TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR CANADIAN POLICY ON COLOMBIA

Transcription

1 Americas Policy Group A Working Group of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR CANADIAN POLICY ON COLOMBIA November 2006

2 The Americas Policy Group (APG) is a working group of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation. The APG is comprised of 35 international development and humanitarian NGOs, human rights groups, labour unions, church and solidarity groups, and research institutions, focused on development and social justice issues in the Americas. Drawing on experience working with diverse partner organisations in the Americas, APG members collectively analyse Canadian policy in the Americas and participate in dialogue and advocacy with government bodies and other decision-makers. To access this and other policy briefs of the APG go to

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY... ii LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS... iv 1.0 COLOMBIA AND WHY IT MATTERS TO CANADA KEY ISSUES OF CONCERN IN COLOMBIA A Human Rights Crisis An Economy in Crisis A Militarized Economy Economic Policies and Employment Peace and Demobilization The Justice and Peace Law Monitoring the Demobilization and Reinsertion Alternative Processes for Demobilization and Reparations Negotiations with Guerrilla Groups CANADIAN BILATERAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT: POLICIES AND PRACTICE International Trade Investment-Related Policy Regulating Canadian Corporate activity in Colombia CANADA S ROLE IN MULTILATERAL FORA TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR CANADIAN POLICY ON COLOMBIA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS NOVEMBER 2006 i

4 TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR CANADIAN POLICY ON COLOMBIA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS This policy brief examines the present state of the human rights crisis in Colombia, the factors that contribute to the crisis, and its impacts on the most vulnerable populations. The brief critically examines Canada s donor, diplomatic, and commercial relations with Colombia and includes recommendations for Canada to help secure long-term solutions to the current crisis. The recommendations cover areas in which Canada has considerable influence, including justice for victims of armed groups, improving trade and investment practices, and promoting human rights within the framework of Colombia s international commitments. The United Nations has called Colombia the worst humanitarian crisis in the America. Grave violations of international humanitarian law have been committed by all of the armed actors guerrilla, paramilitary, and state security forces. The origins of the armed conflict lie in the political exclusion of large segments of the Colombian population and the inequitable distribution of resources within the country. In an attempt to end the conflict, President Alvaro Uribe has pursued an aggressive security program since 2002 that has had mixed results. There have been minor successes under this policy, particularly in Colombia's urban centres, but there have also been many set backs for the rights of large parts of the Colombian population. The policy has also been strongly criticized for not respecting international human rights and humanitarian law. At the same time as reports of human rights violations by the military have increased, Colombia has made very little progress toward ending widespread impunity of human rights abusers. Forced displacement of families from their homes has continued, increasing the vulnerability of hundreds of thousands of people every year, the vast majority of them women and children; the rights of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations are seldom respected in the country; workers rights have been stripped away such that Colombia continues to be the most dangerous country in which to organize labour; and attacks and threats against defenders of the above populations by state and stateallied forces has continued at alarming rates. All of this is taking place in a country with a massive illegal economy of drug production and drug smuggling operated by very wealthy and influential individuals, and a war between illegal armed actors and military forces (some of them also illegal) allied with the state often for control of the country s wealth. Many of the drug cartels, for example, are closely linked to Colombian paramilitary organizations, and in a number of cases are one and the same. Guerrilla organizations are also involved in the production and export of cocaine. Despite repeated calls from the international community for official Colombian forces to sever their ties to these narco forces, collusion between paramilitary groups and the Colombian military continues to the point that paramilitary leaders claim to have control over much of the Colombian state. Such economic and political power in the hands of paramilitary death squads and their leaders has seriously weakened democratic structures in Colombia. Even the legal Colombian economy is under threat. The rights of workers have been undermined by a series of legislative reforms legalizing the withdrawal of benefits mandated by law in accordance with Colombia's international obligations. Permanent jobs in the formal sector are being eliminated and replaced with non-unionized, casual and subcontracted work, while state enterprises are being liquidated and sold off. Deregulation of employment has resulted in a bloated informal economy and a rising number of sweatshops ( maquilas ) in free trade zones outside the reach of labour laws. TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR CANADIAN POLICY ON COLOMBIA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS NOVEMBER 2006 ii

