WINDOWS SPLUNK LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7 - Win2012

Transcription

1 This Windows Splunk Logging Cheat Sheet is intended to help you get started setting up Splunk reports and alerts for the most critical Windows security related events. By no means is this list extensive; but it does include some very common items that are a must for any Information Security and Log Management Program. Start with these samples and add to it as you understand better what is in your logs and what you need to monitor and alert on. DEFINITIONS:: WINDOWS LOGGING CONFIGURATION: Before you can Gather anything meaningful with Splunk, or any other log management solution, the Windows logging and auditing must be properly Enabled and Configured before you can Gather and Harvest the logs into Splunk. The Center for Internet Security (CIS) Benchmarks will give you some guidance on what to configure; but does not go far enough to log and audit what is really needed for a proper Information Security program. The Windows Logging Cheat Sheet contains the details needed for proper and complete security logging to understand how to Enable and Configure Windows logging and auditing settings so you can capture meaningful and actionable security related data. You can get the Windows Logging Cheat Sheet and other logging cheat sheets here: MalwareArchaeology.com/cheat-sheets REPORTS: Queries that are saved for reference and can be launched as needed. ALERTS: Queries you want to be ed on or sent to your smartphone to alert you that something is outside the norm and needs to be looked at immediately. Do not get alert heavy or your staff will ignore them as was the case in the Target and Neiman Marcus breaches. DASHBOARDS: A collection of reports or alerts that are saved into a dashboard view for quick reference. Often used for NOC s and SOC s to monitor critical activity. Dashboards are left up to each user as organization s have different needs and preferences on what they want to see. RESOURCES: Places to get more information. MalwareArchaeology.com/cheat-sheets More Windows Logging Cheat Sheets and resources Better descriptions of Event ID s o Extensive list of Event ID s - Center for Internet Security Benchmarks Google Of course Splunk.com Endless information on Splunk Feb 2016 ver 1.1 MalwareArchaeology.com Page 1 of 8

2 CRITICAL EVENTS TO MONITOR:: 1. NEW PROCESS STARTING: Event Code 4688 will capture when a process or executable starts. 2. USER LOGON SUCCESS: Event Code 4624 will capture when a user successfully logons to the system. 3. SHARE ACCESSED: Event Code 5140 will capture when a user connects to a file share. 4. NEW SERVICE INSTALLED: Event Code 7045 will capture when a new service is installed. 5. NETWORK CONNECTION MADE: Event Code 5156 will capture when a network connection is made from the source to the destination including the ports used and the process used to initiate the connection. Requires the use of the Windows Firewall 6. FILE AUDITING: Event Code 4663 will capture when a new file is added, modified or deleted. 7. REGISTRY AUDITING: Event Code 4657 will capture when a new registry item is added, modified or deleted 8. WINDOWS POWERSHELL COMMAND LINE EXECUTION: Event Code 500 will capture when PowerShell is executed logging the command line used. 9. WINDOWS FIREWALL CHANGES: Event Code 2004 will capture when new firewall rules are added. 10. SCHEDULE TASKS ADDED: Event Code 106 will capture when a new scheduled task is added. FILTERING EVENTS:: 1. Filter by Message, NOT by Event Code: It is common to blacklist event codes that are noisy or excessive that impacts storage and licensing. By enabling Process Creation Success (4688) Process Terminate (4689) and Windows Firewall Filtering Platform Connection Success (5156 & 5158) they will be the top four event codes in your Splunk index. Filtering by the content of the Message or Field name is the better way to go. Once you understand what normal noise is, has minimal risk to be exploited or important to security monitoring you can filter those out at the client or server. Here is an example of a proper exclusion: [WinEventLog://Security] disabled=0 current_only=1 blacklist1=eventcode="4662" Message= Object Type:\s+(?!groupPolicyContainer) blacklist2=eventcode="5156" Message= Application Name:\s+(?!\\program files (x86)\\google\\chrome\\application\\chrome.exe) 2. Indexes: It is normal to have an index named windows for the typical Application, Security, Setup and System logs, but separating other Windows logs into separate indexes is a good practice to reduce search times. Consider collecting the Windows PowerShell, TaskScheduler, Windows Firewall, AppLocker and other Applications and Services logs that you might want to collect into their own indexes if they get large in quantity of events. You can always use the Join command if you want to combine data from multiple indexes. Feb 2016 ver 1.1 MalwareArchaeology.com Page 2 of 8

