If you cant beat them join them

Transcription

1 If you cant beat them join them Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, Schemeil Yves To cite this version: Wolf-Dieter Eberwein, Schemeil Yves. If you cant beat them join them. World International Studies Conference, Aug 2005, Instabul, Turkey. <halshs > HAL Id: halshs Submitted on 9 May 2009 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

2 INTERORGANIZATIONAL IF YOU CAN T BEAT THEM COOPERATION JOIN THEM: wolf.eberwein@iep.upmf.grenoble.fr Schemeil@cidsp.upmf.grenoble.fr Wolf-Dieter Yves and Eberwein Institut F d Etudes Grenoble BP Politiques, 48 Cedex Grenoble Abstract: (First draft Comments are welcome. Not for quotation 9 kind international The ability relations inability theory. of International international organizations cooperation without has candidates long the been authors a for challenged agreement) intergovernmental more the of activity, less autonomous regimes however, organizations and specialized have institutions. long its been agents, focus. The ignored confronted The following problem by scholars, analysis the to more one what hand starts interested extent with with they their in this international the are principals, particular study actually issue functional performance. states, specialization the other with interdependent increasingly complex environment environment. enhances The the latter likelihood is problematic of failure of environment routine autonomy independence coordination from which One the way international states but to and overcome rather substituting organizations inter-organizational the problem some are loss faced induced their cooperation with by individual is the not growing just thereby ad autonomy hoc complexity gaining collaboration with greater of the or as adaptation strategies and collective IGOs have leverage. chosen. As The turns paper out analyses power, expertise greater and detail legitimacy the seem various to determine Paper Istanbul, simultaneously prepared August 24-27, for presentation the choice to at either the cooperate World International or not. Studies Conference,

3 Page 2 Eberwein / Schemeil Introduction: Theoretical issues...9 Why cooperate?...2 and Table the consequences des Matières Adaptation International Mandate Autonomy Strategies Enlargement...21 First?...23 organizations, of IGOs international The Empirical order Investigation...20 and of adaptation...13 complex interdependence Partnership From Influence Weakness vs. and Power...28 Harmonization...26 References Explanations First Cut: and Strategies Interpretations...37 to Strength...30 Table 4.2 A 1: 2: Second UN Two Coordination Political Cut: Why Cultures...45 do Offices of IGOs Adaptation cooperate?...39 and Programs...44 through Cooperation Why the cooperation Introduction: cooperate rather Why cooperate? comprehensive kind, and represent what theoretical than still scope approach compete? a of puzzle their is If available international for collaboration? international explaining actors These intergovernmental choose relations research the theorists. first questions alternative, cooperation Thus concerning what far no is states underdeveloped dominated general, world. issue between area Therefore in the intergovernmental scholarly it comes as literature. no surprise organizations In contrast, that a theory (IGOs) practitioners of cooperation particular in the between is IGO an a

4 Page world topic 3on devote the agenda a lot of that time Cox and energy and Jacobsen to address (1973) it: in call every boundary-decisions. meeting there Eberwein the For / unavoidable Schemeil agents organization s advantage them this issue mandate might or be extensions both a threat of its and own a mandate. promise: Yet either the infringements states do not take the on IGO organisations with. They themselves cooperation seem in prefer order framework to maintain minimize that their international the control. possibilities organizations of joint potentially programs provide by full the The assumptions, (i.e., more study between so, of since cooperation states) line with is rare a the matter between studies rational of available international balancing design display of cost international organizations and a strong utility. institutions tendency If is therefore collaboration to make project. a challenging rational Cooperation payoffs choice task. individuals small argument their utility compared could curve 1 be to applied the they commitments by deliver way of global analogy made, and intergovernmental to public IGOs. goods But how that cooperation could are not one divisible? asses is unlikely. the States shape The and are human cooperation rights, have rather etc. a In stake than contrast in less, the to not states preservation necessarily lagging of behind, because the environment, IGOs they seem are to security, like prefer but more the protection rather interagency as of unavoidable difficulties which expected Whereas is using neither to necessity account public zero economy (as for predicted fulfilling this tools) discrepancy their by but somewhere respective RC desired models in mandates. the of middle2. actual state Rational cooperation behaviour) choice between nor models strong IGOs have exogenous make strong these factor assumptions postulated most RC about barriers analyses the level cooperation of cooperative of support are from endogenously behaviour the electorate determined not fully or the appreciate. selectorate there is also They (as an 1 more and deepening If there flow exclusive an is of one: existing support club according interstate of for stakeholders). cooperation. to a rational choicer, and If They voters enlarging tie Michael want the it rulers to interstate Gilligan member propensity (2004), states interagency no (there contradiction cooperate is cooperation, no trade exists with off the between then ebb (a mathematicians members 2 broader to public cooperation Actually, deliver model. goods and of in it It a in deeper may multilateral nonetheless (such itself states even cooperation). (Schemeil, as be can a forums. coalition. less contributes argued gain polluted 2000). from With that Consequently, to cooperation one air) support exception, should our their as even matter hypothesis such relative if EU: newcomers less this failure than only of one course global their to are point: apportion capacity less public alleviates within cooperative good specific to deliver that ideal convincing or states than secondary world a primary and the strength IGOs founding rational global good, try of

