POPULIST PARTIES IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Transcription

1 University of Turku Centre for Parliamentary Studies POPULIST PARTIES IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES David Đukanović Turku 2014

2 SUMMARY It is hard to open a newspaper nowadays without being confronted by populism. In relation to the European Parliament elections in May 2014, it is reasonable to write a few words about populist parties in Europe and take a deeper look at their historical backgrounds. The influence of populist parties is growing. They are mobilising the masses who are concerned about the European financial and fiscal crisis, which has created insecurity and doubt about the existing political systems and social organizations. These are usually presented as corrupted and elitist without any sense to listen to the wishes of the common people. The EU is seen as an open window for immigrants who are threatening national cultures and safety. The most important point was balancing the literature; some authors see populists as a threat to democratic states and others describe them as a challenge to the existing political structures and systems. Here, the focus is on relevant, actively participating, populist political parties that are involved in political developments and events in selected countries: France-National Front, Netherlands-Party for Freedom and Socialist Party, United Kingdom-UK Independence Party, Sweden-Sweden Democrats, Finland-The Finns, Denmark-Danish People s Party and Norway-Progress Party. First of all, we must bear in mind that the definitions of populism vary among authors. Accordingly, it is necessary to adjust the concept in a manner that will be useful for understanding the discussion about populist parties in Europe. The next step is to explain the differences among populist parties. Then it will be possible to begin with the core part of the seminar paper where we illustrate the situation in seven European countries. It is interesting to see the role that the EU plays in the links between voters and populist parties and their political agendas. In this seminar paper, we are also trying to answer the question of how the other parties react to the populist party and whether they try to exclude the party or accept it as a legitimate party that represents a challenge to some extent. All in all, the most important and interesting part for everyone is the ability of populist parties to influence decision making. Finally, we offer a comparative view on selected populist parties. 1

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION THE CONCEPT OF POPULISM AND ITS APPLICATION... 4 POPULIST PARTIES AND THE LEFT-RIGHT DIVISION... 5 THE IMPACT OF POPULIST PARTIES POPULIST PARTIES IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES... 8 France THE FRENCH NATIONAL FRONT... 8 Presence on the French political scene... 9 Programme and strategic changes in message over time, voter profile The impact of the FN on French political life and the reaction of the parties Netherlands GEERT WILDERS AND THE PARTY FOR FREEDOM IN THE NETHERLANDS Electorate and supporters Programme and mobilisation strategies Membership and intra-party dynamics THE SOCIALIST PARTY THE DUTCH LEFT-WING POPULIST GROUP Strategies and development of the party Programme and cooperation with other groups Voters and members profile Norway THE PROGRESS PARTY Electoral history and key figures Voter characteristics Cooperation with other parties Programmes, topics and strategies Denmark THE RIGHT-WING POPULIST DANISH PEOPLE S PARTY Electorate Anti-immigration and anti-eu rhetoric, demands for the welfare state Legitimacy and dealing with the Danish People's Party Sweden THE RISE OF THE SWEDEN DEMOCRATS Fertile grounds but still very hard to make a breakthrough Elections and supporters Ideology and programme United Kingdom THE UK INDEPENDENCE PARTY AND THEIR NICHE STRATEGY Programme and supporters Further development and battle for ownership of the EU issue Finland THE FINNS AND THE LARGEST EVER INCREASE IN SUPPORT Programmes and mobilisation strategies Leadership, strategy and cooperation COMPARISON OF POPULIST PARTIES PARTY S CORE ISSUES AND OPPOSITIONAL IMAGE (NON)COOPERATION WITH OTHER PARTIES ELECTORATE AND THE POWER OF SELECTED POPULIST PARTIES REFERENCES

4 1 INTRODUCTION The European financial and fiscal crisis created insecurity and doubt about the existing political systems and social organizations, which are closely connected to existing political and state structures. These concerns are being exploited by nationalistic parties and the virulent media. Prejudices against European neighbours and also against our citizens are increasing: southern Europeans are usually presented as lazy people averse to work and unwilling to reform, northern Europeans as lacking solidarity. These problems are a huge challenge to the pillars of the EU. We must take into consideration the fact that populist rhetoric and the presented programmes are gaining more and more support from the citizens who are dissatisfied (Grabow and Hartleb 2013, 3-4). It is hard to open a newspaper nowadays without being confronted by populism and debate about the rising influence of populist parties. In strictly numerical terms, the influence of populist Members of the European Parliament is highly likely to increase after the elections in May 2014, which would be the logical result in terms of the mistrust that surrounds the EU today (Bertoncini and Kreilinger 2013, 13). In relation to the European Parliament elections in May 2014, it is reasonable to write a few words about populist parties in Europe and take a deeper look at their historical backgrounds. It would be interesting to see the role that the EU plays in the links between voters and populist parties and their political agendas. In this seminar paper, we are also trying to answer the question of how the other parties react to the populist party and whether they try to exclude the party or accept it as a legitimate party that represents a challenge to some extent. All in all, the most important and interesting part for everyone is the ability of populist parties to influence decision making. The seminar paper proceeds as follows. First of all, we must bear in mind that the definitions of populism vary among authors. This relates to the ambiguity about whether populism is seen as a type of discourse that can be expressed by any political actor or an ideological characteristic of an exclusive category of political parties. Accordingly, it is necessary to adjust the concept in a manner that will be useful for understanding the discussion about populist parties in Europe. The next step is explaining the differences among populist parties. Then it will be possible to begin with the core part of the seminar paper where we illustrate the situation in seven European countries (France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 3

