Research Report: The Globalisation of Private Security Research Grant No:RES

Transcription

1 Research Report: The Globalisation of Private Security Research Grant No:RES Background The privatisation of security has attracted extensive attention in recent years, but to date these analyses have remained largely focused on military privatisation (Avant 2005; Kinsey 2006; Krahmann 2005; Singer 2000). By contrast, this research project grew out of an interest in the extensive privatisation and globalisation of commercial, non-military security, that is the provision of day-to-day security services such as manned guarding, alarm installation and response, risk analysis and surveillance. This form of private security has expanded at a striking rate in the last two decades, and the private security sector is now valued at US$85 billion and has an annual growth rate of 6-8%. As the sector has expanded it has also become increasingly globalised, with the largest companies seeking profitable new markets in developing countries: Securitas, the world largest security company in revenue terms, now operates in over 30 countries, and has over 210,000 employees. Group4Securicor is present in over 100 countries, employing a total of 360,000 people, while the third largest company Prosegur has expanded from its Spanish headquarters into more than 10 countries in Europe and South America. This parallel process of privatisation and globalisation of security was hypothesised to have particular importance in developing countries, where the unwillingness and/or inability of the state to provide security has long been a source of concern. Little research exists on the global reach of private security companies in developing countries, with most analyses being undertaken by criminologists in rich industrialised countries. As such, there was a distinct lack of theoretical literature and empirical analysis of this emerging phenomenon. Objectives The project had three key objectives: 1) To assess the impact of global private security companies (PSCs) in developing countries by examining four specific cases: South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Sierra Leone. 2) To map comprehensively the emerging global structure of the private security sector, providing a detailed overview of the companies, 1

2 their activities and strategies, market structure and dynamics. 3) To contribute towards developing a theoretical framework for understanding the role of private security in the emerging structures of global governance and the evolving dynamics of third world security at the level of states, societies and individuals. The manner in which these objectives have been addressed and met is outlined below. Objective 1: To assess the impact of global private security companies (PSCs) in developing countries by examining four specific cases: South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Sierra Leone. A key focus was the question of how the provision of security by global, private actors affects state-society relations and government legitimacy, and whether PSCs contribute to greater social stratification, fragmentation and inequality by providing security to only those who can pay, or conversely, act as a force multiplier by increasing the total amount of resources and expertise available. The four countries were chosen to investigate the varied impact of global private security in a range of different settings. In each country, this objective has been met by developing an overview of the private security sector, and by a more in-depth investigation of particularly pertinent issues or situations. Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone was chosen to investigate the role and impact of PSCs in a so-called failed state emerging from prolonged civil war, and undergoing major post-conflict reconstruction programmes. At the start of the civil war, there were two local PSCs in Sierra Leone. By the time of the research visit, there were more than 20 companies, including both Group4 and Securicor (before their merger). The civil war had substantially increased insecurity and weakened state capacity for security provision. Given the involvement of Executive Outcomes and other private military actors in the civil war, private security is highly controversial. Field work was undertaken in April/May 2004, and included interviews with the managing directors of many of the major local security companies, as well as the country directors of the two major global companies, Group4 and Securicor. Interviews were also conducted with representatives from the UN and the international development community, as well as the managing directors of the two major mining operations in Sierra Leone. The relationship between private security, whether global or local, and the

3 state was found to be highly complex, given the fragility and lack of capacity of the state. While security is a key concern in the country, private security was not included in the extensive Security Sector Reform programme and surprisingly little consideration has been given to its role and impact. The role of private security is particularly important and controversial in the country s economically crucial mining sector. We conducted field visits to two of the most significant mining operations, the diamond-mining operations of Koidu Holdings and the bauxite and rutile mine of Sierra Rutile. In both, we uncovered a complex and often contested network of public and private security forces. Examining these operations allowed us to meet the objective of mapping the precise nature of global private security involvement, its impact on economic development, and its place in local structures of power and authority. Nigeria: Nigeria was chosen to investigate the impact of PSCs in the resource rich enclave economy of the Niger Delta where transnational resource companies depend to a large extent on global PSCs for their security. The local population is largely excluded from access to oil wealth, and frequent unrest and political violence characterise the situation. Private security has become a major part of the Nigerian economy, and there are currently between 1,500 and 2,000 PSCs, employing in excess of 100,000 people. The private security sector is prohibited from carrying firearms, but given the generally high level of violence and insecurity, most leading PSCs find it necessary to offer armed protection for key contracts, as well as the possibility of armed response in cases of emergency. The solution comes in the form of co-operation with the Nigerian Police whereby members of the paramilitary Mobile Police - armed with fully automatic weapons are permanently seconded to PSCs and integrated into their everyday operations, thus creating a significant blurring of public and private authority and responsibility. Field work was undertaken in September/October 2004, following interviews in London with security analysts from major petroleum companies operating in the Niger Delta.