5 Page governments reluctant 4 will comply and support more collaboration; if not, rational Eberwein rulers / Schemeil more trade the cooperative aftermath or even of opposed stance 1989 than as to more it. their Change and authoritarian more on the political part predecessors. of the regimes electorate became This seems is particularly democratic to have taken the adopting will case place be industrialists eventually issues overruled - needing a realm trade this in which old barriers. selectorate LDC s Following leaders (Milner the were fall mostly & of Kubota, the responsive Berlin 2005). wall to the As a tiny present far elite IGOs electorate of local are in a concerned, IGOs mandate. Rational extent from choice the better problem analyses adjusting with are this to firmly each analysis grounded other s is the decisions observed in economic caution because theory of they which states fear accounts to which trespass precludes specialization to their and shortcomings functional differentiation when applied are to the dominant IGO world. strategies Admittedly, of the in firms. economics to Their some their relevant enlarge are characterizes theorists, comparable its operational international market an or ideal share. environment substitutable. economic politics A necessary is consists This order. reduced condition is of According at competitors, to least for the competition in prevention to theory each axiomatic of conducive is of whom that the the belief wants loss goods to stability of to and keep power, neo-realist services which if not maintenance system prominently primarily can on indeed Waltz, or competition, its be enlargement 1979)3. conceptualized market This in conceptualization survival in these to survive and micro-economic market of in such shares. international an terms anarchic International and politics system, competition means organizations the inter-state (i.e. focusing most its governmental principals, economic scarce resources analogy the or nations nongovernmental allowing is only (Cooley valid them as & to long - Ron, do can as so. be 2002). they conceptualized But are For in service reality, these two providers, correspondingly IGOs types are of competing not actors, competitors as agents however, for the of in same their - classical theoretically sense. means Functionally that they are different independent each of each them other is active or complementary in a specific market terms of which 3 production. It is noteworthy that Waltz is primarily interested in major powers, i.e. a maximum of seven nations (historically their the maximum level ever obtained).

6 Page Even 5though it may be naïve to overlook the importance of power Eberwein international / Schemeil (List/Zangl, to states order (Leca, nevertheless 2000). are The also growing preoccupied importance with of the international creation and law4 maintenance is a clear evidence of international politics, well just contribute as international 2004:361-2). to building organizations the International desired, differ and governmental in adapt one fundamental to, the organizations existing way orders5. have firms: been This created is their why goal as states of agents is this organisation s order the at maximization any time. perspective) In addition, of gains but neither also (or power-which the the production producer might of, norms say, be the cars and case nor rules from the defining consumer a purely has sociology international to bother not of as about pollution states traffic International the as jams). well are problems externalities as international created neither by organizations production producer as deal well nor with as the consumption. consumers these externalities directly Resource (i.e. pay depletion for. air pollution In contrast, and air we information, are speaking concepts organizations, here and about justifications one a different could certainly of type their of argue, strategies production. have as to One how sell the to what intervene one they hand, produce. they political, produce But or economic actually to diffusing this say that intervening and/or they social are applying structures agents those specific in structures the of societies construction norms. based and Their on how. of primary expectations order On by the role simultaneously other is about thus hand specific normatively they creating, deliver outcomes. grounded. services specifying, That by consumers they differ behaviour6. from firms The selling normative products foundations on a market of the without economic aiming order changing are taken their for In is granted. IGO risky very failure, strategies often performance enterprise notwithstanding of badly aid because relied understood. results the from the fact structures Development then their that state-of-the-art interference empirical which aid, research for these in scientific example, politics organizations does and knowledge has not societies. been support intervene criticized which this This assessment7. are intervention turned complex being out a to total The and is be a 42003:371) 567 among We No There firm speak number others is would a of long-ongoing the orders of advertise discussion conventions order its debate by product to etc. Ram take among has into (2003) risen a account health economists and from Ovaska hazard the 2000 various which, that (2005). in should 1950 domains thus to far, therefore approximately in has which not not produced specific be bought. 55,000 IGOs any by are definite 2000 active. (List/Zangl, results. See

