POLICING AND PEACE OPERATIONS IN AFRICA: REFLECTIONS ON MINUSMA

Transcription

1 POLICING AND PEACE OPERATIONS IN AFRICA: REFLECTIONS ON MINUSMA By Festus Kofi Aubyn KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 39 March 2015

2 Table of Content List of Abbreviations...2 Abstract...4 Introduction...5 Background to the Establishment of MINUSMA...7 MINUSMA Police Component: Mandate, Core Functions and Operational Activities Mandate Composition.. 11 Core Functions and Operational Activities Challenges Confronting MINUSMA Police Component Operational Challenges Challenges related to the Mission Context Mission specific challenges Training Gap Analysis.20 Conclusion and Recommendations 24 Annex

3 List of Abbreviations AFISMA AQIM AU CENI CPTM DPKO EMP FPU IPO KAIPTC MINUSMA MNLA MUJAO NGO PCC QIP SGTM SLIP SML SPT SSR STM TfP UN African-led International Support Mission to Mali Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Africa Union Independent National Electoral Commission Core Pre-deployment Training Materials Department of Peacekeeping Operations École de Maintien de la Paix Formed Police Units Individual Police Officers Kofi Annan Internationall Peacekeeping Training Centre United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali Mouvement national pour la libération de l Azawad Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa Non-governmental Organisations Police Contributing Countries Quick Impacts Projects Standardised Generic Training Modules Senior Leadership Induction Programme Senior Mission Leaders Specialised Police Teams Security Sector Reform Specialized Training Materials Training for Peace in Africa Programme United Nations 2

4 UNAMID UNOCI UNOM UNPOL UNSCR African Union and United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur UN mission in Cote d Ivoire United Nations Office in Mali United Nations Police United Nations Security Council Resolution 3

5 Abstract Police personnel form an important component of United Nations and African Union peace operations. However, in spite of the significant contributions of the police to the overall impact of peace operations, it remains one of the under-researched areas in the peacekeeping literature in Africa. This occasional paper forms part of the systematic attempt by the Training for Peace in Africa (TfP) Programme to address this gap by focusing on the operational activities, training needs and challenges of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) police component. Based on field research conducted in Mali, the paper concludes that the operational support of MINUSMA police to the Malian law enforcement agencies has been in two forms: (a) provision of technical support to the reforming, restructuring and rebuilding of the law enforcement agencies; and (b) operational support in terms of protecting life and property, maintenance of public order, prevention, detection and investigation of crimes. However, the mission lacks adequate funding, human resources and logistics to effectively implement all its mandated tasks. 4

6 Introduction The United Nations Police (UNPOL) plays a very important role in the promotion of peace and security in both conflict and post-conflict context. It is arguably one of the fastest-growing components within United Nations (UN) peace operations, with its activities becoming increasingly wide-ranging and complex. 1 The role of the police was traditionally limited to monitoring, observing and reporting. However, this passive role has changed and rapidly expanded over the years to include myriad of activities such as the protection of civilians, mentoring, training, public order management, re-establishing the rule of law, security sector reform, and promoting gender mainstreaming. 2 More concretely, it is not only the mandates that have changed or expanded, but also the number of police personnel has risen from a lesser figure of 5,840 in 1995 to about 11, 460 personnel as at August While these numbers of UNPOL are distributed across the current 16 UN peace operations in the world, a large number of them are located in Africa. To be precise, out of the 11,460 police personnel deployed worldwide in September 2014, data from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) indicates that 9,019 of them are deployed to missions in Africa. 4 Additionally, the UN operation with the largest number of police is also in Africa - the United Nations and African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) with personnel strength of 3, Since the inception of peacekeeping in the 1948, Africa has both been an important contributor of police personnel and a major theatre for United Nations (UN) peace operations. Unlike in the past, none of the peace operations deployed on the African continent today either by the UN or regional organisations such as the Africa Union (AU) lacks a policing component. This development which undeniably demonstrates the surging demands and increasing importance of police functions also portrays the complexities and the changing needs of contemporary operations. Levine also argues 1 DPKO/DFS, 2014, Policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions, New York: United Nations, p.3. 2 DPKO, 2014, UN Police-United Nations Police have an important role in promoting peace and security accessed 28 September Ibid; DPKO, 2014, Peacekeeping Fact Sheet accessed 20 September DPKO, 2014, UN Missions Summary of Military and Police accessed 10 September Ibid 5