5 Changes to labour law are being effected at the same time as the harassment, murder and disappearance of trade union leaders and members of Colombian civil society organizations. By intimidating and terrorizing human rights defenders, union leaders, and much of the Colombian population, wealthy and powerful Colombians are attempting to remove all obstacles to their concentration and control of the entire Colombian economy and political system. President Uribe s peace process with the paramilitary and other illegal forces has also been roundly criticized by the United Nations and Colombian civil society organizations. The new Justice and Peace Law, intended to provide a legal framework for the demobilization of illegal armed groups, does not meet international standards for truth, justice and reparations for victims of human rights abuses. Even more problematic, the massive demobilization of 30,000 paramilitaries happened under a previous legal regime outside of an adequate legal framework. The Justice and Peace Law of 2005 provides no basis for investigation or prosecution of past crimes, for example. It does however, provide reduced sentences for people who an outstanding legal charge against them. As well, it has become clear that the demobilization process under way under the Law does not provide the mechanisms to ensure the dismantling of the structures of illegal armed groups themselves, or the many criminal activities they operate. In fact, the OAS Mission mandated to verify the demobilization process has observed the re-forming of supposedly-demobilized actors into criminal gangs. The Justice and Peace Law established a National Commission of Reparation and Reconciliation which Canada has supported. Nonetheless, reparations under the Commission only apply to the victims of those paramilitary members who were tried under the Justice and Peace law, a small fraction of the total number of paramilitary being demobilized. The result is that the number of victims eligible for reparations has been reduced to a minimum before the work of the Commission has even begun. As well, the Justice and Peace law does not offer any real incentives for the return of illegally appropriated land. Without the return of stolen land, it is difficult to see what options are left for displaced people other than further hardship and injustice. There is substantial and growing Canadian commercial interest in Colombia. Canadian oil and mining companies are significant players in Colombia, for example, working in some of the most active conflict zones in the country. The Canadian government has actively supported this commercial interest through various government policy instruments. Through its provision of technical and financial support, for example, CIDA was instrumental in the revision of Colombia s mining code that several civil society groups have observed to have weakened existing protections for indigenous communities. Given the interconnections between the war, the drug economy, and human rights abuses, Canadian policy must consider the human rights implications of its trade and investment policies in Colombia. There are key entry points for progress toward resolving the crisis in Colombia for the Canadian government through leadership in various multilateral fora including the UN, the OAS, and the Group of 24, for example. More importantly, there are alternatives for justice and peace put forward by Colombian civil society organizations to bring an end to the conflict and to ensure the victims of human rights abuses are included in a more legitimate peace process. At a minimum, Canada must do no harm and ensure Canadian policy and Canadian corporate actors do not exacerbate an already grave crisis. There is a considerable policy and regulatory policy gap in this regard which requires action. Additionally, there is much that Canada can do to mitigate the effects of the conflict, and to play a more proactive positive role in the country, building on some important historic areas of Canadian action in the Americas. The brief outlines several key areas of recommendation which we hope the Canadian government will consider and promote. The victims have waited too long for genuine peace with justice in Colombia. TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR CANADIAN POLICY ON COLOMBIA NOVEMBER 2006 iii

6 LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Canada s Diplomatic Role Canada must ensure that Colombia remains a foreign policy priority in the Americas. Canada should employ a human rights framework to inform all Canadian policy towards Colombia, including trade and investment policy, in order to ensure policy coherence with our obligations under international human rights law. (p. 4) FAC and CIDA, through the Embassy in Colombia, should continue to use its membership in the G-24 and the thematic working groups (comprised of the UN, donors, civil society, and the Colombian government) to ensure that international cooperation reflects human rights law as agreed at the London Donors meeting. (p.22) Foreign Affairs Canada should issue a Ministerial Statement urging the Colombian government to follow the constitutional ruling T-025 and implement the plan for internally displaced people. (p. 5) Canada must urge the MAPP-OEA mission to verify that the demobilization process is carried out in compliance with international human rights standards. Canada should insist that the MAPP-OEA take into consideration the Colombia work and recommendations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. (p. 14) Canada should urge the Colombian government to carry out a thorough investigation of all legal and illegal assets of demobilized paramilitaries. (p. 13) Canada should encourage the Colombian government to put in place systems for the return of land to the displaced population. In particular, Canada should emphasize the importance of ensuring women have land ownership rights and effective access to government processes to address the issue. Canada should also support the need for maintenance of collective ownership and autonomous control of traditional indigenous and Afro-Colombian lands, and for strengthening the land surveying, registration, and legal title processes available to peasant farmers. (p. 13) In any negotiation processes, Canada must use its influence to ensure that negotiations address social inequalities that have led to the conflict. (p. 15) Canada should promote, assist and accompany processes for the involvement of civil society in the peace negotiations such as those between the Colombian government and the ELN. (p. 15) Canada should carry out extensive consultations with Canadian civil society groups with a view to evaluating the possibility of Canada ratifying the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights while ensuring the full protection of women s reproductive health. (p. 22) TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR CANADIAN POLICY ON COLOMBIA NOVEMBER 2006 iv

