historical characters, we realize that Bloom is not taking that sentence metaphorically, whereas Johannes de silentio is. Philosophical Fragments contains one of these cases, a concise remake of an archetypal fairy tale: the story of the king who falls in love with a girl of the lower classes, (PF 25f) in order to demonstrate that [t]he unhappiness is the result not of the lovers being unable to have each other but of their being unable to understand each other. (PF 25) Though the effect it produces is a radically different kind than the one introduced by de silentio, the truth is that, just like the two passages quoted above, it contributes to transform what is generally labeled as a poetical level of the text into a layer of meaning regarding poetics in the text. In the description of the revisionary ratios, we notice the presence of Constantius s movements of repetition backwards and forwards, a fact acknowledged by Bloom in A Map of Misreading. Indeed, the celebrated definition of repetition and recollection being the same movement, though in opposite directions [for what is recollected has been, is repeated backwards whereas repetition properly so called is recollected forwards], 4 is often quoted by Bloom, at least partially, and not merely as a parallel to poetic misprision; it is actually introduced as the key for what Bloom calls the war against belatedness: 5 The strong poet survives because he lives the discontinuity of an undoing and an isolating repetition, but he would cease to be a poet unless he kept living the continuity of recollecting forwards, of breaking forth into a freshening that yet repeats his precursors achievements. 6 This commentary would be of interest as the point of departure for the discussion of The Point of View on My Work as an Author, which is in my opinion one of the decisive misreadings of Bloom in Kierkegaard s production, though he does not admit it. The Point of View is obviously not the sole possible source of inspiration 4 See SKS 4, pp. 3-4 / R, p Bloom s source: Repetition, trans., introd., and notes by Walter Lowrie, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1941; New York: Harper & Row, 1964, p See Harold Bloom, Kabbalah and Criticism, New York: Seabury Press, 1975, p. 88; hereafter KABBALAH. 6 See Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 82f; hereafter ANXIETY.

143 Poets as Disciples and as Followers at Second Hand 143 for Bloom and there are other overtly autobiographical texts by a few authors, aiming to be taken as definite self -accounts of an author s production that might be selected, as well as other texts by Kierkegaard. Bloom does classify The Point of View as a new kind of spiritual autobiography, 7 and, as I see it, new and spiritual could single out how the authors (in another famous Kierkegaardian self -definition as author of the author or authors, CUP ) are continually present, as subtext, while in Climacus s A Glance into a Contemporary Effort in Danish Literature (CUP ) these authors take over, confining the author in the author or authors to the subtext. Furthermore, whereas The Point of View might illustrate the instances of the revisionary ratios, Climacus s A Glance into a Contemporary Effort in Danish Literature is an excellent model to follow the hidden roads that go from poem to poem, which are defined as limitation, substitution, representation, or the dialectic of revisionism. (KABBALAH 88f) In truth, texts are not necessarily read for the meaning they directly produce, instead, one should look for meaning that is produced between texts. Hence, the identification of patterns of misreading becomes not an end in itself; it is part of a method that allows constructing meaning that is generated either by reading several texts taken together, or by reading strong poets, whose texts or poems show their anxiety versus their precursors. It is in A Map of Misreading that Bloom gives a detailed account of his own misprision of Kierkegaard; he shows how he improves Climacus s text and goes beyond it, by means of what he takes from The God as Teacher and Savior and The Situation of the Contemporary Follower. He openly states that these are the [t]wo sections of the Fragments [that are] closest to the dilemmas of the poetic Scene of Instruction. (MAP 57); in fact, he reads them as a kind of sequel to Constantius s work, as a case of spiritual repetition, in the sense of the relation of repetition for the individuality qualified as free spirit, (FT -r 289) as claimed by Constantius in his open letter to Heiberg. (FT -r ) Bloom places the two chapters from Fragments in relation to Hegel and to left -wing Hegelianism, but this time he also draws attention to the contrast established between on one side, Socrates and Kierkegaard, and on the other, Christ and his disciples. He claims once more, following Climacus, (PF 12) that Socrates and his student [Kierkegaard].. have nothing to teach one another, no davhar or word to bring forward, yet each [provides] the other with a means towards self -understanding, (MAP 57) whereas Christ is described as the one who understands himself without the aid of students, and his students [being]. there only to receive his incommensurable love. (id.) Thus, Bloom is actually putting them in relation to the progression in the stages of anxiety of influence of Kierkegaard et allii at the time of Philosophical Fragments, or to use the terms of the first citation, for Kierkegaard s striving to become a true Instructor. In the case of Socrates, then, there is no davhar, which means that no poetic incarnation proper has taken place, that is, Climacus might understand Socrates, but he has no intention of assuming his persona; in the case of Christ, the 7 See Harold Bloom, Genius: A Mosaic of One Hundred Exemplary Creative Minds. New York: Warner Books, 2003, p. 202; hereafter GENIUS.

144 144 Elisabete M. de Sousa relation is established between Christ and the disciples, not between Climacus and Christ, thus confirming Climacus s stance as a detached beholder. Hence, for Bloom, neither does Christ need to have his understanding revised by any later poet/disciple, nor do his disciples claim to overcome Christ as a precursor, despite the fact that their relation is still one of poetic repetition [as] Primal repression, (id.) the whole being here considered in the terms from the initial quotation as a repression that is itself a fixation upon the precursor as teacher and savior, or on the poetic father as mortal god. (id.) Moreover, in the case of Christ, Bloom underscores that history is separated from necessity, since [t]here is no immediacy by which one can be a contemporary of a divinity. (id.) In the same line of thought, Bloom claims in a later work that the disciples misread Christ s message but their misprision is their mode of repetition in the perpetual renewal of their prospect for becoming a Christian, (GENIUS 200) a statement that brings to our mind the description of the task assigned to the ephebe in the first citation today. In this remark, the mode of repetition is explained as the double movement of Constantius taken as repetition that fills the present and the future with the past. (id.) Accordingly, in Genius, the disciples mode of repetition is said to be a form of poetical misprision in the face of Christ s words, similar to the situation of Kierkegaard himself, who is in turn said to be in a state of permanent anxiety (in Kierkegaard s and in Bloom s senses) in the process of becoming a Christian. (GENIUS 201) Going back to A Map of Misreading, Bloom explains his own Primal Scene of Instruction, which is entangled with commentaries on Freud s primal scene as analyzed by Derrida, with the clear intention of rendering the philosophical context of the six revisionary ratios more complex. The ratios are now connected to the Kabbalah, 8 but they keep their former identities, and the movement of repetition backwards and forwards still prevails. Yet, in the relation established between mediation and repetition, Bloom goes further than Constantius and claims that repetition is not only a substitute trope for mediation, it is a substitute for the process of dialectic itself. (MAP 58f) Accordingly, for Bloom, the double movement of repetition, with the admission of repetition as eternity in the above mentioned sense, that is repetition that fills the present and the future with the past, is taken as the necessary means to open the way for the possibility of overcoming a linear or a circular historic perception of the relation between precursor and ephebe. As I see it, Bloom anchors his concepts in Repetition, but he articulates his thought by means of his reading of the Fragments. Among other possible choices, these few lines from the Fragments discuss much of what underlies Bloom s thought in the idea of repetition as eternity, and also in the presence of freedom in the encounter between the later poet and the precursor: The future has not occurred as yet, but it is not, because of that, less necessary than the past, inasmuch as the past did not become necessary by having occurred, but, on the contrary, by having occurred, it demonstrated that it was not necessary. If the past 8 For a diagram of these interrelations, see MAP 84.

145 Poets as Disciples and as Followers at Second Hand 145 had become necessary, the opposite conclusion could not be drawn with respect to the future, but on the contrary it would follow that the future would also be necessary. If necessity could supervene at one single point, then we could no longer speak of the past and the future. To want to predict the future (prophesy) and to want to understand the necessity of the past are altogether identical, and only the pervading fashion makes the one seem more plausible than the other to a particular generation. The past has indeed come into existence; coming into existence is the change, in freedom, of becoming actuality. If the past had become necessary, then it would not belong to freedom any more, that is, belong to that in which it came into existence. (PF 77f) Bloom s reading of The God as Teacher and Savior, even if we take into account the input brought about by the elaborations on the category of repetition, is relatively consensual with the common interpretation of the chapter, although we have to realize that Bloom leaves out a great part of the religious layer of meaning in the text. The case of The Situation of the Contemporary Follower is similar but more complex, since the chapter, in my view, is read together with Repetition and the passages on the moment in The God as Teacher and Savior. Without stepping into unnecessary detail, I will attempt to trace Bloom s reasoning with a couple of examples. When Bloom claims that [no] contemporary disciple of a great poet could be truly his precursor s contemporary, for the splendor is necessarily deferred, (MAP 57) more than going against the grain of Climacus s validation of the equivalent status of the first and the second follower, Bloom is actually going a step further on the relation between freedom and repetition, underscoring the creative energy contained there. This can be better perceived in this quote from 1982, a few years after the publication of The Anxiety of Influence and A Map of Misreading: To talk about paradigms, however parabolically, in the context of poetry and criticism, is to engage the discourse of repetition, in Kierkegaard s rather than Freud s sense of that term... Repetition, we are told first, is recollected forwards and is the daily bread which satisfies with benediction. Later, the book s narrator assures us that repetition is always a transcendence, and indeed is too transcendent for the narrator to grasp. The same narrator, Constantin Constantius, wrote a long open letter against a Hegelian misunderstanding of his work, which consisted that true or anxious freedom willed repetition: it is the task of freedom to see constantly a new side of repetition. Each new side is a breaking forth, a transition or becoming, and therefore a concept of happening, and not of being. 9 It is this breaking forth, why not call it coming into existence, that enables The Situation of the Contemporary Follower to enter Bloom s conceptual frame of mind. First, it allows him to account for the paradox of poetic encounters belatedly in time, that is to say, to explain the situation that comes about by the fact that the earlier a precursor stands, that is, the longer the time span between the ephebe and the precursor, the greater the possibility of the repetition of such encounters with various ephebes, while all along each encounter is a new one. In other words, although the 9 See Harold Bloom, The Breaking of the Vessels, Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1982, pp

146 146 Elisabete M. de Sousa anxiety of influence can be traced between poems/texts that are historically rooted, eventually, as a consequence, bringing about the possibility of generating a sort of timeline in order to represent the path taken by the ephebe, the fact is that each poem/text stands eternally in time, and thus can confront another poem/text, and/or be confronted by another poem/text at any time or place, only coming into existence as a strong poem/text, by an act of freedom on the part of an ephebe. Bloom however claims that the most relevant source of inspiration for the discussion of the place of the historical in his theory is the triple question in the title page of Philosophical Fragments, (MAP 56f) which is always cited in Swenson s translation: Is an historical point of departure possible for an eternal consciousness; how can such a point of departure have any other than a merely historical interest; is it possible to base an eternal happiness upon historical knowledge. Even if we take into consideration that it is used as a motto, and that it might be intended to contain epigrammatically the essence of Philosophical Fragments, I still believe that the question of the historical in Bloom s theory cannot be understood without also taking into consideration the category of moment, as posited in this work. Naturally Bloom provides evidence for the importance of the triple question for his theory; not only does he overtly assert that the question is perfectly applicable to the secular paradox of poetic incarnation and poetic influence, (id.) he also proceeds to account for his own theory using identical terms: For the anxiety of influence stems from the ephebe s assertion of an eternal, divinating consciousness that nevertheless took its historical point of departure in an intratextual encounter, and most crucially in the interpretative moment or act of misprision contained in that encounter. (id.) But the triple question fails to account for the encounter as a breaking forth, as a coming into existence; moreover, the leveling of the followers in the first hand and in the second, third, hands, pushes Bloom to claim that the chapter The Situation of the Contemporary Follower is on the death of the idea of contemporaneity, since it demonstrates that true passion is always for the past, that only the past can be a poet s or a Christian s lover. 10 The idea of breaking forth, of a transition or of becoming, is indeed much more present in Climacus s elaborations on the moment. The opening paragraph of Section B in Thought -project, for example, places the moment in relation to time and to recollection: If the situation is to be different, then the moment in time must have such decisive significance that for no moment will I be able to forget it, neither in time nor in eternity, because the eternal, previously nonexistent, came into existence in that moment. (PF 13) Furthermore, the moment accounts for the uniqueness of the encounter between god and pupil, both in terms of content, that is, of love, as a mutual experience, which is 10 See Introduction, in Søren Kierkegaard, Modern Critical Views, ed. and introd. by Harold Bloom, New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1991, pp. 1-4, here p. 3.

147 Poets as Disciples and as Followers at Second Hand 147 fundamental in Bloom s conception of the Primal Scene of Instruction, and also in the description of clinamen as Election -love. This is patent in the following passage still from The Situation of the Contemporary Follower: His resolution, which does not have an equal reciprocal relation to the occasion, must be from eternity, even though, fulfilled in time, it expressly becomes the moment, for where the occasion and what is occasioned correspond equally, as equally as the reply to the shout in the desert, the moment does not appear but is swallowed by recollection into its eternity. (PF 25) Kierkegaard s case is repeatedly taken by Bloom as a typical example of poetical misprision and as a writer whose own Primal Scene is inspiring, in extensive and quite frequent commentaries taking Hamann and Hegel as Kierkegaard s precursors. During the discussion of tessera, for example, Bloom states that [w]e must confront here the Romantic version of the dialectic of accommodation, the ironies of which are best expounded by Johann Georg Hamann as precursor, and by his disciple Kierkegaard as heroic ephebe. (MAP 51) Bloom does not elaborate further on this particular dialectic of accommodation; instead, he offers us what can be called his dialectic of accommodation with Kierkegaard as his precursor, which in a way casts Bloom in the position of the poet as disciple and follower at second hand. In Bloom s words, following his misreading of Kierkegaard, poets are similar to Christ s disciples in the sense that they have to go through the anxiety that lies in their perpetual renewal for becoming strong poets; at the same time, they are necessarily followers at second hand, because they cannot be contemporary to the precursor they have elected for their agonistic fight, not only because splendor is necessarily deferred but especially because the features of the moment, when applied to the encounter, leave space for repetition in eternity, thus applying the category of moment as happening, not being.

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149 Philosophical Fragments in Perspective M. Jamie Ferreira University of Virginia The new translation of Kierkegaard s Philosophiske Smuler into Portuguese is a welcome addition to the growing international availability of Kierkegaard s writings, and I am extremely pleased and grateful today to be part of a gathering to consider this text. I want to share with you some of my thoughts after years of reading and re -reading what we can call Smuler, Fragments, Crumbs, and now Migalhas. I begin with a big picture, so to speak the most general way of approaching the book and then consider a more specific level. This more specific level can be broken down into four perspectives. In this way my title needs to be qualified, since I will be suggesting four different perspectives (plural) rather than just one. 1. The Contrast between Two Kinds of Religiousness At a very general level we can consider the role played by Fragments in Kierkegaard s authorship as the proposal of a contrast between two kinds of religiousness. We see it as a contrast between a religion of natural reason (given the code name Socratic ) and a religion of faith (given the code name non -socratic). This contrast is one between what can be discovered by us through our unaided human nature (a religion of immanent recollection) vs. one which needs to be given to us from outside our human nature (a religion of transcendent relevation). Whether we call this contrast one of reason vs. faith, philosophy vs. faith, reason vs. revelation, or natural religion vs. revealed religion, they are presented as alternatives to each other as a case of either or. In particular, the role of the teacher in each of these is radically different either a Socratic midwife who helps us remember what we already know or a Teacher who gives us genuinely new revelation. If we remain at this general level, the Fragments raises the following questions for us. First, one can ask whether the presentation of the two kinds of religiousness favors one over the other. On the one hand, the Moral at the very end of the book (PF 111) suggests that there has been no attempt to address the question whether one kind is more true than the other, but rather only to show how different they are. But it has been argued that this is an ironic or even disingenuous suggestion, and that there are reasons inside the text itself for seeing it as an endorsement of the non -socratic. 1 One needs to read the text and make up one s own mind. 1 E.g., the early suggestion that the uniqueness of the Incarnation proves the correctness of the hypothesis (22), as well as the contrast between a mutual understanding (47, 49) or a happy Kierkegaard in Lisbon, Lisboa, CFUL, 2012, pp

150 150 M. Jamie Ferreira The second question one can ask is whether the contrast between Socratic (immanent, natural) religion and the non -socratic (transcendent, revealed) religion constitutes an exhaustive set of alternatives. This is a different question than the question whether one option is favored above the other. Here we ask whether the book presents a genuine either or? That is, are there only those two alternative ways of being religious? Or, rather, is the presentation of these two kinds of religiousness a strategy of provocation, through which two extremes 2 are described which provoke the reader to engage both of them in such a way that the reader is enabled to grasp the inadequacies of each and hence be pointed toward the value of yet another kind of religiousness? 2. Four Perspectives on the Revealed or Transcendent Religion At the general level, then, the questions concern the contrast between the two kinds of religiousness. At a more specific level, we can consider Fragments as a detailed exploration of one of these kinds of religiousness, namely, transcendent revealed religion. The character of such revealed religion can be approached from a variety of perspectives, and I will focus on four of them: (2.1) revelation as LOVE, (2.2) revelation as TRUTH, (2.3) revelation as GIFT, LEAP, and PASSION, and (2.4). revelation in relation to SOCRATIC SUBJECTIVITY. Within each of these perspectives I will look at both (a) the form of the external revelation and (b) the character of the faith response to the revelation Revelation as LOVE Textually, the less obvious perspective is that of Love because it is not introduced immediately. Climacus explores revealed faith in terms of an analogy with love. He does this first, and at length, in Chapter Two, A Poetical Venture, where he introduces the analogy between a king s love for a maiden and God s love for us. Here the Teacher in the non -socratic thought experiment of the first chapter becomes a Loving Teacher and the needs of love require him to be an Incarnate Loving Teacher. That God is Love assumes here a qualitatively new meaning. The external revelation is not merely that God is a Loving Creator, but also that God is willing to become incarnate for our sakes. understanding (49, 59, 61) and a misunderstanding (51) or unhappy relation (49). It has also been suggested that the Interlude assumes a view of time as decisive that would only be true on the non -socratic position. See M. Piety A Little Light Music: The Subversion of Objectivity in Kierkegaard s Philosophical Fragments, in Robert L. Perkins (ed.), Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, IKC, vol. 7, Macon, 1994, pp ; here, pp Pattison speaks of Climacus and Hegel as opposite boundaries. See George Pattison, Johannes Climacus and Aurelius Augustinus on Recollecting the Truth, in Robert L. Perkins (ed.), Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, IKC, vol. 7, Macon, 1994, pp ; here, p. 258.