7 that the reality of tasks in contemporary peacekeeping demands police rather than soldiers, operating in a more active role, providing law and order services. 6 Despite the significant contributions of the police dimension to the overall impact of peace operations, it remains one of the most under-researched areas in the peacekeeping literature especially, in Africa. This is particularly true regarding the roles played by the different police component namely, the Individual Police Officers (IPOs), the Specialised Police Teams (SPT) and the Formed Police Units (FPUs). The military component has dominated the literature with little systematic study on the overall impact of the police dimension. This occasional paper forms part of the systematic attempt by the Training for Peace in Africa (TfP) Programme to address this gap, focusing on the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Established by the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2100 of 25 April 2013, MINUSMA has been in operation since 1 July 2013 with a current mandate that expires on 30 June The mission has been charged primarily with security, stabilisation and protection of civilians functions. This occasional paper focuses on the roles, challenges and operational activities of MINUSMA police and its overall impact on the implementation of the mission mandate. It also examines the different kind of trainings undertaken by MINUSMA police personnel before and after deployment. The purpose is to identify the possible knowledge and skills gaps in order to develop their operational capacity through training programmes in order to better respond to the changing dynamics of the security situation in Mali. The paper is based on a field research conducted by the TfP at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in April and May 2014 to assess the activities of the MINUSMA police in Mali. During the field research, representatives of the MINUSMA police and other components of the mission, Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), the Malian Police Force, Gendarmerie and the local population were interviewed. 6 Daniel H. Levine, 2008, African Civilian Police Capacity for International Peacekeeping Operations, The Henry L. Stimson Center Publication. 6

8 The paper is divided into five sections. First, the background to the deployment of MINUSMA and the operational context within which the police component operates is examined. This is followed by an analysis of the mandate, core functions and operational activities of the police component of MINUSMA since July The challenges faced by MINUSMA Police in the performance of their roles and responsibilities are examined in the subsequent section. In particular, this section focuses on the challenges with respect to their operational activities, mission-specific difficulties and the environment within which they operate. Practically, the successful execution of policing functions requires personnel with high levels of specialised training, skills and knowledge of complex peace operations. It is, therefore, imperative that police personnel deployed to missions have the necessary training to be able to effectively perform their roles in the rapidly changing peacekeeping context. In that regard, the fourth section assesses the various forms of trainings undertaken by MINUSMA police personnel before and after deployment. It focuses specifically on the pre-deployment training, induction training and the ongoing/in-mission training. The analytical significance of this is in two folds: (i) to asses the relevance and adequacy of the different types of trainings in terms of the implementation of the mandate of the police component; and (ii) to identify the potential gaps if any and the requirement for training, with the intention of providing recommendation to improve general police training practice. The last section concludes with some recommendations on how to improve MINUSMA police capacity to better perform its mandated tasks within the complex operational environment in Mali. Background to the Establishment of MINUSMA The crises in Mali begun in mid-january 2012 when the Mouvement national pour la libération de l Azawad (MNLA) initiated series of attacks against the Malian defence and security forces in the northern part of the country. A subsequent mutiny by some disgruntled soldiers at the Kati military camp near the presidential palace in Bamako led to a military coup d état and the suspension of the country s constitutions in March Due to the retreat of the military following the Tuareg 7 UNSC, 2014, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Mali, /2014/267/, 14 April New York: United Nations; BBC News, Mali crisis: Civilians flee Islamist takeover and French bombs accessed on 20 June

9 rebellion, the coup accelerated the collapse of the State in the North. The MNLA supported by Ansar Dine, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) took advantage of the power vacuum and declared an independent Islamic State of Azawad on 6 April This development weakened the capacity of the Malian Defence and Security Forces and caused a lot of desertions. Consequently, the swift intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) forced the military junta to relinquish power. 9 This led to the formation of a transitional government that was tasked among others to return the country back to constitutional rule and deal with the country s governance challenges. Meanwhile, in northern Mali the Ansar dine, MUJAO and AQIM push out MNLA after tensions erupted between them and divided the territories among themselves. MUJAO controlled the towns of Douentza, Gao and Ménaka; AQIM occupied the towns of Timbuktu and Tessalit, while Ansar Dine remained in control of Kidal. 10 For the 18 months that these armed groups controlled northern Mali, they imposed a strict interpretation of Sharia law on the population, perpetrated grave human rights abuses, including child recruitment, summary executions, sexual violence, attacks on schools, hospitals and destruction of religious, historic and cultural sites. 11 There was also widespread destruction of government and security infrastructures (police and gendarmerie stations, prisons, military barracks, court premises, government offices etc. 12 In particular, the rebels destroyed and looted properties belonging to the security services including doors, windows, iron sheet, electric wires, ceiling fans, water closets, sinks, etc. 13 The humanitarian situation also worsened, with the displacement of thousands of people and the influx of refugees to neighbouring 8 See Kwesi Aning and Festus Aubyn, 2012, Security Situation in West Africa Europaworld.com, General Survey; see UNSC, 2014, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Mali, /2014/267/, 14 April New York: United Nations 9 For more information on the role of ECOWAS see Kwesi Aning and Festus Aubyn, 2013, Managing Complex Political Dilemmas in West Africa: the Role of ECOWAS in Mali New Routes 10 For more information see UNSC, 2014, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Mali, /2014/267/, 14 April New York: United Nations. 11 Human Rights Watch, 2014, Mali: Islamist Armed Groups Spread Fear in North, hrw.org, accessed 12 August 2014; UNSC, 2014, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Mali, /2014/267/, 14 April New York: United Nations. 12 Interview with MINUSMA Police Officer, April ibid 8

