Technical Trends in Recent Targeted Attacks
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1 Technical Trends in Recent Targeted Attacks Gábor Pék (CrySyS) Budapest University of Technology and Economics joint work with Boldizsár Bencsáth, Levente Buttyán, and Márk Félegyházi
2 HOW DID I GET HERE? 2
3 3
4 1 4
5 2 1 5
6 Seems to be a correct invitation, but can be a perfect spear phishing attack
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10 1 It is not a spam. The is 2 3 correct. Vangelis is a great host as far as I am concerned. I've spoken at POC and confirm that it is one of the nicest conferences and hosts around
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13 2 3 I got a mail from Andrei. He was a good speaker of POC last year
14 WHY CRYSYS LAB? 14
15 Stuxnet (June 2010) the Most Menacing Malware in History (Kim Zetter, Wired) Targeted the Natanz nuclear enrichment plant in Iran Modified PLCs (Programmable Logic Controllers) Destroyed hundreds of uranium centrifuges 15
16 Our contributions to Duqu case (Aug Discovery, naming, and first analysis of Duqu (large similarities with Stuxnet) Identification of the dropper (MS Word document with a 0-day Windows kernel exploit) Development of the Duqu Detector Toolkit (opensource, focuses on heuristic anomaly detection)
17 The skywiper/flame case (May 2012) CrySyS Lab participated in an international collaboration to investigate skywiper/flame (corresponding samples: Gauss, MiniFlame/SPE) ~ victims Middle East (Iran, Sudan)
18 Dates of the skywiper/flame case National CERT of IRAN analyses a malware called Flamer (May 27, 2012) CrySyS Lab releases an initial report on a malware called skywiper (May 28, 2012) Kaspersky Lab releases details about their work on Flame (May 28, 2012) 18
19 Miniduke FireEye found a document with 0-day PDF exploit (Feb 12, 2013) PDFs with same 0-days, but different malware module were also found
20 High-profile targets of MiniDuke We expected the use of these against high-profile targets We found ~60 victim IP addresses Many high profile targets in governments and organizations (including NATO)
21 TeamSpy Hungarian National Security Authority asks for our help on an already identified attack (March 2013) We analyzed new samples and investigated various C2 servers We obtained victim lists
22 TeamSpy Multiple waves of attack campaign (from 2004 or earlier) Use of two main malware technologies standard botnet client Teamviewer DLL
23 TeamSpy Likely use of watering hole attack e.g., based on Java exploit Some tools were already known by A/Vs BUT, the whole story was never identified
24 Motivation for the presentation 2006: Shady Rat 2007: Sinowal Trojan and variants 2008: Backshot Yankee 2009: GhostNet 2010: Stuxnet, Hydraq (Aurora), Quackbot 2011: Duqu, Nitro attacks (Poison Ivy) 2012: Flame, MiniFlame (SPE), Gauss 2013: Red October, MiniDuke, Teamspy, Korplug, Kisuky, Hormesu, Janicab, NetTraveler, Icefog, Rarstone, Gh0st RAT, Korhigh, Opsiness, Kimsuky 24
25 Aspects of technical trends Exploitation Attacker techniques Reconnaissance Under the Radar Encryption Compression Modularity and code reuse C2 communication and infrastructure Code signing High profile targets Stealthiness and persistency Goal of Attackers 25
26 EXPLOITATION 26
27 Trend: Use of known and unknown exploits Professional attackers use sophisticated zero-day exploits BUT, other groups prefer known exploits in the first place 27
28 Use of known exploits NetTraveler (CVE , CVE ) Terminator RAT (CVE ) Rarstone (CVE ) EvilGrab (CVE ) BLYPT (CVE ) IceFog (CVE , CVE , CVE , CVE ) Janicab (CVE ) MiniDuke (CVE ) 28
29 Appearance of zero-days Stuxnet (CVE ) Duqu (CVE ) + 9 corresponding CVEs Zero-day platform: The Elderwood platform Adobe Flash Player (CVE ,CVE ) Microsoft IE (CVE ) Microsoft XML Core (CVE ) 29
30 Example: Duqu dropper Duqu dropper was a.doc file with embedded font (Dexter) Font exploited a Windows kernel vulnerability (CVE )
31 Dropper structure Word document Character string that uses Dexter :) in size 4 Embedded font file Dexter with exploit
