Soviet Rifle Regiment/Battalion Tactics

Transcription

1 Soviet Rifle Regiment/Battalion Tactics Fighting at the Micro-Tactical Level WWII Copyright 2011, Breaker McCoy, Editor This book was copyright protected and may not be reproduced in part or whole, or sold, without the express written consent from the author of this book. All Rights Reserved. Table of Contents: 25 Chapters, Appendix Introduction Chapters 1. Soviet Battalion Command from the 1930s 2. Soviet Tactics Prior to Soviet Rifle Platoon 4. Soviet Rifle Battalion and Company 5. Soviet Rifle Regiment and Battalion 6. Soviet Infantry Attack Tactics 7. Red Commander's Battle Place

2 8. Soviet Infantry Tactical Preparations 9. Soviet Assault Regiments and Battalions 10. Soviet Defensive Innovation 11. Soviet Rifle Regiment/Battalion Defenses 12. Defensive Tactics of a Rifle Battalion 13. Soviet Rifle Battalion Firepower (Defense) 14. Soviet Mortars Supporting Rifle Battalions 15. Russian Infiltration Tactics 16. Soviet Tactical Rifle Attack Formations 17. Two Rifle Battalions Attack 18. Battalion Fighting in the Enemy Rear 19. Cooperative Action by Commanders of the 1142d and 176th Rifle Regiments 20. Infantry Combat Training in Wartime 21. Soviet Unit Training in Wartime 22. Soviet Rifle Battalion in the City Fight 23. Units of Fire and Ammunition Reserves 24. Soviet Rifle Battalion Antitank Guns 25. Soviet Rifle Battalion in a Night Attack: Exercise Involving the Reader Appendix: Soviet Rifle Battalion Bibliography

3 Introduction It was possible that we study the giants of military history (who may be born rather than made) and too little the performance of the sergeants, captains, and colonels on whose collective shoulders so much rests.----ltg Walter Ulmer Some national armies, fixated on attrition and micromanagement, think that the battalion commander holds the most important job in the army. To such armies the battalion commander was the vital link between strategic and operational maneuver and tactical execution of plans at the small unit team level. They consider his command to the essence of tactical command. The battalion commander was the closest senior leader to see and fight the battle. He synchronizes decisive combat power at the forward edge of battle if he was deployed with his battalion. (US battalion commanders are frequently so far back behind their battalion that they see only parts of their battalion's combat area and then on maps.) He skillfully employs the dynamics of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership in a unique environment which must withstand the extraordinary stress of combat. Obscure situations, compressed time for decisions which must incorporate risk and initiative, and the psychological weight of personnel and materiel losses dramatically demonstrate that the most essential

4 element of combat power was the competent and confident leadership of the battalion commanders Infantry battalion commanders must be capable of leading their units on battlefields characterized by dispersed formations and independence of action. Successful leadership of battalions in combat operations has always been of some significance. Therefore, the training of infantry battalion commanders for command in combat was of great importance for future combat battalion commanders to turn to military history. The question then becomes: what skills of command of battalions in combat can be learned from a study of selected combat battalion commanders of the past? The nine US Army Rifle Battalion leadership competencies outlined in FM22-100are: (1) Communications; (2) Supervision; (3)and Counseling; (4) Soldier Team Development: (5)Technical and Tactical Proficiency; (6) Decision Making;Planning: (8) Use of Available Systems: and (9)Professional Ethics. However, one of the model was entitled "other" to allow for the identification of a competency which was drawn the course of the study. Red Army battalion commanders were real combat commanders who lived and died with their unit. Few US battalion commanders, in comparison, ever die in

5 combat (since World war I) because they are usually too far behind the lines to be on task or useful. Red Army regimental and battalion commanders were better at their tasks than any other army's battalion commanders except the Germans, Finns and some of the best Romanians. In fact Red army regimental and battalion commanders were trained in methods of combat directly copied from the Germans who actually gave away too many combat secrets to the communists in the 1920s in return for use of secret Soviet training grounds. Because of the high attrition experienced when any army fought the German Wehrmacht, the numbers of dead and wounded Soviet regimental and battalion commanders were always high. That standard condition forced the Red Army to constantly move poorly trained infantry battalion and regimental commanders into the thousands of combat infantry slots always open by dint of heavy casualties within the Red Army in World War II. However, the Red Army copied and even excelled the unique German Army practice of examining current information on recent battles and incorporating those lessons into improved methodology. Other army's such as the inglorious US, British and Canadian (ABC) armies, give great lip service to after action reports but always mismanaged that category. In addition their ABC officers are only

6 slightly literate and totally disinterred in military war fighting. Most such officers are more interested in military politics and so read or practice very little "lessons learned." Of course their innovations are politically oriented and had only negative effects on military performance. For the professional soldier or the soldiers who seeks professionalism there was nothing better to study than the experiences and thinking of the twin exemplars of World War II combat, the German Wehrmact and the Soviet armed forces. This ebook offers totally unique analysis and facts on the very important aspect of conventional warfare carried out by battalion and regimental commanders. (The US Army, in comparison, was so corrupt that they no longer had battalion and regimental commanders.)

