University of Birmingham. POLSIS G 22: Security Studies. First Term 2007/ 2008 ESSAY. Is There a Role for Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War Era?

Transcription

1 University of Birmingham POLSIS G 22: Security Studies First Term 2007/ 2008 ESSAY Is There a Role for Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War Era? Tobias Bock MA International Studies (Security) ID: TXB717@bham.ac.uk

2 Outline 1. Introduction: Research question and research design Potential arguments towards a diminishing role of nuclear weapons The spread of liberal democracies as foreseeable actors A nuclear taboo The strife for non-proliferation A limited nuclear event Deterrence during the Cold War Deterrence after the Cold War Arguments convincing states of the deterring function of Nuclear weapons Deterrence against a hostile environment Deterrence against the only remaining superpower Potential risks of deterrence in the post-cold War era Conclusion: A continuing role for nuclear weapons Bibliography

3 1. Introduction: Research question and research design In this essay, I will address the research question Is there a role for nuclear weapons in the post-cold War era? by arguing that there continues to be a function for nuclear weapons after the Cold War, as a number of nation states strive to obtain them because they are convinced that they facilitate their deterrence against perceived threats. The importance of perception when deciding about what is considered a threat can be incorporated into a Neo- Realist framework, as Walt has done in terms of alliance development (Walt 1985: p. 12, p. 15). 1 One does not need to ultimately solve the question of whether proliferation is benign or malicious or proof whether deterrence actually works or not: Nuclear weapons continue to play a role because a number of states considers them to be useful. However, by pointing to potential risks their likely calculation might incorporate am I able to draw attention to especially one event which may to some degree alter the function of nuclear weapons if it ever happens: the occurrence of a limited nuclear event. In order to demonstrate the lasting role for nuclear weapons, I will first focus on potential arguments pointing towards a diminishing function and explain why none of them are convincing, before special attention will be devoted to a potential limited nuclear event. On the one hand, it cannot explain a decreased role of nuclear weapons simply because it has not yet occurred. On the other hand, it is the one event the likelihood of which demands that one at least points to possible consequences. This clearly distinguishes it from the other potential arguments for a diminished role. I will hence return to the potential risks that deterrence faces today after exploring how the role of nuclear weapons has changed after the Cold War and after examining thoroughly which arguments are likely to persuade states to 1 Because intentions can change and perceptions are unreliable, it is safer to balance against potential threats than to hope that strong states will remain benevolent. (Walt 1985: p. 15) This has been criticised as leaving the Realist framework by others, however, due to Walt s appropriation of nonrealist causal mechanisms (Legro/ Moravscik 1999: p. 38; for criticism on Walt s theory of alliances see ibid.: pp. 36). 2

4 seek them today, both in terms of threats they perceive to originate from their direct neighbours and from an intervention by the United States as the only remaining superpower. 2. Potential arguments towards a diminishing role of nuclear weapons 2.1 A spread of liberal democracies as predictable actors One argument which that is only rarely brought forth in the literature dealing with the role of nuclear weapons but which enjoys attention with regard to the Democratic Peace Theory (Doyle 1995: pp ; Russett 1993: pp ) ever since the end of the Cold War is the assumed spread of liberal democracies. 2 Solingen and Powell both stress the importance of domestic alliances in the quest for nuclear weapons (Solingen 1994: p. 168; Powell 1985: p. 96), and Walton and Gray point out that the way in which a liberal democracy will decide about the use of its nuclear capability is much more open and hence easier to calculate for its opponents than other political systems (Walton/ Gray 2007: p. 217). If the Democratic Peace Theory was to advance from correlation to causation, one could also argue that the more liberal democracies there are, the lesser the role of nuclear weapons (as they maintain peaceful relations with one another). However, of the current United Nations General Assembly Member States, 85 percent are non-liberal democracies (Higgins 1994: p. 43). 3 This leaves a vast number of states whose behaviour cannot be predicted according to Democratic Peace Theory, thus leaving a large room for nuclear weapons to continue to play a role. 2 A public debate was especially sparked by Fukuyama (1989). 3 It is a fact that 85 per cent of the governments represented at the United Nations are dictatorships of one sort or another. (Higgins 1994: p. 43). 3