10 countries such as Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger. 14 In southern Mali where the transitional government controlled, the security apparatus became entirely dysfunctional, morale was very low and the leadership remained feeble due to the overall weakness of the political system. 15 Structural problems such as poor socioeconomic development, weak governance, poverty, unemployment, corruption, transnational organised crimes, and arms proliferation also worsened. As part of the international efforts to tackle the crises, the UN under UNSC Resolution 2071 and 2085 (2012) created the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM). The UNSCR 2085 also authorised the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) to, among other things, support the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north under the control of armed groups, including AQIM and MUJAO. AFISMA was mandated to be deployed in September 2013, but after an unexpected advance by the rebel and terrorist groups southwards towards Bamako, capturing the central town of Konna in January 2013, the Malian transitional authorities requested France intervention to neutralise the threats. 16 Following this development, ECOWAS and the AU were forced to immediately deploy AFISMA in January 2013 instead of September Collectively, the French Military Operation Serval and AFISMA supported the Malian Defence Forces to recover the rebel-held regions in the north. By the end of January 2013, state control was restored in most of the major northern towns, such as Diabaly, Douentza, Gao, Konna and Timbuktu. Some of the armed groups absconded northwards into the Adrar des Ifoghas Mountains while others blended with the local communities and have since employed tactics of asymmetric warfare to destabilise the region. The operational gains of the French and AFISMA intervention facilitated the return of the Malian armed forces to the north. However, in Kidal the MNLA re-established its control and objected to the redeployment of the Malian Defence forces to region See WFP and FAO, 2014, Food Security and Humanitarian Implications in West Africa and the Sahel accessed 15 July 2014; CARE International Emergency Alert: Food Crisis in the Sahel Region of West Africa accessed 18 July Interview with a Police officer in Mali, April See Mehari T. Maru, 2013, AFISMA: Military ahead of Politics accessed 3 October UNSC, 2014, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Mali, /2014/267/, 14 April New York: United Nations. 9

11 As the military operations continued, the UNSC supported the French, AU and ECOWAS proposal to deploy a robust UN peace operation on 6 February 2013 to replace AFISMA. Subsequently, on 25 April 2013, the UNSC passed UNSCR 2100, which authorised the deployment of MINUSMA. The mandate of MINUSMA included among others: security-related stabilization tasks, protection of civilians, human right monitoring, support to the extension of state authority in northern Mali and the preparation of free, fair and inclusive elections, just to mention a few. 18 On 1 July 2013, MINUSMA officially took over authority and re-hatted AFISMA forces. MINUSMA Police Component: Mandate, Composition and Core Functions Mandate In the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2100 establishing the mandate of the MINUSMA, the chapter 12 discusses the creation of the Police component with personnel strength of 1,440 (comprising Formed Police Unit 19 and Individual Police officers). The specific mandates of the Police component are defined in the Chapter 16 of the UNSC resolution Among the roles outlined for the police component include: to support national and international efforts in the reform of the Malian security sector, in particular the Police, the Gendarmerie, the National Guard and the Civilian protection, through technical support, capacity building, as well as collocation and mentoring programs; protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; and promoting and protecting human rights as well as, monitoring, investigating and reporting human rights violations and abuses. 20 The mandate reflects the reality and nature of the Malian situation as well as the broader normative debates on cross-cutting thematic tasks in global peace operations. From the UNSCR 2100, the police component is expected to deliver strategic advice and training for the Malian Police and other law enforcement agencies such as the Gendarmerie, National Guard and Civil Protection. 18 See United Nations Security Council Resolution 2100, 25 April FPUs are cohesive mobile police units of 140 personnel deployed as full contingents by PCCs, who work to ensure the safety and security of persons especially in public order management. 20 For more information, see UN Security Council Resolution 2100, 25 April

12 Moreover, they are also expected to build the capacity of the law enforcement agencies to reestablish the rule of law, enforce international human rights, protect civilians and restore security by demonstrated presence and patrols. On 25 June 2014, the Security Council amended the mandate of the MINUSMA by unanimously adopting UNSCR In the new amended mandate, emphasis was placed on: the protection of civilians; ensuring security; stabilization and supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation; assisting the reestablishment of State authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights. Composition In terms of composition, there were 974 police personnel as of September 2014 including IPOs and FPUs out of the 1,440 authorized police strength. 21 The personnel are from 26 Police Contributing Countries (PCCs): 18 from Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Burundi, Chad, Cameroon, Cote d Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Guinea, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Djibouti, Tunisia, Senegal, and Togo); six (6) from Europe (Netherlands, France, Germany, Sweden, Turkey, and Switzerland); and three (3) from Asia (Yemen, Jordan, Bangladesh). The PCCs and their personnel contributions are represented in figure DPKO, 2014, UN Missions Summary of Military and Police accessed 10 September