7 Chapter 1 Soviet Battalion Command from the 1930s Echoing the ideas and works of Tukhachevskiy and Triandafillov, the 1936 Red Army Provisional Field Regulations emphasized the importance of combinedarms cooperation, rapid maneuver, and commanders' personal initiative to achieve success in future war. The regulations affirmed that infantry in close cooperation with artillery and tanks decides the outcome of battles, and that personal initiative was of the utmost importance, especially when sudden changes occur in the combat situation. These regulations gave the battalion commander considerable responsibility for the control and employment of combined arms. For example, it directed the maneuver battalion commander to take attached tank and artillery commanders on personal reconnaissance prior to battle, and ensure that proper cooperation was maintained between the artillery, the tanks, and the infantry. The commander would receive attached tanks to support his infantry units, and in offensive actions he could even place these tanks under control of his infantry platoon or company commanders. Direct support artillery battalions were also to respond to orders from the infantry battalion commander (sometimes company) whom they supported.

8 While the 1936 Field Regulations spoke of tanks, artillery, and infantry under a battalion commander, the 1942 version addressed only pure battalions, making the line battalion, at least for a time, a mere cog in a developing operational machine. Reviewing accounts of Soviet unit deployments during the Great Patriotic War leaves little wonder why German commanders such as Mellenthin, Manstein, and Guderian clamied to had seen minimal initiative on the part of junior Soviet officers. As early as 1933, Red Army officers had formulated basic concepts of tank and moto-mechanized warfare. At Nomonhan and in the Finnish War, they gained experience in the strengths and weaknesses of armor. The critical importance of small-unit infantry tactics, the necessity of coordination and flexibility in maneuver and fire power, and the methods of artillery-infantry-tank rupture of a powerful fortified position also had been clarified in the Finnish War. However, some serious weaknesses of the Red Army's tactical abilities became apparent during the Russo-Finnish War, where: "[a]t the company/battery and infantry- and artillery-battalion level the lack of proper coordination with other arms was especially marked. The officers simply did not know how to use their forces properly nor did they understand the possibilities of other arms. The infantry was

9 not properly trained for close-in Fighting, nor could it always take proper advantage of artillery support during the offense. " The Finnish War provided excellent experience in winter operations and in the assault of fortified positions. The Red Army of the late 1930s and early 1940s was not yet-up to the task of defending the USSR at the tactical level.

10 Chapter 2 Soviet Tactics Prior to 1942 At the beginning of the Russo-German War, June 1941, the Red Army tactical doctrines, which had developed from a mixture of Western European practice and original thinking, were still largely theoretical and untried. It was true that Red Army leaders had made careful studies of World War I, the Russian and Spanish Civil Wars, and the first year of World War II. But these lessons were not fully digested, even by higher officers. Rapid mobilization between 1937 and 1941 had brought great numbers of inexperienced leaders into service. The tactical modernization of the Red Army had just begun when the Germans invaded the U. S. S. R. In command was concentrated in the infantry staff. although artillery was receiving continually increasing responsibility. The basic operational unit was the powerful infantry division, nearly 18,000 men strong, with two regiments of artillery and a battalion of tanks. Except in the Far East, the corps was the highest organized command structure. Full emphasis upon combat intelligence was not.et evident, although notable beginnings had been made in the development of aerial photo-topography, special maps, and photographic ground reconnaissance; and sound ranging was in an

11 advanced stage. Schemes of maneuver and combat dispositions in the offensive were conventional, featuring a predominance of frontal terrain objectives and deeply echeloned infantry assault forces. Sound defensive doctrines existed. These showed thorough appreciation of the importance of depth, all-around security, successive obstacle systems covered by fire, and the employment of artillery in counter preparation and antitank action. Staff work was detailed and slow, with written orders being employed as low as the regiment. Coordination presented a notable weakness; commanders overstressed personal leadership to the detriment of control. Supporting arms were not fully exploited. Signal planning and techniques especially the employment of radio were deficient. In infantry tactics, the concepts of fire, maneuver, infiltration, and encirclement were beginning to crystallize. Mixed teams of infantry, engineers, and direct-fire artillery for special missions were not yet in evidence. However, rapidly prepared field fortifications, excellent camouflage, and the mass use of specialized snipers were standard practices. Throughout the years prior to World War II, the Red Army concentrated attention on artillery tactics and techniques. By 1941, considerable progress had been made in analyzing artillery capabilities; developing observation and fire

12 direction; employing destruction fire, barrages, and concentrations; and in handling artillery organizations. Four artillery divisions existed. The lack of heavy mortars and of massed mortar fire was an important deficiency. Large-scale employment of armor was still in its infancy, with experimental tank divisions being the most powerful mechanized units. Technical equipment was riot fully developed, while the roles of infantry, engineers, and supporting fire power in armored operations were incompletely understood. In contrast, large horse cavalry units had not been neglected; a powerful cavalry arm, coordinated with artillery and armor, existed at the beginning of the war. When the Germans invaded the USSR in June 1941, inexperienced commanders abounded in the Soviet ranks. Officers, who had recently headed companies and battalions, were now commanding divisions and corps. Is there any wonder why the Soviets had problems with combined-arms warfare at all levels in 1941, when the experienced junior leaders had either already been promoted (often beyond their level of competence), were imprisoned, or were dead? The first phase of the Russo-German War, June to November 1941, was a costly delaying action by the initial protective forces of the U. S. S. R. It revealed the tactical weaknesses of the prewar army; at the same time, new techniques were improvised. Deep obstacle systems justified themselves thoroughly, as did