5 2.2 A nuclear taboo Paul tries to make the case for a taboo that convinces decision makers of all nuclear states to refrain from actually ever using their nuclear weapons, hoping it might even break the spiral of deterrence: As a nuclear state could not threaten to retaliate against an attacker if it was not to use its nuclear weapons, attacks would be less costly and the attacker would not need to consider getting nuclear weapons itself in order to then deter the deterrer (Paul 1995: p. 711). A nuclear state would also be convinced to not use its nuclear capability because the use would signal to other nuclear states that they are allowed to do the same (ibid.: p. 713). Paul himself names a number of flaws of this argument, e.g. by pointing to a potential escalation even if a nuclear state is only threatened by conventional means (as was Israel in both 1973 and 1991, setting its nuclear forces on alert; Paul 1995: p. 712). He additionally admits that other taboos (e.g. incest) are broken even in traditional civilizations (ibid.: p. 713) and that both technological progress as well as an impending military loss may attempt decision makers to break the taboo (ibid.: p. 714). Furthermore, one has to point out that not only is it hard to proof a causal relationship between an alleged taboo and the fact that nuclear weapons are not used, but the idea of a taboo is Western-centric because it assumes to hold regardless of different cultures and civilizations. It also does not help to account for the strategic concepts of eight states that do possess nuclear weapons (Gray 1999: pp. 103). One may add that none of these eight states was ever really obliged to use its nuclear weapons (with Israel coming closest in 1973) (Walton/ Gray 2007: p. 224). 2.3 The strife for non-proliferation There have been numerous proposals for measures of non-proliferation to be taken, most notably those which have materialized in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (see Howlett/ Simpson 1992 and Forsberg et al 1995: pp

6 for a detailed overview). The aim for especially the United States is, as Sagan points out, to successfully implement a norm against nuclear proliferation, while at the same time decreasing but not abolishing one s own nuclear arsenal (Sagan 1997: pp. 85). Other proposals include as US-led and organized world-wide agency (Ikle 1996: p.127) as well as the US and the EU acting as honest brokers of data (Jervis 1993: p. 251). Wohlstetter furthermore has criticized that the NPT implicitly acknowledges the norm for states to pursue what he calls the new natural right to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Plutonium (Wohlstetter 1977: p. 179), hence calling for measures to make it much harder to states to acquire material which is fissionable (ibid.: pp. 176). Yet another proposal includes virtual arsenals, which have to be assembled first and thus cannot be used immediately, therefore lowering the risk of escalation (Gray 1999: pp. 86). None of these arguments can ultimately explain why nuclear weapons would not play a role. The NPT for one has never been signed by Israel, India, and Pakistan and left by North Korea (KCNA 2003), and it has not stopped numerous states from striving to obtain nuclear weapons. Likewise, any norm to not acquire nuclear weapons led by the US is not very convincing due to the role nuclear weapon remain to play for the US security strategy (see Joint Chiefs of Staff 2005; Kristensen 2007: pp. 378 on Oplan 844). As we will see, many states want to obtain nuclear weapons to balance the US as the sole remaining superpower. It thus seems more than unlikely that they accept them as an honest broker. In times of rising energy prises, it appears difficult to convince states from seeking peaceful nuclear power (Baker/ Linzer 2006), while virtual arsenals are considered by existing nuclear weapon states to be unpractical as they could cause a delay and hence benefit the adversary (Gray 1999: pp. 86). What lies at the heart of the problem is not only that there is no single model able to account for all cases of nuclear proliferation (Sagan 1997: p. 85), or the unconvincing position of the US as an honest broker, but rather what 5

7 Gray labels the arms control paradox : The agreement between states to cooperate is supposed to be the key to allow for the practice of arms control, but it is highly unlikely to be found in the political resentments which fuel conflicts in the first place and have states striving for nuclear deterrence (Gray 1999: p. 58). States want the security that is believed (ibid.: p. 60; emphasis added; TB.) to come out of the possession of nuclear weapons, even if the costs may be high. One may think about the option to use force to convince all states to refrain from their nuclear ambitions (practicing assertive disarmament ; Walton/ Gray 2007: p. 223). This is not only likely to be met with unwillingness of the US to do so in practice (Morgan 2003: p. 258), but also if the only superpower were willing to resort to this approach, it would be hard to tell (1) which states actually plan to transfer their peaceful nuclear knowledge into weaponry (Wohlstetter 1977: p. 88), (2) which states may just pretend to have successfully done so (e.g. Iraq, see Walton/ Gray 2007: p. 221), and (3) whether states are using their alleged nuclear weapons to bargain and gain from noncompliance, as North Korea has done successfully and Iran might (ibid.) A limited nuclear event It is acknowledged by many scholars that the sheer existence of an increasing horizontal proliferation raises the likelihood of a nuclear event occurring (Gray 1999: pp. 49; Walton/ Gray 2007: p. 216), for a number of different reasons such as accidental, inadvertent, or unauthorized use (Fetter 1996: p. 177). The notion of a limited nuclear attack has been incorporated into strategy (Brahms/ Kilgour 1986: p. 646; Jervis 1980: p. 617) and some argue that rational reasoning allows decision makers to only strike a few cities of the adversary is not the same as making a bad situation worse by replying with a full scale attack (Waltz 1984: p. 733) or would not be as horrible as what could have happened during the Cold War (Gray 1999: p. 50). 4 For the latest developments with regard to the Iranian strife for nuclear weapons see Mazetti

