Inflation in the GCC: An Analysis of the Causes and Implications for Monetary Policy. Economic Note No. 5

Transcription

1 Inflation in the GCC: An Analysis of the Causes and Implications for Monetary Policy Economic Note No. 5

2 Authors Dr. Nasser Saidi, Dr. Fabio Scacciavillani and Aathira Prasad Disclaimer This economic note should not be reported as representing the views of the DIFC or the Government of Dubai. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the DIFC Authority or the Government of Dubai. This Paper is published to elicit comments and to promote further debate. DIFC Economics Unit Dr. Nasser Saidi, Chief Economist Tel: Dr. Fabio Scacciavillani, Director, Macroeconomics & Statistics fabio.scacciavillani@difc.ae Tel: Aathira Prasad, Economist aathira.prasad@difc.ae Tel: Fahad Ali, Economist fahad.ali@difc.ae Tel: For enquires, please contact Dr. Nasser Saidi / Dr. Fabio Scacciavillani All Rights Reserved, June 2009

3 Table of Contents Introduction 4 Money Supply, Credit Growth and Inflation 7 Causality Tests 9 VAR Estimates 13 Conclusions 27 Appendix - Variance Decomposition of selected VAR models 28

4 1. Introduction Inflation has been a growing concern in the GCC region (Table 1), especially after many years of relative price stability and moderate inflation. Inflation rates jumped in , leading to widespread concern regarding the impact of inflation on purchasing power, real wages and contracts. Price inflation also reflected itself in the unprecedented rise in asset prices, with high growth rates of real estate prices and rental rates. With limited policy options, given fixed exchange rate policies, GCC governments resorted to various forms of price controls and subsidies to contain inflation. Rent caps (5% in Dubai and Abu Dhabi) have been set to limit the steep rise in rental rates across the UAE and Qatar. The governments of Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been actively involved in regulating the price of basic commodities. A few Memoranda of Understanding have been signed between governments and large retailers as part of this initiative to keep the price of essential consumer goods low, in particular food prices, some at 2006 levels. To compensate for inflation, governments across the GCC introduced sharp pay rises in the public sector. However, in line with past experience, price controls did not dampen the inflation rate, which actually accelerated until the summer of 2008 and in recent months has only gradually declined from record levels. This phenomenon has several roots: first of all, the exceptional growth rate in the GCC fuelled by investments financed by energy commodity revenues; second, the worldwide increase in price of food and raw materials spurred by strong expansion in populous emerging countries such as China and India; third, the depreciation of the US dollar, to which the GCC countries (with the partial exception of Kuwait) peg their currencies. Indeed, looking more closely, we notice that during the first three quarters of 2008, the food and beverage component of the consumer price indices (wherever data are available) has grown at a faster pace than the inflation rate. The GCC nations, being net food importers, faced the full impact of the rise in worldwide commodity prices. Table 1: Average inflation rates across the GCC ( ) Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar KSA UAE GCC US World * Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation (*) IMF estimate. Source: IMF, GCC Government websites, DIFC Economics. Table 1 highlights that inflation rates in the GCC countries have been as volatile as inflation in the US, but much less than world inflation. Essentially periods of high inflation in the GCC have been associated with periods of high inflation in the US, (Fig.1) but the recent inflationary outburst is definitely unusual in its magnitude. A common root of this link can be traced to high energy prices (Figure 2) which in the US affect directly the CPI and in the GCC lead to a rise in aggregate domestic demand sustained by higher export revenues. This same connection, albeit much weaker, can be detected by looking at the graph of GCC inflation and world inflation. 4 Inflation in the GCC: An Analysis of the Causes and Implications for Monetary Policy

5 Figure 1: Inflation rates in the US and the GCC from 1980 to 2008 Source: Global Insight, GCC Government websites, DIFC Economics. Table 2: Correlation matrix for inflation across GCC, US and the World: Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar KSA UAE US World Bahrain 1.00 Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE US World Source: IMF, DIFC Economics. Figure 2: Main Commodities Prices Indices Source: IMF Commodity Price Indices. Note: Base year for food and raw material indices: 1995=100; Base year for crude oil price index: 2005=100 5