13 artillery especially in the new role of direct fire. Combat in encirclement and partisan warfare proved effective. Heavy losses of equipment in the early days of the war complicated and hampered the army's combined-arms capabilities. To make better use of their remaining assets, the Soviets quickly disbanded their large rifle and mechanized corps and created smaller armies of rifle brigades and divisions. Some field artillery and anti-air units were withdrawn from rifle divisions and armies, and placed directly under the High Command where they could be allocated depending on the needs of the battlefield. Tank brigades, regiments, and battalions were formed for infantry support and counterattack missions. However, they were often parceled out piecemeal to infantry podrazdeleniye, leaving none for exploitation or counterattack.') In 1941 at the battle of Moscow, the Red Army averaged battalion per KM of front; by the summer of 1942 this had grown to 2-4 battalions per Km and in it was At Kursk and Yassy-Kishinev, some rifle corps even reached 9 battalions per KM. With 8 or 9 battalions operating across one kilometer, it was probably quite difficult for a battalion commander to demonstrate any independent thought or action.

14 However, even the modern US Army, in 2011, has not allowed battalion commanders to employ their initiative since 1950 in spite of their high technology. In fact, the primary use of high technology in the US armed forces was to facilitate US military micro-management with generals managing squads like they did in Vietnam. Yet the US armed forces had always been the first to criticize other armed forces of "allowing no initiative." It s a smoke screen that implies the lie that the US armed forces had allowed command initiative at the tactical level since the 1950s. However, just because one showed no initiative when operating as part of a larger body, there was no reason to assume that given a different set of circumstances a commander would not relish the opportunity to make his own decisions, to control and maneuver his unit independently, and to demonstrate his technical competence. This was precisely what occurred when battalions and brigades became forward detachments for their parent organizations. By November 1941, the mobilized reserves of the U. S. S. R. were ready, and could be thrown in for powerful counterattacks at Tikhvin, Rostov, and Moscow. Between November 1941 and May 1942, the Russians engaged in a winter-spring offensive which ready broke the German lines, but at great cost. The soundness of husbanding reserves for counter operations at the critical time and the

15 effectiveness of infiltrating ski units and large-scale cavalry raids were fully proved. Yet many weaknesses were evident. At Rostov (November 1941), the absence of motorized infantry, self-propelled artillery, and motorized bridging equipment prevented the Red Army from annihilating the encircled German forces. On the Central Front (January April 1942), lack of air cover led to the destruction of the cavalry supply lines and nullified the offensive. At Kharkov (May 1942), inadequate flank protection for the advancing mechanized salient produced disaster. New Soviet Tactical Doctrines While the 1936 Field Regulations spoke of tanks, artillery, and infantry under a battalion commander, the 1942 version addressed only pure battalions, making the line battalion, at least for a time, a mere cog in a developing operational machine. Reviewing accounts of Soviet unit deployments during the Great Patriotic War leaves little wonder why German commanders such as Mellenthin, Manstein, and Guderian claimed to had seen minimal initiative on the part of junior Soviet officers. The High Command of the fled Army studied the reverses of 1941 and 1942 assiduously. By the autumn of 1942, it had assimilated the combat lessons of the

16 war, formulated radically new combat regulations for the arms and the staffs, developed new organizations, and begun mass production of fully modern equipment. As a result of his tactical evaluation. command responsibilities were specifically divided between the commander and staff of combined arms, and the chiefs of arms and services. The Commander became responsible for plans of maneuver and direct control of critical phases of an operation. His staff assumed the function of coordination, while the chiefs of arms and services were charged with detailed planning and control of their particular elements. The army became the basic planning and command group; army group mid even several headquarters coordinated major operations. Uncompromising thoroughness of reconnaissance was required, both by combined and specialized arms. Soviet Tactics Prior To 1942 At the beginning of the Russo-German War, June 1941, the Red Army tactical doctrines, which had developed from a mixture of Western European practice and original thinking, were still largely theoretical and untried. It was true that Red Army leaders had made careful studies of World War I, the Russian and Spanish Civil Wars, and the first year of World War II. As early as 1933, Red Army officers had formulated basic concepts of tank and moto-mechanized warfare. At Nomonhan and in the Finnish War, they

17 gained experience in the strengths and weaknesses of armor. The critical importance of small-unit infantry tactics, the necessity of coordination and flexibility in maneuver and fire power, and the methods of artillery-infantry. tank rupture of a powerful fortified position also had been clarified in the Finnish War. But these lessons were not fully digested, even by higher offi cers. Rapid mobilization between 1937 and 1941 had brought great numbers of inexperienced leaders into service. The tactical modernization of the Red Army had just begun when the Germans invaded the U. S. S. R. In command was concentrated in the in fantry staff. although artillery was receiving con tinually increasing responsibility. The basic Soviet operational unit was the powerful infantry division, nearly 18,000 strong, with two regiments of artillery and a battalion of tanks. Except in the Far East, the corps was the highest organized command structure. Full emphasis upon combat intelligence was not yet evident, although notable beginnings had been made in the development of aerial photography, special maps, and photographic ground reconnaissance; and sound ranging was in an advanced stage. Schemes of maneuver and combat dispositions in the offensive were conventional, featuring a predominance of frontal terrain objectives and deeply echeloned infantry assault forces.