5 Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway). Finally, we offer a comparative view on selected parties. 2 THE CONCEPT OF POPULISM AND ITS APPLICATION It is undeniably true that the rise of populism is a clear indicator that democratically elected representatives are not responsive to the requirements of a certain segment of the citizens. On the other hand, it is hard to find a clear definition of the term and understand the conditions under which the concept is used. As Stijn Van Kessel (2014, 101) highlighted, populist speech can be used to various extents and it is unclear when a political party can be classified as an instance of full populism. Moreover, the author also sees difficulties in the classification process; he briefly showed that populist discourse can be added and removed from the repertoire of the political actors. For this reason, the potential group of populist parties can become rather changeable over time. Ben Stanley (2008, 102) noticed four core components of populism: - The existence of two homogeneous units of analysis: the people and the elite. - The antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite. - The idea of popular sovereignty. - The positive valorisation of the people and denigration of the elite. The crucial component of populism as an ideology is to separate society into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the common people versus the corrupt elite. Politics should be an expression of the general will of the people. In populist democracy, nothing is more important than the general will of the people (Mudde 2004, 543). As we mentioned previously, it is unclear to what extent a political actor should use populist expressions to be classified as an instance of full populism. Political parties may use populist terminology to varying degrees (across time) in their speeches intended for voters or in their agendas. However, populism can be a current and temporary core characteristic of political parties and this reality makes it difficult to talk about an exclusive category of populist parties (Van Kessel 2014, 105). The author (Van Kessel 2014, ) offers a solution to this ambiguity, which is based on Satori s idea of the ladder of abstraction. 4

6 Concepts which are positioned higher on the ladder have fewer properties and are applicable to more cases. In other words, they have a low intension and a high extension. Concepts lower on the ladder have a higher intension (i.e. more properties) and a lower extension (i.e. they are applicable to fewer cases). If we follow this idea, then we can see in Figure 2.1 that positioned expressions of a discourse are at the top of the ladder. In this sense, populism is nothing more than a rhetorical strategy that can be used by any political actor. Populism can also be used as a descriptive feature of a particular group of parties. Then it is necessary to take a further step down to the level of populist parties. These parties have populism as a lasting defining feature and do not use populist rhetoric only sporadically or for a short period of time. If we speak about the populist parties in the European context, it makes sense to take one further step down by distinguishing various party families (e.g. neoliberal populism, social populism, populist radical right, etc.). They still have populism as a defining feature and it is still an important core component of these ideological variations. Figure 2.1: Ladder of abstraction of populist manifestations Populist discourse Populist parties Party families with a populist component Source: Van Kessel (2014, 112) POPULIST PARTIES AND THE LEFT-RIGHT DIVISION The first thing that needs to be said is that the political science literature has mainly focused on the success of radical right-wing populist parties, but we must not forget that there has also been a growth of those that are left-wing. In general, there are many obstacles to researching and comparing the left-wing populists, but somewhere they play a significant role in national political arenas. For instance, the Dutch parliament is an ideal case to examine the parliamentary behaviour of two populist parties that are positioned differently on the political spectrum. First of all, let us consider the differences among populist parties. The most important distinction is the relationship between the elite and the people. Who belongs to the elite or the people depends on the orientation of the populist party (Otjes and Louwerse 2013, 2). While anti-immigrant stances are a feature of radical right-wing populism, left-wing populists, on 5