151 Philosophical Fragments in Perspective 151 Although the focus is on God s example of love in becoming Incarnate, we learn something important about human love. For example, we learn that only in love is the different made equal, and only in equality or in unity is there understanding; (PF 25) it is the boundlessness of love, that in earnestness and truth and not in jest it wills to be the equal of the beloved. (32) The story of the king s attempt to have an understanding with the maiden reveals the extreme importance of sensitivity to the feelings of the other the point is that in love the maiden must remain a genuine other with her dignity intact and not simply an extension of the king. God s example of love shows that love suffers and gives all ; it shows that love does not change the beloved but changes itself. Climacus suggests the humility that is found in genuine love when he writes: What wonderful self -denial to ask in concern, even though the learner is the lowliest of persons: Do you really love me? (33) The embodiedness of the revelation of love involves the emptying out of God in the God -Man. Moreover, Fragments extends the analogy between faith and love in terms of our response to this revelation of Love. The sorrow peculiar to the love of the Incarnate God for us is that it bears the possibility of the offense of the human race when out of love one becomes its savior! and thus is obliged to fear for everyone s perdition. (PF 32) In this way we learn that our love for others can also be the occasion for offense, without ceasing to be love that is, we learn that offense is one response to the revelation of Love. And here the offense has a moral dimension that is, the emphasis is on the attack on our self -esteem that we are unlike God because of SIN. We also learn about the other response to revelation namely, the faith -response. This response is illuminated in terms of paradoxical passion, (39) specifically the paradox of love (id.) namely, that the passion of self -love reaches outward in erotic love of another (for my own sake) yet in so doing invokes its own downfall (when the other becomes more important to me than my own self). In all these ways, then, Fragments thought experiment adds to the story of love which Kierkegaard tells throughout his authorship by exploring the analogy between the passion of revealed faith and the passion of love as well as the analogy between the paradox of revealed faith and the paradox of love. In this perspective one is looking at Fragments in the light of Fear and Trembling, which was an earlier foray into the analogy between the paradoxes of love and faith. Moreover, the notion of passion which appears in passing in Fear and Trembling (FT 42, 67) is now put front and center Revelation as TRUTH The perspective on Fragments that is more obvious, because Chapter 1 opens with it, is the perspective of revelation as truth. The Teacher is the Truth, the Teacher gives the Truth, and the human person s response appears to involve an intellectual challenge to the understanding (rather than a challenge to our self -esteem). The response of faith is the passionate embrace of an Absolute Paradox that requires the understanding to surrender itself, to step aside. (PF 54, 59)

152 152 M. Jamie Ferreira In this perspective, one is approaching Fragments by considering it in the light of Silentio s suggestion in Fear and Trembling that faith begins where thinking leaves off. (FT 53) That is, Fragments is a nuanced exploration of the role of the understanding in relation to faith, and thus provides Kierkegaard with an opportunity to address the implications of his challenge in Fear and Trembling to a philosophical view of faith. The Postscript will later emphasize believing against the understanding and even the crucifixion of the understanding, (CUP 564) but here in Fragments there is a guarantee that the understanding is never to be annihilated. (PF 48) The discussion of the absurd initiates the reader s engagement with the provocative notion of a suspension of the understanding which is a tension between faith being against understanding and faith being above the understanding. Only if the understanding is supreme in its domain can it even face a paradox, yet if it remains supreme it can only reject the paradox. What is involved is not a theoretical paradox, but the practical paradox of both letting go and maintaining the standards of the understanding. This perspective highlights a crucial distinction made in Fragments between the condition for faith and the occasion for faith. The condition for faith is an enabling power achieved in a reorientation of our human nature due to God through God s incarnation; the occasion for faith can be the simple presence of a story about the incarnation. This is why the actual Incarnation is not a superfluous detail. In this respect Fragments is a development of two of Kierkegaard s previous upbuilding discourses (1843) which introduce the notion of the condition for faith. The first of these discourses (actually Kierkegaard s first published discourse) entitled The Expectancy of Faith, speaks of faith in relation to God as teacher, but raises the perplexing notion that faith is a gift of God which is somehow both original in everyone and yet can be had only by being constantly acquired. On the one hand, Kierkegaard says that Every human being has what is highest, noblest, and most sacred in humankind. It is original in him, and every human being has it if he wants to have it it is precisely the gloriousness of faith that it can be had only on this condition. (EUD 14) On the other hand, he says that faith can be had only by constantly being acquired and can be acquired only by continually being generated. (14) Another early discourse, entitled The Lord Gave and the Lord Took Away, claimed that God gives the condition along with the gift. (EUD 134) Fragments can thus be seen as clarifying what is unclear in the first discourse (namely, how faith is original) and as elaborating the message in the second discourse (namely, that faith is a gift). The form of the revelation is here historically -based it is a historical religion, not a potentially eternal one. The question raised by this is the relation between the ontological decisiveness of a historical event and the epistemological irrelevance of historical detail. Chapters 1, 3, 4, and 5 elaborate this perspective. Fragments thus thematizes a continuing concern in the authorship with the relation between divine activity and human activity. In the perspective of truth and the understanding, however, what comes to the forefront is the suggestion of a

153 Philosophical Fragments in Perspective 153 passivity in our acquiring faith. The duplexity of the notion of surrendering oneself is not highlighted Leap, Passion, and Gift A third way of approaching Fragments is to see it as a text which raises the question of the relation between God s activity and our human activity, but this time highlights the kind of human activity at issue in the faith -response. Fragments does this by positing two apparently contradictory notions the notion of leap (PF 43) and the notion of passion. (48, 54, 59, 61) I have argued that these are not contradictory but should be seen as mutually correcting idioms for the exploration of the religious response of faith. The language of passion qualifies the volitional connotations of the notion of leap, and the notion of leap corrects any simply passive notion of passion. The faith -response is not a knowledge, nor an act of will, (62) but a passion which transcends the traditional dichotomy between intellect and will. The language of leap serves to show that faith transcends any dichotomy between passive and active. The significance of the language of leap in this notion of faith as a paradoxical passion/leap reveals that although faith is not an act of unconditioned human will, it may be an act of human will in some sense once the condition is given: he notes that if I do not possess the condition then all my willing is of no avail, even though, once the condition is given, that which was valid for the Socratic is again valid. (63) This possibility is reinforced when Climacus later repeats that faith is not a knowledge, but this time adds that it is an act of freedom, an expression of will. (83) This perspective highlights how the form of the external revelation is considered as gift, but it also affirms our freedom. I have argued elsewhere that Kierkegaard is in Fragments readdressing his continuing concern with the relation between qualitative and quantitative transitions the relevance of continuity and discontinuity in our life -transitions. Although Climacus does not explicitly bring up a role for imagination in Fragments (the way he does in Postscript), he does begin the process of raising to the fore the question of the tension within a conditioned and free act of will, as well as the nuances of the human activity of a Socratic coming to understanding which can become valid again. Moreover, Climacus, admittedly a poet, (PF 26) uses imaginative strategies (Consider a king who loved a lowly maiden) in an admittedly imperfect but useful way of trying to awaken the mind to an understanding of the divine. (id.) The question of the transition to faith as the embrace of the Absolute Paradox initiates a concern with faith as imaginative revisioning that both Climacus and Anti -climacus will develop in detail in later works. This perspective brings together the two earlier perspectives namely, that of the passion of love and revelation as truth. It also ties Fragments to both Fear and Trembling where the concept of leap was mentioned (in a note to the Preliminary Expectoration ) and to Concept of Anxiety, in which Kierkegaard was exploring the concept of leap at about the same time.

154 154 M. Jamie Ferreira 2.4. The Relevance of Socratic Subjectivity Fourth, and finally, one can consider Fragments in terms of its status as a pamphlet which requires a postscript namely, the book that followed two years later (1846), the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments. This perspective brings to the fore two things it leads us (a) to reassess the relation between the Fragments and its postscript so that we see the need for a correction of Fragments, and (b) to reconsider Fragments as the work of a humorist. First, Climacus takes the time (in a very long footnote) to admit that Fragments had not done justice to the Socratic secret of subjectivity. He explains how he thought that the contrast between the two kinds of religiousness would be clearer if he simply lumped together Socrates, Plato, and Hegel. The contrast would then be a simple one between objectivity and subjectivity, or between immanence and revelation. He had wanted, he says, to safeguard against confusion and to avoid complications (CUP 206n) so he kept things simple. Although Fragments had actually mentioned Socrates awareness of the paradox of being a duplex human being, as well as the paradox of being a temporal being relating to an eternal happiness, it had done this in passing, encompassing the whole Socratic under the monolithic rubric of speculation and immanence. The job of making the qualitative difference between the two positions unmistakably clear precluded attention to the nuances of Socratic subjectivity and Climacus admits that Socratic subjectivity had not been rightly depicted (id.) because that would have unduly complicated things for the reader. But at some point it became important to Kierkegaard to get this straightened out, to get it rightly depicted. It is not surprising, then, that the postscript has five hundred and fifty pages about the Socratic secret of inwardness, and that Socratic subjectivity is shown in its richness and depth. In the Postscript s chapter entitled The Intermediate Clause between A and B Climacus identifies the subjectivity he has been exploring as religious subjectivity, the religion of deepening inwardness, or Religiousness A (in contrast to Religiousness B, Christianity) and he goes on to make a new claim. First, the task of subjectivity, whose secret Socrates knew, is presented as so strenuous for a human being that there is always a sufficient task in it. (CUP 557) The task of subjectivity is a task for a lifetime one need not pity the person who doesn t grapple with the Absolute Paradox. One can see Religiousness A as qualitatively different from Religiousness B without seeing Religiousness A as lacking something essential to a valuable and fulfilling life. The new claim is that subjectivity is a necessary preliminary to becoming a genuine Christian: before there can be any question at all of simply being in the situation of becoming aware of it [ the essentially Christian ] one must first of all exist in Religiousness A; (557) if religiousness A does not enter in as the terminus a quo [point from which] for the paradoxical religiousness, then Religiousness A is higher than B. (558) Part Two of the Postscript culminates in the radical new suggestion that Religiousness A is a sine qua non condition of Religiousness B, or Christianity. Whereas in Fragments Socratic subjectivity was presented as an alternative to the non -socratic (Christian) position, the postscript reveals it as indispensable.

155 Philosophical Fragments in Perspective 155 The postscript makes subjectivity strange by correcting the apparent either or presentation of the Fragments. Fragments had presented a sharp contrast between two positions they were presented as alternatives either the Socratic position was true or the non -socratic position was true. In other words, either we possess the truth innately or we do not; either we eternally have the condition, or we need to be (re) given the condition; either we are free or we are bound; either the teacher is human or the teacher is divine; either we need only recollection or we need revelation. Fragments had employed a perspective from which these alternatives had two different starting points truth vs. untruth as a starting point. It had emphasized the qualitative difference between the Socratic and non Socratic by describing human beings at a point in time at which both positions could not be true. Postscript, on the other hand, adopts a new approach by emphasizing the positive relation between the two kinds of subjectivity. The Postscript provokes us to look again at Fragments and reconsider the relation between the two kinds of religiousness presented there. It puts in question any radical either or between the two kinds of religiousness, asking whether immanent religiousness is transcended and left behind ( annihilated ) or instead is preserved and transfigured. The second thing this perspective highlights is the claim that Climacus makes later that Fragments was not intended to be didactic, but rather a text using irony, satire, and parody. (CUP 275) One example of the complex relation between earnestness and jest in the work is the witty repartee between the personified understanding and the personified paradox found in the Appendix, (PF 52-53) but the entire text is clearly the work of a self -admitted humorist. Fragments is thus a magnificent example of the central of the concept of tension in Kierkegaard s entire authorship. The four perspectives I have considered suggest tension (a) between love and offense, (b) in suspending the understanding without annihilating it, (c) between divine and human activity, and (d) in the relation between a rationalized religion and a revealed religion. A final thought. Fragments crucial distinction between the condition for faith and the occasion for faith helps us to put Kierkegaard s whole authorship in perspective. It does this first by suggesting that one can see the work of Fragments as providing an occasion for the reader: neither Kierkegaard nor Climacus could cause the reader to come to faith or provide the condition only God can give; however, they could be acting as the Socratic teacher within the framework of a condition given by God, since once the condition is given, that which was valid for the Socratic is again valid. (PF 63) Fragments would thus instantiate its own claim that the Socratic relation is the highest relation a human being can have to another. (10) We can extrapolate this to the entire authorship; as occasions, Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms are saved from the charge that they undermine their own message about subjectivity by attempting to communicate what cannot be communicated. Philosophical Fragments is wonderful example of such an occasion.

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157 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, and Critical Theory Marcia Morgan Muhlenberg College, Pennsylvania USA Introduction: Kierkegaard and Critical Theory Critical Theory is an interdisciplinary framework of analysis that was founded by a group of intellectuals working at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt am Main, Germany. While the Institute itself was established in 1923, the program of critical theory was not formalized until 1937 when Max Horkheimer, the Director of the Institute at that time, dubbed it as such in his essay, Traditional and Critical Theory. 1 The Institute is frequently referred to simply as The Frankfurt School. To this day there have been three generations of Frankfurt School academics, but critical theory refers to something broader than just the work of the Institute for Social Research. Critical theory now indicates a theoretical approach that is studied all over the world. However, the main interests and goals of the founding Institute still remain integral. Foremost among these interests is the primary focus on the individual human being as the locus for social change. Over the years many debates have ensued as to how the individual can achieve social change. While these debates took critical theory in diverse directions, Søren Kierkegaard, a 19 th century Danish religious thinker, who emphasizes the individual s self -imposed obligation to society at large, played a major role. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard s impact on the development of critical theory has received scant study. I aim to fill this scholarly lacuna. My intention is to expose the complexity not only of Kierkegaard but of the Frankfurt School and their cohort. Kierkegaard s relationship to critical theory suffered from the misappropriation of his works by philosophers and theologians associated with National Socialism. This caused the critical theorists to view the content of Kierkegaard s philosophy itself as fascistic. Ultimately, I will highlight the way in which Kierkegaard has been redeemed for a multicultural activist ethics today, working vigorously against any form of totalitarianism in spirit with the fundamental aims of the Frankfurt School. 1 In Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays, New York: Continuum, In German: Kritische Theorie, vol. 1, Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, Kierkegaard in Lisbon, Lisboa, CFUL, 2012, pp

158 158 Marcia Morgan 1. A Brief History of the Relationship between Kierkegaard and Critical Theory Max Horkheimer was the director of the Institute for Social Research at the time the program of critical theory was formed, and he is credited for its naming. But before he did so in his essay, Traditional and Critical Theory, other members of the Frankfurt School were already drawing connections to Kierkegaard and their incipient critical theoretical views. 2 The first Frankfurt School intellectual to appropriate Kierkegaard was Herbert Marcuse. In his essay of 1929, On Concrete Philosophy, the young Marcuse adopts Kierkegaard s activist critique of Christendom as an example of critical theory rooted in concrete existential praxis, 3 But despite Marcuse s effort to make Kierkegaard a constructive part of the critical theory program, the relationship turned sour only shortly thereafter and remain in a state of disarray for decades to come. This is in large part because of Theodor W. Adorno s ultra -provocative and not so reader -friendly Habilitationsschrift, titled Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic and published in 1933, which served as the real breakthrough for the religious thinker into the domain of critical theory. 4 This breakthrough was both a blessing and a curse. Adorno vehemently rejected Kierkegaard in an attempt to reach opposition intellectuals in Germany at a time when it might have made a difference. Adorno was trying to save Kierkegaard from the Nazi sympathizers who had claimed him for their own theological and philosophical programs (namely, dialectical theology and existential phenomenology). 5 In doing so Adorno pigeonholed Kierkegaard as a proto -fascistic thinker in the minds of the critical theorists for decades to come. This was substantiated by Horkheimer in the 1930s, by Marcuse in the 1940s, and by Georg Lukács in the 1950s. In Authority and the Family, Horkheimer blamed Kierkegaard s notion of obedience for patriarchal hegemony not unlinked to the Aryan ideology of the mother role. 6 In Reason and Revolution Marcuse criticized Kierkegaard for a radical individualism in which the subject is separated from societal concerns and any genuinely active role in the social whole. 7 Lukács likewise reproached Kierkegaard, but this time for giving pride of place to 2 In Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays, New York: Continuum, In German: Kritische Theorie, vol. 1, Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, See Martin Matuštík, Kierkegaard s Radical Existential Praxis, or: Why the Individual Defies Liberal, Communitarian, and Postmodern Categories, in Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, eds. Martin Matuštík and Merold Westphal, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 244; hereafter MATUŠTÍK 1. See Herbert Marcuse, On Concrete Philosophy, in Herbert Marcuse, Heideggerian Marxism, eds. Richard Wolin and John Abromeit, Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2005, pp , and in Marcuse, Schriften, Bd. 1, Springe: Klampen Verlag, See Theodor Adorno, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic, trans. by Robert Hullot -Kentor Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, In German: Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2, edited by Rolf Tiedemann, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, See Marcia Morgan, Adorno s Reception of Kierkegaard, in Soren Kierkegaard Newsletter, ed. Gordon Marino, Northfield MN: St. Olaf College, See Max Horkheimer, On Authority and the Family, in Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory, ibid. 7 See Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, New York: Humanities Books, 1999, pp

159 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, and Critical Theory 159 the irrational and the absurd. In The Destruction of Reason Lukács informs us that the move into the twentieth century, climaxing in the person of Hitler, can be seen as a straight line coming directly from the theoretical dissolution of Hegelian dialectic. 8 The culmination of this dissolution he attributes, in the end, to Kierkegaard. Hence Kierkegaard becomes aligned with the onslaught of totalitarianism, yet again. For this was precisely Adorno s thesis following a different path than Lukács but arriving at the same goal in the early 1930s. This can almost be seen as a repetition compulsion indeed a false repetition in the Kierkegaardian sense 9 in response to the trauma experienced from the various forms of totalitarianism in the first half of the twentieth century. When Marcuse re -engaged with Kierkegaard in the 1960s for the revolutionary plan of the Great Refusal (for example, in the work of One Dimensional Man), a breath of fresh air was allowed to infiltrate the pessimism of Kierkegaard reception by the critical theorists. Here Marcuse shows some moderate success in socially integrating Kierkegaard s existential approach into the activist notion of the Great Refusal (MATUŠTÍK 1 244) as Martin Matuštík has noted. 10 But the saga of Janus faced interpretations of Kierkegaard by critical theory continued when Habermas took the reins of the Frankfurt School for the second generation of critical theorists. In 1987 Habermas delivered a lecture at the University of Copenhagen in which he poses the following question to Kierkegaard, as Matuštík paraphrases it: if the modern individual suffers homelessness in traditionally formed cultures, what is that rational life form which could socially integrate his or her posttraditional crisis identity? 11 In posing the question Habermas critiques Kierkegaard s failure to resolve the crisis of traditional identity socially. Indeed Habermas s question points to a failure to integrate the individual with his or her admission of the crisis of identity, into modernity on a noncommunitarian, postnational basis. (ibid.) Habermas furthermore read Kierkegaard negatively, for example, in his Postmetaphysical Thinking in 1988, citing Kierkegaard s intransparency as yet another instantiation of falling in the trap of a philosophy of reflection and consciousness. 12 But and I find this one of the most interesting and paradoxical aspects of Kierkegaard s relationship to the critical theorists Habermas will later become one of the main proponents of Kierkegaard, for example in The Future of 8 See Georg Lukács, Die Zerstörung der Vernunft, Darmstadt und Neuwied: Luchterhand Verlag, 1973, Band I, originally published in Hungary in In English: The Destruction of Reason, trans. by Peter Palmer, Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities Press, See Kierkegaard, Repetition, trans. by Walter Lowrie, Princeton: Princeton University Press, For an excellent account of the Great Refusal, see Douglas Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984, pp See Martin Matuštík, Postnational Identity: Critical Theory and Existential Philosophy in Habermas, Kierkegaard, and Havel, New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1993, p. 5; hereafter MATUŠTÍK 2. See Jürgen Habermas, The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians Debate, ed. and trans. by Shierry Weber Nicholson, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1989, which includes the Copenhagen lecture. 12 See Jürgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, New York, Polity Press, In German: Nachmetaphysiches Denken, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1988.

