1 TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. Version Certification Report SafeNet Luna PCI configured for use in Luna SA (RF) with Backup Sponsor and developer: SafeNet Canada, Inc. 20 Colonnade Road, Suite 200 Ottawa, ON Canada K2E 7M6 Evaluation facility: Brightsight Delftechpark XJ Delft The Netherlands Report number: NSCIB-CC CR Report version: 1 Head office Apeldoorn: Boogschutterstraat 11A P.O. Box AM Apeldoorn The Netherlands Tel. +31 (0) Fax +31 (0) Project number: Authors(s): Location Apeldoorn: Vissenstraat 6 P.O. Box AM Apeldoorn The Netherlands Tel. +31 (0) Fax +31 (0) NSCIB-CC NLNCSA Date: July 26 th 2013 Number of pages: 18 Number of appendices: 0 Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety. Location Enschede: Josink Esweg 10 P.O. Box AH Enschede The Netherlands Tel. +31 (0) Fax +31 (0) TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a registered company with the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce under number
3 Page: 3/18 of report number: NSCIB-CC CR, dated CONTENTS: Foreword 4 Recognition of the certificate 5 1 Executive Summary 6 2 Certification Results Identification of Target of Evaluation Security Policy Assumptions and Clarification of Scope Architectural Information Documentation IT Product Testing Evaluated Configuration Results of the Evaluation Evaluator Comments/Recommendations 16 3 Security Target 17 4 Definitions 17 5 Bibliography 18
4 Page: 4/18 of report number: NSCIB-CC CR, dated Foreword The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security products. A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025, General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and testing laboratories. By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the product satisfies the security requirements. Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
5 Page: 5/18 of report number: NSCIB-CC CR, dated Recognition of the certificate The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos are printed on the certificate to indicate that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS agreement The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL4. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be found on: The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April 2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOGIS-MRA in December The current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on:
6 Page: 6/18 of report number: NSCIB-CC CR, dated Executive Summary This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Luna PCI configured for use in the Luna SA (RF) with Backup (Luna PCI). The developer of this product is SafeNet Canada, Inc. with corporate headquarters located in Belcamp MD, USA and Engineering office located in Ottawa, Canada. SafeNet Canada, Inc. also acted as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements. The Luna PCI cryptographic module is a Hardware Security Module (HSM) in the form of a PCI card that typically resides within a custom computing or secure communications appliance. It is contained in its own secure enclosure that provides physical resistance to tampering and zeroization of plaintext key material and security parameters in the event a tamper signal is received. The boundary of the cryptographic module is defined to encompass all components inside the secure enclosure on the PCI card The Security Target and the TOE claim conformance to the Cryptographic Module for CSP Signing Operations with Backup Protection Profile (PP/0308), version 0.28, dated 27th October This Protection Profile was registered and certified by ANSSI under the reference PP/0308. The Luna PCI configured for use in the Luna SA 4.1 was originally evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was completed on October 20th 2009, That evaluation, with certification ID NSCIB-CC was completed on November 2nd This Certification Report pertains to the results of a delta evaluation of the Luna SA 4.1 product, specifically, the Luna SA This certification was completed on July 26 th with the preparation of this certification report. Both certifications were conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB]. The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target [ST], that identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Luna PCI, the security requirements and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Luna PCI configured for use in the Luna SA (RF) with Backup are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the Security Target and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report. The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] for this product provide sufficient evidence that it meets the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented (EAL 4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality. The assurance level is augmented with: ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the TSF), ALC_FLR.2 (Evaluation of flaw remediation ), AVA_CCA.1 (Covert Channel Analysis), AVA_MSU.3 (Validation of analysis) and AVA_VLA.4 (Highly resistant). The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [CEM], for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 2.3 [CC]. TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the Luna PCI with Backup for use in the Luna SA (RF) evaluation meets all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. It should be noted that the certification results only apply to the specific version of the product as evaluated.