7 Citizenship and Immigration Canada should maintain source country status for Colombia and make use of programs to provide temporary visas for persons in need of emergency processing under the urgent protection program. Immigration staff at the Embassy should convene a meeting of Colombian civil society organizations that represent victims of human rights violations to hear their concerns, and to define a process in which their information and expertise are taken into account in processing asylum cases. Effort should be made to accelerate the process for all protection cases. (p. 5) The Canadian government should: maintain strong support for the Tripartite Agreement signed at the International Labour Conference on June 1, 2006; monitor and promote, through its Embassy in Colombia and the International Labour Program within Human Resources Skills Development Canada (HRSDC), rapid and effective implementation of the measures agreed upon in the agreement; offer funding for the operation of the Permanent Mission of the ILO to be set up under the terms of the Tripartite Agreement; report to interested Canadian civil society groups on any relevant information on this topic received from Colombian government officials (e.g. from the Ministry of Labour and Presidency). (p. 8) 2. Canada s Role as Donor Canada should support and encourage an independent, strong and diverse human rights community in Colombia. Specifically, Canada should: Increase funding, visible accompaniment, and public recognition of the role of human rights defenders and organizations in Colombia; Continue to provide financial and explicit political support to women s organizations in their efforts to defend women s human rights and build alternatives based on human rights and durable peace; Seek out opportunities to address the particular needs of vulnerable groups of displaced people: women and their children, indigenous peoples, and Afro- Colombians. (p. 4) Foreign Affairs Canada and CIDA should evaluate the effectiveness of the funding provided to the demobilization and OAS Mission by the end of March The Canadian government should only continue to fund the demobilization process if there are clear verifiable results that demonstrate an effective dismantling of paramilitary structures, credible and integral reparation, and the fulfillment of the rights to truth and justice. As a part of this, Canada must urge the Colombian government to implement the Constitutional Court s ruling and amendments that would bring the Justice and Peace Law in line with international standards. (p. 12) TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR CANADIAN POLICY ON COLOMBIA NOVEMBER 2006 v

8 CIDA should increase its strong support to internally displaced people and their associations through Canadian and Colombian NGOs, so that they can meaningfully participate in programs to address their needs, and in the design of reparations for the violations they have suffered. Canada should provide significant and long-term support for non-governmental processes (such as those developed by the National Victims Movement) for truth, justice and reparations that incorporate the perspectives and participation of a broad range of civil society organizations, including the victims of violence themselves. (p. 15) CIDA s support of the demobilization process should not include contributing to reparation funds. These funds should come from the seized legal and illegal assets of the perpetrators of crimes and the Colombian government. Canada should encourage a significant budgetary assignment by the Colombian government to the fund. (p. 13) In any future considerations of supporting re-insertion programs, Canada should ensure that no funding is directed towards programs that: Allow employment opportunities to ex-paramilitaries that provide access to weapons, access to private information pertaining to individuals, or that exercise social control, such as in the police force, as private security guards, or as informants; Do not provide adequate and comprehensive employment training programs for demobilized combatants. (p. 13) Canada should continue to provide funding for the office of the UNHCHR, and send a clear and strong message of support for its continued presence in Colombia under its current mandate. Canada must continue to call on the Colombian government to comply with the timetable for implementation of the UN recommendations. (p. 22) 3. Canada s Role as Investor and Trading Partner Canada should lead the way towards rights-based trade and investment policies in the hemisphere by developing a framework for a human rights impact assessment (HRIA) for existing and proposed international trade agreements, including the FTAA, bilateral, and regional agreements. (p. 16) Canada should commission an independent review involving the effective participation of civil society actors, on the impact of the Colombian mining code reform and Canada s role in its reform, on the environment and on the health and human rights of people, especially indigenous peoples, peasants, and Afro-Colombians. The review should be completed before FAC, International Trade, and the Embassy promote Canadian investment in the Colombian mining industry. (p. 18) TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR CANADIAN POLICY ON COLOMBIA NOVEMBER 2006 vi

9 The Human Rights Division of Foreign Affairs, in consultation with other departments and civil society organizations, should develop a comprehensive and publicly available human rights screen that refers to Canada s human rights commitments. This screen should be a mandatory part of the policy process to permit any government-sponsored investment abroad (including in Colombia), such as through Export Development Canada. (p. 18) The Canadian government should work with the Colombian government and Canadian companies to ensure the application of the principle of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) with local communities concerning mining and extractive projects in their region, recognizing that Colombia s Constitutional Court has ruled that international conventions to which Colombia is a signatory, have power of law in Colombia (including Convention 169 of the International Labour Organization). If there is a lack of evidence of FPIC in the case of a Canadian-related project, the Canadian government should withdraw consular support to that project. (p.18) Canada should establish clear legal norms to ensure that Canadian companies and their directors are held accountable when there is evidence of environmental and/or human rights violations associated with the activities and sourcing of Canadian companies in countries abroad, especially countries in conflict, such as Colombia. (p. 21) TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR CANADIAN POLICY ON COLOMBIA NOVEMBER 2006 vii

