National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events University of Southern California Los Angeles, California

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1 National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events University of Southern California Los Angeles, California Using Risk Assessment, Economic Assessment, and Risk Management to Improve Preparedness for Terrorist Attacks and Natural Disasters: A Methodology for a Qualitative Assessment of Target Capabilities of the Department of Homeland Security Mayank Mohan and Detlof von Winterfeldt International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) Laxenburg, Austria PARTNERS University of Southern California (Lead) International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) RAND Corporation Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania "This work was supported by the National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) at the University of Southern California under Purchase Order No to IIASA. This document was prepared under a cooperative agreement from FEMA 's National Preparedness Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Points of view or opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate or the U.S. Department of Homeland Security." FEMA Grant No GA-T8-K004 Department of Homeland Security June 30, McClintock Avenue, RTH 314 ~ Los Angeles, CA ~ (213) ~

2 Executive Summary Methodology for Qualitative Assessment of Target Capabilities This report describes the methodology for conducting a qualitative assessment of capabilities for prevention, protection, response and recovery described in the Department of Homeland Securities Target Capabilities List (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007). This methodology was applied to assess 37 target capabilities against a terrorist attack using an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). The description of the progression of an IED attack was based on the National Planning Scenario 12 (NPS). In particular, we used the IED attack tree (DFI Government Services, 2006a and b) as a basis of our qualitative model. We thus relied on and built on two significant and existing pieces of prior work by the DHS, which helped us to maintain continuity of work and maintain conformity of language and presentation. The National Planning Scenario-12 and the associated attack tree describe in great detail and depth the activities that terrorists would have to undertake for successful execution of an IED based attack. From this attack tree, we identified the critical tasks of the terrorists possible activities associated with an IED attack, the events that influence these activities, and the consequences of a successful attack. Using the information from this review, we developed the influence diagram (Clemen and Reilly, 1996) shown in Figure 1, which presents the critical components of a terrorist attack and how they influence each other. The influence diagram is a compact description of an attack tree. It describes only the nodes that are included in an attack tree, but not the alternative attack modes or events emanating from these nodes. Put another way, an attack tree is an expanded version of an influence diagram. This one-to-one mapping of trees and influence diagrams is well known in decision analysis, where influence diagrams, event trees, and decision trees are often used as alternative ways of mapping sequences of actions and events. In fact, the software used to create the influence diagrams in this report allows conversion to an event or decision tree and the subsequent quantitative cost-risk-benefit analysis. Thus, the qualitative influence diagram is in fact a first step to the quantitative decision analysis. Figure 1: IED Attack and Consequences Critical Components 2

3 The influence diagram of Figure 1 does not include any interventions by the United States government agencies, using existing or new capabilities. The second step in our qualitative assessment methodology was to create an overlay of each capability in the TCL to describe how a target capability influences certain terrorist activities. The key idea here is that a capability influences a terrorist action or event by reducing the threat, vulnerability, or consequences represented by a given node in the influence diagram. These relationships are represented as additional influence arcs in the influence diagram (see, for example, Figure 2.) To highlight that a node of the terrorist attack tree is influenced by a capability, we have changed this node to a diamond. For example the target capability labeled CBRNE detection affects the terrorists ability to obtain IED components and the terrorists decision to conduct an attack. We developed the capability overlays for all relevant TCL Capabilities (Common Mission Area, Prevent Mission Area, Protect Mission Area, Respond Mission Area and Recover Mission Area). (See figures 2-30 for overlays of Capabilities on IED Attack Critical Tasks). The influence diagram and the capabilities overlays are in itself useful outputs of the qualitative analysis. First, they provide a compact description of attack trees, which are often unwieldy in their expanded form (e.g., Figure 1 is still quite readable, compared to a printed version of the full IED attack tree). Second, they provide an indication of which parts of a terrorist attack are influenced by a given capability. For example, figures 2-30 thus give an indication of the breadth and possible importance of capabilities for interfering with a terrorist attack and/or reducing its consequences. These influence diagrams may also help identifying new capabilities that can interfere with terrorist activities or reduce their consequences but that are not currently addressed by existing target capabilities. While we developed the influence diagrams represented in Figures 1-30 using the NPS-12 scenario attack tree, the TCL for IEDs and our own judgments, we believe that the results are quite reproducible. To make a further step towards a quantitative analysis and to identify high-priority target capabilities for further analysis, we conducted a very simple judgmental scoring exercise to rate target capabilities in terms of their effectiveness and their costs. This part of the analysis is merely illustrative, since it is based on the two authors judgments only. Validation using DHS staff and intelligence analysts would be needed before this methodology can be applied in the field more broadly. Effectiveness was scored on thirteen criteria related to the degree to which the 37 capabilities are likely to reduce a threat, vulnerability or consequence of a terrorist attack. Effectiveness of a capability on each criterion was scored by us as shown in the spreadsheet screenshot of Figure 31. For each effectiveness criterion we made a qualitative judgment of whether the capability s effectiveness is high, medium, low, or not applicable. We used the influence diagrams in Figures 2-30 to guide this judgment. In addition, we scored the costs of the 37 capabilities on a three point high-to-low scale (high indicating high cost) in terms of 1. Social costs (e.g., intrusion of privacy, creation of inconveniences) 2. Investment cost (i.e., capital outlays) 3. Operations cost (i.e., annual costs for operation and maintenance) 4. Implementation time (i.e., years to implementation) 3