32 Dropper font file logical structure Exploit stage gaining control kernel space Stage 0 decrypting Stage 1 (tiny code) Stage 1 initializations and decompression Stage 2 Stage 2 kernel driver to load User Space stage 1 User Space stage 1 injects Stage 2 User Space stage 2 installs malware Main PNF (compressed with Duqu LZO-like compression) compressed
33 Duqu exploit demo
34 ATTACKER TECHNIQUES 34
35 Trend: Spear phishing and watering whole Most of the time attackers use spear phishing s However, watering hole attacks are getting more and more popular 35
36 Spear phising Victims get an with attachments Documents (DOC, PDF, RTF) Compressed file formats (ZIP, RAR) Attachments are typically drive-by-downloaders Examples (Duqu, Miniduke, EvilGrab, NetTraveler, RARSTONE etc) 36
37 Watering hole attack 1 insert exploit Legitimate site 2 visited by victims visit site Attackers choose a site possibly visited by victims 3 download malware victim 4 attacker control 37
38 Example: VOHO attack campaign (June 2012) Attacker: the China-based Hidden Lynx Target: US defence contractors However, files are protected by Bit9's trusted file signing infrastructure 38
39 Example: VOHO attack campaign cont. Use of watering hole attack against Bit9 Theft of the company s code signing certificates Goal: Sign malicious files with Bit9 s protection 39
40 RECONNAISSANCE 40
41 Trend: Systematic reconnaissance Use of well-known network scanners for vulnerability exploration Try to exploit known vulnerabilities with known exploits BUT, direct attacks via 0-days are appearing 41
42 Example: Clever Kitten Found by CrowdStrike (April 2013) Attackers: Indicators point to the Islamic Republic of Iran 42
43 Example: Clever Kitten s reconnaissance Use of Acunetix Web vulnerability scanner PHP backdoor is uploaded via an exploitable site Use of additional tools for lateral movement Packet sniffers to capture credentials Additional vulnerability scanners 43
44 Contrast Example: Duqu s reconnaissance Information gathering about victims Use of spear phishing with an attached 0day DOC file 44
45 UNDER THE RADAR 45
46 Trend: Stealthy C2 Communication Use of image headers in C2 communications recently Goal: mislead perimeter defenses 46
47 Example: MiniDuke drive-by-download 13 bytes long GIF header + encrypted executable 47
48 Example: Duqu data exfiltration + C2 comm. 48
49 Trend: Rare server-side polimorphism Rare server-side polimorphism However, the name of samples, the name of modules, the configuration and C&C servers are different 49
50 Example: Different sample names of MiniDuke gif gif gif gif gif gif gif gif gif gif gif gif bg_aefk.gif bg_afvd.gif bg_dafd.gif bg_dasfs.gif bg_dfdsh.gif bg_dfell.gif bg_dfesik.gif bg_dfeu.gif bg_dfew.gif bg_dfews.gif bg_dflj.gif bg_dfoiu.gif bg_dfrio.gif bg_dfwe.gif bg_dsaf.gif bg_dsaffe.gif bg_dsef.gif bg_dsert.gif bg_dwed.gif bg_edf.gif bg_edf_v2.gif bg_edfsa.gif bg_edse.gif bg_eefds.gif bg_efd.gif bg_efdse.gif bg_efed.gif bg_efwe.gif bg_ekjf.gif bg_ekks.gif bg_elfj.gif bg_elj.gif bg_esd.gif bg_ewfed.gif bg_ewwe.gif bg_fdfe.gif bg_fed.gif bg_fefsf.gif bg_fked.gif bg_fwds.gif bg_kefs.gif bg_kei.gif bg_keio.gif bg_kje.gif bg_kkf.gif bg_koe.gif bg_ldfe.gif bg_leo.gif bg_lfe.gif bg_lkje.gif bg_lkjkef.gif bg_oef.gif bg_ojlro.gif bg_qdf.gif bg_qrg.gif bg_rie.gif bg_ruie.gif bg_sasd.gif bg_sdef.gif bg_sdefk.gif bg_sfef.gif bg_ureio.gif bg_wdf.gif 50
51 ENCRYPTION 51
52 Trend: Frequent use of simple ciphers Frequent use of Vigenere-like ciphers or simpler symmetric key algorithms (e.g., XOR, RC4 etc) 52
53 Example: Understading Flame s update process Flame abuses Windows Update to install malware components Modified cabinet files (.cab) are download from update server First stage:.cab files install a loader (wusetupv.exe or similar)
54 Flame cabinet file decryption.cab files are RC4 encrypted inside an undocumented table format in mscrypt.dat
55 mscrypt.dat table format Record oriented table format Records are padded to N*13 bytes and have an ID at the end (very odd idea!)
