Soviet Rifle Regiment/Battalion Tactics

Transcription

1 Soviet Rifle Regiment/Battalion Tactics Fighting at the Micro-Tactical Level WWII Copyright 2011, Breaker McCoy, Editor This book was copyright protected and may not be reproduced in part or whole, or sold, without the express written consent from the author of this book. All Rights Reserved. Table of Contents: 25 Chapters, Appendix Introduction Chapters 1. Soviet Battalion Command from the 1930s 2. Soviet Tactics Prior to Soviet Rifle Platoon 4. Soviet Rifle Battalion and Company 5. Soviet Rifle Regiment and Battalion 6. Soviet Infantry Attack Tactics 7. Red Commander's Battle Place

2 8. Soviet Infantry Tactical Preparations 9. Soviet Assault Regiments and Battalions 10. Soviet Defensive Innovation 11. Soviet Rifle Regiment/Battalion Defenses 12. Defensive Tactics of a Rifle Battalion 13. Soviet Rifle Battalion Firepower (Defense) 14. Soviet Mortars Supporting Rifle Battalions 15. Russian Infiltration Tactics 16. Soviet Tactical Rifle Attack Formations 17. Two Rifle Battalions Attack 18. Battalion Fighting in the Enemy Rear 19. Cooperative Action by Commanders of the 1142d and 176th Rifle Regiments 20. Infantry Combat Training in Wartime 21. Soviet Unit Training in Wartime 22. Soviet Rifle Battalion in the City Fight 23. Units of Fire and Ammunition Reserves 24. Soviet Rifle Battalion Antitank Guns 25. Soviet Rifle Battalion in a Night Attack: Exercise Involving the Reader Appendix: Soviet Rifle Battalion Bibliography

3 Introduction It was possible that we study the giants of military history (who may be born rather than made) and too little the performance of the sergeants, captains, and colonels on whose collective shoulders so much rests.----ltg Walter Ulmer Some national armies, fixated on attrition and micromanagement, think that the battalion commander holds the most important job in the army. To such armies the battalion commander was the vital link between strategic and operational maneuver and tactical execution of plans at the small unit team level. They consider his command to the essence of tactical command. The battalion commander was the closest senior leader to see and fight the battle. He synchronizes decisive combat power at the forward edge of battle if he was deployed with his battalion. (US battalion commanders are frequently so far back behind their battalion that they see only parts of their battalion's combat area and then on maps.) He skillfully employs the dynamics of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership in a unique environment which must withstand the extraordinary stress of combat. Obscure situations, compressed time for decisions which must incorporate risk and initiative, and the psychological weight of personnel and materiel losses dramatically demonstrate that the most essential

4 element of combat power was the competent and confident leadership of the battalion commanders Infantry battalion commanders must be capable of leading their units on battlefields characterized by dispersed formations and independence of action. Successful leadership of battalions in combat operations has always been of some significance. Therefore, the training of infantry battalion commanders for command in combat was of great importance for future combat battalion commanders to turn to military history. The question then becomes: what skills of command of battalions in combat can be learned from a study of selected combat battalion commanders of the past? The nine US Army Rifle Battalion leadership competencies outlined in FM22-100are: (1) Communications; (2) Supervision; (3)and Counseling; (4) Soldier Team Development: (5)Technical and Tactical Proficiency; (6) Decision Making;Planning: (8) Use of Available Systems: and (9)Professional Ethics. However, one of the model was entitled "other" to allow for the identification of a competency which was drawn the course of the study. Red Army battalion commanders were real combat commanders who lived and died with their unit. Few US battalion commanders, in comparison, ever die in

5 combat (since World war I) because they are usually too far behind the lines to be on task or useful. Red Army regimental and battalion commanders were better at their tasks than any other army's battalion commanders except the Germans, Finns and some of the best Romanians. In fact Red army regimental and battalion commanders were trained in methods of combat directly copied from the Germans who actually gave away too many combat secrets to the communists in the 1920s in return for use of secret Soviet training grounds. Because of the high attrition experienced when any army fought the German Wehrmacht, the numbers of dead and wounded Soviet regimental and battalion commanders were always high. That standard condition forced the Red Army to constantly move poorly trained infantry battalion and regimental commanders into the thousands of combat infantry slots always open by dint of heavy casualties within the Red Army in World War II. However, the Red Army copied and even excelled the unique German Army practice of examining current information on recent battles and incorporating those lessons into improved methodology. Other army's such as the inglorious US, British and Canadian (ABC) armies, give great lip service to after action reports but always mismanaged that category. In addition their ABC officers are only

6 slightly literate and totally disinterred in military war fighting. Most such officers are more interested in military politics and so read or practice very little "lessons learned." Of course their innovations are politically oriented and had only negative effects on military performance. For the professional soldier or the soldiers who seeks professionalism there was nothing better to study than the experiences and thinking of the twin exemplars of World War II combat, the German Wehrmact and the Soviet armed forces. This ebook offers totally unique analysis and facts on the very important aspect of conventional warfare carried out by battalion and regimental commanders. (The US Army, in comparison, was so corrupt that they no longer had battalion and regimental commanders.)

7 Chapter 1 Soviet Battalion Command from the 1930s Echoing the ideas and works of Tukhachevskiy and Triandafillov, the 1936 Red Army Provisional Field Regulations emphasized the importance of combinedarms cooperation, rapid maneuver, and commanders' personal initiative to achieve success in future war. The regulations affirmed that infantry in close cooperation with artillery and tanks decides the outcome of battles, and that personal initiative was of the utmost importance, especially when sudden changes occur in the combat situation. These regulations gave the battalion commander considerable responsibility for the control and employment of combined arms. For example, it directed the maneuver battalion commander to take attached tank and artillery commanders on personal reconnaissance prior to battle, and ensure that proper cooperation was maintained between the artillery, the tanks, and the infantry. The commander would receive attached tanks to support his infantry units, and in offensive actions he could even place these tanks under control of his infantry platoon or company commanders. Direct support artillery battalions were also to respond to orders from the infantry battalion commander (sometimes company) whom they supported.

8 While the 1936 Field Regulations spoke of tanks, artillery, and infantry under a battalion commander, the 1942 version addressed only pure battalions, making the line battalion, at least for a time, a mere cog in a developing operational machine. Reviewing accounts of Soviet unit deployments during the Great Patriotic War leaves little wonder why German commanders such as Mellenthin, Manstein, and Guderian clamied to had seen minimal initiative on the part of junior Soviet officers. As early as 1933, Red Army officers had formulated basic concepts of tank and moto-mechanized warfare. At Nomonhan and in the Finnish War, they gained experience in the strengths and weaknesses of armor. The critical importance of small-unit infantry tactics, the necessity of coordination and flexibility in maneuver and fire power, and the methods of artillery-infantry-tank rupture of a powerful fortified position also had been clarified in the Finnish War. However, some serious weaknesses of the Red Army's tactical abilities became apparent during the Russo-Finnish War, where: "[a]t the company/battery and infantry- and artillery-battalion level the lack of proper coordination with other arms was especially marked. The officers simply did not know how to use their forces properly nor did they understand the possibilities of other arms. The infantry was

9 not properly trained for close-in Fighting, nor could it always take proper advantage of artillery support during the offense. " The Finnish War provided excellent experience in winter operations and in the assault of fortified positions. The Red Army of the late 1930s and early 1940s was not yet-up to the task of defending the USSR at the tactical level.

10 Chapter 2 Soviet Tactics Prior to 1942 At the beginning of the Russo-German War, June 1941, the Red Army tactical doctrines, which had developed from a mixture of Western European practice and original thinking, were still largely theoretical and untried. It was true that Red Army leaders had made careful studies of World War I, the Russian and Spanish Civil Wars, and the first year of World War II. But these lessons were not fully digested, even by higher officers. Rapid mobilization between 1937 and 1941 had brought great numbers of inexperienced leaders into service. The tactical modernization of the Red Army had just begun when the Germans invaded the U. S. S. R. In command was concentrated in the infantry staff. although artillery was receiving continually increasing responsibility. The basic operational unit was the powerful infantry division, nearly 18,000 men strong, with two regiments of artillery and a battalion of tanks. Except in the Far East, the corps was the highest organized command structure. Full emphasis upon combat intelligence was not.et evident, although notable beginnings had been made in the development of aerial photo-topography, special maps, and photographic ground reconnaissance; and sound ranging was in an

11 advanced stage. Schemes of maneuver and combat dispositions in the offensive were conventional, featuring a predominance of frontal terrain objectives and deeply echeloned infantry assault forces. Sound defensive doctrines existed. These showed thorough appreciation of the importance of depth, all-around security, successive obstacle systems covered by fire, and the employment of artillery in counter preparation and antitank action. Staff work was detailed and slow, with written orders being employed as low as the regiment. Coordination presented a notable weakness; commanders overstressed personal leadership to the detriment of control. Supporting arms were not fully exploited. Signal planning and techniques especially the employment of radio were deficient. In infantry tactics, the concepts of fire, maneuver, infiltration, and encirclement were beginning to crystallize. Mixed teams of infantry, engineers, and direct-fire artillery for special missions were not yet in evidence. However, rapidly prepared field fortifications, excellent camouflage, and the mass use of specialized snipers were standard practices. Throughout the years prior to World War II, the Red Army concentrated attention on artillery tactics and techniques. By 1941, considerable progress had been made in analyzing artillery capabilities; developing observation and fire

12 direction; employing destruction fire, barrages, and concentrations; and in handling artillery organizations. Four artillery divisions existed. The lack of heavy mortars and of massed mortar fire was an important deficiency. Large-scale employment of armor was still in its infancy, with experimental tank divisions being the most powerful mechanized units. Technical equipment was riot fully developed, while the roles of infantry, engineers, and supporting fire power in armored operations were incompletely understood. In contrast, large horse cavalry units had not been neglected; a powerful cavalry arm, coordinated with artillery and armor, existed at the beginning of the war. When the Germans invaded the USSR in June 1941, inexperienced commanders abounded in the Soviet ranks. Officers, who had recently headed companies and battalions, were now commanding divisions and corps. Is there any wonder why the Soviets had problems with combined-arms warfare at all levels in 1941, when the experienced junior leaders had either already been promoted (often beyond their level of competence), were imprisoned, or were dead? The first phase of the Russo-German War, June to November 1941, was a costly delaying action by the initial protective forces of the U. S. S. R. It revealed the tactical weaknesses of the prewar army; at the same time, new techniques were improvised. Deep obstacle systems justified themselves thoroughly, as did

13 artillery especially in the new role of direct fire. Combat in encirclement and partisan warfare proved effective. Heavy losses of equipment in the early days of the war complicated and hampered the army's combined-arms capabilities. To make better use of their remaining assets, the Soviets quickly disbanded their large rifle and mechanized corps and created smaller armies of rifle brigades and divisions. Some field artillery and anti-air units were withdrawn from rifle divisions and armies, and placed directly under the High Command where they could be allocated depending on the needs of the battlefield. Tank brigades, regiments, and battalions were formed for infantry support and counterattack missions. However, they were often parceled out piecemeal to infantry podrazdeleniye, leaving none for exploitation or counterattack.') In 1941 at the battle of Moscow, the Red Army averaged battalion per KM of front; by the summer of 1942 this had grown to 2-4 battalions per Km and in it was At Kursk and Yassy-Kishinev, some rifle corps even reached 9 battalions per KM. With 8 or 9 battalions operating across one kilometer, it was probably quite difficult for a battalion commander to demonstrate any independent thought or action.

14 However, even the modern US Army, in 2011, has not allowed battalion commanders to employ their initiative since 1950 in spite of their high technology. In fact, the primary use of high technology in the US armed forces was to facilitate US military micro-management with generals managing squads like they did in Vietnam. Yet the US armed forces had always been the first to criticize other armed forces of "allowing no initiative." It s a smoke screen that implies the lie that the US armed forces had allowed command initiative at the tactical level since the 1950s. However, just because one showed no initiative when operating as part of a larger body, there was no reason to assume that given a different set of circumstances a commander would not relish the opportunity to make his own decisions, to control and maneuver his unit independently, and to demonstrate his technical competence. This was precisely what occurred when battalions and brigades became forward detachments for their parent organizations. By November 1941, the mobilized reserves of the U. S. S. R. were ready, and could be thrown in for powerful counterattacks at Tikhvin, Rostov, and Moscow. Between November 1941 and May 1942, the Russians engaged in a winter-spring offensive which ready broke the German lines, but at great cost. The soundness of husbanding reserves for counter operations at the critical time and the

15 effectiveness of infiltrating ski units and large-scale cavalry raids were fully proved. Yet many weaknesses were evident. At Rostov (November 1941), the absence of motorized infantry, self-propelled artillery, and motorized bridging equipment prevented the Red Army from annihilating the encircled German forces. On the Central Front (January April 1942), lack of air cover led to the destruction of the cavalry supply lines and nullified the offensive. At Kharkov (May 1942), inadequate flank protection for the advancing mechanized salient produced disaster. New Soviet Tactical Doctrines While the 1936 Field Regulations spoke of tanks, artillery, and infantry under a battalion commander, the 1942 version addressed only pure battalions, making the line battalion, at least for a time, a mere cog in a developing operational machine. Reviewing accounts of Soviet unit deployments during the Great Patriotic War leaves little wonder why German commanders such as Mellenthin, Manstein, and Guderian claimed to had seen minimal initiative on the part of junior Soviet officers. The High Command of the fled Army studied the reverses of 1941 and 1942 assiduously. By the autumn of 1942, it had assimilated the combat lessons of the

16 war, formulated radically new combat regulations for the arms and the staffs, developed new organizations, and begun mass production of fully modern equipment. As a result of his tactical evaluation. command responsibilities were specifically divided between the commander and staff of combined arms, and the chiefs of arms and services. The Commander became responsible for plans of maneuver and direct control of critical phases of an operation. His staff assumed the function of coordination, while the chiefs of arms and services were charged with detailed planning and control of their particular elements. The army became the basic planning and command group; army group mid even several headquarters coordinated major operations. Uncompromising thoroughness of reconnaissance was required, both by combined and specialized arms. Soviet Tactics Prior To 1942 At the beginning of the Russo-German War, June 1941, the Red Army tactical doctrines, which had developed from a mixture of Western European practice and original thinking, were still largely theoretical and untried. It was true that Red Army leaders had made careful studies of World War I, the Russian and Spanish Civil Wars, and the first year of World War II. As early as 1933, Red Army officers had formulated basic concepts of tank and moto-mechanized warfare. At Nomonhan and in the Finnish War, they

17 gained experience in the strengths and weaknesses of armor. The critical importance of small-unit infantry tactics, the necessity of coordination and flexibility in maneuver and fire power, and the methods of artillery-infantry. tank rupture of a powerful fortified position also had been clarified in the Finnish War. But these lessons were not fully digested, even by higher offi cers. Rapid mobilization between 1937 and 1941 had brought great numbers of inexperienced leaders into service. The tactical modernization of the Red Army had just begun when the Germans invaded the U. S. S. R. In command was concentrated in the in fantry staff. although artillery was receiving con tinually increasing responsibility. The basic Soviet operational unit was the powerful infantry division, nearly 18,000 strong, with two regiments of artillery and a battalion of tanks. Except in the Far East, the corps was the highest organized command structure. Full emphasis upon combat intelligence was not yet evident, although notable beginnings had been made in the development of aerial photography, special maps, and photographic ground reconnaissance; and sound ranging was in an advanced stage. Schemes of maneuver and combat dispositions in the offensive were conventional, featuring a predominance of frontal terrain objectives and deeply echeloned infantry assault forces.

18 Sound defensive doctrines existed. These showed thorough appreciation of the importance of depth, all-around security, successive obstacle systems cov ered by fire, and the employment of artillery in counter preparation and antitank action. Staff work was detailed and slow, with written orders being employed as low as the regiment. Coordination presented a notable weakness; commanders overstressed personal leadership to the detriment of control. Supporting arms were not fully exploited. Signal planning and techniques especially the employment of radio were deficient. In infantry tactics, the concepts of fire, maneuver, infiltration, and encirclement were beginning to crystallize. Mixed teams of infantry, engineers, and direct-fire artillery for special missions were not yet in evidence. However, rapidly prepared field fortifications, excellent camouflage, and the mass use of specialized snipers were standard practices. Throughout the years prior to World War II, the Red Army concentrated attention on artillery tactics and techniques. By 1941, considerable progress had been made in analyzing artillery capabilities; developing observation and fire direction; employing destruction fire, barrages, and concentrations; and in handling artillery organizations. Four artillery divisions existed. The lack of heavy mortars and of massed mortar fire was an important deficiency.

19 Large-scale employment of armor was still in its infancy, with experimental tank divisions being the most powerful mechanized units. Technical equipment was not fully developed, while the roles of infantry, engineers, and supporting fire power in armored operations were incompletely understood. In contrast, large horse cavalry units had not been neglected; a powerful cavalry arm, coordinated with artillery and armor, existed at the beginning of the war. Operation procedures were developed for systematically disseminating intelligence directly to using agencies. New tactical schemes were brought forward: converging double envelopment, parallel pursuit, and centralized and decentralized defense. The major development in staff work was the required employment of precise tables of combat coordination, which assured continuous, systematic cooperation of all arms. Such cooperation was further aided by advances in tactical signal communications, including the formation of special command, staff, cooperation, and other nets. Reserves were committed in concentrated blows to exploit successes. The maneuverability of infantry was now organized and exploited to the utmost; the employment of small, mixed teams with heavy fire power facilitated infiltration, encirclement, and hasty defense. Deep echelon systems were replaced by wide frontal formations which promoted better lateral control and more flexible

20 maneuverability. Artillery became the main striking force of the Red Army. The new concept of the "artillery and air offensive" embodied the responsibility of the artillery to coordinate all supporting fire power and to provide overwhelming fire power in anticipation of infantry requirements. 'lo achieve this goal, large numbers of artillery organizations artillery divisions, mortar divisions, antiaircraft artillery divisions, artillery brigades, etc were formed. Direct fire became a normal function of all types of artillery. In general, artillery was used with great aggressiveness. To implement deep mechanized operations, two basic types of mobile corps were created: the tank corps and the mechanized corps.' The tank corps, operating with infantry, had a high proportion of tanks and great shock power suitable for penetrations. The mechanized corps, with a large motorized infantry component and fewer tanks, was best fitted for exploitation. In addition, some ordinary infantry was motorized for special operations; shuttling by motor increased the mobility of still other units. The cavalry corps, aided by strong armor and artillery, retained a major role in special operations. Engineers operated in immediate conjunction with assault waves, not only breaking gaps through minefields and obstacles, but also providing immediate defense of newly won positions. Balanced, powerful tactical antiaircraft gun units (12.7mm,

21 37mm, and 8.5mm), operating in close coordination with friendly fighter aircraft, helped prevent repetition of earlier disasters from hostile air action. In special operations, the technique of river crossings especially was perfected. Crossings on a wide front, powerful artillery support, use of improvised as well as table-of-organization equipment, and rapid construction of timber bridges were characteristic. Tactical surprises such as underwater bridges were introduced. Defensive and offensive fighting in cities received careful attention. The Soviets clearly realized the importance of detailed reconnaissance, direct-fire artillery, and aggressive and rapid action by infantry well equipped with submachine guns and grenades. Trends After Stalingrad On 22 January 1942 the Stavka ordered that tank brigades and separate tank battalions would not be divided when committed. These units were generally assigned to armies or corps and employed in close connection with infantry, artillery and aviation units. The combined-arms concept remained strong, but because of the limited assets and few capable commanders, the lowest element of combined-arms control, apart from these tanks units, was now placed at the regiment/division level. The Soviets returned some responsibility for combinedarms coordination to the battalion commander. The basic tactics of the present

22 Red Army were formulated in 1942 and were revealed for the first time in the victory of Stalingrad. Following the Stalingrad campaign, modifications of Soviet tactics were governed by the need of destroying deep, bitterly defended German positions, and by the availability of increasing quantities of modern materiel and well trained officers. Consequently, heavy mine-clearing, bridging, and flame-throwing tanks had been introduced; assault engineer-pioneer brigades had been developed; artillery has been reinforced by super-heavy equipment; and mobile corps had been provided with stronger echelons of self-propelled artillery, mortars, and rockets. As a result of these measures, operations even against powerful positions can progress rapidly. At the same time, mobility and flexibility of control had increased. Greater motorization and the use of ducks and amphibious tanks had speeded operations. Partial decentralization of control from army to infantry corps, has facilitated more rapid reactions to unexpected situations. The 1944 Field Regulations further determined that battalions needed "at least 3 hours of daylight for work on the terrain" in preparation for an operation. Since commanders of forward detachments usually took two to three hours to prepare their podrazdeleniye (e.g. forward detachment, another tactic that the US Army has proven incompetent to master), the 1944 Regulations, in effect

23 considered the average Soviet battalion commander nearly as capable as German Captains commanding battalions. By 1944, the junior Soviet offficer had done much to redeem himself for the failures of Even von Mellenthin, once so critical acknowledged large armored and mechanized formations developed into a highly mobile and keenly egded tool, handled by daring and capable commanders. Even the junior officers became remarkably efficient. By 1945, companies and battalions of both close support tanks and artillery were often attached to support individual rifle battalions.

24 Chapter 3 Soviet Rifle Platoon The Soviet army at the outbreak of war was the least mechanized of all the major armies, its soldiers some of the worst equipped with minimal effective training. That said, there are many accounts of these soldiers equaling and in sometimes exceeding the well-equipped and disciplined forces of the Wehrmacht. The Soviet platoon on the eve of the German invasion was organized thus (at least on paper): 1 Platoon commander armed with a pistol 1 NCO armed with a SMG 1 Messenger armed with a rifle 1 NCO armed with a rifle commanded the mortar squad 1 Mortar gunner with a 50mm mortar, he also had a pistol 2 Ammunition bearers for the mortar both armed with rifles The Soviet rifle platoon included four squads each with: 1 Squad leader, an NCO armed with a rifle 2 Soldiers armed with SMGs 6 Soldiers armed with rifles 1 Machine gunner with an LMG, and pistol sidearm 1 Assistant gunner armed with a rifle

25 Variations in Soviet rifle platoons include the following: The 50mm mortar squad was often not present. There were insufficient Light machine guns and not all squads would had their allocations. Sub-machine guns were also in short supply and their full allotment was unlikely to have been present.

26 During most of the post-invasion period, the fourth squad of the platoon did not exist as any thing more than a paper reference. Anti-tank rifles were issued to some units. These were present at the outbreak of the invasion but ammunition was not always at hand. Rifle Platoon Combat Formations In attack a platoon, whether Soviet or German, had a frontage of 100 meters irrespective of whether in Skirmish Line or Rhomboid. In contrast a Russian platoon deployed in a Broad Wedge had a defensive position 250 meters wide by 150 meters deep. The "Defense Sector" of the platoon was 300 meters wide by 250 meters deep, and overlapped those of the neighboring platoons. The platoon was expected have clear fire on a 400 meters wide area in front of the main battle line. Rifle Squad When in (Skirmish) Line the Soviet squad spread out in a ragged line. In attack the Russians kept 6-8 paces (5-7 meters) between men. In defense a Russian squad covered a meters frontage, and a German squad meters. The mid-1942 Soviet Rifle Platoon By mid-1942, infantry platoon organization had somewhat coalesced into the following pattern, with the squads reduced to 9 men:

27 1 Platoon commander armed with a pistol 1 NCO armed with an SMG 1 or 2 Sniper/Messengers armed with a rifle The platoon would had four squads each with: 1 Squad leader, an NCO armed with a rifle 6 Soldiers armed with rifles/smg still predominantly rifles, but distribution varied widely 1 Machine gunner with an LMG, with a pistol sidearm 1 Assistant gunner armed with a rifle

28 By the end of 1942 two additional LMG would had been available to the platoon. Again, it was a moot point as to how often the fourth squad actually existed as anything but a paper reference. More changes were forced on the platoon structure as the Soviet infantry continued to suffer staggering casualties into 1943 and The fourth squad ceased to exist even on paper and the platoon s squads increase to 11 men (at least in organizational documentation). Platoon leaders and sniper/messengers ceased to exist, leaving only the platoon commander as the platoon HQ. It appears that some platoons were allocated a couple of sniper rifles, and presumably the better marksmen amongst the riflemen were equipped with these.

29 By 1943, infantry regiments had established SMG companies and it was uncertain how SMGs were distributed within rifle platoons. All we are sure of was that there was a significant rise in the numbers of these weapons available to all infantry units. As in all armies of the period, the rifle was the main weapon of the infantry. For the Soviet forces this was the Mosin-Nagant rifle. This rifle was an

30 unremarkable weapon with no features that stand out. However, it was reliable, and the modernized version that appeared in 1930 was easier to manufacture and remained in service throughout the war. The Soviets also had available the SVT38/40 semi-automatic rifles. These rifles used a gas release system during firing to eject the spent cartridge, thus greatly increasing the rate of fire. The main problem with these rifles was the considerable recoil and muzzle blast. It was, however, a popular weapon and issued mainly to NCO and individual soldiers who had undergone additional training. Captured SVT40s led the Germans to develop their Gewehr 43 rifle, copying the semi-automatic mechanism of the SVT40. The standard Soviet pistol of WW2 was the Tokarev TT-33 automatic pistol. This was basically a copy of a Colt-Browning pistol, modified for easier mass

31 production. The Tokarev replaced the aging Nagant revolvers that had been in service for many years, some of which were still in service at the end of the war. The above Soviet propaganda photograph shows an officer waving a TT-33. The sub-machine gun available to the Soviet infantryman at the outbreak of war was the PPD-1934/38. These were never available in sufficient numbers early in the war to make much of an impact and by 1942 were very sparse on the ground as the Germans had overrun the caches of stockpiled weapons during the initial invasion. The Soviets, like the British with their Sten gun and Germans with their MP40, had to had a design that was easy and quick to produce. The design process started in 1940 came up with a weapon that on all counts was superior to the Sten and the MP40. The PPSh-41 was quick and simple to produce; even old rifle barrels

32 were cut down and used in its construction. The weapon begun to appear in 1942 and as the Soviet forces moved on to the offensive it was issued in large numbers. It characterized the Soviet offensive approach well, move quickly and engage at short range en masse, and keep engaging until you had victory. The Soviet light machine gun that saw service throughout the war was the rugged DP 1929, with its distinctive round, flat overhead magazine. It was a typical Soviet weapon: robust and simple to manufacture. Easy to maintain and reliable, it was popular among the troops to which it was issued.