7 the other hand, are concerned with socioeconomic injustice. They often claim that the interests of the common working population are ignored by the political elite. Moreover, the left wants to overcome the key inequalities between people by active state involvement, whereas the right believes the main inequalities between people are natural and outside the purview of the state. Populist radical right parties are imbued by nativism. The idea of nativism is that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ( the nation ). Non-native elements (persons and ideas) represent a kind of threat and danger. The nativist dimension includes a combination of nationalism and xenophobia (Mudde 2007, 22-26). Otjes and Louwerse (2013, 3) underlined differences among surveys on populist parties and emphasized that some of them put left-wing and right-wing populists on opposite sides of the political spectrum, while they are positioned closely together in other studies. A possible explanation could be that voter surveys, manifesto analysis and expert surveys all measure something different. Pre-electoral promises in manifestos are not necessarily the same as perceptions, and it may be that left-wing and right-wing populists share, to a large degree, their electoral rhetoric, but act differently in parliamentary procedures and elsewhere. According to the findings of a study done by Otjes and Louwerse (2013, 16), where they compared the voting behaviour of two populist parties in the Dutch parliament, the voting behaviour of the left-wing populist SP and the right-wing populist PVV was more motivated by the left/right position than their shared populism. It can be said that their populist pillar vanishes after elections. Only on one core populist component, opposition to supranational institutions, was similarity in their voting behaviour found. Taggart (2004, 281) noticed that left-wing Eurosceptics see the EU as an elitist capitalist project not devoted to the efforts of the common working man, while right-wing Eurosceptics see the EU as a challenge to national sovereignty. THE IMPACT OF POPULIST PARTIES I would like to make a few remarks concerning the impact of populist parties. On the one hand, both academia and the media warn of the growing influence of populist radical right parties, but on the other hand, few provide empirical evidence of it. As Mudde (2013, 1) concluded, the effects are largely limited to the broader immigration issue, and even here populist radical right parties are rarely initiators. In the current section, I cite analyses and 6

8 findings from an article written by Cas Mudde, where he challenges statements about the impacts on the people, parties, policies and polities of Western Europe. Populist radical right parties might have affected the position and salience of criminal issues and corruptive elites, Euroscepticism and the immigration issue for some parts of the population, but they have rarely changed more long-term attitudes. According to the Eurobarometer, the public attitudes of many Europeans were already in line with the basic tenets of the populist radical right ideology and parties did not need to change people s minds (Mudde 2013, 6-7). Some academics argue that mainstream parties become more nativist, authoritarian and populist because of competition for electoral success with populist parties. But Alonso and Claro da Fonseca (2012) analysed election manifestos and showed that between 1975 and 2005, almost all mainstream parties increased the salience of immigration and became stricter on the issue. Furthermore, in countries without successful populist radical right parties, the mainstream right will also adopt a strict policy as regards immigration. In general, most parties use populist themes in their political discourse, even in countries without any important populist party (Mudde 2013, 9). What is quite certain is that we can find similar trends in the sphere of policies. The authors noted the limited influence of populist radical right parties within governments and also detected the implementation of legislation on issues like immigration, law and order and integration in countries without such parties in government. To sum up, it is not surprising that populist parties have not affected the type of polity in Western Europe, which means that the populist radical right is not a significant threat to the existing political system (Mudde 2013, 9-10). It is debatable whether populist parties can influence the aforementioned issues. Here are some reasons for the limited impact of populist radical right parties. They just endeavour to bring policy changes on existing issues and not for new ones. It is clear that populist parties gain relatively modest electoral support in parliamentary elections. Few of them are major players but they are promising a lot and implement a small amount of issues. Political parties are not monopolistic players in the process of policy making and populist parties are relatively new actors with a lack of strong connections in the major policy networks. They have no experience in parliamentary actions; their periodic nominal control of policy fields is not enough for real direct influence. And finally, populist parties prefer to keep their 7

9 oppositional image, by using radical rhetoric, rather than being perceived as a part of the corrupt elite (Mudde 2013, 13-14). 3 POPULIST PARTIES IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES In this section, we illustrate the presence of populist parties in the political playground in seven European countries (France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway). The most important point was balancing the literature; some authors see populists as a threat to democratic states and others describe them as a challenge to the existing political structures and systems. Here, the focus is on relevant, actively participating political parties that are involved in political developments and events in selected countries. France This section presents Europe s most well-known populist party: the National Front (Front National, FN), which has a long and rich history. THE FRENCH NATIONAL FRONT The French National Front was founded on 5 th of October 1972 by a small activist group called the New Order (Ordre Nouveau). It had periods of electoral failure and weak popularity, but the most recent French local elections of March 2014 are a very important sign of a successful presence. If we go further back in time, it managed to secure two seats in the National Assembly in the French parliamentary elections of June 2012, while in April its president, Marine Le Pen, achieved the party s best-ever result in a presidential election (17.9% of the vote) (Grabow and Hartleb 2014, 12-13; Willsher 2014). As Magali Balent (2013, 161) highlighted, this longevity shows that the FN is not an anomaly in the French political landscape or even the product of a protest vote in the context of a major economic crisis. Rather, it is the manifestation of a French political tradition that has roots in the perception and formulation of nationalism. They extract the political programme from an open nationalism (demanding openness to other countries so as to perpetuate French influence in the world) and a closed nationalism (advocating withdrawal into oneself as the ultimate condition for national survival). Furthermore, it is no longer a volatile party; their electoral base is well-defined and stable. It consists primarily of male (despite a recent increase in female support), low-skilled and largely working-class people. 8

