IPv6 Intrusion Detection Research Project
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1 IPv6 Intrusion Detection Research Project Carsten Rossenhövel, EANTC AG Sven Schindler, Universität Potsdam Co-Financed By:
2 Project Goals Independently assess the true, current risks of IPv6 attacks Develop intrusion detection tools for IPv6 Assess the readiness of commercial firewalls to cope with intrusion attempts Jointly conducted by Beuth University of Applied Sciences, Berlin; University of Potsdam; Strato AG and EANTC AG. Co-funded by German Federal Ministry of Education and Research Testing and Consultancy services for the service provider network life cycle Network design consultancy and proof of concept testing RfP support, acceptance testing and network audits Vendor neutral technology seminars
3 Project Steps Analyze IPv6 Security Threats Develop and Test Intrusion Detection Tool Install Darknet To Monitor Activity Install Honeynet To Attract Attacks
4 IPv6 Darknet Live since February 2012, % availability Set up two directly attached darknets, one via tunnel broker Completely passive no routes announced; darknet did not respond in any case Should receive only backscatter traffic or attacks Collector EANTC /48 Collector UniP /64 Collector Beuth /64 Deutsche Telekom CompanyConnect 6in4 DFN German Research Network Hurricane Electric
5 IPv6 Darknet Results Received only 1,145 packets in five months! Mostly TCP backscatter (SYN/ACK-bits set) No ICMP or DNS requests Example: 186 backscatter packets arrived from one IRC server in Cape Town probably a victim of a DDOS attack
6 IPv6 Darknet Results (2) How to crawl address spaces in IPv6? Incremental address search infeasible in IPv6 Possible solution: Distribute new prefix for IPv6 address autoconfiguration, triggering Duplicate Address Detection responses Possible solution: Send ICMPv6-echo request to the AllNodes multicast group No attacker used smart methods like the above; Result matched expectations With advertised routes, things change: Sandia.gov received 70 packets/s on a /12 darknet in
7 IPv6 Honeynet (honeydv6) Project team extended low-interaction open source honeyd to support IPv6 (original author: Niels Provos) What is standard honeyd? Emulates a complete network Uses nmap fingerprints to mimic a range of operating systems Captures packets via pcap library We: Added IPv6 extension header, fragmentation, ICMPv6 support
8 Honeyd Administration Interface
9 Honeyd Test with OpenVAS We validated the implementation with OpenVAS (free vulnerability assessment tool) Honeydv6 detects all newly introduced attacks Next: Install honeyd at large-scale data center site of the associated project partner (
10 Development of New/Extended IPv6 Attacks Scapy Toolkit Snort V6 Plugin Open source flexible packet generation toolkit for IPv4/IPv6 packets with arbitrary headers Project created GUI to simplify Scapy use without programming knowledge Open source intrusion detection tool Project extended it for special IPv6 attacks detection beyond trivial basics
11 The Hacker s Choice (THC) IPv6 Attack Toolkit Project based IPv6 attacks on THC s tool Tools/Attacks/Test Suite initiated by van Hauser Parasite6: icmp neighbor solicitation/advertisement spoofer Fake_router6: Announce yourself as a router with the highest priority dos-new-ipv6: Detect new IPv6 devices and tell them that their chosen IP collides on the network Flood-router6: Flood a target with random router advertisements
12 IPv6 Extension Headers IPv6 extension headers are a source of potential attacks Variety and complexity challenging for any implementation Some headers are to be inspected on each hop, some only at destination IPv6 header Routing header Fragment header fragment of TCP header + data Next Header = Next Header = Next Header = Routing Fragment TCP
13 Hop-by-Hop and Destination Options Router Alert RFC 2711 Padding Pad1, PadN IPv6 Jumbograms RFC 2675 Tunnel Encapsulation Limit RFC 2473 IP Mobility Home Address RFC 6275 Action to take when option is not recognized is encoded in the option type.
14 Detection of Attacks With Snort Free lightweight network intrusion detection system Open source; rulesets maintained by Sourcefire IPv6 extensions available at
15 Attacks Included in Test Plan 1. ICMPv6 Filtering 2. Type 0 Routing Header 3. IPv6 Header Chain Inspection 4. Overlapping IPv6 Fragments 5. Tiny IPv6 Fragments 6. Excessive Hop-by-Hop Option 7. PadN Covert Channel 8. Address Scopes 9. Spoofed Neighbor Discovery 10. Duplicate Address Detection 11. Spoofed Redirect Message 12. Spoofed Zero-Lifetime Router Advertisement Message 13. Router Advertisements Flooding 14. Neighbor Advertisements Flooding
16 Outlook Project nears completion Honeydv6 evaluation pending Project partners in the process of publishing tools (under GPL) to ease attack testing for SPs and enterprises EANTC is going to publish an open source IPv6 firewall test plan with functional attacks and performance test cases EANTC may publish firewall test results in the future
17 Thank You For Your Interest! For further information, please contact us: EANTC AG Salzufer 14 D Berlin Germany Phone: Fax:
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