13 Figure. 1 Countries Contribution to MINUSMA Police (as at September 2014) Bangladesh Benin Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Chad Cote d'ivoire Djibouti DR Congo Eqypt France Germany Ghana Guinea Jordan Madagascar Netherlands Niger Nigeria Rwanda Senegal Sweden Switzerland Togo Tunisia Turkey Yemen Source: DPKO, Senegal is the largest PCC to MINUSMA from figure 1 with personnel strength of 286, including both FPU s and IPO s, followed by Togo (144), Rwanda (143), Nigeria (141) and Bangladesh (139) in that order. Ghana, Jordan, Switzerland, Tunisia et al are the PCCs with the lowest contributions. Also, from figure 2, out of the 974 personnel, there are 839 FPU s from Nigeria (140), Rwanda (140), Bangladesh (139), Togo (140) and Senegal (280). The rest of the personnel are IPO s. In terms of gender composition, there are 925 (94.9%) males and 49 female personnel representing only 5.1% of the total police strength. Majority of the police personnel operate mainly in northern Mali with a light presence at the mission headquarters in Bamako. The police component is led by Commissaire Divisionnaire AWALE Abdounasir from Djibouti. 12

14 Figure.2 Composition of MINUSMA Police and the Gender Composition (as at September 2014) Formed Police Unit 135 Individual Police Officers 49 Male Female Total Number of UNPOL Source: DPKO, Core Functions and Operational Activities Per their mandate, the police component is expected to perform two core functions. These are: first, support for the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of the Malian police and other law enforcement agencies: and second, operational support in terms of protecting life and property, maintenance of public order and the effective prevention, detection and investigation of crimes. Other functions include the protection and promotion of human rights, rule of law and protection of civilians. While some of these tasks are meant to be solely performed by FPU s, and IPO s, others are supposed to be jointly undertaken together with other component of MINUSMA such as civil affairs, human right, political affairs and the Military. To effectively fulfil these core functions, the police component have developed a strategic plan to guide its operations in Mali. The strategic plan 22 covers areas such as recruitment of new personnel, provision of material 22 The UNPOL strategic plan was based on an evaluation they conducted, in addition to the needs assessment of the Malian security and justice institutions conducted by the Standing Police Capacity (SPC) and more significantly, the strategic plan submitted to MINUSMA by the Malian security forces. 13

15 support, rebuilding of security infrastructures, refurbishments of police establishments, training, advising, mentoring and dealing with strategic threats such as terrorism and organised crimes. 23 All these initiatives form part of the broader security sector reform and other institutional reforms processes. The importance of the initiatives outlined in the strategic plan cannot be understated. Before the 2012 political crises, the police and other law enforcement agencies remained ineffective, lacked professionalism, adequate equipment and infrastructure to perform their duties. 24 Moreover, recruitment in the Police, Gendarmerie, Civil Protection and National Guards was also for years, not always based on competence, qualifications or merits. 25 This allowed the majority Mande ethnic groups (Bambara, Soninke, Malinke) in the south to dominate the security forces to the detriment of those in the north thus, the Tuare, Maure, Songhai and Peulh minorities. 26 Furthermore, in terms of organisational responsibilities, there seems to be a lack of clearly defined duties between the Police, and the other law enforcement agencies such as the Gendarmerie and National Guards. 27 The responsibilities of these security forces have changed over the years, often based on favouritism under various regimes since independence. 28 As a result, there exists some kind of ambiguity with regard to who does what, when and how, without usurping the powers of the others. In addition to this, the morale of personnel in the law enforcement agencies was also low, with weak leadership due to the overall weakness of Mali's political system. 29 As noted earlier, police infrastructure and materials including offices, accommodation facilities, cells, and files in the north were all destroyed by armed groups during the conflict. 30 Therefore, in some of the towns, almost everything including, offices and accommodation facilities have to be rebuilt. It is against this backdrop that the mission developed its strategic plan in line with the strategic priorities of the Malian Authorities to support the reforms and rebuilding of the police and the other law enforcement agencies. 23 Interview with a MINUSMA Police Officer in Bamako, May Interview with a Police Officer in Bamako, April Interview with a Police Officer in Bamako, April Ibid; interview with a former Ambassador of Mali in Bamako, April Interview with MINUSMA Police Officer in Bamako, April Ibid 29 Interview with MINUSMA Police Officer in Bamako, April Interview with MINUSMA Police Officer in Bamako, May