33 The Soviet army never equipped its infantry with an effective anti-tank weapon throughout the entire war. At the start of the war, the only weapon available to the forces that attempted to halt the Blitzkrieg in 1941 was the PTRD- 41 ATR. This woefully inadequate weapon was based on a German WWI design, and although available in numbers during 1941, the ammunition was not. It was not until 1942 that the weapon saw widespread usage, a time when all other powers were discarding such weapons. Only really useful when employed at close ranges against vulnerable areas of a tank, it required nerve, skill and luck to employ successfully. Chapter 4 Soviet Rifle Company and Battalion Red Army Rifle Company 1943 Red Army infantry units were organized along similar lines as infantry of other nations. At the platoon, company, and battalion level, Soviet infantry used nearly

34 the same basic organization as German infantry. Light mortars had been attached at the company level initially, but they fell out of use, because the platoon received sufficient artillery and mortar support from higher echelons. Red Army Rifle Company, 1943 Company Headquarters o Company Commander, Pistol o Senior Sergeant, PPSh SMG o Anti-Tank Rifleman No. 1, PTRD/PTRS Anti-Tank Rifle o Anti-Tank Rifleman No. 2, PPSh SMG o Messenger No. 1, Rifle/Carbine o Messenger No. 2, Rifle/Carbine o Messenger No. 3, Rifle/Carbine Rifle Platoon (30 of all ranks) o Platoon Headquarters Platoon Leader, Pistol Platoon Sergeant, Rifle/Carbine Messenger, Rifle/Carbine o Rifle Section Sergeant, Section Leader, PPSh SMG Corporal, Rifle/Carbine Machine Gunner No. 1, Degtaryev DP LMG Machine Gunner No. 2, Rifle/Carbine Grenadier, Rifle/Carbine, Hand Grenades Riflemen No. 1, Rifle/Carbine Riflemen No. 2, Rifle/Carbine Riflemen No. 3, Rifle/Carbine Riflemen No. 4, Rifle/Carbine o Rifle Section (same as above) o Rifle Section (same as above) Rifle Platoon (1 Pistol, 3 LMG, 3 SMG, 23 Rifles/Carbines, as above) Rifle Platoon (1 Pistol, 3 LMG, 3 SMG, 23 Rifles/Carbines, as above) Machine Gun Platoon (18 of all ranks) o Platoon Headquarters Platoon Commander, Pistol Platoon Sergeant, PPSh Messenger, Rifle/Carbine

35 o Heavy Machine Gun Squad Sergeant, Squad Leader, Rifle/Carbine Machine Gunner No. 1, Pistol Machine Gunner No. 2, Rifle/Carbine Machine Gunner No. 3, Rifle/Carbine Machine Gunner No. 4, Rifle/Carbine Maxim M.1910 HMG o Heavy Machine Gun Squad (1 Pistol, 4 Rifles, 1 Maxim, as above) o Heavy Machine Gun Squad (1 Pistol, 4 Rifles, 1 Maxim, as above) Rifle Company Formations Soviet Rifle companies attacked on a frontage 350 wide, less at night or in woods, but up to 1 kilometer in rugged mountains The defensive sector of a Russian Rifle company was 700 meters wide by 700 meters deep.company defensive sectors were meant to border each other, but in difficult terrain there could be intervals of up to 1,500 meters between. Russian 50 mm mortars were located meters behind the skirmish line, and in mountains all supporting artillery would be meters from the infantry. Soviet Infantry Battalion April 1941 Battalion HQ: 4O, 1 OR 2 Pistols, 1 SMG, 2 rifles/carbines 3 riding horses Signal Platoon: 1O, 8 NCO, 24 OR 1 SMG, 32 rifles 3 carts and 3 draft horses 3 Rifle Companies each of: Company HQ: 1O, 1 Political O, 1 NCO, 4 OR 2 Pistols, 5 rifles/carbines 1 cart and draft horse 3 Rifle Platoon each of:

36 Platoon HQ: 10, 1 NOC, 1 OR 1 Pistol, 1 SMG, 1 Rifle/carbine 4 rifle squads each: 1 NCO, 10 OR 1 pistol, 2 SMG, 8 rifles/carbine, 1 lt MG and 1 mortar squad: 1 NCO, 3 OR I Pistol, 3 rifle/carbine, 1 50mm mortar. and 1 MG Platoon. Platoon HQ: 1 O, 1 OR 1 Pistol, 1 rifle/carbine 4 Mgs 1 cart and 2 draft horses Machine Gun Company Co. HQ: 1 O, 1 Political O, 2 NCO, 4 OR 2 Pistols, 6 rifles/carbines 1 cart, 1 draft horse, 1 riding horse. 3 MG Platoon each: Platoon HQ: 1 O 1 Pistol 4 MG squads each: 1 NCO, 6 OR 2 Pistols, 7 rifles/carbines, 1 med MG 2 carts 4 draft horses Mortar Company Co HQ 1 O, 1 Political O, 1 NCO, 4 OR 2 Pistols, 5 rifles 3 mortar Platoon each: 1 O, 2 NCO, 12 OR 1 Pistol. 1 SMG, 13 rifles/carbines 2 82mm mortars 2 carts, 2 draft horses Antitank Platoon: 1 O, 2 NCO, 15 OR 3 Pistols, 15 rifles/carbines

37 2 45mm AT guns Supply Platoon; Medical Platoon Guards, and other Soviet elite units replaced the Maxim MG with a 12.7 mm or 14.5 mm HMG. NKVD infantry combat units also had access to newer equipment. The D.P. LMG was usually replaced by the tank D.T. LMG, because it was lighter and had a foldable frame butt. Soviet tank LMGs had bipods fitted for dismounted operations. There were only two 76.2 mm M.1912/M.1927 infantry guns attached at the battalion level, and they frequently performed anti-tank duties in addition to their direct support fire role. The battalion also had two 45 mm L.46 M.1938 or two 37 mm L.45 M.1935 anti-tank guns. Motor rifle units did not had a weapons platoons at company level, these supposedly elite tankoviy desant troops relied on fire support from the tanks they

38 rode into battle. Soviet tank riders suffered horrendous casualties from shattering shells if the tank they were on deflected a shot. KV riders are reported to had suffered more than T-34 riders, because the former had better armor and was not as easily penetrated. The individual motor rifle platoons were equipped with a much larger proportion of automatic weapons, a typical squad would consist of nine men with one LMG, five SMG, and only three Rifles. The Importance of Soviet Tactical Level Flag Signals Soviet BT and T-26 tank formations relied exclusively on flag and flare signals, since the vehicles carried no radios The Soviet Army had flag signals detachments consisting of one NCO and three men. These units were stationed at key positions along the front, and they were deployed all the way back to the company command post. The Wehrmacht soon learned to fire smoke shells into Soviet formations to disrupt any communication by flag signals.. In 1943, the issue of SMGs was increased beyond any previous measure. There are several differing accounts of how this was enacted within the Battalions, so these are just a couple of opinions. In each Rifle Company, one Platoon was re-equipped entirely with the SMG. Quite how this affected the Platoon structure was unclear. The SMG Company proper used a ten man Squad, with three Squads

39 serving under a single Officer. There was also room for interpretation on whether the Platoons in the Rifle Companies kept their DP light machine guns for support, as they were not present in the SMG Company at Regiment. Another version suggests only one Squad per platoon was re-armed, and realistically by this time most Platoons would had been operating at most three Squads. It was one area where some authority was delegated to commanders to act as they saw fit for their local conditions. It's interesting to compare this with the Volks Grenadier units described in the German Army section. It's clear where the German inspiration came from. To describe the training and equipment of the average Soviet soldier as rudimentary was an understatement. The new tactic was overwhelming firepower, but deployed at extremely close ranges, matched by extremely high casualties as a result. Staged reductions - during late 1943 and into 1944, the Red Army took the offensive from the Germans. The issue of sub machine guns mentioned above was an indication of their new aggressive spirit. But the losses did not abate. Even a five hundred man Battalion was becoming unrealistic in many areas. Several versions exist of how further reductions were enacted, this was just one of them. They were targeted primarily at Regimental level.

40 Firstly, each Rifle Company lost a full Platoon, no indication of whether it was rifle or SMG armed. This alone would reduce the Battalion to around four hundred men, practically half of its allied counterpart. Secondly, the third Platoon was reinstated, but the Regiment lost its entire third Battalion. Finally, these two Battalions each lost their third Rifle Company, each of which lost their third Platoon. If the support weapons were retained at similar levels, the Battalion would be perhaps 250 to 300 hundred strong all ranks. That was half the level of the Battalion of two years previous. Reduced Strength Rifle Battalions It was normal practice to attempt to retain veteran units in combat. The theory was that they are more valuable, even under strength, than a full strength outfit which has no experience of battle. British, German and American units would therefore normally receive drafts of replacements to make good at least a portion of their losses. The Red Army, however, developed a notably different philosophy. They recognized the need to feed new recruits into existing formations, but they were simply unable to meet demands caused by their astronomical casualty lists. Instead, they simply authorized a series of modified organizational tables. They were triggered when overall Regimental strength fell to a certain level, and regrouped the remaining assets into a tighter formation. As these ceilings became

41 evermore lower, the effects on the Battalion were truly astonishing. Further reductions were borne by Regimental troops. The changes of 1943 The Rifle Battalion was intended to be the final step in the evolutionary process. However in 1943 a series of new challenges and problems arose which required further amendments. It's difficult to be precise about the timing and the order of these changes, so they are covered here in the most logical fashion. Political Officers During 1943 the Communist leadership reviewed the necessity of maintaining a Commissar in every Company level formation. They concluded this was a luxury they could no longer afford, and the Officers were removed, those at Battalion and above presumably remaining in post. In typical Communist fashion though, those involved were retrained - as Rifle Platoon commanders! Reduced strength Battalion In the latter half of 1943, it was becoming apparent that it was a struggle to maintain Battalions at even the slim 600 man strength previously envisioned. A new table of organization was approved for those units which could no longer meet the late 1942 version.

42 Firepower was significantly reduced, with both the Mortar Company and the Machine Gun Company losing their third Platoon, leaving each with six of their respective weapons. In each Rifle Company, the 50mm Mortar was permanently banished, it was simply unable to create the degree of carnage the Red Army was now seeking to inflict. The Company Machine Gun Squad was retained however. The Rifle Platoon was reorganized yet again. This time, it lost its fourth Squad. Platoon HQ was now simply a lone Officer, no Sergeant or runner to aid him. The three Squads were each now eleven men strong, a leader and ten men with just one LMG per Squad. The allocation of sub machine guns was unclear, but perhaps the Squad was reminiscent of that used back in early 1941, with a couple of men carrying the PPsh 41, a two man gun team, six riflemen and a leader. The Battalion would had dropped to around five hundred all ranks. Sub machine gun units During 1942, Rifle Regiments were authorized an independent Company of some 100 men armed entirely with the PPsh 41 sub machine gun. They were used as shock troops, particularly valuable in the street fighting role. Innovation among the Carnage

43 During just under four years of conflict, the Red Army moved from the brink of annihilation to the capture of Berlin. The human cost was immense. German accounts describe numerous human wave assaults delivered with no tactical acumen. The Red Army did grow in its skills throughout the war, those men who survived becoming extremely capable fighters, yet few survived. Preparations improved because soviet artillery suffered much fewer casualties than Soviet infantry and tanks. Dozens of artillery divisions were assembled to pound German positions and swarms of army air force ground assault fighters and bombers were deployed at the tactical level to help the disappearing infantry. Yet underpinning all this was an acceptance of massive casualties. In the final analysis, the Soviet soldier was treated simply as an expendable munitions.

44 Chapter 5 Soviet Rifle Regiment and Battalion The Rifle Regiment The Red Army rifle regiment was an organization which contains the arms and minimum services necessary for the execution of independent combat missions. It has officers and enlisted men. In contrast with officers and enlisted men of the U. S. infantry regiment, it appears small. The difference was due mainly to smaller weapons crews and service elements. The Red Army rifle regiment was stronger than the U. S. infantry regiment in automatic weapons, especially submachine guns, and in medium and heavy mor tars. But it was weaker in regimental artillery and antitank guns fig. 6. Outstanding feature of the organization of the rifle regiment was the submachine gun company of 100 men, all armed with submachine guns. Table of Arms and Equipment Soviet Rifle Regiment

45 With the exception of heavy mortars and signal equipment, which are motorized, all of the regimental weapons and transport are horse drawn. The regiment was free to maneuver in all kinds of weather and terrain. It was not road bound. The regiment was, however, incapable of extended independent combat, because the supply and maintenance capabilities of its organic transport are low. Even moderate casual. ties greatly reduce its effectiveness. The regiment was easily maneuverable. It requires only three 50-car trains for movement by rail. The artillery commander of a rifle regiment has considerable fire power at his disposal. By combining the resources of the battalion artillery and mortars with organic regimental artillery. he can concentrate the fire of 27 medium mortars. 6 heavy mortars, 12 antitank guns, and 4 regimental howitzers. The Guards Rifle Regiment differs from the standard rifle regiment in that it was upgraded in personnel, and made stronger in light and heavy automatic weapons ( fig. 7). It has two submachine gun companies. The machine gun companies of its battalions had 12 heavy machine guns. instead of the 9 in the company of a standard battalion. The antitank rifle platoon of the Guards Rifle Battalion has 16 antitank rifles, as compared with 9 of the standard battalion. Thus. a Guards Rifle Regiment was able to put more men in the forward lines, and was capable of more extended action than was the standard rifle regiment.

46 Guards Rifle Regiment A Soviet Guards Rifle regiment was able to put more veterans on the line who were better armed than regular Soviet Army regiments. They were able to last longer in close combat and had better morale. The Guards Rifle regiment had more light machine guns and two submachine gun companies instead of one Guards Rifle Battalion Regular Rifle Battalion Antitank Rifles 16 9 Machine Gun Companies 12 HMGs 9 HMGs Light Machine Guns Rifle battalion Basic organizational element of the infantry arm was the rifle battalion. It consists of headquarters, three rifle companies. antitank rifle platoon, mortar company, machine gun company, antitank gun platoon, and a medical unit (fig. 81. Its strength was 619 officers and enlisted men. The battalion was the lowest

47 administrative and housekeeping unit of the infantry arm maintaining a kitchen, a repair shop, a medical unit, and a pharmacy for its subordinate units. With its light trans- port. organic supporting mortars. and light artillery, it was well suited for outflanking and infiltrating tactics in any terrain. In comparison with the U. S. infantry battalion, the Red Army rifle battalion was weaker in personnel and weapons, except light automatic weapons and medium mortars. The outstanding feature of the armament of the rifle battalion was its large number of submachine guns. Supply and maintenance capabilities of the rifle battalion are small. For more thus a day of light combat it must be assisted by regimental or divisional services. A rifle battalion can be easily moved. One truck company (100 SIS-5 trucks) can carry a complete battalion with sufficient rations, forage, and ammunition for 7 to 8 days of heavy combat. Rifle Battalion

48 Two variations of the rifle battalion the motorized rifle battalion and the motorized submachine gun battalion constituted the infantry element of the motorized and the tank brigade respectively. The motorized rifle battalion differs from the standard battalion in that it has additional antitank rifle, antitank gun, and submachine gun platoons. It has six instead of nine 82mm mortars. Its strength was 662 officers and enlisted men. The motorized submachine gun battalion, a part of the tank brigade, was smaller than the standard rifle battalion. lacks the machine gun company. and has six instead of nine 82mm mortars. But, like the motorized rifle battalion, it has additional antitank rifle and antitank gun platoons

49 Chapter 6 Soviet Infantry Attack Tactics Soviet infantry units are characterized by great strength in automatic weapons and mortars. Their tactical motorized mobility was low because they had less organic transport until late in the war. However Soviet rifle regiments and battalion were faster than average foot-mobile ground pounders, especially when advancing. Their moving weight was low compared to similar U. S. units, and as a result their maneuverability was better. Soviet rifle regiments (less their supply trains), rifle battalions, and rifle companies had horse transport only but they could easily move across country even in difficult terrain. The supply capacity of Soviet rifle units was adequate even for heavy combat, but their maintenance facilities were inadequate and had to be supplemented by army resources. Basic Doctrine Soviet tactical employment of infantry was predicated on rapidity of maneuver of small groups. concentration of fire of automatic weapons. and shock action. In fluid situations. rapid deployment and immediate engagement with the Germans are the rule. In more stable situations. engagement with the Germans was generally preceded by thorough reconnaissance and planning. and detailed rehearsal

50 of the contemplated maneuver. including even the tactics of the individual soldier. The objectives of infantry attack are to break the cohesive defense of the Germans, to divide him into small isolated groups, and then to destroy him. The plan of maneuver usually calls for an advance to the flanks of the Germans, culminating in a single or double envelopment. This plan may be varied to conform to the situation or to achieve surprise. Soviet infantry units are deployed hr combat similarly to the U. S. practice; that was. in line, wedge. inverted wedge. column, and echeloned to right or left (fig. 22). The size of the reserve was rigidly controlled. For example, if a regiment on the defensive occupies an interior position, the reserve consists of one rifle company, some antitank rifles, and the regimental antitank and howitzer batteries. In a similar situation. the battalion reserve will consist of one rifle platoon, one antitank rifle platoon, the battalion antitank guns, and several heavy machine guns. A regiment generally attacked on a front 1,500 yards wide; an interior battalion on a front up to 700 yards; a company up to 350 yards; and a platoon up to 1(K) yards. On the defensive, a battalion occupies an area up to 2,000 yards wide and 1,500 to 2,000 yards deep; and a company occupies an area up to 700 yards wide and 700 yards deep.

51 To insure the success of its missions, the Red Army infantry regiment has at its disposal several specialized units: the reconnaissance company, the submachine gun company. the antitank rifle company, the heavy mortar battery, the antitank gun battery. and the regimental howitzer battery. The reconnaissance company executes normal reconnaissance and screening tasks. The submachine gun company was used for rapid flanking moves, infiltration, security of accompanying tank., and as a mobile reserve. The antitank rifle company provided antitank security in all phases of combat. The antitank gun battery, together with battalion antitank guns. was used to repel tank attacked in especially vulnerable sectors. Regimental and battalion antitank guns, together with the regimental artillery, are used extensively for direct fire in support of river-crossing operations and assault of fortified positions. The heavy mortar battery was used under centralized control during artillery preparation on the offensive and for laying down barrages on the defensive. It was under control of supported units in the assault phase of the offense and in decentralized defense. Approach March A Red Army infantry regiment. acting as an advance guard of a division, has the missions of overcoming the resistance of Germans outposts, occupying terrain favorable for deployment of the division, and organizing preliminary

52 reconnaissance. To accomplish these missions, the regiment advances in the following order: advance guard preceded by reconnaissance elements, the main body, the flank guards, and the rear guard. The advance guard consists of an infantry battalion reinforced by artillery and engineers. The main body follows 1.2 to 1.8 miles behind the advance guard. It consists of several sections, each comprising a balanced fighting group of approximately battalion size. The main body was flanked by security groups consisting of rifle platoons reinforced with heavy machine guns and antitank rifles. The rear guard, likewise, consists of a reinforced rifle platoon. If the regiment advances along an exposed flank, the flank guard on the exposed side was increased to approximately a battalion. Artillery elements which form parts of the main body must always be ready to support the advance guard. During long halts, artillery habitually deploys for action, while antitank units reconnoiter and deploy in sectors considered especially vulnerable to attack by tanks. If the advance guard encounters only disorganized resistance, it overpowers Germans rear guards while the main body continues advancing. If the advance guard encounters organized resistance et a well fortified position, the regiment deploys for action and endeavors to overpower the opposition by speed of maneuver and shock action. If the Germans was fully prepared to defend organized positions, the regiment secures advantageous ground for the deployment of the

53 Plan of attack, rifle battalion echeloned to the left. division and for organized intensive reconnaissance. During the advance the Commander retains his command post in the advance guard.

54 Red Infantry Regiment in approach march formation.

55 Example of infantry offensive, rifle battalion in double envelopment. Example of wedge and inverted wedge. The Offensive In the offensive, infantry generally has two successive missions: First, it must break into the forward defense lines of the Germans in a particular sector and destroy or neutralize the system of infantry and antitank weapons. This mission was accomplished by the initial infantry assault groups. The subsequent

56 mission was determined by the over-all objective of the division. It generally consists of overcoming all Germans resistance in the assault sector including Germans artillery positions. Both the initial and the successive missions are designated in terms of space and time. The assault was conducted in three distinct phases: the preparation, the execution of the initial mission of the infantry groups, and the penetration of the Germans defenses in depth in the execution of the subsequent missions (fig. 24). Preparation for the attack. The preparation phase includes command and staff reconnaissance; the command decision; formulation of the operations, intelligence, signal, and rear area plans; and formulation of the tables of combat coordination. Upon receipt of their missions, subordinate commanders formulate their plans of maneuver and designate assault groups for the execution of specific tasks. A typical assault group consists of three to five engineers, a rifle platoon, and several antitank rifles. Some battalion mortars and battalion guns are assigned to the various assault groups according to the general and partial fire plans. Heavy machine guns are either allotted to the assault groups, or retained under centralized control. According to the demands of the situation, regimental and, less frequently, divisional specialized arms are distributed among the assault groups. If time

57 permits, the assault groups rehearse the plan of maneuver both individually and as a whole. These rehearsals are generally conducted in daylight and a! night over terrain similar to that of the contemplated operation and far enough removed from the Germans to escape his observation and interference. Before important operations it was not uncommon for Soviet troops to spend considerable time drilling in standard and specialized use of their weapons. Conduct of the assault. During the assault. regimental and battalion commanders remain at their command observation posts. Only in exceptional circumstances may they leave their command posts to lead subordinate units in combat. It was considered imperative that the final artillery barrage be laid so that there was a minimum of time between it and the moment that the infantry reaches the forward defense lines of the Germans. Regimental and battalion antitank guns and mortars will continue to fire on their targets until the last possible moment. The infantry must be placed so as to reach the Germans forward lines from 1 to 2 minutes after the artillery barrage was lifted. Red Army regulations state that infantry can follow within 200 yards and 100 yards, respectively. of forward and flanking barrages of artillery firing at ranges of 2,000 to 3,000 yards. Infantry can follow within 150 to 200

58 yards behind the bursts of 82mm mortars, and within 200 to 250 yards behind the bursts of 120mm mortars. During the assault. antitank guns and mortars revert to the control of the supported units. Regimental artillery supports the assault in depth and prepares to displace forward. Battalion commanders do not commit their units in extended fire duels with the Germans centers of resistance; instead, they move ahead, leaving small detachments to deal with the by-passed Germans. When the infantry advance reaches the artillery positions of the Germans, widening of the breach, destruction of the by-passed centers of resistance, and exploitation of the break-through are achieved by the regimental reserve, assisted by some of the assault groups. The remainder of the assaulting force consolidates captured positions, prepares to repel counterattacks, or regroups and continues the advance. If tanks accompany the infantry attack, regimental and battalion artillery concentrate fire on Germans antitank defenses. Infantry and engineers protect the tanks from hostile infantry, neutralize antitank minefields and other antitank obstacles, and help evacuate damaged tanks. Tanks must not outdistance their supporting infantry by more than 400 yards. Typical missions which may be assigned to accompanying tanks by an infantry commander include:

59 Determination of the location and number of breaches to be made in antipersonnel obstacles. Firing positions of the Germans which are to be destroyed. Sectors of responsibility for repelling counterattacks. Assembly areas. Subsequent missions of tanks.

60 Chapter 7 Red Commander's Battle Place by Major V. Vladimitov, Soviet Army, in July 1943 The regimental commander telephoned three times demanding a report: What are your companies doing? Where are they located? The battalion commander, Captain Gunia, answered vaguely. According to him, the units were making progress, and this was true. But he could not state exactly where they were or what resistance they were encountering. This made the commander angry and he said quite a few unpleasant words to the captain. The fact was that nothing happened in the way it had been anticipated by the captain. The signalmen got lost somewhere, and reports from the company commanders were not coming. Furthermore, he saw absolutely nothing from his observation post, nor was it easy to determine from the sounds what was happening up ahead. "I'meters going to see Lebedinsky," the captain said to his adjutant. "You stay here and try to get in touch with the other companies." And here was what happened an hour after this conversation. Captain Gunia got interested in the offensive battle raging on the left flank of his battalion and took over the command of Lebedinsky's company. The adjutant continued to sit in the old observation post and to receive delayed and incomplete information concerning

61 the actions of other companies. in the meantime the situation on the right flank became more complicated. The Germans moved his tanks there. They could had been stopped by artillery fire, by simply picking up the telephone and informing the regimental commander. Nobody did this, however. The battalion commander was with the let flank company, while his adjutant, who had stayed at the observation post, saw nothing and knew nothing. And so it happened that the battalion commander let the reins slip out of his hands and could not control the battalion. As a result the offensive of the battalion as a whole were disrupted. Why did this happen? That's very simple. The battalion commander did not find his place in the battle. At first he became detached from his units and could not see them; then, instead of correcting his mistake, he remained with one of the companies, forgetting that he was responsible for all of them. No wonder he could not direct the battalion and did not know of the counterattack undertaken by the Germans. In this case we see a flagrant violation of the infantry battle regulations which require the battalion commander to be behind the battle formations of his units and in a place which will enable him to observe battle operations both of his own units and of those on the flanks of his neighbors. He should be able to see his

62 battle disposition and observe the Germans. Captain Gunia neglected this most important requirement and therefore did not accomplish his mission. Our manual was a digest of battle experience. Each word recorded there has been tested in the field tens and hundreds of times. The regulations are intended to insure precise control of troops under the most complicated and severe conditions. What should Captain Gunia had done in order to observe the operations of his companies? Should he had established his observation post out in front inasmuch as the terrain was broken, or in the rear on a hill? It was impossible to had a solution for each case. The regulations, however, state that a battalion commander should be able to observe the battlefield, no matter what the circumstances may be. Messengers' can fail him, communications can fail him, but his eyes will not, and he should be able to direct the battle all the time. To do this he does not had to visit the companies and attend to everything. Frequent absence from the command post disrupts the direction of battle, One must not under estimate the value of personal contact between the commander and his subordinates. But this should be done wisely, so that control of battle was not lost. The Battle Regulations of Red Army Infantry state: "Personal contact among battalion and regimental commanders and their-subordinates was of

63 prime importance. It enables the commander to transmit his will and directions directly to his subordinates; it enables the subordinates to get confidence in success out of this contact with the commander. Personal contact was especially important before the battle and when a marked 'change in the situation takes place." In modern battle of maneuver, such changes in the situation occur quite frequently. Our attacked are followed by the attacked of the Germans, and vice versa. The decisive part in the battle may suddenly shift from infantry to artillery. It was not surprising, therefore, that the place of the commander will change. The important thing was that he should choose the place where his presence was most needed. Nor should it be overlooked that modern infantry battle formations are saturated with attached and supporting weapons, which are highly mobile. It was the duty of the commander to see to it that they too are properly employed. Therefore the commander's place must be determined not only by the location of the formations of his unit, but also by the disposition of all the elements cooperating with him. In short, his place was where he can see better what goes on the battlefield, where he can insure communications, and where his personal presence was needed.

64 It should also be kept in mind that excessively frequent changes of command and observation posts, as well as too frequent visits to subordinate units, disorganize the work of his subordinate commanders. Worse yet was the situation in which the commander takes over the duties of his subordinates, forgetting his duty of directing the battle. As long as the means of communication at his disposal telephone, radio, and messengers enable him to know what happens in the subordinate units, as long as he can personally observe the unfolding of the battle and the situation does not require his presence in lower headquarters, then his place was at his command post. If, however, communications are disrupted, if the commander was no longer able to observe his battle formations, or if the situation demands his presence in the lower units, then he must change his place. All this does not mean that there was a stereotyped formula for determining where commanders of different units should be located. The regulations require that the battalion commander should be able to see everything that happens in his sector, and that the regimental commander could observe everything at least in the direction of main effort. Everything that happens beyond his field of vision should be made available to him by precise and uninterrupted communication. Even this, however, does not mean that the regimental command post will remain

65 immovable throughout the battle. Battles frequently make even regimental commanders change their places. Regimental Experience A regiment commanded by Major Miroshnichenko was under attack by a numerically superior Germans infantry unit supported by tanks. Having established the direction of the Germans main effort, comrade Miroshnichenko set up his command post in the rear of the battalion directly in front of the Germans concentrations. The regimental commander could not see his other battalions from this command post, but they were in constant communication with him and made timely and detailed reports. Quite suddenly, the Germans changed the direction of his thrust, and the battle became intense at once. What was Major Miroshnichenko to do? He could move his command post to the rear of another battalion inasmuch as it was now impossible to see what was going on in the main direction, or he could remain where he was, depending on the phone for the direction of the battle. The Major chose the second alternative, which was undoubtedly correct. If lie had changed his command post in this critical moment, he would undoubtedly had found himself out of touch with the battle for quite

66 some time and would not had been able to provide either artillery or any other support to his units. Then the artillery fire of the Germans disrupted the wires to the battalion. It was clearly sensible to abandon the present command post and to move to the alternate one previously prepared on the other flank of the regiment. Another good reason for doing this was the fact that the amount of time needed to restore communication would had been greater than that required to effect the transfer to the alternate command post, which had good visibility throughout the entire depth of the attacking battalion. The wires to the alternate command post are also cut, but the regimental commander can see the battlefield and direct the battle. He also makes use of messengers. But finally, the Germans's attack reaches its peak. His infantry was cut off from his tanks by our fire. Many of his tanks are burning. At this moment, however, six Germans tanks carrying infantry detachments atop them break through our forward edge. The infantry and tanks get established near the second line of our trenches which are not yet occupied by anybody. Realizing the gravity of the situation, the Major throws his reserves into the battle. Simultaneously he orders the artillery to destroy the tanks by fire at close range.

67 It's getting dark. The repeated attack of the Germans was beaten back and his main forces had not passed through our forward positions, but the liquidation of the group that has broken through was not completed. The artillery and the reserves which are given the mission to destroy this group are showing little cooperation. The commander's presence was imperative in order to take care of this danger. In the rear of the regiment Major Miroshnichenko joins the commander of the attached artillery battalion, and together they work out a plan for the destruction of the Germans group. This personal intervention expedites the action against Germans tanks. As we see now, the commander in this case determined correctly his place in the battle. It always depended upon the situation and the communication facilities available, and upon the possibilities of observation. In the Battle Regulations of Red Army Infantry we find this: "Battalion and regimental commanders direct the battle from command posts. Command posts (main and alternate) are set up at distances from advance battle formations which allow the commander of a battalion to observe the field of battle and the operations of his battalion, and the commander of a regiment, the operations of his regiment at least in the direction of the main effort. The regimental commander should also be able to exercise personal direction of his subordinate unit, should be

68 in constant communication with them, and, if necessary, should intervene in the battle personally." This regulation requirement was followed by the regimental commander. During each stage of the battle he was where his presence was needed and where he could direct the battle most readily

69 Chapter 8 Soviet Infantry Tactical Preparation Types of Tactical Plans In Soviet practice, the forms of maneuver and organization of operations consistently follow a limited number of basic patterns: the infantry offensive, the tank and mechanized offensive, the meeting engagement, the pursuit, the centralized and decentralized defense, the mobile defense of mechanized forces, the withdrawal, and the disengagement from encirclement. The Infantry Offensive The Soviet infantry offensive was made by infantry supported by artillery, tanks, engineers, and aviation as the situation demands. It was generally in the form of simultaneous attacked on a broad front with concentrations of artillery and. particularly, tanks in the break-through area. The attack seeks to penetrate the Germans defenses in two or more sectors and converge on a limited objective; its mission was to encircle or envelop Germans groupings and destroy them by simultaneous attacked from all directions. This scheme of maneuver was fundamental the offensive operations of units of every size from the platoon to the army group. A typical plan of attack (fig. 10) was formulated in the following manner:

70 Mission: To destroy Germans forces which are guarding the approaches to communication center X. Farces available: Nth infantry Division. Enemy farces: Two infantry regiment.: and two artillery regiments. Plan of maneuver: 1st Regiment to advance to Objective A through breach made by the neighboring division. 2d Regiment, rising the same breach, to advance to Objective B. leaving one battalion to deal with points of resistance C and D. 1st Battalion, 3d Regiment to penetrate Germans defenses and join 2d Regiment at Objective C. Provide flank security for 2d Regiment. 3d Battalion, 3d Regiment to penetrate Germans defenses and join 2d Regiment at Objective E. 2d Battalion, 3d Regiment to penetrate Germans defenses and join 1st Regiment at Objective A. Soviet offensive theory stresses the importance of combined or coordinated operations. Supporting arms are usually under the senior commander of that arm until such time as the predetermined phase in the combat plan directs subordination of the supporting arms directly under the command of the supported unit. Coordinated attacked are planned and rehearsed with the utmost care, and great attentii.1 was given to the smallest details. Daring and initiative on the part of smaller unit commanders was imperative.

