Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych Center for International Relations. NATO and Article V. (Unauthorised text)

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1 Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych Center for International Relations Maria Wągrowska, Bartosz Wiśniewski (eds.) NATO and Article V (Unauthorised text) Report from the conference organised on March 8, 2007 within the framework of the Changing NATO and the Central and East European Agenda project carried out in cooperation with the German Marshall Fund of the United States. The Center for International Relations gratefully acknowledges the cooperation and support of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in issuing of the English version of the Report. CENTRUM STOSUNKÓW MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH ul. Emilii Plater 25, Warszawa TEL.: (22) , FAX: (22) info@csm.org.pl

2 NATO is the most efficient politico-military alliance of our times. The goal of the reform of its structures and capabilities that is currently underway is to provide it with an ability of reacting to new types of threats. From the point of view of the Polish security policy, participating in this process is of key importance said Bogusław WINID, PhD., under-secretary of state in the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Poland at the NATO and Article V conference organised by the Center for International Relations (CSM) on March 8,2007 in Warsaw. This way minister Winid made reference to the words of the president of CSM, Eugeniusz SMOLAR, who, in his speech opening the conference, had asked how NATO should react to the current threats to international security and how this reaction would affect the internal cohesion of the North Atlantic Alliance, in particular the efficiency of security guarantees included in Article V of the Washington Treaty. The conference participants included heads of analytical institutes and experts from some of the NATO member countries: professor Peter Burgess (Peace Research Institute in Oslo), professor Cornel Codita (National School for Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest), Osman Faruk Logoglu (President of the Eurasian Strategic Studies Center in Ankara), Kestutis Paulauskas (Deputy Defence Adviser at the Permanent Delegation of Latvia to NATO) and Ivo Samson, PhD (Slovak Foreign Policy Association in Bratislava). According to B. Winid Article V of the Washington Treaty is a decisive factor for the usefulness of NATO for the members of the organisation. The security guarantees found in the article are an important premise for the shaping of, among others, the Polish defence policy. The Polish deputy Defence Minister also pointed to the fact that in the future collective defence will not play a key role in the functioning of the Alliance, as had been the case during the Cold War. The evolution of the Alliance s tasks moves it away from the traditionally understood collective defence. Security guarantees under Article V will however not lose their significance, as certain countries still see the danger of a possible armed attack. All the NATO member countries may become targets of asymmetric attacks, said B. Winid, and after the 9/11 attacks such a possibility lies within the scope of Article V. Such an approach was also visible after the attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in The importance of security guarantees has been reflected in the documents of the consecutive NATO summits most recently in November 2006 in the Riga Summit Declaration, as well as in the document known as the Comprehensive Political Guidance. These documents state that participating in missions of various types, NATO should always remain capable of defending the territories of its member countries. B. Winid stressed that it is for that reason that a sound 2

3 functioning of the key mechanisms enabling NATO to defend the territories of its member countries should be ensured. The transformation of the Alliance is to strengthen the collective defence capability; an example of this being the location of elements of the command structure and military infrastructure (ports, airports) on the territories of so-called flank countries or taking into account scenarios envisaging a collective defence in defence planning and military exercises. From Poland s perspective, the placing on our territories of an AGS (Allied Ground Surveillance) base would be of key importance. This would prove that the Alliance, independently of developing its expeditionary capabilities, continues to see the importance of Article V as an effective instrument of defence against traditional threats, the speaker underlined. At the same time, it seems that with the change of the nature of the threats, Article V should be interpreted in a new manner. Not only should it pertain to the defence of the territorial integrity of the NATO member countries, but also in the interest of security perceived in a broader manner, connected with the necessity of diminishing asymmetric threats. In this context, many countries point to the issue of energy security. Minister Winid emphasised that Poland is interested in adapting the Alliance to a changing security environment. This interest is expressed in the participation in the mission of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The military presence in this country stems from the conviction that also phenomena occurring in faraway areas may be the source of threat for Polish security and that countering them should not be limited to a few chosen countries. In Minister Winid s opinion, the declarations issued by certain countries about the limitation of their military participation in Afghanistan are a reason for concern. This limitation could result in a decrease of the effectiveness of military operations against the Taliban. Minister Winid underlined that while Poland does not treat the mechanisms existing in the European Union as an alternative to the security guarantee from NATO, it does see the much desirable possibility of cooperation between the EU and NATO as an important premise for the effectiveness of various operations. At present, there is a debate concerning the most effective way of dividing tasks between the two organisations. Describing Poland s expectations towards NATO, B. Winid stated that security guarantees in the case of a hypothetical military attack are of foremost importance. A bilateral cooperation between the allies is seen as a means of strengthening the Alliance s operations and not as an alternative for them. Tadeusz Chabiera from the Polish Institute for International Affairs asked what Poland s reservations towards the present condition of NATO consist in. Minister Winid explained that national restrictions in the 3