7 Page: 7/18 of report number: NSCIB-CC CR, dated Certification Results 2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Luna PCI configured for Use in Luna SA (RF) with Backup from SafeNet Canada, Inc. located in Ottawa, Canada. The TOE, Luna PCI configured for use in the Luna SA (RF) with Backup, includes the following: the Luna PCI cryptographic module in a PCI Card form factor ( [legacy part number ] and [legacy part number ] with Firmware Version 4.8.7), a Luna PIN Entry Device (PED) (Local PED Firmware Versions and ) and ikeys, API library and driver software (version 4.5.1), Luna SA 4.5 / Guidance Documentation ( , Revision B). These are the three non security relevant differences between part numbers and : 1. Minor modification to PCB. Improper position of connector interferes with the addition of the PCI bracket for Luna PCI applications. 2. Addition of tooling holes. Added two tooling holes to aid in assembly of the bottom cover to the PCB. Added plating and RoHS information onto bottom cover drawing. 3. Material contributing to de-lamination. Another material was substituted to correct the problem. To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the Luna PCI configured for use in Luna SA with Backup. Details can be found in section 2.5 of this report. 2.2 Security Policy The TOE provides a physically and logically protected component for the performance of cryptographic functions for: key generation key storage encryption and decryption, digital signature and verification used by application systems that provide cryptographic support functions such as a Certificate Authority/Certification Service Provider (CA/CSP) or Time Stamp Authority (TSA). It includes processors, read-only and random-access memory, and firmware packaged in a tamper-resistant form along with Cryptographic API software that resides on the host computer.
8 Page: 8/18 of report number: NSCIB-CC CR, dated Figure 1 shows the TOE and Figure 2 its appliance deployment configuration as part of the Luna SA network-attached appliance. Figure 1. Luna PCI Cryptographic Module Figure 2 Luna SA with PED and ikeys
9 Page: 9/18 of report number: NSCIB-CC CR, dated The boundary of the TOE encompasses the following: 1. The Luna PCI cryptographic module a printed circuit board in PCI card format enclosed within tamper-resistant metal covers. The printed circuit board hosts volatile and non-volatile memory, a microprocessor, with its associated firmware, data, control and key transfer signal paths, an FPGA that provides an entropy selection function for the on-board random bit generator, input/output controller, power management and a local oscillator. 2. The Luna PIN Entry Device, which is housed in a separate physical enclosure and, through a physically and electrically separate data port connection to the module, provides a trusted path for the communication of critical security parameters (authentication data and plaintext cryptographic parameters) to and from the module. 3. ikeys, which are USB token devices used to securely store authentication data and other critical security parameters for entry through the Luna PIN Entry Device. 4. PKCS #11 client library and driver software provides the programming and communications interface normally used to access the cryptographic module. 5. User and Administrative Guidance documentation for the TOE is provided on CD-ROM along with client PKCS #11 software. The TSF boundary is the Luna PCI cryptographic module. The following authenticated roles are supported by the TOE: Security Officer (SO) authorized to install and configure the TOE, set and maintain security policies, and create and delete users (Crypto Officer and Crypto User roles). The TOE can have only one SO. Crypto Officer authorized to create, use, destroy and backup/restore cryptographic objects. Crypto User authorized to use cryptographic objects (e.g., sign, encrypt/decrypt). The major functions supported by the TOE are outlined below: Random Number Generation FIPS validated Deterministic Random Bit Generator (Pseudo-random Number Generator) seeded by internal Hardware Non-deterministic Random Bit Generator. Based on ANSI X9.31, Appendix A section 2.4 Generate Public/Private Key Pairs RSA 1024, 2048, 4096 bits key pairs in accordance with ANSI X9.31 DSA 1024 bits key pairs in accordance with FIPS PUB ECDSA in accordance with FIPS PUB and ANSI X9.62 Generate Secret (Symmetric) Keys TDES 112, 168 bits in accordance with FIPS PUB 46-3 and ANSI X9.52 AES 128, 192, 256 bits in accordance with FIPS PUB 197 Secure Key Material Storage and Access Key material stored in hardware and strongly encrypted Access to private keys and symmetric keys is provided via key handles only Compute Digital Signatures and Verify Digital Signatures RSA 1024 bits, 2048 bits, 4096 bits (PKCS #1 V1.5, PKCS #1 PSS, ANSI X9.31) with SHA-1 RSA 1024 bits, 2048 bits, 4096 bits (PKCS #1 V1.5, PKCS #1 PSS) with SHA-256, 384, 512 DSA 1024 bits (FIPS PUB 186-2) with SHA-1 ECDSA (FIPS PUB Appendix 6 recommended curves) with SHA-1 Encrypt / Decrypt Data