10 The FN is undeniably part of the far-right family and the most visible political form today is anti-immigrant xenophobia, as well as a constant rejection of elites. The arrival of Marine Le Pen as president of the party means a new era best described by the term dédiabolisation (detoxification), which means the strategy of adopting more measured rhetoric and offering credible proposals with the aim of presenting the FN as a party fit to govern. FN s core themes are more closely linked to the fears relating to globalisation, European integration and mass immigration related to the Islamisation of Europe. These issues formed the basis of the FN s campaign and it is clear that today the party s concerns are more closely related to identity and they are now prioritising cultural issues (Balent 2013, 162; Cross 2012). Presence on the French political scene The history of the FN shows that the party has become a long-term player on the French electoral scene. The party experienced repeated setbacks during the 1970s (the FN won 0.76% of the vote in the 1974 presidential election, 0.3% in the parliamentary elections of 1978 and 0.18% in those of 1981); the 1980s were the years of its political rise. This was confirmed by its breakthrough at the European Parliament elections in June 1984 (where it won 11% of the valid votes and gained 10 MEPs). The 1990s were a decade of consolidation, during which the party continued to win around 10 15% of the vote, but it was also a time of internal divisions with a split in the party in December 1998, due to the departure of the supporters of Bruno Mégret. Despite this division and weak voters support at the European Parliament elections in June 1999 (in which it won just 5.86% of the vote), the party successfully started the new millennium with preserved political credibility by qualifying for the second round of the 2002 presidential election with 16.8% of the vote. It came fourth in the 2007 presidential election (10.44%), and five years later, the party achieved its best-ever result in a presidential election with Marine Le Pen in the first row (17.9% of the vote) (Balent 2013, 163; Grabow and Hartleb 2014; Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000; Ministère de l'intérieur; Willsher 2014; Veugelers 2000). In general, the FN always achieved significant results on the national level, but on the other hand, the number of FN elected representatives has always remained small. The voting system in which candidates are elected on a majority basis reduced the significance of the votes gained and it does not work in the FN s favour. In contrast with the national level situation, it is better represented in municipal councils (20 councillors elected in 2008), regional councils (118 councillors since 2010) and the European Parliament (three seats since 2009), which all use proportional representation systems. As for the National Assembly, 9

11 where one member is elected for each constituency in a two-round contest, the party has only managed to win seats on three occasions: in 1986 (30 MPs), in 1997 (one MP) and in 2012 (two MPs) (Balent 2013, 163; Grabow and Hartleb 2014; Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000; Ministère de l'intérieur; Willsher 2014; Veugelers 2000). Maybe it is the right time to say some more words about the results achieved by the FN in the local elections, which were held in the second half of March In many points, they were different than previous ones. France experienced its lowest turnout in 50 years. Marine Le Pen s populist National Front added ten others to Hénin-Beaumont municipality in a secondround vote from a first-round vote. Although the complete result gave the National Front only 7% of the votes on a national level, it was a historic result for a party. They also secured over 1,200 municipal-council seats. It was a great opportunity to prepare National Front officials for future electoral contests. In this condition, the FN could reach a significant result in the European Parliament elections in May (The Economist 2014a, 31 st of March; RFI 2014, 30 th of March). Programme and strategic changes in message over time, voter profile France s national rebirth and the survival of French identity are the ultimate purposes of FN s political programme. National survival is the cornerstone of the FN s programme. In the 1970s and 1980s, the FN believed that the national identity was threatened by international Communism because of the negation of Western civilisation and European liberties. Ten years later, immigration and identity themes became more important in the context of multiculturalism. The European Union, the US and French leaders were seen as driving forces of globalisation processes. Many enemies were identified, both within the national borders immigrants, the Jews, political elites, the media and beyond international Communism during the Cold War, the US and globalisation since 1990, the European Union, and Islam (Balent 2013, ; Grabow and Hartleb 2014; Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000; Veugelers 2000). Due to such a view of the situation, the FN s political programme is based on three areas. First, the FN wants to restore France s economic and social fortunes by imposing protectionist measures to combat unfair competition and relocations. Second, the FN programme promotes the restoration of the authority of the state and the state apparatus that forms the basis for its sovereignty. They see the state as the authority that can adopt the legislation on immigration in order to reverse the flows of immigrants. Third, the country s 10