3 The following Splunk Queries should be both a Report and an Alert. Remember that alerts should be actionable, meaning when they go off something new and/or odd has occurred and you should respond and investigate. MONITOR FOR PROCESSES STARTING :: 1. Monitor for Suspicious/Administrative Processes: This list is based on built-in Windows administrative utilities and known hacking utilities that are often seen used in exploitation. Expand this list as needed to add utilities used in hacking attacks. You do not need to alert on all processes launching, just suspicious ones or ones known to be used in hacking attacks. Some administrative tools are very noisy and normally used or automatically executed regularly and should NOT be included to make your alert more actionable and accurate that something suspicious has occurred. index=windows LogName=Security EventCode=4688 NOT (Account_Name=*$) (arp.exe OR at.exe OR bcdedit.exe OR bcp.exe OR chcp.exe OR cmd.exe OR cscript.exe OR csvde OR dsquery.exe OR ipconfig.exe OR mimikatz.exe OR nbtstat.exe OR nc.exe OR netcat.exe OR netstat.exe OR nmap OR nslookup.exe OR netsh OR OSQL.exe OR ping.exe OR powershell.exe OR powercat.ps1 OR psexec.exe OR psexecsvc.exe OR psloggedon.exe OR procdump.exe OR qprocess.exe OR query.exe OR rar.exe OR reg.exe OR route.exe OR runas.exe OR rundll32 OR schtasks.exe OR sethc.exe OR sqlcmd.exe OR sc.exe OR ssh.exe OR sysprep.exe OR systeminfo.exe OR system32\\net.exe OR reg.exe OR tasklist.exe OR tracert.exe OR vssadmin.exe OR whoami.exe OR winrar.exe OR wscript.exe OR "winrm.*" OR "winrs.*" OR wmic.exe OR wsmprovhost.exe OR wusa.exe) eval Message=split(Message,".") eval Short_Message=mvindex(Message,0) table _time, host, Account_Name, Process_Name, Process_ID, Process_Command_Line, New_Process_Name, New_Process_ID, Creator_Process_ID, Short_Message 2. Monitor for PowerShell bypass attempts: Hackers will often use PowerShell to exploit a system due to the capability of PowerShell to avoid using built-in utilities and dropping additional malware files on disk. Watching for policy and profile bypasses will allow you to detect this hacking activity. index=windows EventCode=4688 (powershell* AND -ExecutionPolicy) OR (powershell* AND bypass) OR (powershell* AND -noprofile) eval Message=split(Message,".") eval Short_Message=mvindex(Message,0) table _time, host, Account_Name, Process_Name, Process_ID, Process_Command_Line, New_Process_Name, New_Process_ID, Creator_Process_ID, Short_Message 3. Monitor for all processes excluding trusted/known processes: You can create reports for any or all processes starting (4688) and filter out the known good ones to create a more actionable report and alert. For larger lists consider using the lookup command. Your.csv file has to be in a 'lookups' directory in either the parent or a child local directory; /opt/splunk/etc/apps/search/lookups. The idea here is a typical system has a normal state, if you exclude all the normal processes, then if something new runs, say BlackPOS.exe as was the case in the retail breaches, you would be able to detect it. index=windows LogName=Security EventCode=4688 NOT (Account_Name=*$) NOT [ inputlookup Trusted_processes.csv fields Process_Name ] eval Message=split(Message,".") eval Short_Message=mvindex(Message,0) table _time, host, Account_Name, Process_Name, Process_ID, Process_Command_Line, New_Process_Name, New_Process_ID, Creator_Process_ID, Short_Message Feb 2016 ver 1.1 MalwareArchaeology.com Page 3 of 8