4 We also created aggregate effectiveness and cost scores based on a weighting of low, medium, and high costs and effectiveness as described at the end of this report. Finally, we calculated an indicator of cost-effectiveness by dividing the effectiveness score by the cost score thus providing a preliminary ranking of target capabilities. At this point it is important to caution that our judgments of cost and effectiveness as well as the scoring model are very tentative. They were completed in this study to demonstrate the methodology, not to suggest priorities or recommend policies. To improve and validate these judgments a major exercise involving DHS scientists and staff as well as members from the intelligence community would need to be conducted. With this caution in mind, our own judgments lead to the conclusion that the following five capabilities score highly in terms of cost-effectiveness: 1. Counter Terror Investigation and Law Enforcement 2. Intelligence Analysis and Production 3. CBRNE Detection 4. Critical Infrastructure Protection 5. Responder Safety and Health A detailed description of the influence diagrams and the scoring procedure is provided below. From the influence diagram of Figure 1, it is clear that there are certain critical components in the terrorists chain of activities. These critical components are: 1. Effective Decision Making a. Leadership b. Clear goals and objectives c. Resources d. Perception of sufficient damage Any US capability that interferes with any of the four elements will affect terrorists decision to carry out an IED attack. 2. Ability to collect primary resources a. Financial resources b. Operation s personnel c. Documents d. Information To obtain each of these resources, the terrorists could rely on more than one method. For example financial resources could be obtained through personal funds of the terrorists or through an illegal means such as money laundering. Given the range of possibilities, it may be difficult to effectively reduce the ability to collect resources. 3. Physical Access to target sites a. Obtain necessary information about security procedures at the site b. Explore possibility of finding blind spots in security possible sympathizer, not all entry points are well protected c. Avoid detection of the IED device 4

5 d. Pass check points without interdiction Methodology for Qualitative Assessment of Target Capabilities Physical access thus, for most part, relies on the terrorists ability to understand the features of the security measures at the checkpoints and possessing necessary documents. 4. Develop IED capability a. Skills for IED development b. Obtain components c. Obtain facility to develop IED d. Transport components to facility e. Successful testing As in the case of primary resources, each element for developing an IED could be achieved by one or combination of means. And given the possible permutations to successfully develop an IED, it may seem difficult to counter IED development. However, the difference here is that IED development requires certain key items such as explosive materials. Focusing attention on sale and movement of explosive materials thus may be an effective way of countering an IED attack. 5. Successfully detonate device a. Have a thoroughly tested device b. Possess personnel with suitable mindset to carry out the detonation c. Smuggle the device to detonation site d. Locate suitable location within the site to place the device e. If the device is remotely detonated, have a well tested remote detonation device These critical tasks are drawn from the National Planning Scenario. In addition to these tasks, we added the consequences of an IED attack. 6. Direct Human Injury. These are human injuries resulting directly from the IED explosion. Once an IED is detonated much can be done to reduce the magnitude of human injury. These steps are identified as: a. Provide immediate and effective care to survivors b. Search for and rescue possible survivors c. Provide necessary short term and long term medical care 7. Indirect Human Injury. These injuries do not arise directly from the detonation. Steps to reduce such injuries may be: a. Determine and eliminate any environmental or ecological threat from the detonation b. Control access to the detonation site c. Reduce psychological impacts 8. Direct Economic Loss. This is the loss arising from the detonation: a. Structural Damage b. Costs of conducting response and recovery efforts 9. Indirect Economic Loss. These losses occur after the detonation and include both short term and long term losses: a. Business disruption at detonation site 5