4 operations in Afghanistan which are being introduced also by countries applying for NATO membership may be a cause of concern. Fulfilling the obligations arising from its membership in NATO, Poland follows the rule of the solidarity of allies. However, the introduction of the mentioned national restrictions may lead to breaching of the foundations of this solidarity. According to the president of the Turkish Eurasian Strategic Studies Center, Ambassador Osman Faruk Logoglu, in Turkey NATO continues to be perceived as the key institution assuring security for the Euro- Atlantic area, even if the discussion on its subject is not currently animated. NATO has kept its effectiveness as an organisation guarding the territorial integrity of its member countries, and at the same time possesses the relevant capabilities to meet new types of threats, such as, foremost, terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the importance of energy security is increasing. Ambassador Logoglu sees Article V as a fundamental provision of the Washington Treaty. It is its essence and defines the spirit of the Alliance. And yet Turkey s experiences with NATO have not been unambiguously positive. In 1964 the United States warned the government in Ankara that if it carries out a military intervention in Cyprus, NATO will not react, should there be a Soviet aggression on Turkey. Furthermore, in 1991, in the context of the Gulf War, Turkey invoked Article IV of the Washington Treaty which foresees the possibility of the member countries consulting together, should the security of one of them be threatened; however the allies did not respond to its appeal. At present, there are significant sources of instability in the vicinity of Turkey, namely Iraq, Iran s attempts to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East conflict, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Upper Karabakh, tensions in Georgia and on the Balkans. Moreover, Turkey is situated in the centre of the clash of civilisations the Christian and Muslim one; it also lies on the crossing of roads, along which pipelines used for the transport of energy resources are located. Hence Turkey is very much interested in how Article V will be enforced and what the rules of using it in the future will be. Although NATO has successfully adapted to the changing conditions and has proved a capability of inner transformations, due to the constant changes in the security environment of its member countries, this process has not yet ended. The key question is how the role of Article V should be adapted so as to face future threats. According to O.F. Logoglu, the answer should be found in the new strategic concept of NATO, which is to be adopted in Peter Burgess from the Peace Research Institute in Oslo stated that Article V and the guarantees contained therein are of key importance for the Norwegian security policy. At the same time, in his country there is 4

5 an ongoing debate about the legality of the provisions of Article V (understood as being in conformity with Norwegian law). The admissibility of the participation of Norwegian troops (Norway only has a professional army) in missions abroad is being discussed. According to Burgess, Norway is traditionally perceived as a nation with strong humanitarian and pacifistic motivations. The evolution of NATO s nature into an organisation supporting the international community s efforts for peacekeeping was met with support in that country. In Norway, there is a wide-spread and accepted view that one of the reasons for which allied countries are conducting out-of-area operations is to prove the existence of common values. Andrzej Karkoszka from the Polish Academy of National Defence asked why ambassador Logoglu had not mentioned the recent case when Turkey was let down by NATO security guarantees namely when it requested the deployment of Patriot missiles, fearing that Iraq may fire missiles with unconventional warheads after the outbreak of the war in 2003? Addressing P. Burgess, he reminded that during the Cold War Norway was one of the countries encompassed by the Alliance s procedures of contingency planning. This should have resulted in Norway having obligations in return to a certain extent towards the Alliance, while from Burgess s words it seems that the Norwegian public opinion is currently not particularly in favour of NATO. Karkoszka asked whether the reason for this could be the fact that the largest threats have been averted. Marcin Zaborowski from the European Union Institute of Studies on Security in Paris talked about the increasing euroscepticism of the Turkish society - he presented the results of a study included in the Transatlantic Trends report carried out by the German Marshall Fund of the United States 1. M. Zaborowski asked whether the improvement of relations with Russia and attempts of improving relations with Iran may be an evidence of a breakthrough in Turkey s foreign policy. Marek Madej, an analyst from the Polish Institute of International Affairs, asked about the direction of Norway s debate on energy security namely, whether it is concentrated on how NATO could be useful in guaranteeing energy security to Norway or, on the contrary how Norway can contribute to maintaining energy security of the NATO member countries. P. Burgess responded that Norway is particularly interested in a situation where its allies would help protect the country s energy resources. 1 A report from the conference organised by the Center for International Relations devoted to a discussion on the Transatlantic Trends 2006 report is to be found at An electronic version of the report (also in Polish) may be found at 5