16 Operationally, both the FPUs and the IPOs are performing different kinds of roles within the mission. However, in terms of the comparative advantages, contact with the population is more intense with IPOs than FPUs because they are more connected to the local population. The IPOs are mainly engaged in the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of the Malian Police, Gendarmerie, Civil Protection and National Guards through operational and technical support. Based on a performance gap analysis and training needs assessment conducted with the Malian law enforcement agencies, the IPOs are also building the capacity of the law enforcement agencies, through training in the areas of how to conduct criminal investigations, provision of election security, traffic policing, professional behaviour, intelligence gathering, how to counter an ambush or terrorist threats, public order management and riots control. 31 Annex 1, for example, shows the date, name of training and the contents of some of the training programmes conducted by MINUSMA police from July 2013 to March 2014 as at the time of the field research. Through these training programmes, the police has strengthened the operational capacity of the Malian police and the other law enforcement agencies to maintain public law and order and to effectively respond to criminal activities. For instance, during the country s presidential and parliamentary elections in 2013, several Police, Gendarmerie and National Guard personnel were trained on how to respond to electoral violence and the code of conduct of security personnel during election periods. This contributed to the relatively peaceful conduct of the presidential and legislative elections. Overall, since the deployment of the mission, it was noted that more than 2,000 Police, Gendarmes, National Guards and Civil Protection officers have been trained in various areas at all levels. A train- of trainer s programmes for all levels - junior, middle and senior levels respectively have also been conducted. 32 Majority of the training programmes are organised in collaboration with facilitators from the Malian police and other law enforcement agencies. This is particularly significant as it fosters local ownership and commitment from the local security agencies. 31 Interview with MINUSMA Police Officer in Bamako, May Interview with MINUSMA Police Officer in Bamako, May

17 Most importantly, because MINUSMA police lack the capacity and expertise to deliver all the training needs of the Malian law enforcement agencies, it partners with the European Union Police, countries such as Turkey, France and other international training institutions such as the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) to deliver some of the training programmes. In November 2013, for instance, MINUSMA collaborated with the KAIPTC under the sponsorship of the TfP programme to train the Malian security forces and some IPOs on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) in post-conflict and fragile context in Bamako. 33 In April 2014, a Police Middle Management Course (PMMC) was also organised by the KAIPTC in conjunction with MINUSMA police for the Malian police and other law enforcement agencies with TfP funding. The Malian police personnel interviewed noted that the various training programmes have impacted positively on their professional conduct and behaviour because they assume the UN is watching or monitoring their actions. 34 Monitoring is also a very important aspect of the responsibilities of MINUSMA police. It covers the operations of the police and other law enforcement agencies in terms of their service delivery, investigations, conduct, and effectiveness to ensure that it is in line with international policing standards and human rights provisions. Essentially, the training programmes and monitoring activities are helping to some extent in professionalising the law enforcement agencies at the institutional level and developing the skills of individual personnel. To further consolidate the various training programmes, the IPO s are mentoring and advising the police and the ministry of interior security on the institutional reform processes of the police and the other law enforcement agencies. 35 Several Quick Impacts Projects (QIPs) such as building police infrastructural facilities and other community establishments destroyed during the conflict are also been built to win the heart and minds of the local population. 36 For example, several offices, police posts in the north and the abattoir in Kidal which was destroyed by armed groups have been reconstructed. This has contributed in building relationship with the local population. Office equipment and other facilities necessary for the execution of policing functions have also been provided by MINUSMA as part of its material support to the police and the other law 33 MINUSMA Police, ECHOS POLICE, N 003, November Interview with Malian Police Officer in Bamako, May Interview with MINUSMA Police Officer in Bamako, May Interview with MINUSMA Police Officer in Bamako, May

18 enforcement agencies. However, the provision of such material support has been limited due to lack of funds. The FPU s, on the other hand, provide protection for all UN personnel and facilities in Mali. Thus, they provide security to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of all UN personnel and associated personnel, installations and equipments within the mission. The FPU s also undertake joint patrols with the Malian Police and Gendarmerie in the major population centres in the north and perform public order management and VIP escorts functions. 37 In particular, during the legislative elections on 24 November 2013, the FPU s provided technical and logistical support to Mali s Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI). The unit facilitated the transportation of electoral materials, deployment of domestic and international observers and helped secure almost all the 21,000 polling stations across the country. 38 The first visit of the President of Mali, Boubacar Keita after his elections to Timbuktu in early 2014 was also made possible as a result of MINUSMA police and military escorts. 39 Majority of the FPU s are deployed to the northern part of the country in towns such as Timbuktu, Kidal, Gao and Mpoti to ensure a secure environment due to the presence of armed groups within the local communities. The rest are in the south, assisting the Malian police and law enforcement agencies in security provision and providing security for UN personnel at the mission headquarters in Bamako. However, the operational deficit is that most of the FPU s in the north are located in the cities. Their presence is less felt in the villages where the presence and attacks by the various armed and terrorist groups are rife. The reason adduced to this shortfall was that the Malian police and gendarmerie have not yet extended their authority to those places for the FPU s to assist due to lack of infrastructure and logistics. 40 The UN Secretary-General s report on the situation in Mali in June 2014 vividly captured this when it noted that few officials, gendarmes or police officers have taken up posts outside the principal towns owing to lack of security, infrastructure and resources and the slow pace of socioeconomic activities Interview with MINUSMA Police Officer in Bamako, May Better World Campaign, 2013, Mali: The Next Front in the War on Terror, the Case for Fully Funding UN Peacekeepers in Mali. accessed 6 October Interview with MINUSMA Police Officer in Bamako, May Interview with MINUSMA Police Officer in Bamako, May UN Security Council, 2014, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, S/2014/403, 9 June