6 b. Economic impact on area affected (e.g., less tourists) c. Economic impacts on the nation The next steps in the overall methodology are to map the DHS capabilities on the IED attack influence diagram to determine interfaces and potential impact on risks of such an attack, and then conduct an assessment of the effects and cost of these capabilities. These steps are discussed in the main body of the report below. A spreadsheet to help in the assessment has been developed to aid in the quantification step, and is available as part of this report. 6

7 Mapping DHS Capabilities on the IED Influence Diagram To understand the objectives of a capability, its interaction with other capabilities, potential elements and its costs we relied on the descriptions in the target capabilities list in the DHS Target Capabilities List (DHS 2007). 1. Common Mission Area Capabilities a. Planning: Planning supports all agencies and it defines the process by which agencies will prioritize, coordinate, manage and support personnel, information, equipment and resources to prevent, protect and mitigate against, respond to and recover from catastrophic events. Mapping is presented in Figure 2. Before and event occurs, to ensure that resources are allocated efficiently through the use of updated and best available information; after an event occurs, redistribution of the resources through defining processes by which involved agencies interact and exchange resources. Planning may not require extensive investments initially. There is a definite periodic component in the costs (personnel salaries, conducting trainings, investments in research and analysis). Planning also may not enforce significant behavioral changes in society. Figure 2: Planning Capability Interaction with IED Attack 7

8 b. Risk Management Risk management is defined by the Government Accountability Office as a continuous process of managing through a series of mitigating actions that permeate an entity s activities the likelihood of an adverse event and its negative impact. Mapping is presented in Figure 3. Timely identification and assessment of risks with the purpose of developing efficient and dynamic protect, prevent and mitigate strategies. Risk Management entails potential initial cost in recruitment and training of personnel. Significant costs in operations and management owing to the dynamic nature of capability. It may be susceptible to some changes in behavior of the society. Figure 3: Risk Management Capability Interaction with IED Attack 8

9 c. Community Preparedness and Participation: The Community Preparedness and Participation capability provides that everyone in America is fully aware, trained and practiced on how to prevent, protect/mitigate, prepare for and respond to all threats and hazards. Mapping presented in Figure 4. Provide mechanisms for efficient community involvement in all mission areas (Prevent, Protect, Respond and Recover). Possibly low initial monetary costs. Periodic costs in training and development. Moderate to high social costs since it may involve a degree of change in society s behavior. Figure 4: Community Preparedness Capability Interaction with IED Attack 9

10 d. Intelligence Information Sharing and Dissemination: The intelligence and information sharing and dissemination capability provides necessary tools to enable efficient prevention, protection, response and recovery activities. It is the multijurisdictional, multi-disciplinary exchange and dissemination of information and intelligence among the Federal, State, local and tribal layers of government. Timely sharing of information and intelligence across organizational/jurisdictional boundaries. Initial costs in establishing mechanisms, centers. Operation costs in update tools and methods. Social costs possibly low. Figure 5: Intelligence Information Sharing and Dissemination Capability Interaction with IED Attack 10

11 2. Prevent Area Capabilities a. Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings: This capability entails the gathering, consolidation and retention of raw data and information from sources to include human sources, observations, technical sources and open materials. Locally gathered information on suspicious activity is gathered and analyzed for credibility or need for action. Initial costs developing mechanisms to gather raw data Operations costs data analysis, update of mechanisms Social costs potentially low Figure 6: Information Gathering and Recognition of Warnings and Indicators Capability Interaction with IED Attack 11