71 In the offensive, a given situation may call for certain types of specially trained troops. In cases where columns of tanks make an assault of a fortified position, special detachments of combat engineers, thoroughly trained for their particular assignment, may be used to facilitate the assault or may even be assigned a combat ini3sion such as seizing and securing bridges and water crossings. Soviet tactical practice prescribes the use of line, wedge, inverted wedge, or echeloned arrangement of forces in the attack. Except for special operations, such as assault of a fortified position, columns will not be used. Normally, in preparation for a penetration, attacking forces are placed well forward, while mobile units used for the purpose of exploitation of a penetration are brought up from the rear. To utilize maximum shock power, the Red Army normally limits the uncommitted reserves to one-ninth of the infantry combat strength. On difficult terrain this may be increased up to one-sixth. Offensive operations are accomplished in five distinct phases: Concentration of forces. This phase was characterized by intensive reconnaissance and observation, secret concentration and regroupment, elaborate rehearsals, and deception. Detailed reconnaissance was conducted by units which are already in line, and was combined with command reconnaissance by units designated for the break-through.

72 In the final stages of preparation, reconnaissance in force was conducted in several sectors. At times, reconnaissance was staged to resemble a major offensive in order to deceive the Germans as to the real direction of attack and to throw him off balance. Concentration and regroupment of forces was accomplished with great secrecy. Elaborate precautions are taken to prepare in advance camouflaged dispersal areas for troops, especially armor and artillery. Units arc grouped according to the tactical plan, and further subdivided into teams. one team for each objective. These teams stage day and night rehearsals over ground which has been specially prepared to resemble that of the contemplated breakthrough. Artillery fire was rigidly controlled and was limited to the minimum consistent with antiaircraft and counterbattery defense requirements. Fire was conducted only by duly and roving batteries.

73 The coordinated attack. Soviet tactical concept. Meanwhile staffs. often augmented by special teams from General Headquarters (Stavka Glavnogo Komanduishchego) prepare field orders, artillery

74 fire plans, tables of combat coordination, and other necessary papers. If the Commander judges that the troops and staffs are not sufficiently well prepared for the operation, he prescribes a special training schedule which may extend over the preparatory period. Soviet preparation for an assault of prepared positions was deliberate, extending from several days to 6 or 10 weeks depending on the caliber of Germans resistance and the state of preparedness of the assault troops. Fire Preparation In the second phase, the air forces seek to isolate the Germans- by destroying his communication lines. Artillery undertakes the destruction of located fire positions. Finally, every available weapon, centralized under one command, concentrates a brief but extremely violent barrage immediately preceding the assault. The Assault In the assault phase of the break-through or penetration artillery was allotted to the various assault teams for direct support. Movement of units and fire of supporting arms are controlled on the initiative of local commanders. Artillery must observe the movement of supported units, executing firing missions on the request of assault team commanders or according to tables of combat coordination.

75 In order to maintain continuous control, the overall commander must observe the movement of units, especially in the decisive direction. Command liaison officers are delegated to supervise the execution of the assault in secondary directions and to transmit changes in com bat plans which necessitate changes in tables of combat coordination. Securing the Offensive After the objective in the Germans' rear has been reached, the attacking units consolidate their positions, secure their flanks against counterattacks, and prepare for the exploitation of the penetration. For example, in an attack made by tanks, combat engineers are used for the special purpose of protecting the tanks from counterattack by throwing out contact and controlled mines at the moment the assault was stalled or otherwise stopped for consolidation or regrouping. After regrouping or repelling a counterattack, the tanks continue the attack, passing over the areas covered by controlled mines. The mines are picked up and the operation was repeated at the next forward limit of the advance. Exploitation Mobile formations pass through the gap in parallel columns, pursuing the Germans. Motorized light artillery, engineers, and infantry from the assault units are attached to them as needed and available. The remaining infantry units attack

76 encircled Germans forces, continuing also to provide flank security. Air and artillery units reinforce the fire of self-propelled and mobile artillery on call from mobile formations striking in the Germans rear. On call from the infantry, they destroy encircled Germans remnants. Calculated risks are taken to secure bridgeheads and commanding terrain and to prevent the Germans from organizing a defense on intermediate positions.

77 Chapter 9 Soviet Assault Regiments and Battalions Soviet assault regiments and battalions were specially reinforced and reorganized units utilized to seize highly lethal enemy fortifications, fortified areas and urban areas. Assault Regiment Each regiment of the basic rifle division employed in the assault was reinforced and thereby converted into an Assault Regiment by some or all of the following additions: Artillery (one battalion of the organic divisional artillery, one battery- of the organic divisional antitank battalion. a GHQ mortar battalion, and a GHQ light gun battalion. Armored vehicles (two companies of medium tanks, one company of heavy tanks, one battery of light or medium self-propelled guns, and about a platoon of mine-clearing tanks) The equivalent of a battalion of combat engineers The assault regiment resulting from these reinforcements formed two assault battalions. The third rifle battalion was utilized for the infantry component of the

78 regimental assault group, the regimental obstacle-clearing group, and the

79

80 regimental reserve. The regimental assault group was used in operations against forts and concrete casemates of great strength. In addition to a rifle company, it comprised a pioneer platoon, a heavy tank company, mine-clearing tanks, a selfpropelled gun battery, and platoons of mortars and flame throwers. It was often supported by a smoke-laying group. The regimental obstacle-clearing groups clear passages through minefields and obstacles. prior to and (luring the infantry and tank assault, support the battalion obstacle-clearing groups in difficult opera-lions, and enlarge gaps for the passage of succeeding echelons.. The regimental reserves provide antitank and antipersonnel security, especially for the flanks and rear of the regiment; they also serve as a personnel and materiel replacement pool for the assault battalion and the regimental assault group. The tank support group consists of two medium tank companies, each of which normally- supports one assault battalion. The regimental artillery groupment consists of one organic battalion of divisional artillery regimental combat team', plus a battalion of heavy mortars. This groupment was under the control of the divisional artillery commander during the artillery preparation phase, but passes under the control of the regimental commander during the assault phase. This artillery fires from open as well as covered positions, supports the assault as directed by the regimental commander,

81 and may be utilized to replace losses in the battalion direct-fire artillery groupment. The assault regiment in the main effort deploys with assault battalions abreast or in column; its zone of action therefore varies front 550 to 1,100 yards. Assault battalion The assault battalion was the primary tactical unit employed in the assault of fortified positions. It consists of the rifle battalion reinforced by two batteries of 76.2mm guns or infantry howitzers. two light antitank guns, a platoon of antitank riflemen. and a company of pioneers (fig. 61. The assault battalion, like the assault regiment, forms but two assault companies:. the third rifle company being allotted to the battalion assault group, the directfire artillery groups, and the battalion reserve. Each assault company deployed two platoons one rifle and one submachine-gun platoon abreast. Infiltration and trench-clearing teams. as well as personnel for flank security, are organized from the third platoon. Eacl company was reinforced by an obstacle-clearing groni of one :Mincer and one rifle section; and a direct-fire artil lery group of ":6.2-min guns or a hotritzer battery, two light antitank guns. and a rifle section for se curity fig. (12E. irect-fire artillery does not par ticipate in the artillery preparation.

82

83 For operations against pillboxes and concrete emplacements, an assault group was organized in the battalion. Its organization varies slightly in strength and capabilities in accordance with the resistance of the Germans position to be assaulted. Typically. it consists of a section of submachine gunners, a section of pioneers, a section of antitank riflemen, and two or three men armed with flame throwers. hr battali..1, mortars and heat t machine guns!remain under. entralited control. The battalion resei te consists of the balance of the third company 1 one rifle and sine submachine-gun platoonf and an antitank rifle section. -1 he battalion deploys on a front of 550 yards and to a depth of 110 Yards in one assault echelon. In mountain warfare and in swamps, the battalion de ploys in two echelons. 3. PHEIPAR.1TI0N OF THE ASSAULT a- Organization of reconnaissance. The stair of the senior troop commander organizes the reconnaissance plan for the entire operation. Soviet practice prescribes mission-type and continuous reconnaissance by all teconnaissance units to make possible the proier command decision. A minimum of three separate sets of aerial photographs was often prescribed to supplement ground reconnaissance. Extensive and uninterrupted ground observation during the preparation phase, as

84 well as during com bat, was one of the most important forms of recon naissance. Day and night reconnaissance patrols de termine specific Germans data. Complete information must be gained by means of combat reconnaissance. A combat reconnaissance group consists of a rifle battalion supported by two or three divisional artil lery battalions and reinforced by GHQ artillery and tanks, mortar units, and aviation. During this op eration, special artillery, tank, and engineer recon naissance was conducted simultaneously with general troop reconnaissance. During combat reconnais sance, forward Germans firing positions and outposts may be assaulted and seized if the neutralization or capture of such positions will facilitate general as sault. All information of Germans installations and dis positions was recorded on largescale maps and dis tributed down to battalion and company command ers several days prior to the assault. b. Planning the assault. Assault group train ing was a fundamental requisite during the preparation phase. Thorough training in the proper employ ment of the individual weapon was followed by the training of assault groups in close coordination with all supporting arms. In many- Operations this type of training has taken place on a large scale in an area far to the rear. and has included practice assaults by the assault teams against reproduced Germans fortifications. Holding

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86 forces and reconnaissance units remained in contact with the Germans forward positions during this time. The line of departure was far more elaborate in this type of operations than in the offensive where no heavily fortified PAW was encountered. A for ward trench position was constructed at a distance of 150 to 200 yards from the Germans outpost line, and was occupied by observers and security elements. Infantry units are deployed in several lines of trenches to the rear where elaborate shelters, dumps, and concealed gun positions are prepared. These trenches are 100 to 150 yards apart; they contain battalion and regimental reserves, dug-in direct-fire gun positions, mortar positions, command posts and medical stations, and ammunition and other supply dumps. The topographic service produces maps (R. F. 1/2,000) in sufficient quantities for complete Disgemination. The entire mem, fortified zone was indicated in the greatest possible detail. The com bat coordination tables are worked out in complete detail with definite missions assigned to every assault group. Troop concentration and redeplo anent prior to the assault are carried out by night w WI great secrecy, using specially constructed communication trenches. Assault groups must occupy the line of departure trenches within one day of the assault. On the eve of the assault, ramps are dug and pas,ain. are cleared to

87 facilitate movement forward of personnet, tanks, and guns from their entrenched positions. 4. CONDUCT OF THE ASSAULT The artillery and aviation preparation has the mission of weakening Germans resistance to the great est possible degree. Artillery,' and bombardment units attack all known Germans fortifications on a front wider than the main effort sector in order to neutralise Germans- posit' - s which can direct flanking fire on the penetration area. Stormovik formations attack Germans personnel in trenches. assembly areas, and rear areas as well as firing positions and targets of opprtunity. Fighter groups provide cover against Germans air action throughout the entire operation. Artillery and close-so:tort aviation continue to neutralize Germans positions throughout the entire assault phase by attacking successive Germans defensive lines and strongpoints impeding the progress of the assault groups. Particular atten tion was directed against concentrations of Germans infantry- antitank guns and revived strongpoints. gun batteries, and mortars. The obstacle clearing groups prepare lanes through minefields and wire entanglements on the eve of the assault and move forward during the artilleryaviation preparation phase to continue ob stacle clearance.

88 Final assault group and tank preparations are completed 'luring the artillery and air offensive, in accordance with the observed results of the prepara tion. The assault begins at the moment tank units reach the line of departure. artillery fire was transferred against Germans positions in depth and on the flanks of the assault sector. The assault must follow close loo hind the artillery barrage. to deny- the Germans an oppoltumtv to reorganize. Infiltration units mole forward prior to the assault in order to cover the assault units w ith submachine-gun fire directed against Germans infantry firing posi tion.. Infantry and tank assault groups then pass through obstacles along prepared lanes. directing their fire on the first and second line of trenches. Upon reaching the first line of trenches. grenades are thrown and the group continues the offensive, keeping close to its supporting artillery and mortar barrage. Enemy- personnel left behind in trenches are destroyed by the trench-clearance teams and units of the second echelon. The obstacle-clearing groups continue to remove mines and obstacles, guide infantry and tanks through the gap, then fob low them for further obstacle clearance. Automatic weapons and artillery fire at revived Germans firing posit'. to facilitate the forward advance of assault groups.

89 The offensive was intensified by feeding an increas ing number of supporting troops into the penetration area to reinforce the break-through ',warheads and to deliver strong flank attacked from the gap. Those special fortification assault groups which had been assigned the specific mission of destroy ing known Germans fortifications are placed in the first echelon. Other special assault groups follow in the second echelon in readinels to assault new or revived casemates or strong points as directed by the battalion commander in that sector. The assault group commander deteintines the direction and mode of attack, taking into account the location of supporting Germans firing positions, their sectors of fire, the characteristics of the fortifications to be assaulted, and precautions against Germans counter. attacked. The assault group sections operate as fol lows: Direct-fire artilkry, machine-gun and tank sections fire on adjacent Germans firing positions and infantry protecting the fort or casemate. The ob stacle-clearing section and the main body of the assault group advance through obstacles up to 100 yards of the casemate and cover the demolition sec tion with submachine-gun fire and by grenades. The demolition section destroys the casemate in a singk blast or piecemeal. depending on its site an.1 strength. At the same time, charges are placed; grenade, flame-throw.: and submachine gun attficks are directed against apertures. In some cases,

90 em brasures are blocked by sand bags. ( A detailed description was given in section V of part 11.1 After the assault was launched, artillery and machine-gun support was brought up behind the assault group to cover probable approaches of Germans counterattach ing infantry. Powerful forts are assaulted after the advancing echelons of infantry and tanks had isolated the fort from its supporting firing positions and Germans in fantry. Smoke screens arc often used to facilitate the assault on a powerful fort which has been by passed and was isolated from Germans support. After breaking through the main defensive posi tion, the next positions are similarly assaulted but at a greater tempo. To facilitate the complete seizure of the fortified zone. every small breach in depth and on the Ranks must be immediately ex ',kited even though the breach may not be in the sector of the main effort. Attillery and air bombardment in short concen- trations support the deep penetration of the assault groups. Increasing numbers of supporting troops develop the penetration 'n depth and width. Eery captured position was carefully secured against Germans rountecattacks by hasty minefields. firing positions, and wire obstacles placed by engineer groups of the second echelon. When Germans

91 counterattacks are repulsed, the assault groups must follow on the heels of the withdrawing Germans for further ex ploitation.

92 Chapter 10 Soviet Defensive Innovation The strength of Red Army defensive tactics lay in the determination of the troops, coordination of all types of fire with all systems of antitank and antipersonnel fortifications and obstacles, skillful organization of the ground, and decisive counterattacks. The defense should be deep antitank, antiartillery, and antiaircraft so as to be able to withstand, absorb, or shatter mass attacked by Germans infantry supported by tanks, artillery, and aviation. The use of reserves in the Soviet defense varies, depending on the type of defense, terrain, and objective. Usually the Soviets concentrate the overwhelming bulk of a unit's strength on the main line of resistance. The reserve was limited to approximately one-ninth of the total combat strength. In certain situations, however, when decisive results can be gained, an extremely large mobile reserve was maintained. A tank corps, for instance, may act as a reserve for an infantry division. Such a tank unit was kept concealed well in the rear, with careful preparation made to facilitate its rapid commitment on the flank of the attacking force. Depending on the situation, the Commander's objective, and available forces, the defense may be either centralized or decentralized.

93 Centralized defense for destroying the attacking Germans, using massed artillery and counterattacks. Centralized defense. The centralized type of defense seeks, by employing obstacles or by maneuver, to channelize the Germans attack in a given direction in order to gain a more favorable position for a decisive counterattack with heavily armored units and concentrations of massed artillery (fig. 14). Dummy positions and fake fortifications are used extensively. A favorite Soviet maneuver was to allow- the Germans to penetrate deeply into the lines and trap him in a firesack. The

94 counterattack takes the form of a large-scale ambush on the deep flank, the counterattacking units being supported by massed, registered artillery. The counterattack was under the direct control of the over-all troop commander. The mission of this type of defense was destruction of the Germans. Decentralized Defense The objectives of decentralized defense are to deny the Germans use of terrain, to divide his attacking forces, and to destroy him by numerous local counterattacks on the initiative of the local ground commander (fig. 15). In this type of defense each unit down to the smallest takes position for close all-around protection. Favorable terrain was sought for the development and fortification of strongpoints and islands of resistance. Each unit uses its assigned artillery and other organic weapons for its own protection. In decentralized defense, strongpoints and islands of resistance frequently will be surrounded or cut off from other friendly troops. Only on specific orders from the senior troop commander was the position abandoned. This particular type of defense was especially effective against tanks and mechanized units.

95 Figure 15. Decentralized defense for denying terrain to superior Germans forces by strongpoints with close-in, around defense

96 Chapter 11 Soviet Rifle Regiment /Battalion Defenses Battalion defensive position The Soviet infantry battalion could defend a forward position up to 1 mile in width and 1500 to 2,000 yards deep. However, in strongly fortified zones the front width was narrowed to 100 yards or less, and the battalion was deployed in greater in depth in conformity with the lay-out of the strong points and prepared fortifications. A Red Army zone of resistance consists of a series of battalion, or more rarely, regimental centers of resistance containing company and platoon strong points. The centers of resistance and strongpoints are sited so as to be protected by natural and artificial barriers, and to cover these barriers with fire. Trenches supplemented by pillboxes and open or covered artillery emplacements are the main types of strongpoint fortifications. Tactical intervals, both planned and forced by terrain exigencies, between strongpoints form pockets in which a penetrating enemy may be trapped and brought under observed fire. The battalion must he prepared to organize the strong points for all-around defense, but Red Army defensive positions normally contain a "gorge."' exposed to

97 fire from rear positions. This presents the problem of immediate utilization of the battalion position if captured by the enemy. In occupying a prepared position, the battalion commander must prepare a defense plan which indicates the strength, equipment, and locations of individual fortifications, strong points, trenches, and concrete pillboxes to be manned by the battalion units, as well as the attached infantry support groups for each casemate. The system of fire, antitank defenses, camouflage requirements, engineer works, and minefields are also indicated. The first mission of the battalion commander was to supplement the existing system of fire with the battalion and attached weapons, and to continue the development of the position by the construction of supplementary communications trenches, personnel shelters, observation posts, and switch positions for personnel and weapons, especially mortars. All battalion artillery, and attached mortars must be registered on avenues of approach, on outpost positions, and on obstacles. Alternate mortar positions, observation posts, and command posts are prepared, wired for signal communications, and registered on critical areas within the battalion fortified sector in order to destroy enemy forces in fire sacks should the enemy penetrate into the battalion sector.

98 Artillery and mortars are organized for counter-preparation fire. During Germans artillery preparation, destructive Germans fire against fortifications and firing positions may be minimized by lasting protective smoke screens. This was done on orders of the regimental commander. When firing positions are neutralized or destroyed, the system of fire was reorganized by moving forward machine guns and other weapons to reserve positions. When the enemy assault phase begins, all destroyed weapons in firing positions, must be replaced by reserve weapons. Soviet casemates are always provided with a rear exit and ramp to facilitate rapid movement of artillery in and out of the position. During the assault, Germans penetrations were isolated by machine-gun and mortar fire from rear and flank positions: counterattacking groups then destroy the isolated men. Tanks are engaged by antitank guns, casemates, and open emplacements. When tanks break through the forward defensive position, they are destroyed at the best antitank defensive position while mortar fire and automatic weapons separate Germans infantry and tanks by antipersonnel fire. Revived pillboxes are supported by artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire while fortification support groups and tanks counterattack the Germans to

99 reestablish, the position. Deep Germans penetrations are resisted by maintaining heavy fire against the Germans flanks and preventing the isolation of individual strongpoints. Artillery fires was from open positions when necessary, and all weapons deliver the maximum fire to restrict Germans movement and to enable regimental reserves to organize an effective counterattack. Regimental defensive position Although the battalion organizes strong points for all-around defense, the regiment was responsible for intermediate defensive positions and switch positions which may be occupied upon orders from the division commander. The regimental defensive position was characterized by extensive development of firesacks and ambushes, well camouflaged and fortified infantry positions. and highly maneuverable artillery and mortar fire. The regimental reserve consists of at least one infantry battalion, reinforced by tanks and artillery. The reserve was deployed to the rear of the battalion strong points with the missions of reinforcing the battalion positions by fire and counterattacking Germans assault forces which penetrate or by-pass the forward battalion positions. The regiment must be prepared for all-around defense if encircled.

100 The regimental position has considerable defensive strength. due to minefields and intricate obstacles erected by the engineers. The regimental smoke. lay ing group was organized for screening the position from observed Germans artillery fire. Gin:stet-preparation fire by divisional and attached artillery has been a decisive factor in weakening large-scale Germans attacked on the fortified zone. Fortified zones are the key positions which deflect the attacking Germans into chamtelized sectors in which he may be isolated and destroyed. Massed artillery Ire IS concentrated on Germans forces which penetrate between strong points into a firesack. Then a isoverful tank and infantry counterattack desttovs the Germans salient. These tactics are char acteristic of the centralized type of defense. A notable example of this was the destruction of Ger man forces in their attempt to penetrate the fortified zone of the IS. Ulf Sk salient in I0 3. The bases of organization of permadent fortified areas are battalion and regimental defensive psi tions. Special defensive battalions are often formed for this purpose, and equipped with a high propor tion of automatic weapons, medium mortars, and antitank weapons. For general discussion of de fensive organization see chapter V 1.1 Battalion defensive position

101 The in fantry battalion can defend a forward position up to 1 mile in width. However, in strongly fortified zones the front ( kith was 'lammed to 100 vards less, and the banal' was edict. in depth ow_.n in con. fortuity- with the lay-out of the strong!whit and prepared fortifications. Tiey battalion must he pre pared to organize the stroeg points for all-around defense. but defensive positions normally contain a "gorge."' exposed to fire from rear positions. This presents immediate utilization o: the battalion posi tion if captured by the enem--. In occupying a prepared position. the battalion commander must anavre the defense plan which indicates the strength. equipment, and locations of individual fortifications. strong points. trenches. and concrete pillboxes to be manned by the battalion units, as well as the attached infantry support groups for each casemate. The ss-stem of fire. antitank de fenses. camouflage requirements. engineer wor!.s. and minefields are also indicated. The first missions of the battalion coinneander av to supplement the existing systcri of fire with the kttalion and at. tached weapons, and to continue the development of the position by the construction of supplementary communications trenches, per.connel shelters, ob servation posts, and switch positions for personnel and weapons. especially mortars. All battalion. ar tillery, and attached mortars must be registered on avenues of approach, on outpost positions, and on obstacles. Alternate mortar positions, observation posts,

102 and command posts are prepared, wired for signal communicat, and registered on critical areas within the battalion fortified sector in order to destroy Germans forces in firrsacks should the Germans penetrate into the battalion sector. Artillery and mortars are (organized for counter. preparation fire. During Germans artillery prepara tion, destructive Germans fire against fortifications and firing positions may be imtuunized by lasing protective smoke screens. This was (lone on orders of the regimental commander. When firing posi tions are neutralized or destroy I e... the system of fire was reorganized by moving forward machine grins and other %capons to reserve positions. When the assault phase begins, all destroyed weapons in firing positions: must be replaced by reserve weapons. Soviet casemates are always provided with a rear exit and ramp to facilitate rapid movement of artillery in and out of the position. During the assault. Germans penetrations are iso lated by machine-gun and. -tar fire from rear and flank positions: counterattacking groups then destroy the isolated meters meters.. Tanks are engaged by antitank guns. easemates, and open emplacements. When tanks break through the forward defensive position, they are destro IA at the nest dcfro ive position while mortar fire and automatic weapons separate Germans infantry and tanks l.y antiperso fire. Revived pillboxes are

103 supported by artallery, mortar, and matitine gun fire while fortification support groups and tanks counterattack the Germans to reestablish, the position. Deep Germans p netra lions are resisted by maintaining heavy fire against the Germans flanks and. preventing the isolation of individual strongpoints. Artillert fires from open positions when necessary. and all weapons dither the maximum fire to restrict Germans movement and to enable regimental reserves to organize an effee live Counterattack. Regimental defensive position Although the battalion organizes strong points for all-around defense, the regiment was responsible for intermedi ate defensive positions and switch positions it hielt may be occupied upon orders from the division --ennmander. The regimental defensive position was characterized by extensive development of firesacks and ambushes, well camouflaged ()aged infantry positions. and highly maneuverabk artillery and mortar fire. The regimental reserve consists of at least one infan try Lttalion, reinforced by tanks and artillery. The reserve was deployed to the rear of the battalion strong points with the missions of reinforcing the battalion positions by fire and counterattacking Germans assault forces which penetrate or by-pass the forward battalion positions. The regiment must be prepared for all-around defense if encircled. The regimental position has

104 considerable defensive strength. due to minefields and intricate obstacles erected by the engineers. The regimental smoke. lay ing group was organized for screening the position from observed Germans artillery fire. Gin:stet-preparation fire by divisional and attached artillery has been a decisive factor in weakening large-scale Germans attacked on the fortified zone. Fortified zones are the key positions which deflect the attacking Germans into chamtelized sectors in which he may be isolated and destroyed. Massed artillery Ire IS concentrated on Germans forces which penetrate between strong points into a firesack. Then a isoverful tank and infantry counterattack desttovs the Germans salient. These tactics are char acteristic of the centralized type of defense. A notable example of this was the destruction of Ger man forces in their attempt to penetrate the fortified zone of the IS. Ulf Sk salient in I0 3.

105 Organization Of A Strongpo1nt Deliberate construction of fortifications was normally planned and carried out before contact was made with the Germans. During prolonged defensive op erations. permanent defenses are developed from hasty fortifications. The nerve center of every de fensive zone was the strongpoint. the effetiiveness of which depends upon an adequate coordination of defense works with tactical requirements. The usual procedure was first to protect the positions against Germans- tanks by mines and obstacles: then to provide fire protection for the obstacles: and finally to construct shehers for supplies and pet sonnel t figure 3 i.

106 The Soviets stress camouflage of defensive posi tions as a principal requirement. The work of cam ouflaging was reduced by the concentrated form of Soviet f4rtetsvpiints. Skillful use of dummy strong-points helps to conceal the true positions from Germans observation. A few dummy defense works are some. tinier mattered inside the actual strongpronts to distort its outlines. The normal elements which constitute strong-point are trenches. machine-gun enilacemei.ts. mor tar and antiaircraft emplacements. tank and self. propelled artillery emplacements. and antitank and antipersonnel obstacles and mines i figure -1i. a. Trenches. In selecting sites for trenches. chief cmooderation was given to fire and coarealment. Cleat outlined latolmarks are avoided. As a rule. trenches follow one elevation contour along gentle slopes. The Soy sets cover trenches built Hear topo graphic crests. Occupation of reverse slopes for flanking and riblicpw hre was recommended in most caw,. Fire and communication trenches are built along the firmt and in the depth of strongpoints. The pur pose of the trenches along the front was to connect separate firing positions and their elements (figure 51. II the strongpoint was small. fire trenches along its edge form practically one continuous line. Re. serve fire trenches on or in front of the fo:-ward edge of the main line of resistance

107 provide support in initial defensive action and during the repulse of attacked. Security of withdrawal from strongpoint was ensured by covered communication trenches and underground passages leading from the position to concealed area in the rear. Communication trenches connect all fire trenches, gun emplacements. shelters. and observation posts to permit maneuver ability- within the strongpoint. For communication and maneuver along the forward edge of a strong-point, a parallel trench was built which may also serve as a fire trench. Easy communication with the rear was organised. Tunnels are built if terrain condition.; are favorable and sufficient time was available. A widened communication trench parallel to the front in the rear of a strongpoint was recommended to per mit rapid transfer of units. This wider trench in the rear constitutes an additional antitank ditch. It may be built rectilinearly and was covered for camouflage. Normally. a battalion defense zone has three lines of trenches and three communication trenches con necting the defensive zone with the rear. The first trench runs along the forward edge of platoon strong-points. Usually it was not continuous and was sited on the military crest. The second, basic trench was, as rule. continuous and follows the second line of pla toon strongpoints and centers of

108 resistance. The third. broken trench was dug on reverse slopes of eleva tions and runs along the third line of platoon strong-points or along the rear boundary of the second line of platoon strongpoints. Sufficient space was left between the trenches for the organization of a dense fire system in front of the forward edge of the defen sive position and for fire cover of obstacles. These distances are usually. 610 to 1.3(10 fret between the first and second trench and 300 to 610 feet between the second and third trench. Red Army trenches are deep and narrow. Stakes driven into the trench sides provide sortie steps at intervals of 25 to 30 feet. Exit to the rear was pro vided in trenches and communication passages by ramps or steps dug in the earth at intervals of 65 to 100 feet. On the average, trenches completed to a full profile are from 3.2 to 5.2 feet wide at the top and 1.6 to 2 feet at the bottom; their depth was 3.2 to 11.1 fret figure 61. Fire pits for riflemen and ma chine-gun positions are buih at close intervals about 13 to 16 feet between riflemen and 6.5 to 130 feet between machine guns. Communication pas sages are of sufficient width 16 feet, for the trans portation of heavy machine guns and. when neces sary. antitank guns. Such wide communication passages are considered especially important between the main and reserve gun positions in open terrain.