7 Page deficient. expounds 6In Jessica Eihorn s (2001: 30) words, for example, the World Eberwein Bank absorbs / Schemeil the These intervention destination general the huge does remarks prescriptive not produce point literature to a road the map overall on for development getting problem there. without of knowledge acknowledging constitutive that knowing for and below). logic and Olsen of This action (1998) dilemma which identified may of will any be to be an social ideal more obstacle types or political less of to, logics acute or rather actor of for action inviting (an actors issue (further interagency to as which refined a function we cooperation. by will Risse, of the come 2004:19- specific March back the 22) assumes best are example, the guarantee logic cause-effect of for consequences survival. relationships It assumes and such that logic as for cause-effect of example appropriateness. the relations belief that within The military logic a specific of strength consequences implication more or which less might independently finally lead from to the a war environment. the armament But efforts this logic were can intended lead to to arms prevent. issue races, is area One the unconditionally is the resistance might operate to be change what along and March the thus lines and a lack Olsen prescribed of adaptation8. call the by competency their knowledge trap. and That expertise. the specialists The result for The intervene consequences counterproductive be a cause logic somewhere of of a appropriateness their conflict such activities even as or the its though prolongation unconditional is might based the have. upon actors (see support the The i.e. do assumption Lischer, of not consequences victims have 2003). specific in that a given This it could is knowledge illustrates conflict moral turn or area. out the ethical as second It to may the be to point international achieve such the an made, approach the desirable that order, this should may end. kind be also Nonetheless, of supportive be logic counterproductive which of given cooperation is the constitutive acknowledged due yet to at for the the same lack creation of time complete knowledge it or could maintenance information, also as how lead of this rigid kind of conviction that expressed the imposed its strategy various is stabilisation the best. The programmes. IMF could be a good example of to which 8 What organizations, problematic: As Maslow is they the said, intervene first crucial whether at one their point point but state interventions : if which you or to non-state, have be they a derived hammer, require do are not from designed you knowledge necessarily treat these anything upon preliminary about have premises as a nail the although! complex which remarks? most are environment necessary International of them but are in

8 Page considered 7as knowledge-based institutions. But, as we pointed out, one Eberwein cannot / exclude Schemeil must possibility they need be supplemented that by power pooling with to be knowledge sufficient able to intervene resources. the margin effectively. And of error thirdly, or That failure order is, can the to be mandates succeed reduced. they or Secondly, missions need the nor To precisely command what perceived extent some degree as cooperation satisfying of legitimacy. some between perceived If the agencies agent needs intervening help the intervention solve does these not might three command actually dilemmas? some fail. This support to increase glance, legitimacy cooperation the our of knowledge research their is outcomes. a question. prerequisite base, the We Functional power postulate to both and success specialization the that legitimacy inter-organizational intervention, of interdependent autonomy intervening cooperation of agents. decisions, environment can in At effect first and is enhances goods externalities may There collectively and the services, can likelihood enlarge enhanced. the of their failure protection individually Moreover, performance of one restricted universal can argue whereas power rights, that the and cooperation and joint legitimacy. the production capture between of of organizations global large public cooperation are also three plausible arguments, however, speaking in favour of the minimum scale principals be each opposed other. power to Second, between the potential because IGOs agencies. the empowerment themselves states First pursuing there individually of could IGOs diverging be that the oppose could aims desire result an in to increased different avoid from their infringement organizations dependence cooperating on on would their with of knowledge composite that experience institution rather epistemic in than a and net a capitalist gaining expertise loss. communities If in and the produced legitimacy leading free trade order and organization they world disseminated to will retain disseminating either their in a by gain autonomy. coalition other little its IGOs own of or, And, IGOs what individualistic and third, is their they also larger may possible, the values core fear and through cultural among so, both how anti-globalization and these its economic humanitarian two contradictory organizations NGOs issues and trends and demonstrators. and cooperating are security present. with alliances, Therefore, This the presupposes former agencies we must will identifying with explain loose a their good whether, credentials record causes and of in Before IGOs. positive By going doing and further, so, negative we it is will necessary factors emphasize determining to give primarily our interagency own collaboration, vision cooperation. of interagency cooperation cooperation and coordination among if