12 b. Intelligence Analysis and Production: Intelligence analysis and production is the merging of data and information for the purpose of analyzing, linking and disseminating timely and actionable intelligence with an emphasis on the larger public safety and homeland security threat picture. This process focuses on the consolidation of analytical products among the intelligence analysis units at the Federal, State, local and tribal levels for tactical, operational and strategic use. Timely production of intelligence products for use in Prevent, Protect, Respond and Recover operations. Initial: Setting up facility and resources Operations: Update of facilities, mechanisms Social: Possibly low Figure 7: Intelligence Analysis and Production Capability Interaction with IED Attack 12

13 c. Counter-Terror Investigation and Law Enforcement: Counter-Terror Investigation and Law Enforcement is the capability that includes the broad range of activities undertaken by law enforcement and related entities to detect, examine, probe, investigate and conduct operations related to potential terrorist activities. Current and emerging investigative techniques are used with an emphasis on training, legal frameworks, recognition of indicators and warnings, source development, interdiction and related issues specific to antiterrorism activities. Suspects involved in criminal activities related to homeland security are successfully deterred, detected, disrupted, investigated and apprehended. Initial: Technology and methods Operations: Use and Update Social: Arguably Medium to High Figure 8: Counter Terror Investigation and Law Enforcement Capability Interaction with IED Attack 13

14 d. CBRNE Detection: Provides the ability to detect CBRNE materials at points of manufacture, transport and use. Includes detection of CBRNE material through area monitoring but not through their effects on humans or animals. It also includes development and adoption of technology. CBRNE materials are rapidly detected and characterized at critical locations. Initial: Arguably moderate to high Operations: Operations costs would mirror initial costs Social costs: Possibly moderate Figure 9: CBRNE Detection Capability Interaction with IED Attack 14

15 3. Prevent Area Capabilities a. Critical Infrastructure Protection: The Critical Infrastructure Protection capability enables public and private entities to identify, assess, prioritize and protect critical infrastructure and key resources so they can detect, prevent, deter, devalue and mitigate deliberate efforts to destroy, incapacitate or exploit critical infrastructure and key resources. Reduce risks to critical infrastructure through combination of prioritization, assessment and identification programs. Initial: Possibly medium high Operations: Medium high Social: Medium high Figure 10: Critical Infrastructure Protection Capability Interaction with IED Attack 15

16 4. Respond Mission Area a. Onsite Incident Management Onsite Incident Management is the capability to effectively direct and control incident activities by using the Incident Command System (ICS) consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Effective and efficient management of an incident through the Incident Command System (ICS) Initial costs developing plan, recruiting personnel. Operations costs Training, plan update. Social costs possibly none Figure 11: Onsite Incident Management Capability Interaction with IED Attack 16

17 b. Emergency Operations Center Management: Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Management is the capability to provide multi-agency coordination for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. To provide effective coordination between agencies during an event Initial costs involve development of plan and systems, operations and maintenance costs would consist of training and costs to update systems and plans. Social costs are potentially low. Figure 12: Emergency Operations Center Management 17

18 c. Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution: Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution is the capability to identify, inventory, dispatch, mobilize, transport, recover and demobilize and to accurately track and record available human and material critical resources throughout all incident management phases. Critical resources are those necessary to preserve life property, safety and security. Effectively and efficiently move resources between both response and recovery groups. Initial Plan and Systems Development Operations and Maintenance: Plan update, Training Social Costs Possibly None Figure 13: Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Capability Interaction with IED Attack 18

19 d. Volunteer and Donations Management: Volunteer Management and Donations is the capability to effectively coordinate use of volunteers and donations in support of domestic incident management Maximize the augmenting effect of voluntary support on response and recovery operations Initial costs: Plan and systems development Operations and maintenance: Plan update, training Social costs Possibly none Figure 14: Volunteer and Donations Management Capability Interaction with IED Attack 19

20 e. Responder Safety and Health: Responder Safety and Health is the capability that ensures adequate trained and equipped personnel and resources are available at the time of an incident to protect the safety and health of on scene first responders, hospital/medical facility personnel and skilled support personnel through the creation and maintenance of an effective safety and health program. Prevent all injuries to response and recovery personnel Initial Plan and systems development Operations and Maintenance: Plan update, training Social Costs Possibly none Figure 15: Responder Safety and Health Capability Interaction with IED Attack 20