18 Sound defensive doctrines existed. These showed thorough appreciation of the importance of depth, all-around security, successive obstacle systems cov ered by fire, and the employment of artillery in counter preparation and antitank action. Staff work was detailed and slow, with written orders being employed as low as the regiment. Coordination presented a notable weakness; commanders overstressed personal leadership to the detriment of control. Supporting arms were not fully exploited. Signal planning and techniques especially the employment of radio were deficient. In infantry tactics, the concepts of fire, maneuver, infiltration, and encirclement were beginning to crystallize. Mixed teams of infantry, engineers, and direct-fire artillery for special missions were not yet in evidence. However, rapidly prepared field fortifications, excellent camouflage, and the mass use of specialized snipers were standard practices. Throughout the years prior to World War II, the Red Army concentrated attention on artillery tactics and techniques. By 1941, considerable progress had been made in analyzing artillery capabilities; developing observation and fire direction; employing destruction fire, barrages, and concentrations; and in handling artillery organizations. Four artillery divisions existed. The lack of heavy mortars and of massed mortar fire was an important deficiency.

19 Large-scale employment of armor was still in its infancy, with experimental tank divisions being the most powerful mechanized units. Technical equipment was not fully developed, while the roles of infantry, engineers, and supporting fire power in armored operations were incompletely understood. In contrast, large horse cavalry units had not been neglected; a powerful cavalry arm, coordinated with artillery and armor, existed at the beginning of the war. Operation procedures were developed for systematically disseminating intelligence directly to using agencies. New tactical schemes were brought forward: converging double envelopment, parallel pursuit, and centralized and decentralized defense. The major development in staff work was the required employment of precise tables of combat coordination, which assured continuous, systematic cooperation of all arms. Such cooperation was further aided by advances in tactical signal communications, including the formation of special command, staff, cooperation, and other nets. Reserves were committed in concentrated blows to exploit successes. The maneuverability of infantry was now organized and exploited to the utmost; the employment of small, mixed teams with heavy fire power facilitated infiltration, encirclement, and hasty defense. Deep echelon systems were replaced by wide frontal formations which promoted better lateral control and more flexible

20 maneuverability. Artillery became the main striking force of the Red Army. The new concept of the "artillery and air offensive" embodied the responsibility of the artillery to coordinate all supporting fire power and to provide overwhelming fire power in anticipation of infantry requirements. 'lo achieve this goal, large numbers of artillery organizations artillery divisions, mortar divisions, antiaircraft artillery divisions, artillery brigades, etc were formed. Direct fire became a normal function of all types of artillery. In general, artillery was used with great aggressiveness. To implement deep mechanized operations, two basic types of mobile corps were created: the tank corps and the mechanized corps.' The tank corps, operating with infantry, had a high proportion of tanks and great shock power suitable for penetrations. The mechanized corps, with a large motorized infantry component and fewer tanks, was best fitted for exploitation. In addition, some ordinary infantry was motorized for special operations; shuttling by motor increased the mobility of still other units. The cavalry corps, aided by strong armor and artillery, retained a major role in special operations. Engineers operated in immediate conjunction with assault waves, not only breaking gaps through minefields and obstacles, but also providing immediate defense of newly won positions. Balanced, powerful tactical antiaircraft gun units (12.7mm,

21 37mm, and 8.5mm), operating in close coordination with friendly fighter aircraft, helped prevent repetition of earlier disasters from hostile air action. In special operations, the technique of river crossings especially was perfected. Crossings on a wide front, powerful artillery support, use of improvised as well as table-of-organization equipment, and rapid construction of timber bridges were characteristic. Tactical surprises such as underwater bridges were introduced. Defensive and offensive fighting in cities received careful attention. The Soviets clearly realized the importance of detailed reconnaissance, direct-fire artillery, and aggressive and rapid action by infantry well equipped with submachine guns and grenades. Trends After Stalingrad On 22 January 1942 the Stavka ordered that tank brigades and separate tank battalions would not be divided when committed. These units were generally assigned to armies or corps and employed in close connection with infantry, artillery and aviation units. The combined-arms concept remained strong, but because of the limited assets and few capable commanders, the lowest element of combined-arms control, apart from these tanks units, was now placed at the regiment/division level. The Soviets returned some responsibility for combinedarms coordination to the battalion commander. The basic tactics of the present

22 Red Army were formulated in 1942 and were revealed for the first time in the victory of Stalingrad. Following the Stalingrad campaign, modifications of Soviet tactics were governed by the need of destroying deep, bitterly defended German positions, and by the availability of increasing quantities of modern materiel and well trained officers. Consequently, heavy mine-clearing, bridging, and flame-throwing tanks had been introduced; assault engineer-pioneer brigades had been developed; artillery has been reinforced by super-heavy equipment; and mobile corps had been provided with stronger echelons of self-propelled artillery, mortars, and rockets. As a result of these measures, operations even against powerful positions can progress rapidly. At the same time, mobility and flexibility of control had increased. Greater motorization and the use of ducks and amphibious tanks had speeded operations. Partial decentralization of control from army to infantry corps, has facilitated more rapid reactions to unexpected situations. The 1944 Field Regulations further determined that battalions needed "at least 3 hours of daylight for work on the terrain" in preparation for an operation. Since commanders of forward detachments usually took two to three hours to prepare their podrazdeleniye (e.g. forward detachment, another tactic that the US Army has proven incompetent to master), the 1944 Regulations, in effect

23 considered the average Soviet battalion commander nearly as capable as German Captains commanding battalions. By 1944, the junior Soviet offficer had done much to redeem himself for the failures of Even von Mellenthin, once so critical acknowledged large armored and mechanized formations developed into a highly mobile and keenly egded tool, handled by daring and capable commanders. Even the junior officers became remarkably efficient. By 1945, companies and battalions of both close support tanks and artillery were often attached to support individual rifle battalions.