9 Page between is 8international organizations. But it is also clear, that the intra-organisational Eberwein / Schemeil Beigbeder research interdependence equally thus crucial (2003a) far from lacking. have the convincingly perspective Our core argument of argued, the process both is straightforward: of dimensions adaptation are of the IGOs. greater need As of Dijkzeul the systematic dimension adapt and complexity within and between societies and states, the greater the level need and achieve increase by coordinating the activities within and between specific functional areas order of given not the only support greater of all coherence, stakeholders, efficiency hence and increase effectiveness, the global but level also of to legitimacy maintain if for not to In for have this excluding a international formal paper, the we mandate NGOs will order ourselves accorded from its the change. discussion them international by is obvious. international intergovernmental In contrast agreement. to organizations. IGOs NGOs the therefore former The reason do have not a to They or the Federation as struggle anti-personal transnational also have to get problems access networks landmines), to as the how the governments confederations to form get of organized, coalitions both or nationally either (such federations as as strong and the consortium internationally (such transnational as for the organizations International banning influence. differs asymmetric: of comparison the Red Cross to IGOs9. and Red Finally, Crescent). the Cooperation relationship and between coordination NGO among and IGOs NGOs of independently In organizations the following NGOs from and we develop them10. firstly are review either problems some patronized of the resulting by main IGOs, shortcomings from subcontractors the functional in study differentiation of of NGOs international or and act is division approaches collaboration of labour that and explain coordination within under and among between what international conditions and organizations; to what end we help strategies then them outline of to adjust the cooperation, different 9 ever analysing growing the complexity various strategies of their environment. that international Secondly, organizations we present have our empirical developed findings either to the cultures enlarge This issue their has area been adressed of competence, by Lindenberg/Bryant to increase (2001). their Difficulties respective arise, legitimacy among others basis because through of different inter- by trends others Baddache, in of particular organizations 2005; the Igalens/Queinnec, establishment from same of family cooperative 2004). such as links Caritas, between MSF NGOs Oxfam. and the One business could also world point (cf. to among new to alternative 10 Young (2000) linkages: has partner, argued that subcontractors the relationship and possibly between adversaries. NGOs and their cooperating partners can lead to various

10 Page organizational findings 9 cooperation or refrain from cooperative activities. Finally, Eberwein will / sum Schemeil 2. Theoretical and point issues so some of the theoretical implications. up our In international his process classical relations organizations of organizing. study has Inis already are Claude representative He produced defines (1964:3) international aspects observes of the organizations; that phase [T]he that process growing as the a world process has complexity is been engaged whereas reached of a structural given time dimension, (Claude, i.e. 1964:4). the various We prefer actors to and understand the way they by international are linked or organization not. The process (IO) in their (2002:193; organizations as turn well, review can that be see in they article understood the also deserve study International Martin/ of more attention international Simmons, specifically organizations as agents relations 1998) because the argue has interactions waxed of that institutions their and the taking agenda-setting waned centrality Simmons place yet, as among of they influence. international and postulate them. Martin In addition international they Law also regimes, organization and play a a and frequent role later, has socializing been stress international least the agents. UN institutions partially system). One of subsumed the (with The problems consequence a strong under is component that is study the that term the of In structural are Nobody the international lost creation out would complexity of and sight. challenge maintenance of the the individual assumption of international organisations that IGOs order. contribute and the To specific realist (or are and interdependencies intended neo-realist to contribute) thinking among core conditions the of issue institutions anarchy. of cooperation Keohane are rooted (1984) primarily in the and interaction among the research states of power following and IGOs and suggested as their (op.cit:195). agents that cooperation under At the to is the Among five type possible analysis dimensions of research other under by scholars of Rittberger specific is institutional assuming Koremenos conditions (1990) market design showing et where failure al. which (2002) states under leading move avoid explored what into short-term the conditions variations specifics establishment interests. cooperation of across the of organizations. A institutions such good is institutions. example facilitated. along That is

11 Page The recently English 10school of international relations (see among others Bull, Wight) Eberwein as well / Schemeil leading normative More recent to the structure the Copenhagen developments, study evolving. of norms school as Simmons and (i.e Buzan the and resulting et Martin al.) postulate institutions (2002: ) an indicative international argue, of take society the increasingly underlying as thereby more advantage legislative particularistic more relevant processes, of interest theories than distributional input dominate, developed legitimacy or in addressing models domestic defining (allowing democratic politics, issue to of build such legitimacy processes. majorities as informational where One could areas output models also where legitimacy add major from becoming (2002:205) borders porous conclude between respectively that international this particular less relations and less area relevant theory of research and (cf. comparative Russett, has furthered 2003). politics Simmons our understanding are increasingly Martin that between Their overview the complex overall governments, of milieu conclusion extant in research: which domestic contrasts institutions despite coalitions, with the operate their one IGOs Dijkzeul growth, by and systematically transnational and international Beigbeder actors examining organizations (2003b:5) the draw relationships have their not of received continue organizations required much by (Dijkzeul stating has theoretical been and that Beigbeder, characterized over and empirical the 2003b:9). last by attention a two continuous They or three over draw lament the decades, the last conclusion that three the more debate that four and rather on decades. better international than study posing They This the question perspective goes clearly why of against international their dysfunctions. authors organizations such as If Barnett Dijkzeul fail and one and Finnemore should Beigbeder ask (1998) are how right who they such look actually a at perspective IGOs function. from is presupposes argument among organizations organizations complements a themselves. sound theoretical and dilemma actors and implies, of empirical interdependence basis that to it start which is from-which replicated the functional within we do division not the have. functional of labour Their What international is 2.1 the International interdependence role of international organizations and how organizations, do and they the adapt consequences what to a changing are the of complex consequences international interdependence environment? of growing