10 TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR CANADIAN POLICY ON COLOMBIA 1.0 COLOMBIA AND WHY IT MATTERS TO CANADA The internal armed conflict in Colombia has persisted for more than 45 years. In fact, the United Nations has called Colombia the worst humanitarian crisis in the Americas. 1 Grave violations of international humanitarian law have been committed by all of the armed actors. In the last 20 years, the Colombian conflict has taken the lives of at least 70,000 people, the majority of them civilians killed outside of combat, while thousands of others have been victims of disappearances, kidnappings and torture. 2 The situation in Colombia also plays a major role in defining the political and economic context in the Andean region and more broadly in Latin America. The origins of the armed conflict lie in the political exclusion of large segments of the Colombian population and the inequitable distribution of resources within the country. With the top 10% of the population earning forty-two times what the bottom 10% earns each year, Colombia is one of the world s most economically unequal countries. 3 It is extremely unlikely that the army can win a military victory against the guerrilla organizations and, even were it to do so, the social inequity at the root of the conflict would remain unresolved, maintaining a highly unstable situation. The political exclusion and social inequity that remains today must be addressed if Colombia is to achieve a stable and lasting peace. Building a peaceful, just and democratic Colombia is first and foremost a struggle of the peoples of Colombia. They pay the most direct price for the current conflict and have the greatest role to play in creating a new society and nation. But the conflict has clear regional and international dimensions. Countries like Canada need to clarify both their commitment and their obligation to support Colombians efforts to build a different future. In the first instance, Canadian foreign policy must do no harm that is Canadian policies and practices, including corporate practice, must not fuel or accentuate the conflict. Canadian citizens expect no less. Secondly, the Canadian Government must decide what it is willing to do to provide proactive support and accompaniment to bolster the forces for peace and democracy as part of the Canadian commitment to human rights and stability in the hemisphere. Other legitimate Canadian foreign policy objectives, including commercial objectives, must be consistent with, and not undermine, the first two priorities. This will require deliberate consideration and commitment to address the interaction and coherence of different Canadian objectives and interests United Nations, Press Briefing on Colombia by Emergency Relief Coordinator, May 19 th, Amnesty International, Colombia: The Paramilitaries in Medellín: Demobilization or Legalization? September, World Bank Group, World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty, Washington, DC, October, p TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR CANADIAN POLICY ON COLOMBIA NOVEMBER

11 The recommendations made in this brief demand a whole-of-government approach on the part the Canadian government. The issues addressed are integrally related to one another, and have implications for several government departments Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Department of International Trade, and the Privy Council Office, to name four. The Americas Policy Group looks forward to substantive engagement and dialogue with the Canadian government on these recommendations in the coming months. 2.0 KEY ISSUES OF CONCERN IN COLOMBIA 2.1 A Human Rights Crisis Since 2002, the President of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe, has pursued an aggressive security program referred to as the Democratic Security Policy. While these measures may have improved levels of security for some segments of the population, particularly in Colombia's urban centres, they have been strongly criticized for not respecting international humanitarian law and for running counter to the recommendations made by the Office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR). 4 Since the implementation of the Democratic Security Policy, reports of human rights violations by the military, including extrajudicial executions and torture, have increased, according to the UNHCHR and the Colombian Commission of Jurists. At the same time, due to a lack of political will in the Attorney General s Office, Colombia has made virtually no progress toward ending widespread impunity of human rights abusers. Despite the documented frequency of abuses and collusion with paramilitaries, the number of military personnel under investigation is remarkably small. Attacks and threats against human rights defenders and social activists continue at alarming rates. President Uribe s public statements equating human rights activists to defenders of terrorism added to the level of risk and increased the danger for many organizations, including those supported by the Canadian government. Under the Democratic Security Policy there have been widespread arbitrary detentions and violations of due process. According to the Colombian Commission of Jurists, from August 8, 2002 to August 7, 2004, 6,411 people were detained arbitrarily or with violations of due process, compared to a total of 2,869 in the six previous years. 5 This practice is a flagrant violation of the rule of law and due process, and should be strongly condemned by the international community. 4 5 In particular, the implementation of a paid informants network and the formation of peasant soldiers serve to blur the distinction between civilians and combatants in contradiction of the UN recommendations. Comisión Colombiana de Juristas, El Deber de la Memoria: imprescindible para superar la crisis de derechos humanos y derecho humanitario en Colombia 2004, Bogota, TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR CANADIAN POLICY ON COLOMBIA NOVEMBER