8 Yet many others point out the occurrence of a limited nuclear event may very well revolutionize the terms of the debate (Gray 1999: p. 81) and is to be regarded an oxymoron (ibid.: p. 94), especially if it would affect Western population or at least Western groups in far away regions (ibid.: p. 110). This would of course not be the same as the potential nuclear winter of the Cold War (Brahms/ Kilgour 1986: 648), but even the smallest nuclear event (be it accidental or on purpose) would have serious implications (Sagan 1994: p. 103). The fact that a number of nuclear crises has not escalated does not guarantee that the next event does not go wrong (Fetter 1996: p. 178), because causation is not the same as correlation. As Schell put it: the logic of deterrence strategy is dissolved by the very event the first strike that it is meant to prevent (Schell as quoted in Carranza 1999: p. 22). This argument is thus the hardest one to refute, and one can only due so because it simply has not yet occurred. However despite the role that nuclear weapons continue to play, the danger of a single nuclear event is the risk one will have to devote the most attention to in the future. We do not know, of course, whether or not it would actually change the role of nuclear weapons (Mandelbaum 1995: p. 37), but if one thinks about the public reaction to Chernobyl (Tønnessen et al 2002: pp ), one can imagine the impact a nuclear event might have on the public opinion (at least) in the Western states (Mandelbaum 1995: p. 36). 3. Deterrence during the Cold War While there where eight nuclear powers during the Cold War (the five declared, i.e. UN Security Council Members US, USSR, China, France, and Great Britain; as well as the undeclared South Africa, Israel, and India), the main goal of deterrence (at least from a Western point of view) was to avoid an escalation between the two superpowers, be it a conflict fought with conventional or nuclear weapons (Walton/ Gray 2007: p. 210). However, this position came under attack by neo-conservatives in the US who believed the main goal was to deny the USSR the possibility to attack (see e.g. Nietze p. 210). 7

9 Each superpower threatened to attack something that was either precious to the adversary s leaders (the homeland ) or do violence to the sinews of state power (including the military, top rank decision makers, and command and control). The first threat was labelled countervalue, the second one counterforce (Walton/ Gray 2007: p. 212; Brahms/ Kilgour 1986: p. 646; Nietze 1977: p. 207). Many scholars argue that the threat of MAD ( mutual assured destruction, see Brahms/ Kilgour 1986: p. 646) forced decision makers on both sides to adopt a rational view in order to prevent what could have resulted in a nuclear winter (ibid.: p. 648). However one should be reminded that this rationality was at times on the edge of escalation, e.g. during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 when friction (Mahnken 2007: p. 75, p. 79; Villacres/ Bassford 1995: pp. 10) led to a different interpretation of orders by US president Kennedy and the US Navy (Sagan 1985 as quoted in Tetlock et al 1994: p. 262). It would have been similarly interesting to see how a more ideological leader would have behaved in the place of Gorbachev at the end of the USSR (see e.g. Gray 1999: p. 92), but this of course remains speculation, as well as a assumed nuclear strike planned by Stalin shortly before his death (Brent/ Naumov as quoted in Walton/ Gray 2007: p. 215). 4. Deterrence after the Cold War 4.1 Arguments convincing states of the deterring function of nuclear weapons After the Cold War, the world has witnessed a trend towards horizontal proliferation, while vertical proliferation in the US and the former USSR is steadily declining (Walton/ Gray 2007: p. 210). There is a number of states which have a demand for nuclear weapons because their decision makers crave the security that is believed to flow uniquely from having them (Gray 1999: p. 60; emphasis added; TB). External threads are perceived or anticipated (ibid.: 8