10 Page: 10/18 of report number: NSCIB-CC CR, dated RSA 1024, 2048 and 4096 bits in accordance with PKCS #1 V1.5 and OAEP TDES (ECB and CBC mode) 112 and 168 bits in accordance with FIPS PUB 46-3 AES (ECB and CBC mode) 128 and 256 bits in accordance with FIPS PUB 197 Import (Unwrap) Private Keys RSA 1024, 2048 and 4096 bit private keys in PKCS #8 format with TDES and AES in CBC mode Export (Wrap) and Import (Unwrap) Secret Keys TDES, AES with TDES and AES in ECB mode TDES, AES with RSA 1024, 2048 and 4096 bits in accordance with PKCS #1 V1.5 The TOE provides the following security services to support the protection of key material and cryptographic services: User authentication, Access control for the creation and destruction of keys, Access control for security administration functions, Access control for usage of keys with cryptographic functions, Self-test of the TOE. For more information about the security policy that the TOE implements, please refer to [ST] Chapter Assumptions and Clarification of Scope Usage assumptions The following assumptions about the usage aspects defined by the Security Target have to be met (for the detailed and precise definition of the assumptions refer to the [ST], chapter 3.2): A.Correct_DTBS Correct DTBS Content Data The DTBS-representation submitted to the TOE is assumed to be correct. This requires that the DTBS (e.g. the certificate content data) has been generated and formatted correctly and maintains this correctness until it is passed to the TOE. A.User_Authentication Authentication of Users The client application software is assumed to be operating as the TOE user on behalf of a human user and interacts directly, including authenticating, as the user of the TOE. Individual human users authorised to access the TOE cryptographic services may not be known to the TOE itself. The TOE environment performs identification and authentication for the individual users and allows successfully authenticated users to use the client application as their agent for the cryptographic services. A.Admin Trustworthy TOE Administration When in operation, it is assumed that there will be a competent authority assigned to manage the TOE and the security of the information that it contains and who can be trusted not to deliberately abuse their privileges so as to undermine security. A.User_Management User Management The TOE will not, in general, be aware of the identities of end-users authorised for the TOE services. It is assumed that the management of the individual user assignments for the 3 TOE roles is done in the environment in a trustworthy fashion according to a well-defined policy.
11 Page: 11/18 of report number: NSCIB-CC CR, dated Environmental assumptions The following assumption about the environmental aspects defined by the Security Target has to be met (for the detailed and precise definition of the assumption refer to the [ST], chapter 3.2): A.Audit_Support CSP audit review The CSP reviews the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE. The client application receives and stores the audit trail of the TOE for review by the System auditor of the CSP according to the audit procedure of the CSP. A.Data_Store Storage and Handling of TOE data The TOE environment ensures the confidentiality, integrity and availability of their security relevant data for TOE initialisation, start-up and operation if stored or handled outside the TOE. The TOE environment ensures the availability of the backup data. Examples of these data are verification authentication data, cryptographic key material and documentation of TOE configuration data. A.Controlled_Access Physical Security Controls When in operation and when stored as a backup, the TOE is assumed to be located within a controlled access facility providing physical security that is adequate to prevent physical access by unauthorized persons. A.Human_Interface Interface with Human Users The client application will provide an appropriate interface and communication path between human users and the TOE because the TOE does not have a human interface for authentication and management services. The TOE environment transmits identification, authentication and management data of TOE users correctly and in a confidential way to the TOE. A.Legitimate_FW_Update Legitimate Firmware Update Signed by the Vendor It is assumed that legitimate firmware update packages are digitally signed by the vendor using a private key whose use is restricted to this purpose and that the digital signature is verifiable by an instance of the TOE Clarification of scope The threats listed below are not (entirely) averted by the TOE. Additional support from the operating environment of the TOE is necessary (for detailed information about the threats and how the environment may cover them refer to the [ST], especially chapter and chapter 8). T.Data_Manipul Manipulating Data outside of the TOE User data that is transmitted to the TOE from the client application may be manipulated within the TOE environment before it is passed to the TOE. This may result in the effect that the TOE signs data without the approval of the user under whose control the data is submitted to the TOE. When performed within the client application such manipulations may not be detectable by the TOE itself and therefore this threat needs to be countered within the TOE environment. T.Insecure_Init Insecure Initialisation of the TOE Unauthorised CSP personnel or authorised CSP personnel without using adequate organisational controls may initialise the TOE with insecure system data, management data or user data. An attacker may manipulate the backup data to initialise the TOE insecurely by the restore procedure. T.Insecure_Oper Insecure Operation of the TOE The TOE may be operated in an insecure way not detectable by the TOE itself. This includes the use and operation of the TOE within another environment than the intended one (e. g. the TOE may be connected to a hostile system). T.Malfunction Malfunction of TOE