6 An additional element can be attributed to fluctuations of the dollar: periods of sharp and prolonged dollar depreciation are associated with higher inflation rates in the GCC. Here the cause is obviously the effect on the price of imported goods. However, despite the attention this factor has received among professionals and the general public, Figure 3 shows that the increase in import deflator has remained remarkably stable in the face of the US dollar slump. Imported inflation in the GCC has been limited as measured in national accounts price data. However, the data might not capture reality due to a number of distortions, but in any case they should induce some caution when drawing conclusions. Figure 3: Dollar index and GCC import deflator Source: Haver Analytics. In this paper we will carry out a series of econometric estimates and tests to determine which factors contributed to the build-up of inflationary pressures in the GCC countries, considered as an aggregate economic area. We are conducting the exercise at the GCC level because of the forthcoming monetary union in the Gulf. The argument is that by fixing their exchange rates to the US dollar, the GCC countries have, by and large, run a common monetary policy. We wish to draw some lessons from the past that can guide the Gulf Central Bank, possibly without the stricture of a fixed peg to an external anchor. The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 will develop a simple monetary model and illustrate its implications for the GCC; Section 3 will report the causality tests on money and inflation, and exchange rates and inflation; Section 4 will examine the dynamics of the relationships between the variables, feedback, the response to shocks in the variables, and the relative contribution of each variable to inflation; Section 5 will provide some concluding remarks. 6 Inflation in the GCC: An Analysis of the Causes and Implications for Monetary Policy

7 2. Money Supply, Credit Growth and Inflation Our simple monetary model is primarily based on the quantity theory of money 1, which describes the relationship between money supply and inflation. Monetarists assume that velocity and the number of transactions per unit of output are relatively stable (absent changes in the factors affecting velocity, such as interest rates and payment technologies), implying that there is a direct relationship between the growth of money supply and inflation. Consumers can raise aggregate demand by increasing spending on goods and services, but the more inelastic the aggregate supply in the economy, the greater the impact on inflation. The increase in money supply could also lead to increase in the price of non-traded goods and services, while for small open economies with fixed exchange rates, increases in foreign inflation can be transmitted to the domestic economy. The direct relationship between money supply and inflation in the GCC is evident from Figure 4. Figure 4: Annual inflation rate & Broad Money growth per unit of output, Source: IMF WEO, IIF, DIFC Economics. 1 The Quantity Theory of Money states that MV = PT where M is Money Supply, V is Velocity of Circulation, P is Price level and T is Transactions or Output. 7

8 Similarly, a rise in domestic credit growth also has a direct impact on inflation (Figure 5). Credit growth originates from monetary expansion which leads to the growth of bank and other credit intermediaries balance sheets, generating an expansion of consumer and corporate credit. Periods of monetary expansion are typically associated with periods of high economic activity and upward pressure on prices and wages. More businesses borrow from banks during periods of high economic activity leading to periods of high credit growth alongside rising inflation. Figures 4 & 5 show that, on average, the GCC money supply/credit growth and inflation relationships are consistent with empirical norms and predictions of economic theory. Figure 5: Annual inflation rate and credit growth per unit of output, Source: IMF WEO, IIF, DIFC Economics. 8 Inflation in the GCC: An Analysis of the Causes and Implications for Monetary Policy