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110 Chapter 12 Defensive Tactics of a Rifle Battalion by Maj A. Pavlov on 13 March 1943 By the end of the day of 11 March 1943, formations from the a WaffenSS Tank Corps had broken through the defenses of Soviet troops to the north of Kharkov. In developing the offensive to the southeast, the Germans tried to break out into the rear of the 3d Tank Army which was defending the city. The 113th Rifle Division (commander, Maj Gen Ye. S. Alekhin), in being in the reserve of the 6th Army in the area of Alekseyevka (40 kilometers to the south of Rogan) received the mission of advancing to the Roganka River, organizing defenses along this line and preventing the further advance of the Germans to the Severskiy Donets. The 2d Rifle Battalion (commander, Captain I. F. Cherkashin) from the 1288th Rifle Regiment (commander, Lt Col I. I. Logvinov) from this division arrived after a 40 kilometer march in the spring mud. By 0800 hours on 12 March the Soviet battalion took up the defensive area assigned to it: the northwestern edge of Rogan, the mound with the marker +1.4, elevation and the southwestern edge of Rogan. The battalion was ordered to concentrate its basic efforts on holding Rogan in order to prevent the breakthrough of Germans tanks and infantry from Kharkov toward Chuguyev.

111 On the right in the area of Rogan farm, the defenses were held by the 1288th Rifle Regiment and on the left the 1292d Rifle Regiment. Due to the fact that the division was defending along a broad front, the battalion defensive areas were up to 5 kilometers wide along the front. There were significant spaces not occupied by the troops between the battalion defensive areas. Thus, there was an interval up to 1.5 kilometers between the 1288th Rifle Regiment and its adjacent unit on the right, and up to 2 km with the adjacent unit on the left. In effect several Soviet battalions were simply screening their front and incapable of prolonged resistance. The terrain which was to be defended by the 2d Rifle Battalion was an open plateau rising to the north and the west from Rogan. Even in moving the forward defensive edge significantly to the west of the Roganka River, the advantages in the nature of the terrain were on the side of the Germans. The population point itself located in the lowlands along both sides of the river, with clay structures easily destroyed by artillery fire and was not of particular value for organizing the defenses in it.

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113 Defensive battle of rifle battalion in area of Rogan March 1943 For creating 'a solid defense along a broad front under these conditions significant men and equipment were required. However, the battalion had a total of: 324 soldiers, 244 rifles, 36 sub-machine guns, 8 light and 6 medium machine guns, 4 antitank rifles, 2 45mm guns and 8 mortars. One battery from the 1200th Light Artillery Regiment (4 76mm cannons) and a heavy battery of 2 203mm guns had been assigned for supporting the combat operations of the battalion. The supply of ammunition was also insufficient (one unit of fire for rifle and machine cartridges, 0.3 units for mortar shells, 0.5 units of cartridges for the antitank guns and 0.5 units of shells for the 45mm guns). Proceeding from a rapid analysis of the terrain conditions and the existing situation, the battalion commander decided to focus his basic efforts on covering the Kharkov--Rogan highway along which the advance of the Germans tanks which had broken through was expected. Because of the large spaces between the adjacent subunits, the battalion had to organize an all-round defense.

114 On 12 March 1943, at 1200 hours, having completed reconnaissance of the defensive area, the battalion commander issued the operation order with the following deployment of the battalion: The 4th Rifle Company, reinforced by two antitank guns and two medium machine guns, was ordered to defend the area: the boundary of the path with the road running from Rogan to Rogan Farm, elevation 177.6, the northern edge of Rogan. The crews of the antitank guns were take up firing positions on the right flank along both sides of the road to Rogan Farm, while the medium machine guns should be to the left of the road. They had the mission of firing over the river valley and the approaches to the farm. Battle outposts comprising 12 men occupied a position on the boundary of the road and the path. The 6th Rifle Company with one 45mm gun, two antitank guns and two medium machine guns took up the defenses along both sides of the Kharkov-- Rogan Highway. The 45mm gun was ordered by the battalion commander to advance to elevation 177.6, while the antitank guns were positioned along both sides of the highway with the task of firing along it. In the aim of supporting the boundaries with adjacent companies, the crews of the medium machine guns took up firing positions on the flanks. Battle

115 outposts were sent to the intersection of the highway and the village road (1.5 km to the northwest of elevation 177.6). The 5th Rifle Company reinforced by one 45mm gun and one medium machine gun was given the mission of defending the area: the hill with the marker 175.5, elevation 167.7, the southwestern edge of Rogan. The gun crew was to take up a firing position along the road running to Rogan Station while the medium machine gun was to be on elevation The mortar company with positions on the western edge of Rogan was given the mission of firing on Rogan Station, the Kharkov--Rogan Highway and the exits from Rogan Farm. The battery of 76mm (dual purpose) guns positioned on the northwestern edge of Rogan was to fire at Germans tanks and infantry advancing along the highway from Kharkov and along the road from Rogan Station. The battalion commander ordered the battery of 203mm guns to prepare fire against the intersection of the highway and railroads and the exits from Rogan Station as well as be ready to repel Germans tank attacked from the northwest. The battalion commander positioned his reserve (a mixed platoon of submachine gunners with a medium machine gun) on the northwestern edge of Rogan,

116 having given them the mission to be ready for counterattacks on the axes of Rogan Farm and elevation At 1400 hours, the companies had taken up their assigned defensive areas and had begun to dig trenches. Regardless of the frozen ground, by the beginning of combat a majority of the subunits had dug firing trenches for kneeling and standing positions and had equipped the firing positions for the guns, antitank guns and machine guns. Some trenches were interconnected by communicating trenches. With the onset of darkness, the deputy battalion commander for political affairs assembled the party and Komsomol organizers and the company agitators, giving them the task of paying particular attention so that each soldier knew the particular features of the defensive area and knew the necessity of steadfastly repelling the Germans tank and infantry attacked. It was recommended in the talks to explain to the men that the basis of success was their tenacity on the defensive, clear cooperation, prompt fire support for adjacent subunits, boldness and initiative in combat. On 13 March at 0900 hours, a group of Germans dive bombers attacked Rogan. At the same time the roar of artillery fire sounded from Rogan Farm. For clearing up the situation, the battalion commander immediately sent out in this direction a reconnaissance patrol of five sub-machine gunners.

117 At 1100 hours, the scouts reported that German tanks and motorized infantry had broken into Rogan Farm from the northwest. The first battalion of the 1288th Rifle Regiment defending it under Germans pressure had pulled back to the eastern bank of the Roganka River. At this time, the commander of the 4th Rifle Company informed them that 50 soldiers from the 1288th Rifle Regiment had pulled back to the positions of his subunit. Having assessed the situation in the area of the adjacent unit to the right, the battalion commander drew the correct conclusion that the greatest danger was arising precisely on the battalion's right flank and he immediately reinforced the small 4th Rifle Company with this group of soldiers. He instructed the commander of the battery of 203mm guns to prepare fire against the southern edge of Rogan Farm. At 1140 hours, three Germans tanks appeared around the mound with the marker +4.2 on the Kharkov Highway. They advanced cautiously, stopping frequently. A 45mm gun which was on elevation 177.6, at a range of meters opened fire and after several rounds hit the lead tank. The others stopped and soon retreated to the other side of the railroad embankment. At 1230 hours, 24 German aircraft appeared over Rogan and dropped high explosive and incendiary bombs. As a result, a portion of the buildings in the

118 population point was destroyed and fire broke out. The bombing did not cause any particular harm to the battalion personnel, since the soldiers were in trenches a significant distance away from the buildings. At 1300 hours, under the cover of heavy artillery and mortar fire, up to a battalion of German infantry with 20 tanks from Rogan Farm attacked the battle formation of the 4th Rifle Company. Upon the orders of the battalion commander, the batteries of 203mm howitzers and 76mm cannons opened fire against the advancing Germans. As the Germans approached the forward defensive edge, the crews of the Soviet mortars, antitank guns and medium machine guns entered combat. Suffering great losses, the Germans moved forward slowly. By 1500 hours they had pressed the battle outposts of the 4th Rifle Company but were unable to advance further. The Germans infantry was cut off from the tanks by solid rifle and machine gun fire and lay down in open terrain some meters from the forward defensive edge. For providing aid to the infantry, the Germans tanks, firing on the move, advanced. Some seven German tanks were knocked out by the fire of the antitank rifles and the cannon battery firing with direct laying.

119 However, four Germans tanks succeeded in breaking into the company's position. Benefiting from this, the Germans infantry rose to the attack. An extremely dangerous situation developed on the battalion's right flank. Captain Cherkashin immediately dispatched a special messenger to the regiment commander to report the situation and asked for help for the battalion by the firing of the divisional artillery and the supplying of the required amount of ammunition for the guns and mortars. At the most crucial moment of combat, the Soviet rifle battalion was reinforced by seven tanks from the 25th Tank Brigade which had been sent here by the division commander. The battalion commander immediately gave the tanks the mission of counterattacking the Germans. (He was following the principle of risky attached troops while preserving own troops.) The artillery and mortar batteries, upon the orders from the battalion commander, intensified the fire against the attacking German infantry and tanks which had broken into the defenses of the 4th Rifle Company. By a decisive attack by the tanks and infantry, the Germans were driven out of the company's defensive area and, in suffering great losses, began to pull back toward Rogan Farm.

120 At 1700 hours, around 40 Germans aircraft reappeared over Rogan. With their sirens turned on, they dove at the population point trying to demoralize our troops. The battalion's subunits remained in their positions ready to repel new attacked. The aircraft were still circling in the air, when the German tanks and infantry again went into the attack. Six heavy German tanks with an infantry party attacked the right flank of the 4th Company while seven tanks and around a company of infantry advanced in the direction of the mound with the marker At this same time, up to a company of German tanks with infantry attacked the 6th Rifle Company along the Kharkov Highway. By simultaneous actions from different directions, the Germans was counting on breaking through the battalion's defenses and clearing the road to Chuguyev. By organized fire of the antitank weapons and small arms in the defensive area of the 6th Rifle Company, the Germans attack was driven off. Leaving a damaged tank and scores of bodies on the battlefield, the Germans retreated. The German reconnaissance in force attacks were wasting too many men and tanks which would better serve them in a Schwehrpunkt directed attack. In this battle the German heavy tanks represented the greatest threat for the battalion. Regardless of the heavy-fire by the 203mm and 76mm guns, at 1730

121 hours they reached the northern edge of Rogan and opened up flanking fire against the 4th Rifle Company which by this time had suffered great losses in the course of the intense battles (15 soldiers, 2 antitank rifles and 1 medium machine gun had been knocked out)." Being without powerful antitank weapons in the battle formations, this time the 4 th Company was unable to check the Germans advancing tanks and infantry and began to pull back in the southwesterly direction. A threat of outflanking the right flank of the battalion had arisen. For restoring the situation, the battalion commander ordered his reserve by a counterattack to destroy the Germans infantry which had broken through toward the east edge of Rogan. The mortar company which had consumed all its ammunition was given the mission of reaching the northern edge of Rogan and covering the retreat of the 4th Rifle Company by rifle and sub-machine gun fire. The tanks which at this time were on the western edge of Rogan were given the mission of counterattacking the German infantryand tanks which had approached the northern edge of this population point. The artillery batteries were ordered to support the tank counterattack. By the decisive actions of the mortar company, by the heavy fire of the cannon battery which fired at the Germans tanks at point-blank range as well as by

122 the firing of the machine guns and the 45mm gun from the area of marker 177.6, the German advance was stopped. At this same time, Soviet tanks had reached the northern edge of Rogan, they quickly reformed into battle formation and went over to the counterattack. The Germans could not withstand the rapid attack of Soviet subunits and, leaving four tanks and scores of bodies on the battlefield, pulled back to Rogan Farm. The reserve of the battalion commander (a mixed platoon of sub-machine gunners), a brief battle cleared the eastern edge of Rogan of the Germans infantry. The retreating 4th Rifle Company was able to halt and deploy for the defensive 100 meters to the north of the Kharkov Highway. Thus, the position on the battalion's right flank was significantly restored. With the onset of darkness, the Germans infantry again attacked the northern edge of Rogan. A fierce battle broke out. By rifle and machine gun fire, the mortar troops repelled the thrust of the Germans which was endeavoring to break through to the firing positions of the 203mm guns. Considering the developing situation, the battalion commander ordered the commander of the battery of 203mm guns under the cover of the mortar company to change firing positions.

123 Regardless of the fact that individual groups of Germans sub-machine gunners succeeded in breaking through the battle formations of the mortar company and capturing several houses on the northwestern edge of Rogan, the submachine gunners supported the changing of firing positions by the battery of 203mm guns. At 2300 hours after heavy artillery and mortar fire along the entire front of the battalion, the Germans infantry and tanks which were on the northern edge of Rogan again went over to the offensive and began to press the mortar company. At the same time, up to a platoon of Germans sub-machine gunners crossed the river and reached the southern edge of Rogan. There was a real threat of the encirclement of the battalion. Considering that during all the combat the Germans had not shown any particular activity in the area of the 5th Rifle Company, the battalion commander ordered the company's commander to leave a rifle platoon in the defensive area as a battle outpost and with the remaining forces along with the mortar company to counterattack the Germans which had seized the northern edge of Rogan. The commander of the 5th Rifle Company gave the mission to the battle outposts, he led the remaining personnel of the company to the western edge of Rogan and through a liaison officer established contact with the mortar company.

124 Soon both subunits went over to the counterattack. Soviet rifle and mortar troops boldly attacked the German sub-machine gunners which had occupied the buildings. By 2400 hours, the northern and northwestern edges of Rogan had been cleared of the Germans. The Germans sub-machine gunners which had penetrated to the southern edge of Rogan also could not stand the rapid attack by the reserve of the battalion commander and retreated to the eastern bank of the Roganka. The situation had been restored. At this time a messenger from the regimental commander had reached the battalion commander who was on the western edge of Rogan. The messenger brought an order to take up a new defensive line along the line of elevations 177.8, 176.0, elevation During the night the battalion's subunits retreated in an organized manner and took up the new defensive area. Subsequently, from intelligence data it was learned that the battalion with reinforcements, in checking the advance of the motorized infantry regiment and the tank battalion from the SS Panzer Division Totenkopf, destroyed 17 tanks and up to 300 soldiers and officers. Thus, regardless of the limited time, the battalion commander and his staff were able to organize an effective fire plan, precise cooperation with the suporting artillery and later also tanks. The well thought out fire plan made it possible to hit

125 the Germans both on the approaches and directly ahead of the forward edge and ensured the repelling of attacked by superior German forces. The steadfastness and tenacity of the men on the defensive were the result of well-coordinated actions by the subunits and the high morale of all the personnel. The most important conditions for the successful repelling of the Germans attacks were the well-organized control of the subunits by the battalion commander, the high activeness, mutual help of the defending subunits and the bold maneuvering of the personnel and fire in the course of combat.

126 Chapter 13 Soviet Rifle Battalion Firepower By Colonel V. Pruntzov in Krasnaya Zeczrla, 1944 Thanks to its exceptional power, the fire of modern Soviet artillery and of large caliber mortars weapons, Soviet infantry firepower, and consequently the importance of the latter was underestimated. This underestimation was completely erroneous and led at times to an insufficient utilization of the fire possibilities of infantry weapons. The term "infantry fire" embraces all types of weapons of a rifle battalion with the exception of antitank guns. Infantry fire was used during the most decisive moments of battle for repelling Germans attacked and for fighting the way to the Germans when assaulting his positions. In both cases the technical rapidity of fire (rate of fire) of the weapons was used to its full extent. The effectiveness of infantry fire during these short periods was determined by two factors. The first was the technical density of fire, i.e., the number of bullets or fragments per linear meter of the target area in one minute. The second was the accuracy of fire, which depends not only on the skill of the riflemen but to a considerable extent on preliminary preparations assignment of targets, measurement of distances. selection of reference points, etc.

127 An idea of the possible density of infantry fire both in defense and in attack can be obtained from the following calculations. A rifle battalion of average strength usually defends a sector with a front of 2,000 meters. Its frontage in attack was 500 meters. Taking average figures for the number of weapons in a battalion (considering the normal wartime shortage) and the average practical rate of fire, the average number of bullets and fragments released by a battalion within a minute would be as follows: McCoy's Caveats 200 rifles firing 10 bullets each-3,000 bullets. (affected by troops hiding) 25 submachine nuns, 50 bullets each-1,250 bullets. (close range) 3 heavy machine, guns. 210 shots each-900 bullets. (reveals all MG positions) 16 light machine guns, 125 shots each-2,000 bullets.(reveals all MG positions) 6 50mm mortars, 15 shots each, 200 effective fragments from each projectile-18,000 fragments. 3 82mm mortars, 15 shots each, 300 effective fragments for each projectile, 13,500 fragments. 150 hand grenades (thrown during the assault stage), 200 effective fragments per grenade-30,000 fragments. (close range) The grand total, then, was 7,150 bullets and 31,500 fragments per minute, not counting 30,000 hand-grenade fragments used (luring the last moments at the expense of rifle fire. Thus the average density of infantry fire in defense will be three bullets and more than fifteen fragments per linear meter per minute, and during the support of attack, more than fourteen bullets and sixty-three fragments.

128 This purely mathematical calculation requires some correction with respect to defense. An enemy attack was not conducted 'uniformly along the entire front, which enabled the defender to concentrate his fire when firing at important advancing threat concentrations. Such a concentration can just about double the density of infantry fire in defense. Taking this into account, one may assume that the density of infantry fire in defense was six bullets and thirty fragments per linear meter per minute; in attack, fourteen bullets and sixty-three fragments. The figures for battalion weapons and manpower used above are arbitrary. They may change. But the strength of the battalion determines the width of its defense sector. Consequently, the average density of fire under conditions of normal saturation of the front will be approximately the same as above. What will be the effect of this density of infantry fire in battle? Let us imagine the area in front of the defending title battalion split into corridors, each corridor being one meter wide. By maintaining the above mentioned density of fire, each of these corridors will be pierced by six bullets and thirty fragments per minute. It will take the Germans soldiers about one minute to cover the assaulting distance. Each soldier in assault averages three meters of front. This means that

129 each soldier assaulting the position will be subjected to eighteen bullets and ninety fragments released from a distance not exceeding 200 meters, and in the last moments, point-blank. The theory and practice of firing infantry weapons shows that not more than a single shot was required to hit a man-size target at a distance of 300 meters or less. This means that the defenders possess fire means with sufficient power to wipe out entirely the manpower of the attacking Germans. This power of infantry fire on the part of the defenders explains why a poorly prepared German attack was repelled within a short time with great losses for the attacking side. What, then, are the targets of the infantry fire in repelling attacked? First of all, the manpower of the attacker Cutting off the Germans, infantry from its supporting tanks, our infantry weapons hit it with massed fires and, upon reaching the density of fire mentioned above, easily stop the attack. Systematically, Soviet snipers destroy Germans officers, observers, messengers, machine gunners, accompanying-artillery gunners, and other important targets.

130 Antitank rifles participate in repelling Germans tanks when they approach at a distance of 300 meters or less. Mortars wipe out concentrations of Germans soldiers advancing along the approaches to our defenses and destroy machine guns, mortars, and artillery guns first of all, targeting those which are closer to our forward edge and therefore ' more dangerous than the others. It was quite obvious that in order to make the attack successful it was necessary to reduce the density of the infantry fire of the defenders to its minimum, and still better to. zero. The Soviet Battalion Attack During a Soviet attack it was essential to deny Germans infantry any possibility of conducting tire. During the preparation of the attack, the destruction of the fire means of the defending Germans, the destruction of his trenches, and the annihilation of his men are executed by artillery, combat aircraft, and mortars, and in the course of the attack, by tanks. However, in spite of the multitude and effectiveness of all these means of neutralization, it was only rarely possible to deprive the Germans completely of the possibility of repelling attacked by means of infantry fire, for if the Germans

131 managed to save as little as twenty-live percent of the maximum density of his infantry fire, the attack was made difficult. That was precisely the time when well trained infantry should help itself with its own fire. Mortars As far as mortars are concerned, the fact that they must support the infantry attack by firing over the head of their troops arouses neither doubts nor difficulties. This support was provided at all times and in all places. Machine Guns Machine guns, however, are often forgotten, and this in spite of their tremendous importance. It was true that the flat trajectory fire of the machine gun does not affect the Germans hidden in pillboxes and at the bottom of trenches. But the shower of this fire will not allow the Germans to leave the pillboxes; it will prevent his soldiers from rising from the bottom of their trenches and his commanders and observers from looking through embrasures and vision slots. Thus, well aimed machine-gun fire may pin down the Germans forces surviving aerial bombing and artillery and mortar fires. Moreover, well organized machinegun fire will prevent the Germans from firing from his trenches. According to Soviet calculations, heavy and light machine guns of a rifle battalion release 2,000 bullets per minute. During an attack along a 500-meter

132 front, machine guns will fire a density of about six bullets per minute pet meter of the front. Fire of this density directed at the parapets or embrasures will prevent Germans soldiers from getting up and carrying out accurate observed fire. Machine-gun fire of high intensity was opened only before the very beginning of the assault and was delivered for a few minutes, until the nearest objectives of the assault had been taken. For subsequent assaults of new objectives in the depth of Germans defenses, machine-gun fire has to be organized anew. The difficulty in organizing machine-gull fire arises from the fact that it should be conducted through the gaps between Soviet attacking units and from firing positions located at or near the assault line (within assaulting distance). On the other hand, the task was facilitated by the fact that only a part of the front was to be taken under machine-gun fire, or only those objectives which remain intact by the end of our artillery and mortar preparation. Here arises the problem of the use of infantry weapons in the general fire plan, both in defense and in attack. In this general fire plan all types of infantry weapons should be given definite missions as to objectives, time, and methods of execution, and the commanders of all infantry units should make all the necessary preparations for the successful completion of these missions.

133 In the spring of 1915, the Russian 70th Riazhskii Infantry Regiment was preparing to attack the Germans on a front of approximately one and a half kilometers. The distance between the trenches of the regiment and those of the Germans was about 800 meters. The area in between was a meadow, partly marshy and partly covered with small shrubs. The German defense had prepared full-profile, continuous trenches with overhead covers; they fired front embrasures, and were protected by two rows of barbed wire. Reconnaissance had found out that the Germans had a well organized system of rifle and machine-gun fires. The Russian Situation and Decisions Only four batteries with an insignificant amount of ammunition were detailed for the support of the Riazhskii Regiment. Consequently, it was obvious that the Germans defenses could not be neutralized by artillery fire. The regimental commander decided to do it with his machine guns. After a thorough reconnaissance the following plan was worked out. During the night preceding the assault, seventeen heavy machine guns (most of them captured) secretly advanced under the cover of a strong reconnaissance force and occupied firing positions in the bushes within 200 or 250 meters of the German trenches.

134 They prepared fires for German embrasures, and each machine gun was assigned a definite sector and provided with from twelve to fifteen cartridge belts. At dawn, three battalions left their trenches and moved toward the Germans. The Germans gave the alarm. They rushed to the tiring posts, but at that moment our machine guns began firing. As an intense fire was raging around the embrasures, the Germans soldiers, dumfounded and perplexed, lay down at the bottom of the trenches. They did not call in supporting fires just outside their trenches. As a result, the Soviet regiment lost only fifteen or twenty men. It pierced the Germans defenses, advanced successfully, and took up to 2,000 prisoners. A similar episode took place during this war. In one sector of the front the regiment of Colonel Babadzhanyan was about to attack the Germans. They occupied well equipped trenches. In addition to the artillery fire, Colonel Rabadzhanyan secretly displaced all his machine guns to advance positions, and each of them was assigned a well reconnoitered target. Our machine guns did not let the Germans fire a single shot at our attacking units. The Germans were caught in their trenches and, wiped out.

135 These episode, taken from two wars show the irresistible power of infantry fire, provided it was well organized. This power should be used still more skillfully and in a fuller and more extensive manner.

136 Chapter 14 Soviet Mortars Supporting Rifle Battalions Mortars, the infantryman's artillery, play a far greater tactical role in the Red Army than they do in our own. Used by the U.S. Army as a supplementary weapon, with fire control decentralized to a small infantry unit, mortars in the Red Army are fundamentally used for massed fire as an independent striking weapon. Since 1942, this large-scale use of mortars has been developed into a definite tactical doctrine among Soviet troops. Although fire requirements are set by the Red Army infantry, technical control and coordination are the responsibility of an artillery commander. Field artillery methods are used by Soviet mortar troops, who conduct massed fire missions for antitank-antipersonnel barrages, countermortar fire, and interdiction. They also will fire smoke missions, or in support of automatic weapons. Each Russian 82mm mortar company, with nine pieces, fired in support of its own rifle battalion. The company could lay down a fixed barrage 275 yards wide, with each tube typically firing 14 rounds. Action was begun by firing two company concentrations of three rounds each, followed by four platoon salvos at 5-second intervals.

137 Zone fire was conducted against Germans assembly areas and troop concentrations, the zone engaged by one medium mortar company being not larger than about 7 acres (an area about 180 x 180 yards in total). Zone fire was conducted at the rate of about 18 rounds per 2 acres per minute. Elevation and deflection was shifted in order to cover a zone adequately, each platoon firing 2 to 4 rounds for every shift of about 50 yards. Short, intense concentrations were fired at visible targets in exposed positions. These concentrations usually lasted for 2 to 3 minutes, with the ammunition expenditure being about 50 rounds per 2 acres per concentration. Soviet Mortars in Defense In defense the mortars of a Soviet Rifle Regiment were normally grouped into a provisional medium mortar battalion, containing 27 medium mortars (82mm) and six heavies (120mm). Such a battalion could fire a barrage 600 to 700 yards wide. Mortars can be fired through the roof of a ruined building if the groundlevel flooring was solid enough to withstand the recoil. Red Army Mortar Employment In the Red Army, mortars are classed either as light, medium, or heavy. The light mortar, a 50-mm equivalent of our own 60-mm mortar, is the standard weapon

138 of the rifle company, there being a two-mortar platoon to each company. These mortars may either support their own company in action, or all the mortar platoons in a battalion may be combined into a six-piece provisional mortar company which fires missions in support of the whole battalion. In such a case, a fire direction center will be established, and fire conducted through the use of messengers and visual signals. Where possible, 50-mm mortar fire is coordinated with that of the medium mortar units. The Soviet medium mortar is an 82-mm piece, the equivalent of our own 81-mm mortar. Each battalion 82-mm mortar company, with nine pieces, may fire in support of its own rifle battalion. It is normal practice, however, when on the defense or in a static situation, to combine the three medium mortar companies of a rifle regiment into a provisional battalion commanded by the regimental heavy mortar battery commander, whose pieces operate jointly with those of the three mortar companies. This provisional mortar battalion establishes a fire direction center with wire communication to observation posts, and to platoons through their company command posts. Observation posts are numerous, there being platoon OP's and company OP's in addition to those maintained by the battalion. The provisional battalion commander is in turn under the command and coordination of the division artillery headquarters. Thus the provisional medium mortar battalion, unlike our

139 own decentralized control of 81-mm mortar platoons, may fire massed concentrations in support of the entire regimental front, or may on occasion fire into the sectors of adjacent regiments, range permitting. The crew of an M mm mortar go into action during one of the Red Army's winter offensives. Although normally

140 the weapon of a mortar platoon, the platoons within a battalion may be combined to form a provisional mortar company. The Soviet standard heavy mortar is the 120-mm, there being seven of them in the regimental mortar battery. There is no equivalent organization or weapon in the U.S. Army infantry regiment. In 1942, the Red Army organized some GHQ mortar battalions and regiments that function much as do our own 4.2-inch chemical mortar battalions.

141 The crew of an M mm mortar displace forward to a new firing position. In a fast-moving situation, the aggressive displacement of guns is one of the characteristics of Red Army mortar tactics. CONDUCT OF MORTAR FIRE Mortar troops of the Red Army conduct their fire according to a thorough procedure. Artillery intelligence is acquired aggressively, with platoons, batteries,

142 and battalions, working with infantry and artillery patrols to push their OP's as far forward as necessary. Enemy information is carefully and thoroughly evaluated, and intelligence is exchanged by all echelons from field armies to mortar companies. Artillery intelligence reports, as issued by the artillery headquarters, contain the operational recommendations and requirements of even the lower echelon mortar units. Based upon this intelligence, and upon a thoroughly developed firing technique, a comprehensive fire plan is established. Once established, the plan is not static, but changes continuously as the operational requirements of the supported rifle troops vary. Once in action. mortar units will determine the requirements of fire against various targets, make fire reconnaissance against minefields, register specific concentrations, and establish check points. Such preliminaries having been established, mortar units then concentrate on secrecy, surprise, aggressive displacement of guns, maneuver of fire, and varying their mortar tactics. Constant coordination and liaison between the mortar units, the artillery command, and the rifle units is a strict rule. The result is a closely knit fire plan wherein a single system of terrain reference is maintained by all troops. This in turn facilitates the requests for fire by rifle units, and its delivery by any or all fire support units.

143 Officer supervision and centralized control of mortar batteries is stressed in the Red Army by assigning a larger number of officers to mortar units than will be found in the equivalent units of the U.S. Army. Also. the greater number of medium and heavy mortars found in the Soviet rifle division, give it a striking power, by weight of projectile, of two and a half that of an American infantry division. THE MEDIUM MORTAR COMPANY Although medium (82-mm) mortar platoons may be assigned to separate support missions, or medium mortar battalions may be formed for massed fire under certain operational circumstances, the medium mortar company is the standard operational unit among Red Army mortar troops. When on the offense, the medium mortar company must supply supporting fire for the most forward rifle battalion troops. During the general artillery preparation that precedes a Red Army infantry attack, the mortars concentrate on neutralizing enemy infantry positions, and breaking gaps through minefields and wire entanglements. As the Soviet infantry deploys, the mortars join with the artillery in providing general covering fire, and during the attack the mortars fire concentrations against the foremost enemy positions, known weapons emplacements, and counterattacking infantry.