160 160 Marcia Morgan Human Nature. 13 Here Habermas invokes Kierkegaard s opaque notion of radical subjectivity while Habermas himself has spent a lifetime propagating communicative action internal to a transparent discourse ethics. Noteworthy here is that it has been Habermas students and successors who have most innovatively furthered a connection between communicative action, critical theory, and Kierkegaardian activist subjectivity. 14 Foremost among these scholars is Martin Matuštík. It is the work of the latter, I argue, that has most impacted the relationship between Kierkegaard and critical theory today, and it is for that reason that I will focus on his work in the final portion of this paper. But before I do that, in order to elucidate the negative reading of Kierkegaard that had dominated critical theory for decades, I would like to turn now in the second section of my paper to present Theodor W. Adorno s reading of Kierkegaard from the Habilitationsschrift (Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic). I will focus on Adorno s reading of the Philosophical Fragments as a means to show some of the most important features of Adorno s argument and some of the most indicting stereotypes of Kierkegaardian subjectivity. I would like to highlight and clarify these stereotypes so that I can subsequently show the ways in which significant new developments in critical theory have clearly rendered them false and therefore also obsolete. II. Adorno s Kierkegaard and the Argument Against Philosophical Fragments Theodor W. Adorno provided one of the most significant and at the same time problematic readings of Kierkegaard in the twentieth century. 15 Adorno s study 16 provoked two of the most important issues of Kierkegaard scholarship: the relationship between the aesthetic and religious life possibilities put forth in the heterogeneous writings of Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms, and the question of the extent to which a critical theory of society is made manifest in these writings. But there are many reasons why Adorno s Kierkegaard cannot be construed as a convincing interpretation of Kierkegaard s Collected Works, and needs to be seen rather as a confrontation with something else. 13 See Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature, New York: Polity Press, In German: Der Zukunft der menschlichen Natur, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, It is important to note here the very compelling essay by Robert L. Perkins, The Politics of Existence: Buber and Kierkegaard (MATUŠTÍK ). Perkins emphasizes well Kierkegaard s actual life praxis, especially the last year and one -half of his life, as a politically active form. Professor Perkins essay, along with Merold Westphal, Kierkegaard s Critique of Reason and Society, University Park, PA: Penn State UP, 1987, do much to bring out this dimension of Kierkegaard. 15 The first portion of this part of the paper has been previously published in my article Adorno s Reception of Kierkegaard: in the Kierkegaard Newsletter: A Publication of the Howard and Edna Hong Library of St. Olaf College, Theodor W. Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997); hereafter GS followed by the volume number. In English: Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic, trans. Robert Hullot -Kentor, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989); hereafter K.

161 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, and Critical Theory 161 Adorno s Kierkegaard must be viewed within the philosophical and historical contexts of the time and place in which it was conceived. 17 It was written and rewritten between the years First published in 1933 in Germany, the book appeared in bookstores on February 27, the day that Hitler declared a national emergency and suspended the freedom of the press, making his transition from chancellor to dictator. 19 In the Note appended to the second and third editions of Kierkegaard Adorno himself makes reference to the fate of his first publication of the book. He writes: The final version appeared in 1933 in the publishing house of J.C.B. Mohr in Siebeck, on the very same day that Hitler became Dictator. Walter Benjamin s review appeared in the Vossiche Zeitung one day after the anti -semitic boycott, on April 2, The effect [Wirkung] of the book was from the beginning on overshadowed by political evil. While the author had been denaturalized, the book was, however, nor forbidden by the authorities and had sold very well. Perhaps it was protected by the censors inability to understand it. The critique of existential ontology which the book works out was meant at the time of its publication to reach the oppositional intellectuals in Germany. (GS 2, 261) 20 The weight of the historical events that the book was forced to carry was nonetheless an external burden. But there is another which, although also strongly related to the external political and historical events of the time, is internal to the text itself. It is this internal burden that I want to consider, for it brings to light the real aim behind Adorno s book. Adorno s vigorous emphasis on the necessity of incommensurable individual experience and the role of preserving its sensuous concreteness his call to save the particular and to strive for the nonidentical, as he writes in his later work, Negative Dialectics 21 can be seen clearly in the Kierkegaard text. But it is evident that, after having examined the arguments Adorno presents against Kierkegaard, his claims have less to do with Kierkegaard than with a desire to read something 17 I do not want to restore Adorno s Kierkegaard to the exact context in which it was written and received, but rather outline the methodological and historical situation of Kierkegaard research, interpretation, and reception at the time of Adorno s writing the book. This is meant as a background forum for understanding Adorno s vehement rejection of the religious philosopher. For an excellent review of the philosophical and historical situation against which Adorno was writing his Kierkegaard, see Christian Henning, Der Faden der Ariadne: Eine theologische Studie zu Adorno, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, Adorno s Kierkegaard served as his Habilitationsschrift, the second dissertation required for promotion to university professor in Germany. This was Adorno s second Habilitationsschrift, the first on Kant and Freud having been rejected by Hans Cornelius in See Adorno, Der Begriff des Unbewussten in der transzendentalen Seelenlehre, in GS 1, pp The Kierkegaard study was approved by Paul Tillich, and Adorno became promoted to Professor thereby. See Susan Buck- Morss, The Origins of Negative Dialectics, New York: The Free Press, 1977, p. 268 n See Robert Hullot -Kentnor, editor s introduction to Adorno, Kierkegaard, p. xi. 20 This is my translation of the German. 21 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton, New York: Continuum Press, 1995, published for the first time in German as Negative Dialektik, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1966.

162 162 Marcia Morgan else into and against Kierkegaard. Adorno s claims are related more to his fervor against the onslaught of the totalitarian manifestations of his day, and the loss of individuality with its distinct experiential contents that was the consequence of those manifestations. That this was one of the aims behind the project is indicated in Adorno s remark, quoted above, that the critique of existential ontology was meant to reach the oppositional intellectuals in Germany. (ibid.) One of the ways Adorno carried out his attack against Kierkegaard was with the claim that Kierkegaard created a so -called bourgeois interieur through his inception of truth as subjectivity. (Adorno took this concept from Walter Benjamin s The Origins of German Trauerspiel and applied it to a reading of Kierkegaard.) Adorno thereby castigates Kierkegaard for his emphasis on inwardness and claims that through such focus Kierkegaard theorizes a subject as spiritualized body, devoid of all this -worldly experiential import. In the third chapter of Adorno s text, titled Explication of Inwardness, Adorno executes what he calls a sociology of inwardness. He claims: A sociology of inwardness would be necessary to historically explain the image of the interieur. The idea of such a sociology is only apparently paradoxical. Inwardness presents itself as the restriction of human existence to a private sphere free from the power of reification. Yet as a private sphere it itself belongs if only polemically, to the social structure. (K 47) One must be aware that Adorno is here applying his nascent negative dialectics which was formulated many years later in the text by that name to Kierkegaard s subject. 22 Adorno is forcing Kierkegaard subject to obey the movement of negative dialectics, in which the subject at once provides an escape from social reality and is bound to the power of reification internal to social reality. Adorno writes, Kierkegaard disclosed something of the character of the social relation between the outer world and the privately supported thinker. 23 But, continuing his negative dialectic Adorno then poses the following question in regard to a morality implied in such a conception of subjectivity:...how would the moral person have to conduct himself if the outer world were indeed in his power or if he could gain control of this power? Does not Kierkegaard recognize the external as distinct from the internal and as material of ethical conduct; would not, in that case, morality itself be dependent on the historical condition of this material as its proper object? By denying the social question, Kierkegaard falls to the mercy of this own historical situation, that of the rentier in the first half of the nineteenth century. (K 47) Subsequently, Adorno equates the concrete self in Kierkegaard to the bourgeois self, (K 49) a self devoid of any vibrant socio -political agency in its comfortable abode set apart from the crowd. Through key passages from Philosophical Fragments Adorno links his attack against an alleged bourgeois interieur to a problematic thesis of spiritualism that 22 See Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. by E.B. Ashton, New York: Continuum, Ibid.

163 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, and Critical Theory 163 he attributes to Kierkegaard. Adorno declares: The thesis of spiritualism is made manifest in an extreme formulation in Philosophical Fragments, (K 51) and for Adorno, the spiritualistic thesis of the Philosophical Fragments, is maintained through the entire oeuvre. (K 52) This should not surprise, as any and all features of Kierkegaardian subjectivity are maintained through the entire oeuvre for Adorno, as the latter disavowed any indirect authorship in the writings of Kierkegaard. This produced a flattened out constellation of ideas that fails to deliver the vibrant model of dialectical movement necessitated by a critical theory of society as Adorno conceived it. Adorno pulls the thread of distinctness provided by each of the pseudonyms out of Kierkegaard s writings, causing the various spheres of existence to collapse into one amorphous whole. Adorno continues his destruction of Kierkegaardian subjectivity through an epistemological -ontological evaluation of further passages from Philosophical Fragments. According to Adorno, for Kierkegaard, the relationship between truth and untruth is equated to the relationship between being and nonbeing. (K 51) As the disciple is the sinful man who is to be awakened by Christ, akin to the change from nonbeing to being, this constitutes an exclusively spiritual re -birth, which receives truth and is the condition for understanding it. Adorno writes: Like the natural self the crowd is for Kierkegaard the untruth ; living people appear as allegories of truth or untruth. This is enough evidence for Adorno that Kierkegaard s subject is not only stripped of all corporeal experience in the constitution of his or her selfhood; Kierkegaard s subject for Adorno is also a figure alone in the world, isolated in its own middle -class living room (the bourgeois interieur ) and thus separated from the world of social and political reality. Moreover in Adorno s argument, the spiritualism in Kierkegaard s thinking becomes the object of form, completely immaterial, with no intuition or instinct. This comprises what Adorno repeatedly throughout his text calls objectless inwardness. 24 Spirit is bound to the body as its expression for Adorno; spirit is bound to the semblance of the interieur and only that. Adorno transitions this argument against Philosophical Fragments to the bodily despair existing in Part I (A s papers) of Either/Or. According to Adorno s additional connection of the bourgeois interieur to the melancholy running throughout Kierkegaard s writings, Kierkegaard s subject wallows in his or her own escapism from the social whole. (K 52) Adorno elaborates in a section titled Melancholy : The inner history of melancholy, just like that of subjectivity altogether, is conceived by Kierkegaard without any regard for external history. (K 59) The position progresses against Kierkegaard s subject of the Philosophical Fragments where Adorno writes: All this [about demonic despair] could just as well be said of objectless inwardness as it is said of the depraved, eviscerated self of the purely demonic. For only that language can lead beyond the demonic that is debarred from an inwardness that does not know a priori whether other human beings in the world exist. (K 56) Kierkegaard thereby creates a subject equivalent 24 See for example p. 55.

164 164 Marcia Morgan to a Cartesian Archimedean point, albeit in purely spiritualized form which for Adorno becomes mythologized via Hegelian dialectic. While I do not need to go into further detail about Adorno s argument for reasons that are clear from the beginning of my own exposition; I believe this exposition demonstrates clearly just how and why Adorno was rebuking Kierkegaard in the manner that he was. I would like to emphasize, however, the significance of Adorno s thesis of an objectless inwardness in catapulting Kierkegaard ever more deeply into the works of the critical theorists. Although they rejected him in the history previously outlined, they could not rest with their rejection. Their need continually to find new angles to critique Kierkegaard slowly morphed into the need to recognize Kierkegaard as indeed crucial to their own socio -political and theoretical interests. Although this was spearheaded by Marcuse by his inclusion of Kierkegaard as a positive force for his project of The Great Refusal (in One Dimensional Man), it was really thanks to Habermas s student, Martin Matuštík, that Kierkegaard was placed clearly and concretely in the midst of a robust and vibrant critical theory of society. I turn now to Matuštík s understanding of Kierkegaard s subject as the exact opposite that presented by Adorno. III. Martin Matuštík and Radical Existential Praxis In his essay Kierkegaard s Radical Existential Praxis, published in 1995, Matuštík writes that Kierkegaard takes us beyond the limited understandings of subjectivity available up until now. I agree with Matuštík where he claims: neither possessive individualism, nor ethical anarchism, nor some group ethos can genuinely sustain Kierkegaard s category of the individual. (MATUŠTÍK 2 261, n.9) Matuštík takes us past the unfruitful divide between premodern notions of the self and nominal aloofness or postmodern erasures of the self. (MATUŠTÍK 1 239f) Right from the outset, with his more differentiated understanding of what Kierkegaard meant by subjectivity, Matuštík makes very clear and argues forcefully that Kierkegaard does not create a conception of subjectivity which would fall prey to Adorno s theory of a bourgeois interieuer. Matuštík writes: Kierkegaard invites us to consider a form of critical theory and action that would solicit radical honesty about limits and motives informing concept -formation and activism. (MATUŠTÍK 1 240) Kierkegaard s individual for Matuštík takes the path of the individual as an opening to that radical existential praxis which is crucial if democratic multiculture in the present age can be made possible. (ibid.) Kierkegaard s individual is not someone offering a total withdrawal from the ethico -political, but as a concrete universal wherein radical existential praxis enhances and embodies critical social theory. (ibid.) Matuštík explains convincingly that the solution to the downfall of the modern subject is clearly not in the Marxian version of sociality or association: While both the early Marx and Kierkegaard are very much preoccupied with the demise of the human individual, not unlike later Adorno and Marcuse, Kierkegaard argues

165 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, and Critical Theory 165 that the leveling of the individual by the herd mentality of the present age cannot be resisted directly through social union. (ibid.) While I do not believe that Adorno s thesis could be fitted into such a flat matrix of Marxian sociality or association (to understate the fact), Adorno, on the other hand, did not recognize the potential commonality between his own dialectical understanding and that of Kierkegaard. To substantiate his argument, Matuštík cites Kierkegaard from The Point of View where the latter writes: The individual is the category through which this age, all history, the human race as a whole, must pass. 25 By this Matuštík points out that any version of quantitative equality is unacceptable for Kierkegaard. This creates a requisite qualitative modus of thinking and acting as an individual, which Matuštík outlines further and which for him coincides Kierkegaard s notion of the individual with Habermas s theory of communicative action. Matuštík continues his argument by elaborating the way in which Kierkegaard jests at both the categories of communitarian self and postmodern suspension of normative discourse. Then Matuštík asks: Yet what can this category [of individual responsibility] bespeak if it is neither an atomistic path to autonomous agency, nor a prevalent convention, nor a nominal gesture bereft of compelling solidarity? (MATUŠTÍK 1 240f) Here Merold Westphal, from his work, Kierkegaard s Critique of Reason and Society, offers great insight. 26 After having described the element of negative dialectics internal to Kierkegaard s appropriation of the individual self -consciousness in Hegel s phenomenology, Westphal writes: we should not be surprised if Kierkegaard s political bent: is more like Marx s if it emerges indirectly, through a critique of what he believes is the overriding sociopolitical defect of the theory and practice of his times rather than as a positive description of the institutions of the society he deems most rational [Kierkegaard s] diagnosis centers on a lack of subjectivity, the failure of people to be passionately committed, ethicoreligious individuals. (WESTPHAL 33) Westphal writes further: But the individualism he wishes to evoke is neither compositional individualism, to put it philosophically, nor bourgeois individualism, to put it socio -politically. It is actually the dialectical individualism he inherited from Hegel. Our task is to discover Kierkegaard s politics in the negative critique through which he seeks to rescue dialectical individualism, to repeat, from a Hegelian philosophy that he views as insufficiently faithful to it and from a society of which Hegel s philosophy and of his present age is a tendency toward self -deification of the We. (ibid.) Westphal describes Kierkegaard s politics in a nutshell as coming from a statement taken from Fear and Trembling, whereby we ought never forget that a God exists and that the we as individuals are ever in a state of becoming. (ibid.) 25 Kierkegaard, PV 128, cited in MATUŠTÍK 2, ibid. 26 See Merold Westphal, Kierkegaard s Critique of Reason and Society, Penn State: Penn State University Press, 1992; hereafter WESTPHAL.

166 166 Marcia Morgan How we relate to our own state of becoming individuals is for Matuštík a fundamental point. The process of becoming an individual, accordingly, entails becoming a concrete universal, which is the individual as radical existential praxis. He writes: The most concrete universal is achieved not by the hermeneutically given cultural whole but by the individuals who take responsible relation to and choose themselves to be this or that whole which they already descriptively are. (TA 62f; MATUŠTÍK 1 241) Here Matuštík cites Fear and Trembling whereby de silentio: calls us back to inhabit the universal in fear and trembling. His earnest jest is that he speaks of agency in terms not clearly recognizable in our liberal -communitarian and post/modern debates. The jest is that one is to act responsibly towards others in the world even when neither one s self -transparency nor conventions secures action. (MATUŠTÍK ) There is thereby a radical self -choice that cannot be identified with self -assertions, communitarian visions of the good, or value skepticism. (ibid.) I choose myself, as the famous dictum goes, as I already am. (ibid.) I am not making a choice in abstractio, but rather as the most concrete universal. In other words, there can be no identity of the individual as the most concrete universal. The choice of myself is an act of choosing myself as a person capable of responsible, radically honest choosing, (ibid.) self -choice; it is necessarily a qualitative choice. Matuštík claims: It modified how I embody my choices but does not justify what I choose. (ibid.; EO II 204) In sum, it does not have to do with what I have chosen as the object of my choice, but rather of the modality of myself as a choosing agent. Hence, Matuštík is right to claim that Kierkegaard is not doing away with normative agency as the postmoderns, according to Matuštík, will want; but also there is no evaluation of what I have chosen after the fact of choosing myself, according to my interpretation of Matuštík. Matuštík at this point in the development of his argument moves Kierkegaard into a very Habermasian position whereby what Matuštík defines as Kierkegaard s existential ethics entails a self -choice [that] operates as the condition of the possibility that I can think normatively and act morally in the public sphere. (MATUŠTÍK 1 244) The qualitative modality of having chosen myself as the concrete universal provides the condition for the possibility of my ethico -moral moreover, normative action and decision. (ibid.) This is worked out provocatively and convincingly in Matuštík s lengthy analysis of critical theory and existential philosophy in Postnational Identity, published in 1993, and also plays a role in his later theory of Specters of Liberation, published in In Postnational Identit, Matuštík constructs his crossover model, conjoining existential ethics and communicative action. The visual created thereby provides a helpful tool to understand the connection between Kierkegaard and critical theory in the most productive manner. The creation of a self -choosing subject in Kierkegaard yields a vertical construction of a single individual whereby the normative dimension of Habermas communicative action provides a horizontal framework in and through which the vertical existential ethic makes itself manifest. The vertical and horizontal constructions intersect through a contemporaneity of two radically distinct dimensions

167 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, and Critical Theory 167 of the self. The moment of this intersection becomes the condition of the possibility of the subject to exist in and through a critical theory of society. In order to make this intersection possible Matuštík draws on Climacus version of existential communication from Philosophical Fragments. In the chapter titled Communicating Existence from Postnational Identity Matuštík explains: Climacus does not secure communicative interaction by recourse to the Platonic metaphysics of ideas. He maintains conversation that is Socratically open -ended. For Climacus, unlike Plato, to learn from Socrates presents a task of repetition, not a metaphysic of recollection. In Climacus the Socratic and the posttraditionally modern come together in existential communication. (MATUŠTÍK 2 136) Matuštík thereby quotes from the Fragments: Socrates remained true to himself and artistically exemplified what he had understood. He was and continued to be a midwife, not because he did not have the positive, but because he perceived that this relation is the highest relation a human being can have to another. (PF 10) From this Matuštík learns: that sharing in another s temporality requires my becoming her con/temporary. This con/ temporaneity stands for an intersubjective mode of temporality or inter -temporality...i cannot communicate existence and access time speculatively...self -choice effects my other -relations, since I harness my temporal existing directly before the other s temporal existence. (MATUŠTÍK 2 136) What Matuštík s argument about Kierkegaard shows is the extent to which Kierkegaard supersedes all of the heretofore construed false dichotomies in the construction of the self. Matuštík has clearly brought Kierkegaard into the 21 st century, keeping the Frankfurters in tow, in a way that opens up a wide expanse of possibilities for future developments of Kierkegaard in critical theory.

