LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT AND DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Transcription

1 LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT AND DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BY P.P. IZAH (Ph.D, Northwestern) Director Institute for Development Research Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, Nigeria Paper for ECOWAS-P on Security Challenges and Political Instability in West Africa held in Dakar-Senegal from 29 th -31 st October, 2013

2 PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT AND DEMOCRACY West African countries in the last twenty years have undergone democratic transitions resulting in civilian governments. Most countries in the sub-region have accepted the primacy of democracy as the ideal form of government. The countries are undergoing rapid democratization, building democratic institutions, political parties, electoral institutions, civilian governments made up the executive, the legislature and an independent judiciary. Along with these is also a relatively free press, as means for achieving full democracy. Today we can say that most West African countries in their quest to democratize have established governments consisting of the executive the legislature and the judiciary. The forms of government varies from parliamentary system, the presidential system and the French highbred. Since 1991, when democratic transition began in Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America and Asia, political scientists have increasingly paid attention to those institutions which are more likely to lead to the consolidation of democracy in new democracies (Stepan and Skach, 1994:119). One institution that is expected to 2

3 ensure democracy is the legislature. In recent years, scholars have began to look at the role of the legislature in ensuring transparency and accountability. Through its core oversight function, parliament holds the government to account on behalf of the people. Today parliamentary oversight extends to the function of government and the agencies. Only recently the British parliament rejected David Cameron s plan to strike Syria. Similarly, the US congress nearly disgraced President Obama over his intention to strike Syria which was within his powers as president. Today, there is a growing literature on the subject of parliamentary oversight (Lees, 1977, Maffio, 2002) argued that the oversight roles of the legislature has not received its due attention despite the role in consolidating democracy. Oversight functions if properly carried out can be a strong weapon in checking executive tendency towards dictatorship. Before we proceed further let us ask a number of questions. First, what exactly is legislative oversight? Is it necessary for a democratic government? What is the effect of legislative oversight in consolidating democracy in societies in transition? 3

4 The answer to the first question is that legislative function consists of supervision of the implementation of government policies in ministries and departments which the legislature had made laws for. This include visits to ministries and departments to assess the extent to which budgets are being implemented, whether or not they comply with budgetary provisions as approved by the legislature. But in actual fact, oversight is more than just the supervision of what the executive has done, but also include governments legislative proposal. For example, the executive may submit a proposal for a budget, the legislature can amend this budget or even reject it. In this way the legislature can check on the executive and ensure that executive bills actually provide for the interest of the population rather than specific or narrow interests. Even in parliamentary systems where the executive is part of the legislature, the process through which a bill becomes law, (referral to specific committees of parliament, the discussion of the bill within such committees) gives the parliament t or legislature the power to oversee government plans before they are actually enacted. In theory, regardless of whether we view oversight as a kind of ex-post review of government policies and programmes or we view it 4

5 as supervision of government activities that can be performed ex-post ex-ante, it is generally agreed that effective oversight is good for the proper functioning of democratic system. This is so for at least two basic reasons (West and Cooper, 1989); first because the oversight activity can actually improve the quality of policies and programmes initiated by the government, and second as government policies are ratified by the legislative branch, such policies acquire greater legitimacy. The point I am making here is that because the legislative branch includes members of the opposition parties, there is a greater consideration of general public interest in the process of oversight than it is considered at the executive level made up of people from the same political party with the same outlook. The extent to which the vital oversight role can be effective depends on many factors. The first major factor is the constitutional provision for oversight. The second major factor is the competence and personal integrity of the individual legislature. In many of our parliaments, the legislatures themselves may be poorly educated and may not have personal competence to actually scrutinize government activities at the committee level. In the end, oversight activity boils down to collecting money from government agencies and 5

6 departments. And many government ministries are fully aware and simply include such demands as PR in their budgets and do as they wish. Third, technical competence of legislative assistants which are supposed to provide the necessary information to the legislator in the areas of his or her oversight function is often lacking. Although very few studies of legislative oversight have been conducted it is generally agreed that in democratizing societies, often lack of political will and corruption have reduced the significance and potential gains of the oversight function. But where these can be overcome or minimized, there are several tools the legislature can employ to oversee the government and government activities. These include hearing in committees, hearing in plenary assembly, the setting up of adhoc committees, for specific oversight activities, parliamentary questions and question time (Maffio 2002, Pennings, 2000). Many studies have observed that the presence of oversight tools are necessary but not sufficient condition for effective oversight. Effective oversight depends not only on the availability of tools, but, depends also on additional conditions. Effective oversight may depend on the specific oversight powers given to the parliament (constitutional 6

7 provisions) whether parliament can modify legislation, whether adequate information is provided (Loewenberg and Patterson, 1979) and the role of individual legislature (Rockman, 1984). What then is the impact of legislative oversight? Does oversight actually affect the functioning of the political system? The answer to this is not straight-forward. Despite allegations of corruption levelled against committee oversight function, it has proved useful and strengthened the belief in democracy. In Nigeria for example, oversight function in key areas of government departments e.g. petroleum has revealed widespread abuse of the subsidy programme although the committee s report has not fully been implemented, government had to provide a moré transparent payment to oil marketers. There are a number of cases in which the executive had to respond and change its policies based on recommendations of the legislature after exercising ex-post oversights. The potential benefit of a proper oversight function to the political system has encouraged international organization to strengthen the legislature as means of enhancing democracy in developing countries. 7

8 Although not many studies are available, if the negative aspects of the oversight function can be minimized, oversight can keep the executive in check and prevent the tendency towards dictatorship especially in presidential system. As of now, whether or not oversight function does make a difference, the jury is still out. But we can argue that as the oversight potential increases it will become easier to scrutinize and control government and its activities and since controlling the government is a key component of democratic government, the more a government is subject to potential control, the more likely it is for the political system to be democratic. In other words oversight potential is a cause of and not a consequence of democratic quality and I dare conclude that if we really want to democratize we must strengthen the legislature by providing the necessary capacity and frameworks to provide effective check on the executive branch which easily drifts into group think. 8

9 REFERENCES Aberback (1979). Changes in Congressional Oversight. American Behavioural Sciences. Loewenberg, G. and Patterson S.C. (1979). Some Social Requisites of Democracy. Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. APSR. Pelizzo, R. and Stapenhurst, R. (2004). Legislatures and Oversight: A Note in Quadernidi Scienza Politica. Rockman B.A. (1984). Legislature-Executive Relations and Legislative Oversight:. Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 9 No. 3. 9