12 Page Dijkzeul postulate 11and Gordenker (2003:315) taking growing international interdependence Eberwein / as Schemeil related into division independent to that four the issues states, particular that second, determine problems the functional their involved activity: differentiation first, study the division of among international of organizations; people organizations and territories third, a given, making and of labour policy among making organizations from execution. and within them, and, finally, the separation of decision the The orders crucial, in differentiation the first introduction. since of observation the functional member Each is differentiation states. fundamental: organization They do is international have equivalent active a life a to of particular organizations the their double own. segment production The are not second of reality. simply effect observation Functional postulated executing This is definitely corresponds true but trivial. to what However, constructivists anything identify but trivial as specific are the constructions consequences of reality. of this statement. as mandate organization states the Whaling to Every further primarily Commission organization economic active limiting in has growth humanitarian a specific itself and welfare, to concept emergencies. whales, or as the Médecins to World its At particular this Bank sans point being Frontières domain it is irrelevant endowed of as activity a with medical such the third define has more mandate less autonomously of a specific organization defined what (as it does. the case of the first two) or whether This referred area parts perspective; the functional of to organization the above. environment differentiation This is dilemma active may in more arises in effect more if less a number automatically less constitutive insulated of conditions from leads are its a to sub-systemic environment the not intervention met: 1. the even functional dilemma successfully, country) even 2. i.e. though the producing mandate is unclear the of expected whether organization results the means (reducing is are such, actually poverty, that adequate; it for has example means 3. the in to organization a particular intervene systemic though has professional These be Successfully reduced the individual means to skills, isolated fighting to problems legitimacy intervene cause-effect the taken HIV/AIDS successfully and together support relationships, pandemic constitute (money, fails the to actually personnel, the underlying implies intervention fulfil much time logic its mandate. dilemma. etc.) of more organizational but than Reality due distributing to can lack design. not of antiretroviral the dynamics drugs. of this How problem complex are has that been relationship analyzed is and greater what detail some by of the the Population consequences Action of

13 Page International Meadows 12Report The Security Demographic (Cincotta et al., 2003). Eberwein Following / Schemeil rather to either that (1999: one of the 1) the problems in intervention is not necessarily is not that a lack people of knowledge, do not know i.e. the uncertainty, leverage Donella indeed use the but lead lack rather to problems of that knowledge everyone in any functionally or is the trying wrong very well-circumscribed conclusions hard to push derived it area. in the from wrong valid direction. knowledge point Thus can but The dynamic Dissecting First, specification third within nonlinear issue the a sector real relates of system world the to problem particular into the which division different of is functional coordination the of functional core labour of sector. among may the sectors problem be The organizations recognized leads international of to uncertainty several and following practiced system follow-up referred is directly as a problems. necessary to complex earlier. from but the simple command, need UN s does reality not Interagency coerce work. is that To compel Steering within give one any the Committee example, other diverse element Minear (IASC) UN family, to (1999:300) in do charge anything. no element of cites the In humanitarian the has other study adequate words, commissioned sector: authority even [T]he if the by sector problem to or coordinate should across occur sectors is at acknowledged, three if none levels: of the within will collective any not organization necessarily actors has take itself11, the place means between either to enforce organizations within it. a given That to the example Turning decision-making same to functional the economic fourth and area, policy and sector and final making between and issue the from Dijkzeul environment). organizations execution and Gordenker refers across to different the (2003) fact functional that raise, whereas the areas separation at (a the good top of in There level concrete Project reduce of the with the action CO2 organization one plans emissions of its which goals: strategic by can the 2012 then reduction decisions to the be executed. levels of are poverty of made, Good by they These 50 examples percent; still are need clearly would or to the be strategic be Kyoto transformed the Millennium Protocol decisions. into translated are in fact are into implemented, several concrete ways programs and, as how finally, to of go action what about the but results in order one are. part to of achieve problem, these goals. another How is how they they are of were to 11 A do January good more so, just example than he a ordered sufficient. little is bit, what the as The person the funds secretary absorption poured in charge general capacity so of easily fundraising of a had big as been never French to reached. stop before. humanitarian any The further fundraiser, organization activities however, as told wanted us. funds In the that to first continue came days