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169 The via perardua Salvation in Spinoza and Kierkegaard Maria Luísa Ribeiro Ferreira University of Lisbon Philosophy Centre of the University of Lisbon 1. A different experience of salvation Spinoza and Kierkegaard the hardships of a confrontation At first glance, everything seems to set them apart. A temporal distance of two hundred years separates them. Spinoza ( ) plays an eminent role in the storm that revolutionized Western thought; inserted in the optimist paradigm of the new philosophy, he shares with his peers the wish to reach an objective truth, using the mos geometricus to fulfill his desideratum. As a major representative of the rationalist paradigm, he is concerned with the Whole, which he reveals deductively, by rendering visible the logic that sustains it. For some of those who studied him (Kierkegaard included), the path followed by the author of Ethics has in Hegel his highest exponent, opening the way to an optimist conception of the real, made explicit in its different manifestations. Philosophy and science are identified, and the separation between philosophy and theology, reason and faith, truth and belief, becomes now clear and manifest, although this does not mean that the dialogue between both sides ends. Kierkegaard ( ) is a post -hegelian who exposes his pertinent mistrust towards great theoretical constructions. He despises them for their inability when it comes to responding to the aspirations for a concrete life, dilacerated by restlessness, doubts and fears. In the Danish philosopher, the daring mission of explaining the real as a whole is replaced by the more modest and realistic task of drawing the contours of human finitude in its constitutive frailness. Kierkegaard renounces the systems that came before him, namely Hegel s, in order to scrutinize individual existence and interior evidence. He even objects to anyone who might appreciate his thought in a systematic fashion some day after his death, by analyzing it in subjects and chapters. The use of pseudonyms in his writings reveals a strong attraction to the contradictory, as well as horror of what is finished and definite. His strikingly original prose is the antipode of Spinoza s concise and precise style. Kierkegaard s style is so uncommon in philosophical literature that still today some of his commentators question themselves over the pertinence of applying a philosophical label to his texts, which are much easier to classify as dispersed points of view, or even as effusions of an anguished Kierkegaard in Lisbon, Lisboa, CFUL, 2012, pp

170 170 Maria Luísa Ribeiro Ferreira soul. 1 In fact, Kierkegaard s writing is ambivalent, unfolding itself into a multiplicity of hypotheses that annul themselves reciprocally. His discourse is fragmented; his philosophical themes always have a personally experienced relation to the subjects/writers who present them. In many of his texts, he raises questions that he leaves unanswered, dragging himself thereafter into anxiety. In his texts, one finds a radical and deliberate discontinuity, illustrating his horror of objectivity, necessity and abstraction. Hence, it is there where his criticism of Hegel arises from, and consequently of Spinoza, whom he introduces as a predecessor of the former. His stance is similar to the stance of the Greek sophists he does not show the way, or advice on conduct. He is a serious challenging voice that confronts and disturbs us, but that makes us think. Spinoza uses the mos geometricus; the questions he raises are analyzed and solved with the security and objectivity of a mathematician. He brushes doubts aside by means of solid arguments, and uses deduction as argumentative procedure. He chooses synthesis as the most adequate method of exposition, and takes Euclid as a model: Euclides, who only wrote very simple and most intelligible things, can be easily explained in every language. 2 Accordingly, he follows the Greek mathematician by tracing an itinerary where the Whole is the point of departure for reaching its parts (the modes), which he then exhaustively analyzes in his Ethics. Bringing together both philosophers also becomes difficult due to the differences of character and temperament. Spinoza is a calm man who seeks to live a life free of the passions that anguish men and leave them unsteady. In one of his first works, he expresses that wish, and ranks the most common passions riches, honors and sexual pleasure; he disapproves of them since they bring disturbance and are a serious menace to the happiness that everybody should seek. 3 Moreover, he puts them aside not for whatever sin they may contain sin is something non -existent for the author of the Ethics but for the disturbance they may cause in the path he has set himself to follow, i.e., searching for truth. This is a search that we also detect in Kierkegaard, but he lives through it in pain, obsessed as he is with his awareness of finitude, and sin in his permanent horizon. In The Concept of Anxiety, he tells us that sin is not a condition. He is not interested in knowing how sin was born; his only certainty is that anxiety came into the world with sin. Sin corresponds to a loss of innocence; it goes back to 1 This is the case of S. Evans who begins an introductory volume to Kierkegaard by questioning him Is Kierkegaard a Philosopher? (Stephan Evans, Kierkegaard. An Introduction, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp.1-4). In the same line of thought, Louis Mackey considers that there is no underlying unity in Kierkegaard s thought, but only points of view, expressed in a multiplicity of entries and perspectives, with the pseudonyms as significant elements of that dispersion; in Louis Mackey, Points of View: Readings of Kierkegaard, Tallahassee, Florida: Florida State University Press, 1986, pp Euclides, qui non nisi res admodum simplices & maxime inteligibiles scripsit, facile ag unoquoque in quavis lingua explicatur; Tractatus Theologico Politicus (henceforth, referred to as TTP), in Spinoza Opera, ed. Carl Gebhardt, Heidelberg, Carl Winter, 1972, cap. VII, G. III, p Hereafter G. 3 See the letter of intentions at the beginning of the Treatise of the Emendation of the Intellect, TIE, 1 to 5, G. II, p. 5.

171 The via perardua Salvation in Spinoza and Kierkegaard 171 Adam, but is not his concern. 4 The history of mankind begins with sinfulness, and sexuality is instituted along sinfulness. However, sin is also the way to perfection because gaining awareness of sin is the first redemptive step. Recognizing guilt and the unfolding anxiety guides us to divine providence, if and when worked by faith: With the help of faith, anxiety brings up the individuality to rest in providence. So it is also in relation to guilt, which is the second thing anxiety discovers. (CA 161) Kierkegaard distinguishes between an objective anxiety, a reflection of the finitude of men, and a product of the change operated by Adam s sin in men, and a subjective anxiety, placed in each individual as a consequence of sin. Negativity is inherent to the human condition; it is a kind of wound which should always be left open. His aim is to show the unavoidable sinful nature of all men, by providing evidence of the inglorious fight they engage in, so as to overcome the ensuing anxiety. Anxiety differs from fear. Fear sends one back to something precise and concrete, whereas anxiety derives from the consideration of freedom as pure possibility. While Kierkegaard cultivates anxiety, taking it as an inevitable dimension of the human condition, Spinoza is committed to fighting anxiety, keeping all that may bring sadness and trouble to all of us at a distance. There is a sharp contrast between the internal dilacerations of Kierkegaard s anthropology and the serene joy that rules over Spinoza s thought. For the latter, sadness is always bad and it should be avoided, since happiness, in its different manifestations, is the goal we are supposed to reach. The kinds of contentment he considers (hilaritas, gaudium, acquiescentia in se ipso, beatitudo) stand as indicative criteria that show we are on the right track; it is absolutely necessary to cultivate them so as to reach a harmony with God/Nature. Only then shall we be truly free. Freedom in Spinoza implies a ceaseless fight against sadness, contrasting with Kierkegaard s thesis, whose claim is that the awareness of our freedom inescapably leads us to anxiety. More differences come about when we consider their modalities of making philosophy. Kierkegaard is an asystematic author, chiefly interested in the life experience of each human. He thinks in a dramatic mode, questioning the arrogant and dogmatic certainty of the great systems; his adversary is Hegel and Kierkegaard criticizes Hegel s philosophical construct. Kierkegaard prefers irony and distance to the seriousness and objectivity of the great systems; he is thus interested in personal actuality in what it concerns authenticity. The abstract thought that is prevalent in Spinoza and Hegel lives sub specie aeternitatis, despising concreteness and temporality, an attitude that contrasts with Kierkegaard s, since the latter is attentive to human misery and fears, emphasizing the difference between the creator and the creatures. Anxiety derives from the impossibility of linking the part to the Whole; between one and the other there lies an abysmal distance. Hence, the philosopher is mindful of the individual and disdainful of all thought that does not value the human. But man sets forth, lost and isolated, confused by the distance that he seeks in vain to reduce, a distance that leads him to despair. The beginning of philosophy does not lie in awe, but in despair; philosophy is posited at the service of faith. Contrariwise to the philosophies of totality, Kierkegaard 4 The Concept of Anxiety, ed. and transl. by Reider Thomte in collaboration with Albert B. Anderson, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, pp Hereafter CA.

172 172 Maria Luísa Ribeiro Ferreira values the moment, understanding philosophy as the intersection of the trans -temporal and the temporal, of eternity and time. Spinoza builds a system where the presence of an imminent God is manifest in all things; he identifies reality and perfection, showing us an organized world where everything has to do with everything. The Whole is his point of departure and with the Whole (named as Substance) he begins his opus magnum Ethics. In this work, he argues for the naturalization of the divine, made accessible to man through reason. The objective of the philosopher is to know like God knows; unable to apprehend the totality of divine intellect, he still claims to have access to a God quatenus, that is, to the divine manifestations in the modes whose order he seeks to decipher. Kierkegaard wagers on the supernatural and on transcendence. His God is opaque, obscure and distant; it would be absurd to know Him or even to prove Him, since He cannot be conceptualized. The author of Philosophical Fragments admits and practices a revealed religion, even when it is paradoxical and rationally obscure. Miracles are admitted and accepted as reinstatement and proof of divine omnipotence. But beyond the above mentioned differences, derived from their own particular vision of the world and of life, there are affinities that bring them together. In the first place, we highlight the relevance of religion, leaving an indelible stamp on both thinkers. Although they distance themselves from established religions, they are guided by the search of a God that might satisfy them. In the case of Spinoza, a God/ Nature to whom we have access by knowledge; in Kierkegaard, a merciful God only to be attained by faith, but susceptible of responding to human aspirations. In contrast with the prevailing views criticized by both, one finds a deep religiosity, more striking in Kierkegaard, more subtle in Spinoza; yet, this did not prevent charges and accusations on the part of the well -thinking intelligentsia of the societies they lived in. In truth, they both became dissident voices who nonetheless brought about a great impact upon their contemporaries. Quite early on, Spinoza left behind the Jewish worldview he was brought up with and educated in; at twenty -four, he cut all ties with the Hebrew community that had expelled him. The utmost severity of the herem (excommunion) that segregated him, forbidding him to contact his peers, far from demoting him, succeeded in providing the incentive to make him proceed with the fighting he held against superstition and prejudice, a recurrent attitude in his short life, plainly manifest in his writings. As for Kierkegaard, he also breaks his ties with the Lutheran religion he was brought up with and educated in. The harsh criticism of Bishop Martensen, the permanent conflict with the Danish Church, and his denunciation of the hypocrisy of the clergy, sentenced him to proscription, contributing decisively to the increasing depth of his relation to God, intensely lived in solitude. He steadily confronts the truth of Christianity with the falsehood of the ministers and the churches. As for Spinoza, he deals severely with the positive religions which he relegates, in general, to the domain of superstition (superstitio). However, he still praises what he considers to be true religion (vera religio), 5 which he actually reduces to a set of moral rules, to be used in a well -balanced and just society. Though he is framed by another context, 5 TTP, ch. XII, G. III, pp

173 The via perardua Salvation in Spinoza and Kierkegaard 173 Kierkegaard also sustains a religious duality, thus distinguishing between a social and pacifying religion (something he is not concerned with) and another religion he claims to be the authentic, since it brings us unrest and causes anxiety and suffering. Spinoza and Kierkegaard were philosophers without a school, isolated in their iconoclastic stance towards tradition, institutions, and unfunded beliefs. They were both committed to separate philosophy from theology, denouncing the harmful role of the latter. In one of his first works, Spinoza alerts us so that philosophy is not confounded with theology, 6 an exhortation he repeats in other writings, namely in the Theological Political Treatise. De silentio, Kierkegaard s pseudonym in Fear and Trembling compares theology to a courtesan: Theology sits all rouged and powdered in the window and courts its favor, offers its charms to philosophy. (FT 32) It is also worth noticing their affinity in some criticism concerning a few questions in particular; it is the case of Incarnation, a subject that Spinoza refuses to understand, stating that it is an attempt at logic. He writes: As for what some churches add, namely, that God took up human nature, I have warned expressly that I ignore what they want to mean; moreover, frankly speaking, their language seems to me so absurd, as if we said that a circle took the shape of a square. 7 In a draft where Kierkegaard analyses the same theme, he also manifests the same difficulty in accepting Incarnation, classifying it as a paradox. So he writes: ( ) Historically, one can perhaps show this [Incarnation] to be the most fantastic thing conceivable; whether this assumption has ever been historical or not makes no difference in the case, but in this way the understanding itself has made the Incarnation a paradox, which only it itself can produce. 8 But while the former disclaims the issue, taking into account its absurdity, the latter places Incarnation at the core of his quest. They both underscore the incompatibility of faith and reason. Spinoza relegates faith to a type of knowledge that is not defendable, placing faith at the level of imagination and denying any contribution on the part of faith to the pursuit of truth. Kierkegaard, on the contrary, values the role of faith as a mediator in the relation with God; salvation is impossible without faith. Both philosophers invested in salvation. Salvation is presented by Spinoza as a reward for a hard course the via perardua 9 which is to be found with increasing joy. Kierkegaard lives through this joy in anxiety, as the actuality of a paradox which stands as the revelation of eternal truth in time, something difficult to understand and consequently, difficult to attain. Kierkegaard theorizes God in a painful way, feeling in his skin the abyss that separates man from transcendence, a distant and paradoxical entity. Spinoza dissects 6 ( ) ne Philosophia cum Theologia confundatur. Renati Descartes Principiorum Philosophiae, II, prop. XIII, schol., G. I, p Caeterum quod quaedam Ecclesiae his addunt, quod Deus naturam humanum assumpserit, monui expresse, me, qui dicant, nescire; imo, ut verum fatear, non minus absurde mihi loqui videntur, quam si quis mihi diceret, quod circulus naturam quadrati induerit. Ep. LXIII to Oldenburg, G. IV, p JP II 1340 (Pap. V B 5:8) n.d., Draft cited in Selected Entries from Kierkegaard s Journals and Papers pertaining to Philosophical Fragments. (PF ) 9 Et. V, prop XLII schol., G. II, p. 302.

174 174 Maria Luísa Ribeiro Ferreira God with the rigor of geometers and traces with certainty the way that will lead us to think of God, better said, to think the way God thinks, brushing aside miracles and mysteries, as a consequence of ignorance. Immanent or transcendent, God is for both of them the object of their search and the way to salvation. Despite his conflict with the established religion, it would be difficult to accuse Kierkegaard of atheism. Although he defends himself forcefully against this accusation, 10 Spinoza is still taken by many as a miscreant. 2. Kierkegaard, a reader of Spinoza In Kierkegaard s production, a few mentions of Spinoza can be found. In The Concept of Irony (1841) and in Either/Or (1843) Spinoza is referred to sporadically; in his Johannes Climacus or de omnibus dubitandum est, written in , he opens the text with a quotation from the Treatise of the Emendation of the Intellect, using Spinoza to distinguish between true doubt and doubt posited by sheer stubbornness (PF 13); in Philosophical Fragments, Spinoza is dealt with in a very long note in Chapter III; in The Concept of Anxiety (1844) and in Sickness unto Death (1849), he is summoned once more; in the journals and notebooks, the author of Ethics is occasionally brought out, to corroborate certain theses, or to signal disagreement with those same theses, due to the fact that he exemplifies an abstract philosophy where the individuals are lost in the Whole. Kierkegaard s considerations are brief, standing as scattered notes not aimed at a grounded approach. They nonetheless demonstrate a sense of opportunity, showing Kierkegaard s knowledge and respect for Spinoza s thought, despite the fact that he distances himself from Spinoza. For the author of Fragments, Spinoza stands for rationalist and objective philosophy, controlled by scientific preoccupations, and in full possession of an unblemished logic: But of what use is science and scholarship? None, none at all! It relaxes everything in calm, objective observation and thus freedom becomes an unaccountable something. From a scientific -scholarly point of view Spinoza is and remains the only consistent one. 11 Kierkegaard s interest in the author of Ethics dates back to 1841, when he attended Schelling s lectures in Berlin and became acquainted with the Jewish philosopher; this mediated approach by a third party was the first step to a deeper knowledge. According to the journals, by 1846 he had read the complete Ethics: I have now read through Spinoza s Ethics. 12 The Danish thinker was always critical of speculative thinking and he takes Spinoza as one of its genuine representatives. 10 See chiefly letters XXX to Oldenburg and XLII to Jacob Ostens. 11 NB 15:93, Pap. X2 A 428; Søren Kierkegaard s Journals and Papers, F -K, vol. 2, ed. and transl. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, assisted by Gregor Malantschuk, Bloomington, London: Indiana University Press, 1970, p Pap. VII 1 A 35; JJ:443, SKS 18, p. 289; Kierkegaard s Journals and Notebooks, Vol. 2, Journals ee -KK, ed. by M. J. Cappelørn, A. Hannay, D. Kangas, B. H. Kirmmse, V. Rumble, K. Brian Söderquist and G. Pattison (vol. Editor), Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008, pp Hereafter, referred to as KJN 2.