12 Forced displacement of families from their communities is a crucial issue in Colombia, increasing the vulnerability of hundreds of thousands more people every year. Over 3.6 million people have been forcibly displaced by the conflict since and in 2005 alone, over 310,000 people were displaced. 7 Internally displaced people (IDP) continue to suffer from poverty, unemployment, lack of housing, lack of access to education and healthcare, and discrimination from those who view them as linked to one or another of the illegal armed actors. Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities suffer levels of displacement that are disproportionately high relative to their percentage of the overall population. In fact, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees is warning of a looming humanitarian emergency 8 due to the internal displacement of indigenous peoples, and warns that some groups risk extinction as a result of the armed conflict. Indigenous peoples become particularly vulnerable to social, spiritual and cultural disintegration when they are forced from their lands which in some cases they have occupied for thousands of years. When they are displaced, particularly in cities, they also require specialized programs to attend to their distinct needs. The vast majority of the displaced population are women and children who together account for 74% of IDPs. 9 Adolescent boys and girls are extremely susceptible to recruitment by armed actors or urban gangs. Displaced girls and young women are especially vulnerable to forced prostitution and trafficking, as well as abductions and forced sexual slavery by armed actors. 10 Most displaced persons come from rural areas. Land is normally registered only under the man s name, and when women lose their husbands through death, separation or abandonment, they are left with nothing. Women have played an important role as protagonists in the struggle for human rights and peace in Colombia. Women's organizations and networks such as la Ruta Pacíifica and the Organización Femenina Popular have the capacity to mobilize thousands of women and men against militarization and the war and to bring forward proposals based on peace with justice. Disturbingly, women's organizations in Colombia have reported a relative increase in violence against women since the beginning of the demobilization process Conferencia Episcopal de Colombia y CODHES, Desafíos para construir nación: El país ante el desplazamiento, el conflicto armado y la crisis humanitaria , Bogotá, 2006, p. 19. CODHES, Número de Personas Desplazadas por Departamento de Llegada por trimestre 2005, CODHES Web site, Colombia: Humanitarian emergency looms for indigenous communities. UNHCR Briefing Notes, April This brief makes reference to a report by the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia which states that more than 19,000 indigenous people were displaced in United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Integration of the Human Rights of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective; Violence Against Women, report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, Mission to Colombia, submitted to the 58 th Session of the UNCHR, March E/CN.4/2002/83/Add.3 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Integration of the Human Rights of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective; Violence Against Women, report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, Mission to Colombia, submitted to the 58 th Session of the UNCHR, March E/CN.4/2002/83/Add.3 Interview between Rachel Warden of KAIROS Canada and Mujeres que Crean, Medellín, February 6, TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR CANADIAN POLICY ON COLOMBIA NOVEMBER

13 In response to legal actions brought by organizations of the internally displaced, the Constitutional Court issued a ruling (T-025) in 2004 that ordered the government to design a national plan for attention to internally displaced families. However the national plan is drastically under-funded by the government, and government authorities often participate only when forced by public pressure. Following the demobilization of paramilitary forces, there is now a significant risk that new displacements will not be recognized as such by state authorities. People are told they cannot be registered as internally displaced since they are not fleeing the actions of a recognized armed actor, but rather those of common criminals. Due to the ongoing human rights situation, Colombia is classified by Canada as a source country one of the few countries in the world where it is necessary that people be allowed to solicit asylum without having to leave the country first. Security conditions for people are so grave that people s lives are at serious risk if they are forced to cross the border to another country. Although the Canadian Embassy in Bogotá previously welcomed the information and recommendations made by Colombian human rights organizations with regard to specific asylum cases, it appears that this is no longer the case. Today, the embassy does not accept recommendations for individual asylum cases; it advises people to self present either in person or in writing. Nor will the embassy expedite cases of individuals under immediate threat the urgent protection program is not operative. Instead, these people are advised to travel to neighbouring countries and apply from there. Recommendation #1 Canada must ensure that Colombia remains a foreign policy priority in the Americas. Canada should employ a human rights framework to inform all Canadian policy towards Colombia, including trade and investment policy, in order to ensure policy coherence with our obligations under international human rights law. 12 Recommendation #2 Canada should support and encourage an independent, strong and diverse human rights community in Colombia. Specifically, Canada should: Increase funding, visible accompaniment, and public recognition of the role of human rights defenders and organizations in Colombia; Continue to provide financial and explicit political support to women s organizations in their efforts to defend women s human rights and build alternatives based on human rights and durable peace; Seek out opportunities to address the particular needs of vulnerable groups of displaced people: women and their children, indigenous peoples, and Afro-Colombians. 12 Reference to human rights includes both individual and collective rights. TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR CANADIAN POLICY ON COLOMBIA NOVEMBER