10 p. 61; emphasis added; TB). 5 Whether they are dangerous or not, what matters is that states regard them as being best addressed by nuclear weapons capability. Scholars today still acknowledge as legitimate existential fears (Solingen 1997: p. 126) what Thucydides included when naming Fear, honor, and interest as driving forces of a polity s behaviour (Gray 1999: p. 55). There appear to be two main drivers which convince states that nuclear weapons are useful in today s international system: They (1) enable a state to deter its potentially hostile neighbours, and (2) to severely hinder the United States as the only remaining superpower to force them to compel with its interests (given that the Cold War superpower overlay has largely ceased to exist; Buzan/ Wæver 2003: pp. 68). While both domestic political drivers and honor (Gray 1999: pp. 65) may constitute an additional incentive for states to acquire nuclear weapons, I will not focus on them separately because both arguments are ultimately aimed at materializing in deterrence: To improve one s domestic standing requires at least the existence of some sort of perceived threat. Clearly different factions in power can have a distinct effect on a state deciding to or refraining from acquiring nuclear weapons. 6 But it seems difficult imagining a state striving for nuclear weapons only to make one faction s domestic opponents look bad. Similarly, honor and prestige can give many benefits to the leaders of a state (also domestically), but in the end this symbolic feature is supposed to materialize into hard power: honor and status are not wanted because they are satisfying in themselves, but because they translate into influence (Gray 1999: pp. 66), telling the neighbouring states not only we are a great people, but rather we are a great people, you better not attack us. I will start my analysis by focusing on the regional and then turn to the systemic level of analysis. 5 Which is similar to Walt s argument presented in the introduction, see Walt 1985: p. 12, p As can the domestic rate of approval, see e.g. Tetlock at al 1994: p. 266 on the highly varying public support for US defence spending between 1973 and

11 4.1.1 Deterrence against a hostile environment While some states over time abandon their nuclear ambitions (see Walton/ Gray 2007: p. 218), others remain convinced that nuclear weapons effectively protect them from an attack by their hostile neighbours, conventional or otherwise. As it is mainly weak states which fight wars (Waltz 1984: p. 744), it is in the regions that harbour them where one has an incentive to deter others from attacking. Faced with the experience that appeasement rarely works successfully (Leng/ Wheeler 1979 as quoted in Tetlock et al 1994: p. 259) and that neighbouring states make no attempts to abolish their nuclear arsenal (and even if, one could not turn back time to a pre-nuclear age; see Yankelovich/ Doble 1984 as quoted in Tetlock et al 1994: p. 265), they may feel that there is no substitute for nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent (e.g. Israel s arsenal may have been the reason why S. Hussein did not use WMD against Israel in 1991; Gray 1999: p. 74). And while nuclear weapons are viewed by decision makers as credible and severe (Walton/ Gray 2007: p. 212) enough to work as a deterrent, they may at the same time believe that they will never actually be used by them or their opponent, given that they are aware of how most leaders want to hold on to their power (Waltz 1984: p. 237) and not jeopardize it by a reckless action which may invite a counter attack. The importance states recognize in nuclear weapons goes far enough for some of them to successfully pretend a certain level of nuclear weapon progress to deter a possible attack, as S. Hussein did before Coalition Forces attacked Iraq in 2003 (Walton/ Gray 2007: p. 221) Deterrence against the only remaining superpower As the superpower overlay of the Cold War has vanished (Buzan/ Wæver 2003: pp. 68), the US remain the main actor likely and capable to confront states in the entire world for a number of different reasons. Not surprisingly, at least some states will try to shield themselves from this risk and hence try to deter the 10

12 United States (Morgan 2003: p. 270). Already a small nuclear capability with which one could hit US targets may be sufficient to deter a US intervention, given that this would cost the US more than it could benefit from an engagement (Betts 1995: p. 79). With regard to what has been discussed in 4.1.1, some of these states may also be capable of changing a regional balance of power in a way that does not favour the United States (Mandelbaum 1995: p. 22; Gray 1999: pp. 64). A general outcome of this possible development could be that the US gets progressively unwilling to maintain its level of engagement in far regions, especially if its homeland is at risk (Gray 1999: pp. 48). With regard to specific crises, this would mean that one could have to picture states like North Korea or Iran succeeding against the US due to their escalation dominance (Walton/ Gray 2007: p. 225). 4.2 Potential risks of deterrence in the post-cold War era The fact that a number of states are convinced that nuclear weapons are a useful tool to deter both neighbouring enemies and the US does of course not constitute a causal mechanism demonstrating that deterrence actually works in every single event. There are risks to deterrence, which despite the fact that this has not yet occurred, may at some point in time lead to a limited nuclear event of any kind. Any such event may or may not have a huge impact on the international systems, but the likelihood of change is pointed out by many scholars (see Powell 1985: p. 75; Sagan 1994: p. 103; Fetter 1996: pp. 176). There is no single formula which can account for all cases in which states strife to obtain nuclear weapons (Gray 1999: pp. 55; Walton/ Gray 2007: p. 214) and different domestic politics have an impact on the way in which this strife is carried out (Powell 1985: p. 96). The next crisis may always take a different direction than everything we have seen before (Fetter 1996: p.178), as is warned by scholars who e.g. point to the future of Indian-Pakistani hostilities, where decision makers at some point 11