144 When on the offense, the medium mortar company must supply supporting fire for the most forward rifle battalion troops. Here the crew of an M mm mortar move to a new position during the battle for Stalingrad. When on the defensive, Soviet mortar companies, besides providing the normal support fires, must be prepared to put concentrations on concealed approaches anywhere within a mile and a half range, fire barrages to separate counterattacking enemy infantry from their tanks, and neutralize enemy forward support weapons. If enemy troops break into the Soviet defenses, the Soviet mortars are expected to aid in the destruction of these enemy elements by cutting off their path of retreat, and supporting the Red Army counterattack. The Red Army mortar company moving into action is preceded by a reconnaissance section from the company, which selects the firing positions and observation posts.

145 Whenever possible, the company OP is established near or in the same locality as the rifle battalion OP, since the mortar captain and the battalion commander maintain the closest liaison. Meanwhile, each mortar platoon establishes its own OP in front of its position, but not too far to prohibit the passing of verbal orders or signals from the OP's to the platoons. Telephone communication is established from each of the platoon OP's to the rifle battalion OP, and from there to the mortar company headquarters hack at the firing position. There is also wire communication between the battalion OP and the battalion command post. When the company moves into its firing position, the usual procedure is to deploy the platoons in line with no more than about 35 yards between platoons, each platoon front also being approximately 35 yards. Thus the mortars would be roughly dispersed in battery along a front of between 150 to 200 yards. This procedure varies with the terrain, of course, and mortar platoons may often be arranged in echelon, rather than line, but along a general, common front. As the pieces are moved into position, a company base piece is designated, it usually being the mortar farthest to one flank. In turn, base pieces are designated for each platoon, again usually a piece on the flank of the platoon. The mortars are then laid to fire a parallel sheaf; that is, each mortar is laid to fire on the same azimuth. This is done by setting the platoon base pieces in parallel with the

146 company base piece, usually by using an artillery aiming circle. Then the mortars of each platoon are laid in parallel with their respective base pieces, usually by reciprocal laying. When the company firing position has been established, the company commander, his second in command, a telephone operator, and an observer from each platoon make a reconnaissance for an alternate firing position and observation posts. However, if the company is continually displacing forward to accompany rifle troops on the offensive, each platoon may reconnoiter and advance independently with the infantry company it is supporting. But in the more stable situation, the company commander may select a reserve firing position not less than 200 yards from his mortars, have mortar positions prepared at this alternate location, and have camouflaged communications trenches dug between the two localities.

147 Members of a battalion medium mortar company set up an M mm mortar among the ruins of Kharkov. The distance about 35 yards between this crew and the one in the background is SOP in the Red Army for medium mortars going into battery. Red Army mortarmen lay their guns much the same way we do, however the sight they use may be either simpler or more complicated than our own. The sight on the 82-mm mortar (left) may be used for laying a parallel sheaf among mortars in battery.

148 After the company's sector of fire has been designated, probably by the artillery staff, the company commander prepares the company firing data with the aid of his observer. From five to seven reference points are selected in the company's sector, one of these being designated as the base point. Among these reference points are those which have also been selected by the rifle battalion commander for his own purposes. It is not unusual for the mortar company commander then to assign separate fire missions to his platoons, particularly if several targets have previously been marked for destruction. In such cases, platoon commanders prepare additional firing data of their own, including such things as range determination, charge selection, and the determination of angle of fire and deflection shifts. But when the whole company fires a concentration on one target, the preparation of firing data again becomes the responsibility of the company commander. Registration on base points, reference (check) points, planned concentrations, etc., is by observed fire using the bracket method. This is done by the company commander using his base piece, firing first on the base point. Successive corrections are made during registration until the ratio of overs to shorts in a narrow fork does not exceed two to one in successive bursts. Then the sheaf is adjusted by firing all pieces at the determined range. On occasion, the ladder

149 method is also used. During fire for effect, transfers of fire are computed from base points or from previous targets. Smaller sectors, or individual targets, may be designated to platoons, which then will register independently.

150 Red Army mortarmen fall in for inspection at a Soviet training camp. The M mm mortar, here shown in carrying position, is a weapon of the rifle company. When in action, the company commander generally conducts the fire when his whole company is engaged on a single fire mission. However, if several targets are engaged at the same time, targets and fire missions may be allotted to the different platoons, in which case the platoon leaders will conduct the fire for their own pieces. The Red Army medium mortar company is capable of laying a fixed barrage across a front of about 275 yards. It is the usual Soviet practice to allot 14 rounds per piece when conducting such a fire mission. Action is begun by firing two company concentrations of three rounds each, followed by four platoon salvos at 5-second intervals. Defensive barrages against tank-borne infantry attacks are fired according to a prearranged plan. A series of phase lines between 300 and 400 yards apart are selected along the expected route of approach, the closest phase line being about 300 yards from the forward friendly positions. The ranges of each of these phase lines are determined in advance, and fire begins at the furthest phase line at the

151 moment the lead tanks cross it. Fire is then shifted to each succeeding phase line until the attack is either repulsed, or has penetrated the last line. Zone fire is conducted against enemy assembly areas and troop concentrations, the zone engaged by one medium mortar company being not larger than about 7 acres. When the zone contains troops in extensive fortifications, the mortar fire will probably be preceded by artillery firing for destructive effect. Zone fire is conducted at the rate of about 18 rounds per 2 acres per minute. Elevation and deflection is shifted in order to cover a zone adequately, each platoon firing 2 to 4 rounds for every shift of about 50 yards. Short, intense concentrations are fired at visible targets in exposed positions. These concentrations usually last for 2 to 3 minutes, with the ammunition expenditure being about 50 rounds per 2 acres per concentration. MASSED MORTAR FIRE Massing the medium mortars of a regiment to form a provisional medium mortar battalion, is a Red Army practice more likely to be encountered when Soviet troops are on the defensive, or when the situation is relatively stable. Placed under the command of the regimental heavy mortar battery commander, the 27 medium mortars, plus the 6 heavies (120-mm), can fire a barrage 600 to 700 yards wide.

152 When a provisional mortar battalion organizes its firing position, the companies are echeloned in depth along the front, with intervals of about 100 yards between companies. Dummy and alternate firing positions are prepared, but the battalion usually goes into position rather far forward in order to get the maximum range for its pieces. When the battalion commander has received the battalion fire mission, he allots separate missions to each of the companies. The battalion sector may be divided among the medium mortar companies for general support purposes. He also designates the reference points, sectors for antipersonnel barrages, accompanying concentrations, and platoon and company phase lines for antitank-antipersonnel barrages, aimed at infantry riding on tanks. Once the battalion is in position, the pieces are not registered until the order to do so is received from the headquarters of the artillery which is supporting the rifle troops on that particular front. This headquarters designates both the time and duration of the mortar registration. The order in which companies will register their mortars, and the methods of registration, are then set by the battalion commander in order to reduce the registration period, and to avoid interference among the companies.

153 Within the battalion, communication is by telephone, but for communication with the artillery headquarters and the infantry, radio is used. Once this communication has been established, the battalion commander is able to fire all companies as a single unit. This massing of fire is probably the outstanding feature of Soviet mortar tactics. When firing a massed antipersonnel barrage, each company is given the coordinates of its right sector line. The pieces are laid so that each company's barrage will fall with the extreme right burst near its sector line. The other bursts then extend to the left across the sector. The command to fire is not given until the enemy infantry has approached to within 200 to 250 yards of the Soviet front-line positions. Then the command to fire is given only on the orders of the infantry commander, or the commander of the artillery group supporting the infantry. If the enemy approaches to within 150 to 200 yards of the front with no orders to fire having been received, then the battalion commander can open fire on his own initiative. In frontal antipersonnel barrages, fire is conducted in a parallel sheaf fired from fixed settings. Ammunition allotment for such a barrage is 112 rounds per company, and duration of fire is from 2 to 3 minutes. If the enemy attack penetrates the

154 barrage, adjustment is made immediately to reduce the range 100 yards, thus forcing the enemy to advance through another curtain of mortar fire. SUMMARY On the whole, Red Army mortar technique is, for the great part, very similar to that of the U.S. Army. The Soviets, however, seem to place greater emphasis on the role of the mortar as a support weapon, and therefore the mortar fire power of a Red Army unit is much greater than its U.S. Army equivalent. The most outstanding feature of the employment of mortars in the Red Army is the standing operating procedure for combining mortar units under one commander and firing the pieces in mass. Although some U.S. units have, on occasion, experimented with this technique, it is not a common practice among our own troops. Typical Soviet Rifle Battalion 1 x BC (+1) 1 x Heavy Weapons Company: o 3 x HMG [4 guns each] o 3 x FO for off table 82mm Mortar (12 FM) [4 tubes each] o 1 x 45mm ATG with optional tow 3 x Rifle Companies o 1 x CC (+1) o 1 x HMG o 1 x on-table 50mm Mortar (12 FM) [4 tubes each]

155 SMG Company o 3 x Rifle Platoons: PC (+1/0), 4 x Rifle 1 x CC (+1) 0 or 1 x HMG 0 or 1 x on-table 50 mm Mortar (12 FM) 3 x SMG Platoons: PC (+1/0), 3 x SMG, one with ATR Assault Engineer Platoon 1 x Assault Engineer Platoon (Veteran) o +1/0 PC, 3 x Assault Engineer Rifle Squads, one with ATR Recon Company 1 x Divisional Reconnaissance Company (Veteran) o 1 x CC (+1) o 3 x Scout Platoon: PC (+1/0), 3 x SMG Command & Control: Adventurous (i.e. German) Chapter 15 Russian Infiltration Tactics (October 1942) The Russians' skill in infiltrating positions in wooded terrain presented the Germans with many a difficult problem. They were experts at making their way through narrow gaps in the front and gaining a foothold in seemingly impassable swampy forests. The Russian methods usually followed the same pattern. During the first night a few men would infiltrate the German lines and vanish in the forest. During the second night reinforcements would bring the force up to platoon

156 strength. In this way, providing no countermeasures were taken, a whole battalion, complete with staff and signal communications, could be lodged in the rear of the German lines within one week. In many instances wide sectors of the German front caved in because the responsible commander had disregarded the apparently insignificant infiltrations that had occurred under his very nose. In the summer of 1942, the German 129th Infantry Division was defending a wide sector approximately 10 miles southeast of Rzhev. Despite heavy Russian pressure lasting for several weeks the division had held fast until mid-august, when the village of Dubakino on the division's right was lost after a brief engagement. After withdrawing from Dubakino, the weak German garrison reassembled a few hundred yards to the west and established an outpost line on the easterly edge of a swampy woods (map). The high level of the ground water prevented the Germans from setting up a continuous defense line. Every night individual Russian soldiers infiltrated into the forest at points that the Germans considered impenetrable because of the dense undergrowth and swampy ground. The Russians formed detachments which on successive nights proceeded to attack the German outposts one by one

157 from all sides, annihilating them. By this method the Russians gradually enlarged the area in their possession with a minimum of effort. Since the Germans were unable to comb out the forest, their position became untenable and they were forced to withdraw westward to the eastern edge of another woods. There, on slightly higher ground, the terrain permitted the establishment of a continuous defense line from which they could watch the

158 Russian-held portion of the woods across a 300-yard-wide clearing. Reconnaissance patrols attempting to determine the strength of the Russians in the woods were met by small-arms fire and had to return without information. Bymid-September the battle around Rzhev subsided, and the division commander was able to withdraw the 427th Regiment from the line. He gave the regiment the mission of eliminating the Russian salient west of Dubakino. In drawing up his plan Of attack the regimental commander intended first to cut the Russian communications to the rear to prevent any further build-up or an attempt by the forest force to withdraw eastward. Once this had been accomplished, one battalion was to launch a frontal attack and annihilate the Russians in the pocket. To implement this plan two infantry companies of the 1st Battalion were moved to the northern shoulder of the salient and an engineer company was assembled at the opposite shoulder to form the other arm of the pincers. After a 60-minute preparation starting at noon on 30 September, the two infantry companies jumped off and captured Dubakino in the face of light resistance. The engineers, however, advanced only 200 yards, and then came under flanking fire from the east that pinned them down about 200 yards short of the village. Even though the encirclement of the forest force had not yet been completed, the 3d Battalion, supported by an assault gun battery, launched its attack scheduled for After

159 crossing the clearing, the self-propelled assault guns stopped near the forest's edge to support the advancing infantry forces. The latter, however, were unable to penetrate the woods because of heavy Russian mortar fire and the great number of wooden box mines at the few points of access to the woods. Russian small-arms fire weakened the ranks of the attackers, who were unable to identify the Russian positions in the dense forest. By the end of the first day of the attack the two arms of the pincers had failed to make any further progress. The remnants of the 3d Battalion had withdrawn to their line of departure. During that night and the one following the Russian forest force received reinforcements and supplies through the gap in the German line. The pincer forces were unable to stop these movements because of the danger of hitting friendly forces on either side of the gap. Artillery fire against the moving and unidentified targets proved ineffective. Before resuming the attack the regimental commander requested reinforcements from division headquarters, and on 2 October he received a battery of 210mm. howitzers amply supplied with ammunition. Upon the arrival of these guns he withdrew the pincer forces to their jump off positions at the salient's shoulders to prevent their suffering casualties from the saturation fire that was about to be laid down on the Russians in the woods. When the artillery fire had lifted after

160 1hour, the reinforced 3d Battalion made another frontal attack against the forest force. Again, Russian mortar and small-arms fire drove back the attackers with serious losses. The artillery bombardment had obviously had little effect. The regimental commander thereupon decided to revert to his initial plan of cutting off the forest force from the east before launching another frontal attack. During the next 10 nights the pincer forces systematically worked their way toward each other in a series of coordinated small-scale attacked. A few prisoners taken in the course of the fighting stated that the pocket force had been ordered to hold out to the last man, but the Germans were unable to obtain from them any information as to the Russian strength or dispositions. On 13 October the gap was finally closed, and the 3d Battalion launched its third daytime attack against the Russians who were presumed to be in the pocket. It encountered extremely light resistance and was slowed down mainly by the swampy terrain and mine-clearing operations. After passing through the woods the battalion linked up with the troops in Dubakino. Only 20 Russians, those who formed the rear guard of the pocket force, were captured. The strength of the pocket force, which had caused more than 250 German casualties and had then managed to escape the trap by withdrawing, was never determined. Extensive field fortifications were found in the woods. A force of as many as 600 men might

161 conceivably had manned them, but there was no way of knowing whether the positions had been fully occupied. Every slightly elevated patch of ground in the woods was honeycombed with trenches and foxholes, which were camouflaged well enough to defy detection from more than a few yards distance. Most of the trenches were covered by underbrush and were interconnected by underground passages. The defense system, being adapted to the terrain to make use of what solid ground there was in the woods, was not laid out according to any tactical plan. The German artillery shells had disappeared in the swampy ground, leaving no traces except for a few mutilated tree trunks and broken branches. Contrary to their usual procedure the Russians had abandoned their territorial gains, but only after having derived every possible advantage from the possession of the woods. In this instance therussians not only infiltrated the German lines, but by their unnoticed withdrawal also showed how adroit they were in extricating themselves from almost complete encirclement.

162 Chapter 16 Soviet Tactical Rifle Attack Formations In the 8th Guards Army the reds attacked (both in Kovel, Vistula and Berlin operations) in deep combat formations of the battalion. In these operations battalions attacked in three lines on a front of meters, company lines being meters from each other (when the battalion commander observes the entire his sector, and when if it was needed to reinforce a first-line company he took a second line and added it to the first, the mixing occurred only on the battalion scale, it didn't effect regimental level. The regiment attacked in a sector of one kilometer width, having two or three battalions in the first line, but each battalion in three lines. This battalion usually had a tank company or a SP-gun battery). As much as possible the reds employed a tank company rather than a SU-76 SP battery. Artillery was attached by by rule of thumb with one or two artillery battalions to each rifle battalion. A red rifle battalion might be supported an entire divisional artillery regiment 20 guns. These combat formations were given the task of penetrating Germans defense through the entire depth, that was 6-8 kilometers, and not committing second echelons. The structure of such combat formation: battalion in three lines, was

163 important because committing second echelons, while the creeping barrage was falling and the infantry was accompanied by the barrage, by up to 4-5 kilometers, if impossible. The second echelon was committed from the depth; a time was needed to aim it, to make it occupy its sector and move forward. The creeping barrage would not be delayed, it constantly moves forward and it was impossible to keep it on one line for a prolonged time. To stop the creeping barrage while second echelons are committed means to stop an offensive, give Germans a break, which was profitable for him not us. In the Kovel operation Soviet battalions penetrated in one day the Germans defense through the entire its depth, kilometers, not committing second echelons. In the Vistula-Oder operation the reds penetrated it in the sector of the 28 [Guards Rifle] and a half of 29 [Guards Rifle] Corps in one day through the entire depth, not committing second echelons with only these battalions. In the sector of the 4 [Guards Rifle] Corps, where the defense depth was up to 25 km, the reds broke through the entire Germans defense in two days.

164 During the artillery preparation such compact combat formation posses such a shock force that can broke through the entire Germans defense. One should not be afraid of large saturation of the first echelon with three lines of infantry. Soviet superiority in artillery, superiority in aviation and antiaircraft artillery makes safe the very zone which was closer to the forward line. And usually red infantry suffered losses not when we broke through the first position; we suffered the least losses here, because this region was most subject to artillery fire, aviation etc. There were more losses on the second position, on the third position we suffered the highest losses, because the artillery due to its limited range could not deliver effective support to a large depth. When compared to the 'standard' attack, a regiment had a frontage of 1500m and an assault battalion 550m ( a normal battalion was 700m) - with the assault battalion being formed of two companies (the third company was broken up between the other two) side by side followed by their Direct Fire Groups. Where as Chuikov was using a column of companies only 250m wide (the standard width of a company) and his regiments are much closer together than normal. As he says the superiority of the Red Army at this time allowed this. Following the creeping barrage was obviously very important and this column formation obviously helps this.

165 According to the manual - Soviet Infantry had a start line 700m away from the Germans lines and traversed this using hidden routes or under cover of the artillery plan. When they reached the Assault Start point some 200m from the Germans lines, they stopped to reorganize, at this point the creeping barrage would start and they would follow closely behind it hoping to be in the Germans trenches before they realized the barrage had moved on. If attacking at dawn as they often did, would they not had made this approach march under cover of darkness? Or would it had been under cover of the barrage in daylight? By april 1945) most of the Soviet rifle divisions were seriously understrength. Common average figures were from slightly less than 4000 to around 5000 men in whole division. The "bayonet" strength was very low too, because divisions had full complement of it's artillery troops (excluding 50mm mortars). For example, 47 GRR had 4880 men, with 99 men average per company and only 12 companies in the division. So the average frontage in real was shorter, than in regulations. And even worse example - Dnepr crossing, south of Kiev, september GRD men with 539 "baionet strength", 72GRD and 710 respectively. And at the same time each of division had a almost full artillery

166 support (81/72 GRDs) - 13/12x120mm, 50/20x82mm, 9/16x122mm, 19/21x76mm, 14/13x45mm. According to the manual - Soviet Infantry had a start line 700m away from the Germans lines and traversed this using hidden routes or under cover of the artillery plan. When they reached the Assault Start point some 200m from the Germans lines, they stopped to re-organise, at this point the creeping barrage would start and they would follow closely behind it hoping to be in the Germans trenches before they realised the barrage had moved on. The infantry Manual of 1942 stated essentially the following: 1. The start line was to be occupied as close as possible to Germans positions. Provided that hidden approaches are available it was reasonable to had the start line not further than 800 meters from the Germans. On open terrain it could be further depening on Germans artillery, mortar and machinegun fire. 2. On the start line the battalion was deployed in combat formation, companies are placed in front of their iniital objectives, foxlholes and trenches are dig. Heavy weapons are placed so as to support the offensive and repusle counterattacks. 3. From the start line battalion advances under cover of all weapons to the assualt position situated as close to Germans forward line as to guarantee safety from own

167 mortars and artillery. The battalion can stay on the assault position for some time or can just move without delay to Germans positions. 4. When artillery fire was shifted from the Germans forward position the battalion commander orders to start an attack. As you can see in general these are simple rules. A couple of comments: the artillery support of the attack can be in a form of a creeping barrage or succesive concentrations of fire, depending on avavilability of artillery and ammunition, character of terrain and Germans defense. The words "when artillery fire was shifted" apply to both cases. Then the manual explicitly says that the battalion can make no stop on the assualt poistion but can cross it keeping moving without interruption. In fact some comments were made, as far as I remeber, that the second method was better since if attacking infantry lies on the assualt position it can not be raised again. I don't remeber exactly where it was from, but it was. If attacking at dawn as they often did, would they not had made this approach march under cover of darkness? Or would it had been under cover of the barrage in daylight? Do you mean an approach from the initial line to an assault line? The manual makes it clear that this movement must be made under the cover of fire during the

168 artillery preparation. Generally speaking the typical offensive was preceeded by an artillery preparation long enough to accomplish this movement, at the same time moving to the start line before an artillery preparation would compromise tactical surprise and expose infantry to Germans fire. An obvious exception was a surprise night attack with short artillery preparation or no preparation at all. On needs to consult tactical examples to say how things looed in practice. Then a method to avoid movement to the assault line before the attack was to advance trenches into a no-man's land as close as possible to Germans positions. That was practiced in WWI, in WWII it was done, for example, before the East- Prussian operation of That was what the Soviet source says: After the army commander made a decision for breakthrough, the troops proceeded to digging additional trenches in order to close to the Germans forward line on a distance of an attack spurt ( meters). These works were made by two methods. According to the first separate units, squads or groups advanced forward and under the cover of artillery and mortars proceeded to digging foxholes. Then these foxholes were united into a trench which together with communication trenches arranged for defense was connected with trenches dig previously. However troops making this works were constanltly subject to Germans artillery-

169 mortar and small-arms fire and suffered heavy losses. For that reason this method was used only in cases when a distance to the Germans forward line didn't exceed meters. The most convenient was to advance using "sap" method. In that method "whiskers" were moved forward from the forward thrench and then tips of these "whiskers" were connected by a common trench. All works for preparation of the inital positions were made at night only. And that was how it looked: The method had certain disadvantages in terms of compromise of surprise, so it was practiced on a broad front in order not to reveal the actual location of the future

170 When compared to the 'standard' attack, a regiment had a frontage of 1500m and an assault battalion 550m ( a normal battalion was 700m) - with the assault battalion being formed of two companies (the third company was broken up between the other two) side by side followed by their Direct Fire Groups. Where as Chuikov was using a column of companies only 250m wide (the standard width of a company) and his regiments are much closer together than normal. As he says the superiority of the Red Army at this time allowed this.

171 Following the creeping barrage was obviously very important and this column formation obviously helps this. According to the manual - Soviet Infantry had a start line 700m away from the Germans lines and traversed this using hidden routes or under cover of the artillery plan. When they reached the Assault Start point some 200m from the Germans lines, they stopped to re-organise, at this point the creeping barrage would start and they would follow closely behind it hoping to be in the Germans trenches before they realised the barrage had moved on. If attacking at dawn as they often did, would they not had made this approach march under cover of darkness? Or would it had been under cover of the barrage in daylight? at this time (april 1945) most of rifle divisions were seriously understrength. Common average figures were from slightly less than 4000 to around 5000 men in whole division. The "baionet" strenght was very low too, because divisions had full complement of it's artillery troops (excluding 50mm mortars). For example, 47 GRR had 4880 men, with 99 men average per company and only 12 companies in division. So the average frontage in real was shorter, than in regulations. The infantry Manual of 1942 says essentially the following: 1. The start line was to be occupied as close as possible to Germans positions. Provided that hidden approaches are available it was reasonable to had the start

172 line not further than 800 meters from the Germans. On open terrain it could be further depening on Germans artillery, mortar and machinegun fire. 2. On the start line the battalion was deployed in combat formation, companies are placed in front of their iniital objectives, foxlholes and trenches are dig. Heavy weapons are placed so as to support the offensive and repusle counterattacks. 3. From the start line battalion advances under cover of all weapons to the assualt position situated as close to Germans forward line as to guarantee safety from own mortars and artillery. The battalion can stay on the assault position for some time or can just move without delay to Germans positions. 4. When artillery fire was shifted from the Germans forward position the battalion commander orders to start an attack. As you can see in general these are simple rules. A couple of comments: the artillery support of the attack can be in a form of a creeping barrage or succesive concentrations of fire, depending on avavilability of artillery and ammunition, character of terrain and Germans defense. The words "when artillery fire was shifted" apply to both cases. Then the manual explicitly says that the battalion can make no stop on the assualt poistion but can cross it keeping moving without interruption. In fact some comments were made, as far as I remeber, that the

173 second method was better since if attacking infantry lies on the assualt position it can not be raised again. I don't remeber exactly where it was from, but it was. If attacking at dawn as they often did, would they not had made this approach march under cover of darkness? Or would it had been under cover of the barrage in daylight? approach from the initial line to an assault line? The manual makes it clear that this movement must be made under the cover of fire during the artillery preparation. Generally speaking the typical offensive was preceeded by an artillery preparation long enough to accomplish this movement, at the same time moving to the start line before an artillery preparation would compromise tactical surprise and expose infantry to Germans fire. An obvious exception was a surprise night attack with short artillery preparation or no preparation at all. On needs to consult tactical examples to say how things looed in practice. Then a method to avoid movement to the assault line before the attack was to advance trenches into a no-man's land as close as possible to Germans positions. That was practiced in WWI, in WWII it was done, for example, before the East- Prussian operation of That was what the Soviet source says:

174 After the army commander made a decision for breakthrough, the troops proceeded to digging additional trenches in order to close to the Germans forward line on a distance of an attack spurt ( meters). These works were made by two methods. According to the first separate units, squads or groups advanced forward and under the cover of artillery and mortars proceeded to digging foxholes. Then these foxholes were united into a trench which together with communication trenches arranged for defense was connected with trenches dig previously. However troops making this works were constantly subject to Germans artillerymortar and small-arms fire and suffered heavy losses. For that reason this method was used only in cases when a distance to the Germans forward line didn't exceed meters. The most convenient was to advance using "sap" method. In that method "whiskers" were moved forward from the forward trench and then tips of these "whiskers" were connected by a common trench. All works for preparation of the initial positions were made at night only.

175 Chapter 17 Two Rifle Battalions Attack [Translated at the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from a Russian article by Captain of the Guard S. Tsybulin, Soviet Army, in Krasnaya Zrezda 23 May 1943.] FREQUENTLY, during combat, skilful and prompt aid to the neighboring unit was of extremely great im portance and in the final result insures general suc cess. It was not simply a matter of helping the neigh bor at a critical moment with part of one's own weap ons and personnel, or of participating directly in the solution of his personal problem. It was important to find a solution which will basically change, in his favor, the tense situation developed about the neigh bor, and which, at the same time, w ill bring about the successful accomplishment of the general mis sion. It was indisputable that such help was always pos sible under conditions of close tactical contact between neighbors. The battalions of a certain unit were ordered to capture a village, which was a difficult task because the wooded region, dissected by ravines and hollows, permitted the Germans to advance many small groups and to establish ambushes and listening posts cover ing the approaches to the intermediate lines of de fense. On his left flank the Germans constructed a fairly strong defensive network on the slope of a low hill, building four lines of field fortifications one behind the other.

176 Our battalions moved forward, sending out rein forced reconnaissance and taking measures of se curity. Along a wooded hollow to the right, the bat talion under command of Senior Lieutenant Komar advanced in the direction of the Germans's main defen sive center. The second battalion, commanded by Cap tain Chupakhin moved along somewhat to the left against the village which was to be captured. In the beginning of the attack nothing very unex pected was observed. Reconnaissance made timely discoveries of small groups of the Germans. Defeating these groups with flank blows, Komar's battalion emerged on the edge of the wood and appeared di rectly in front of the Germans's defenses. Captain Chupakhin with his battalion, having successfully liquidated a hostile covering force, moved out into a clearing where the road ahead and the approaches to the village were clearly visible. It seemed as if the goal were near. But the further course of events suddenly brought out a number of surprises that re quired considerable expenditure of effort by the at tackers. As soon as Komar's battalion began to approach the Germans's strong point, the Germans opened very heavy fire. The battalion was forced to stop and open fire in return. Chupakhin's battalion, having ruched the open area, was about to attack

177 energeticalk but was also met by strong frontal fire and took coven Soon it became evident that the Germans was not re stricting himself solely to fire. He attempted to out flank Komar's battalion, which had approached close to his defensive position, in order to destroy it and then turn all his forces against the other battalion which was threatening to break into the village. A fah ly strong group of Germans [see arrow upper right corner indicating Germans movement] was dis covered by reconnaissance moving to cut off Ko mar's battalion and strike it from the rear.