175 The via perardua Salvation in Spinoza and Kierkegaard 175 But he acknowledges the punctual pertinence of some of Spinoza s theses, among them the criticism of the dilettantish doubt of the skeptics, a mockery of the true doubt cultivated by Kierkegaard, in its existential side. In a similar way, he uses Spinoza to attack Hegel and his systematic philosophy. Spinoza also appears as a precursor of Hegelianism and is cited as an antidote to Kierkegaardian theses, thus reinstating a contrario the understanding of such theses. This is the case of Kierkegaard s unconditional acceptance of miracles, since they corroborate his religious vision of the world, consentaneous with the intrusion of the supernatural. According to the naturalist and rationalist view of the Jewish philosopher, accepting miracles is typical of the ignorant and the superstitious, and as such, it is often deconstructed, and denounced in detail in chapter VI of the Theological Political Treatise. Kierkegaard s mention of Spinoza s treatise concerns a passage of chapter I, thus commented in his 1843 journal: It is strange that, against miracles, revelation, etc., Spinoza constantly uses the objection that it was a peculiarity of the Jews to refer something immediately back to God and jump over the intermediate causes, just as if it were merely a peculiarity of the Jews and not of all religiousness, so that Spinoza himself would have done so if he, too, had had religiousness, and as if the difficulty did not lie just here: whether, how far, in what way in short, inquiries which would give the keenest thinking plenty to do. 13 Spinoza is also mentioned when, in Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard distinguishes between ideality and actuality. Following Aristotle, Kierkegaard defends the transition from potency to action, defining movement by means of that transition, in contrast with the Spinozistic point of view, where it is the very essence of things that is dynamic, demanding a constant transformation, a process similar to divine potency (potentia). Pantheism is also one of the themes that Kierkegaard is concerned with. Although not explicitly mentioned, it is Spinoza who is at stake in this excerpt of the journals: According to the teaching of Xnty [Christianity] man is not to merge into God through a pantheistic fading away, or into the divine ocean through the blotting out of all individual characteristics, but in an intensified consciousness (20 Aug. 38). 14 Blessedness was an issue which interested both philosophers. For Spinoza, the issue is the guiding point of human life, taken as the highest concretization of the wish that lies in our essence and pushes us forward. When we progress in the knowledge of one s self, we understand how we are part of, or an expression of, a vaster Being, within which we move. 15 The conquest of happiness is exclusively due to human effort that increasingly moves on, regardless of the concepts of anxiety and sin. For Kierkegaard, beatitude is attained once we live Christianity in full, and this is not a complete individual effort, indebted as it is to divine revelation and 13 Pap. IV A 190; JJ:192, SKS 18, p. 20; KJN 2, p Pap. II A 248; DD:131, SKS 17, p. 259; Kierkegaard s Journals and Notebooks, Vol. 1, Journals aa -DD, ed. by M. J. Cappelørn, A. Hannay, D. Kangas, B. H. Kirmmse, V. Rumble, K. Brian Söderquist, Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007, p It is significant that the cover of the first edition of the Theological Political Treatise bears a citation from the Gospel of John, I, 4, 13: Per hoc cognoscimus quod in Deo manemus, et Deus manet in nobis, quod de Spiritu suo dedit nobis. (TTP, G. III, p. 3)

176 176 Maria Luísa Ribeiro Ferreira mercy. But in both Kierkegaard and Spinoza, the utmost beatitude is identified with attaining truth, and, as we shall see, this is what salvation is about. 3. The pertinence of a question in Philosophical Fragments Since an exhaustive analysis of all the citations of Spinoza in Kierkegaard s oeuvre is not feasible on this occasion, we develop the one that seems to us more pertinent, namely the long note in chapter III of Philosophical Fragments, The Absolute Paradox. The central character in the book is the narrator, Climacus, who evaluates the Socratic perspective of truth and puts forward an alternative view to reach truth, with faith taking the major role, regardless of the need for demonstrating proofs. As the main thesis, the chapter develops the idea that every human being is faced with the experience of contradiction or paradox: one feels attracted by something that one does not know, but at the same time one verifies that the unknown cannot be reached on a merely rational level. What is at stake is to turn oneself to the god, as Kierkegaard says; without God s help one cannot overcome the dilemmatic situation: either renouncing to reason, or giving up one s deepest aspirations. Because man is a limited being, neither can he reach God by himself, nor can he make an idea of God, and what is even less, he cannot prove God s existence; on the way to God there are no arguments, and the proofs are absurd. To Kierkegaard, there is no point in drawing conclusions about the existence of something or someone in view of the actions, since when talking about actions one assumes beforehand that an existent reality is being referred to; and for Kierkegaard, Spinoza is a thinker who understands God in Himself, not needing to attend to God s actions. This is how Kierkegaard actually posits his thought: I do not demonstrate it from the works ( ) but only develop the ideality I have presupposed. (PF 42) Spinoza s Ethics begins with an unconditional adhesion to God, justifying God in Himself, and in all the things that express Him. In Spinoza, existence is the point of departure; it is the first step, an indisputable fact that does not require demonstration. Kierkegaard identifies himself with the Spinozistic thesis of a being whose essentia involvit exitentiam. (PF 41) For the Danish thinker, the Jewish philosopher does not separate God from His actions, God is a being whose essence is to exist, because in Spinoza s God, existence is not a quality, but an essential and indispensable category to think of God. 16 Kierkegaard does not cite the initial definitions of God contained in the Ethics, namely the ones related to Causa sui, Substance and God; yet, he must have them in mind. He also recalls (and explicitly refers to) a passage from Principa philosophiae cartesianae, 17 where it is stated that the perfection of things depends on their respective degree of being. Now, Kierkegaard contests the existence of degrees of being in things; for him, a fly or God are both holders of being. And he uses Hamlet s famous 16 Note that the Spinozistic God is identified with nature; it should always be present that this God sive Natura is very different from the Jewish -christian divinity. 17 Principa philosophiae cartesianae, Pars I, prop. VII, I, G.I, p. 41.

177 The via perardua Salvation in Spinoza and Kierkegaard 177 to be or not to be in order to sustain the absolute difference between what exists and what does not exist all that exists shares the being in an equal way. This is exactly the point where the seeming harmony with Spinoza fades away. Kierkegaard accuses Spinoza of putting a tautological reasoning in practice, since right from the start he assumes the principle that the more perfect, the more being; he is not concerned with proving the existence of that being, better said, he unquestionably accepts the existence of it. His criticism is also targeted at the use of an obscure language that omits the relations of God with the real. The imprecision of Spinozistic language would then result from confusion between essence and existence, because, in what concerns God, for Spinoza the two terms are permutable. In an entry from the Journals on this same issue, Kierkegaard claims that, although Spinoza shows progress in relation to the theses of Anselm and Descartes, he still combines the two lines of argumentation the one that serves the facts and the one that stands in the level of ideas, and this always implies a shift when it comes to passing from essence to existence. 18 Spinoza is not concerned about this hiatus, and he actually sees no problem in it; however, Kierkegaard underscores this hiatus, as a signal of our impossibility to explain God by setting up bridges between God and ourselves. The end of the note shows evidence of this difficulty, an insurmountable one for the author of Philosophical Fragments: the difficulty is to grasp factual being and to bring God s ideality into factual being. (PF 42) I am not sure if Kierkegaard s criticism of Spinoza is totally fair regarding this topic. I think that part of his criticism is due to the different framing of conceptual paradigms in each of the authors. The Danish philosopher takes God as the supreme paradox, and the fact that we cannot justify his existence has to do with the unknown, the unknown that human intelligence has to challenge, involved as it is in finitude and sin. God is wholly the Other, and man can only reach God by faith. The way to God does not imply science; it requires a vital adhesion. Spinoza explains God with the clarity and objectivity of a geometer, and uses a deductive method to present God, as if it were a question of lines, planes and bodies. 19 And of special notice is the fact that, despite placing God among the founding definitions of his Ethics, Spinoza does not restrain himself from presenting proofs of God s existence by means of an argumentative reasoning aimed at persuasion (Et.I, prop. XI dem. I and II). To grasp Kierkegaard s criticism better, one should keep in mind that he does not focus on how Spinoza takes the statute of ideality into consideration. To the author of Ethics, ideas, like bodies, have a real existence; they come out as expressions of thought as attributes, taking place side by side with the manifestations of the corporeal modes. Thought and extension, the two attributes of God/Substance that we are allowed to know, are also recipients of reality; neither of them is ideal in the common use of the term. On denying the possible, by determining the absurd of their existence, Spinoza, 18 This is the Spinozistic improvement of the Anselmian -cartesian idea, which no doubt profoundly, but nevertheless deceptively, permits a shift by suddenly switching from a factual line of demonstration to an ideal one. Draft cited in Selected Entries from Kierkegaard s Journals and Papers pertaining to Philosophical Fragments. (PF 190) 19 ( ) ac si quaestio de lineis, planis aut de corporibus esset. Et.III, praef., G. II, p. 138.

178 178 Maria Luísa Ribeiro Ferreira just like Hegel will later claim, concedes to ideas the dimension of actuality; for him, ideality is a mode of thought and this is an attribute of Substance, as real as existence. Kierkegaard concludes by stating that Spinoza is obscure when he speaks of the divine Being, and fails to sound convincing in what concerns the passage of essence to existence. Kierkegaard s objections result from his concern in contrasting divine transcendence and human finitude; yet, when he recalls Spinoza, he puts a finger on the core of a difficulty faced by the reader of Ethics: the statute of the initial definitions. The eight definitions that open Book I immediately posit questions such as these: what meaning should we give them? what lies behind them? should we accept these definitions as axioms? or rather as eternal truths that the author reached after taking a long strenuous intellectual route? in that case, for what reason does the philosopher force us to accept something that he does not demonstrate? would it be that he considers these definitions to be self -evident? Kierkegaard grasps the underlying difficulty in Spinoza on the passage from essence to existence; the doubts Kierkegaard posits show pertinence and are shared by many interpreters of the Ethics. To be able to answer them, one should follow the course of the complete work, coming to understand that the beginning of Ethics is made to be dependent on the end, and that Book I gains another meaning once Book V is read attentively, since this is the book where the author deals with the notions of intuitive science and intellectual love of God. I think that the initial definitions can only be accounted for once we understand them as the peak of a process that led the author to the knowing of God (considered by Spinoza to be desirable and possible), and as an invitation to our own endeavor. The Jewish philosopher has undoubtedly taken that via perardua (Et.V, prop XLII, schol.) and as a result, he manages to speak to us about God with the security of a geometer; as if he knew Him, and could explain Him, and this is definitely what Kierkegaard challenges. 4. The different experience of salvation For thou hast created us for thyself, and our heart cannot be quieted till it may find repose in thee. Augustine, Confessions (I, I, 1) 20 This excerpt is not aimed at bringing Spinoza and Kierkegaard closer to Augustine s God, but instead, to emphasize human restlessness, which is present in Augustine and central to the thought of both modern philosophers. In truth, they both highly value the relation to God, and they build their way to God on salvation, although in different modes. In Spinoza, salvation is the highest point of an effort that is feasible, despite its hardship. To the author of Ethics, salvation is a path that directs us to ourselves, and at the same time to God and things, allowing us to reach supreme happiness. At the end of Ethics, (Et V, prop. XLII, schol.) this state of supreme happiness is 20 fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te. St Augustine s Confessions (Loeb), trans. by William Watts, London: W. Heinemann; New York: The MacMillan Co., 1912, pp. 2-3.

179 The via perardua Salvation in Spinoza and Kierkegaard 179 made to be coincident with the highest level of knowledge, where we see the things in God. It is a path of self -discovery where knowing operates a metamorphosis in our ideas, transforming them because it understands them from confused to adequate ones. It is a difficult path; all are invited to follow it, but only a few are successful. The concluding scholium in the Ethics is clear: Of course what is found so rarely must be hard. 21 Only the wise man is capable of reaching blessedness, the highest degree of contentment that man aspires to. Spinoza identifies salvation, blessedness and freedom, using the term glory, in order to describe more accurately this animic state. (Et.V, prop. XXXVI, schol.) Blessedness is the consequence of our vision of the things in God, that is, of abandoning the cognitive perspective that places them in time, by taking them now under a species of eternity (sub specie aeternitatis). We save ourselves when we reach this threshold, where we are entitled to a full living experience of the love of God (idem). And this is what liberates us from the fear of death and the rule of the passions, (Et. V, prop. XXXVIII) giving us back the statute of eternal modes of thought, constitutive of the eternal and infinite intellect of God. 22 In Kierkegaard, salvation emerges as an anguished experience whose success outdoes human initiative (dependent as it is on divine revelation) and demands the presence of a Teacher. Despite the admiration that the philosopher devotes to the pedagogical ability of Socrates, he believes it to be insufficient, since in order that salvation takes place, one has first to acknowledge one s own condition as a sinner, something that no human teacher can reveal. Only the divine Teacher is able to awaken us, making us recognize the truth that lies within us, the truth that we aspire to. (PF 14) Kierkegaard does not overestimate knowledge. He supports a personalized truth, a subjective and existential truth, an interior truth that is reached at the expense of sacrifice. In contrast with Spinoza, for whom salvation demands a surplus of rationality, for the Danish philosopher, the revelation of the Absolute that saves us implies the suspension of understanding and the reference to a personal being that redeems us. Hence the importance of God made man, the supreme paradox where the eternal crosses time and the transcendent incarnates in the human. God is made the equal of the last of men, and just like the last of men, he undergoes suffering. (32-33) The absurd idea of a suffering God, in need of men, is abhorrent to Kierkegaard, disturbing him incessantly. (id. 35) To Kierkegaard, salvation implies an individual, and individualized confrontation with Christ as a person, as the God that took human form. In this process, faith is indispensable; it is not an act of will, it is something that God gratuitously concedes. Kierkegaard considers faith to be a miracle that 21 Et sane arduum debet esse, quod adeo raro reperitur. Et.V, prop. XLII, schol., G. II, p ( ) ex quibus ( ) apparet, quod Mens nostra, quatenus intelliget, aeternus cogitandi modus sit, qui alio aeterno cogitandi modo determinatur, et hic iterum ab alio, et sic in infinitum; ita ut omnes simul Dei aeternum et infinitum intellectum constituant. Et. V, prop. XL, scol., G. II, p. 306.

180 180 Maria Luísa Ribeiro Ferreira opens our eyes by divine action. To men, the master reveals the understanding of the eternity that is present in the moment. This is the fullness of time. Both Spinoza and Kierkegaard place salvation in time, associating salvation to their practice of living, and therefore, to ethics. Ethics takes place in time and demands a relation to God. Spinoza s philosophy, as metaphysics, has a theoretical dimension, but cannot do without a practice of living. This is expressed in one of his very first writings, when he states very clearly his wish of reaching ( ) the eternal fruition of a supreme and continuous joy. 23 In his Ethics, he draws a course that leads to God, where the joyful passions play a dynamic role, since joy accompanies everything that grows; joy increases the virtuality of our essence, and it makes the striving (conatus) that lives in each and every man progressively coincide with the divine strength (potentia), of which we are a manifestation. The metaphysics that Spinoza develops in his Ethics is made to be at the service of praxis; a therapy of passions becomes explicit, and far from casting a negative eye on passions, this therapy invests in them, brushing aside the harmful ones and cultivating the ones that may be of help, on the way to knowledge and the love of God. This is the task that the philosopher proposes to each and every man, although the majority spurns the challenge: We feel and know by experience that we are eternal this is what he tells us at the end of Book V, in Ethics. 24 This feeling is the immediate knowledge resulting from an itinerary that includes life and thought. The salvation Kierkegaard speaks about is far from being peaceful, since it is brought about by the painful process of living through spirituality. Spirituality is always accompanied by the awareness of the fact that it is impossible for us to know God, that there are insurmountable obstacles in the questions that devastate us, that we are attracted towards what we ourselves know we will never be able to reach. Death, anxiety, despair are constant presences that the philosopher strengthens, instead of combating. Eternal life faces him as the goal of an ethical life. This corresponds to a new human dimension where the help of the divine Teacher becomes indispensable, (PF 18) although it shall never be reached by man if he relies only on himself. Augustine s restlessness cited at the beginning of this section, is definitely outdone by Spinoza when we reach intuitive science, i.e., the knowledge that saves us. However, Augustine s restlessness persists in Kierkegaard, and in his quest for the truth that may save us is a dramatic endeavor, shadowed by doubt, and nurtured by a feeling of guilt that never allows us to be totally happy. 23 ( ) continua, ac summa in aeternum fruerer laetitia, TIE, G. II, p ( ) sentimus experimurque, nos aeternos esse. Et.V, prop. XXIII, schol., G. II, pp

181 Resumos em Português Laura Llevadot Junto de um túmulo: Ética e Ontologia O título do ensaio tematiza as relações entre Kierkegaard e Heidegger sobre a questão da morte, em especial a questão da «morte de cada um». Michael Theunissen (2006) salienta que muitos aspectos da análise existencial da morte concretizada por Heidegger em Ser e Tempo parecem basear -se na meditação levada a cabo sobre a morte por Kierkegaard no discurso Junto de um túmulo, no qual o filósofo não tem em conta «a morte do outro», insistindo, tal como Heidegger, na necessidade de pensar a sua própria morte. Analisa -se neste ensaio a ligação entre o ético e o ontológico, entre o edificante e o filosófico, produzida pela apropriação heideggeriana do tratamento temático kierkegaardiano. O principal objectivo do ensaio é a reconsideração da relação entre o edificante e o ontológico a partir de uma leitura paralela dos dois textos. Não se trata porém de defender um contra o outro, mas antes da tentativa de clarificar qual viria a ser o papel do edificante no pensamento pós -metafísico, presumindo de que o desempenho desse papel se verifica. O primeiro passo consiste numa breve análise das semelhanças no tratamento do assunto no discurso de Kierkegaard e no primeiro capítulo da segunda secção de Ser e Tempo; «O possível ser -um-todo do Dasein e o Ser -para-a-morte». Em seguida, estabelece -se uma definição do edificante de modo a que seja possível compreender a diferença entre Kierkegaard e Heidegger no que diz respeito à meditação que oferecem sobre a morte. Por fim, demonstra -se que a diferença entre o ontológico em Heidegger e o edificante em Kierkegaard não reside no facto de no primeiro não se encontrarem considerações éticas, mas antes nas respectivas posições face ao conhecimento. Darío González A Paciência enquanto temporalidade da vida interior nos Discursos Edificantes de Kierkegaard Nos últimos discursos edificantes de 1843 e nos primeiros de 1844, Kierkegaard observa e comenta os temas da «paciência» e da «expectativa», com o objectivo de esclarecer a relação complexa entre o eu, por um lado, com o temporal, e por outro, com o eterno. Tendo por fundo a «auto-contradição» em que a alma se ganha e se conserva, o autor dos Discursos tenta descrever a constituição histórica do eu como uma «vida» concreta que é continuamente confrontada pela possibilidade de uma transformação radical. O ensaio explora as ligações temáticas e estruturais entre a caracterização da alma e a teoria da temporalidade desenvolvidas em O Conceito de Angústia. Entre outras semelhanças, torna -se óbvio que a noção filosófica de repetição, evocada na introdução ao tratado sobre a angústia, antecipa o tratamento da noção bíblica de paciência presente nos Discursos. Com efeito, a repetição tem um papel decisivo nos Discursos Edificantes,

182 182 Resumos em Português não apenas como conceito, mas também como figura retórica, em particular nos passos em que se descreve a virtude da paciência. O desenvolvimento deste motivo leva o autor a concluir que a «segunda ética», anunciada em O Conceito de Angústia, está fundamentalmente associada a uma determinada fenomenologia da paciência. É nesta base que Kierkegaard consegue caracterizar a alma humana como uma relação tripartida, respectivamente, como uma relação consigo mesma, como uma relação com o mundo, e como uma relação com Deus. O círculo descrito por estes três elementos constitui a estrutura concreta da repetição e a experiência interior da temporalidade. Entre as consequências mais importantes desta estratégia, tenta -se no presente ensaio sublinhar a efectiva des -substancialização da alma e a desformalização paralela da noção de tempo que se encontra pressuposta na fenomenologia da paciência em Kierkegaard. Maria Leonor L. O. Xavier Providência: a fé do crente e a desconfiança do filósofo Combinam -se no ensaio duas motivações principais: o interesse intelectual pela especulação sobre a ideia de Deus, enquanto tema chave do pensamento ocidental, e a experiência espiritual de quem acredita, ou não acredita, na providência divina, de acordo com as religiões teístas. O objectivo principal é o de desenhar uma abordagem pessoal à questão da harmonia ou desarmonia entre uma ideia de Deus, aceite do ponto de vista filosófico, e a crença num Deus providente. Em primeiro lugar, estabelece -se uma relação de prioridades entre a questão da existência de Deus e a questão da providência divina, começando pela primeira. Um deus que preserva, à semelhança do que encontra em Ockham, como causa conservadora do seu efeito, tem de ser uno e eterno, e necessariamente providente. É esta ideia, filosoficamente defensável, que se toma como ponto de partida para questionar a providência divina: aplica -se a cada um dos indivíduos, ou ao mundo como um todo? A providência divina é um tipo particular, ou geral, de providência? Em geral, os crentes acreditam num tipo de providência particular, o que conduzirá ao segundo momento do ensaio, no qual se analisa esta crença dentro do caminho espiritual da fé. A crença na providência está directamente relacionada com a consciência da finitude e da incerteza da vida humana, e assegura bem -estar e satisfação de desejos terrenos, o que leva o crente a compreender a dimensão egoísta da sua própria crença. Como superação, o crente ora por si e também pelos outros e à mediada que a sua fé se purifica, aceita que se faça a vontade de Deus e prescinde de exprimir a sua própria vontade na oração. Esta é a fé que leva ao martírio, ao sacrifício, de si próprio e dos seus entes queridos, como Kierkegaard descreve no caminho de tribulação de Abraão, levando o filho Isaac para o holocausto. Este é um caminho de perfeição na fé, que se inicia na crença num deus providente, um caminho que abre de novo espaço para que a filosofia coloque novas questões. José Miranda Justo Da diferenciação dos tempos à «seriedade da existência». (Elementos do primeiro dos Três Discursos Edificantes de 1843 relevantes para a compreensão da categoria de «repetição».) É sabido que Kierkegaard quis evitar a confusão entre as obras trazidas a lume com a «mão esquerda» e as publicadas com a «mão direita». Não obstante, existe sempre a possibilidade de relacionar passagens dos discursos edificantes com problemas colocados nas obras escritas sob pseudónimo e publicadas em paralelo, e dessa forma intentar esclarecer esses problemas através desses mesmos passos, ou o processo contrário. Neste ensaio, o autor observa, num primeiro momento, como a complexa estrutura do tempo detectável no primeiro dos Três Discursos Edifi