4 The research was concentrated in the capital, Lagos, and in the oil-producing regions of the Delta. Interviews were conducted with representatives of Group4Securicor (trading in Nigeria as OSL), Armor Group, Control Risks, major Nigerian security companies and the Nigerian Police. Interviews were also secured with the chief security analyst for ChevronTexaco, with the Head of Security for Shell, and the country director of Statoil. Research in the Niger Delta took place in three locations: Port Harcourt, the major city in the region and headquarters for the operations of most of the major resource companies; Warri, the main logistics base for ChevronTexaco s operations; and Escravos, Chevron s remote, main production facility in the Delta. To a significant degree, public force has been privatised in the Niger Delta, with all levels of public forces (the police, Mobile Police, and military) directly integrated into the operations of the oil companies, and private security plays an important role not only in the provision of site security, but in the management, equipping, and control of public security forces. As insecurity and violence has escalated in the Delta, global private security has become increasingly central to the maintenance of Nigeria s current social and political order. Kenya: Kenya was chosen because of its status as a country in transition to democracy. Crime and insecurity pervade social life, mistrust of the police is widespread, and increasingly all sections of the population rely on some form of private security, whether informal community watches or commercial security companies. More than 2,000 PSCs operate in the country, but as there is no regulation of the sector the majority are poorly resourced, offering low-quality services and paying wages well below the minimum wage. Private security is unarmed, which given the high level of firearms in Kenya makes manned guarding an extremely dangerous job. Industry sources estimated that between security guards were killed every month in greater Nairobi and Mombasa, although no official statistics exist. Field work was undertaken in October/November Research was concentrated in Nairobi, where high degrees of crime and insecurity are major social concerns and important political issues. Interviews were undertaken with the leading PSCs, numerous

5 smaller firms, and representatives of the two competing industry associations. Interviews were also conducted with public policy researchers with expertise in crime and security, and with the Kenyan Police. The possible regulation of the sector is a key and controversial issue, and one that sheds considerable light on the politics and economics of security in Kenya. The industry has argued that due to high rates of violent and often heavily armed crime, closer cooperation between private security and the police including the reinstatement of previous practices of direct secondment of officers to the private companies is required. This policy has been rejected by the Commander of the Kenyan Police Service on the grounds that it represented a 'privatisation of already inadequate public resources, channelled them exclusively towards those who could afford to pay, and risked contributing towards fragmenting the social fabric of the country. The private security industry itself exhibits a similarly revealing fissure over the political economy of security. Of the two industry associations, one argues for greater regulation, higher standards of service, and supports recent government legislation to raise the minimum wage. The other association was formed explicitly to oppose the legislation, which it argues is part of an attempt by the larger companies to force smaller providers out of business, with the consequence that only the wealthy would be able to afford private protection. In the case of Kenya, then, the objective was also clearly met and significant impacts of private security, both global and local, were identified. Importantly, our Country Report on Kenya attracted considerable interest, and PSCs and policy makers alike have referred to it as part of the effort to reform and regulate the sector. South Africa: South Africa was chosen because of the sheer size and sophistication of its private security sector. As a proportion of GDP the country has the largest private security sector in the world, and crime and violence are highly politicised in the post-apartheid era. The sector is well-regulated, and currently 3,553 companies are registered with the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority. Private security is armed, and rapid armed response is a key service. Numerous global companies, including Group4Securicor, ADT, Chubb, and Armor Group have operations in South Africa, whereas many domestic companies have expanded into other African countries.

6 Field work was undertaken in January to April Interviews were conducted with most major security companies, including all the international companies. Interviews were also conducted with policy makers, representatives of the police, non-governmental organisations involved in security, as well as academic researchers. In addition, an indepth study was made of security provision in Cape Town city centre, where security has to a significant extent been outsourced to Group4Securicor. It is clear that private security has considerable political and social consequences, and that security remains at the heart of political struggles. At the same time, our research shows that private security has also helped secure the transition to democracy, by allowing for a stronger presence of security personnel than the state alone could have provided. Given the high crime rates, this has been crucial for continued legitimacy among the white population and also for business and foreign investment. Paradoxically, while helping to secure the transition, private security provision may also help preserve divisions between rich and poor. In the case of Cape Town, the new hybrid security networks (see Results below) have also had exclusionary effects, which may in the long term be detrimental to legitimacy. In the case of South Africa, the objective was thus met and significant impacts of private security were discovered and analysed. Objective 2: To map comprehensively the emerging global structure of the private security sector, providing a detailed overview of the companies, their activities and strategies, market structure and dynamics. As very little research exists on transnational private security, and virtually none in the African context, this objective was addressed through extensive primary research into the operations of global private security companies, including extensive interviews with senior management. Company websites, business and stockbrokers reports also provided useful information. The objective has been met and a comprehensive account of how and why the private security sector has grown and globalised has been developed. This includes an overview of the little known expansion of African private security companies into other African countries, particularly that of Kenyan companies into neighbouring Rwanda, Uganda,