12 future is ensured by promoting a pro-birth policy. The FN s vision of the future also involves placing more emphasis on national historical and geographical heritage through selective courses, and preserving national integrity with overseas territories (Balent 2013, ; Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000; Veugelers 2000). There have been significant changes in the message. The previously mentioned identified enemies were the platform for the FN s rhetoric and programme. In the early 1990s, the party replaced its ultra-liberal economic principles (they opposed the Socialist-Communist coalition) with support for state interventionism. Disappointment among the working classes by the left and their worry about globalisation appeared as a great opportunity for the FN. It appealed more to that group and the FN became the defender of social rights and of public authority dedicated to the French people. In the context of the economic crisis, the party gave the most important role to the state to protect domestic producers and workers. The FN linked the EU to a non-democratic structure that undermines identity-based values and forces cosmopolitanism. Marine Le Pen decided to keep step with current issues and highlighted Islam as a rival culture on French territory. However, the FN is striving to form a credible alternative to government by toning down its rhetoric. Some surveys and authors claim that a vote for the FN is no longer a protest vote. People who voted for the FN agreed with the ideas advocated by the party. The FN gains votes by people who are concerned about identity threats such as Islam. Marine Le Pen adjusted the rhetoric to match the needs and concerns of voters who are struggling with globalisation and tough competition (Balent 2013, ; Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000; Veugelers 2000). A large variance exists in FN support between regions, which is explained partly by the number of immigrants present, but only indirectly by the unemployment level (Lubbers and Scheepers 2002). The impact of the FN on French political life and the reaction of the parties The FN became an electoral force from the 1980s. The emergence of a new national and international context legitimised the party s core issues. The FN gradually became the third largest political force in France at the expense of the traditional political groupings. The FN successes of the 1980s are connected with an overly moderate response by the traditional right to the ruling left on security and immigration issues. In the 1990s, the FN started to recruit from the working class. These people were disappointed by the left. In recent elections, the FN achieved some significant increases in its electorate and more than ever before, the FN has become a cross-class party that has won support from all social and political backgrounds (Balent 2013, ; Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000). 11

13 Today, the extremist nature of the FN has vanished. A huge part of the French population agree with the opinion that there are too many immigrants in France. In the 1980s, the traditional right concluded local pacts with the FN to prevent a Social-Communist win, but the next decade in the 1990s was not in the same colours. Right-wing parties implemented a strategy of isolation and tried to prevent the spread of the FN s ideology (Balent 2013, ). Parties are reluctant to accept the FN as a relevant member of the French political arena, as is also seen in the latest calls of some politicians within the frame of the 2014 local elections (Willsher 2014; Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000). Netherlands I would like to make a few remarks concerning the historical administrative and political regulation and organization of society in the Netherlands. Lucardie and Voerman (2013, ) began their chapter with the pillarization of the Dutch society and state organization, which was perhaps the most important element preventing the rise of populist movements until the last decade of the twentieth century. Pillarization means segregation of society, which is divided and organized along ideological and religious lines. For instance, Catholics attend Catholic schools, read Catholic newspapers, join Catholic trade unions, listen to Catholic radio and watch Catholic television, and most importantly, they vote for the Catholic party, while Calvinists and Social democrats do the same. So the concept of a homogenous people or nation cannot be applied to any populist movements and we know that a homogenous nation is a defining characteristic of populist movements. Towards the end of the twentieth century, the ties between the pillarized organizations weakened and the political sphere as well as the Dutch society became more homogeneous, which can be seen as a potential for populist movements. In the 1990s, the potential was realised with the establishment of some parties. In 1994, the Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij, SP), which belongs to the left-wing populist group, entered parliament with two seats. It will be presented in the next pages after Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom (Partij Voor de Vrijheid, PVV), which was founded in GEERT WILDERS AND THE PARTY FOR FREEDOM IN THE NETHERLANDS Geert Wilders, a parliamentarian for the People s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD) since 1998, was arguing that Dutch parties do not succeed in limiting immigration and promoting integration. On 2 nd of September 2004, Wilders left the VVD after a few disagreements, and in the next few months, he became an 12

14 important actor in the campaign against the European Constitutional Treaty, which was rejected by the Dutch population in a referendum. Having gained political momentum in the summer of 2005, Wilders founded his own party, the Party for Freedom (De Lange and Art 2011, 1235). The party participated in the 2006 elections and entered parliament with nine seats gained by 5.9% of the vote. The 2009 elections for the European Parliament demonstrated that the electoral potential of the party was substantial. It gained 17.0% of the votes and obtained four seats in the European Parliament. In the local elections held in Almere and Den Haag in 2010, PVV got 21.6% and 16.8%, respectively. The electoral growth of the party slowed in the 2010 national elections, when it won 15.5% of the vote and 24 seats in parliament. The PVV became one of the most important actors in a coalition formation process (De Lange and Art 2011, 1235). Wilders party concluded a parliamentary support agreement with the VVD and the Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen-Democratisch Appèl, CDA), but the economic crisis complicated this cooperation because of the refusal of cutbacks in welfare, pensions or healthcare. They also refused to support diktats of Brussels. In the provincial elections, they lost some support and gained 12% of the vote, and also in the 2012 general elections, the share of the vote declined to 10% (Lucardie and Voerman 2013, 190). Figure 3.2: Share of seats in the Dutch House of Representatives occupied by the PVV and the SP share of seats* 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% share of seats* PVV-12 seats 8% SP-15 seats 10% Other parliamentary parties-44 seats** Government (VVD and PvdA)-79 seats 29,30% 52,70% *Total number of seats: 150. **Christian Democratic Appeal, Democrats 66, Christian Union, Green Left, Reformed Political Party, Party for the Animals, 50PLUS, Van Vliet Source: The Dutch House of Representatives The last Dutch local elections were held on 19 th of March this year. The PVV led by Geert Wilders only put up candidates in two municipalities (as was done some years before): 13