56 mscrypt.dat table format Two major record types Name (type 3) Data binary string integer (type 4) (type 5) (type 6)
57 mscrypt.dat table linked list format Each name record has a pointer to the corresponding data and the previous name record
58 mscrypt.dat name record (type 3)
59 mscrypt.dat name record 4-byte length
60 mscrypt.dat name record pointer to data record
61 mscrypt.dat data record length
62 mscrypt.dat data record value
63 mscrypt.dat record ID
64 mscrypt.dat pointer to previous name record
65 The cabinet files in mscrypt.dat - binary (type 4)
66 The cabinet files in mscrypt.dat - length
67 Wuident.cab RC4 encrypted + 4bytes ID Wuident.cab encrypted + 4bytes ID
68 Cabinet files: Use of modified RC4 Flame s RC4 uses 104-byte keys as described by Aleks Gostev Strange key length!
69 Cabinet files: Use of modified RC4 However, the code contains a 100-byte long key string only Extended by 4 pieces of 0x00 bytes (can be used for key diversification)
70 Trend: Appearance of advanced encryptions Appearance of asymmetric key encryption (e.g., RSA) and advanced symmetric key algorihtms (e.g., Twofish, AES) 70
71 Example: SPE s C2 communication The most detailed report contained some errors and missed some details Elvis_and_his_friends
72 SPE s C2 communication (original analysis) 72
73 SPE s real C2 communication (no layers) XOR Twofish Twofish
74 Example: SPE uses Twofish for C2 comm. SPE s Twofish algorithm was not detailed (e.g., uses CBC mode)
75 SPE s 4-byte header
76 SPE s 16-byte IV for Twofish
77 SPE s encrypted part (padded CBC block)
78 SPE s Twofish content unencrypted
79 COMPRESSION 79
80 Trend: Use of comprerssion algorithms Use of either unmodified or modified versions of known compression algorithms E.g., LZMA, LZO, Bzip 80
81 Example: Decompressor in Duqu dropper Duqu dropper decompressor seg000:000011c0 000 lea eax, [ebx+eax*4] seg000:000011c3 000 mov ecx, eax seg000:000011c5 000 mov eax, [ecx] seg000:000011c7 000 mov edx, [ebp-0ch] seg000:000011ca 000 shr edx, 0Bh ; seg000:000011cd 000 mul edx seg000:000011cf 000 cmp eax, [ebp-10h] seg000:000011d2 000 jbe short loc_11fc seg000:000011d4 000 mov [ebp-0ch], eax seg000:000011d7 000 mov edx, 800h seg000:000011dc 000 sub edx, [ecx] ; seg000:000011de 000 shr edx, 5 ; seg000:000011e1 000 add [ecx], edx LZMA at mov ecx,[edi] mov edx,eax shr edx,0bh imul edx,ecx cmp [ebp+0ch],edx mov esi,[ebp-10h] mov eax,edx mov edx,800h sub edx,ecx shr edx,5 add edx,ecx xor ecx,ecx
82 Example: Duqu dropper compression We found very similar code chunks in LZMA However, we could not find an identical implementation
83 Duqu dropper decompression/recompression We ran Duqu decompressor to decompress the payload And Re-compressed with LZMA
84 LZMA dictionary sizes We got back the original byte stream with d16 dictionary size (lzma.exe e Zd Zdc -a1 -d16) The default lzma.exe dictionary size is d22 84
85 Duqu dropper LZMA verified
86 MODULARITY AND CODE REUSE 86
87 Trend: Use of known and unknown modules Attackers build code from either self-made or external modules E.g., Putty, Socks proxy, VNC, keyloggers 87
88 Example: Use of known modules Stuxnet: LZO Duqu: ~LZMA, LZO Flame: putty, SQLite, libbz2, zlib, Lua Teamspy: Teamviewer Zeus (RCApp): VNC 88
89 What about licenses? LZO: GPL LZMA: LGPL, Common Public License Putty: MIT license SQLite: public domain libbz2: BSD-style license zlib: very permissive zlib_license Lua: MIT license Teamviewer: commercial product 89
90 Example: Duqu s self-made screen recorder First, a full screen is captured in 16 colors (Saved as BMP with missing header) and only incremental parts are saved afterwards (This was a joint work with one of our students, Roland Kamarás)
91 A sample for incremental screen capture data