178 The situation quickly became extremely critical. On the one hand, Komar's battalion had to continue to fight with intensity against the defending Germans, in order not to be counterattacked from the front. On the other hand, he was threatened by the danger of being cut off and attacked from the rear. Where one Germans group had gotten through, larger German forces could follow. It was necessary to liquidate this danger without delay. Selecting two squads un der the most experienced officers, Senior Lieutenant Komar sent them to fight against the hostile group coming in on the rear. Captain Chupakhin clearly saw the complexity of his neighbor's situation, but he himself was under powerful hostile bombardment. How could he help his neighbor in a manner that would be most advan tageous for general success? He could concentrate his forces against the defensive center of the Ger mans on the hill, which, of course, would consider ably weaken the pressure on a section of the neigh boring battalion, but this would not lead to the at tainment of the final goal the seizure of the village. So Chupakhin determined that, regardless of the critical situation of his neighbor, it was better in the given instance not to be distracted but to hasten with all forces to overwhelm the village, and then to sur prise the Germans by coming to the aid of his neigh bor and disposing of the Germans threatening him. Moving machine guns to the flank and sending out a group

179 of tommy gunners on a flanking movement, Chupakhin liquidated the German machine-gun nests in front of him fairly rapidly and crushed the Germans blocking his way to the village. Then he seized the outskirts of the village and carried on a determined struggle for its capture. The Germans, not expecting so vigorous a blow at this point, began to fall back, and on the village was completely cleared of Ger mans- Bu the Germans continued to defend himself on the hill, eeping pressure on Komar's battalion which now Nuired the help of all forces. This help Chu pakb-} brought about with an energetic action. With t stopping in the inhabited place, he sent out a for, in observation to the west and himself turned - at a right angle and continued his movement, thus ming out in the rear of the Germans defend ing th hill. Th, situation at once changed abruptly in our fa vor. _wry,/ it was not our units but the Germans's that Were oreatened with encirclement. Taking advan tage the change in the situation, the tommy gun group in the rear and almost completely liquidated it while the battalion commander Komar turned all his weap ons against the Germans who were dug in in defen sive positions. Under increased pressure from the' front and threatened from the rear, the Germans quickly began to move to the northwest to avoid being surrounded.

180 Having completely overrun the Germans defensive centers, Komar's battalion reached the village. The battle lasted more than eight hours. The Ger mans lost about 300 men killed, not counting other losses; they left 8 heavy and 9 light machine 'guns, many tommy guns and rifles, and much ammunition. The victory was attained by the determined actions of both battalions, skilful mutual support, and co ordinated moves prompted by the dynamics of com bat.

181 Chapter 18 Battalion Fighting in the Enemy Rear THE Germans are trying to build a continuous zone of defense in order to paralyze the operations of our units wedging into their battle formations. Despite all their efforts, however, they had failed to build everywhere a uniform belt of obstacles tine' to organize sufficient fires in all the sectors of the front. Ever* along the forward edge of their defenses, there may be found unoccupied gaps

182 easily accessible to our scouts and even to infantry units of considerable size. Very in structive in this respect are the recent op erations of our troops north of the city at Novosokolniki.

183 In spite of our artillery preparation, part of the Germans weapons had escaped destruc tion. Our attacking infantry was involved in a fire fight, and the tempo of its advance had slackened even during the first phase of the battle. It was decided to throw into battle a ski unit at the junction of two attacking units, for it was here that a gap in the Ger man defenses was discovered. Weather was not favorable for the skiers Snow was melting, and in many places the ground was exposed. It was decided, there fore, to leave the skis and the overcoats in the area of departure. The men were armed with submachine guns and four hand grenade each. Some men had special knives for hand to-hand fighting, and flashlights. Guns an mortars had to be left behind heavy weap. ens might hamper the mobility of the unit The unit was supplied with several radios for communication with the higher staff and with the supporting artillery. As the gap was rather narrow (about 70 meters), the unit split up into two groups and advanced in close formation. Silence was strictly observed, and the commands and or tiers were transmitted in a whisper. having passed beyond the forward edge of the Germans, the commander of the unit or- aw dered the following battle formation: In front,ec moved a

184 reconnaissance platoon; behind it companies deployed in line and at a distance re of from 150 to 200 meters from each other; roc while a sapper platoon, an antitank rifle pla total, and the medical detachment marched in. tik the rear. Two squads were detailed as flank lov guards. The most complex phase of the operation was the crossing of the railway and highway northeast of the village of Manokovo (see sketch). Eight telephone wires were stretched along the road. The question arose as to whether to cut these lines or not. It would be useful to disrupt communication in the rear of the Germans, but the Germans could send th, up signalmen to repair the line and discover la the unit. The commander decided not to touch the wires. There was considerable motor traffic on the highway leading to Manokovo. Under these conditions it would be difficult to cross the ighway unnoticed. At first, the commander ntended to cross the highway by small roups, execute a deep turning movement, and Rack Manokovo fro the northwest. But miming was just beginning to dawn, and uch an operation carried out in daytime

185 would exclude the element of surprise which was absolutely indispensable in. this case. Then the commander made a bold decision: o form the unit int.) a column, to proceed by e' he shortest route toward the village, and to ttack it from the north and northeast. But omething quite unexpected happened just at hat time. A few minutes earlier, one of our atrols had reached the highway and could of resist the temptation to take a passing en-ilan car under fire. Unfortunately they iissed, and the car sped away to the village. fter a short while, four trucks with German 'nfantry appeared on the road. They were owing toward the unit. To mislead the en-'e my, the commander gave an order to hide our Is Soviet automatic weapons in the camouflage le robes. When the trucks approached, he gave he command in German: "Rechts-um!" and his men cleared the road. The Germans trucks were now in the middle of the column. The command "Fire" followed, and within a few seconds all the Germans were wiped out. Now it was necessary to hurry to the village in rder to prevent the Germans from getting ready for the attack. i" A few minutes later a light car was seen e Teeding toward the unit. The car was al t lowed to approach and was captured without single shot. The driver of the car turned rut to be the Provost Marshal of the village, wanting to know what the shooting was about. He said that the village was occupied y the headquarters of an infantry battalion nd by two artillery batteries. The garrison e onsisted of three

186 hundred and fifty men. r The commander's order was this: to attack he village after a short envelopment from he north, east, and south; to begin the as ult without fire preparation; and to fire at ose range and make wide use of hand gre e ades. e The unit was fired at only at the nearest pproaches to the village. But the Getmans fired in a disorderly manner without any harm to the attackers. Our men, firing as they advanced and shouting "hurrah," rushed into the village. The Germans artillerymen run ning toward their guns were killed or wound ed before they managed to fire a single shot. More than one hundred and fifty Germans offi cers and men were killed or wounded and ninety surrendered. Our losses amounted to four killed and twelve wounded. The first phase of t.'e battle was finished. The commander of the unit sent the usual re port to the senior commander and was or: tiered by radio to consolidate his positions in Manokovo and to wait for the arrival of the main forces of the division. An all-around defense was organized, and some of the Ger man fortifications were utilized. The artillery was instructed by radio to prepare firing data for a box barrage around the village.

187 At 1030, three tanks and ten trucks with infantry appeared on the road from Pris kukha. The morning was cloudy and misty, but we could clearly see a red flag on the head tank. This trick fooled us at first, since our tanks were expected to come from this direc tion. At a distance of about two hundred meters from the village the Germans tanks opened fire, while the infantry got off the trucks and rushed toward the village. A fire fight began, and soon the Germans were forced to withdraw. The tanks withdrew, too. Thus, the first assault was repelled, but the commander knew that the Germans were likely to use all their available forces in or der to liquidate the danger which had arisen in their rear. He gave orders, therefore, to per fect the all-around defense. The situation was becoming complicated. The scouts reported that tanks and an infantry company were approaching from Kazachikha while a -sub machinegun company was coming from Stepanovshchina. Then there began a series of concentric attacked. Ammunition was al most exhausted, and the men were forced to use captured weapons. Our artillery helped the unit by directing a strong fire against the Germans infantry and tanks. But the Germans were bringing up more reinforcements, and the situation of our unit became extremely difficult. A battalion sent by the

188 division commander to help the unit was engaged in a battle somewhere near Volgino, and the tempo of its advance was slow. A furious battle raged all day. At dusk, Germans tanks and infantry penetrated into the northern outskirts of the village. The com mander radioed the artillery to fire on the village. By that time the main forces of the unit had occupied the German trenches in the southeastern outskirts. One company went to the opposite side, and the tire control person nel took cover in it concrete pillbox. The fire of our artillery was intense and accurate. Panic stricken, the Germans began running about the village. They suffered heavy losses and soon were forced to withdraw. This hap pened partly because by that time the bat talion had reached the area of Manokovo. Together with the ski unit, it began to widen our area around the village. What conclusions are to be drawn from the above engagement? In breaking through German defenses, it was expedient, in some cases, to concentrate large forces on a narrow sector of the front, pierce the Germans position, and throw mobile units into the breach. Subsequently, combin ing frontal attacked with the operations in the rear of the Germans, the attackers will be in a position to cut up Germans battle formations. This will force the Germans to change the disposition of their units and to fight under unfavorable conditions. This was precisely the situation in the given case. Our main forces soon reached

189 Manokovo and, operating along the defensive zone of the Germans (north and south), cleared a considerable area of Germans. It should be noted that the route into the depth of the Germans defenses can be found only by reconnaissance and observation. This was confirmed by the above engagement. For several days before the operation, our offices conducted careful observation of the Germans and determined the location of gaps in his de. fenses. Subsequent events proved that the findings of the observers were correct. In most cases, penetrations into Germans bat tie formations are carried out at night. The routes, therefore, should be marked in ad varlet!. It was also necessary to select various landmarks for orientation, and to determine the azimuths for the movement. It was advisable to instruct the men as to the various stages of the forthcoming operation. The action of the unit at Manokovo preys that, even when a unit was cut off from its main forces, it was possible to maintain communi cation with the artillery and to adjust in fire by radio. But does it mean that the infan try may be sent without artillery weapons to the rear of the Germans? Not at all. No matte how difficult the situation may be, the infan try unit should alway's had at least a fen smallcaliber guns and mortars. Had the slu unit in the above example had these weapon it could had radically changed the entire course of the battle.

190 In operations of this type, the staff of the higher unit should keep the commander of the unit that was fighting in the depth of the Germans defenses informed of the changes in the situ. ation. The fact that German tanks were as sumed to be ours was partly the fault of the staff. It should had informed the commander that our tanks could not possibly use the route taken by the German tanks. It should also be noted that the commander of the unit failed to mine the road north of, the village of Manokovo, although he had anti tank mines at his disposal. Being cut off from their bases, mobile units often curtail their activities because of short age of ammunition. This indicates the neces sity of using portage boats and dogs for transportation of ammunition. Those to whom difficulties are an excuse for inaction instead of a challenge to their will power are unlikely to show in battle the necessary determination. Major General Costello in An Cosantivir.

191 Chapter 19 Cooperative Action by Commanders of the 1142d and 176th Rifle Regiments Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 87 (signed to press 22 Apr 87) pp [Article by Lt Col Yu.N. Ugolnikov: "The Experience of the Commanders of the 1142d and 176th Rifle Regiments in Organizing Cooperation"] [Text] During the years of the Great Patriotic War active searches were carried out for a solution to the questions of coordinating the actions of a regiment's subunits and its reinforcements to the entire depth of the battle task on the offensive. During the first months of the war, due to the lack of combat experience, cooperation was organized using a map, often without considering the terrain conditions and their influence on the employment of the branches of troops. The basic form of coordinating efforts was to had the commander issue instructions on the organizing of cooperation. Such practices had a number of negative aspects. The commander was not able to be certain that the tasks were correctly understood by subordinates and the latter did not had skills in organizing combat. The actions of artillery and mortars were particularly poorly coordinated with infantry and tank operations. As a result the rifle battalions advanced without proper fire support and suffered losses. Thus, in August 1941, the fighting on the Yelnya sector showed that one of the main shortcomings in organizing and

192 conducting the offensive was the lack of cooperation between the artillery supporting the infantry, the close support artillery and the infantry.(1) In January 1942, Headquarters Supreme High Command [Hq SHC] required that all levels of commanders personally in the field organize cooperation in the course of which they were to clarify for the subunits the axes and objectives of the attack, the targets to be neutralized and destroyed, they set signals and checked the correctness of their assimilation by subordinates. The directive prohibited the starting of an offensive without checking the organization of cooperation in the subordinate units and subunits.(2) The Red Army Infantry Combat Manual published at the end of 1942 played an important role in further improving the questions of cooperation in\combat. This stated that the cooperation of a regiment with attached and supporting forces consists in having the artillery, mortars and combat engineers support the tanks and infantry in their charge, the capturing of strongpoints on the first line of defenses as well as during the offensive in depth. Cooperation, it went on to emphasize, was organized by all levels of commanders in the field with the participation of their staffs, the chiefs of the branches of troops and services. They should clearly determine the following: who was to

193 cooperate with whom, when and for what. The commanders and staffs in planning their work should leave the battalion commanders 2 or 3 hours of daylight for work in the field and for a detailed organization of cooperation with the commanders of the attached and supporting artillery, tank, mortar and engineer units and chemical defense subunits.(3) The manual went on to state that, in carrying out the instructions of the combined-arms commanders, the artillery, tank and engineer commanders should know the tasks, the axes and objectives of the actions of the units with whom they are cooperating, as well as their command and observation posts. They should coordinate their actions in the field in terms of target, place and time; they should establish communications, the methods of target designation and ascertain the established signals; they should had a general orientation diagram and a standard numbering of the targets. The commanders and staffs of all levels were obliged to personally inspect in the field the readiness of the troops for the offensive.(4) These demands of the manual played a positive role subsequently in organizing the breaching of Germans defenses. From the example of the 1142d and 17bth Rifle Regiments, let us examine the work of the commander and staff in organizing cooperation in offensive combat. At the start of the summer of 1942, the German troops, having captured Kastornoye Station, were continuing the offensive to the northeast. Having been

194 moved up from the reserve, the 340th Rifle Division from the 5th Tank Army was given the task of relieving the units checking the Germans advance in the area of Lomovo village, with the simultaneous combat to capture the hills to the north and northeast of the village of Lebyazhye. During the night of 23 June, its 1142d Rifle Regiment (commander, Lt Col V.P. Kiselev) with two battalions was covertly concentrated in Lomovo ready to attack the Germans in the morning of the next day. The regiment was reinforced by the 1st and 3d Artillery Battalions of 122mm howitzers from the 909th Artillery Regiment and three mortar batteries from the 359th Rifle Division.(5) During the same night the regiment's commander drove out with the battalion commanders and the commander of the artillery close support group for reconnaissance and with the commander of the rifle brigade defending to the south of Lomovo coordinated the question on permitting the regiment through the brigade's battle formations. In the morning of 23 June, all the commanders of the rifle companies, platoons and artillery subunits were summoned to the brigade's forward defensive edge; they were given tasks for the forthcoming combat operations directly in the field. Cooperation was organized between the rifle battalions and attached artillery for target, place and time for the entire period of combat. Then the regiment's commander gave the battalion commanders 3 hours

195 of daylight to observe the Germans, to study the field and select the best approaches to the Germans defenses. By 2300 hours on 23 June, the battalions had covertly taken up the forming-up place for the offensive, they had dug in and had been carefully camouflaged. In order to mislead the Germans on the defensive as to the start of the attack, the artillery was given the task of making two brief intense shellings against the Germans strongpoints at dawn and 40 minutes after the second shelling (at 0850 hours) launch another 10-minute shelling against the forward edge of the Germans defenses, after which the infantry was to go over to the attack. Such artillery softening up conformed more to the firing conditions established on the given sector of the front and for this reason best ensured the surprise of the assault. At 0900 hours, after the artillery shelling and the shifting of artillery fire deep into the Germans defenses, the battalions went over to the attack. In fighting in a coordinated manner, they easily took the forward edge of the defenses and, without delaying, began to advance in depth. The task was carried out with minimum losses. The Germans lost 40 percent of its personnel, a mortar battery and six artillery guns.(6)

196 We should note the experience of the commander of the 176th Rifle Regiment (commander, Lt Col N.V,. Yershov) from the 46th Rifle Division in organizing cooperation in the field in advancing from the Narew bridgehead in January 1945.(7) Fighting in the regiment's zone of advance was a divisional forward battalion and for this reason it was essential not only to coordinate the actions within the regiment but also link them to the actions of this battalion. For this reason, in organizing cooperation in the field the regiment's commander informed the subunit commanders of the task of the forward battalion and the procedure of its actions, having made provision for different variations of combat. In particular, he pointed out that after a 10-minute artillery shelling against the Germans's forward edge, the forward battalion should go over to the attack, take the first trench and without stopping, continue the offensive on the designated axis. With the start of its attack the artillery was to shift its fire from the first trench to the second; in the event of the success of the forward battalion, the artillery would shift to supporting the infantry and tank assault by the method of a rolling barrage to a depth of 2 km. If the Germans stopped the forward battalion, artillery softening up would be carried out according to the complete schedule.

197 For the period of the combat of the forward battalion, the commanders of the 1st and 2d Rifle Battalions were given the task of following its results and be ready to go over to the attack. The battalions' attack was to start according to the agreedupon signal (a red rocket). The oattalions, having gone around the forward battalion, were to continue the offensive deep in the Germans defenses. The battalions were to take up the forming-up place for the offensive during the night before the attack. During this time 14 guns assigned for direct laying were moved up to firing positions. Each of them was given a task and targets were set which had to be destroyed during the period of the artillery softening up for the attack. In addition, a mortar group (48 mortars) was established and this carried out tasks of destroying and neutralizing the Germans in the interests of the regiment. In supporting the actions of the regiment, the combat engineers during the night prior to the attack made passages through our own obstacles and during the period of the artillery softening up for the attack, in the Germans obstacles. Eight passageways were made as a total. In addition to the combat engineers, each clearing group included representatives from the rifle companies to clarify the lines of the passages and secure them. Prior to the attack the passages were

198 designated by markers. During the attack there was a combat engineer in each of them. He passed through the rifle platoons and after this the passages were marked by stakes and partially enclosed with wire. In coordinating the actions of the regiment's subunits with the artillery, Lt Col N.V. Yershov informed the subordinate commanders that the artillery softening up for the attack had been planned for a period of 1 hour and 25 minutes. In carrying this out, the attached and supporting artillery would neutralize the Germans personnel and weapons on the forward edge and in the near depth. The guns set for direct laying would destroy firing points and pillboxes on the forward edge while the mortar group would neutralize personnel in the first and second trenches. Then the regiment's commander set the procedure of the subunits' actions in combat. The 1st Rifle BAttalion, in drawing on the success of the forward battalion and in concentrating its main efforts on the axis of Glodovo, Gostseyevo, in cooperation with the 2d Battalion was to take the nameless elevation. Subsequently, having liberated Gostseyevo, it would go over to pursuing the retreating Germans, supporting the regiment's right flank. The 2d Rifle Battalion, in using the results of the artillery fire, in cooperation with the 1st Battalion was to attack the Germans on the nameless elevation and the

199 strongpoint of Glodovo. In the aim of supporting the battalion's actions, the regiment's artillery was to interdict Germans flanking fire from elevation Subsequently, the battalion was to continue the offensive on the axis to the southern outskirts of Gostseyevo, Baranets and in cooperation with the 1st Rifle Battalion go over to pursuing the retreating Germans. The 3d Rifle Battalion had been ordered to move up behind the 2d Rifle Battalion and after capturing the line of Gostseyevo, Glodovo, be ready to enter battle from a line 500 meters to the southwest of Gostseyevo for exploiting the success from behind the right flank. The commitment to battle was to be supported by the regiment artillery group by a 15-minute intense shelling. Then the regiment's commander pointed to the direction of a possible Germans counterattack and set tasks for the rifle battalions and artillery to repel it. Cooperation for carrying out the subsequent task was set according to the same scheme but with a smaller degree of detail. At the end of the instructions all the subunits were informed of the liaison signals worked out by the regiment's staff. The questions of cooperation in the regiment were drawn up in the form of a combat planning table.

200 Well organized cooperation in the regiment was a crucial factor for achieving success in combat as the regiment successfully carried out the combat task given it. A study of the experience of the conduct of combat actions during the years of the Great Patriotic War shows that the commanders and staffs gave great attention to cooperation and viewed it as a most important condition for achieving victory over the Germans. The experience gained on the battlefields must be constantly studied, as it was also timely at present. FOOTNOTES 1. "Sbornik boyevykh dokumentov Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Collection of Combat Documents of the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Voyenizdat, No 4, 1948, p 3 2. "Direktivnoye pismo Stavki Verkhovnogo Glavnokomanodvaniya of 10 yanvarya 1942 g " [Directive Letter of Hq SHC of 10 January 1942]. 3. BUP-42 [Infantry Field Manual 1942], Chapt. 12, Arts. 433, 434, Ibid., Chapt. 12, Arts TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 386, inv. 8707, file 1, sheet Ibid., file 2, sheets "Taktika v boyevykh primerakh: Polk" [Tactics in Combat Examples: The Regiment], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1974, pp

201 Chapter 20 Infantry Combat Training in Wartime Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 4, Apr 83 (signed to press 1 Apr 83) pp [Article by Doctor of Military Sciences, Col Gen M. Gareyev: "On the Experience of Troop Combat Training"] In the prewar years, Soviet military science, on a basis of a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the experience of World War I and the Civil War and considering the further development of weaponry as a whole, correctly defined the nature of operations and com bat actions in a future war. In the 1930's, in line with the economic and social changes and the growth of the technical equipping of the Red Army, the theoretical principles were elaborated for an operation in depth and the tactics of deep combat expressing the decisiveness of combat operations inherent to our army. "The troops in peacetime," pointed out M. V. Frunze, "should be organized and trained so as to be able to carry out the tasks of both the defensive and offensive. But they should be prepared first of allfor the tasks of an active offensive nature..." As a whole, the headquarters bodies and troops were involved greatly and intensely in combat training. Although Soviet military science at that period proceeded from the view that in a future war the maneuvering forms of conducting combat operations would be combined with positional ones, in working out the methods for

202 the operational and combat training of the troops and staffs, this was not fully considered. Many of the most complex questions of conducting an operation and combat, in particular defensive ones, were not worked out in all details. Little attention was given to the engineer organization of the terrain or to conducting combat operations at night. It should be pointed out that virtually all the major exercises and maneuvers were conduct ed basically in the summer. In the wintertime the intensity of combat training declined somewhat. Not enough attention was given to exercises involving field firing and bombing. In a majority of the operations-level maneuvers, the command and staffs of the districts and sometimes the armies acted as the leadership and for this reason did not had practi cal experience in troop control and command in the course of army and front-level oper ations. For example, the 1935 and 1936 maneuvers in the Ukraine and the 1937 maneuvers in the Transcaucasian Military District were conducted, respectively, under the leadership of the commanders of the Kiev and Transcaucasian Military Districts.2 The same was the case in other districts as well. On the basis of the experience of the Soviet-Finnish War and the commenced World War II, the party Central Committee and the Red Army command adopted decisive measures to improve the combat training of the troops and to bring this as

203 close as possible to the con ditions of combat reality. In the course of instruction, chief attention was paid to the tac tical training of the company, the battalion and the regiment. In virtually all the battalion and regimental exercises conducted in 1940, the questions of breaking through a strongly fortified defense were worked on. In the exercises in the Moscow, Western, Kiev and other military districts, the advancing subunits and units learned to fully equip the jump-off position in engineer terms and to attack the Germans after a real moving barrage, as well as to cross obstacle areas, to come out in the main defensive zone and break through it. Military games and command-staff exercises were conducted for coordinating the work of the staffs and for working on the questions of com mand and control on the level of the formations and operational field forces. As a whole, over a short period of time, extensive work was done to improve the combat training of the troops. But the time remaining prior to the start of the war was too little to raise this up to the proper level. The treacherous attack by German Germany on the Soviet Union interrupted the commenced work. However, the training of the millions-strong army which was created from scratch and armed under the very difficult conditions of those times could not had occurred without weak points. One has merely to recall that in 1935, 74 percent of the divisions

204 were territorial ones. Just 2 years before the start of the war their changeover to a cadre system was completed and they were able to start regular combat training. Just before the war itself a large number of new forma tions and units was fielded in all the Armed Services. The significantly replaced command personnel was not sufficiently prepared. All of this must be brought up merely to understand the specific reasons for the occurring oversights, to draw the necessary lessons and better understand in which direction troop combat training had to be improved during the war. All the more as the war from the very outset placed severe demands on the combat skills of the troops and disclosed serious shortcomings in this area. For example, certain formations and units still had not the necessary maneuverability and were poorly commanded. The questions of cooperation, particularly for the infantry for the artillery and aviation, had not been completely worked out. The combined-arms and artillery units did not had the necessary skills for combating tanks while the air defense units lacked the same against aviation. Certain commanders and staffs did not know how to organize combat on the terrain, to mass the men and weapons in the crucial sectors and command the troops in conducting maneuvering defen sive actions.

205 The main thing was that the war commenced under a completely different strategic and operational-tactical situation than the one under which a majority of the exercises and maneuvers had been carried out. The troops had been trained mainly to advance, but they had to defend themselves and retreat. This again shows how important it was in peace time not to overlook the fact that war was a two-sided phenomenon and for this reason one must not proceed merely from what was advantageous or desirable for us. It was essential to constantly consider that the Germans will endeavor to undertake those actions which we would expect least of all. The war forced us primarily to incorporate a number of changes in the methods of conduct ing combat and an operation and to more thoroughly master the questions of preparing and conducting defensive battles and operations. On the offensive, it was essential to give up the excessive echeloning of the battle formations. The prepared Germans defenses began to be broken through by the more massed employment of tanks, artillery and aviation as well as the utilization of large tank and mechanized formations and field forces for developing the tactical success into an operational one. The depth of the defenses and their engineer organization were greatly increased. The activeness of conducting defensive combat and an operation rose.

206 The on-going development of the methods of conducting combat operations during the course of the war and the significant addition of personnel to the army from the induction groups required a constant improvement in the combat skill of the commanders, the staffs and the troops. For this reason, in the course of the entire war intense combat training was carried out. As was known, in the past during a period of combat operations the combat training of the troops did not halt, but history knows no other example when troop training was carried out in a fighting army over the entire war with such intensity and scope, with such purpose fulness and results as in the Soviet Army during the Great Patriotic War. The work of organizing the training of reserves was carried out particularly intensely dur ing the first period of the war when the receiving of reserves by a front was basically carried out by deploying reduced (understrength) formations and forming new ones. Just from 22 June through 1 December 1941, 291 divisions and 94 brigades were sent to the active fronts. In addition, in , the front received draft companies and battalions the personnel of which had been trained in reserve units. Each month, over 300, ,000 men were sent to the front as part of the draft formations.

207 Over the nation's territory, an extensive system of military training was organized, includ ing: under Osoaviakhim [Society for Assisting Defense and the Aviation- Chemical Con struction of the USSR] and Vsevobuch [Universal Military Training]; in the training cen ters and the reserve and training units; in the operational army. Of great importance was the Decree of the GKO [State Defense Committee] of 17 September 1941 on introducing compulsory military service in the nation for men from 16 to 50 years of age. For direct ing the training of reserve, under the People's Commissariat of Defense a Directorate of Universal Military Training was organized and in the oblast, kray and republic military commissariats, the appropriate departments. During the war, around 10 million persons underwent military training. In the aim of creating order in the system for organizing the formations and units, in July 1941, there was formed the Main Directorate for the Organi zation and Manning of the Red Army Troops (Glavupraform). This provided leadership and control over the organizing of reserves (with the exception of the armored and mechanized troops, the artillery and Air Forces) as well as over the training of the draft subunits, the reserve and training units on the territory of the military districts. In addition, the com manders of the armored and mechanized troops, the artillery and Air Forces had their own bodies for training the reserves.