9 3. Causality Tests According to widespread belief and professional commentary, the inflation process in the GCC stems from three main factors: a) Non-traded goods and services (driven by high liquidity, excess aggregate demand and infrastructure bottlenecks in housing and transport); b) International commodity prices (food prices in particular, but also raw materials) c) US dollar weakness resulting from long-standing imbalances in the US current account and related low-saving ratios. The latter two factors are linked (Fig. 6): US dollar depreciation, ceteris paribus, leads to higher international commodity prices (as they are commonly denominated in USD). Figure 6: High positive correlation between the food commodity index and the euro Source: IMF, Bloomberg, DIFC Economics. In order to test and statistically confirm or reject these beliefs, we run a battery of Granger causality tests between the exchange rate, money supply and oil prices on one side and inflation on the other, using aggregate data for the GCC countries. We use quarterly data between 1991 and 2008 on GCC aggregate money supply, oil prices, dollar-euro exchange rate index, import prices, value of imports, and various commodity indices, to verify the direction of causality and the magnitude of each variable s impact on the GCC inflation rate between 1991 and The quarterly data for the GCC have been collected from the Global Insight and Haver Analytics databases, with latest updates from the GCC governments websites. The commodity indices are taken from the IMF database. Unfortunately data on the price of non-traded goods and services are not available for the GCC and reported price indices do not allow us to separate traded from non-traded goods and services, so little can be said on their impact. This means that the relative impact of domestic and external factors cannot be assessed with much precision. We will elaborate on this issue in Section 5. In general, data availability is limited, and often the data are of questionable quality. Table 3 reports the Granger causality (GC) test results for pair-wise groups of variables at different lags. Before illustrating the results, we wish to stress that Granger causality helps to determine whether data, on the realisation of one variable, can improve the forecast of another, beyond the own history of a variable. In this 9

10 sense it is a much weaker notion than what is meant by causality in colloquial language. Note that the GC test involves a rejection of the null hypothesis x does not GC y at a particular confidence level, so the lower the probability in the last column of Table 3 the more likely it is that the first variable Granger causes the second. Adopting a more formal language, we can say by looking at the first test in Table 3, that we reject the null hypothesis that money supply in the GCC does not Granger cause CPI inflation in the GCC at 0.02% confidence when we run the test with lag length set to 1. Likewise we cannot reject the null hypothesis that CPI inflation does not Granger cause money supply at 35.0% confidence. Increasing the number of lags up to four, the results of the GC test for money supply and inflation do not change, but when the lag length is increased to six, neither variable can help predict the other. The sensitivity of the GC test to the lag length is a notorious problem in empirical analysis. Given our limited sample size, increasing the lag length weakens the asymptotic properties of the estimates; therefore, we consider more reliable the results for shorter lags. In conclusion, the empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that money supply does appear to strongly Granger cause inflation in the GCC. For other pair-wise GC tests the number of lags has a more pronounced effect, pointing at some ambiguity in the results (due possibly to the short sample size). For example, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that CPI does not Granger cause US dollar exchange rate index and vice versa at conventional confidence levels, but if we were willing to accept a 10% error, with two lags, CPI inflation would Granger cause FX, while with four lags the opposite holds true. These kinds of results in our view underline that the relationship between the two variables in question is essentially not stable enough for drawing any solid conclusions. The results may also be due to a third variable affecting both CPI and FX. Another important result is that oil price fluctuations do not Granger cause inflation. Strong as it might be, this statistical result is consistent with the fact that Gulf oil exporters do not adjust the domestic prices of energy in line with international prices. The last GC tests in Table 3 focus on the import price deflator. In the absence of a reliable import deflator series for the GCC, we use a proxy, constructed as the equal weighted average of the US and Euroland export deflator. The import deflator fluctuation Granger causes inflation (but not vice versa) at short lag, but as the lag length increases, Granger causation disappears. By and large, the Granger causality tests in Table 3 are in line with what one would expect from economic theory, i.e. money supply and import prices have an impact on inflation. Oil prices, on the contrary, do not Granger cause inflation since administered retail energy prices are not adjusted to reflect international prices. An extra battery of GC tests is presented in Table 4. These tests are not very sensitive to the lag lengths; therefore, we just show the result for lag three. 10 Inflation in the GCC: An Analysis of the Causes and Implications for Monetary Policy