14 Recommendation #3 Foreign Affairs Canada should issue a Ministerial Statement urging the Colombian government to follow the constitutional ruling T-025 and implement the plan for internally displaced people. CIDA should increase its strong support to internally displaced people and their associations through Canadian and Colombian NGOs, so that they can meaningfully participate in programs to address their needs, and in the design of reparations for the violations they have suffered. Recommendation #4 Citizenship and Immigration Canada should maintain source country status for Colombia and make use of programs to provide temporary visas for persons in need of emergency processing under the urgent protection program. Immigration staff at the Embassy should convene a meeting of Colombian civil society organizations that represent victims of human rights violations to hear their concerns, and to define a process in which their information and expertise are taken into account in processing asylum cases. Effort should be made to accelerate the process for all protection cases. 2.2 An Economy in Crisis A Militarized Economy: Organized criminal mafias are using the drug trade to gain economic and political power. Colombia is a major producer of illegal drugs. The production and export of cocaine constitutes a massive illegal economy largely controlled by numerous drug cartels made up of wealthy and influential individuals within Colombian society. These cartels are closely linked to the paramilitary organizations in Colombia, and in a number of cases are one and the same. Guerrilla organizations (principally the FARC, and to a lesser degree the ELN) are also involved in the production and export of cocaine. Through the laundering of drug profits and the use of ruthless violence, paramilitaries have penetrated significant sections of the economy. It is now extremely difficult to distinguish between legitimate businesses and those controlled by the paramilitaries something that must be taken into account when considering Canada s growing trade and investment in Colombia. Paramilitaries control the northern ports as well as a number of lotteries, cable TV franchises, and local private medical clinics. These activities process large amounts of cash, permitting effective money-laundering, as well as providing opportunities for smuggling, extortion, and other illegal activities. There continues to be strong evidence of collusion between paramilitary groups and the Colombian military despite insistence from the international community that the government take action to break such links. 13 After the municipal and congressional elections in 2004, paramilitary commander Salvatore Mancuso claimed that paramilitaries controlled 35% of the 13 The UNHCHR has made this recommendation each year since the office in Colombia began to present reports. Organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have reiterated this demand in multiple reports. The Group of 24 Donor Nations also made this recommendation in the London Declaration in TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR CANADIAN POLICY ON COLOMBIA NOVEMBER

15 Colombian congress. Most analysts agree that paramilitary forces gained influence in Congress with the 2006 elections. They have taken control of many municipal and departmental governments and have penetrated even the national intelligence service. Such economic and political power in the hands of the paramilitary has seriously weakened democratic structures in Colombia. The growing illegal economy, largely based on drugs but rapidly integrating with the legal economy, is not contained by national boundaries. The increasing economic and political power of drug mafias has the potential to allow organized crime to become institutionalized in the political and economic systems throughout the region Economic Policies and Employment: While union leaders continue to be violently repressed, legislative reforms are undermining the rights of workers. The impacts of the violence and internal conflict have been compounded by 15 years of economic policies that have undermined the livelihoods of the working majority. Colombian state structures responsible for social policy have been weakened, reformed, or entirely dismantled. A growth in GDP over the past several years has been accompanied by a rise in poverty, social exclusion, unemployment and under-employment, and job insecurity. 14 The rights of workers have been undermined by a series of legislative reforms including proposals for reforming the Constitution, and changes in the labour law. The latter legalizes the withdrawal of benefits previously mandated by law in accordance with Colombia's obligations as a member of the International Labour Organization. Permanent jobs in the formal sector are being eliminated and replaced with non-unionized, casual and subcontracted work. Rates of unionization have declined to less than 5% of the workforce, and barely 1% of the population is covered by a collective agreement. 15 Trade unions and union membership is declining due to various factors including: the liquidation and reorganisation of state enterprises and public companies; the deregulation of employment through subcontracted cooperatives or the informal economy; and the relocation of production to sweatshops ( maquilas ) in free trade zones outside the reach of labour laws. The flower industry is a paradigmatic example of the confluence of labour law reform on the one hand, and the violent repression of unions on the other, to protect certain economic interests. The mostly female workers in the flower industry regularly face long hours, poverty wages, sexual harassment, obligatory pregnancy testing, and exposure to high levels of pesticides that have been linked to a variety of health problems. 16 Short-term work contracts make union organizing more difficult, and the flower industry has hired thugs to repress those attempting to organize around working conditions International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Background Report: Colombian trade union mission to Members States of the European Union, May, Ibid. Cyndi Mellon, Women and Flowers: A Toxic Combination, Americas Update, March/April 1996, p. 4; American University, Trade and Environment Database [TED], Rose Trade and the Environment, January 1998, p.5. TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR CANADIAN POLICY ON COLOMBIA NOVEMBER