183 Resumos em Português 183 cantes de 1843 apresenta aspectos subjacentes à categoria de repetição: nesse discurso, ao tempo rápido e breve da mera inteligência subordinada aos interesses imediatos contrapõe -se o tempo longo e lento da inteligência «amorosa», no qual pode detectar -se a eficácia da repetição. No segundo momento do ensaio, pretende -se construir um entendimento daquilo que o autor designa como uma constituição de sentido capaz de dar conta da ligação estabelecida entre o tempo lento da repetição em Kierkegaard e o conceito de significado (ou sentido), sendo esse entendimento construído através da oposição simultânea entre a categoria do singular e as categorias do geral e do particular. Na última parte do ensaio, aborda -se a questão da relação, por um lado, entre o significado e a repetição, e por outro, entre os tópicos da «vida» e da «seriedade na existência», tal como são elaborados por Costantin Constantius nas suas reflexões teóricas sobre o conceito de repetição. Elisabete M. de Sousa Falar em termos humanos Após uma panorâmica geral sobre o teor das considerações tecidas por Harold Bloom acerca da questão da genialidade de Kierkegaard, bem como acerca da posteridade do filósofo dinamarquês em relação à crítica da religiosidade, considerações que contemplam Kierkegaard como pensador especulativo e como poeta, o ensaio apresenta uma síntese das implicações de uma observação de Bloom sobre o papel decisivo das «realidades aparentes» em diferentes obras de Kierkegaard, realçando -se as referências bloomianas de variado ênfase à questão do génio e do apóstolo, e apontando também para aquilo que Bloom retira de Kierkegaard para a sua própria teoria literária, e para a sua prática enquanto crítico do pensamento ocidental. Em seguida, a criação de realidades aparentes é ilustrada em três situações. Na primeira, comentam -se algumas conotações do uso do termo e do conceito de génio por Kierkegaard, de modo a enquadrar o impacto do atributo de «trovoada», com que o filósofo se refere a génio em O Instante. Na segunda situação, analisam- se os seis prefácios dos volumes de Discursos Edificantes de 1843 e 1844, a partir da relação neles estabelecida entre o autor, o livro e o leitor, cujos planos acabam por ver os seus contornos sucessivamente alterados e alternados, de modo a que no sexto prefácio o leitor, como indivíduo singular possa surgir em lugar iminente, e o livro possa adquirir o estatuto de edificante. As conclusões desse comentário são igualmente vistas de acordo com a reiterada falta de autoridade do autor em todos esses prefácios. Por fim, o processo de criação de realidades aparentes é analisado através dos planos criados pelo uso de expressões como «falar/pensar/reflectir humanamente», em exemplos retirados de A Repetição, Temor e Tremor, e Discursos Edificantes. Carlos João Correia Lançamento das traduções portuguesas A Repetição e Temor e Tremor Comunicação proferida por ocasião da Conferência de 30 de Abril de 2010, assinalando o lançamento das duas primeiras traduções no âmbito do Projecto do Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, centrado na tradução de Obras de Kierkegaard. Nesse sentido, contém considerações vários respeitantes ao mérito das respectivas traduções (A Repetição por José Miranda Justo e Temor e Tremor por Elisabete M. de Sousa), à relevância científica do projecto, e à oportuna confluência deste lançamento com o início de um ciclo de conferências versando sobre as obras de tradução já realizada e/ou em curso.

184 184 Resumos em Português Arne Grøn Tempo, coragem e ipseidade: reflexões sobre o discurso de Kierkegaard «Preservar a alma com paciência» Partindo das considerações de Heidegger de que o conteúdo filosófico do pensamento de Kierkegaard seria mais visível nos Discursos Edificantes de Kierkegaard do que nas suas obras teóricas, o ensaio centra -se na análise da validade dessa afirmação. À partida, admite -se que uma tal ligação é possível e verificável no tópico da subjectividade presente nas duas dimensões das obras de Kierkegaard, já que para o autor do ensaio, as dificuldades que encontramos ao tentar compreender a subjectividade implícita na edificação lançam como desafio uma explanação filosófica da subjectividade humana. O problema prende -se com a dificuldade de comunicar interiormente, e com a de estabelecer uma «dialéctica da visão» correcta entre o que edifica e o que é edificado. A edificação tem pois de pressupor uma certa forma de falha, um ponto crítico, uma forma de desespero, a qual será suprimida através da edificação. Porém, a edificação mostra -nos que, porque edifica, nos envolvemos numa acção singularmente subjectiva: mais do que edificarmos o outro, edificamo -nos a nós próprios encetamos connosco um diálogo, observamo -nos, interpelamo -nos, confortamo -nos. Assim, os discursos edificantes de Kierkegaard não se deixam descrever simplesmente como sendo de natureza monológica ou dialógica, pelo contrário, são universais, visto tratarem de questões que não apenas colocamos como seres humanos, mas que colocamos a nós próprios enquanto seres humanos. Enveredamos então por uma forma diferente de protecção ou de preservação (tendo o autor em mente a ideia kierkegaardiana de «preservar a alma») contra o perigo de perder a alma, e pela aceitação de uma vida dominada pela recorrência do duplo movimento de espera e de temor desse processo. Neste processo, o autor demonstra (1) que a paciência é essa possibilidade exacta e radical, inerente à ipseidade; ganhar -se e perder -se no tempo, como relação do eu no tempo, ou como modos de relacionamento com o tempo; (2) que a coragem e a preocupação constituem por seu lado os movimentos da expectativa deste fenómeno no nosso próprio eu, residindo aqui o edificante enquanto tal. Claudia Welz A perfeição humana: a auto superação O ensaio problematiza a normatividade da ipseidade humana, a partir dos Quatro Discursos Edificantes de 1844 de Kierkegaard. Os discursos possuem evidentes interligações e partilham pelo menos um motivo: a perfeição humana versus a auto -ilusão. A noção de perfeição está ligada à capacidade de auto -superação numa luta interior que pressupõe que o indivíduo se distancie das possibilidades negativas que lhe são inerentes. A análise processa -se em quatro etapas. (1) O discurso «Necessitar de Deus é a mais elevada perfeição do ser humano», que versa a problemática manifesta ao superar -se uma presunção auto -enganadora através de uma auto -aniquilação, é confrontado com a descrição da liberdade humana por Heidegger. (2) O discurso «O espinho na carne» trata da superação da dependência do indivíduo com a ajuda da esperança; uma vez lido tendo em conta a teologia da Reforma, fica claro como Kierkegaard se apoia na dialéctica da actividade e da inactividade. (3) O discurso «Contra a cobardia», cuja temática é a luta contra o orgulho e a ilusão do retrocesso, sublinha o papel da determinação como caminho para a perfeição; aborda -se ainda o modo como o ponto de vista de Kierkegaard sobre o egoísmo e o altruísmo, o amor a si próprio e o ódio a si próprio, é posto em causa por Simone Weil. (4) O discurso «Aquele que reza bem luta na oração e sai vitorioso é nisso que Deus sai vitorioso» esclarece um problema metodológico: o que poderá servir de critério para uma auto -avaliação, se o entendimento que se tem de si próprio é constantemente ameaçado porque nos enganamos a nós próprios?

185 Resumos em Português 185 Richard Purkarthofer Estar presente a si próprio: alguns comentários sobre o papel da imagética óptica e acústica nos Discursos Edificantes de Kierkegaard. O ensaio aborda questões de estilo, de estrutura e de imagética, relevantes para o conteúdo filosófico dos discursos edificantes de Kierkegaard de 1843 e Esses aspectos são comparados e contrastados com ocorrências em discursos posteriores. A análise destaca a centralidade do tratamento do tempo e da temporalidade para o desempenho das metáforas ópticas e acústicas na descrição kierkegaardiana da constituição do ser humano. Demonstra -se como progressivamente as metáforas visuais cedem terreno às acústicas, e explica -se a implicação deste processo para a interpretação do conteúdo filosófico dos discursos. O ensaio começa analisando, o diálogo estabelecido por Kierkegaard com Aristóteles, Agostinho, e Espinosa, através das mudanças detectadas no uso das metáforas em estudo. Especial atenção e desenvolvimento são dados à expressão at være sig selv nærværende (estar presente a si próprio), enquanto fórmula que reúne o que Kierkegaard assume como at være sig selv (ser-se em si próprio) e at bevare sig selv (conservar-se a si próprio), e enquanto conceito fundamental para o pensamento ontológico e antropológico do autor. José Miranda Justo Determinações temporais em Migalhas Filosóficas Partindo da demonstração levada a cabo no ensaio anterior, o autor re -introduz uma distinção entre duas modalidades do tempo que é correlativa de uma crítica do alcance do entendimento e crucial para a determinação da categoria de repetição, bem como para uma caracterização dos processos de constituição de sentido: por um lado, um tempo rápido, acelerado, que nos deixa no plano de um entendimento deficitário, que é também o plano da multiplicidade, e, por outro lado, um tempo lento, distendido, propício à experiência da singularidade e da constituição de um sentido novo. O tempo lento identifica -se com o «amor» e a sua eficácia é a de um pathos que abre a possibilidade de um poiein insuspeitado do ponto de vista do entendimento. Essa distinção está presente nas Migalhas Filosóficas, embora de um modo não totalmente idêntico, pelo próprio objectivo do texto, e pelo estilo do pensar de Climacus. O objectivo central das Migalhas Filosóficas passa por excluir a possibilidade de encontrar uma mediação racional para o sentido da incarnação, e esse objectivo envolve primordialmente a categoria de «paradoxo», enquanto paradoxo resultante de no mesmo instante se pensar o que é histórico e o que é eterno no advento do deus -homem. Porém, o paradoxo é pensado simultaneamente como pathos suspensivo das possibilidades do mero entendimento e como determinante da abertura à categoria de «instante» e àquilo que ela tem de eminentemente criativo, superando -se assim também a separação entre sujeito e objecto por via da constituição daquilo que o autor do ensaio designa por devir -sujeito. Num segundo momento, é posto em evidência como o «vir à existência» do eterno é uma questão que diz respeito à «consciência» da eternidade, devendo como tal ser visto igualmente como um devir -eterno. Como diz Climacus: «o paradoxo une especificamente os contraditórios, é a eternização do histórico e a historicização do eterno.» Este problema desemboca finalmente na consideração da fé como «acto de liberdade» e na relação entre essa liberdade e a liberdade do «vir à existência», sendo que tal relação se estabelece para a consciência necessariamente na dependência do tempo.

186 186 Resumos em Português Poetas como discípulos de segunda mão Elisabete M. de Sousa Entre os pensadores e filósofos mais frequentemente evocados por Harold Bloom, Kierkegaard figura em posição de relevo, quer no que diz respeito aos comentários directos de Bloom ao pensamento do filósofo dinamarquês, quer na utilização de conceitos e categorias kierkegaardianas para a construção da própria teoria da influência. Na presente comunicação apresenta -se uma das passagens e dos conceitos extraídos por Bloom de Migalhas Filosóficas, tanto aqueles relativamente aos quais o crítico e teórico norte -americano admite ser devedor de Johannes Climacus, como outros que, embora desempenhando um papel operativo no pensamento de Bloom (em particular, em The Anxiety of Influence e em A Map of Misreading) não são por ele explicitamente reconhecidos como sendo daí retirados. No caso de Kierkegaard, a par de Migalhas Filosóficas de Johannes Climacus, analisa -se também matéria relevante em A Repetição de Constantin Constantius. É dado maior destaque aos aspectos que aproximam a teoria de influência poética a Migalhas Filosóficas, com maior incidência nos capítulos «O deus como mestre e salvador» e «O discípulo de segunda mão», a par da tripla pergunta da página de rosto de Migalhas Filosóficas. A aproximação de Bloom a Kierkegaard é comentada, em especial, no contexto da cena de instrução poética e a relação entre eternidade e inscrição histórica. Na descrição dos rácios bloomianos, comenta -se a presença da categoria de repetição e, na parte conclusiva do ensaio, o modo como esta categoria, tal como é entendida por Bloom, abre espaço para que o papel criativo gerado pelo «instante» (de acordo com a definição enunciada em Migalhas Filosóficas) surja com idêntica relevância, senão mesmo maior, face às considerações sobre o histórico que Bloom herda de Climacus. M. Jamie Ferreira Migalhas Filosóficas em perspectiva O ensaio inicia -se com uma imagem de conjunto do livro que nos habituámos a conhecer pela designação de Smuler, Fragments, Crumbs e, agora, Migalhas; em seguida, propõe -se um nível de consideração mais específico organizado em quatro perspectivas. No nível geral, considera -se o papel desempenhado por Migalhas Filosóficas dentro da obra de Kierkegaard enquanto proposta para estabelecer um contraste entre dois tipos de religiosidade; as várias questões levantadas prendem -se com o modo segundo o qual os dois géneros de religiosidade são postos em contraste enquanto alternativas, alternativas preferidas e alternativas exaustivas. No nível mais específico, considera -se as Migalhas Filosóficas como uma exploração pormenorizada de um desses dois géneros de religiosidade, a saber, enquanto religião transcendente revelada, concentrando -se a atenção da autora em quatro perspectivas diferentes (mas inter -relacionadas) incidindo sobre a religião revelada: (1) a revelação enquanto Amor; (2) a revelação enquanto Verdade; (3) a revelação enquanto Salto/Paixão/Dádiva; e (4) a revelação na sua relação com a subjectividade socrática. Em cada uma das quatro perspectivas a autora observa tanto (a) a forma da revelação externa, como (b) o carácter da resposta da «fé» à revelação. Após uma análise pormenorizada das implicações hermenêuticas deste tipo de abordagem, por um lado, na orgânica de Migalhas Filosóficas, e por outro, globalmente na produção kierkegaardiana, uma análise que tem em conta as quatro perspectivas acima designadas, o ensaio termina com a sugestão de que Migalhas Filosóficas constitui um óptimo exemplo da centralidade do conceito de «tensão» no conjunto da obra de Kierkegaard; retomando ainda as quatro perspectivas consideradas, é a tensão analisada em quatro vectores: (1) a tensão entre o amor e o escândalo, (2) a tensão contida na suspensão do entendimento, sem que haja lugar à respectiva aniquilação, (3) tensão entre a acção divina e a acção humana, e (3) a tensão contida na relação entre uma religião racionalizada e uma religião revelada.

187 Resumos em Português 187 Kierkegaard, Migalhas Filosóficas, e a Teoria Crítica Marcia Morgan Kierkegaard concebeu Migalhas Filosóficas como antídoto para o grandioso sistema filosófico que emerge dos escritos de Hegel. Em vez de um argumento abrangente, Kierkegaard oferece- nos pedaços de conhecimento as suas «migalhas filosóficas», os quais, não obstante, actuam de maneira bem mais contundente no que diz respeito à subjectividade do que qualquer grande narrativa metafísica poderia alcançar. Discutem -se neste ensaio várias intersecções decorrentes dessas migalhas de filosofia de modo a poder produzir -se uma descrição consistente da subjectividade kierkegaardiana. O objectivo traçado, a partir da análise das várias intersecções é, além disso, o de fazer valer a concepção do sujeito em Kierkegaard como um dos modelos mais viáveis de actividade sociopolítica para o século XXI, demonstrando desta forma a relevância actual de Kierkegaard para a teoria crítica da sociedade. Na primeira parte, analisam -se as intersecções entre Kierkegaard e a teoria crítica em geral através de uma panorâmica da recepção histórica de Kierkegaard pelos nomes maiores entre os pensadores da escola da teoria crítica. Comenta -se em seguida o contributo da recepção de Kierkegaard para um entendimento histórico mais abrangente do problemático lugar do filósofo dinamarquês dentro do pensamento político do século XX, tanto na Europa como nos Estados Unidos. Na segunda e na terceira partes do ensaio, estabelecem -se intersecções entre a primeira e a terceira gerações de representantes da teoria crítica em torno dos respectivos argumentos a favor e contra Kierkegaard, exemplificando com a obra de Theodor W. Adorno, e com a de Martin Matuštík, através da crítica que Adorno faz de Migalhas Filosóficas na sua «Habilitationsschrift», Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Aesthetischen (Kierkegaard: construção do estético) e através da teoria de Matustik sobre a subjectividade kierkegaardiana em Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, Postnational Identity, e Specters of Liberation, enquanto contra -argumento à crítica de Adorno. Após analisar o argumento de Adorno através do confronto com momentos chave de Migalhas Filosóficas, será exactamente o contrário do que é defendido por Adorno a vir a lume. Este argumento torna -se particularmente claro com base na teoria de Matuštík de uma «praxis existencial radical», por este atribuível sobretudo a Kierkegaard. Luísa Ribeiro Ferreira A via perardua: a salvação em Espinosa e Kierkegaard Uma primeira comparação entre Espinosa e Kierkegaard, no que diz respeito à procura de um modo de fazer filosofia que os leva a demarcarem -se dos respectivos contextos, é realizada através de duas sínteses do pensamento destes autores; destaca -se o papel de Hegel, como expoente máximo da filosofia racionalista iniciada por Espinosa, na definição do posicionamento do pensamento do filósofo dinamarquês; também são salientadas as diferenças de disposição (de carácter, e na natureza das respectivas obras) entre Espinosa e Kierkegaard, designadamente o optimismo do primeiro versus a angústia do segundo. Nesta primeira parte, definem -se ainda as posições dos dois filósofos em relação à transcendência e a Deus, abordando -se uma primeira vez, o tema da salvação nos dois autores. Na segunda secção do ensaio enumera -se as menções de Espinosa na obra de Kierkegaard, comentando -se em especial, as referências à Ética espinosiana, ao Tratado Político Filosófico e uma menção ao tema do panteísmo. A terceira secção analisa com maior pormenor a longa nota de autor incluída em Migalhas Filosóficas, na qual Climacus ataca a posição de Espinosa sobre a natureza da essência divina e a sua concepção sub specie aeternitatis. Na quarta e última secção do ensaio retoma -se o tema da salvação em ambos os autores, salientando -se, por um lado, as diferenças que existem no percurso que encetam rumo à bem -aventurança e à beatitude, e por outro, as implicações trazidas pelo modo como se colocam diante de Deus (e o papel da fé nesse posicionamento) para a concepção dessa via perardua para a salvação.