11 Table 3: Pair-Wise Granger Causality Tests for Inflation Null Hypothesis: Lag 1 F-Statistic Prob. Money supply does not Granger cause CPI CPI does not Granger cause money supply Null Hypothesis: Lag 4 F-Statistic Prob. Money supply does not Granger cause CPI CPI does not Granger cause money supply Null Hypothesis: Lag 6 F-Statistic Prob. Money supply does not Granger cause CPI CPI does not Granger cause money supply Null Hypothesis: Lag 1 F-Statistic Prob. CPI does not Granger cause FX FX does not Granger cause CPI Null Hypothesis: Lag 2 F-Statistic Prob. CPI does not Granger cause FX FX does not Granger cause CPI Null Hypothesis: Lag 4 F-Statistic Prob. CPI does not Granger cause FX FX does not Granger cause CPI Null Hypothesis: Lag 1 F-Statistic Prob. CPI does not Granger cause OIL OIL does not Granger cause CPI Null Hypothesis: Lag 4 F-Statistic Prob. CPI does not Granger cause OIL OIL does not Granger cause CPI Null Hypothesis: Lag 1 F-Statistic Prob. CPI does not Granger cause Imp defl Imp defl does not Granger cause CPI Null Hypothesis: Lag 4 F-Statistic Prob. CPI does not Granger cause Imp defl Imp defl does not Granger cause CPI

12 As one would expect, oil prices GC export prices in the major economies and also money supply in the GCC, but Table 4 also shows that money supply in the GCC causes the import deflator which is obviously a spurious result stemming from the fact that both money supply and import deflator are GC by oil prices. In other words, high oil prices lead to current account surpluses, an increase in international reserves and hence acceleration in money supply growth. Table 4: Additional Pair wise Granger Causality Tests Null Hypothesis: Lag 3 F-Statistic Prob. Money Supply does not Granger Cause Imp defl Imp defl does not Granger Cause Money Supply OIL does not Granger Cause Imp defl Imp defl does not Granger Cause OIL OIL does not Granger Cause Money supply Money supply does not Granger Cause OIL Having established these stylised facts on Granger causality, we turn to an econometric estimation of the dynamic relationship between inflation and its determinants, taking into account potential feedback from inflation on other variables. 12 Inflation in the GCC: An Analysis of the Causes and Implications for Monetary Policy

13 4. VAR Estimates In this section we use a standard Vector Auto Regression (VAR) 2 model to examine how inflation responds to shocks in broad money growth, oil prices, commodity and raw materials prices, and the US dollar exchange rate index. The variables included in the VAR model are consumer price inflation (CPI_GCC) and broad money growth (M_GCC) for the GCC region, the euro-dollar index (FX) to capture fluctuations in the US dollar against major currencies, nominal oil revenues of the GCC (NOM_OR), and world inflation for food commodity (Food_PC), raw materials (Rawmat_PC) and metals (Metal_PC). We take the percentage changes of all variables and adopt the Schwartz Information Criterion together with the Hannan and Quinn criterion to determine the optimal number of lags, which for all models, partly due to the limited sample size, turns out to be 1. The model results (forecast variance decompositions and impulse responses are based on the Cholesky decomposition) are reported in Exhibits 1-10, with the order of variables in each VAR being determined by their relative exogeneity. The analysis proceeds in stages. First, we run a VAR with three variables, i.e. money supply growth, oil prices and inflation. We then add external factors such as the exchange rate, the import deflator, the nominal effective exchange rate, and commodity and food price inflation. Unfortunately, one important contributory factor to inflation, wage growth, cannot be analysed for lack of data, nor can we estimate the effect of real income, because neither quarterly GDP figures nor industrial production are available. The only meaningful proxy for economic activity is imports because in these economies both consumption and investment goods come predominantly from abroad. The impulse response functions 3 in Exhibit 1 essentially suggest that inflation is affected mostly by money supply. Its impact peaks after three quarters and strongly persists even after ten quarters. Money supply however is quite sensitive to changes in oil prices, although the effects tend to fade after one year. Hence, from this simple model one can conclude that oil prices have an impact on inflation through the channel of changes in the current account affecting international reserves, the monetary base and hence monetary aggregates. 2 Vector Auto Regression (VAR) is a flexible and easy-to-use econometric tool used to capture the interlinkages among multiple economic variables. A VAR is an n-equation, n variable linear model in which each variable is influenced by its own lagged values, and by current and past values of the other n-1 variables. 3 The impulse response functions trace the effect of a one-standard deviation shock in each variable on all the others over the number of periods indicated on the horizontal axis. 13