6 Osman F. Logoglu said that in Turkey the predominating view is that NATO should react to any threat to the security of one of its member countries, hence also in the case of energy security, although it is impossible to predict what such a reaction would consist in. According to Logoglu, the refusal of deploying Patriot missiles to Turkey proves that Turkey s arguments are not always met with understanding from Western European institutions. Stressing the need of adapting Article V to new challenges in the area of security, Logoglu drew attention to the fact that this process may not be detached from the question of NATO enlargement. From Turkey s point of view, defending the integrity and power of NATO mechanisms is of foremost importance, although this does not mean that Turkey opposes to the development of the European Union s military capabilities. These capabilities may not, however, be constructed in opposition to or at the expense of NATO. Ambassador Logoglu confirmed that Turkey demonstrates increasing anti-american sentiments coupled with a decreasing support for the country s EU accession. However, according to him, it is difficult to speak about a dramatic change in Turkey s foreign policy cooperation with Euro- Atlantic institutions is of a strategic nature. In the second part of the conference chaired by Maria Wągrowska from the Center for International Relations, speeches were given by: prof. Cornel Codita (National School for Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest), Kestutis Paulauskas (Deputy Defence Adviser at the Permanent Delegation of Latvia to NATO) and Ivo Samson, PhD (Slovak Foreign Policy Association). Prof. Cornel Codita said that after the optimism of the 1990s which predicted a significant improvement of security, the current fears of the international community about security are not smaller than during the Cold War. This optimism allowed for carrying out certain changes in the functioning of the security institutions of the Western world, including NATO. However, following the September 11 attacks, pessimism began to dominate in international discourse. One of the factors that make it difficult to predict the development of the international situation is Russia's conduct, although Moscow's policies in essence reflect the attempt of preserving the country s position in the hierarchy of world powers, especially vis-à-vis the United States. The real reason, and at the same time a solid justification of why the contemporary situation is unpredictable, is the fact that many political decisions are made on the basis of ideological premises. This also pertains to NATO s decision-making process it is assumed, among others, that the Alliance will use armed forces to resolve conflicts and, afterwards, it will support nation-building, i.e. the creation of national structures and institutions the task of which will be peace-keeping. However, NATO lacks the means necessary to realise these plans. 6

7 According to professor Codita, the current understanding of Article V is incorrect. Article V defines the world by dividing it into two categories an area where an armed attack may take place (and the response will be the use of force), and an area in which there are more possibilities of reacting peacebuilding, peace-keeping missions, etc. The problem, however, is that taking actions in the second area, the Alliance still uses instruments characteristic for the first one. As a result, the effectiveness of NATO operations is limited. Kestutis Paulauskas said that Lithuania had wanted to join "the NATO of 1949", in other words, a NATO whose mission was to ensure a United States presence in Europe and to prevent the USSR from expanding into the West. At present, however, the situation has changed. This is caused, among others, by the reduction of American military presence in Europe. At the same time, shaping the security policy of their country, Lithuanian decision-makers face a major dilemma, i.e. the necessity of taking into account a situation where the actions of the Russian Federation will significantly condition Lithuania s security policy, while at the same time Russia is NATO s strategic partner. Both NATO and the European Union are organisations with global aspirations and interests, while Lithuania is focused on a regional perspective. Therefore, pursuing the country's interests, Lithuania s government must be able to think globally and act locally. It is with this in mind that the gradual "demilitarisation" of regarding security is shifting towards perceiving it in "softer" categories, such as that of energy security and a broadly understood regional stability. This in turn has caused the interest in NATO and the importance thereof in Lithuania to somewhat diminish. Currently, the main point of reference for Lithuanian foreign policy is the country s EU membership. For obvious reasons, the significance of the country s home policy is also gaining importance. In Lithuania, the provision of the Comprehensive Political Guidance, stating that collective defence will remain the core purpose of NATO, was met with support, but the discussion about the wording of the document that took place before reaching an agreement raised concerns. It had been argued that - although collective defence is the central point of NATO's activities - the meaning of Article V had changed, as its initial interpretation is only valid in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Lithuania's participation in NATO's mission in Afghanistan has a twofold justification. Firstly, it expresses Lithuania's gratitude for the security guarantees the country has received from the Alliance. Secondly, since present-day threats are of a supranational character, therefore Lithuania's first line of defence lies in Afghanistan. At the same time, questions are being raised about the actual importance of the presence of Lithuanian forces in Afghanistan for the defence of the country s national territory and about Lithuania being capable of ensuring logistic support for such an important foreign mission. 7