21 f. Emergency Public Safety and Security: Emergency Public Safety and Security Response is the capability to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident or a major event by securing the affected area, including crime /incident scene preservation issues as appropriate, safely diverting the public from hazards, providing security support to other response operations. Protect and assess the incident area, mitigate further public risks by controlling access Initial Plan and systems development Operations and Maintenance: Plan update, training Social Costs Possibly None Figure 16: Emergency Public Safety and Security Capability Interaction with IED Attack 21

22 g. Environmental Health Environmental Health describes the capability to protect the public from environmental hazards and manage the health effects of an environmental health emergency on the public. The capability minimizes human exposure to environmental public health hazards. Rapid identification of environmental public health hazards and protection measures to at risk population Initial Plan and systems development Operations and Maintenance: Plan update, training Social Costs Possibly none Figure 17: Environmental Health Capability Interaction with IED Attack 22

23 h. Explosive Device Response Operations: Explosive Device Response Operations is the capability to coordinate, direct, and conduct improvised explosive device (IED) response after initial alert and notification. Coordinate intelligence fusion and analysis, information collection, and threat recognition, assess the situation and conduct appropriate Render Safe Procedures (RSP). Conduct searches for additional devices and coordinate overall efforts to mitigate chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) threat to the incident site. Threat assessments are conducted, the explosive and/or hazardous devices are rendered safe, and the area is cleared of hazards. Measures are implemented in the following priority order: ensure public safety; safeguard the officers on the scene (including the bomb technician); collect and preserve evidence; protect and preserve public and private property; and restore public services. Initial: Development of plans, mechanisms Operations: Training and update Social: Possibly low Figure 18: Explosive Device Response Operations 23

24 i. Fire Incident Response Support: This capability provides coordination and implementation of fire suppression operations, which include the following tasks: assessing the scene, assigning resources, establishing an incident command system (ICS) consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS), communicating the status of the situation, requesting additional resources, establishing a safe perimeter, evacuating persons in danger, rescuing trapped victims, conducting fire suppression, determining the cause of the fire(s), and ensuring the area is left in a safe condition. This capability further includes support necessary to prepare the community and reduce vulnerabilities in the event of a major event. Dispatch and safe arrival of the initial fire suppression resources occur within jurisdictional response time objectives. The first unit to arrive initiates the Incident Command System (ICS), assesses the incident scene, communicates the situation, and requests appropriate resources including any necessary mutual aid or cross-discipline support. Firefighting activities are conducted safely and fire hazards are contained, controlled, extinguished, and investigated, and the incident is managed in accordance with emergency response plans and procedures. Initial: Development of plans, mechanisms, facilities Operations: Training and update Social: Possibly low Figure 19: Fire Incident Response Support Capability Interaction with IED Attack 24

25 j. Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place Citizen Evacuation and shelter-in-place is the capability to prepare for, ensure communication of and immediately execute the safe and effective sheltering in place of an at risk population. It also includes managed evacuation to safe location in response to a potential or actual dangerous environment. Overall objective: Affected populations are safely sheltered-in-place or evacuated to a safe area Initial Plan and systems development Operations and Maintenance: Plan update, training Social Costs Possibly none Figure 20: Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place Capability Interaction with IED Attack 25

26 k. Search and Rescue Search and Rescue is the capability to coordinate and conduct search and rescue response efforts for all hazards, including searching affected areas for victims and locating, accessing, medically stabilizing and extricating victims from the damaged area. Maximize the number of victims saved in shortest possible time while maintaining rescuer safety Initial Plan and systems development Operations and Maintenance: Plan update, training Social Costs Possibly none Figure 21: Search and Rescue Capability Interaction with IED Capability 26

27 l. Emergency Public Information and Warning: The Emergency Public Information and Warning capability included public information, alert/warning and notification. It involves developing, coordinating, and disseminating information to the public, coordinating officials and incident management and responders across all jurisdictions and disciplines effectively under all hazard conditions. Transmission of coordinated, prompt and useful information to all concerned parties Initial Plan and systems development Operations and Maintenance: Plan update, training Social Costs Possibly None Figure 22: Emergency Public Information and Warning Capability Interaction with IED Capability 27