4 MONITOR FOR USER LOGONS 4624 & 4625:: 1. Monitor for Logon Success: Logging for failed logons seems obvious, but when a user credential gets compromised and their credentials used for exploitation, successful logins will be a major indicator of malicious activity and system crawling. This alert looks for successful logons > 2 and excludes domain controllers to detect when a rogue user account crawls across systems in your network. index=windows LogName=Security EventCode=4624 NOT (host= DC1" OR host= DC2" OR host= DC ) NOT (Account_Name="*$" OR Account_Name="ANONYMOUS LOGON") NOT (Account_Name= Service_Account") eval Account_Domain=(mvindex(Account_Domain,1)) eval Account_Name=if(Account_Name="- ",(mvindex(account_name,1)), Account_Name) eval Account_Name=if(Account_Name="*$",(mvindex(Account_Name,1)), Account_Name) eval Time=strftime(_time,"%Y/%m/%d %T") stats count values(account_domain) AS Domain, values(host) AS Host, dc(host) AS Host_Count, values(logon_type) AS Logon_Type, values(workstation_name) AS WS_Name, values(source_network_address) AS Source_IP, values(process_name) AS Process_Name by Account_Name where Host_Count > 2 2. Monitor for Logon Failures: Watch for excessive logon failures, especially Internet facing systems and systems that contain confidential data. This will also detect brute force attempts and users who have failed to changed their passwords on additional devices such as smartphones. You can add stats count to watch for quantity, exclude certain accounts you know are good and normally fail. Avoid excluding administrative accounts as they are the ones the hackers are after. index=windows LogName=Security EventCode=4625 table _time, Workstation_Name, Source_Network_Address, host, Account_Name 3. Monitor for Administrative and Guest Logon Failures: Hackers and malware often try to brute force known accounts, such as Administrator and Guest. This alert will monitor and alert if configured for attempts > 5. index=windows LogName=Security EventCode=4625 (Account_Name=administrator OR Account_Name=guest) stats count values(workstation_name) AS Workstation_Name, Values(Source_Network_Address) AS Source_IP_Address, values(host) AS Host by Account_Name where count > 5 Feb 2016 ver 1.1 MalwareArchaeology.com Page 4 of 8

5 MONITOR FOR FILE SHARES :: 1. Monitor for File Shares being accessed: Once a system is compromised, hackers will connect or jump to other systems to infect and/or to steal data. Watch for accounts crawling across file shares. Some management accounts will do this normally so exclude these to the systems they normally connect. Other activity from management accounts such as new processes launching will alert you to malicious behavior when excluded in this alert. index=windows source="wineventlog:security" EventCode=5140 (Share_Name="*\\C$" OR Share_Name="*D$" OR Share_Name="*E$" OR Share_Name="*F$" OR Share_Name="*U$") NOT Source_Address="::1" eval Destination_Sys1=trim(host,"1") eval Destination_Sys2=trim(host,"2") eval Dest_Sys1=lower(Destination_Sys1) eval Dest_Sys2=lower(Destination_Sys2) rename host AS Destination rename Account_Domain AS Domain where Account_Name!=Dest_Sys1 where Account_Name!=Dest_Sys2 stats count values(domain) AS Domain, values(source_address) AS Source_IP, values(destination) AS Destination, dc(destination) AS Dest_Count, values(share_name) AS Share_Name, values(share_path) AS Share_Path by Account_Name MONITOR FOR SERVICE CHANGES 7045 & 7040:: 1. Monitor for New Service Installs: Monitoring for a new service install is crucial. Hackers often use a new service to gain persistence for their malware when a system restarts. All the retail Point of Sale breaches included one or more new services that could have been easily detected with this alert alone. index=windows LogName=System EventCode=7045 NOT (Service_Name=mgmt_service) eval Message=split(Message,".") eval Short_Message=mvindex(Message,0) table _time host Service_Name, Service_Type, Service_Start_Type, Service_Account, Short_Message 2. Monitor for Service State Changes: Monitoring for a service state changes can show when a service is altered. Hackers often use an existing service to avoid new service detection and modify the ServiceDll to point to a malicious payload gaining persistence for their malware when a system restarts. Unfortunately the details are not in the logs, but this alert can lead you to look into a service state change or enable auditing on keys that trigger seldom used services to watch for ServiceDll changes. There are a few services that will normally start and stop regularly and will need to be excluded. Use registry auditing (4657) to monitor for changes to the ServiceDll value. index=windows LogName=System EventCode=7040 NOT ( *Windows Modules Installer service* OR *Background Intelligent Transfer Service service* ) table _time, host, User, Message Feb 2016 ver 1.1 MalwareArchaeology.com Page 5 of 8