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189 Index A Abraham, 55f, 64, 74f, 78, 81ff; and Isaac, 55, 81f, 182. abstract thinking/thought, 23, 30, 133f, 171. abstraction, 31, 170. absurd (the), 39, 74, 152, 159, 178f. action(s), 31, 46, 52, 54, 58f, 81f, 108, 113, 118, 160, , 175f, 180; as existent reality, 176. activism, 164. activity, 62f, 67, 78, , 118, 120, 152f, 155; inactivity, 107f; divine vs. human, 152f, 155. actuality, 27f, 43, 46, 64, 78, 81, 136, 145, 171, 173, 175, 178, of another; and the ethical, 27; and ideality, 175f, 177f. Adam, 170f. admiration, 88, 99, 108, 179. Adorno, Theodor W., 158, , 187; Kierkegaard, Construction of the Aesthetic, ; objectless inwardness, 163f. aesthetic (the), 158, 160. aging, 47f, 70. ambiguity, 36-38, 47, 72, 113, 115. ambition, 64, 101. analogy, 41, 63f, 70f, 125, 150f. anamnesis, 62, 80, 134. anarchism (ethical), 164. Anselm, 177. anthropology, anthropological, 26, 32f, 35f, 38, 88, 117f, 124f, 128, 171. anxiety, 35-43, 48, 59, 67, 105, 140f, 143f, 146f, 170f, , 180; anxious, 90, 140, 145; anxiety and despair, 67, 180; The Concept of Anxiety, see S. A. Kierkegaard, Works; as freedom s possibility, 171; and guilt, 171; and hereditary sin, 59, 67, 170; of influence, see Bloom, Harold; and innocence, 37; moment of anxiety, 43; objective vs subjective, 171. apologetics, 52. apostle(s), 48f, 57, 68ff, 104f; and authority, 69. appropriation, 20, 29f, 32, 39, 48, 157, 165; misappropriation, 157. Aquinas, Thomas, 51. Aristotle, Aristotelianism, 51f, 118, 120f, 175. Armstrong, Karen, 81. art, 23, 45, 67, 73, 81, 124. association, 45, 48, 81, 164f. attitude, 58, 81f, 89, 109, 171f. Augustine, Augustinian, 93, 118, 124f, 178, 180. author/authorship, 49, 61, 67, 69, 71ff, 76, 78f, 117, 128, 139f, 142f, 149, 151f, 155, 161, 163, 171, 177f. authority, 26, 28f, 49, 61, 69, 72f, 76, 139, 158, dismissal of, 72. autobiography, 79, 143. awakening (the), 47. awareness, aware, 21, 43, 45, 53, 67, 69, 82, 91, 97f, 101f, 109, 111, 113, 119, 130, 154, 162, 170f, 180. B beatitude, 105, 176, 187. Beckett, Samuel, 68. becoming, 47, 49, 67-70, 73, 78, 95, 100, 102f, 106, 130, 133, 135f, , 151, 154, 166f. being, 19-27, 29-34, 37-40, 42-47, 53ff, 59, 69f, 74f, 77ff, 86ff, 92-97, , 106, 111f, 114, 117f, , 128f, 134, 136, 142, 144f, 147, 152, 154, 155, 157, 163f, 167, ; degrees of, 177; in things, 177. belief, 24, 33, 53f, 64, 67, 100, 137, 169, 173. believer, 38, 53ff, 127, 133; as subjective thinker, 128. Benjamin, Walter, 161f. betray oneself, betrayal, 29, 90f, 93f, 98. Bible, 35, 78; James, 48f, 69; Job, 49, 56, 64, 70, 78f, 81, 99; John, 45, 120, 175; Mark, 72, Paul, 38, 43, 57, 100, 104ff, 119, 123, 130f; Peter, 57. bird(s), 70f, 122ff, 129f.

190 190 Index Bloom, Harold, 67-70, , 183, 185f; anxiety of influence, , 186; on Kierkegaard s seeming realities, 68, 71, 74, 76. blessedness, 105, 175, 179. Boethius, 53. book (the), 48, 71ff, 122, 145. bourgeois, C Candaules, King of Sardis, 119, 130. care(s), 54, 102, 124. category(ies), 20, 26f, 33, 36, 44, 57-62, 64f, 73, 79, , 139, 145ff, 158, 164f, 176. causation, types of, 52. certainty, 24f, 53, 70f, 76, 89f, 92, 170f, 174. change, 61, 94ff, 103ff, 114f, 117, 119, 121, 124f, , 136f, 145, 151, 157, 163, 171. Chekhov, Anton, 68. choice, choose, 32, 44, 62-65, 82, 85, 132, 141, 166. Christ, 38, 68f, 120, 143f, 147, 163, 179. Christendom, 67f, 158. Christian, Christianity, 26-29, 32, 35, 51f, 67-70, 76, 82, 104, 119, 121, , , 144, 146, 154, 161, 172, 175f; attack on, 67f; becoming a, 67, 69, 144. consolation, 30, 79, 82. Church, 67, 80, 119, 172. coming into existence, 136ff, 145f. communication, 27ff, 67, 76ff, 86, 95, 118f, 128, 167; direct vs indirect, 29, 67, 76, 78, 86; existential, 128, 167; in the form of edification, 86, 95; subjective thinker s form of, 128. comparison, 38, 69, 73, 106, 113f; of divine and human greatness, 74. concern, 24, 26f, 47, 70, 85ff, 90-95, 96, 99, 133, , 158, 171, 178; and losing oneself, 92, 94, 96. condemn, condemnation, 24, 104, 110. confidence, 82, 101. confused, confusion, 21, 57, 91, 113, 121, 126f, 154, 171, 177. conscience, 53ff, 97f, 105, 107, 110, 114. consciousness, 21, 43, 46, 67, 78, 113f, , 146, 159, 175; eternal, , 146. contemporaneity, contemporary, 136, 139, , 167. contradiction, contradictory, 23, 35-38, 40f, 44, 48, 82, 136f, 153, 169, 176. courage, 85ff, 89ff, cowardliness, coward, 74, 105, 108ff, 112. Critical Theory, , crowd, 99, 162, 163. D danger, 87ff, of despair, 94, 96, 99; earthly vs eternal, 89-96, 99, 101, 108; of giving up oneself, 87, 96 94; in relation to time and the world, 93. Dawkins, Richard, 51. death, 19-27, 28-34, 47, 53f, 79, 88f, 92, 95, 98, 105, 110, 120, 124f, 134, 146, 179f; certainty and uncertainty of, 24f, 30, 53f, 89, 92; as detour to life, 88; dying, 19, 22ff, 26, 33, 38; earnest thought of, 21ff, 29f; moment of, 24, 54. deception, 21, 108f, 113f. decision, 24, 29, 34, 63ff, 81, 88f, 93, 101, 108, 113, 135, 166; delay in, 108; moment(s) of, 88f, 93. definition, 20, 24, 39, 49, 124f, 129, 142, 176ff. delusion, 101. demonism, 68. Dennett, Daniel, 51. Derrida, Jacques, 26, 31, 33, 139, 144. Descartes, René, 39, 173, 177. desire, desiring, 25, 28f, 37, 39f, 54, 58f, 62, 72, 80, 82, 89f, 107, 115, 118, 120, 133f, 140, 162. despair, 22, 67f, 86, 93-96, 99f, , 125, 163, 171, 180; and anxiety, 180; and forms of despair over oneself, 67, 110; and God, 100, 106, 108; and hope, 72, 86, ; and poet s existence, 68; and self, 67, 86, 94, 96, 99, 106; and sin, 67; and will, 110. despondency, despondent, 104ff, 108. destination, destiny, 51, 53f, 67, 102. dialectic(s), dialectical (the), 64, 78, 86, 112f, 136f, 143f, 147, 158f, dialogue, dialogical, 52, 61, 71, 82, 88, 115, 122, 127, , 160. Diderot, Dennis, 51.

191 Index 191 difference, 20-26, 28-30, 33f, 36, 39f, 42, 45-48, 59f, 62, 64, 69, 75, 79f, 89, 113, 118, , 128f, 136, 154f, 158, , 177. differenciation, differentiate, 20, 26, 30f, 52, 57, 75, 131, 134. dignity, 49, 55, 151. Diogenes, 78f. disciple(s), 69, 75, 78, 139, 141, 143ff, 147, 163; mode of repetition, 69, 144. discourse, type of, 26-31, 33f, 57, 72f, 76, 86-88, distance, distancing, 25-27, 56, 58, 68,71, 73f, 99, 109, 113, 126, 169, 171f, 174. distinction, 19-23, 25, 27f, 31, 38, 41, 45, 57f, 69, 81, 112, 131, 133f, 152f, 155, 163. distraction, 108, 121. double movement, 144. double reflection, 26, 78. doubt, 51, 55, 60, 69, 72, 108, 122, 132, 174f, 177f, 180. drama, dramatic, 67f, 80, 171, 180. duplexity, 153. duty, 79, 124. E earnestness, earnest, 21-24, 27-30, 32, 34, 57, 64f, 81, 123, 131, 151, 155, 166. ears and eyes, 117, 119, 121, 130; Christian truth as, 119, 130. edification, 20, 25ff, 30-33, 85ff, 92, 94; and negativity, 94. edified, 85ff, 95. edify(ing),19ff, 25-34, 73, 76, 85-88, 93-96, 128; edifying vs to edify, 73; to be edified vs to edify, 85ff. edifying discourse, 25-31, 34, 85ff, 92-96; how vs what, 85-88; as philosophically challenging, 96. either/or, 149f, 155. egoism, 111f. emotion(s), emotional, 23, 58, 75, 97. Epicurus, Epicureanism, 23, 51. essence, 22, 31, 44, 46, 52, 67f, 73f, 76, 78, 136f, 146, , 180. eternity, 35f, 38, 41f, 47f, 81f, 98, 124, 132, 135ff, 144, 146f, 172, 179f, the eternal; 35f, 38, 41f, 44, 47f, 53, 80ff, 89, 105f, 109, , 132, , 146f, 172, 179f; becoming -eternal, 135; the beginning of, 132, 135; consciousness of, , 146; and existence, 136f; eternal happiness, 135f, 146, 154; and the moment, 135, 147, 180; in the past and in the future, 48, 135; and the temporal, 16, 124; and time, 35f, 38, 41f, 47f, 137, 146, 172. ethic(s), 19, 27, 31f, 34, 36, 38, 42ff, 46, 49, 63, 81, 157, 160, 166f, 180. ethical (the), 20ff, 26ff, 30-34, 36, 43f, 48, 54f, 64f, 72, 79, 82, 86, 107, 162, 164f, 180. Euclid, 170. expectancy, 38, 42, 47f, 93, 105, 152. existence, 21, 23, 25, 32, 35f, 38, 42, 48, 51ff, 57, 59, 64f, 78f, 81, 85, 92, 97f, 101, 103, 111, 113, 128, 131, , 145f, 160, 162f, 167, 169, 176ff; coming into, 42, 131, , 145f; poet s, 113; spheres of, 163. existential, 19ff, 25f, 31-34, 42, 94, 133f, 158f, 161f, 164, 166f, 175, 179. experience, experiential, 22, 32, 35f, 39, 41, 46f, 59ff, 63, 77, 80f, 92, 95, 105, 107, 118, 127, 131, 140, 146, 159, 161ff, 169ff, 176, 178ff. experiment, experimental, 58, 61, 80f, 85, 150f. F faith, 36, 38, 42, 44, 47, 51-56, 64, 69, 74f, 78f, 81ff, 100, 106f, 132f, 136f, , 165, 169, 171ff, 176f, 179f; and coming into existence, 136f; and doubt, 55; knight of, 74, 81f; as opposite of sin, 136; and resignation, 74, 82. fairy tale, 142. fear, 25, 37, 40, 42, 79, 88, 101, 151, 169, 171, 179; and trembling, see S. A. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling. Feuerbach, Ludwig, 51. fickleness, 113. finitude, 32, 53, 169ff, 177f; vs infinitude, 67. flesh, 38f, 49, 104ff; thorn in the, 38, 64ff, 104ff. flower, 71, 82. follower(s) (the), 135f, 139, 143, 145ff. forget, forgetting, 43, 48, 60, 79, 98, 103, 105, 111, 130, 134f, 137, 142, 146, 166. forgetfulness, 109. forgiveness, 42.

192 192 Index Frankfurt School, 157ff. freedom, free, 32, 36f, 55, 60, 62f, 65, 69, 103, 111, 114, 124, 137f, , 153, 155, 161f, 170f, 174, 179; and anxiety, 36, 145, 171. Freud, Sigmund, 139, 144f, 161. future (the), 40ff, 47f, 60, 80, 105, 109, 135, 144f, 160, 167. G general (the), 60. genius, 51, 67-70, 73, 82; as thunderstorm, gift(s), 35, 40, 44, 49, 72, 82, 91, 103, 107, 150, 152f; good and perfect, 49; and the task, 40. God, 30f, 38, 43f, 49, 51-56, 69f, 72, 75f, 81f, , 114f, 122f, 125f, 130, 135ff, 139ff, , , 155, 166, ; changelessness of, 69; as criterion, 115; existence of, 51, 136, 176ff; human equality before, 30, 75; and human heart, 115; love of, 105, 112, 150f, 178ff; manifestation of, 172, 177; need of, 75; omnipotence of, 172; as absolute paradox, 75; proofs of God s existence, 52f, 172, 177; quatenus, 172, 179; relation to, 100, 114, 172, 178, 180; self before, 102, 106; visibility and invisibility of, 100; word of, 28, 76, 106. good (the), goodness, 29, 33, 44, 53, 55, 59, 82, 105f, 108, 109f, 112, 115; good and evil, 53, 59. governance, 74. grace, 76, 100, 106, 110. Luther, 97, 106f, 119, 130, 141; and works, 106, 119. greatness, 74, 110. Greece, Greek(s), 35, 51f, 62f, 82, 117ff, 123ff, 131, 135, 170. Grøn, Arne, 62, 94, 128. guilt, guilty, 37, 54, 97, 98, 114, 120, 171, 180; and anxiety, 171, 180. Gyges, 119. H Habermas, Jürgen, 159f, 164f, 166f. Hamann, Johann Georg, 60f, 63, 141, 147; as Kierkegaard s precursor, 147. Hamlet, 177. happiness, happy, 70, 102, 133f, 135f, 146, 149, 154, 170f, 175, 179f; happy vs unhappy, 134. Harris, Sam, 51. Hegel, Georg W. F., Hegelian, 42, 57f, 64, 94, 132, 143, 145, 147, 150, 154, 159, 164f, 169, 170, 171, 175, 178. Heiberg, Johan Ludvig, 143. Heidegger, Martin, 19-26, 28-36, 85, 87f, 90, 96f, 103, 114, 158; Being and Time, 19ff, 25f, 30-33, 37, 97; Letter on Humanism, 31f. Heraclitus, 64, 78f. herem, 172. hero, heroic, 82, 105. Herodotus, 117, 119. historical point of departure, 146. history, historical(ly), 37, 42f, 49, 51f, 81, 119, 124, 130, 132f, 136f, 142, 144, 146, 152, 158, 161f, 163ff, 171, 173. Hitchens, Christopher, 51. Hitler, Adolf, 159, 161; National Socialism, 157. honesty, honest, 164, 166. hope, 38, 42ff, 72, 81ff, 86, ; as perfection, ; trial and temptation of, 107. hopelessness, 107. Horace, 127. Horkheimer, Max, 157f. Hügli, Anton, 113f. human, 32, 34f, 38f, 44ff, 51-56, 67, 70-72, 74ff, 77, 81f, 85-89, , 105ff, 109, , 120, 122, 124, 127, 137, 140, 149, , 157, 160, 162, 164f, 167, 169, 171ff, human being, 31f, 33, 44f, 53, 55f, 75, 78, 86ff, 92-97, 100f, 102, 106, 111, 114, 120, , 128f, 152, 154f, 157, 167, 176, 164; perfection of, 16, 55, 97, 99, 100f, 105, 109, 113, 115. humanly speaking, humility, 30, 97, 101, 109ff, 151; humble, 101, 111. humor, humorist, 154f. I Ibsen, Henrik, 68. ideal(s), 25, 55f, 97, 177f. ideality,

193 Index 193 identity, 72, 79, 97, 99, 111f, 159, 166f; human- divine, 111. idolatry, 111. ignorance, 174. illusion(s), 21, 47, 76, 100, 127. image, 29f, 33f, 43, 61, 80, 97, 103, 115, 120, 123, 130, 162. imagery, , 130. imagination, imaginary, 24, 28, 42, 59, 107, 129, 130, 153, 173. imagining, imaginable, imaginative, 74, 95, 108, 130, 141, 153. immanence, immanent, 26, 69, 70, 76, 134, 149f, 154, 155, 174; and teleology, 70. immediacy, immediate, 47, 52, 57, 59, 129, 136, 144, 180. immortality, 28, 33, 140. imperfection(s), imperfect, 42, 52, 74, 129, 110. in suo esse perseverare, 125. incarnation, incarnate, 26, 39, 77, 103, 132, 136f, 139, 141, 143, 146, 149ff, 151f, 173, 179. indifference, indifferent, 25, 27, 47, 110. indirect communication, 26f, 29, 67, 76, 78, 86. indirect method, 92. individual(s), 22ff, 27f, 30, 34-37, 40, 45, 47ff, 49, 53, 56, 61, 67, 70-73, 76, 87, 112, , 164ff, 169, 171, 174ff, 179. individuality, 45, 143, 162, 171; principle of, 35. infinity, infinite, 48, 52f, 128, 179. inner, 21, 27, 29, 35, 37ff, 41, 43, 45ff, 49, 54f, 61, 94, 97f, 101, 114, 121, 163; history, 163; and outer, 38, , 162. innocence 37, 40, 170; and anxiety, 40, 170. interpretation, 20f, 31, 36f, 42, 48, 68, 77, 79, 117f, 122, 125f, 127ff, 140f, 145, 159, 161, 166. inwardness, inward, 38, 47, 68, 86, 88, 90, 93, 154, 162ff; objectless, 163f; Socratic secret of, 154. irony, 59, 67f, 78, 128, 132, 147, 155, 171, 174. Isaac, 55, 81f. Islamism, 52. Israel, Isaraelites, 75, 82. J James (Apostle), 48f, 69. jest, 23, 151, 155, 165f. Jew, Jewish, 172, 174ff, 178. Job, 49, 56, 64, 70, 78f, 81, 99. Judaism, 51f. judgment, 97f, 110. K Kafka, Franz, 39, 68. Kamlah, Wilhelm, 118. Kant, Immanuel, 46, 161. Kierkegaard, Søren Aabye Pseudonymous author(s), Kierkegaard s, Constantin Constantius, 57, 59, 62, 64f, 70, 74, 78, Johannes Climacus, 26f, 128, , , , 167, 174, 176. Johannes de silentio, 57, 74f, 78, 81f, 142, 152, 166, 173. Married Man (the), 70. Vigilius Haufniensis, 126, 129; as author of The Concept of Anxiety, 40, 46. Young Man (the), 70, 74. Works cited, The Book on Adler, 126f. The Changelessness of God, 69. Christian Discourses, 122, 127ff. The Concept of Anxiety, 35f, 38, 40-48, 73, 85, 126ff, 135, 139, 170f, 174. The Concept of Irony, 78, 128, 174. Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 26, 70, 85, 121, 128, De omnibus dubitandum est, 174. Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 35, 37f, 40, 42, 44-49, 58, 68, 71ff, 75f, 77, 87, 117. Either/Or, 122, 128, 163, 174; Diapsalmata, 70. Fear and Trembling, 27, 55, 57, 59, 68, 73f, 77ff, 81ff, 120, 140, 142, 151ff, 166, 173. Four Upbuilding Discourses, 44, 58, , 120. Judge for Yourself!, 67. The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air, , 129, 130. On My Work as an Author, 121f, 142. Philosophical Fragments, 131ff, 133, 139f, 142f, 146, , 157, 160, 163, 165, 167,