24 Chapter 3 Soviet Rifle Platoon The Soviet army at the outbreak of war was the least mechanized of all the major armies, its soldiers some of the worst equipped with minimal effective training. That said, there are many accounts of these soldiers equaling and in sometimes exceeding the well-equipped and disciplined forces of the Wehrmacht. The Soviet platoon on the eve of the German invasion was organized thus (at least on paper): 1 Platoon commander armed with a pistol 1 NCO armed with a SMG 1 Messenger armed with a rifle 1 NCO armed with a rifle commanded the mortar squad 1 Mortar gunner with a 50mm mortar, he also had a pistol 2 Ammunition bearers for the mortar both armed with rifles The Soviet rifle platoon included four squads each with: 1 Squad leader, an NCO armed with a rifle 2 Soldiers armed with SMGs 6 Soldiers armed with rifles 1 Machine gunner with an LMG, and pistol sidearm 1 Assistant gunner armed with a rifle

25 Variations in Soviet rifle platoons include the following: The 50mm mortar squad was often not present. There were insufficient Light machine guns and not all squads would had their allocations. Sub-machine guns were also in short supply and their full allotment was unlikely to have been present.

26 During most of the post-invasion period, the fourth squad of the platoon did not exist as any thing more than a paper reference. Anti-tank rifles were issued to some units. These were present at the outbreak of the invasion but ammunition was not always at hand. Rifle Platoon Combat Formations In attack a platoon, whether Soviet or German, had a frontage of 100 meters irrespective of whether in Skirmish Line or Rhomboid. In contrast a Russian platoon deployed in a Broad Wedge had a defensive position 250 meters wide by 150 meters deep. The "Defense Sector" of the platoon was 300 meters wide by 250 meters deep, and overlapped those of the neighboring platoons. The platoon was expected have clear fire on a 400 meters wide area in front of the main battle line. Rifle Squad When in (Skirmish) Line the Soviet squad spread out in a ragged line. In attack the Russians kept 6-8 paces (5-7 meters) between men. In defense a Russian squad covered a meters frontage, and a German squad meters. The mid-1942 Soviet Rifle Platoon By mid-1942, infantry platoon organization had somewhat coalesced into the following pattern, with the squads reduced to 9 men:

27 1 Platoon commander armed with a pistol 1 NCO armed with an SMG 1 or 2 Sniper/Messengers armed with a rifle The platoon would had four squads each with: 1 Squad leader, an NCO armed with a rifle 6 Soldiers armed with rifles/smg still predominantly rifles, but distribution varied widely 1 Machine gunner with an LMG, with a pistol sidearm 1 Assistant gunner armed with a rifle

28 By the end of 1942 two additional LMG would had been available to the platoon. Again, it was a moot point as to how often the fourth squad actually existed as anything but a paper reference. More changes were forced on the platoon structure as the Soviet infantry continued to suffer staggering casualties into 1943 and The fourth squad ceased to exist even on paper and the platoon s squads increase to 11 men (at least in organizational documentation). Platoon leaders and sniper/messengers ceased to exist, leaving only the platoon commander as the platoon HQ. It appears that some platoons were allocated a couple of sniper rifles, and presumably the better marksmen amongst the riflemen were equipped with these.

29 By 1943, infantry regiments had established SMG companies and it was uncertain how SMGs were distributed within rifle platoons. All we are sure of was that there was a significant rise in the numbers of these weapons available to all infantry units. As in all armies of the period, the rifle was the main weapon of the infantry. For the Soviet forces this was the Mosin-Nagant rifle. This rifle was an

30 unremarkable weapon with no features that stand out. However, it was reliable, and the modernized version that appeared in 1930 was easier to manufacture and remained in service throughout the war. The Soviets also had available the SVT38/40 semi-automatic rifles. These rifles used a gas release system during firing to eject the spent cartridge, thus greatly increasing the rate of fire. The main problem with these rifles was the considerable recoil and muzzle blast. It was, however, a popular weapon and issued mainly to NCO and individual soldiers who had undergone additional training. Captured SVT40s led the Germans to develop their Gewehr 43 rifle, copying the semi-automatic mechanism of the SVT40. The standard Soviet pistol of WW2 was the Tokarev TT-33 automatic pistol. This was basically a copy of a Colt-Browning pistol, modified for easier mass

31 production. The Tokarev replaced the aging Nagant revolvers that had been in service for many years, some of which were still in service at the end of the war. The above Soviet propaganda photograph shows an officer waving a TT-33. The sub-machine gun available to the Soviet infantryman at the outbreak of war was the PPD-1934/38. These were never available in sufficient numbers early in the war to make much of an impact and by 1942 were very sparse on the ground as the Germans had overrun the caches of stockpiled weapons during the initial invasion. The Soviets, like the British with their Sten gun and Germans with their MP40, had to had a design that was easy and quick to produce. The design process started in 1940 came up with a weapon that on all counts was superior to the Sten and the MP40. The PPSh-41 was quick and simple to produce; even old rifle barrels

32 were cut down and used in its construction. The weapon begun to appear in 1942 and as the Soviet forces moved on to the offensive it was issued in large numbers. It characterized the Soviet offensive approach well, move quickly and engage at short range en masse, and keep engaging until you had victory. The Soviet light machine gun that saw service throughout the war was the rugged DP 1929, with its distinctive round, flat overhead magazine. It was a typical Soviet weapon: robust and simple to manufacture. Easy to maintain and reliable, it was popular among the troops to which it was issued.