12 Page: 12/18 of report number: NSCIB-CC CR, dated Internal malfunction of TOE functions may result in the modification of DTBS-representation, misuse of TOE services, disclosure or distortion of CSP-SCD or denial of service for authorized users. This includes the destruction of the TOE as well as hardware failures which prevent the TOE from performing its services. This includes also the destruction of the TOE by deliberate action or environmental failure. Technical failure may result in a insecure operational state violating the integrity and availability of the TOE services. The correct operation of the TOE also depends on the correct operation of critical hardware components. A failure of such a critical hardware component could result in the disclosure or distortion of the CSP-SCD, the modification of DTBS-representation or the ability to misuse services of the TOE. Critical components might be: the central processing unit a coprocessor for accelerating cryptographic operations a physical random number generator storage devices used to store the CSP-SCD or the DTBS-representation physical I/O device drivers 2.4 Architectural Information In this chapter the architecture of the TOE is described. The Luna PCI HSM is contained on a printed circuit board in PCI card format with a PCI bus interface enclosed within two blue coloured metal covers. This hardware form factor is officially identified with Hardware Version VBD , but mostly referenced by the name "K5". The printed circuit board hosts a microprocessor that runs the Luna PCI firmware with version The function of the Luna PIN Entry Device is to communicate authentication data and PINs to and from the Luna PCI. The ikeys are USB memory devices containing authentication data. The Luna PCI has been designed such that users only have access to their 'own' key material stored in 'partitions'. These partitions function as 'private virtual HSMs' for users. Logical access to key material and cryptographic services is provided indirectly through the API Library software on the Luna SA host computer. See Figure 3 for an impression of the TOE in its operational environment. Crypto User Client system Secure Comm link Crypto Officer (CO) Network software API library software Driver Software = TOE software component Administrative software = TOE hardware/software component Security Officer (SO) LUNA SA Appliance LUNA PCI HSM (K5) Figure 3 The TOE in its operational environment PCI PCI bus Serial ikeys USB Serial PED CO SO
13 Page: 13/18 of report number: NSCIB-CC CR, dated All security functionality of the TOE is located in the Luna PCI HSM. As such the Luna PCI HSM can be regarded as the TSF. 2.5 Documentation The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer: Identifier Luna SA guidance documentation on CD ROM Version , Revision B 2.6 IT Product Testing Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the developer s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities Testing approach and depth The testing by the developer exercised all modules as described in the low level design documentation and all internal interfaces of the TOE. The developer employed four basic techniques: 1. Running scripts on the client system, together these scripts test all PKCS#11 related client functionality in the K5 TSF; 2. Exercising CLI commands on the Luna SA, together these tests test the administrative functions of the TSF also including software upgrade, backup and recovery. 3. Luna SA CLI commands in combination with changing hardware conditions, these tests test the physical self-protection and failure handling. 4. Testing the quality of the cryptographic algorithms and the PRNG according to FIPS140-2 certification. The evaluator independent testing consisted of: 1. Sample testing (4:ATE_IND:2-8) to validate the developer testing by running regression test scripts on the evaluator test configuration. These test scripts were mainly focused on cryptographic functions used by CUs from client systems. 2. Independent tests (4:ATE_IND:2-4) by defining and running interactive tests on the evaluator test configuration using a command line interface on the Luna SA. These tests were mainly focused on SO and CO responsibilities Independent Penetration Testing Following the Developer Vulnerability Analysis, the following penetration testing effort was made. 1. The evaluators assessed all possible vulnerabilities found during evaluation of the classes. This resulted in a shortlist with a number of possible vulnerabilities to be tested. 2. The evaluators made an analysis of the TOE in its intended environment to check whether the developer vulnerability analysis has assessed all information. 3. In addition the evaluator conducted a brainstorm and concluded from this brainstorm a list of possible vulnerabilities. From these vulnerabilities a list of possible attack scenarios was concluded and from these attack scenarios the evaluator analyzed the level protection using design information. The CEM rating method for attack potential was used for decisions on sufficient trust for TOE protection.