8 Vilnius is of the opinion that NATO's transformation should take place solely under the condition of the enforceability and credibility of Article V. On the other hand, the Lithuanian way of thinking about security is still constrained by an "old" perception of threats, foremost threats from the East. Meanwhile, this way of thinking is increasingly less present in NATO. What Paulauskas considers interesting is the transposition of the debate onto defence planning, starting from threat evaluation. Each country performs an individual evaluation on the national level, but NATO's evaluation has to be collective and multi-national. Problems stemming from this are obvious the threat of terrorism will not be the same for Great Britain and Lithuania, while Portugal is not prone to a violation of its airspace by Russia s air force to such an extent as Lithuania is. There are natural mismatches, the negative effects of which should be alleviated by the solidarity of the allies. Ivo Samson from Slovakia reminded the conference participants that the Slovakian government that has been formed last year is also made up of political forces that held power in the middle of the 1990s, when the country was "the last Central European ally of the USSR". The situation significantly changed after 1998, when a politician with strongly pro-american leanings became prime minister. It still remains uncertain whether or not the current government will once again choose a pro- Russian orientation in its foreign and security policy. Slovakia's national security strategies adopted after 1998 (the last one in September 2005) place Article V in the centre of the debate on the country's security. Slovakia s territorial integrity, sovereignty and prosperity are to be guaranteed by NATO and Slovak armed forces. At the same time, these strategies see the United States as the key ally of Slovakia in the area of security (the country s middle-term (till 2014) foreign policy strategy sees the US s role similarly), and yet this view is not so visible in the statements of the most prominent politicians, including the president and prime minister. In 2006, half of the Slovak armed forces taking part in peacekeeping missions were NATO-led. The official stand of the Slovak government does however foresee the reduction of that number. This pertains both to NATO- and US-led missions Slovakia has withdrawn its armed forces from Iraq, leaving only 11 officers who are training the Iraqi army. There are also plans to increase the number of troops taking part in UN missions. According to Samson, the real test for the Slovakia s current priorities in the area of security policy, as well as the currently predominant perception of security threats is the country s stand in the United Nations Security Council, of which it is a non-permanent member since the beginning of So far Slovakia has refrained from voting on resolutions vetoed by the US (among others on the Middle East conflict. 8

9 Andrzej Karkoszka, the former deputy Minister for National Defence, asked the panellists to define to what extent Romania, Slovakia and Lithuania may fulfil the obligations of Article V. He also asked to judge the current relevance of Article V. Ivo Samson pointed out that it is necessary to distinguish the original understanding of Article V from the present-day interpretation. The former a commitment to undertake collective actions in case of an armed attack on one of the members of the Alliance is accepted in Slovakia widely and without reservations. Meanwhile, the present-day interpretation of Article V the readiness to take part in operations in areas not encompassed by the provisions of the Treaty is manifold, as the new government of Slovakia has announced the country will only participate in such missions that guarantee success and make sense. According to Samson, if NATO is to continue to play its role of preventing the import of insecurity, it should strongly engage in exporting security to the entire world. This foresees the necessity of reinterpreting Article V by each member of the Alliance that treats its membership in NATO as the main line of its national security policy. K. Paulauskas explained that Lithuania has no choice but to have faith in the effectiveness of Article V. An alternative to that, tested in the past with not the best results, was a policy of neutrality. The rationale for such faith is the fact that the force of Article V was sufficient to discourage the USSR from aggression. At present, the deterring force of Article V does not have to be considered with such great threats or challenges. Paulauskas also said that as NATO decided to provide support for Kosovo and Afghan nationals, it is difficult to imagine it would not do the same, should the security of any of the members of the Alliance be threatened. P. Burgess said that from Norway's point of view, NATO, after having approved the new Strategic Concept in 1999, is evolving in the right direction and is seen as a useful instrument in Norway's security policy. If the issue of having no significant enemy will be solved once and for all, its usefulness will further increase. M. Zaborowski asked how one ought to interpret Jaap de Hoop Scheffer's statement NATO's Secretary General said that the current state of UE-NATO relations resembles a "frozen conflict" and that the two organisations should divide their tasks in the following manner tasks linked with civil activity should be handled by the EU and those requiring the use of force by NATO. Paweł Pietrzak, an analyst from the Department of International Security Policy in Poland s Ministry of National Defence, asked the panellists about their predictions, should the ISAF mission in Afghanistan become a failure and, in particular, how this would influence Article V. In K. Paulauskas s opinion, the division of tasks as suggested by Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has two levels the political and practical one. On 9