13 may deviate from deducted Cold War behaviour (Karl 1997: p. 117; Caranza 1999: p. 20). This leads to an additional problem: Decision makers may choose to not be deterred (Gray 1999: pp. 89; Walton/ Gray 2007: 217; Brahms/ Kilgour 1986: p. 649), contrary to Waltz claim (Waltz 1984: p. 237). One factor this appears to depend on is different ideologies which have materialized in different geographical areas of the world (Gray 1999: pp. 91; Gray/ Walton 2007: p. 215; with regard to the developing world see Kraig 1999: p. 141), what states are supposed to do when acting rationally is not how they may actually decide to act (Sagan 1994: p. 103). Before I go on to question the rational/ irrational dichotomy, one should keep in mind that under a certain set of circumstances, the leader of a liberal democracy such as the United States may similarly refuse to be deterred (Betts 1995: p. 79). However, this is not the same as claiming that actors deviating from an allegedly rational Cold War pattern of behaviour are actually acting irrational, they still tend to perform a cost-benefit calculation (Brahms/ Kilgour 1986: pp. 649). They just value goals differently, and their aims may be limited to a particular cause (Tetlock et al 1994: p. 259). Saddam Hussein did not behave stupid or irrational in 1991 (Stein 1992: p. 173; p. 148), but prioritised to avoid a potential defeat (which he perceived as a very credible threat) as his main goal (ibid.: p. 177; Morgan 2003: p. 275), as have Israel and South Africa in the past with regard to their hostile regional neighbours despite their nuclear superiority (Kraig 1999: p. 147, p. 154) or as Japan did during World War II (Jervis 1980: p. 633). Efforts as such undertaken by e.g. Israel do bear the risk of leading to an arms race, as adversaries then may seek to acquire nuclear weapons to deter the original deterrer (Jervis 1993: p. 62, as quoted in Kraig 1999: p.143). Egypt at some point thought to balance the Israeli superiority (Kraig 1999: p. 161). Arms races may especially be a problem in developing regions as the superpower overlay has been taken off, leading to the (re-)emergence of ethnic and territorial conflicts (Jervis 1993: p. 250, p. 252). 12

14 But even in conflicts that threaten to escalate between nuclear states which share a similar approach to securitisation and cost-benefit analysis, complete knowledge of a situation is barely available (Kraig 1999: p. 146), thus making it very hard to predict the adversary s behaviour. Furthermore and contrary to the Waltzian belief (Waltz 1984: p. 740), conflicts tend to escalate, as Clausewitz has already pointed out (Cimbala 1991: pp. 200). 7 Israel feared they would (Kraig 1999: 154) and set their nuclear arsenal ready to use in both 1973 and 1991 (Paul 1995: p. 712; Walton/ Gray 2007: p. 224). Sometimes states may even facilitate a potential escalation because this risk may very well pay off in the end, as a deterrent for future times, showing the opponent one is willing to go through with a strategy (Brahms/ Kilgour 1986: p. 646; with regard to the Cold War see Jervis 1980: p. 631) or to get first-strike advantages (Powell 1989: p. 61). 5. Conclusion: A continuing role for nuclear weapons In conclusion, there has been and remains a role for nuclear weapons after the end of the Cold War. It is, however, different from the Cold War s MAD deterrence (the rationality of which should not go unquestioned). While it is still not clear whether deterrence works in 100 percent of the cases and there is no causal mechanism explaining all cases of nuclear proliferation, there is still the strife for horizontal proliferation: At least a number of nation states, especially in volatile regions or perceived as a threat by the United States want to obtain nuclear weapons to deter their neighbours and/ or an intervention of the only remaining superpower. As long as there are at least some states apparently making this cost-benefit calculation, there remains a role for nuclear weapons. This does not mean that deterrence necessarily works; some states just perceive nuclear weapons at the best mean to deal with an assumed threat. This does also by no means imply that proliferation is benign, it bears high risks 7 Clausewitz points to (1) the role of emotions, (2) the decisions leaders make, and (3) the expectation about a potential escalation caused by the adversary (Cimbala 1991: pp. 200). 13

15 instead: Every potential nuclear standoff is unique, and Clausewitz already pointed to the likelihood of escalation in given situations (Cimbala 1991: pp. 200). While none of the theories for a non-role of nuclear weapons dealt with in this paper is convincing, the likelihood of a limited nuclear event appears to be the risk most likely to occur and possibly altering the thinking about nuclear weapons and the pressure on decision makers at least in Western states. This, of course, remains speculation until and if a limited nuclear event occurs. 14

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