14 Page: 14/18 of report number: NSCIB-CC CR, dated For a number of attack scenarios the evaluator decided that practical testing was needed Test Configuration The test set up for the evaluator independent testing consisted of the following configuration: Figure 1 Schematic presentation of the test configuration The core of the test configuration is a Luna SA with a K5 Luna PCI inside and a PED connected to the SA. These components comprise the TOE according to the [ST]. The PC runs a terminal emulator to control the SA administrative software in the Luna (see Figure 1) and the PC also contains test applications to test the client functionality in the Luna PCI. The table below shows the specifics of the test configuration: Device Manufacturer Model Luna SA SafeNet Model GRK SN: Part REV E Software version Luna PCI SafeNet Model VBD SN: Part [legacy part number ] Firmware version Luna PED SafeNet MODEL: PED Firmware Version ikeys SafeNet USB memory sticks Personal computer Testing Results PC 2.0 GHz, Window2000 The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details. The developer s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification. No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests. 2.7 Evaluated Configuration The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number SafeNet Luna PCI configured for use in Luna SA (RF) with Backup.
15 Page: 15/18 of report number: NSCIB-CC CR, dated Results of the Evaluation The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR] 1 which references several Intermediate Reports and other evaluator documents. The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is given in the following tables: Security Target Configuration management Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 Delivery and operation Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 Development Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 Guidance documents Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 User guidance AGD_USR.1 Life cycle support Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 Evaluation of flaw remediation ALC_FLR.2 Tests Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 Independent testing sample ATE_IND.2 Vulnerability assessment Validation of analysis AVA_MSU.3 Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 Covert Channel Analysis AVA_CCA.1 Independent vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.4 1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the evaluator and is not releasable for public review.
16 Page: 16/18 of report number: NSCIB-CC CR, dated Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the SafeNet Luna PCI configured for use in Luna SA (RF) with Backup, to be CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 4 augmented by ADV_IMP.2, ALC_FLR.2, AVA_CCA.1, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4. This implies that the product satisfies the security technical requirements specified in the Luna PCI configured for use in Luna SA (RF) with Backup Security Target, Revision 5, July 24th The Security Target claims demonstrable conformance to the Cryptographic Module for CSP Signing Operations with Backup Protection Profile, version 0.28, dated 27th October 2003, registered and certified by ANSSI under the reference PP/ Evaluator Comments/Recommendations Obligations and hints for the developer None Recommendations and hints for the customer The customer must/shall follow the provided guidance documentation, in particular: The requirements placed by the TOE on its operational environment. Within the scope of the certified configuration, only local PED administration is allowed. The TOE is no longer in a certified configuration if remote RED functionality has been enabled.
17 Page: 17/18 of report number: NSCIB-CC CR, dated Security Target The Luna PCI configured for use in Luna SA (RF) with Backup Security Target, Revision Level 5 is included here by reference. 4 Definitions This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM: API CA/CSP CO CU HSM IT ITSEF NSCIB PED PIN P/N PP SA SO TOE TSA Application Programming Interface Certificate Authority/Certification Service Provider Crypto Officer (user role of the TOE) Crypto User (user role of the TOE) Hardware Security Module Information Technology IT Security Evaluation Facility Nederlands Schema voor Certificatie op het gebied van IT-Beveiliging PIN Entry Device Personal Identification Number Part Number Protection Profile Secure Appliance (host computer PC for the TOE) Security Officer (user role of the TOE) Target of Evaluation Time Stamp Authority
18 Page: 18/18 of report number: NSCIB-CC CR, dated Bibliography This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this report: [CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III, version 2.3, August [CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 2.3, August [ETR] [NSCIB] [PP] [ST] Brightsight, Evaluation Technical Report Luna PCI, EAL4+, Version 2.0, July 24 th Nederlands Schema for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.0, 1 July CWA version 0.28 dated 27 October 2003 Cryptographic Module for CSP Signing Operations with Backup (CMCSOB) Protection Profile (PP). Luna PCI configured for use in Luna SA (RF) with Backup Security Target, Revision 5, July 24 th 2013 (This is the end of this report).