14 Exhibit 1: Impulse response functions for a three variable model (oil, broad money growth & inflation) with 1 lag Removing the oil prices from the VAR and substituting the dollar-euro exchange rate index, (Exhibit 2) confirms that the major effect on inflation is exerted by money supply. The exchange rate movements are much less important and in particular in the equation for inflation the coefficient of the exchange rate (not reported here) is not significant. 14 Inflation in the GCC: An Analysis of the Causes and Implications for Monetary Policy

15 Exhibit 2: Impulse response functions for a three-variable model (exchange rate, broad money growth & inflation) with 1 lag In order to verify if economic activity has any influence on money and inflation, we run a VAR with nominal oil revenues (expressed in US dollars). The result, depicted in Exhibit 3, indicates that shocks to this variable influence both money and inflation, but the role of money supply shocks remains predominant in explaining inflation persistence, while money supply is neither influenced by inflation nor by growth in oil revenues. The same VAR with the addition of the food prices index as an exogenous variable yields similar results; the only notable change is that the impulse response function of money supply to inflation is always flat. 15

16 Exhibit 3: Impulse response functions for a three-variable model (nominal oil revenues, broad money growth & inflation) with 1 lag When running a VAR with four variables oil, dollareuro index, money supply and CPI inflation (Exhibit 4) we observe that the exchange rate and the oil price display scant importance in the inflationary dynamics, while money supply remains the dominant factor. Essentially, when adding the exchange rate to the model in Exhibit 1, the only significant change is that the effect of oil prices on money supply is dampened by the effect of the exchange rate on money supply. 4 4 Another specification substitutes the exchange rate index for the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) for Saudi Arabia, which, in the absence of a NEER for the GCC as a whole, is used as a proxy. Again, the main effect on inflation comes from money supply, but in this specification the effect of the exchange rate on the money supply is negative, and there is even a noticeable effect of NEER on oil prices, which reduces the impulse of money supply on inflation. These results are rather implausible in our view and underline the fact that either NEER for Saudi Arabia is not a good proxy for the entire region or that NEER is not a good measure of the effects of currency movements. 16 Inflation in the GCC: An Analysis of the Causes and Implications for Monetary Policy

17 Exhibit 4: Impulse response functions for a four-variable model (oil prices, exchange rate, broad money growth & inflation) with 1 lag When replacing oil prices as an exogenous variable in a three-variable VAR with the food commodity price index (Exhibit 5), the raw materials index or the metals index (these latter results are not reported here), the results do not change appreciably in terms of the effect of money supply on inflation, but international food prices do have a stronger effect on inflation than oil prices (as can be seen from the variance decomposition on the next page). 17

18 Table 5: Variance Decomposition Variance Decomposition of the model: Food, Oil, Money growth& Inflation Variance Decomposition of FOOD: Period S.E. FOOD OIL M_GCC CPI_GCC Variance Decomposition of OIL: Period S.E. FOOD OIL M_GCC CPI_GCC Variance Decomposition of M_GCC: Period S.E. FOOD OIL M_GCC CPI_GCC Variance Decomposition of CPI_GCC: Period S.E. FOOD OIL M_GCC CPI_GCC These results are consistent with oil prices capturing the effect of increased international reserves and capital inflows affecting money growth, while food prices- for any given exchange rate- proxy for imported inflation. Raw materials and metals prices on the contrary have a very weak effect on both inflation and money supply. These results, in other words, suggest that international food prices exert a direct impact on CPI inflation stronger than the expansionary effect of higher oil price, because given the fixed exchange rate ceteris paribus the food price affects a large CPI component. Even when we add oil prices as an exogenous variable in this three-variables VAR the result change minimally as the coefficients on oil price are small and not significant. 18 Inflation in the GCC: An Analysis of the Causes and Implications for Monetary Policy