19 Challenges Confronting MINUSMA Police Component Operational Challenges A number of challenges confront MINUSMA police in the performance of their roles in Mali. First, there is a gap between the mandate of the police component and the resources provided for implementation. The mission is faced with logistical, financial and human resource constraints. 42 The MINUSMA police component is currently operating under its authorized strength of 1,440 by the UN Security Council. As at September 2014, there were 974 police personnel including IPOs and FPUs, representing about 67.1% of the authorised strength. This has affected the deployment of personnel to most part of northern Mali. The paradox however is that, whiles more personnel are needed to effectively implement the mandate, the MINUSMA Police lacks the necessary resources and logistics to receive more personnel. Logistically, the mission lacks office spaces, boots, equipments, and accommodation facilities for personnel to carry out their duties. 43 Funding for the implementation of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and training programmes are also limited. For the training programmes in particular, because MINUSMA lacks funds to sometimes provide coffee breaks, per diems and other minor costs, trainees for the Malian security services are at times not encouraged or motivated to attend the programmes. Challenges related to the Mission Context The environment within which MINUSMA operates also poses a fundamental challenge. The mission operates in a context where armed and terrorist groups remain active in the desert north; the provision of governance and justice is weak; and the political, economic and security situation remains volatile. The situation is principally dire in the northern part of Mali, where the lives of peacekeepers are constantly at risk due to the presence and attacks by armed and terrorist groups. As at September 2014, more than 20 peacekeepers have, for example, lost their lives through attacks by terrorist groups such as MUJAO and AQIM. One of the cases involved an ambush and 42 Interview with MINUSMA Police Office in Bamako, May ibid 18

20 killing of nine peacekeepers from Niger by MUJAO between the northeastern towns of Menaka and Ansongo. 44 Moreover, in some northern cities such as Kidal, MINUSMA personnel are seen as allies of the Malian Armed Forces and the police who are not welcomed in the region. According to interviews with MINUSMA personnel, the local population claim that the police and the military deserted them during the terrorist occupation in 2012 and left them to their faith to fend for themselves. 45 Hence, the people have lost confidence and trust in the ability of the Malian Armed Forces to protect them and have, therefore, set up their own informal police system to protect themselves. 46 However, the military and the police who also feel humiliated and defeated during the crises in 2012 also want to exert their power and influence over the population. The ensuing power struggle has often created tensions between the security forces and the various armed groups in the region, putting the life of MINUSMA personnel in danger and sometimes in combat positions. The advisory and mentoring function of the MINUSMA police have also proven to be difficult because most of the Malian Police officials at the helm of affairs are very knowledgeable and experienced individuals who have also served in several UN missions. Most of them were colleagues of some of the MINUSMA police in other missions in Cote d Ivoire, Liberia, Haiti and the UN-AU mission in Sudan (UNAMID). The challenge for MINUSMA police is how to advice their fellow colleagues in Mali without making it appears as if they lack the capacity or do not know anything. 47 Mission specific challenges MINUSMA as a whole has also been criticized for failing to deploy outside the cities by the government, and for bringing the Malian troops back to the north by the local population. In the 44 See Aljazeera, 2014, Nine UN peacekeepers killed in Mali ambush accessed 6 October Interview with MINUSMA Police Office in Bamako, May ibid 47 Interview with MINUSMA Police Office in Bamako, May