15 Almere and The Hague. The party finished second in The Hague with seven seats out of a total of 45 seats in the municipal council. In Almere is the biggest party altogether with PvdA with eight seats out of a total of 39 (Municipality of Almere 2014; Kroet 2014). Those two cities together have approximately 700,000 inhabitants, which is around 4% of the entire Dutch population. In a post-election speech in The Hague, Mr Wilders asked the crowd: In this city and in the Netherlands, do you want more or fewer Moroccans?, and the crowd roared back: Fewer! Fewer! Fewer! After this, he finished with: Then we ll arrange that. We can notice his anti-immigrant rhetoric on these occasions (Statistics Netherlands 2014; The Economist 2014b, 20 th of March). Electorate and supporters According to Lucardie and Voerman (2013, ), the electorate of the PVV was basically concentrated in peripheral areas in the south-west, south-east and north-east of the Netherlands and in the commuter towns around Rotterdam and Amsterdam. The supporters were predominantly secular, as data suggests that three-quarters of the voters in 2006 did not belong to any religious group. They were predominantly from urban and suburban areas and consisted of young and male parts of the population, while the income and educational levels were a little below average. In 2010, the electorate had expanded, mainly at the expense of the Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA) and the SP. In 2010, PVV supporters were the least satisfied with government policy over the previous three years. They had less confidence in political parties, the parliament and the government. They felt that immigrants needed to integrate, that the number of refugees should be minimised especially those from Islamic countries. They also believed that European unification had gone too far and they were not supporting the idea of Turkish membership in the European Union. Programme and mobilisation strategies In the first election platform of the PVV, we can identify the importance of economic liberalism issues such as tax reduction, and on the other side, conservative issues, which were related to crime and security issues. The party wanted to reduce government subsidies and decrease expenses of the civil service. The party exhibited authoritarian attitudes. Controlling crime and security was planned in the direction of hiring more police officers, nurses and teachers. It favoured liberalisation in the environmental sector, but not with respect to immigration policies. The PVV also supported moral issues like gay rights or euthanasia, which was perceived as liberal behaviour of the party. After 2006, the liberal elements in the ideology of the PVV receded into the background. The party remained conservative in its 14

16 position on crime and punishment, but it changed its position in the socioeconomic zone. The party became strong supporters of the welfare state and a social Netherlands, without reduction of pensions or social security, without rent increases and without cutbacks in healthcare (Lucardie and Voerman 2013, 192; Vossen 2011). Even if the previously mentioned policies gained importance for the PVV, its core effort became Islam, mass immigration and European integration as factors fostering multiculturalist processes and migration. According to Wilders, the combination of these three factors is the main threat to the independence of the Netherlands. The PVV is strongly nativist. Wilders ideologue Martin Bosma argued that Islam is not a religion but a political ideology that can capture power over the majority because of its fanatical nature. He created a plan that should be implemented in the fight against Islamisation. The actions of this plan include: closure of Islamic schools, no more mosques should be built and immigration from Islamic countries should be prevented, also immigration from non-islamic countries should not be encouraged. Immigrants would not be entitled to social security for the first 10 years of their stay. Dutch language and culture should get more attention in school programmes. In 2012, the party even required an exit from the EU and return to the old national currency guilder instead of the common currency euro. With its radical anti-european views, the PVV became more and more isolated in the Dutch party system (Lucardie and Voerman 2013, ; Vossen 2011). The party s populism became apparent from its 2010 election manifesto in which it is argued that the elites have lost touch with reality and have done things that by no means have improved the situation of ordinary people (Rooduijn 2014, 83). Membership and intra-party dynamics Wilders learned several lessons from the collapse of the Pim Fortuyn List. The PVV did not recruit any members because Wilders stated that he knew what could go wrong when you open up the party to members too quickly. He is scared of infiltration by troublemakers and financially influential people, who can be disloyal and are potentially able to make changes in the ideological pillars. Therefore, the PVV does not have any members. Wilders has been building the PVV slowly and methodically. This antipathy towards political parties seems to be characteristic of all populists, but few of them go so far as to reject any form of membership. In financial aspects, the party faced some problems as they cannot receive any money from membership. The party organization was also weakened by internal secessions and dissidence (De Lange and Art 2011, 1237; Lucardie and Voerman 2013, ). 15