33 The Soviet army never equipped its infantry with an effective anti-tank weapon throughout the entire war. At the start of the war, the only weapon available to the forces that attempted to halt the Blitzkrieg in 1941 was the PTRD- 41 ATR. This woefully inadequate weapon was based on a German WWI design, and although available in numbers during 1941, the ammunition was not. It was not until 1942 that the weapon saw widespread usage, a time when all other powers were discarding such weapons. Only really useful when employed at close ranges against vulnerable areas of a tank, it required nerve, skill and luck to employ successfully. Chapter 4 Soviet Rifle Company and Battalion Red Army Rifle Company 1943 Red Army infantry units were organized along similar lines as infantry of other nations. At the platoon, company, and battalion level, Soviet infantry used nearly

34 the same basic organization as German infantry. Light mortars had been attached at the company level initially, but they fell out of use, because the platoon received sufficient artillery and mortar support from higher echelons. Red Army Rifle Company, 1943 Company Headquarters o Company Commander, Pistol o Senior Sergeant, PPSh SMG o Anti-Tank Rifleman No. 1, PTRD/PTRS Anti-Tank Rifle o Anti-Tank Rifleman No. 2, PPSh SMG o Messenger No. 1, Rifle/Carbine o Messenger No. 2, Rifle/Carbine o Messenger No. 3, Rifle/Carbine Rifle Platoon (30 of all ranks) o Platoon Headquarters Platoon Leader, Pistol Platoon Sergeant, Rifle/Carbine Messenger, Rifle/Carbine o Rifle Section Sergeant, Section Leader, PPSh SMG Corporal, Rifle/Carbine Machine Gunner No. 1, Degtaryev DP LMG Machine Gunner No. 2, Rifle/Carbine Grenadier, Rifle/Carbine, Hand Grenades Riflemen No. 1, Rifle/Carbine Riflemen No. 2, Rifle/Carbine Riflemen No. 3, Rifle/Carbine Riflemen No. 4, Rifle/Carbine o Rifle Section (same as above) o Rifle Section (same as above) Rifle Platoon (1 Pistol, 3 LMG, 3 SMG, 23 Rifles/Carbines, as above) Rifle Platoon (1 Pistol, 3 LMG, 3 SMG, 23 Rifles/Carbines, as above) Machine Gun Platoon (18 of all ranks) o Platoon Headquarters Platoon Commander, Pistol Platoon Sergeant, PPSh Messenger, Rifle/Carbine

35 o Heavy Machine Gun Squad Sergeant, Squad Leader, Rifle/Carbine Machine Gunner No. 1, Pistol Machine Gunner No. 2, Rifle/Carbine Machine Gunner No. 3, Rifle/Carbine Machine Gunner No. 4, Rifle/Carbine Maxim M.1910 HMG o Heavy Machine Gun Squad (1 Pistol, 4 Rifles, 1 Maxim, as above) o Heavy Machine Gun Squad (1 Pistol, 4 Rifles, 1 Maxim, as above) Rifle Company Formations Soviet Rifle companies attacked on a frontage 350 wide, less at night or in woods, but up to 1 kilometer in rugged mountains The defensive sector of a Russian Rifle company was 700 meters wide by 700 meters deep.company defensive sectors were meant to border each other, but in difficult terrain there could be intervals of up to 1,500 meters between. Russian 50 mm mortars were located meters behind the skirmish line, and in mountains all supporting artillery would be meters from the infantry. Soviet Infantry Battalion April 1941 Battalion HQ: 4O, 1 OR 2 Pistols, 1 SMG, 2 rifles/carbines 3 riding horses Signal Platoon: 1O, 8 NCO, 24 OR 1 SMG, 32 rifles 3 carts and 3 draft horses 3 Rifle Companies each of: Company HQ: 1O, 1 Political O, 1 NCO, 4 OR 2 Pistols, 5 rifles/carbines 1 cart and draft horse 3 Rifle Platoon each of:

36 Platoon HQ: 10, 1 NOC, 1 OR 1 Pistol, 1 SMG, 1 Rifle/carbine 4 rifle squads each: 1 NCO, 10 OR 1 pistol, 2 SMG, 8 rifles/carbine, 1 lt MG and 1 mortar squad: 1 NCO, 3 OR I Pistol, 3 rifle/carbine, 1 50mm mortar. and 1 MG Platoon. Platoon HQ: 1 O, 1 OR 1 Pistol, 1 rifle/carbine 4 Mgs 1 cart and 2 draft horses Machine Gun Company Co. HQ: 1 O, 1 Political O, 2 NCO, 4 OR 2 Pistols, 6 rifles/carbines 1 cart, 1 draft horse, 1 riding horse. 3 MG Platoon each: Platoon HQ: 1 O 1 Pistol 4 MG squads each: 1 NCO, 6 OR 2 Pistols, 7 rifles/carbines, 1 med MG 2 carts 4 draft horses Mortar Company Co HQ 1 O, 1 Political O, 1 NCO, 4 OR 2 Pistols, 5 rifles 3 mortar Platoon each: 1 O, 2 NCO, 12 OR 1 Pistol. 1 SMG, 13 rifles/carbines 2 82mm mortars 2 carts, 2 draft horses Antitank Platoon: 1 O, 2 NCO, 15 OR 3 Pistols, 15 rifles/carbines