16 Changes to labour law are being effected at the same time as the deliberate intimidation, harassment, threats, murders and disappearances of trade union leaders and members are being carried out by armed groups. These human rights violations are perpetrated against trade unionists as a form of intimidation and terror to prevent them from carrying out their union responsibilities and activities. These violations have sometimes occurred in collaboration with employers in the context of regular union activities such as collective bargaining, strikes, or other kinds of job action. 17 More trade unionists are killed in Colombia than in all other countries combined. In 2005, 70 trade unionists were killed in Colombia, and hundreds more were threatened and subjected to violent attacks. 18 Murders and other violations against union leaders are met with almost total impunity. Concern over these cases has been brought forward at the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). 19 While Colombia has ratified many ILO Conventions, it consistently fails to comply with their obligations. Due to persistent impunity and the number of unresolved cases, the ILO mandated a High-Level Tripartite Visit (comprising government, employer, and worker representatives), to visit Colombia in October Based on this mission, the Committee on Freedom of Association s 2006 report to the ILO Governing Body noted that the situation of violence against trade unionists and impunity is still extremely serious, since very little progress has yet been made to improve it and that existing government protection measures for trade unionists under threat cannot provide any definitive solution to the problem of violence as long as there continue to be individuals or groups that are able to carry on threatening trade unions with impunity. 20 This tripartite mission resulted in an agreement concluded in Geneva, on 1 June, 2006 between the three Colombian trade union centrals, 21 Colombian employers' representatives and the Colombian government. The agreement guarantees a permanent ILO presence in Colombia and will aim to promote decent work conditions. It also places emphasis on the defence of the fundamental rights of workers, trade unionists and trade union organisations, and most particularly the right to protection of life, to trade union freedom, freedom of association and expression, collective bargaining, and employers' freedom of enterprise. This agreement was hailed by trade union representatives as "the fruit of twenty years' work by trade unions within the ILO" For example, court cases over this collaboration involving Coca Cola Company and Drummond Coal are currently underway. Colombian National Trade Union School (Escuela Nacional Sindical), Report on the violation of human rights of Colombian unionists in 2005, April For example, Informe de la alta Comisionada de las naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos sobre la situación de los Derechos humanos en Colombia, Commission for Human Rights, 62 nd Session, January 20, 2006, E/CN.4/20006/9. Hundreds of cases have been cited over the years in the annual surveys of violations of trade union rights of the Internacional Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Committee on Freedom of Association, Report to the ILO Governing Body, Report No. 340, March, 2006, paragraphs 608 and 611. These are the Cental Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT), Confederación General de Trabajo (CGT), and the Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia (CTC). International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Tripartite agreement on a permanent ILO presence in Colombia, On-line Bulletin, June 2, 2006, available at &Language=EN TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR CANADIAN POLICY ON COLOMBIA NOVEMBER

17 Recommendation #5 The Canadian government should: maintain strong support for the Tripartite Agreement signed at the International Labour Conference on June 1, 2006; monitor and promote, through its Embassy in Colombia and the International Labour Program within Human Resources Skills Development Canada (HRSDC), rapid and effective implementation of the measures agreed upon in the agreement; offer funding for the operation of the Permanent Mission of the ILO to be set up under the terms of the Tripartite Agreement; report to interested Canadian civil society groups on any relevant information on this topic received from Colombian government officials (eg. from the Ministry of Labour and Presidency). 2.3 Peace and Demobilization: Without legitimate processes for truth, justice and reparations there cannot be durable solutions to the conflict. The current demobilization process of paramilitary groups is fundamentally flawed. Under its current framework, it will not contribute to addressing the root causes of the conflict, and in fact may exacerbate them. Supporting a credible and just process is not only a moral issue for past injustice, it is also fundamental to ensuring the generations-old cycle of violence does not become the future The Justice and Peace Law Does Not Guarantee People s Right to Truth, Justice or Reparation The government initiated peace talks with the paramilitary organizations of the United Self- Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) in July of The AUC declared a cessation of hostilities in December of 2002 which the government had established as a pre-condition for entering into formal discussions on a demobilization process. The ceasefire has been repeatedly violated without any consequences for the demobilization. 23 Many members of the international community Canada very vocally among them insisted that the Colombian government put in place a legal framework for the demobilization process that complied with international standards on truth, justice and reparations, as a condition for providing support. The international community maintained that demobilizations without an adequate legal framework would be counterproductive and unlikely to succeed in establishing long-term peace. A law called the Justice and Peace Law, passed in 2005, purported to be such a legal framework. Nevertheless, the massive demobilizations that occurred in 2005 took place under the previous legal regime that is, outside of any adequate legal framework. In practice and in defiance of the international community, the Colombian government has effectively implemented paramilitary demobilization of 32,000 combatants outside a legal framework, and is now presenting the international community with a fait accompli. 23 According to Amnesty International, more than 2, 300 killings and disappearances have been attributed to the paramilitaries since they declared a ceasefire in December TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR CANADIAN POLICY ON COLOMBIA NOVEMBER