92 Incremental screen capture (complicated format)
93 Sample - Inremental image 1
94 Sample Incremental image 2
95 Sample merged image with incr. parts
96 C2 COMMUNICATION 96
97 Trend: Use of social media No IRC and peer-to-peer C2 communication Advanced tricks: google queries, social media 97
98 Example: MiniDuke uses social media Initial web page queries (DNS resolve?) - port TCP/80 - HTTP twitter.com port TCP/443 - SSL port TCP/80 HTTP Google search strings lufefihkljflkwpr HkyeiIDKiroLaKYr lufefihkdrolakyr 98
99 Example: MiniDuke C2 URLs on Twitter The weather is good today. Sunny! uri!wp07vkkxyt3mne5uidkz4il/iw48ge/ewg== Albert, my cousin. He is working hard. uri!wp07vkkxymfnkwn2nbmx4ch/iu2c+gjow39hb phl My native town was ruined by tornado. uri!wp07vkkxyt3md/jonlhzrl2fjjy8l2it 99
100 Sample twitter message used by MiniDuke 100
101 C2 INFRASTRUCTURE 101
102 Trend: dedicated C2 infrastructure Use of dedicated C2 servers (mostly http) These are either hacked sites or paid servers 102
103 Example: Hacked sites for MiniDuke s C2 103
104 Example: Paid C2 servers of Teamspy R2bnetwork.org Krepov Bogdan Serafimovich Registered Kortopla.org Registered Registered Newslite.org Planetanews.org Uses Sample 539b0094e07e43bfced8a415ba5c84e3 TeamViewer network Bulbanews.org C&C status comms TV Comms Old C&C comms Politnews.org Title contains politnews string Uses HU victim FTP comms Bannetwork.org
105 Trend: Stealthiness influences the C2 infrastructure Stealthiness influences the number of victims per C2 E.g., Duqu: ~20 / Teamspy: ~1000 / Flame: ~10000 / ~100 ~100
106 Example: Flame C&Cs Kaspersky + OpenDNS
107 Example: Flame C&Cs Kaspersky + OpenDNS
108 Example: Flame C&Cs Kaspersky + OpenDNS
109 Example: Flame C&Cs Kaspersky + OpenDNS
110 Example: Flame C&Cs Kaspersky + OpenDNS
111 CODE SIGNING 111
112 Trend: Evading digital signatures Professional attackers enforce valid code signing Other groups simply evade verification 112
113 Example: The fake (but valid) cert. of Flame chains up to the MS root can be used for code signing! looks valid 113
114 Example: The valid certificate used by Duqu Issued by: VeriSign 114
115 Example: Evading verification by DLL preloading DLL preloading allows for automatic DLL file load Original DLL is replaced on the disk 115
116 Example: Evading verification by DLL preloading Digital signatures are verified on main executable but, not on loadable modules E.g., EvilGrab Teamspy (advapi32.dll) 116
117 Example: Teamspy DLL in signed Teamviewer 117
118 HIGH PROFILE TARGETS 118
119 Trend: Everybody can be a target All sectors are infected 119
120 Red October: Jan 2013 (report from Kaspersky) 120
121 APT1 victims (report from Mandiant) 121
122 Nettraveler: June 2013 (report from Kaspersky) 122
123 TeamViewer dashboard at the attackers
124 PERSISTENCY AND STEALTHINESS 124
125 Trend: Tradeoff between persistency and stealthiness Tradeoff between persistency and stealthiness 125
126 Examples: Duqu and Flame Duqu erases itself after 36 days in any circumstances Flame erases itself when the machine is under heavy load or freezes (detection of AVs is default) 126
127 GOAL OF ATTACKS 127
128 Trend: Information stealing or data destruction The goal of targetted attacks is either information stealing (E.g., Duqu, Flame, Red October etc) or data destruction (E.g., batchwiper, Trojan.Korhigh, Shamoon) 128
129 Example: Data destruction by Batchwiper Simple bat file compiled with BAT2EXE 129
130 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE 130
131 Conclusions Targeted attacks are difficult to handle However, protecting against them is not impossible 131
132 Future What we need is Learning Better defense and Proper handling of incidents 132
133
134 Questions? 134
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