21 capital city Bamako, it was also indicated that some government officials are also unhappy with the presence of UN personnel because they claim the mission has taken over the biggest hotel in the country which uses to host state officials and other important personalities in the country. The government also wants the mission headquarters to be relocated to the north instead of Bamako and to remove the MINUSMA logos on their vehicles because it portrays a negative picture about the country. The government also want the mission to help extend state authority to the north rather than engaging in the on-going mediation and political processes in the north although it forms part of MINUSMA s mandate. Lastly, terrorism, organised crimes and health crises such as EBOLA VIRUS also poses major threats to the mission. Training Gap Analysis The quality and effectiveness of individual personnel is one of the important factors that determine the success or failures of peace operations. This can be achieved through effective training that prepares peacekeepers with the requisite skills and knowledge to accomplish their tasks. As argued by Cutillo, the historical experience of the UN has shown that underprepared peacekeepers cost lives and endanger missions. 48 In this regard, all personnel including the police have to go through a comprehensive training to adequately prepare them to perform their mission tasks. Generally, there are three phases of peacekeeping training prescribed by the UN for police personnel before and after deployment to missions. The first is the pre-deployment training which takes place prior to deployment. This is a generic, specialised and mission-specific peacekeeping training which are based on United Nations standards. 49 This training is provided by PCCs to personnel before deployment. The Standardised Generic Training Modules (SGTMs), the Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTM) and the Specialized Training Materials (STMs) developed by DPKO are the materials used for this training. The contents of the modules are the same everywhere 48 Alberto Cutillo, 2013, Deploying the Best: Enhancing Training for United Nations Peacekeepers Providing for Peacekeeping No UN Policy Evaluation and Training Division, Peacekeeping Resource Hub: About Peacekeeping Training, available at accessed 20 September

22 although it is however, often adapted by trainers to suit specific mission context. The mode of delivery might also differ due to the different trainers and training pedagogy of the various PCCs. The second is a mandatory induction or mission-specific training that is delivered to personnel upon arrival at the mission ground. It includes both generic and specialized training that are necessary for personnel to effectively carry out their tasks. 50 The third form of training is the ongoing training which is a form of learning activity for personnel in the mission subsequent to the induction training. The courses offered usually reflect the cross-cutting skills gaps identified in the mission to build the capacity of personnel to implement their mandate. 51 Aside these three phases of training, the UN also organises a specialised training programme for senior leaders 52 in mission to equip them with the skills and knowledge to effectively respond to the challenges of contemporary peace operations. 53 The Senior Leaders training is provided through two programmes the Senior Leadership Induction Programme (SLIP) 54 and the Senior Mission Leaders (SML) 55 course. Almost all the police personnel interviewed had gone through pre-deployment training from their countries of origin in their national police academies and the peacekeeping training centres of excellence such as the KAIPTC in Ghana, and the École de Maintien de la Paix (EMP), in Koulikoro, Mali. However, majority of them uundertook the training programme long before the mission was established. Some of the essential topics covered by the pre-deployment training as indicated by the MINUSMA police interviewed are presented in table 2. It included among others: the fundamental principles of peacekeeping; the establishment and functioning of UN peace operations, effective mandate implementation, authority, command and control in peace 50 Ibid. 51 ibid 52 The senior leaders consist of: senior military, police and civilian managers at D-2 level and above head of mission and their deputies, senior civilian leaders, force commanders, and police commanders. 53 UN Policy Evaluation and Training Division, Peacekeeping Resource Hub: About Peacekeeping Training, available at accessed 20 September The SLIP provides newly appointed senior leaders with an orientation on peacekeeping issues, such as challenges in the implementation of mission mandate, and the relationship between UN Headquarters and the Field. 55 The SML prepares potential mission leaders for the roles and responsibilities of a senior leader in UN mandated operations and allows participants to understand how current operations are managed in the field. 21

23 operations; roles and responsibilities of UNPOL; human rights; conduct and discipline; prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse; HIV/AIDs and security issues. Most of the personnel have also served in other missions such as UNAMID and the UN mission in Cote d Ivoire (UNOCI) after their pre-deployment training. Hence, they came to the mission with both the theoretical knowledge of peace operations and practical field experience, which implies that they were somehow prepared to perform their roles in Mali. In spite of the fact that the context of Mali is arguably different from other missions, there was no indication as to whether personnel especially the IPO s had any pre-deployment training in their various countries before being deployed to the mission. Some of the personnel interviewed noted that they came directly from other missions like UNOCI and UNAMID. All the same, the induction training helped fill the mission or context specific gaps that would have been covered by the pre-deployment training. Essentially, the induction training covered security briefings and presentations of the mission context and how personnel could perform their functions. 56 In other words, unlike the pre-deployment trainings that usually provides generalised training irrespective of the expertise of personnel, the induction training targeted specific functions of personnel within the mission. More significantly, due to the fluid and dynamic nature of the security situation in Mali, the mission has also instituted monthly in-mission training for personnel to address some of the skills and knowledge gaps that can hinder the effective implementation of the mission mandates. However, due to the work load and resource constraints, the mission is unable to organise these training sessions regularly. Some of the topics that has so far been covered by the in-mission training consist of general security issues confronting the mission; code of conducts for peacekeepers; misconduct and behaviours; gender-based violence, tactical techniques, weapons handling training, how to respond to terrorist threats/attacks, hostage situations and violence, and peace consolidation. 57 From November 2013, a training session on the basic notions of IED s was for example organised for 50 members of the Senegalese FPU. 58 This training was organised to equip the FPU s with the requisite knowledge to better secure the discovery area of IED s before the arrival of minesweepers. 59 A similar training on mines, IEDs and other explosives 56 Interview with MINUSMA personnel, May Ibid 58 MINUSMA Police, 2014, Monthly Information Bulletin of MINUSMA Police N 007, November ibid 22