14 Page The environment provisional 13 conclusion to be drawn is that the issue of adaptation of Eberwein IGOs to their / Schemeil internal 2003: interdependence. dimension an area as well of research as the that inter-organisational needs further attention, dimension taking (see into Dijkzeul/Gordenker, account changing poverty ). (equally and The This old linkage reality inference between of international follows terrorism directly life) which has is from only anything been the discovered but assumption a new phenomenon recently. of both growing Thus and the how more which some international and extent states more mitigated and dense international organizations becomes organizations crucial. adjust over We contend are time confronted to that the part growing with of the can number intervention if not of linkages overcome dilemma that but with are 2.2 International through adequate organizations, cooperation international and coordination. order and adaptation to Thus organizations narrow states. clearly far we have is an only underdeveloped raised a whole field set in IR. of issues But before implying going that into the greater study detail of international their principals. As defined down such the domain As they topic such, are of of inquiry. genuine they activity, are International subjects constitutive are formally of international elements governmental as agents of subject international law12. organizations They the authority orders have are creatures a (March/Olson, more of we the have or states, of less the to 1998), and histories reflected Olson created in (1998:968) which changing by states changes political suggest, and designed orders environmental that an and to contribute interconnected institutional conditions to that arrangements. are and end. automatically interdependent The problem If interdependence arises, world unambiguously as produces place) problem health connectedness issue, at area two today for levels: are which present, it clearly first they internally, which is. are Thus, is competent. clearly adapting WHO had the Thirty to case, to the adapt years adaptation requirements internally ago, HIV/AIDS occurs which originating (or the rather was governments not the should a specific public take and perspective as 12 See well by first creating with report the on UNAIDS13. the relevant responsibility environment. The of process international They of internal organizations also need adaptation, to submitted externally however, to the General has in that Assembly to be functional put of into did WHO. UN, 13 Another A/CN.4/532 example would be the inclusion of gender based violence (GBV) in the reproductive health program the by

15 Page divisions health 14may turn out to be obsolete, either because the issue area is defined Eberwein too narrowly / Schemeil environment). IGOs changing have issues) several or because mutually of the not recognition necessarily of critical exclusive linkages options across how issue to areas adapt (health to these (i.e. inherent conditions. As they cannot change the environment as such nor overcome and alternatives Competition work difficulties at implies their social mandate disposal: systems enlargement; competition, as complex collaboration, dynamic systems means cooperation, IGOs imply, agree and they reluctantly coordination. have several alliances cooperation whatever out the joint stand is transaction the programs for, best whereas way costs because to the pool may appropriate resources this be is for the and word each only skills in contributor; way the and non to achieve reduce defence coordination desirable an sector existing collective includes partnership ; threat-what goals, both to (collaboration), Neorealist former, through there and is neonstitutionalist and no joint cooperation, independent ventures theories to since inter-organizational address it diverge relies expected on the cooperation, coalitions public role of good cooperation: against because (cooperation). a according states possible cooperate to harm without balance coalitions negotiating either facilities with or without offered institutions; by international for the fora, latter, as shown states could by not failure collaborate of Vienna to organizations, two prominent multiplied of power authors international mechanism whose at conferences. reputation the end of is In the but order eighteenth little to connected gain some century to further before issue insight, the of international Congress we go back the In his famous Arnold book, Discord Wolfers and (1962) Collaboration, and Kenneth Wolfers Waltz (1979). argues that even though states are of existing arrangements, distrustful which means enemies of that each may are they arise (what promises other, are from they inner-oriented. their of nevertheless a leaders future desire assistance ; to usually But improve set they up call collaborative Wolfers, may relations alliances also 1962: within be the schemes 182). or result the collective cooperating Such of the order collaborative intention to defence group deter meet oriented inner-oriented existing a common threat. (Wolfers, cooperative According external 1962: threat 27). to framework, Wolfers The by EU cooperative is cooperation, whereas a good effort. NATO example using In is of this our limited an case definition, principle collaboration time will determined indefinitely not is take outward- lasting by place. the to