28 m. Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospitalization Treatment: Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment is the capability to appropriately dispatch emergency medical services (EMS) resources; to provide feasible, suitable, and medically acceptable pre-hospital triage and treatment of patients; to provide transport as well as medical care en-route to an appropriate receiving facility; and to track patients to a treatment facility. Emergency Medical Services (EMS) resources are effectively and appropriately dispatched and provide pre-hospital triage, treatment, transport, tracking of patients, and documentation of care appropriate for the incident, while maintaining the capabilities of the EMS system for continued operations. Initial: Development of plans and mechanisms Operations: Training and update Social costs: Possibly low Figure 23: Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Capability Interaction with IED Attack 28

29 n. Medical Surge: Medical surge is defined as the rapid expansion of the capacity of the existing healthcare system in response to an event that results in increased need of personnel, support functions, physical space and logistical support. Provide expanded healthcare capacity for event without significantly altering capacity for routine healthcare. Initial Plan and systems development, building spare capacity Operations and Maintenance: Plan update, training, maintaining spare capacity Social Costs Possibly none Figure 24: Medical Surge Capability Interaction with IED Attack 29

30 o. Medical Supplies Management and Distribution Medical Supplies Management and Distribution is the capability to procure and maintain pharmaceuticals and medical materials prior to an incident and to transport, distribute and track these materials during an incident. Availability of medical supplies at the event site in a timely manner. Initial Plan and systems development Operations and Maintenance: Plan update, training Social Costs Possibly none Figure 25: Medical Supplies Management and Distribution Capability Interaction with IED Attack 30

31 p. Mass Care: Mass Care is the capability to provide immediate shelter, feeding centers, basic first aid, bulk distribution of needed items and related services to persons affected by a large scale incident. Mass Care is usually provided by Non Government Organizations or local governments. Mass Care services including sheltering, feeding and bulk distribution are rapidly provided for the population and companion animals within the affected areas. Initial Development of plans, mechanisms Operations: Training and update Social costs: Potentially low Figure 26: Mass Care Capability Interaction with IED Attack 31

32 q. Fatality Management: Fatality Management is the capability to effectively perform scene documentation, the complete collection and recovery of the dead, victim s personal effects and items of evidence, decontamination remains. Complete and rapid removal of human remains, decontamination of remains and site. Initial Development of plans and mechanisms Operations: Training and update Social: Possibly low Figure 27: Fatality Management Capability Interaction with IED Attack 32

33 4. Recover Mission Area: a. Structural Damage Assessment: Structural Damage Assessment is the capability to conduct damage and safety assessments of civil, commercial and residential infrastructure and to perform structural inspections and mitigation activities. Accurate situation needs and damage assessments. Initial: Development of plans and mechanisms Operations: Training and update Social: Possibly low Figure 28: Structural Damage Assessment Capability Interaction with IED Attack 33

34 b. Restoration of Lifelines Restoration of Lifelines is the capability to initiate and sustain restoration activities. This includes facilitating the repair/replacement of infrastructure for oil, gas, electric, telecommunications, drinking water, wastewater and transportation services. Lifelines to undertake sustainable response and recovery activities are established. Initial: Development of plans, facilities and mechanisms Operations: Maintenance of infrastructure, update Social: Possibly low Figure 29: Restoration of Lifelines Capability Interaction with IED Attack 34

35 c. Economic and Community Recovery: Economic and Community Recovery is the capability to implement short and long term recovery and mitigation processes after an incident. This will include identifying the extent of damage caused by an incident, conducting thorough post event assessments and determining and providing the support needed for recovery and restoration activities to minimize future loss from a similar event. Economic Impact is estimated with the goal of establishing priorities for recovery; business disruption is minimized and population is provided with appropriate levels of relief with minimal delay. Initial: Development of plans and mechanisms Operations: Update and Training Social: Possibly low Figure 30: Economic and Community Recovery Capability Interaction with IED Attack 35