24 was also organised for 118 personnel (56 Togolese FPU s and 62 Senegalese FPU s) in Kidal from 17 to 27 March, On 9 November 2013, 20 participants including IPOs and the FPUs from Senegal and Bangladesh also received training on first aid to be given to a victim on the battlefield. 61 Unlike the pre-deployment training, the induction and in-mission trainings are all carried out and financed by the mission, putting strains on their already limited resources. To overcome some of the resource and capacity constraints, most of the in-mission trainings are organised in conjunction with bilateral and multilateral partners such as the French Cooperation in Mali and the European Union. While the induction and in-mission training has provided an opportunity for the MINUSMA police component to train personnel on the same curriculum and thereby minimizing the difference in competence, there is no standard curriculum for trainers to use. Collectively, the pre-deployment, the induction and the in-mission training is relevant but not adequate in terms of the mandate of the police component. Generally, all the three phases of training compliments each other. In terms of relevance, from the UNSCR 2100 and UNSCR 2164, the police component is expected to deliver strategic advice and training for the Malian Police and other law enforcement agencies. Topics such as effective mandate implementation, security sector reform (SSR) and roles and responsibilities of UNPOL which covers advisory and capacity building modules are useful in the performance of this role. Moreover, the MINUSMA police are also expected to build the capacity of the law enforcement agencies to re-establish the rule of law, enforce international human rights, protect civilians and restore security. Again, topics such as human rights, the rule of law, protection of civilians, SSR, and the specialised training of FPU s are useful in preparing personnel to perform these tasks. However, due to the peculiarities and dynamic nature of the security situation in Mali, there are certain important areas where further training is needed according to the personnel interviewed. These include issues of leadership and management, human resource management, budget management, information management skills, mine awareness and counter IEDs, how to deal with transnational organised crimes, negotiation and mediation skills. This is represented in table 2. Importantly, training in these areas is needed 60 MINUSMA Police, 2014, Monthly Information Bulletin of MINUSMA Police N 007, March MINUSMA Police, 2014, Monthly Information Bulletin of MINUSMA Police N 007, November

25 to adequately prepare MINUSMA police personnel to quickly adapt to complexities and volatile environment in Mali. Table 1: Contents of Training Programmes received by MINUSMA Police and Some Training Needs Identified Type of Training Received & Modules/Contents Pre-deployment training Induction Training On-going (in-mission training) Fundamental principles of peacekeeping Authority, Command and Control in Peace Operations Roles and responsibilities of UNPOL Human rights/rule of Law Conduct and Discipline Prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse HIV/AIDs and Gender Protection of Civilians SSR/DDR International Humanitarian Law Specialised training Leadership and Management Human resource management, Budget management, Fighting crime Negotiation and mediation skills. Security briefings and presentations of the mission context, Mandates and how personnel can perform their functions as specified in the UNSCR Training Needs identified General security issues Code of conducts for peacekeepers misconduct and behaviours, Gender-based Violence Tactical techniques Weapons training (shooting), How to respond to terrorist threats/attacks, hostage situations and violence, Peace consolidation. Information Management Skills Dealing with transnational organised crimes Mine awareness and counter IEDs Source: Fieldwork, 2014 Conclusion and Recommendations The police component of MINUSMA has contributed to the overall implementation of the mission mandate through its operational activities. The component which comprises both IPOs and FPU s 24

26 have since the establishment of MINUSMA provided operational support to the Malian police and other law enforcement agencies in two main areas. First, they have supported in the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of the Malian police and other law enforcement agencies through technical support, experience sharing and advice. Second, they have provided operational support in terms of protecting life and property, maintenance of public order and the prevention, detection and investigation of crimes. However, despite its contribution to the overall impact of MINUSMA in Mali, several challenges persist. Therefore, in order to successfully implement their mandate, MINUSMA police have to support the Malian police and the other law enforcement agencies to extend state authority to every part of the country by providing material support and helping to stabilize the security situation in the country. This would help the mission deploy beyond the major population centres to enhance its legitimacy and credibility. The success of this would depend largely on the availability of logistics and uniformed personnel on ground. In that regard, it is important that the mission is provided with adequate funding and logistics to effectively implement its tasks and PCCs who have pledged uniformed personnel and assets to MINUSMA should also accelerate their deployments. Furthermore, the relevance of the pre-deployment and induction training in terms of the implementation of their mandate is undeniable. However, due to the shifting nature of the environment within which the mission operates, it is imperative that the capacity of the MINUSMA police is developed in the areas identified in table 2 and other equally important areas which have not yet been covered by the in-mission training. Training in these areas will enable the police component to quickly adapt to the challenges and changing environment in Mali. 25