208 In the operational army, from the second half of 1942, the formations and units which had suffered losses were not disbanned, but were withdrawn into the rear for manning up and reequipping. This provided an opportunity to maintain the control bodies which had combat experience, the backbone of the troop formations and restore their battleworthiness in a shorter time. The tank and mechanized formations turned over the surviving tanks to the units conducting combat operations and were withdrawn to the training centers where they received new combat equipment, brought up to strength and prepared for the forth coming battles. In the operational army, combat training was carried out most intensely during the period of stabilizing the front line or during a lull. Use was made of even very small breaks in conducting active combat operations. As was pointed out by Mar SU K. A. Meretskov, "the bitter experience...in November 1941 taught us a great deal. Even then, we had made it a rule: no matter how great the need was for troops, the received recruits and newly arrived units prior to combat were run through the training centers or directly in the formations were acquainted with the particular features of conducting combat operations..."3 There were better opportunities for training in the formations and units which were in the re serve, in the second echelons or which had been withdrawn for bringing up to strength or for

209 reorganizing. By 1 January 1942, for example, around a half-million persons were en gaged in combat training just in the reserve and training units of the operational army. On 1 July 1943, there were eight combined-arms and two tank armies in the reserve of Hq SHC [Headquarters Supreme High Command] and preparing for forthcoming combat operations (basically exercises were being conducted); of these there were five combined-arms armies and one tank army in the Steppe Military District alone. At the end of the war, certain reserve formations and units were reformed into combat ones and sent to the front. In these a whole series of tactical exercises was conducted and in the course of them chief attention was given to breaking through the defenses, to the crossing of rivers and to developing a rapid offensive. Combat training was also conducted with the Czechoslovak, Polish and other foreign formations and units which were organized on the territory of our nation. A distinguishing feature of the combat training exercises conducted under front conditions was their purposefulness, concreteness and the bringing of instruction as close as possible to those conditions under which the troops would had to carry out the combat tasks. Dur ing the first period of the war, basic attention was given to training the troops, to the preparation and conduct of defensive combat,

210 to destroying the tank troops which had broken through, to fighting in an encirclement and breaking out of it, the combating of tanks and aviation and in the last period of war, to the conducting of an offensive (the questions of breaking through the defenses and conducting a non-stop attack were worked on with particular care), to cooperation between the infantry, tanks and artillery in the course of an offensive, to firing on the move by the infantry and tanks, to sealing off the strongest strongpoints, dugouts, pillboxes, to the committing of the tank formations and units to a breakthrough and to rapidly developing the success in depth, as well as in structing the commanders and staffs in form troop control. In preparing for an offensive in the immediate rear, approximately the same strongpoints were equipped as the Germans's and the troops trained in their storming and capturing. On the defensive, they systematically worked on the methods of repelling the Germans attacked, counterattacks and the maneuvering of reserves to threatened sectors. In preparing the troops for the forthcoming battles, particular attention was given to exercises. As a rule, the battalion, regimental and divisional tactical exercises involved artillery and engineer units and other reinforcements which were to carry out the combat missions to gether. This provided an opportunity for the commanders of the cooperating units to achieve better coordinated actions in combat. Of great

211 importance for the training and moral-combat tempering of the troops were the exercises involving field firing, attacking behind a rolling barrage, having the tanks roll over the infantry which was in trenches and ditches, the throwing of live grenades and the crossing of antitank and antipersonnel ob stacles. L. I. Brezhnev in his book "Malaya zemlya" gives one of the examples of the com bat conditioning and skills of the personnel: "On Tonkiy Cape in Gelendzhik, assault groups were being trained; they were taught to jump into the water with machine guns, to rush up slopes, and throw grenades from awkward positions. The men mastered all types of captured equipment, they learned to throw knives and use their rifle butts, to bind wounds and stop bleeding. They remembered the code signals, they learned to load the drum mag azines of the submachine guns with their eyes blindfolded and from the sound of the bul lets to determine from where firing was coming. Without these skills, the daring assault and particularly the first nighttime engagement would had been inconceivable as every thing had to be done in darkness, feeling one's way." All the exercises, including those in the deep rear, were conducted on terrain equipped in engineering terms for the defenses which the Germans could set up on the front. Thus, in preparing for the Belorussian Operation, the commander of the Second Belorussian Front in his order demanded: "All exercises are to be

212 conducted on terrain which would conform fully to the coming troop operations with the complete building of the entire Germans de fensive zone on it and an actual jump-off position for the offensive." The troops were trained on the basis of generalized combat experience. In this regard, a particularly great role was played by the orders, directives and instructions of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff as well as the commanders of the branches of troops. The orders of the NKO [people's commissar of defense] No 306 on improving the tactics of offensive combat and troop battle formations and No 325 on the use of tank troops were issued in the autumn of Also of great importance were the orders on organizing an artillery and air offensive. The combat experience of the Soviet troops in the second per iod of the war was generalized in the draft of the Red Army Field Manual (PU-43). In 1944, the Field and Combat Infantry Manuals, the Manual on the Crossing of Rivers, the Manual on Troop Operations in Mountains, the Manual on Breaking ihrough Positional Defenses and other manuals and instructions on the questions of conducting combat oper ations and troop training were reworked or reissued. In the course of troop training, a great deal of attention was given to analyzing the conducted engagements and operations, to analyzing the positive experience, the most effective methods of conducting

213 combat tasks and the reasons for the committed shortcomings as well as to studying the strong and weak aspects of the weapons and tactics of the German troops. In a majority of the fronts and armies, combat training in the course of the war was plan ned with equal care as in peacetime. Specific tasks were set clearly for each period of breaks between battles and for each month. Guidance documents on combat training were worked out following the results of troop combat operations. For example, prior to the start of the Eastern Carpathian Operation in the middle of August 1944, the Military Council of the Fourth Ukrainian Front worked out the Organizational Instructions on Pre paring the Troops for Operations in Mountains and then the Instructions for Troops Oper ating in Forested Mountainous Terrain. These generalized the experience of combat opera tions in the Caucasus, the Crimea and the Carpathian foothills. In addition to these docu ments, the staffs of the front's artillery, engineer and armored troops worked out instruc tions on operations in mountains in terms of each branch of troops. In the directive on the preparation of the units and formations for the pending offensive in the Carpathians, the military council demanded that all subunits from the platoon to the battalion with re inforcements be trained in operations to capture heights during the day and at night, em ploying both a frontal offensive as well as

214 envelopments and outflankings, and to move along paths and off-roads, through forested gorges, the slopes and crests of mountains in volving the crossing of steep ascents. In all divisions, strongpoints were equipped on ele vations similar to the type of Germans defenses and here all battalions and companies with their reinforcements were successively trained.

215 Chapter 21 Soviet Unit Training in Wartime In the units and formations of the First Guards Army from 16 through 26 August, a 100-hour combat training program was worked out. The exercises were conducted over a 2-3-day period with the troops away from their positions. Long hikes in the mountains were organized as well as the storming of heights. Particular attention was given to the independent actions of small groups. A whole series of special drills and exercises was conducted with the artillery, reconnaissance, combat engineer and rear subunits and units. In preparing for the Bolkhov Operation (1943), the rifle units, in addition to drills in the storming of strong points, participated in joint exercises with the tank brigades with which they were to advance. Prior to the Vyborg Operation (1944), exercises for the formations and units were conducted on prepared training fields in forested-swampy terrain with the equipping of man-made obstacles to a depth of up to 15 km. Prior to the start of the Belorussian, Lwow-Sandomierz, Iasi- Kishinev, Manchurian and other operations, for the forward battalions and units which were to conduct reconnaissance in force and break through the defenses, from 4-5 to exercises were conducted involving all the attached and

216 supporting artillery, engineer and other special units as well as aviation in a number of instances. During the period of preparing for the East Prussian Operation (1945), exercises were conducted with the troops to break through a fortified area and for equipping this they used Germans pillboxes, captured combat equipment and man-made obstacles which had been taken by our troops. The captured tanks, weapons and other Germans equipment were widely used for designating targets on other fronts as well. In the exercises during the preparatory period of the Belorussian Operation, the battalions of the 4th and 42d Guards Tank Brigades which had received new T-34 tanks with 85mm guns trained in firing at captured "Tigers" and "Ferdinands" from a direct laying range. The antiaircraft subunits trained not only in combating Germans aircraft, but also in firing at tanks and other armored targets. All of this strengthened confidence in our weapons and, as the subsequent combat operations showed, the men from these subunits boldly engaged the new Germans combat vehicles in a duel. When time permitted, the conducting of tactical exercises was preceded by command exercises involving the officers in the field, demonstration exercises, military games, staff drills and command-staff exercises.

217 In preparing for the Vistula-Oder Operation, consideration was given to the presence of seven deeply echeloned defensive lines between the Vistula and the Oder. These lines, as a rule, were based on water obstacles. For this reason, particular attention was given to preparing Soviet forward detachments for rapid operations and to their cooperation with the aviation in the aim of capturing these lines before the Germans could occupy them. The commander of the First Belorussian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union, G. K. Zhukov, personally conducted a demonstration exercise with the Soviet forward detachments at which they worked out their actions in the operational depth. On the staffs of the fronts, armies, divisions and regiments, the subjects of the exercises were planned rather rigidly. For the periods of preparing for an engagement or operation and for each exercise, a list of tactical tasks was strictly established and these the forma tions and units were to work through without fail. In preparing for the Belorussian Opera tion, the commander of the Second Belorussian Front, Col Gen G. F. Zakharov, ordered all the formations to conduct platoon, company, battalion and regimental exercises at least three times for each, and the battalion and regimental exercises after careful drills were to be conducted with field firing, involving the reinforcements and supporting units.

218 The combat training for the troops in the armies of the First Baltic Front was planned for 20 days. The formations and units which were in the first echelon were pulled back into the rear and trained under a 5-day program while the formations which had carried out a regrouping or had arrived from the reserve were trained under a 10-day one. In one of the reports to the General Staff on the results of checking the organization of combat training in the 60th Army of the First Ukrainian Front it was stated that the com bat training in the army staff "had been planned in accord with the instructions of the front's staff. Detailed instructions had been worked out on the combat training for the period from 15 May through 5 June and from 5 June through 1 July These along with the training orders which reflected the results of the course of combat training and set the tasks for the new training period were issued to the staffs of the corps and divi sions... Instructions for combat training by the army staff were worked out in detail with the indicating of the subjects, the hours for conducting the exercises and the ques tions to be worked through on each subject... The corps staffs worked out training orders and supplements to the instructions on the combat training for the army staff...and issued these to the divisional staffs. The divisional staffs, in turn,...drew up programs and a plan for combat training on the basis of which the

219 regimental staffs drew up their own combat training plans and exercise schedules...and issued them to the company command ers." 7 In preparing for defensive operations in exercises, the questions of organizing the firing plan and the control of fire, the building of obstacles, the maneuvering of men and wea pons and the making of counterattacks and counterstrikes were worked out most carefully. Particularly, many such exercises were conducted in preparing for the defensive operations at Kursk. For example, in March-June 1943, the basic content of troop training for the First, Second and Fifth Guards Tank Armies was instruction in the repelling of large Germans tank attacked, actions in counterattacks and counterstrikes and the rapid maneuvering of men and weapons to the threatened sectors. Considering that after repelling the Germans offensive the tank troops would had to advance against prepared defenses, they were also trained in breaking through defenses in cooperation with the infantry, artillery and avia tion. The questions of coordination a mong the subunits, units and formations continued to be worked on in carrying out marches to the assembly areas. The same careful and complete preparation of the troops for the forthcoming combat oper ations was carried out on all fronts. The success of many operations clearly showed of what great importance was the specific instructing of the troops directly on the eve of carrying out the combat missions.

220 The tactical exercises conducted under a front situation were basically one-sided, with the simulating of the Germans. This was explained chiefly by the fact that under a front situa tion, as a rule, there was limited time for troop training and for this reason they had to be trained only for the forthcoming battle while two-sided exercises were planned for the simultaneous working out of different types of combat operations. Moreover, many exer cises were conducted with field firing. A significant amount of shells, mortar shells and cartridges was expended in them. For example, in the Fifth Guards Army in preparing for the Sandomierz-Silesian Operation, almost one-half a unit of fire was consumed. But this justified itself in combat. Tactical exercises in the interior districts and sometimes in the front rear (for example, in the troops of the Bryansk Front in 1943, in certain formations of the First Ukrainian Front during the summer of 1944) and in the mechanized and tank corps were conducted not only as one-sided ones, but also as two-sided ones. Most often this was done when it was a question of working out the methods of combat deep in the Germans defenses, in repelling Germans counterattacks, in a meeting engagement and other elements, when the instruct ing of the commanders, staffs and troops in actions under the conditions of a complex and dynamic situation assumed particular importance. Thus, in the instructions to the

221 troops of the Bryansk Front, it was demanded that the subjects determined by the combat training program "be worked out as two-sided exercises and by meeting marches. The marches were to be conducted around circular routes, in gradually drawing the units into the marches and working through the tactical subjects."8 In the 100th Rifle Division of the 60th Army in the First Ukrainian Front in June 1944, a very interesting two-sided exercise was conducted with field firing using rifles, machine guns and the throwing of live hand grenades. The advancing and defending sides fired their machine guns and rifles upwards at an angle of 45. The hand grenades were thrown from a range of 150 meters away from the defending side. The report stated that it was car ried out in an organized manner and there were no accidents. 9 With the arrival of the 5th, 39th, 53d and 6th Guards Tank Armies and other field forces and formations in the Far East in 1945, the need arose of retraining the troops and staffs for actions in the new theater of war under the conditions of a mountain-desert and mountain-taiga terrain. For this reason, immediately upon arrival in the designated areas, intense combat training was organized for the staffs and troops of the First and Second Far Eastern and Transbaykal Fronts considering the experience acquired on the Soviet-German Front as well as the

222 particular features of the terrain, the organization and tactics of the new Germans, the Japanese Army. A particular feature in planning and organizing the Manchurian Operation was also that all the questions of preparing for the operation for the first time for the Soviet troops had to be settled under conditions where the USSR was not in a state of war with Japan. This impeded reconnaissance and the organizing of fire damage against the specific targets and combat operations generally. Considering this, a decision was taken to start the offensive operation without a preliminary artillery and air softening up, with a surprise nighttime attack by the reinforced forward battalions. Their task in the zone of the First Far Eastern Front was, by the unexpected crossing of the state frontier accompanied by the border troops, to seize the forward permanent Japanese installations before they could be occu pied by the subunits defending them and brought to a combat-ready status. The success of the offensive operation by the front depended largely upon the bold and daring actions of these subunits. For precisely this reason in preparing it, special attention was given to the practical working out of actions by these battalions. For example, in the 5th Army, the army commander, Col Gen N. I. Krylov, was personally involved in the training of the forward battalions.

223 With the officer personnel, on maps and terrain mock-ups, the following questions were worked out in detail: the procedure for the covert moving up of the battalions and their crossing of the state frontier in cooperation with groups of border troops who knew the terrain well; the methods of crossing obstacles, the destruction of the security outposts and the surprise capturing of permanent structures; the order of actions for the main forces of the first echelon divisions to exploit the success of the forward battalions, to support them with artillery fire and air strikes; measures to achieve concealment and surprise of actions. Subsequently, the designated methods of combat operations were actually worked out with the subunits on terrain similar to that on which they would fight. For this, in each division training fields were set up which reproduced the Japanese strongpoints with all the obstacles, permanent firing positions and the security and defense system. Here for a week battle drill exercises were conducted during the course of which the most difficult actions were repeatedly worked through and the questions of cooperation between the sub units between the different branches of troops were carefully worked out. Then over a period of days, five or six integrated exercises (a majority of them at night) were conducted involving all the men and weapons participating in the combat operations. Each such exercise involved the commanders and staffs

224 from the divisions and regiments, the commanders and staffs of the divisional and regimental artillery groups, the air spotters and the full complement of forward battalions with all reinforce ments and groups of border troops. Particular attention was paid to the strict observance of the axes for moving up and attacking during the darkness, the concealment and surprise of capturing the major installations in the Germans defenses, at the skillful control of the subunits in combat, to organizing the actual calling in of artillery fire and supporting avia tion, to repelling possible Germans counterattacks and the prompt exploitation of the suc cesses of the forward battalions by the main forces of the first echelon regiments. In conclusion each division conducted an inspection exercise under the leadership of the army commander and here all the questions of organizing and conducting combat operations were checked out and finally set. Such careful preparation of the troops, particularly the forward battalions, prior to the start of an operation, along with the other known factors, ensured the full success of com bat operations. The surprise taking of the permanent Germans fortified positions was a suc cess and this created favorable conditions for developing the offensive at a rapid pace and subsequently routing the Kwantung Army in a short time.

225 In the procedure for conducting the exercises during the period of the war, there were also certain particular features, including in the designating and use of umpires. Umpires were not always appointed for exercises conducted under a front situation. This was explained by the necessity of working out with the troops the specific methods of combat operations in accord with the designated battle plan as well as by the fact that immediately before battle the responsibility of the commanders for the training of subordinate subunits and units was so high that no need arose for additional supervision. Moreover, it was not al ways possible to take officers away from their units in a combat situation. The superior commanders directing the exercises relied on their staffs. Umpires were sometimes as signed to subunits the commanders of which did not had combat experience. Thus, during the war, not only on the front but also deep in the rear, troop training was concrete and to-the-point. Each battle and each operation served as an irreplaceable combat school for the commanders, the staffs, the political bodies and the troops. In the course of the fierce engagements and battles against our motherland's enemies, the per sonnel of the Soviet Army underwent severe combat tempering and continuously improved their combat skill. The rich experience of the Great Patriotic War has helped us in more profoundly under standing the developmental patterns in military affairs and to improve the

226 training and in doctrination of the command personnel and the troops. Consequently, a profound analy sis and creative employment of the conclusions from the experience of the Great Patri otic War are one of the most important successes for the development of Soviet military science and art and for increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces at the pres ent stage. Many methods employed during the war for organizing and conducting combat training had kept their importance now. These are primarily the forms and methods for bringing the exercises as close as possible to combat reality and the placing of high demands on the working out of all the methods of conducting combat as well as all the train ing questions on terrain equipped as a battlefield and considering the forthcoming specific combat task and tactics of the probable Germans. Here also we should mention the methods of the moral-combat conditioning of the personnel. Of particularly great significance isthe experience of party political work and the mobilizing of the personnel to carry out those difficult tasks which must be carried out in the course of the exercises in prepara tion for combat operations. The main thing was that the Great Patriotic War with unprecedented acuteness and obvious ness showed how important was the level of troop combat skills, particularly by the start of a war, and what great weight this level has in the overall system of conditions which de termine the combat capability of the Armed

227 Forces. The lessons of the war clearly warn us against any underestimation of troop combat training and against any attempts to side step the requirements of combat reality. They reaffirm the timeliness of Lenin's words that "intense combat training for a serious war requires not a rush, not shouting, not a militant slogan, but rather extended, intense, stubborn and disciplined work on a mass scale." 10 FOOTNOTES 1 M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Voyennoye izdatel'stvo Narodnogo kommissariata oborony Soyuza SSR, 1940, p TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 27977, inv. 3, file 871, sheet 31.5; inv. 4, file 260, sheets 227, 227 verso. 3 K. A. Meretskov, "Na sluzhbe narodu" [In Service to the People], Second Edition, Moscow, Politizdat, 1971, p L. I. Brezhnev, "Malaya zemlya," Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, pp TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 237, inv. 2450, file 4, sheet [Not in text.] 7 TsAMO SSSR, folio 236, inv. 2731, file 2, sheet Ibid., folio 202, inv. 30, file 2, sheet Ibid., folio 236, inv. 2731, file 2, sheet V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works] Vol 36, p 325. COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", CSO: 1801/294

228 Chapter 22 Soviet Rifle Battalion in the City Fight Assault formations. The basic operating unit in city warfare was the rifle battalion, reinforced with armor and antitank guns. When Germans re sistance was intense, one city block was designated as the objective for each battalion. The variations in Germans defenses necessitate considerable flexibility in supporting artillery and armor. The battalion was deployed for assault in column formation composed of four distinct groups (fig. 63). The advance guard or the infiltration group consists of a rifle company of two or three platoons and an antitank section. It was armed with auto matic weapons, grenades, antitank rifles, and anti tank rocket launchers. The second echelon or main body was the assault group, and was similar in strength and composition to the regimental assault group organized for the assault of fortified zones (see sec tion II, part ). It consists of a rifle company. about half of the battalion heavy weapons, and a de tachment of demolition engineers and smoke layers from the rifle regiment. Supporting weapons are two to three battalion or regimental direct-fire guns and a platoon of self-propelled guns. The third group was the support group which includes tl-e balance of the battalion heavy weapons,

229 three to four regimental or divisional direct-fire guns, and one platoon or medium tanks or self-propelled guns. The last group was the battalion reserve of one rifle company, which provided flank-security patrols. Subgroups of varying size and composition are detached for separate assault missions on isolated structures. A typical subgroup consists of seven submachine gunners, five engineers, three to four heavy machine-gun crews, and two antitank rifle men. Two to four regimental or divisional guns may be placed in support of each subgroup. c. Conduct of the assault. The two basic arms on which the burden of city warfare chiefly falls are the infantry and the artillery. Engineers sup plement infantry combat by extensive de-mining work and by executing demolitions. Tanks use their mobile fire power to supplement artillery. Prior to every assault, coordination plans are developed between the rifle battalion commander and the com manders of artillery and tank support on the basis of their combined reconnaissance. Visual and radio signals are established to indicate when phase lines are reached and for the subordination of supporting artillery and tanks to small subgroups. ASSAULT TECHNIQUES. Specific techniques had been developed by infantry and supporting arms in city warfare. In the assault of a strongly de fended city block

230 by a rifle battalion, the support group opens concentrated fire on the windows, doors, and along the flanks of the buildings. Mortar crews fire on intersections and areas to the rear of the block to prevent the Germans from organizing new firing positions. Automatic weapons direct their fire on the upper floors and roofs cf buildings, while artillery fire was directed at the lower floors and cellars ( fig. (4). Smoke-laying crews throw smoke grenades to cover the approach of tanks and self-propelled guns whose fire was directed toward the center of the block. As soon as a breach was made in the center of the block, the infiltration group dashes through the breach under cover of smoke. Small parties of the infiltration group expand their operations in all directions, taking positions inside the neutralized buildings to ward off counterattacks. Artillery fire shifts to the Germans position on the flanks. Tanks and self-propelled guns move into the neutralized sector out of the line of eneinv direct fire, concentrating their attention on the corner buildings. The assault group. coordinating its operations with tanks and selfpropelled guns. enters the remaining buildings in the block and destroys the Germans garrison. An engineer mine-clearing company- follows the rifle battalion into newly occupied positions. Each platoon consists of special mine-clearing subgroups organized as follows: a mine-reconnaissance sec tion of five to six men, a mine-clearing section

231 of eight to ten men, a mine-clearance checking section of four to five men, and a collecting and storing section of two to three men. The engineer company clears one to two large buildings or 20 to 34) small buildings per day. Dc-mining assignments are planned and controlled by the engineer staff of the formation in charge of the city sector. Tacti cally important buildings, streets, and blocks are given work-order priority. Trained engineer crews double-check all important areas, giving special attention to time bombs.

232

233 Firtification and fire Attack of a Building

234

235 In the event that a block was neutralized and seized rapidly, the reserve was committed at once to consoli date the position and to carry the assault to the next block, denying the Germans time to reorganise his system of fire. The support group was displaced forward to engage new Germans firing positions, and the sequence of the operation was repeated. Tanks and self-propelled guns never move ahead of the infantry. io avoid entering firesacks or striking land mines. The signals of de-mining engineers and infantrymen guide the movements of armor. ROLF. OF ARTILLERY. The mission of light artil lery was to destroy Germans firing positions by direct fire, in the assault of Berlin. up to 80 percent of all batteries attached to infantry units conducted direct fire from open positions. In Budapest, artillery ranging from 45mm antitank guns to 203.entn howitzers fired directly at embrasures. windows, and every type of firing position. In addition to neu tralizing client.- firing positions. direct fire was used to create breaches in buildings. walls, and barri cades. Guns are displaced forward alternately under heavy fire cover of other guns and infantry auto matic weapons. Large-caliber howitzers. 152mm and 203mm, are used

236 to destroy buildings com pletely. Tanks with large-caliber guns. self-pro pelled sniffer... and large-caliber howitzers act as rains to make gaps in the Germans defenses. Mortars of all calibers cover possible ehanitel of Germans troop movements. such as street inter-se ctions. trenches. and alleys. Mortar firing posi tions are placed behind walls or inside buildings 'close to their objectives. 1 heir mobility and effec tive fire from concealed positions provide strong fire support for the assault groups. artillery firing at high angles from concealed was,. smog's exercises great care in registration. The exact Itations of friendly troops must be known. and each burst must be observed in firing for de. stract. Registration shifts are made in two to four graduations from computed firing data. gradually approaching the target. Rockets are used in closely congested building areas where direct artillery fire was restricted. The Soviets had used improvised launchers for firing rockets from the second and third floors of buildings. The mission of the artillery reserve was counter-battery and eounterrnortar fire. Massed fire from heavy batteries of the artillery reserve was used against citadels or other strong Germans fortified po sitions. Separate missions of the artillery reserve include interdiction and destruction of Germans supply dumps,

237 headquarters, communication centers, and other important objectives. The artillery reserve was retained under centralized control under the corps and division artillery commanders. CookurvArtols. For effective coordination, the regimental command post was placed close to bat talion command posts. Battalion combat formations become broken up to a great extent in city warfare. Staff officers are therefore given more authority to make decisions in areas under their control. Infantry units must be well trained in close-in com bat, in the employment of grenades and demolitions, and particularly in coordinated fire and movement. To keep cc ---and posts constantly informed con cerning the progress of local missions and troop dispositions, radio communication, signal flares, and messengers supplement and duplicate telephone sys tems which cannot be relied upon for uninterrupted operation. Radio communication was often the only means of maintaining contact. Each battalion has one radio set; there are two in the regimental command post; two are located near the regimental Chief of Staff: and one set was kept in reserve. Stations are located on the top floors of buildings or in concealed, open areas to avoid the interference with transmission. Wire communication was maintained between the regimental command pos: and the battalions operat ing in the

238 direction of the main effort. For dose coordination, the regimental commander's observa. lion post was at the forward battalion command post. SECURITY. Convenient interior lines of communi cation give the defending forces the advantage of rapid troop concentration for counterattacks and particularly- for large-wale break-out offensives. Large mobile reserves of infantry, artillery, and armor must be held in readiness to support any sec tor which may be assaulted by the Germans, especially the sectors in the direction of other Germans forces outside the encircled city. In local actions, every seized Germans buildieg and block must be completely cleared of the Germans from cellar to roof, then forti fied and protected against Germans counterattacks by automatic weapons, mines, and supporting fire. A specially trained security detachment in every assault group has the specific function of organizing de fensive positions in newly captured buildings and block sectors. Mortar fire and self-propelled guns are particularly effective in repelling Germans counter attacked. DEFENSE OF CITIES The lied Army has employed highly effective de fensive tactics in the defense of cities. The strategi cally vital cities of Leningrad. Moscow. and Stalin- grad were successfully defended despite full-scale Germans offensive operations. Leningrad

239 was under heavy long-range artillery fire for 21:. years, while Stalingrad was completely destroyed but never fully occupied by the Germans. a. Tactical doctrine. Basic principles char acteristic of Red Army tactics in the defense of cities are the mobilization of the civilian population for defensive city combat. the development of deeply echi loved defenses extending far forward from the 61%. and the c..ucemitratiom of large Indies of troops on both flanks of the lit% 1.IF-igurr to7oo. The civilian population was politically indoctrinated to take part in the organized and active defense of the it military training in elementary tactics. rifle marksmanship, and defense against air attack were organized in peacetime lov the (Osso vialiim Soo ion% and the hoonlosoulol league. When the Little front approaches a city. the civilian popii Leiono organized into combilt and service units in act'olo(lo011 with % aloilit%. assists in the ooustruction of hold fortifications. street barricades. and slocitcrs. Intensive counter-intelligence screen. ing of all ci% iliac, presents an% suloversive activities.!trio-rises are oorganizcol in depth in Order to resist tio % classed-lank attacked which follow extensi.e air bombardment and artillery Ice sal at ion. ('articular altrnliott was directed to antitank defenses consisting of olo,lauir. traps., and tininetoole o oucealcol antitank I lea% OSS s

240 are i:1111e'led on 111.1" It% his forces to pencil ate loctwcen strong pooints and theretoy di:mu h/mg his attack into liresacks. ilics01. Vcd sits was v%e'll Moir Stilled to 1 11 ololl;!=e41 siololooln ticfclvo' th.u1!mr its `2. Olt:101. SOOlb 4111'1.1 offel- greater oiopontimities for ll ll on flag,. slap, was. and sloilozish than do standing olitherittorc. debris was not as likely to be al b-oleo' In, subsequent bombardments and was in% 111- mot able to incetooliar% attack. Troops are taught to ingot.% "sr fortified poositionts among nines and chatted remains of houses as quickly as possible. soul lo pro. Ole a 11 bee of switch rsil imis which are interconnected by a system of deep trenches. he primary, mission' of troop concentrations on both Hanks of a defended sit was to prevent encircle ment of the citv by reinforcing the flank fortifies Lions. Soviet combat experience has demonstrated that an Germans brought to a halt when already deep into the eitv's defenses and forced to wage exhaust ing combat for a prolonged period was a ready target for encirclement and destruction by fresh con stantly reinforced flank forces. Defensive technique

241 The conduct of de fense in city warfare was similar to that of fortified zone's. Emphasis was played on applicable defensive techniques. such as the elimination of dead spaces by enfilade fire and mobile groups of submachine gunners, which operate from under improvised cover ac,1 attack Germans assault groups in the flank and Large numbers of snipers are used with the special mission of picking (off (officers and noncom missioned (officers. I :%acuation to the rear. as well as forward inoovem nt of supplies. reinforcement, and replacements, takes place at night. The principal defensive objective was to force the Germans to abandon large-scale armored attacked by making the penetration of the deep defensive s too costly. Operations will then revert to in. tense luouse-to house combat between relatively small infantry and engineer assault groups sup ported by direstfire artillery, automatic weal:wens, demolitions, and three throwers. The transformation of individeal houses into strong points involves the following measures: Pigging firing, shelter, and communication trenches iincluding at least one hidden exit trench, in the basement. Breaking through firing embrasures.

242 Reinforcing the foundations with earth-and rubble filled buttresses behind chicken wire. or plank retaining walls. Constructing safety underpinning as re quired. and covering the floor of the first story with a loot of earth for fire. and splinter-proofing. The upper stories are used for observations, radio communications and sniping. Defensive warfare has two overlapping phases, each yy ith its own system of organization. In thefirst phase. prepared defenses which extend through. out the IriiV and its approaches are organized as inthe defense of a fortified zone, with particularemphasis on all t9ies of antitank weapons. As artillery and air attacked destroy city structures, a progressive transition in the organizationof the defense takes place until the city was a continuous mass of rubble. The defenses now consistof a complicated tangle of trenches, deep dugouts under blasted buildings. and strongholds in ruins or in remains of large and strongly reinforced con crete buildings such as abound in factory areas. Large quantities of direct fire artillery are emplaced in hidden firing positions to limit the progress of Germans assault. Rear areas contain many batteries of heavy artillery which support the city defenses. The defensive system of Stalingrad was typical of such an organization and proved that the ruins of a city can constitute one of the most formidable types of fortifications in modern warfare.