17 THE SOCIALIST PARTY THE DUTCH LEFT-WING POPULIST GROUP The Socialist Party was formed in 1971 and in the beginning followed a Maoist strategy in the sense of gathering information. Party members were integrated into the masses to find what the people wanted. In five consecutive parliamentary elections, they did not succeed in entering parliament. Gradually, the party abandoned its Maoist strategy and Marxist ideology, while retaining its populist appeal to the people and its critique of the political elite in the Netherlands (Otjes and Louwerse 2013, 7). Strategies and development of the party As we said previously, the SP was formed in 1971 out of a Maoist splinter group of the Communist Party of the Netherlands, and through transformation processes, it became the third largest party in the Netherlands in 2006 with over 50,000 members and 25 MPs. Dan Keith (2013, 2-3) highlighted three main stages in this significant transformation. First, at the time of the collapse of Communism in Europe, the SP s leaders abandoned their Maoist strategy and Marxist ideology in an effort to attract new voters and members. Their strategy was to establish workers councils, implement economic planning and create an oppositional image of the party. Their activist members were constantly in contact with ordinary people and elected officials paid a large proportion of their wages to the party, so that they lived on a normal wage. Those acts can be seen as distancing themselves from the elite way of life. In 1994, the Socialist Party entered parliament with two seats with the populist slogan Vote Against, Vote SP. It was a sort of protest party at that time. After gaining its first seats in parliament, a second stage began. The social democratic PvdA broke tradition by pursuing allegedly neo-liberal policies and SP found an opportunity to modify its agenda. The Socialist Party made some significant anti-elite statements during the election campaigns and also in the manifestos. They started to emphasise the principles of human dignity, equality and solidarity. During the late 1990s, the SP increasingly focused on criticising neo-liberalism, welfare cuts and privatisations as well as technocratic European decision making. The SP constantly warns against becoming a powerless province within the undemocratic European Union. This strategy brought many PvdA and GreenLeft (GroenLinks) supporters to the SP. The 1998 elections yielded five parliamentary seats. The same year brought the first participation in ruling groups on local councils, and in 1999 came the first seat in the European Parliament, completing the party s representation at all levels (Keith 2013, 2-3; Otjes and Louwerse 2013, 7-8; SP international). 16

18 In the general elections of 2002, the SP won nine seats, under its new, positive slogan of Vote for, Vote SP. In 2004, two seats were won in the European Parliament, and a year later the party took the lead in the campaign against the neoliberal European Constitution. The SP increased its vote share considerably up to 2006, when it became the third party in parliament (almost 17% of the seats). In the provincial elections of 2007, the SP gained 54 more provincial legislators than in the provincial elections of 2003, and made it to a total of 83 provincial legislators. In the 2012 Dutch election, the SP took only 15 seats (see Figure 3.2). The latest local election in March 2014 showed the rise of the SP s power. In 2010, the SP won 226 seats, this time they came close to doubling that, to 443 seats (NOS 2014; SP international). Programme and cooperation with other groups First of all, we must bear in mind that the leading goals of the party are human dignity, equality and solidarity. As we can understand, their programmes and actions were also created according to these goals. A quick overview of their official webpage gave us a clear picture of how they want to achieve their goals. The party strives to limit the influence of all international actors, especially the EU s impact on the domestic market and regulation. They are convinced that the drive for European unification, as it is currently defined, is above all inspired by the major multinationals and will have negative consequences for the general population. Among other activities, it is possible to notice some broader issues such as healthcare for everyone and also struggling for public ownership. The SP wants to offer the opportunity for both young and elder people to join them in common actions and political activities. They cooperate across borders on issues such as war and peace, globalisation and the unfair division of wealth in the world (SP international). Keith and McGowan (2013, 7-14) also said that the party has sought to campaign on issues that deliver more votes. They wanted to ensure that migrant workers are equally treated in the labour market. This was one of the acts in the vote seeking policies and an attempt to focus on themes that will bring more support. The SP is in favour of more migration so long as it does not destabilise the Dutch labour market. However, the immigration issue was not significant in some of the latest campaigns as it was not seen as a vote winner. All in all, the SP plays a game of combinations including some restrictions on immigration as well as policies to combat discrimination against migrants. The SP has links to migrant groups and prefers to deal with them on class terms. They are an important source in socioeconomic welfare policies but also hold an important share of the migrant vote. 17