6 MONITOR FOR NETWORK CONNECTIONS :: 1. Monitor for Suspicious Network IP s: This does require the use of the Windows Firewall. In networks where this is normally not used, you can use Group Policy to set the Windows Firewall to an Any/Any configuration so no blocking occurs, yet the traffic is captured in the logs and more importantly what process made the connection. You can create exclusions by IP addresses (such as broadcast IP s) and by process names to reduce the output and make it more actionable. The Lookup command will benefit this query tremendously by excluding items. index=windows LogName=Security EventCode=5156 NOT (Source_Address=" " OR Source_Address=" *" OR Source_Address="::1" OR Source_Address="ff02::*" OR Source_Address="fe80::*" OR Source_Address=" " OR Source_Address= ) NOT (Destination_Address=" " OR Destination_Address=" " OR Destination_Address="*.*.*.255" OR Destination_Address=" *") NOT (Destination_Port="0") NOT (Application_Name="\\<some process name>\\" OR Application_Name="*\\bin\\splunkd.exe") dedup Destination_Address Destination_Port table _time, host, Application_Name, Direction, Source_Address, Source_Port, Destination_Address, Destination_Port sort Direction Destination_Port MONITOR FOR FILE CHANGES 4663:: 1. Monitor for New files: This requires directories and/or files to have auditing set on each object. You want to audit directories that are well known for malware such as AppData\Local, LocalLow & Roaming as well as \Users\Public for the following: index=windows sourcetype=wineventlog:security EventCode=4663 NOT (Process_Name="*\\Windows\\servicing\\TrustedInstaller.exe" OR "*\\Windows\\System32\\poqexec.exe") NOT Object_Name="C:\\Users\\Surf\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data*" NOT Object_Name="C:\\Users\\<special user>\\appdata\\roaming\\microsoft\\windows\\recent\\customdestinations") NOT (Object_Name="C:\\Windows\\System32\\LogFiles\\*" OR Object_Name="*ProgramData\\Microsoft\\RAC\\*" OR Object_Name="*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Explorer\\thumbcache*" OR Object_Name="*.MAP" OR Object_Name="*counters.dat" OR Object_Name="*\\Windows\\Gatherlogs\\SystemIndex\\*") rename Process_Name as Created_By table _time, host, Security_ID, Handle_ID, Object_Type, Object_Name, Process_ID, Created_By, Accesses Feb 2016 ver 1.1 MalwareArchaeology.com Page 6 of 8

7 MONITOR FOR FILE CHANGES 4663 continued:: 2. Monitor for Crypto events: Setting auditing on a File Server Share will allow large amounts of file changes from a crypto event to be detected. Look at a large quantity of changes > 1000 in 1 hour to detect the event. Use the same settings as above as you only need to monitor for NEW files. It is obvious when an event occurs! index=windows LogName=Security EventCode=4663 host=* (Accesses="WriteData (or AddFile)" AND Object_Name="*.*") NOT (Security_ID="NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM") NOT (Object_Name="*\\FireFoxProfile\\*" OR Object_Name="*.tmp*" OR Object_Name="*.xml" OR Object_Name="*Thumbs.db" OR Object_Name="\\Device\\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy*") NOT (Object_Name="*:Zone.Identifier" OR Object_Name="*.part*") stats count values(object_name), values(accesses) by Security_ID where count > 1000 MONITOR FOR REGISTRY CHANGES 4657:: 1. Monitor for Registry Changes: Adding auditing to known exploited registry keys is a great way to catch malicious activity. Registry keys should not change very often unless something is installed or updated. The goal is to look for NEW items and changes to known high risk items like the Run and RunOnce keys. index=windows LogName=Security (EventCode=4657) Object_Name="*\\Run*" table _time, host, Security_ID, Account_Name, Account_Domain, Operation_Type, Object_Name, Object_Value_Name, Process_Name, New_Value Feb 2016 ver 1.1 MalwareArchaeology.com Page 7 of 8