16 role Page What 15 will be feasible collaboration where IGOs are but corporate actors. Eberwein They / Schemeil understatement. The claims of second that coactors states well with established themselves nation-states, scholar do not try that to what we benefit want we may from to revisit call a division partners briefly of is labour use Kenneth a between UN Waltz. sponsored play them He the because extended extent do mechanically not of cooperate this their to IGOs, sort dependency selected of deliberately, because order would by (Waltz: they the some also make international 106). of seek them them Nevertheless to interdependent. (and control structure for Waltz what our because purpose, they This acknowledges depend conclusion they specific display that or could IGOs) even to lessen the easily may if states most appropriate because others structure The through of the behaviour structure IGOs. Like within they states the form anarchic some in interacting IGOs framework. will with rewarded others If this is states so, because states (Waltz, alter they 1979: their fit the 93), behaviour competition competition better than between other organizations, IGOs for survival the latter being independence penalized follows (Waltz: the 106). same path existing among such reason: According they WTO, between Waltz, emulate the states. cooperation World the hegemonic Competition Bank, is the not IMF, states due is therefore to and preferences rational arbitrated WIPO choice. for tend by Cooperation a to the liberal predominate existing economic is structure. automatically for a system. simple as IGOs the brought behaviour cooperation the cooperate sequence about to between of fit by decisions as a international chain precisely which of factors the eventually actors existing which not reach lead structure. ex-ante the states point The phenomenon and where corporate theoretical states but actors (and expectation results therefore to ex-post adjust is IGOs) from their We seem thus with to one another faced with without two contradictory having planned explanations it. of international cooperation. The that first other emulation they authors postulates share assumes limit where in themselves common, it cooperation to power be and to is mechanical as unequally the second, rational issue area whether distributed and of intentional structural security. they among are Only decisions outcome really states if the that in of (Waltz). assumption an states different. organized (Wolfers) The First question tenable world whereas of all, through that is what both the the various about the issue limits areas of cooperation are structured valid. hierarchically Since Keohane with and security Nye on (1977) the top published are their their arguments analysis

17 Page of relates complex 16interdependence that assumption can no longer be upheld. Eberwein A different / Schemeil emulation that rational to the that intentional does not at vs. all mechanical contradict explanation. the notion of If intentional structural determinism behaviour. It is simply equated argument not mechanical! the calculations most powerful order actors to adjust survive14, rationally cooperation to the being existing possibly structure unintended as the result but certainly of means their with For strategies behaviour? distinct option empirical strategies, these And purposes second, two the authors outward the does problem the do and same explicitly the than logic inward boils apply or down directed explicitly to all to the two one. suggest issue related Adaptation areas? in issues: terms Wolfers in first terms of of collaborative suggests of all, the which Wolfers Adaptation occurs, seems occurs when to ignore-when states if a set IGOs they of perceive want actors what a common share one could a outside compatible call threat upgrade or-which normative the common is an outlook. element good. first two Second, protective include action to maintain (i.e. the adaptation collective water their decision power and may move by health). status. two occur against or If Therefore Waltz more a common inner-directed states is power fact or external IGOs correct considerations fashion. to threat, states solve as Whereas this a should IGOs problem notion only be Wolfers can the which collaborate be core had enlarged requires determinant in mind order as joint to a of What minor themselves, Security state is and enlightening IGO collaboration these early cooperation. decisive actors Council thus It seems opposing and its possible Courts, powerful to the theoretical apply ones WTO, endowed the approaches same World logic with Bank, is some to the the and distinction hard relationships possibly power between (the between IMF); UN major with to IGOs less and Accordingly, predicted organizations situation the actors would relying whose be the on behaviour soft more power prominent would (UNESCO, explain IGOs, WHO, whereas most of WMO, the less deviation ILO, influential FAO, from WIPO). IGOs the its one organizations would would be the expect also position will corresponding tend of coactors cooperate processes with a residual states of to adaptation capacity buttress or of enhance influence. where major their As own a consequence international different less preserving 14 In other influent analytical words, whatever IGOs logically levels impact would (individual the intentional they collaborate vs. may structural). and have mechanical with on world the argument prominent affairs. are not states directly for compatible same as they influence, purpose: relate to

18 Page Turning 17to the second point what is paradox is that, history teaches Eberwein us that there / Schemeil either substantive security than cooperation as a prerequisite cooperation with it: IGOs for without or do a cooperate as a specific a threat but threat as to they their do survival15. understood not necessarily There by traditional are consider areas of cooperation notions potential is more in order to upgrade outside their narrow conditions confines of work of the and security increase domain their chances where IGOs of success. cooperate As most simply of of them power Does are based the are this in agents irrelevant. political not mean in of that the their economy On security international principals, the contrary, show issue the organizations that its states? power dominance that international Arguments is relevant are can just be if derived instruments organizations contested. divergent from notions of This principal-agent the try does states to of get not orders where around imply theories, prevail. IGOs that former delegated mandate conditional are a to certain power some amount issue16. extent of The dependent power principal-agent reflected of the latter. relationship their The institutional main is point not design, unidirectional is that i.e. agents the type because have of been their this limited its and range their of endowment. action. The The more more general specific the mandate the of greater an organization is the ability is, the of more organization the The delegation relevance security to of domain authority. define an issue its area In specific highly technical to the salient activities, states areas to is states. that the such more is as to Therefore say specific its weather autonomy. one and limited would telecommunications In expect will addition, the only mandate the limited greater issues can of be insulated can from be political fairly large interests17. simply If, because the organization as Mitrany such has suggested as the various technical UN the be. Funds however Turning characterized incentives, do to it have can performance meaning by rely limited uncertainty, on a that regular resources Cooley IGOs its budget and interests (as (concretely: Ron such NGOs) will (2002:13) as the are a be limited WHO shaped faced argue its budget), with power often that competitive unintentionally in is their enhanced. a market power and is environment, by contractual limited. material If economic relations. 15 argument This, could according be based to their the provisional notion of relative findings, gains would which, however, lead them has to been give contested their survival technologies 17 theoretical 16 See This is definitely discussion far as such well reaching as not the and empirical the Internet consequences the case references grounds. when or mobile new are on this phones. technologies taken. particular See for emerge issue example by where Cooley/Ron the basic discussion strategic (2002:9-18) about decisions the with new political information both and