194 194 Index Repetition, 57, 59f, 60, 62, 64, 68, 70, 73f, 77-81, 83, 139f, 142f, 144ff, 159. The Sickness Unto Death, 27, 67, 86, 95, 98, 110, 120, 125, 128, 174. Søren Kierkegaard s Journals and Papers, 173f, 177. Stages on Life s Way, 61, 70, 128. Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, 48, 72, 88. Three Upbuilding Discourses, 56ff, 61, 119ff, 131. Works of Love, 19, 22, 27, 32, 70, 86, 89, 121. knight (of faith and of resignation), 74, 81, 82. knowing, 27, 29f, 33, 45, 62, 102, 108, 113f, 117, 134f, 170, 178f. knowledge, 21, 27ff, 33f, 45-49, 62f, 67, 80, 113, 115, 117f, 135, 137, 146, 153, , 179f. L language, 28f, 37f, 46, 49, 59, 70f, 73, 75, 79, 103, 117, 122f, 127, 132, 138, 153, 163, 170, 173, 177; body language, 79; human language, 70f; pragmatics of, 103; Spinoza s, 177; and spirit, 37; and time, 138. Latin (words and expressions), 107, 125ff. leap, 36, 64, 79, 133, 150, 153; with passion and gift, 153; qualitative leap, 36. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 64, 79f. Levinas, Emmanuel, 10, 11, 46ff, 98. life, 21ff, 27-30, 34ff, 38f, 41-49, 53 ff, 59, 61-65, 70, 77-81, 86-90, 93f, 98f, 101f, , 115, 121, 124, 126, 128f, 153f, 159f, , ; eternal, 180; ethical, 65, 180; religious, 55, 160. lily, 122ff, 129f. literature, literary, 57, 67f, 128, 139, 140, 142, 143, 169. logic, logical, 62f, 67, 132, 169, 173f. Lombardus, Petrus, 106. lose, loser, loss, 46, 55f, 82, 86f, 89-95, 99, 102, 107, 162, 170. love, 22, 28f, 38, 42ff, 54f, 57-60, 69, 74, 79, 86, 105ff, , 118, 120f, 131, 133, 139, 142f, 146f, 150f, 153, 155, 178ff; and forgiveness, 42; from God, 110, 146; God as, 150f; hate and, ; leap of, 17, 150; object of, 121; of other, 111; of self, 110f, 118; work of, 43; God s, 69, 105, 112, 150, 178ff; un -, 54. Lowrie,Walter, 140, 142, 159. Lübcke, Poul, 128. Lukács, Georg, 158f. Luther, Martin, 70, 97, 106f, 119, 130, 141. Lutheran, 172. M Marcuse, Herbert, 158f, 164f; the Great Refusal, 159, 164. Martensen, Hans Lassen, 133, 172. Marx, Karl, Marxian, 51, 164, 165; Marxism, 158f. master(s), 33, 67, 102, 180. Matuštík, Martin, 20, 158ff, maxim(s), 23. meaning, 19f, 34, 46ff, 51, 53f, 58-65, 69-73, 75ff, 81, 107, 118, 125, 127, , 140, 142f, 145, 150, 178. mediation, mediate, 64, 69, 82, 132ff, 139, 144, 174. melancholy, melancholic, 81,163. memory, 98. mercy, merciful,106, 162, 172, 176. merit, 106, 127. Meslier, Jean, 51. metaphor(ical(ly)), 39, 42, 48, 57, 61, 70f, 75, 107, 111, 117, 130, 142. metaphysics, metaphysical, 64f, 79, 118, 121, 126, 127f, 130, 167, 180. Midwife, 149, 167. miracle(s), 172, 174f, 180. mirror, 48, 49, 97, 114, 120. Molbech, Christian, 126. Molière, 68. moment (the), 24, 36f, 41f, 44, 46f, 54, 58-61, 64, 74, 76, 88f, 91-94, 103, , 145ff, 167, 172, 180. monotheism, 51f. morality, moral, 33, 43, 54, 58, 97, 149, 151, 162, 166, 172; moralistic, 94. Moses, 75, 102. movement, 46, 49, 63f, 74, 78, 80, 82, 92, 103, 111, 115, 122f, 129f, 132, 139, 142, 144, 162f, 175. multiculture, multicultural, 157, 164.

195 Index 195 multiplicity, multiple, multiplying, 42, 57-63, 131, 133, 170. N Nagel, Thomas, 77f. nature, 42, 45, 52, 55, 62, 69, 79ff, 103, 118, 122f, 132, 149, 152, 160, 171ff, 176; and God, 52, 152, 171f, 176. necessity, necessary, 24, 29, 34, 42, 52, 57, 59f, 62-65, 67, 69, 72, 91, 93, 108, 111, 124, 128, 134ff, 139, 140, 143ff, 154, 161f, 170f. need(s), needy,19-24, 27, 31, 39f, 44, 52f, 54, 70, 75, 85, 93, 96, 99, 101f, 104, 107f, 113, 115, 119, 125, 133, 134, 144, 150, 154f, 164, 176, 179. negativity, negative, 30, 33f, 58f, 63, 72, 93-96, 99, 113, 124, 160ff, 165, 171, 180. negation, 59, 68. neighbor, 22, 121. Neoplatonic, 52. Nielsen, Rasmus, 122. Nietzsche, Friedrich, Nietszchean, 51, 61, 68, 81, 139, 140. nonbeing, 163. normativity, normative, 26, 97, 165ff. nothing(ness), 39f, 41f, 44, 72, 79, 92, , 105, 107, 109, 112, 114, 127f, 134, 140f, 143. O obedience, obedient, 111, 122f, 130, 158. object, 38f, 42f, 48, 62, 67, 81f, 120f, 128, 133, 134ff, 162f, 166, 174. objectivity, objective, 27, 39, 77, 133f, 150, 154, , 174. observation, observer, 46, 62, 70, 74, 88, 113, 119f, 174. occasion, occasional, 19ff, 24, 28ff, 33, 70, 74, 77, 80, 119, 130, 134f, 147, 151f, 155, 176. Ockham, William of, 52. offense, 151, 155. Olsen, Regina, 78. omnipotence, of God, 172. oneself, 20-24, 56, 64, 67, 73, , 117, 119, , 134, 153, 176; overcoming, 97, 99, 101, 113, 115; as witness, 97. ontology, ontological, 19-23, 25f, 31-34, 37, 42, 45, 79, , , 133, 136, 152, 161ff. ordeal, 55f, 64. originality, original, 39, 71, 112, 125, 129f, 142, 152, 169. other(s) (the), 19, 22, 28, 54f, 58, 73, 85, 86f, 101, 104, 120, 124, 151, 167, 177. Otto, Rudolph, 81. outer (the), 38, 101, 162; and the inner, 38, 101, 114, 162. P paganism, pagan(s), 64, 70, 81f. panentheism, 112. pantheism, 175. paradox, paradoxical, 26, 75, 82, 102f, 108, 113, , 140, 145f, , 159, 162, 172ff, 176f, 179; eternal truth as, 173; as faith, 82, 133, 151, 153; and gift and leap, 153; god -man as absolute, 132f, 153, 174, 176f, 179; and Socrates, 154. passivity, passive, 46f, 59, 61f, 68, 82, 91, 106f, 131, 133, 153. past (the), 41f, 81, 104f, 135, 144ff. pathein, 59, 133. pathos, 131. patience, (im)patient, 35-49, 58, 85, Paul, Pauline, 38, 43, 57, 100, 104ff, 119, 123, 130f. perfection, perfect, 42, 49, 52, 55, 72, 79f, , , 113, 115, 128, 136, 171f, 176f. phenomenology, phenomenological, 20, 23, 25f, 28, 32, 39, 44-48, 57, 59, 81, 92f, 158, 165. Philo of Alexandria, 52. philosopher(s), 51ff, 60, 62, 64, 77-81, 113, 122, 139f, 157, 161, 169, ; German, 51. philosophy, 42, 49, 51-55, 60, 62f, 77, 81, 83, 94, 113, 115, 117f, 125, 128, 132, 140, 149, 157ff, 165f, 169, , 180. Pirandello, Luigi, 68. Plato, Platonic, Platonism, 51f, 80, 82, 113, 118, 132, 140, 154, 167; Phaedrus, 132. poet, poetic, 63, 68f, 70, 79, 113, 119, 121f, 130, , 144f, 147, 153. poetry, 11, 29f, 121ff, 130,

196 196 Index poiein, 59, 131, 133. politics, political, , 173, 175. possession(s), possess, 37, 40f, 43ff, 55, 79, 99f, 112, 129, 153, 155, 174. possibility, 20f, 23ff, 29, 31, 36, 39f, 49, 52, 59, 61, 64f, 74f, 80, 90, 92-97, 103f, 111, 113, 131f, 134ff, 139, 144ff, 151, 153, 166f, 171; and necessity and actuality, 136. postmodern, 158, 164, 165f. power, 22, 30, 37, 38, 43, 47ff, 56, 59, 68, 82, 88, 99f, 102f, 112, 119, 123f, 126, 127, 130, 141, 152, 162. prae oculis esse, 118, 125, 127. prae sensibus esse, 118, 125. praeesse, 118, 125. praxis, 158, 160, 164, 166, 180. prayer(s), 53f, 69, 114f, 122. present (the), 41f, 46f, 48f, 63, 105, 110, 117ff, 121, , 129ff, 136, 144, 146, 164f. preservation, preserve, 35f, 48, 85, 87-96, 101, 105f, 108, 112, 124f, 141, 145, 161. pride, proud, 30, 74, 97, 99, 101, , 159. process, 30, 35, 37f, 47f, 61f, 64f, 73, 76, 113, 122, 125, 130f, 137, 140f, 144, 153, 166, 175, 178ff. Proença, Raul, 51. prophet, 51. prosopopeiæ, 71. Proust, Marcel, 68, 80. providence, 51, 53-56, 171. psychology, psychological, 26, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, 46, 54, 58, 68, 113, 126, 136. R rationality, 58, 132f, 179. reader (the), 28ff, 33f, 42, 48f, 71ff, 75f, 79, 87f, 92, 94ff, 103, 120, 123, 130, 141, 150, 152, 154f, 178. reading, 20f, 36, 48, 57f, 63, 72, 75, 82, 87ff, 94, , 149, 160, 162, 170. recollection, 62, 80, 104f, 131, 134, 139, 142, 146f, 149, 155, 167. redemption, 107, 112; redeeming, 73, 105, 157, 179. redoubling, 45, 58, 128f. reflection, 24, 26f, 31, 33, 36, 38, 41, 43, 47, 63, 65, 76-79, 81f, 85f, 159, 171. Reformation, 106, 119. relationship, 19f, 22f, 61f, 64, 93, 101, 104, 124, 137, , 163. religion, 19, 51, 77, 81f, 85, 115, 140, 149f, 152, 154f, 172ff. religious (the), 20, 26, 31, 35f, 145, 153, 158, 161. religiousness, 149f, 150, 154f, 175. renunciation, renouncing, 49, 82, 99, 100, 112, 169, 176. repentance, 43f, 104f. repetition, 33, 43ff, 49, 57-65, 68ff, 71-74, 77-81, 83, , 139, , 147, 159. resignation, 56, 74, 82, 105. resoluteness, 89, 93, 108, 109. resolution, 51, 108f, 113, 147. restlessness, 169, 178, 180. revelation, 51f, 60, , 173, 175f, 179. Ricoeur, Paul, 103. risk, risking, 89, 124. romantic (the), 68, 80, 147. S salvation, 35, 38, 63, 169, Schelling, Friedrich W. J. von, 78, 174. Schiller, Friedrich, 82. self (the), 22, 24, 31, 36, 39, 43-46, 49, 85-89, 91, 95, 96, 102f, 111ff, 117, 124ff, 129f, 151, , 167, 175. self -accusation, 104f. self -assessment, 97, 99,109, 179. self -awareness, 76. self -choice, 166f. self -contradiction, 35, 41, 44, 137. self -deception, self -deceiving, 21, 48, , 104, 108, 113ff. self -destruction, self -destructive, 110, 112. self -esteem, 151. self -evaluation, 103, 110, 114f, 130, 163, 166. self -hatred, selfhood, 85-89, 91ff, 95ff, 112, 114, 163. self -image, 97, 115. self -importance, 99f, 102, 110, 112. selfishness, selfish, 29,45, 54, 55, 109, 112. self -knowledge, 45f, 48, 98, 102f, 113. selflessness, 109. self -love, 38, , 151.

197 Index 197 self -reflection, 78, 111. self -sufficiency, 99, 102, 104. self -understanding, 95, 97f, 103f, 114, 143. sensuousness, sensuous, 36ff, 40, 42, 49, 161. sermon, 26, 28, 45, 49, 69, 72, 76. sexuality, sexual, 39, 73, 170f. Shakespeare,William, 134, 141. sickness, see S. A. Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto death. simplicity, 26, 48, , 129f. sin(s), sinful(ness), 26, 37, 39, 41ff, 45f, 57-60, 63, 67, 69, 111f, 114f, 120f, 131, 151, 163, 170f, 176f, 179; against and before God, 111, 151; and anxiety, 59, 67, 170f, 176; definition of, 43; and despair, 67; and guilt, 112; hereditary, 41; multiplicity of, 57-60, 120f, 131; root of, 170f. single individual (the), 45, 61, 71ff, 87. singular (the), singularity, 59ff, 65, 80f. skepticism, skeptic(al), 52, 118, 166, 175. society, societal, 67f, 157f, 160, 163ff, 167, 172f. Socrates, Socratic, 60, 63, 132, 134, 140, 143, 149f, 153ff, 167, 176, 179. sophist(s), 170. soteriological, 107. soul (the), 28, 35, 37-49, 58, 68, 70, 74, 85, 87-96, 105, 107, 115, 120, 127, 170. speech, 55, 58, 69, 118, 130. Spinoza, Benedict (Baruch), 125, ; attacks, 175; confrontation with Kierkegaard, 169; eight initial definitions, 178; Ethics, 169f, 172, 174, ; glory, 179; God (attributes), 177; ideas (as actuality), 177ff; intellectual love of god, 178; intuitive science, 178, 180; Kierkegaard s knowledge of, 174; kinds of contentment, 171, 179; herem, 172; language, 170, 173, 177; the modes, 170, 172, 177ff; mos geometricus, 169f; principa philosophiae cartesianae, 176; proofs of God s existence, 176f; sub specie aeternitatis, 171, 179; superstitio, 172; and the task of the philosopher, 180; Theological political Treatise, 175; theses, 174f, 177; vera religio, 172; via perardua, 169, 173, 178. spirit (the), 38, 57, 62, 80f, 94, 106f, 112, 129, 143, 157, 163; spiritual, 32, 35, 37, 42, 48, 62, 68, 72, 79ff, 106f, 143, 163; spiritualism, 163. Steiner, George, 79f. Stoellger, Philipp, 107. Stoicism, 51. struggle, 53, 55, 91, 94, 96, 98f, 101f, , superstitio, see Spinoza, superstitio. style, stylistic, 117, 122, 128, 131, 134, 137, 142, 169; see writing. sub specie aeternitatis, see Spinoza, sub specie aeternitatis. subject (the), 24, 33, 46, 55, 62, 87, , 158, 162ff, 166f; becoming -subject, subjectivity, subjective, 27f, 30, 34, 38, 42, 85ff, 98, 128, 133, 154f, 160, , 167, 171, 179. suffering, 30, 38, 55f, 72, 88, 91, 100, 104ff, 133, 173, 179. suum esse conservare, 125. synholon, 129. synthesis, 35-41, 44, 46-49, 51, 64, 128f, 170. system, 39, 53, 63, 79, 172. T task, 21, 35, 40, 47, 49, 60, 65, 71, 87, 93f, 96f, 103, 108, 125f, 141, 144f, 154, 165, 167, 169, 180. tautology, tautological, 125, 177. teacher, 49, 61, 72f, 86f, 127, 139ff, 143, 144f, , 155, 179f. teleology, telos,70. Teles, Basílio, 51. telos, teleological, 46. temporality, temporal (the), 35ff, 39ff, 40-43, 45-49, 57, 82, 85, 92, 103, 105, , 167, 172. tension, 35, 40f, 121, 123f, 152f, 155. Terence, 127. Tertullian, 141. theology, theological, 26, 33, 52, 106f, 115, 157f, 169, 173. Theunissen, Michael, 19, 29, 181. thinking, 21-24, 31ff, 37, 58, 61, 70, 80, 97, 99, 107, 115, 128, , 152, 159, 163, 165, 174, 175.

198 198 Index thorn (in the flesh), 38, 64ff, 104ff. thought, 19-24, 30, 39, 45, 52, 61, 64f, 67, 70-74, 77, 80f, 91, 97, 101, 105, 109, , 132ff, 139f, 144, 146, 150f, 154f, 169, 170f, 174, time, 24ff, 30-33, 35f, 38, 40-43, 46-49, 57ff, 61, 64f, 72, 75, 80, 85, 87, 91-94, 96f, 104ff, 109, 124, , 137f, 145f, 147, 150, 155, 167, 172f, 179, 180; and eternity, 35f, 38, 41f, 47f, 132, 135, 146f, 172f, 179; God s vs human, 75, 133; and language, 138; and the moment, 36f, 41f, 47, 93, 103, , 146f; fullness of time, 180; times (the), 129f; slow time vs rapid time, 16f, 57ff, 61, 64f, 131; Socratic time vs. Christian time, 134f. to be oneself, 93f, 110, 124f, 129. to be present to oneself, 117, to preserve oneself, 92, 94f, 124f. totalitarianism, totalitarian,157, 159, 162. transcendence, transcendent, 44, 49, 133f, 137, 145, 149f, 172, 174, 178f. transition(s), 43, 52, 64, 145f, 153, 161, 163, 175. truth, 26, 31f, 36, 63, 108, 122, 135f, , 155, 162f, 169f, 172f, 176, 178ff; and certainty, 25; of Christianity, 26, 172; essential, 155; eternal, and historical, 135f, 173, 178; given by teacher, 151; objective, 169; to oneself, 92, 94; as subjectivity, 162, 179; vs untruth, 155, 163. U uncertainty, uncertain, 24f, 53, 71f, 76, 89, 94. understanding, 24f, 31, 34f, 39, 52, 54-63, 70f, 74-78, 86, 88f, 95f, 103, 113, 121, , 136f, 144, , 155, 161, 163ff, 172f, 175, 179f. universality, universal ( the), 82, 88, 166. untruth, 155, 163. upbuilding (the), 19, 26f, 35, 38, 40, 42, 44, 46f, 49, 71f, 76f. upbuilding discourses, 45, 72, 103, 117, 119; and art of writing, 45; Upbuilding Discourses, see S. A. Kierkegaard. V vera religio, see Spinoza, vera religio. via perardua, see Spinoza, via perardua. view(s), 14, 27, 32f, 35, 44f, 51f, 58ff, 63-67, 76ff, 86, 92f, 97, 100ff, 106, 108ff, 113, 118, 131f, , , 150, 152, 157f, 158, 165, 169f, 172, 174ff. virtue(s), 36, 43, 69, 106ff, 111. vision, 34, 52, 64, 82, 86, 95, , 125, 130, 135, 139, 151, 166, 172, 175, 179; dialectics of, 86. visual, 71, 117f, 120, 123, 166. vita passiva, 107. Voltaire, 51. W Weil, Simone, 97, 110ff, 115, 184. Westphal, Merold, 20, 158, 160, 165f. whole (the), 42ff, 57, 61, 71ff, 76, 88, 100, 102, 115, 124, 131, 144, 154, , 174. widow, 72. Wilde, Oscar, 68. wish, 72, 77, 97ff, 109, 113ff, 137, 169f, 175, 180. without authority, 29. word (the), 35f, 39f, 44f, 48f, 70, 107f, 121, 126, 128f, 133. work(s) (the), 22, 46, 60, 68, 72, 106, 114, 140, 142, 154f, 157, 159ff, 164, 176. worthiness vs unworthiness, worthy vs unworthy, 55, writing, 45, 61, 78, 87, 131, 170. Y you (as addressee), 22f, 29, 33, 35, 44, 49, 67, 73, 88, 91, 100, 110, 114f, 119, 121, 123, 127, 140, 141, 151.

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