19 Since its foundation, the Socialist Party has always been in opposition. The SP expresses the most left-wing views on many issues. Between 1994 and 2002, the PvdA had a strategy to isolate the SP. Usually, this involved voting against the SP s proposals. After the disastrous election result in 2002, the PvdA started to cooperate with the SP and their relationship has improved significantly since the elections of 2006 when the PvdA joined the government, whereas the SP did not (Government of the Netherlands; Otjes and Louwerse 2013, 9; The Dutch House of Representatives; Wroth 2012). Voters and members profile In the article written by Keith and McGowan (2013, 8), they report some similarities in the socioeconomic backgrounds of support for the SP and the PVV. The main supporters are lower educated and from lower income groups working and lower middle classes. However, in the value scale, there is little overlap between their voters. Their supporters constitute two different groups of voters, which are quite steadfast in the sense of switching between the two ends of the political spectrum. According to the results of an extensive survey carried out amongst SP members at the end of 2005, the SP members are concerned about global inequality and social rights. The average level of education of SP members is above the average for the broader Dutch population. The number of students is rising, while almost half of the members are employed and receive salaries. Members are very willing to help in civic projects and give their free time to support the party s goals (SP international). Norway In the next few paragraphs, we will learn some more facts about Norway s Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, FrP). THE PROGRESS PARTY Norway s Progress Party is an interesting case and many authors describe it as a doubtful or mild case of a right-wing populist party. However, according to Anders Ravik Jupskås (2013, ) and his perception of the right-wing populist family, we can say that FrP fits the definition of right-wing populism. The party is by far the most anti-immigrant party in Norway, and in 2009 about 56% of the FrP s delegates agreed that immigration represents a serious threat to national identity. If we turn our focus towards the authoritarian component of right-wing populism, then the leading role of the FrP is clearly visible with 44% of the 18

20 parliamentary candidates supporting a prohibition of gay marriages by law. Moreover, 78% in the FrP agreed that people who break the law should be punished more. The party also takes a leading role on issues such as disagreement with Norwegian democracy as well as expressing populist terminology, for instance FrP: the party for ordinary people. These acts and information convince us that the FrP belongs to the right-wing populists. Electoral history and key figures Probably, we are not wrong if we say that the history of the FrP is the history of ideological conflicts, multiple electoral booms and organizational consolidation. Just a few months after its foundation by Anders Lange, the FrP made its electoral breakthrough in 1973 and gained four seats in parliament. The party offered a major reduction in taxes as the only alternative programme against high taxation policies, which were on the political menu at that time (The Progress Party). This success was followed by a period of internal turbulence, the death of Lange and less than 2% of the votes after the 1977 election. After that period, Carl I. Hagen gained power within the FrP and became the chairman in He held this position until Under his leadership, the brighter days started. The real breakthrough came in the municipal and parliamentary elections in 1987, when the FrP gained 10.4% of the vote in the municipal and 12.3% in the country election. In that year, immigration also featured in the political debate (Jupskås 2013, ; Widfeldt 2000, ). In the early 1990s, the FrP once again faced internal tensions with an ideological prefix. This was probably the main cause for the unclear message about Norwegian membership in the EU. Many voters were confused by the party s unclear stance on this issue, and this ambiguity greatly contributed to the setback in The crisis resulted in the secession of the liberal fraction. Gradually, the EU question vanished from the agenda and the FrP focused its message towards defending the welfare state and promoting a stricter immigration policy. In the 1997 campaign, their effort in the areas of criminality, immigration and care for the elderly were apparent. They became the second largest party for the first time and also repeated this achievement in 2005 and As we mentioned previously, Hagen stepped down in 2006 and Siv Jensen became the party leader. She is less confrontational and enjoys a better relationship with the other non-socialist parties. The party had its best electoral result but suffered in the 2011 local election after internal scandals and the attack by the right-wing extremist Breivik, who left the party s youth branch in 2007 (Jupskås 2013, 208; The Progress Party; Widfeldt 2000, ). Nowadays, the Progress Party is in the minority 19

21 government with the Conservative Party and holds 29 out of the 169 parliamentary seats (see Figure 3.3). Figure 3.3: Share of seats in the Parliament of Norway occupied by the Progress Party share of seats* 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Progress Party (government)-29 seats Conservative Party (government)-48 seats Other parliamentary parties-92 seats** share of seats* 17,20% 28,40% 54,40% *Total number of seats: 169. **Labour Party, Christian Democratic Party, Centre Party, Liberal Party, Socialist Left Party, Green Party Source: Stortinget 2013 Voter characteristics According to Jupskås (2013, ) extracts from some recent analysis, the party s electorate in a few recent national elections shows that the FrP is over-represented in the working class and among white-collar (office) workers in the private sector. Moreover, in 2009 the party was the most popular among unemployed people, and 49% of them voted for the FrP. If we focus on the gender composition, then it is clear that men represent around two-thirds of the party s supporters. The type of area where voters originate coincides with the overall demographic distribution in Norway, according to this, two-thirds come from cities and the rest of them are from more rural areas. Jupskås (2013, 228) also said that only 47% of the FrP s voters in 1997 voted for the party four years later, but the share of loyal voters has increased in recent elections. Cooperation with other parties The FrP has not been exposed to the strong strategy of total boycott from all other parties. The FrP was invited as a supportive actor in several state budgets, and since the 2013 elections, all of the opposition parties accept the party s important role in the governmental coalition. The FrP s history as an anti-tax movement without fanatic nationalism and its important nominal share of parliamentary seats make it difficult to exclude the party in parliamentary discussions and negotiations. If we move on to some specific examples, then it 20