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Senforce Endpoint Security Suite Version 3.1.175 Security Target Version 1.0 06/19/07 Prepared for: Senforce Technologies, Inc. 147 W Election Rd Ste 110 Draper UT 84020 Prepared By: Science Applications
National Information Assurance Partnership Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme TM Validation Report Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10257-2011 Dated: 31 March 2011 Version: 1.0 National Institute
Accellion Secure File Transfer Cryptographic Module Security Policy Document Version 1.0 Accellion, Inc. December 24, 2009 Copyright Accellion, Inc. 2009. May be reproduced only in its original entirety
Security Target for Cisco Secure PIX Firewall 515, 520, 525 Version 5.2(3) Reference: ST January 2001 Version: 1.6 Europe: USA: CISCO Systems Ltd CISCO Systems Inc. 3 The Square 170 West Tasman Drive Stockley
FIPS 140 2 Non Proprietary Security Policy Kingston Technology Company, Inc. DataTraveler DT4000 G2 Series USB Flash Drive Document Version 1.8 December 3, 2014 Document Version 1.8 Kingston Technology
Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program Certification Report Certificate Number: 2009/54 2 June 2009 Version 1.0 Commonwealth of Australia 2009. Reproduction is authorised provided that the
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KECS-CR-16-36 Korean National Protection Profile for Voice over IP Firewall V1.0 Certification Report Certification No.: KECS-PP-0717-2016 2016. 6. 10 IT Security Certification Center History of Creation
C033 Certification Report Mobile Billing System File name: Version: v1a Date of document: 15 June 2011 Document classification: For general inquiry about us or our services, please email: firstname.lastname@example.org
Secure File Transfer Appliance Security Policy Document Version 1.9 Accellion, Inc. November 11, 2010 Copyright Accellion, Inc. 2010. May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
Supporting Document Guidance Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar devices April 2012 Version 2.0 CCDB-2012-04-003 Foreword This is a supporting document, intended to
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TRUSTED SECURITY FILTER SECURITY TARGET Edition: 4 29 Oct 07 Previous editions: Ed. 1 11 May 2006 Ed. 2 16 Aug 2006 Ed. 3 28 June 2007 Author: KKK Appr.: PÅT All pages in this document shall have the same
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SNAPcell Security Policy Document Version 1.7 Snapshield July 12, 2005 Copyright Snapshield 2005. May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision]. TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. MODULE OVERVIEW...3
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certicom application notes Certicom Security for Government Suppliers developing client-side products to meet the US Government FIPS 140-2 security requirement THE PROBLEM How can vendors take advantage
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VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON Te Whare Wānanga o te Ūpoko o te Ika a Māui School of Engineering and Computer Science Te Kura Mātai Pūkaha, Pūrorohiko PO Box 600 Wellington New Zealand Tel: +64 4 463
Check Point Endpoint Security Media Encryption Security Target Version 1.0 June 23, 2010 Prepared for: 5 Ha Solelim St. Tel Aviv, Israel 67897 Prepared By: Science Applications International Corporation
Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 11FMV3127-87:1 Dokument ID HEMLIG/ enligt Offentlighets- och sekretesslagen (2009:400) 2012-01-23 Country of origin: Sweden Försvarets materielverk Swedish Certification Body
C013 Certification Report VirtualEye v5.0 File name: Version: v1a Date of document: 8 March 2011 Document classification: For general inquiry about us or our services, please email: email@example.com
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy 3Com Embedded Firewall PCI Cards 3Com Corporation 5403 Betsy Ross Drive Santa Clara, CA 95054 USA February 24, 2006 Revision Version 0.4 Page 1 of 15 1. Introduction The following
USB Portable Storage Device: Security Problem Definition Summary Introduction The USB Portable Storage Device (hereafter referred to as the device or the TOE ) is a portable storage device that provides
Archived NIST Technical Series Publication The attached publication has been archived (withdrawn), and is provided solely for historical purposes. It may have been superseded by another publication (indicated
IBM WebSphere Message Broker Security Target Version 2.1.2 2007-08-22 Document History Version Date Summary Author 1.0 2006-10-23 Final EAL3 ST plus changes by IBM. SAIC / IBM 1.1 2006-12-11 Fixed inconsistencies.
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