19 Exhibit 5: Impulse response functions for a three-variable model (food prices, broad money growth & inflation) with 1 lag and oil prices as an exogenous variable Exhibit 6 and 7 depict a four-variable VAR with the percentage change in the raw materials index and oil prices, respectively. The impulse response functions are almost identical, with the only noticeable difference being the effect of raw materials on the money supply. In practice, raw material prices have a more pronounced effect on broad money than on oil prices. And in Exhibit 6, compared to Exhibit 7, broad money has a larger impact on inflation, while the effect of the exchange rate devaluation is marginally smaller and the decays a bit slower. Variations in the raw materials index have a much more powerful effect on broad money than on inflation, and a notable effect on the dollar index. 19

20 Exhibit 6: Impulse response functions for a four-variable model (exchange rate, raw material prices, broad money growth & inflation) with 1 lag Another VAR specification in Exhibit 8 uses an import deflator rather than an exchange rate index to capture more precisely the effect of currency fluctuations on domestic inflation. The lower graph on the left-hand side shows that the effect of import prices is markedly stronger than that of foreign exchange, even stronger than money supply (which continues to be a notable factor, as in all previous VARs). 20 Inflation in the GCC: An Analysis of the Causes and Implications for Monetary Policy

21 Exhibit 7: Impulse response functions for a four-variable model (import deflator, oil prices, broad money growth & inflation) with 1 lag 21

22 Exhibit 8: Impulse response functions for a five-variable model (import deflator, food prices, oil prices, broad money growth & inflation) with 1 lag To highlight even more starkly this phenomenon we run a five-variable VAR with the FX index in place of the import deflator (see Exhibit 9). It emerges that FX movements influence inflation only when they translate (arguably with some delay) into higher import prices. Actually, by running a bivariate VAR (not reported here) we see that this direct pass-through effect is almost nil or, to make a more accurate statement, the data do not display a noticeable regular and systematic effect of exchange rate movements on import prices. 22 Inflation in the GCC: An Analysis of the Causes and Implications for Monetary Policy

23 Exhibit 9: Impulse response functions for a five-variable model (oil prices, food prices, exchange rate, broad money growth & inflation) with 1 lag The overall conclusion can be summarised as follows: import prices (from Europe and the US) have a major impact on inflation, with money supply playing a somewhat weaker role. International food prices and oil prices also have a significant impact. Exhibit 10 displays the impulse responses from a specification that uses nominal oil revenues as a measure of economic activity and adds non-fuel commodity prices (assumed exogenous). The interesting impulse responses are shown in the last row. Inflation has a strong autoregressive element but is also caused by money supply shocks, while the influence of real activity is minor. 23

24 Exhibit 10: Impulse response functions for a three-variable model (nominal oil revenues, broad money growth & inflation) with 1 lag and non-fuel commodity prices as exogenous The variance decomposition table for the same model shows that oil revenues account for less than 10% of the variance, while money supply shocks contribute to almost 50%, with the rest attributed to the autoregressive part. The coefficients of nonfuel commodity prices are small and often not very significant (other VAR models in the Appendix). 24 Inflation in the GCC: An Analysis of the Causes and Implications for Monetary Policy

25 Table 6: Variance Decomposition Variance Decomposition of the model: Nominal Oil revenues, Money growth & Inflation Variance Decomposition of NOM_OR: Period S.E. NOM_OR M_GCC CPI_GCC Variance Decomposition of M_GCC: Period S.E. NOM_OR M_GCC CPI_GCC Variance Decomposition of CPI_GCC: Period S.E. NOM_OR M_GCC CPI_GCC We have run VAR with the same variables as in Exhibit 10, substituting the price of oil for oil revenues and obtaining similar results (not surprisingly); furthermore, adding LIBOR to the set of variables does not change the picture appreciably. 25