36 Assessing the Capabilities After mapping the capabilities on the IED Attack diagram, assessing the effectiveness and cost of capabilities was conducted using the following rules and judgments. Effectiveness Scores The Effectiveness Score (ES) of a Capability consists of four components. The first component is the assessment of the Capability against the effectiveness criteria. A Capability is assessed as high, medium or low against each of the effectiveness criteria. The spreadsheet is set up to count the number of high (#HE), medium (#ME) or low (#LE) scores the Capability receives from an expert. These are reported in columns O, P and Q respectively in the spreadsheet labeled Assessment. The second component is the relative importance of a high, medium or low assessment. The expert provides input on the relative significance of a high (whe), medium (wme) or low score (wle). This input is obtained from the expert using slider controls in rows 26 and 27 of the spreadsheet labeled Control & Results. The sum of significance scores (High+ Medium + Low) is set up to be 100. Most capabilities do not operate independently and rely on effective functioning of certain other capabilities. An expert using the spreadsheet is required to input number of other capabilities the Capability being assessed relies upon (#O). This input is obtained in column W of the spreadsheet labeled Assessment. To assist the expert in making this assessment, the influence diagram represents the interaction of the Capability with other capabilities. The fourth and the final component of the Effectiveness Score is % reduction (R) in effectiveness by reliance on single another capability. This input is obtained on the Control & Results sheet using slider controls on row 31. Based on these four components the Effectiveness Score can be calculated as: ES 1 = (#HE*wHE + #ME*wME + #LE*wLE)*(1-R) #O The highest possible score for a Capability is thus 900. (9 (# Effectiveness parameters) x 100 (Weight of a High Assessment) and 0 reliance) 1 To each Effectiveness Score a random number between 0 and 0.01 is added. This random number helps in breaking ties between Capabilities when they are ranked according to Effectiveness Scores. It is for this reason that the list of Top 6 Capabilities is included in the results sheet, since some Capabilities may be very close in their scores. 36

37 Cost Scores The Cost Score (CS) of a Capability also consists of four components. The first component is the assessment of the Capability against the cost criteria. A Capability is assessed as high, medium or low against each of the cost criteria (high meaning high cost). The spreadsheet is set up to count the number of high (#HC), medium (#MC) or low (#LC) scores the Capability receives from an expert. These are reported in columns R, S and T respectively in the spreadsheet labeled Assessment. The second component is the relative importance of a high, medium or low assessment. The expert also provides input on the relative significance of a high (whc), medium (wmc) or low score (wlc). This input is obtained from the expert using slider controls in rows 29 and 30 of the spreadsheet labeled Control & Results. The sum of significance scores (High+ Medium + Low) is setup to be 100. The third component is number of other capabilities the Capability being assessed relies upon (#O). Most capabilities do not operate independently and rely on effective functioning of certain other capabilities. An expert using the spreadsheet is required to input number of other capabilities the Capability being assessed relies upon. This input is obtained in column W of the spreadsheet labeled Assessment. To assist the expert in making this assessment, the influence diagram represents the interaction of the Capability with other capabilities. The fourth and the final component of the Cost Score is % increase (I) in costs by reliance on single additional capability. This input is obtained on the Control & Results sheet using slider controls on row 32. Based on these four components the Effectiveness Score can be calculated as: CS 2 = (#HC*wHC + #MC*wMC + #LC*wLC)/(1+I) #O The highest possible Cost Score of a Capability is thus 400. (4 (# Cost criteria) x 100 (Weight of Low Assessment), 0 reliance) Cost-Effectiveness Score The cost-effectiveness score is the ratio of the effectiveness score divided by the cost score and multiplied by 10. It provides an indication of the overall value of a target capability. 2 To each Cost Score a random number between 0 and 0.01 is added. This random number helps in breaking ties between Capabilities when they are ranked according to Cost Scores. It is for this reason that the list of Top 6 Capabilities is included in the results sheet, since some Capabilities may be very close in their scores. 37

38 References Clemen, R. T., & Reilly, T. (1996). Making Hard Decisions. Belmont, CA: Duxbury (second edition). DFI Government Services Homeland Security Strategy & Policy Group. National Planning Scenarios. Wahsington DC, 2006a. DFI Government Services Homeland Security Strategy & Policy Group. National Planning Scenario 12: Explosives Attack Bombing using Improvised Explosive Devices, version 3. Wahsington DC, 2006b. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Target Capabilities List: A companion to the National Preparedness Guidelines. Washington DC,

39 Figure 31: Qualitative Assessment of Target Capabilities and Aggregate Cost and Effectiveness Scores (Please Refer to Accompanying EXCEL Spreadsheet) 39