8 MONITOR FOR WINDOWS POWERSHELL COMMAND LINE - 501:: 1. Monitor for PowerShell Command Execution: Hackers will often use PowerShell to exploit a system due to the capability of PowerShell to avoid using built-in utilities and drop additional malware on disk. Monitoring the PowerShell command lines that are executed can catching potentially malicious behavior. PowerShell logs have some odd formatting, the sample below shows a unique non-regex way to parse odd logs using the Splunk split command. PowerShell logs are the worst as far as using the split command. These logs are not in the standard Windows logs and will need to be added to your Splunk inputs.conf file in order to collect them. The Windows PowerShell logs may be found under: Applications and Services Logs - Windows PowerShell index=powershell LogName="Windows Powershell" (EventCode=500) eval MessageA=split(Message,"Details:") Eval Short_Message=mvindex(MessageA,0) Eval MessageB=mvindex(MessageA,1) eval MessageB = replace (MessageB,"[\n\r]","!") eval MessageC=split(MessageB,"!!!!") Eval Message1=mvindex(MessageC,0) Eval Message2=mvindex(MessageC,1) Eval Message3=mvindex(MessageC,2) eval MessageD=split(Message3,"!!") Eval Message4=mvindex(MessageD,3) eval Message4=split(Message4,"=") eval PS_Version=mvindex(Message4,1) Eval Message5=mvindex(MessageD,4) Eval Message6=mvindex(MessageD,5) Eval Message7=mvindex(MessageD,6) eval Message7=split(Message7,"=") eval Command_Name=mvindex(Message7,1) Eval Message8=mvindex(MessageD,7) eval Message8=split(Message8,"=") eval Command_Type=mvindex(Message8,1) Eval Message9=mvindex(MessageD,8) eval Message9=split(Message9,"=") eval Script_Name=mvindex(Message9,1) Eval Message10=mvindex(MessageD,9) eval Message10=split(Message10,"=") eval Command_Path=mvindex(Message10,1) Eval Message11=mvindex(MessageD,10) eval Message11=split(Message11,"=") eval Command_Line=mvindex(Message11,1) table _time EventCode, Short_Message, PS_Version, Command_Name, Command_Type, Script_Name, Command_Path, Command_Line MONITOR FOR WINDOWS FIREWALL CHANGES 2004 & 2005:: 1. Monitor for Additions to Firewall Rules: Malware and hackers will often add a firewall rule to allow access to some Windows service or application. These logs are not in the standard Windows logs and will need to be added to your Splunk inputs.conf file in order to collect them. The Windows firewall logs may be found under: Applications and Services Logs Microsoft - Windows Windows Firewall with Advanced Security - Firewall index=windows LogName=Security EventCode=2004 table _time, host, Rule_Name, Origin, Active, Direction, Profiles, Action, Application_Path, Service_Name, Protocol, Security_Options, Edge_Traversal, Modifying_User, Modifying_Application, Rule_ID 2. Monitor for Changes to Firewall Rules: Malware and hackers will often modify a firewall rule to allow access to some Windows service or application. These logs are not in the standard Windows logs and will need to be added to your Splunk inputs.conf file in order to collect them. index=windows LogName=Security EventCode=2005 table _time, host, Rule_Name, Origin, Active, Direction, Profiles, Action, Application_Path, Service_Name, Protocol, Security_Options, Edge_Traversal, Modifying_User, Modifying_Application, Rule_ID Feb 2016 ver 1.1 MalwareArchaeology.com Page 8 of 8