10 the political level, NATO declares a full readiness to cooperate with the EU. The predominant view in NATO, however, is that the EU will not completely engage in a strategic dialogue with NATO until it can be certain of the power and efficiency of the ESDP, i.e. when it matches NATO as far as its operational capabilities are concerned the EU will then not be in the position of the weaker partner. As far as the practical level is concerned, the situation of countries that are members of only one of the two organisations (NATO or the EU) seems to be the biggest problem. According to Paulauskas, solving both problems is only a question of time and of working out certain mechanisms. Such mechanisms will inevitably be developed, because NATO and the EU have cooperated or are cooperating in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Afghanistan. I. Samson judged that if the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan will end in failure, it will be necessary to re-determine the character of the entire Alliance. This would be the first failure of the Alliance since the beginning of its existence. Its consequences would be important, but are difficult to predict at present. According to K. Paulauskas, failure is not an option. The Alliance s stand towards the first offensive of the Taliban troops will play a key role for the mission s success (and for NATO s future). According to gen. Grzegorz Wiśniewski from Poland s Ministry of National Defence, currently the most important NATO instrument is the allies system of defence planning which forces one to ask questions about capabilities. Wiśniewski claims it is impossible to discuss the issue of the effectiveness and usefulness of Article V without taking into account the capabilities which enable the undertaking of operations. Marek Garztecki, PhD, from the Polish Academy of Sciences asked the panellists to give concrete examples of changes in the organisational structure of the armed forces in the various member countries which reflect changes in the perception of threats from traditional ones to the so-called asymmetric ones. According to O. Logoglu in Turkey there is a perception that adaptations need to be made to the changing conditions of the security environment. Such adaptations consisted in reducing the size of armed forces and a gradual increase of making the army professional. P. Burgess explained that the Norwegian Ministry of Defence developed a new strategic concept in It reflects the growing interest in so-called asymmetric threats, but most of all concentrates on the issue of societal security, i.e. providing security for the country s social structures. Prof. Codita drew attention to the fact that the question of capabilities may not be viewed in an abstract manner, but in connection with the goals of the security policy, with the characteristics of the planned mission (e.g. its duration). 10

11 According to K. Paulauskas, the Alliance s system of defence planning is currently a complex construction, using several smaller mechanisms, often differing in the terminology used. The biggest challenge consists in a necessary change of the way of thinking about capabilities accepting that, with an increase of the number of out-ofarea operations, it is the logistic capacities and not strictly the combat capacities that are gaining significance. The key to success is becoming not the force of the troops fire, but the capability of ensuring a sound functioning of the troops in regions that are several thousands kilometres from one another, as in Afghanistan. The transformation of Lithuanian armed forces, adapting their structure and catalogue of missions to the evolution of threats to the country s security, consisted in reducing the number of combat brigades from ten to one, followed by changing the profile of the armed forces tasks. While before the reform, the majority of tasks consisted in territorial defence, after the reform they encompass humanitarian and peacekeeping missions as well. Dr I. Samson noticed that the discussion on the issue of capabilities focuses on two key issues soft power and hard power. In his view, Europeans seem to be more in favour of the use of soft power, in other words the possibility of influencing participants of international relations by instruments other than military ones primarily economic instruments. He also reminded that the term soft power is an element of a broader concept of complex interdependence, which makes the efficiency of soft power dependent on the ability to convince the partner/opponent about the existence of a common system of values in the mutual relations. The events connected with Iran s nuclear programme prove that the lack of such common values makes soft-power instruments inefficient, which in turn leaves no alternative other than the use of hard-power instruments. Capabilities are essentially linked with the financial means the countries have at their disposal. At the NATO Prague Summit in 2002, the allies declared that their expenses in the area of security and defence will not be inferior to 2% of their respective GDPs. Many countries, including Slovakia, have not only failed to meet this commitment, but have gradually been diminishing their contribution (in 2007 it will be of 1.62% in Slovakia). According to Samson, there is no common vision of defence against new types of threats that would be shared by all the NATO member countries. This results from a different perception of capabilities required to counter these threats, and particularly the role that should be played by soft and hard power. * * * * * The conference organised within the framework of the Changing NATO and the Central and East European Agenda project carried 11

12 out by the Center for International Relations (CSM) as part of a cooperation with the German Marshall Fund of the United States was attended by ca. 60 participants. The project is carried out by the CSM International Security Programme headed by Maria Wągrowska. 12