19 Page the has top 18preference the side effect of suboptimal performance. This Eberwein means that / Schemeil unsatisfactory. involving cultural any interest the funding Performance to withhold and managing of information IGOs of is specific not as does limited projects. to principal contractual IGOs also when respond activities the expected to normative any results the activities agent they are forces also involved that shape the how process organizations of norm see creation, the world dissemination (Barnett/Finnemore, and socialization. 1998:703), One and are could information. fundamental related have well accept issue Yet this of the uncertainty particular argument issue related of suboptimal is to related their specific to performance two different area of activity, and aspects: the on strategy on the the other one to hand withhold level shown, to there organisational are inherent structure. problems In due the to latter the tension case as between Dijkzeul/Gordenker the organization s (2003: strategic ) the be to and some the actual extent people substituted the field, externally the classical by drawing issue in any upon organization. the existing Performance epistemic can is communities. Performance organization the alleged IGOs states lack and more is of is unable internal directly recently NGOs to achieve democracy linked anything. to and legitimacy. demand external IGOs greater are Without transparency. permanently accountability any Ironically, support confronted by nor pointing the with legitimacy adaptation this out issue their no while through cooperation makes them stronger and by the same token reduces transparency as follows enhance from same this statement time the closer this that they some get, IGOs the more might able be to forced confront into cooperation critics they in are. order What of institutions benefit can from now their enable any turn performance collective to them to adaptation discard achievement and to any issue gain responsibility whatever greater IGOs are legitimacy. their faced in contribution the with. current Becoming Barnett woes the and of part outcome. any Finnemore of country, a network (1999) and of to deal We five non-pathological First will extensively use their with arguments, this issue and by expand focusing them the to more pathologies general strategic of international options. organizations. norms pathologies there is irrationality which counterparts. do actually of rationalization, capture only thereby specific meaning cases can that be their contrasted regular Each procedures, with of these considered and to rules be efficient are applied (successful under elections) false premises turn out the to result produce being counterintuitive that means results, generally their an

20 Page issue that treated 19at some length among others by Cortell and Peterson (2001). Eberwein A good / example Schemeil complicating Herzegovina to a are federal free elections state. where rather One the than considered premature would facilitating expect to elections be that a transition necessary actually particular to condition legitimized democracy. pathology for the This to democracy. opponents be was more the But likely of case the they in transition in Bosnia- can highly be of specialized The similar crises rates. second organizations. the The to the IMF alternative pathology first inappropriately pathology is what this as case they applied could call example bureaucratic standardized be two they complementary present: universalism. formula the of handling strategies: budget This strategy cuts of either plus Asian is expansion high more financial interest or less the The routinized. missing organizations third Whether qualifications normalization competence we are and of dealing deviance competences. or cooperating with which a pathology means or coordinating that is open. exceptions It with could other to rather rules organizations be over that time the existing become having of rules Taking governance mandate persons are the or no as World longer dimension the then efficient Bank High in as their Commissioner and adequate programs example and one of was Refugees, are could thus the argue outset the Ogata, result that deviance included of their organisational inclusion given internally its economic of displaced learning; An interesting its programs fourth pathology on the Balkans, what even they though call insulation. that fell outside That means its original that mandate. organization good shuts particular council Single se itself but rather interests. off from a necessity As feedbacks example to shield of the one the environment. organization could take the This off reform from may political not package necessarily pressures submitted be of pathological professionals with its purely 300 or so technical measures to be taken which then became the to the various changing European Act. March/Olsen (1998: 956) talking about the competency trap where EU The final so pathology that get their more is activities what and more Barnet tend efficient and to become Finnemore but loose obsolescent18. out describe of sight as that cultural their contestation. environment They has been see the 18 this example. That as could an Cultural also internal be due contestation division to the irrationality of has the also of organization, rationalization external where or bureaucratic component the UN universalism. which in general is fundamental may be a for good its