37 2 45mm AT guns Supply Platoon; Medical Platoon Guards, and other Soviet elite units replaced the Maxim MG with a 12.7 mm or 14.5 mm HMG. NKVD infantry combat units also had access to newer equipment. The D.P. LMG was usually replaced by the tank D.T. LMG, because it was lighter and had a foldable frame butt. Soviet tank LMGs had bipods fitted for dismounted operations. There were only two 76.2 mm M.1912/M.1927 infantry guns attached at the battalion level, and they frequently performed anti-tank duties in addition to their direct support fire role. The battalion also had two 45 mm L.46 M.1938 or two 37 mm L.45 M.1935 anti-tank guns. Motor rifle units did not had a weapons platoons at company level, these supposedly elite tankoviy desant troops relied on fire support from the tanks they

38 rode into battle. Soviet tank riders suffered horrendous casualties from shattering shells if the tank they were on deflected a shot. KV riders are reported to had suffered more than T-34 riders, because the former had better armor and was not as easily penetrated. The individual motor rifle platoons were equipped with a much larger proportion of automatic weapons, a typical squad would consist of nine men with one LMG, five SMG, and only three Rifles. The Importance of Soviet Tactical Level Flag Signals Soviet BT and T-26 tank formations relied exclusively on flag and flare signals, since the vehicles carried no radios The Soviet Army had flag signals detachments consisting of one NCO and three men. These units were stationed at key positions along the front, and they were deployed all the way back to the company command post. The Wehrmacht soon learned to fire smoke shells into Soviet formations to disrupt any communication by flag signals.. In 1943, the issue of SMGs was increased beyond any previous measure. There are several differing accounts of how this was enacted within the Battalions, so these are just a couple of opinions. In each Rifle Company, one Platoon was re-equipped entirely with the SMG. Quite how this affected the Platoon structure was unclear. The SMG Company proper used a ten man Squad, with three Squads

39 serving under a single Officer. There was also room for interpretation on whether the Platoons in the Rifle Companies kept their DP light machine guns for support, as they were not present in the SMG Company at Regiment. Another version suggests only one Squad per platoon was re-armed, and realistically by this time most Platoons would had been operating at most three Squads. It was one area where some authority was delegated to commanders to act as they saw fit for their local conditions. It's interesting to compare this with the Volks Grenadier units described in the German Army section. It's clear where the German inspiration came from. To describe the training and equipment of the average Soviet soldier as rudimentary was an understatement. The new tactic was overwhelming firepower, but deployed at extremely close ranges, matched by extremely high casualties as a result. Staged reductions - during late 1943 and into 1944, the Red Army took the offensive from the Germans. The issue of sub machine guns mentioned above was an indication of their new aggressive spirit. But the losses did not abate. Even a five hundred man Battalion was becoming unrealistic in many areas. Several versions exist of how further reductions were enacted, this was just one of them. They were targeted primarily at Regimental level.

40 Firstly, each Rifle Company lost a full Platoon, no indication of whether it was rifle or SMG armed. This alone would reduce the Battalion to around four hundred men, practically half of its allied counterpart. Secondly, the third Platoon was reinstated, but the Regiment lost its entire third Battalion. Finally, these two Battalions each lost their third Rifle Company, each of which lost their third Platoon. If the support weapons were retained at similar levels, the Battalion would be perhaps 250 to 300 hundred strong all ranks. That was half the level of the Battalion of two years previous. Reduced Strength Rifle Battalions It was normal practice to attempt to retain veteran units in combat. The theory was that they are more valuable, even under strength, than a full strength outfit which has no experience of battle. British, German and American units would therefore normally receive drafts of replacements to make good at least a portion of their losses. The Red Army, however, developed a notably different philosophy. They recognized the need to feed new recruits into existing formations, but they were simply unable to meet demands caused by their astronomical casualty lists. Instead, they simply authorized a series of modified organizational tables. They were triggered when overall Regimental strength fell to a certain level, and regrouped the remaining assets into a tighter formation. As these ceilings became

41 evermore lower, the effects on the Battalion were truly astonishing. Further reductions were borne by Regimental troops. The changes of 1943 The Rifle Battalion was intended to be the final step in the evolutionary process. However in 1943 a series of new challenges and problems arose which required further amendments. It's difficult to be precise about the timing and the order of these changes, so they are covered here in the most logical fashion. Political Officers During 1943 the Communist leadership reviewed the necessity of maintaining a Commissar in every Company level formation. They concluded this was a luxury they could no longer afford, and the Officers were removed, those at Battalion and above presumably remaining in post. In typical Communist fashion though, those involved were retrained - as Rifle Platoon commanders! Reduced strength Battalion In the latter half of 1943, it was becoming apparent that it was a struggle to maintain Battalions at even the slim 600 man strength previously envisioned. A new table of organization was approved for those units which could no longer meet the late 1942 version.