26 Exhibit 11: Impulse response functions for a four-variable model (nominal oil revenues, LIBOR, broad money growth & inflation) with 1 lag 26 Inflation in the GCC: An Analysis of the Causes and Implications for Monetary Policy

27 5. Conclusions We have conducted an empirical analysis of inflation in the GCC countries over the period 1980 to 2008, using quarterly data. In our analysis seeking to determine the factors influencing inflationary pressures in the GCC countries, money supply in the region comes up as the foremost factor. In fact, the Vector Auto Regression analysis starting with a simple threevariable model and expanded to more complex specifications highlights that even when we look simultaneously at variables such as the exchange rate and commodity prices, the influence of money supply shocks predominates in the inflationary process. International factors such as the foreign exchange rate, and food and raw material prices (which were rising in the first half of 2008) historically have had less influence on inflation in the GCC region. Monetary fluctuations are the major determinant of inflation fluctuations in the GCC over the period Our results imply that monetary stabilisation and control is at the root of the control and stabilisation of inflation. our analysis on the GCC because we wish to analyse the policy implications from the perspective of a future Gulf Central Bank, which will be entrusted with monetary policy responsibilities once the GCC countries form the Gulf Monetary Union. In this framework our results highlight first and foremost the importance of an independent monetary policy. Given the region s peg to the dollar (with the exception of Kuwait), the GCC central banks have been forced to mirror the Fed s monetary policy cycle with real interest rates turning negative at times; this has, in turn, led to an increase in domestic lending, which resulted in excess liquidity, fuelling domestic inflation further. Containing inflationary pressures would have required putting a lid on domestic demand, addressing the non-tradables inflation and easing supply bottlenecks (e.g. the real estate sector) through a tighter monetary policy, which the peg to the dollar prevented. It is important to note that a country-specific empirical analysis could produce different results than those at the aggregate GCC level. However, we are conducting 27

28 Appendix -Variance Decomposition of selected VAR models Variance Decomposition of the model: Food, Money growth& Inflation (Oil prices exogenous) Variance Decomposition of FOOD: Period S.E. FOOD M_GCC CPI_GCC Variance Decomposition of M_GCC: Period S.E. FOOD M_GCC CPI_GCC Variance Decomposition of CPI_GCC: Period S.E. FOOD M_GCC CPI_GCC Inflation in the GCC: An Analysis of the Causes and Implications for Monetary Policy

29 Variance Decomposition of the model: Exchange rate, Raw material, Money growth& Inflation Variance Decomposition of FX: Period S.E. FX RAW_MAT M_GCC CPI_GCC Variance Decomposition of RAW_MAT: Period S.E. FX RAW_MAT M_GCC CPI_GCC Variance Decomposition of M_GCC: Period S.E. FX RAW_MAT M_GCC CPI_GCC

30 Variance Decomposition of the model: Exchange rate, Raw material, Money growth& Inflation (continued) Variance Decomposition of CPI_GCC: Period S.E. FX RAW_MAT M_GCC CPI_GCC Inflation in the GCC: An Analysis of the Causes and Implications for Monetary Policy

31 Variance Decomposition of the model: Imported inflation, Food, Oil, Money growth & Inflation Variance Decomposition of IMP_INF: Period S.E. IMP_INF FOOD OIL M_GCC CPI_GCC Variance Decomposition of FOOD: Period S.E. IMP_INF FOOD OIL M_GCC CPI_GCC Variance Decomposition of OIL: Period S.E. IMP_INF FOOD OIL M_GCC CPI_GCC

32 Variance Decomposition of the model: Imported inflation, Food, Oil, Money growth & Inflation (continued) Variance Decomposition of M_GCC: Period S.E. IMP_INF FOOD OIL M_GCC CPI_GCC Variance Decomposition of CPI_GCC: Period S.E. IMP_INF FOOD OIL M_GCC CPI_GCC Inflation in the GCC: An Analysis of the Causes and Implications for Monetary Policy

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