18 Further, the Justice and Peace Law itself very clearly does not meet international standards for truth, justice and reparations. It has been strongly criticized by international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, as well as by the United Nations Human Rights Office in Colombia. Under international law, states have a strict obligation to investigate the crimes perpetrated during a conflict and to prosecute and sanction those responsible. These crimes have no statute of limitations and are not subject to amnesty. The Justice and Peace Law of 2005 provides no basis for investigation or prosecution of past crimes. It does, however, provide reduced sentences for people who have an outstanding legal charge against them. This means that the only people who are likely to take advantage of this law are paramilitary ringleaders, including those against whom there is clear evidence of heinous human rights abuses. It is also evident that the Justice and Peace Law does not provide the legal enforcement mechanisms necessary to ensure the dismantling of the structures of illegal armed groups, or the many criminal activities they operate. Paramilitary control of the drug trade, extortion rackets, and gasoline smuggling will therefore not be affected, nor will their control of legitimate businesses bought with profits from illegal activities. The demobilized combatants are, in the majority, young men who have few skills other than the ability to handle arms, and who have grown up in a culture of violence. They receive a monthly allowance from the government ironically, of greater value and for a longer period, than a displaced person receives as well as job-skills training. At the same time, the government program has not been assigned sufficient resources to adequately address the needs of the demobilized combatants, particularly with regard to employment training. Regional representatives of the Human Rights Ombudsman and municipal mayors have voiced concern that they are not included in the local negotiations that decide how demobilization in an area is to take place, yet are expected to accept reinserted paramilitaries into their communities. The Reference and Opportunity Centres, which aim to decentralize delivery of legal, psychological and social services, are mostly understaffed and lack the capacity to coordinate actions with uninformed local authorities and agencies. 24 Mayors do not receive information regarding the numbers of demobilized paramilitaries in their municipalities, nor their locations, nor guarantees of funding to meet the social needs of reinserted paramilitaries once the funding for reinsertion runs out. It is evident that current reinsertion programs need to focus not only on the demobilized combatants, but also the communities who are accepting them. 25 The Victims Movement in Colombia questions the reinsertion of demobilized combatants because it believes reinsertion programs need to be based on a transparent and verifiable demobilization process that is the product of a true dismantling of paramilitary structures. Without this, any reinsertions run the risk of, among other things, failing to prevent history from repeating itself. For example, known paramilitaries have been seen working openly with the International Crisis Group, Colombia: Towards Peace and Justice?, Latin America Report No. 16, March 14 th, 2006 Christian Peacemaker Teams, notes from meeting between Human Rights Workers of Barrancabermeja (ETTDH) and the Mayor, Regional Human Rights Ombudsman, Police Chief, and other municipal government representatives, February 2 nd, TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR CANADIAN POLICY ON COLOMBIA NOVEMBER

19 army in rural zones. 26 Other demobilized paramilitaries are forming security companies through which they re-arm and establish new forms of social control through targeted assassinations, threats against community leaders, and imposition of curfews, for example. 27 The most recent reports of the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (known by its Spanish acronym, MAPP-OEA) documents several cases of concern where demobilized combatants have regrouped into criminal gangs that control illegal economic activities and intimidate communities. 28 Canada originally maintained that it would support demobilizations only within an adequate legal framework that complied with international standards. The current demobilization is not even taking place under the much-criticized Justice and Peace Law, let alone an adequate legal framework. Only if the current demobilization process is changed so that it meets international standards, should Canada consider supporting re-insertion programs and even then with great caution. The Justice and Peace Law established a National Commission of Reparation and Reconciliation. One of the main criticisms Colombian civil society groups have of the Commission is that reparations under the Commission only apply to the victims of those paramilitary members who were tried under the Justice and Peace law, a small fraction of the total number of paramilitary being demobilized. The result is that the number of victims eligible for reparations has been reduced to a minimum before the work of the Commission has even begun. Funds for reparations are supposed to come from the assets turned in by the demobilized paramilitaries, the budget assigned by the national government and from international donors. But perpetrators of human rights offences only have to declare assets they obtained illegally and have in their possession, and the Commission does not have a mandate to investigate. Currently, demobilized paramilitaries circumvent this provision by simply assigning assets to a third party, such as a family member or company. These resources therefore are not taken into account as compensation for victims. Colombia has one of the most unequal distributions of arable land in Latin America and access to land is one of the root causes of the conflict. Estimates are that the paramilitaries have acquired between three and four million hectares of the best agricultural land in the country through extortion, forced displacement and assassinations. This land has been taken from Afro- Colombians, indigenous peoples, and peasant communities. The Justice and Peace law does not offer any real incentive for the return of this illegally appropriated land. Without a return of stolen land, it is difficult to see what options are left for displaced people to re-establish their livelihoods Denouncements made by Christian Peacemaker Teams to the Regional Human Rights Ombudsman, Barrancabermeja, October 25 th, 2005 and November 9, 2005; denouncement made by the Regional Human Rights Ombudsman, Barrancabermeja, to the Military and government officials in the Municipal Security Council, October 29, Examples cited as well as additional ones can be found in Observatorio de Paz Integral, Boletin No. 12, March, Permanent Council of the OAS, Sixth Quarterly Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/-OEA), CP.doc/ , February 6, TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR CANADIAN POLICY ON COLOMBIA NOVEMBER