42 Firepower was significantly reduced, with both the Mortar Company and the Machine Gun Company losing their third Platoon, leaving each with six of their respective weapons. In each Rifle Company, the 50mm Mortar was permanently banished, it was simply unable to create the degree of carnage the Red Army was now seeking to inflict. The Company Machine Gun Squad was retained however. The Rifle Platoon was reorganized yet again. This time, it lost its fourth Squad. Platoon HQ was now simply a lone Officer, no Sergeant or runner to aid him. The three Squads were each now eleven men strong, a leader and ten men with just one LMG per Squad. The allocation of sub machine guns was unclear, but perhaps the Squad was reminiscent of that used back in early 1941, with a couple of men carrying the PPsh 41, a two man gun team, six riflemen and a leader. The Battalion would had dropped to around five hundred all ranks. Sub machine gun units During 1942, Rifle Regiments were authorized an independent Company of some 100 men armed entirely with the PPsh 41 sub machine gun. They were used as shock troops, particularly valuable in the street fighting role. Innovation among the Carnage

43 During just under four years of conflict, the Red Army moved from the brink of annihilation to the capture of Berlin. The human cost was immense. German accounts describe numerous human wave assaults delivered with no tactical acumen. The Red Army did grow in its skills throughout the war, those men who survived becoming extremely capable fighters, yet few survived. Preparations improved because soviet artillery suffered much fewer casualties than Soviet infantry and tanks. Dozens of artillery divisions were assembled to pound German positions and swarms of army air force ground assault fighters and bombers were deployed at the tactical level to help the disappearing infantry. Yet underpinning all this was an acceptance of massive casualties. In the final analysis, the Soviet soldier was treated simply as an expendable munitions.

44 Chapter 5 Soviet Rifle Regiment and Battalion The Rifle Regiment The Red Army rifle regiment was an organization which contains the arms and minimum services necessary for the execution of independent combat missions. It has officers and enlisted men. In contrast with officers and enlisted men of the U. S. infantry regiment, it appears small. The difference was due mainly to smaller weapons crews and service elements. The Red Army rifle regiment was stronger than the U. S. infantry regiment in automatic weapons, especially submachine guns, and in medium and heavy mor tars. But it was weaker in regimental artillery and antitank guns fig. 6. Outstanding feature of the organization of the rifle regiment was the submachine gun company of 100 men, all armed with submachine guns. Table of Arms and Equipment Soviet Rifle Regiment

45 With the exception of heavy mortars and signal equipment, which are motorized, all of the regimental weapons and transport are horse drawn. The regiment was free to maneuver in all kinds of weather and terrain. It was not road bound. The regiment was, however, incapable of extended independent combat, because the supply and maintenance capabilities of its organic transport are low. Even moderate casual. ties greatly reduce its effectiveness. The regiment was easily maneuverable. It requires only three 50-car trains for movement by rail. The artillery commander of a rifle regiment has considerable fire power at his disposal. By combining the resources of the battalion artillery and mortars with organic regimental artillery. he can concentrate the fire of 27 medium mortars. 6 heavy mortars, 12 antitank guns, and 4 regimental howitzers. The Guards Rifle Regiment differs from the standard rifle regiment in that it was upgraded in personnel, and made stronger in light and heavy automatic weapons ( fig. 7). It has two submachine gun companies. The machine gun companies of its battalions had 12 heavy machine guns. instead of the 9 in the company of a standard battalion. The antitank rifle platoon of the Guards Rifle Battalion has 16 antitank rifles, as compared with 9 of the standard battalion. Thus. a Guards Rifle Regiment was able to put more men in the forward lines, and was capable of more extended action than was the standard rifle regiment.

46 Guards Rifle Regiment A Soviet Guards Rifle regiment was able to put more veterans on the line who were better armed than regular Soviet Army regiments. They were able to last longer in close combat and had better morale. The Guards Rifle regiment had more light machine guns and two submachine gun companies instead of one Guards Rifle Battalion Regular Rifle Battalion Antitank Rifles 16 9 Machine Gun Companies 12 HMGs 9 HMGs Light Machine Guns Rifle battalion Basic organizational element of the infantry arm was the rifle battalion. It consists of headquarters, three rifle companies. antitank rifle platoon, mortar company, machine gun company, antitank gun platoon, and a medical unit (fig. 81. Its strength was 619 officers and enlisted men. The battalion was the lowest

47 administrative and housekeeping unit of the infantry arm maintaining a kitchen, a repair shop, a medical unit, and a pharmacy for its subordinate units. With its light trans- port. organic supporting mortars. and light artillery, it was well suited for outflanking and infiltrating tactics in any terrain. In comparison with the U. S. infantry battalion, the Red Army rifle battalion was weaker in personnel and weapons, except light automatic weapons and medium mortars. The outstanding feature of the armament of the rifle battalion was its large number of submachine guns. Supply and maintenance capabilities of the rifle battalion are small. For more thus a day of light combat it must be assisted by regimental or divisional services. A rifle battalion can be easily moved. One truck company (100 SIS-5 trucks) can carry a complete battalion with sufficient rations, forage, and ammunition for 7 to 8 days of heavy combat. Rifle Battalion