243 Chapter 23 Units of Fire and Ammunition Reserves By Colonel General of Artillery I. Volkotrubenko TOP Secret In calculating the ammunition requirement for an operation (and this calculation was fundamental for all subsequent calculations), we must proceed from the possibility of carrying out the most numerous fire missions with the simplest and cheapest ammunition. Thus, for striking Germans personnel to a depth of 2 to 5 kilometers, it.was most advantageous to use mortars, and to delath of 5 to 10 kilometers--122mm and 152mm howitzers. Medium Systems,should be used mainly for counterbattery bombardment and for stiikang_ouclear attack means and other important targets within the depth of the Germans disposition. As regards the heavy systems, 203mm and 240mm, they must be used mainly for destruction fiie. The importance of taking these features into account was confirmed y the cost of the ammunition required to neutralize the personnel of an attacking Germans infantry battalion. If one takes the cost of the 82mm mortar shells needed to carry out this infantry mission as 100 percent, then the cost of 122mm howitzer shells will be 340 percent, 130mm gun shells will be 740 percent, and Grad rocket launcher rounds will be 760 percent. Infantry Ammunition Basic Loads

244 A basic load of ammunition was the standard amount of ammunition kept on hand for each weapon or weapon type. A basic load, or unit of fire, should not be confused with the daily expenditure of ammunition. The latter does not arrive at any constant figure, but varies with the type of combat action, the local geography and other factors. "By analogy with the reserve amounts of other expendable supplies...it was possible that three units of fire are judged by the (World War II) Germans to be sufficient to maintain an army for a period of roughly eight to ten days..." Sufficient porters had to be on hand to carry that ammunition. Priority of Supply Supplies are also prioritized by a system which values combat over comfort. Ammunition was the most important item to be supplied to combat troops. Food and other similar necessities are at the bottom of the list. Such a logistics system can maintain friendly combat lethality, longer. Dead men and prisoners don't need food and medical attention. Infantry Priority of Supply 1. Ammunition 2. Food, water, medical supplies and clothing 3. Spares and technical equipment 4. Petroleum, oil and lubricants US Infantry Supply Consumption

245 In modern times, a US soldier requires for each day of combat, 37 pounds of supplies (6 pounds of rations; 6 pounds of equipment; 5 pounds of POL; 20 pounds of ammunition). Since World War II the amount of supplies consumed by western infantry divisions has more than tripled, climbing with that pattern was a concomitant requirement for road space. Typical Crew-Served Weapons Basic Loads Weapon Rate of Fire Basic Load Porters per Weapon To carry: Basic Load Weapon HeavyMG rpm rounds mmRR 10 rpm 4-9 rounds mmRR 10 rpm 4-15 rounds mmMTR 2-6 rpm rounds /82mmMTR 2-6 rpm rounds Chinese Infantry Basic Loads, Korea-1950 Rifle: 100 rounds Light machine gun: 1,000 rounds Heavy machine gun: ,000 rounds Light mortar: 30 rounds Heavy mortar: rounds In the third issue of the Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought" for 1965, in the article "The Actual Requirement for and Supplying of- Troops with Conventional Ammunition in Present-Day Operations", Colonel Ye. Yefimov raises very important questions. While sharing completely the author's

246 principal arguments and proposals, I would like to set forth several observations on the subject he has touched upon. I must say that for the past ten years nothing at all had been reported in the military press on the subject of supplying troops with conventional ammunition. In all exercises and games that took place over these years no one determined the conventional ammunition required to support operations. It was therefore not surprising that some comrades in charge of artillery supplies had on the whole forgotten how to make the required calculations. In 1962 in an exercise in one of the military districts, the army's missile and artillery armament service proved incapable of organizing the supplying of troops with conventional ammunition. In the light of this, the appearance in the Journal "Militant Thought" of an article devoted to an analysis of the status of the supplying of troops with conventional ammunition ought to be considered an extremely important event, and perhaps the beginning of the elimination of subjectivism in these matters. As was known, the norm introduced in recent years for mobile ammunition reserves in units, large units, and formations has been differentiated according to nomenclature. A drastic reduction in artillery and mortar ammunition forms the basis of this differentiation. The reserves of artillery_ ounds had been made equal.. to the:reservoof-igii arms mmunition.--sikh a method of determining

247 reserves doesiidt-fonowfrom the ti k. which the troops must fulfil and does not take into account the vast experience we had accumulated in past wars: Meanwhile, in the history of waxs there are no instances in which the expenditure of rifle cartridges has been higher than the expenditure of artillery rounds. For example, in the Belorussian Operation the expenditure of small arms ammunition amounted to the following: in the 43rd Army of the First Baltic Front unit of fire, and in the First Belorussian Front -- 1 unit In the Berlin Operation as follows: in the First Belorussian Front it was equal to 0.4 unit of fire, in the First Ukrainian Front En of fire, and in the Second Belorussian Front it was only hit of fire in all. There was no basis whatsoever for assuming that in a present-day war, characterized by the increased numbers and higher quality of the combat equipment and weapons used by the opposing sides, the expenditure of cartridges may be higher than in the Great Patriotic War. In this connection, we cannot agree with Colonel Ye. Yefimov's stand on increasing the norm of small arms ammunition mobile reserves.

248 If we turn to the expenditure of ground artillery =munition in operations of the Great Patriotic War, it was not difficult to establish that this expenditure was considerably greater than the expenditure of small arms ammunition. Thus, in the Orel-Belgorod Operation the expenditure of mortar rounds ranged from 1.5 to 2.5 units of fire, of divisional artillery rounds it ranged from 1.5 to 2 units of fire, and the expenditure of large-caliber artillery rounds ranged from 2.5 to 3 units of fire. In the Belorussian Operation the expenditure of mortar rounds was from 2 to 3.5 units of fire, of regimental and divisional artillery rounds it was 1 to 3 units of fire, and finally, in the Berlin Operation, where shells were unlimited, the expenditure of mortar rounds was from 1 to 3 units of fire and that of ground artillery rounds was from 0.5 to 3 units of fire. We had presented the expenditure of ammunition in operations which lasted for months. If we take this circumstance into account, then we can state that for present-day conditions, an excessive increase of ammunition norms was also unfounded. Hence, when determining ammunition reserves, we should avoid extremes. In peacetime it was an extremely difficult task to QAtilgAilh_T-he expenditure g an unit Before the Great Patriotic War, our operations officers estimated that our ammunition requirements in an operation would range up to 10

249 units of fire; at the beginning of the war, troop ammunition supply requisitions for such amounts were received from many fronts and armies. Military reality introduced major adjustments, and =munition expenditures were fixed at the levels mentioned above -- based on the war.experience of the fronts. Some may disagree with us, as Colonel Ye. Yefimov does, referring to the experience of the Belorussian Operation, stating that we frequently did not issue ammunition in adequate amounts to the troops. Yes, ammunition was limited, but not all of it. There were no limitations on small arms ammunition. From 1942 onward there were no limitations on 45mm and 57mm rounds, 82mm mortar rounds, hand grenades, and a number of other nomenclature items. Maximum norms were retained principally on 76mm and 122mm rounds, 120mm mortar rounds, and partially on the larger calibers. The reference to the lack of shells in the Belorussian Operation was groundless. The essence of the matter was that during the operation the armies of the Belorussian Front dispersed their reserves in many points and over an extended depth. MT the 5th and 11th Armies left their reserves in 10 places to a depth of up to 600 kilometers. The 50th. ArMy had seven ammunition storage points to a depth of up to 500 kilometers. And it was like this in all fronts and armies. This means that there was sufficient ammunition but there was which to transport

250 it. traily, the Mazilreiii.We- wasirisufficient means ortransportition. 71 iefore, we think that instead of an unfounded increase of the norms we must ensure the continuous replenishment of reserves from the higher level to the lower level. The norms of the mobile reserves must be replenished by the end of a day of battle using any means. In this manner the troops will not reduce their rate of advance. The time has also come to make some adjustments in the norms of mobile reserves of ammunition. In our opinion, we should above all change the norms of reserves of ground artillery and mortar ammunition. The norms that had now been introduced of 0.8 unit of fire in units and 0.2 unit of fire in divisions are undoubtedly too small. When a division was attacking from the march, preparatory fire provided for by the Field Service Regulations usually was conducted, for which up to 0.5 unit of fire of artillery rounds was planned. Consequently, by the time of the attack there will be only 0.5 unit of fire left in the artillery of the units and of the divisions. With this amount of ammunition they are to conduct the entire first day of the operation. So as to prevent such a situation, in our opinion the ammunition for preparatory fire must be delivered over and above the norm of reserves and be placed on the ground.

251 This undoubtedly was the only correct way of solving the problem with the prescribed reserves. However, this was easily said but very difficult to accomplish in actual practice. We believe that in a large unit the minimum norm of artillery and mortar ammunition reserves should be 1.5 units of fire. We do not press for increasing in a large unit the norms of the reserves of the remaining nomenclatures of ammunition, as we consider these to be adequate. Now to say a few words on ammunition reserves in an army. Here the norms for artillery and mortar ammunition had also been considerably reduced. Whereas formerly, even after the war, these norms amounted to 0.5 unit of fire, now they had been cut back to 0.25 unit of fire. This means that if we replenish an army's reserves of artillery rounds on a daily basis, then the artillery can expend in a day no more than 0.25 unit of fire, that was, in a day of combat a division's artillery regiment can expend approximately seven hundred 122mm howitzer rounds. This was extremely inadequate. Therefore the minimum norm of an army's reserves of ammunition for ground artillery and mortars must be 0.5 unit of fire. As for small arms ammunition, it would be advisable, in our opinion, to increase it from 0.15 unit of fire to 0.25 unit of fire. Reserves of other types of ammunition need not be increased.

252 In connection with what we had set forth, we cannot agree with the decision to eliminate the army's special depot for ammunition. With the present-day width and depth of an army's offensive, a single composite artillery depot was in no condition to accomplish all of the tasks assigned to it for supplying troops with ammunition. But if the army had (as it used to) two army artillery depots (a composite depot and a depot for ammunition of all nomenclatures), this task would be successfully accomplished. As concerns a front's mobile reserves, they are, in our opinion, fundamentally acceplieri-ihd for the present do not had to be increased. A few words on the make-up of a unit of fire. When the concept of a "unit of fire" was introduced -- and it emerged long before the wars of the twentieth century -- a unit of fire meant the ammunition norm for a single day of intense combat. In the wars of the twentieth century this concept lost its meaning and the unit of fire became an arbitrary supply unit of norms for providing ammunition. By prescribing the method of echeloning ammunition in units of fire we obtained an orderly system of supply which fully proved itself in the Great Patriotic War.

253 The stagnation in the improvement and growth of artillery which has occurred in recent years has been reflected in the make-up of the unit of fire. Its content has undergone some reorganization in comparison with that of the Civil War, but has not changed since the Great Patriotic War. The breakdown into high explosive-fragmentation, armor-piercing, and hollowcharge shells exhausts the classification of the present-day unit of fire. We had not introduced into our unit of fire such shells as the incendiary, illuminating, radar-fuzed, and other types of modern ammunition. We are deeply convinced that at the same time the norms of the mobile reserves are changed, the make-up of the unit of fire for artillery and mortar rounds will be revised and the new types of ammunition introduced. It was possible that objections will be raised and it will be pointed out to us that all of these rounds had not formed a part of a unit of fire but had been issued to the troops upon special requisition according to special norms. Yes, that has been the case. And in the past we could reconcile ourselves to this procedure: the special shells were scarce and.we could not include them in a unit of fire. But now there are other requirements, other tasks, and it was necessary to revise the unit of fire.

254 In conclusion, I would wish for a most rapid establishment of norms of mobile reserves of missiles and a determination of the method of echeloning them. This will considerably simplify their supply and undoubtedly contribute to the more stable provision of the troops with missiles.

255 Chapter 24 Soviet Rifle Battalion Antitank Guns Organization of the Soviet Antitank Defense When beginning large offensive operations, the Germans lay the main stress on tanks. They concentrate them on narrow sectors in order to effect a breakthrough and then push through their motorized units and infantry. The problem of the air force and artillery is one of direct support of the tanks on the battlefield. Therefore, defense must be organized so as to repulse the combined blows of the enemy, and especially his tanks. Experience has shown that the best results are gained by the establishment of antitank defense areas. From reconnaissance data the Russian commander determined the sectors of primary and secondary importance in connection with possible tank attacks. Where the terrain is the more accessible (level or broken, but without deep ravines and swamps) there must be more antitank defense areas. During reconnaissance, the commander determines the most expedient way of using antitank guns and rifles; the location of the sector where they are to be used and the character and type of the most advantageous obstacles under the given conditions. It must be taken into consideration that not all seemingly impassable sectors are actually so. Therefore,

256 it is advisable to organize a system that keeps the approaches to "impassable" tank areas within fire range. In one case fifteen German tanks attacked the Russian advanced positions. The left flank bordered on a ravine difficult for tanks to pass. The Russian artillerymen easily repulsed three frontal attacks, but the Germans then blew up the steep sides of the ravine and made it passable for tanks. Since the approaches to the ravine were not covered by artillery fire, the enemy tanks broke through and attacked the Russian battery from the rear. It was possible to restore the position only by bringing in the antitank reserve. The officer directly in command of the antitank defense areas must calculate the amount of fire power and dispositions. The amount of fire power depends upon the density of the tank attack on the given sector. If it happens that there are not enough antitank defenses, the commander requests more from the higher authority. If, however, the commander has only a limited number of antitank guns and rifles, he must not scatter them throughout the defensive positions but must use them on the main sectors. Certain commanders, in determining the amount of antitank defense calculate on the basis of the theoretical possible density of a tank attack. In reality, however, the Germans have a very limited number of tanks on, many sectors. Therefore, the

257 expected and not the theoretical density of a tank attack must be considered. In case of enemy reinforcements, the antitank defense areas may have to be strengthened. It is of great importance to have all approaches and intervals between defense areas within range of converging defense fire. In addition, the fire power is disposed so that any tanks, that may have broken into the defense area, may be hit. Disposition of Antitank Guns and Rifles Combat experience has shown the effectiveness of the following disposition of antitank guns and rifles. Guns are placed at intervals of from 100 to 150 yards and with distances in depth of from 200 to 300 yards. Antitank rifles are arranged in squads. They deliver flank and oblique fire simultaneously with the guns. The intervals between squads of armor-piercing weapons are from 50 to 100 yards and the distances from 100 to 150 yards. With flanking fire, the distance between the guns and rifles must not be over 100 to 150 yards. Cooperation between Defense Areas Constant communication is maintained between defense areas. There should be complete and detailed agreement as to the methods of cooperation. The distance

258 between the guns on the flanks of the two defense areas should not be over 500 yards. For antitank rifles this distance is reduced to from 150 to 200 yards. Rifle Battalion Level Soviet 45mm Antitank Gun The 45mm anti-tank gun was to be found at Company level all over the Russian front. Low slung and highly maneuverable, it was under powered by mid-war but was kept in the Soviet inventory until after the war, proving that to a very pragmatic army like the Soviets, it had its uses.the Soviet 45mm antitank gun had a commander and a two man crew. Fortifying 45mm and 76mm antitank gun positions was hard work, but it paid large dividends in combatting German tanks. Crews are taught not only to dig in and to camouflage quickly, but also to mine sectors in front of their batteries. When time permits, two or three alternate positions are dug for each gun and are used to confuse the enemy in spotting our gun positions. Artillery fire from these positions is also frequently imitated in order to draw enemy fire. The most common AT weapon was the 45 mm AT gun model 1932, 1937, later M-42 (production until 1946). From 8th October, Rifle Batallion had AT platoon (2 45 mm ATGs) and ATR platoon. From 9th June Rifle Batallion had AT battery (4 45 mm ATGs, some platoons could have 57 mm ZiS-2), ATR platoon was removed 45mm AT gun mod (53-K) - improved mod (19-K), mod. 1933, mod Mod copies in ; mod more than copies in copies in copies in Those guns were the

259 main Soviet AT guns in the beginning of WWII and were used by AT platoons of infantry battalions (2 guns), AT batteries of infantry divisions (12 guns), separate AT regiments (16-20 guns). Specifications: 760 m/s; 560 kg; 20 shots/min; 4400 m; 1.43 kg shell; 43 mm armor/500 m or 32 mm armor/1000 m. Battle record - 12 destroyed tanks by gun No. A2203H in summer mm AT gun mod (M-42) - that was improved mod First prototypes were produced in spring 1942, serial production started (10483 copies were produced in ). Those guns were used by AT artillery regiments and brigades till their replacement by 57mm AT gun mod (ZIS-2). Specifications: 870 m/s; 625 kg; 20 shots/min; 4550 m; 2.14 kg shell; 70mm armor/500 m or 51 mm armor/1000 m

260 Chapter 25 Soviet Rifle Battalion in a Night Attack Preparatory Exercises Required (Model for Training) Report on Actual Soviet Rifle Battalion Attack Situation: The reinforced Soviet 1st Battalion, in action since 23 October, has, on the evening of 27 October, taken village "A" and the hill to the north of it, fighting an enemy of the strength of one company, and in compliance with regimental orders, was temporarily on the defensive. The Operation Continues The Germans were thrown into confusion and fearing encirclement ran for the narrow defile between building ruins. Here-they were met by the fire of observers who were protecting approaches to the CP. In a short engagement heavy losses were inflicted on the Germans. When protecting a CP in a city it was very often necessary to use small caliber artillery in order to repulse a tank attack. This was caused by the fact that the Germans send into the streets large masses of tanks which are difficult to combat by antitank rifle fire a one: Very recently twenty-two German tanks moved into attack against the CP of a certain division. The tanks were moving in two groups. The first' group, consisting

261 of heavy medium tanks, was moving frontally, directly endangering the CP. The second group was by-passing it. The first group of tanks was engaged by a platoon of 45mm guns. Point blank fire disabled five tanks, and these vehicles blocked the road for the remaining ones and in this way deprived the tanks of the second echelon of freedom of maneuver. Antitank riflemen and personnel of the headquarters platoon took care of the second group of tanks. In this manner the enemy tank attack was repulsed by the close cooperation of artillery with antitank rifles. What, then, are the general deductions which can he made? It serves a useful purpose to make up special patrols from the headquarters platoon personnel whose mission will be to defend the CP at its approaches In addition to this; the fire system must be organized so as to control not only the streets but also the individual blocks. It was necessary to had a reserve of antitank elements. Besides the main CP it was necessary to had in reserve a series of CPs. All this will insure invulnerability of the CP and its uninterrupted activity. On being attacked by the 1st Battalion. the enemy had withdrawn along the highway to the north and northeast. One machine gun and one heavy trench mortar was still firing on Hill No. 50; one light ' gun was firing on the 1st Communist Company out of the region to the west. of Hill No. 50. During the evening hours,

262 air. reconnaissance observed motor vehicles assembled in "U"; there appeared to be tanks, also. Status of the Soviet Infantry Battalion Heavy Weapons: One platoon of heavy infantry guns and one platoon of light antitank cannon was attached to the 1st Battalion. Weather : 37 degrees Fahrenheit; deep mud, poor visibility.

263 Condition of Soviet Battalion. Without sufficient heat for three days; clothing soaked through; estimated exhausted. Ammunition Status: One-third of original allotment still remaining. Activities Required Prior to Such a Battle After a period of thorough training, both of the individual and of the formation, the men must also be trained in night movements and combat in larger formations such as a reinforced battalion. An important point in connection with such exercises was the instilling of confidence in commanders in this type of combat by frequent practice of night exercises, in order that they may be able to forestall panic on the part of the troops if the occasion arises Soviet Rifle Battalion in a Night Attack Preparatory Exercises Required (Model for Training) The action described here was the very kind which will illustrate the characteristic phases of night combat. It may be hest employed as a troop command exercise at the close of the formation exercises. It was not suited for a combat fire exercise The proper representation of the enemy will be difficult in any case. At about 5:30 PM, the regimental commander appears at the battalion command post and gives the following brief order: "Enemy withdrawing along highway toward

264 'D.' No detail known Combat group under U. was pursuing the enemy toward '(1)' and, according to my calculations has now, at 6:00 PM, about reached 'Z.' Reinforced 1st Battalion immediately sets out in frontally directed pursuit and reaches `(1),' advancing on both sides of the highway. Two tanks are being brought to the north entrance of 'A.' I, myself, will be at first be stationed in village 'A.,". The following by the participating commanders: Deliberations; repetition of battalion commander's orders; description of battalion staff organization. It was not known whether the enemy has continued to withdraw beyond Hill No. 50 or has stopped somewhere along the highway) for instance, in the vicinity of Hill No. 70 and outside of "C." It was uncertain at what rate the combat group No. 1.,under U., was advancing. No connection exists with it. It was important to keep hotly after the enemy as long as he was in the notion of attacking. The highway was suitable for employment as a guide in the advance. It was chosen, therefore, to march on the middle line with the battalion. At about 7:15 PM the battalion commander goes to the hill north of "A." He was followed in file by the 3rd Company, one heavy machine-gun platoon and one heavy - trench mortar group The heavy infantry gun platoon and the AT platoon are still stationed on the north edge of "A." The commander was with the battalion. The commanders of the 1st and 2nd Companies are summoned by messenger.

265 The companies, themselves, with their subordinated heavy weapons, assemble in file to the right and left of the highway. A group from each of the two companies (the 1st and 2nd) was sent out 200 yards in advance as security. Shells are still dropping here and there on the western part of the hill north of "A." The sound of motors can be heard to the northeast. It has now become quite dark and a light rain was beginning to fall. The men turn in for the night right where they are. On account of the situation of the enemy and condition of the men, most of the commanders are very dubious as to the wisdom of this night operation The commander of the three tanks which had arrived in the meantime, reports that he was unable to operate effectively at night, and proposes that they remain in "A"

266 and head toward "D" at dawn, in the wake of the battalion. All these doubts must first be dispelled by the definite decision and firm orders of the battalion commander.

267 The form in which the advance was made was shown in sketch No. 2. The dispositions are made during the halt. The troops cannot start till every commander has reported ready. What arrangements are made with the heavy weapons in case of a possible encounter with the enemy? What missions are assigned to the groups preceding the 1st and 2d Companies? The battalion begins the march. It was 7:30 PM. When the rifle troops see and hear the column of heavy weapons coming along behind them with roaring motors, their morale was again improved. Half way over Hill No. 50, there was a short halt. Every one runs up to the highway to see what it was all about. An enemy tank was standing there with its motor still running but its crew was nowhere to be seen. After the men had been cleared off the highway the troops continue their advance. Suddenly a few rifle shots are heard to the left of the highway. The advance group belonging to the 1st Company was firing tracer bullets in the direction of a bush beside the highway. At the same time one of our machine guns begins firing. Shortly afterward the detonation of hand grenades was heard. An enemy gun was taken, its crew shot down.

268 The 1st Company receives the order to pass by to the left of the group of farm buildings and not to search them. After a few hundred yards a halt was made, order reestablished and the disposition, which has just come to an end, reported by each of the commanders at the start. At the same time the commanders make the suggestion that the men now be given at least an hour's rest, since the march over the soft, wet fields with loose equipment has been extremely fatiguing. "Weariness on the part of the men must never be used as an excuse for abandoning pursuit. The commander was justified in demanding what appears impossible. We must be bold and reckless. Every man must give to the limit." Weary and with dragging steps, the battalion starts out again. Almost immediately afterward, a few rifle shots are heard in the area occupied by the 2d Company. The advance continues uninterrupted. Time and again the commanders are forced to give their attention to the disposition to see that it was maintained as originally commanded. Otherwise, the battalion commanders would not know where the various parts were. Suddenly, a few hundred yards ahead, a bright jet of fire was seen. Then the detonations and crackling of exploding infantry ammunition was heard. The enemy has set fire to an ammunition truck. The company commander of the 2d Company, in the light of the flames, sees several groups dash across the highway in the

269 direction of village "B." He was now, with his company, only 200 yards from the village. (Decision of the commander of the 2d Company.) In compliance with orders from the battalion, the 2d Company was brought, in file, to the highway and. as it continues to advance, passes to the left of village "B." A night fight in the village, with heavy losses' and doubtful results, was thereby avoided. As the first houses of "C" begin to come into sight, the two groups proceeding ahead of the 1st and 2d Companies, begin to receive machine-gun and rifle fire along the highway. (Deliberations of the group leaders and their decisions.) It was necessary for the two detachments to deceive the enemy with respect to the real strength of the attacking force, by firing on him from as many positions as possible. It was, therefore, desirable that the detachments be provided with as large a number of machine pistols, automatic rifles and machine guns as possible. The young soldiers of the 1st and 2d Companies estimate the enemy's strength at at least a company. The older heads, however, know that firing at night al. ways sounds more dangerous than it was in reality. SKETCH No. 2.

270 A halt was again made as a result of this contact with the enemy. The commanders of the heavy weapons come up ahead with the battalion commander; the commander of the 3rd Company had been with him all the time. There was also an enemy trench mortar firing along the-highway now. There are, however, no casualties. The two detachments cease their firing. Far in the rear of village "C," a white flare rises. What combat plan was made by the battalion commander? Although unable to see anything, the tanks fire along the highway in the direction of the village. The machine-gun platoon which was following them fires in the same direction in single shots, as if the guns were rifles. The AT platoon The Germans organize antitank defense by utilizing all weapons at hand. It was echeloned in depth. They particularly employ for this purpose their regimental and division guns and all the also fires. Impressed by this fire, the enemy ceases fire immediately. The 1st and 2d Companies take advantage of this to go around on the right and left of village "C," joining forces again on the highway north of "C." The leaders of the two advance detachments, under the fire of the heavy weapons, had continued to advance on their own initiative. They fire a white light signal, then enter the village.

271 The enemy, with a strength of about thirty men, tries to escape on the north side of the village but part of his forces are brought down by the fire of our troops, part of them taken prisoner by the 1st and 2d Companies. So far we had had no casualties. Two machine guns and the trench mortar had fallen into the hands of the battalion. The sound of motors, corning from the direction of "D," increases in intensity. More flare signals rise in the air. Flare signals are also seen to the east. Where was the combat unit under U.? North of "C" a halt was made, the disposition corrected and a new start made. Morale was good; fatigue was soon forgotten. The battalion was descending the hill to the north of "C." After a few hundred yards a flare signal rises from very close at hand. A few paces ahead the 1st and 2d Companies see a confusion of vehicles apparently including-guns and tanks at the bottom of the slope. A moment of quiet follows. What can all this be? Russian voices are then heard and a group of men appears. Company commanders shout, "Forward march! Double quick time!" In between shouts are heard, "Everybody on straight ahead!" The men fight their way ahead with hand grenades, spades, and pistols. A German truck and a tank are standing together. Their crews are shot down as they attempt to crawl under them. Great confusion was brought about in the order

272 of the battalion by the close and wild fighting, but order was a matter of minor importance, just now. All commanders take those men and weapons on ahead that happen to be near them. In the light of the flares new activity was detected in "I)." It was impossible to move the heavy weapons ahead any farther as the highway was blocked by enemy columns. Hence, the rifle companies take up the fire all alone. After a short time, however, it was learned that the supposed enemy was the combat group under U. which had reached "D" a short time before. A little before the 1st and 2d Companies got into action with the enemy column, the 3rd Company, which was back of them, had seized without firing a shot a horse-drawn enemy ammunition train which, all unsuspectingly, had turned onto the highway from a side road and most of whose drivers were asleep. It was 3:00 AM. The battalion's mission has been fulfilled. Casualties: one man slightly wounded by our own fire. The doctrines involved are evident from the description of the engagements.

273 Appendix 1 Soviet Rifle Battalion TO and E, The Rifle Battalion, circa 1941 Battalion Headquarters (4 Officers, 1 man) Signal Platoon (1 Officer, 32 men) Anti Tank Platoon (1 Officer, 17 men) Supply Platoon (1 Officer, 32 men) Medical Detachment (1 Officer, 7 men) Machine Gun Company (4 Officers, 1 Commissar, 90 men) Company HQ (1 Officer, 1 Commissar, 6 men) Three Platoons, each comprised of; 1 Officer, 28 men Mortar Company (4 Officers, 1 Commissar, 47 men) Company HQ (1 Officer, 1 Commissar, 5 men) Three Platoons, each comprised of; 1 Officer, 14 men Three Rifle Companies (5 Officers, 1 Commissar, 171 men) each comprised of; Company HQ (1 Officer, 1 Commissar, 5 men) Medical Detachment, 5 men Machine Gun Platoon, comprised of; Platoon HQ (1Officer, 1 man) Two Squads, each comprised of 5 men Three Rifle Platoons, each comprised of; Platoon HQ (1 Officer, 2 men) Light Mortar Squad (4 men) Four Rifle Squads, each comprised of 11 men Total Strength of 775 all ranks (31 Officers, 5 Commissars and 739 men)

274 The Rifle Battalion, circa 1942 Battalion Headquarters (3 Officers, 1 Commissar) -Signal Platoon (1 Officer, 10 men) -Anti Tank Rifle Platoon (1 Officer, 22 men) -Supply Platoon (1 Officer, 11 men) -Medical Detachment (5 men) Machine Gun Company (5 Officers, 1 Commissar, 52 men) Company HQ (2 Officers, 1 Commissar, 1 man) -Three Platoons, each comprised of; 1 Officer, 17 men Mortar Company (5 Officers, 1 Commissar, 55 men) Company HQ (2 Officers, 1 Commissar, 1 man) -Three Platoons, each comprised of; 1 Officer, 18 men Three Rifle Companies (6 Officers, 1 Commissar, 138 men) each comprised of; Company HQ (2 Officers, 1 Commissar, 7 men) -Medical Detachment, 5 men Mortar Platoon, comprised of; Platoon HQ (1Officer) -Three Squads, each comprised of 3 men Three Rifle Platoons, each comprised of; -Platoon HQ (1 Officer, 3 men) -Four Rifle Squads, each comprised of 9 men Total Strength of 609 all ranks (33 Officers, 6 Commissars and 570 men)

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