7 Tanzania, and other east African countries and also the presence of South African companies across the continent. The mapping of the sector reveals not only important commercial dynamics, but also underlines significant social and political changes in the global political economy intrinsic to the expansion of private security. Transformations associated with neoliberal economics and the commodification of security facilitate and encourage the growth and globalisation of private security and make it more difficult for countries to resist privatisation, even when they fear this is a threat to national security. South Africa is a case in point, where the Committee for Safety and Security attempted to ban foreign involvement in the private security sector, but was overruled by the Ministry of Finance pointing to the importance of free trade and foreign investment (Abrahamsen and Williams 2006). Objective 3: To contribute towards developing a theoretical framework for understanding the role of private security in the emerging structures of global governance and the evolving dynamics of third world security at the level of states, societies and individuals. This objective has been addressed through detailed interrogation of cross-disciplinary literature and research, and through extensive empirical research as outlined above. The expansion of private security has been the focus of increasing research in both sociology and criminology, where it has recently given rise to theories of networked security governance. The most fundamental claim of networked security governance is that security can no longer be seen as the exclusive monopoly of state institutions. Instead, we are seeing a process of pluralisation (Garland 2003; Johnston and Shearing 2003) or multilateralisation (Bayley and Shearing 2001) through which both the provision and governance of security is dispersed to include a variety of different actors and agencies. Security is characterised by pluralization and commodification, and by the rise of private actors and hybrid public-private agencies (Johnston and Shearing 2003) organised within networks. However, this research has remained at the level of domestic politics, and as noted by Wood and Dupont (2006) there is a striking need for theoretical development and concrete research at the transnational level. Drawing on these theoretical debates, as well as the extensive fieldwork, we have developed a theoretical framework explaining the operation of what we term transnational security governance

8 networks (see Results below). This framework will enhance theoretical and empirical knowledge about these processes, as well as providing a foundation for further research. Method The primary methods used were: 1. In-depth review of published literature on security privatisation and the security industry, along with the relevant literatures in Political Science, Criminology, International Relations, Development Studies, and African Politics. 2. Semi-structured interviews with industry actors, private security clients, police officials, political authorities, development organisations, researchers, and civil society actors. Results While security is frequently analysed within the dichotomies of public/private and global/local, the major finding of the research is that in the cases examined public and private actors are increasingly knit into global-local, public-private security networks with key impacts on economic transfers and structures of governance. These cases illustrate that private security is often enmeshed in intricate hybrid structures with public security forces that are crucial to the operation of security in these countries, and to their broader integration into the world economy. We have determined that these networks are more pervasive than generally recognised. Located at the nexus of national/international, public/private structures, extensive transnational private security networks constitute structures of power and governance of an importance yet to be recognised in contemporary world politics. Analysing security networks requires a two-stage process: mapping the actors and nodes making up the network, and examining the relationship between the different nodes in the network - patterns of cooperation and contestation and the differing resources and forms of power available to the actors. Transnational security governance networks reflect the different forms of capital (Bourdieu 1991) possessed by actors in the specific security fields (Dupont 2004). Analytically, it is useful to identify five specific forms of capital, though these will often be combined and interrelated in the actual practices of agents and in the operation of networks. Of the five, economic capital corresponds

9 most closely to the conventional use of the term, and refers to the possession of financial and material resources by an agent. Political capital, on the other hand, refers to the proximity of actors to the machinery of government and their ability to draw upon the resources of the state to advance their agendas. A third category, that of cultural capital, is defined by expertise - by the possession of knowledge about the field in question, and the ability to move effectively in the network that this expertise allows. Social capital, in turn, reflects the social networks an actor is connected to and can draw effectively upon. Finally, symbolic capital refers to the legitimacy granted to an organisation, and its capacity to speak authoritatively in a given field in short, the capacity of an actor to bring together some or all of the previous forms of capital in order to take up an established place in the field and networks in question. The different forms of capital provide a useful way of discerning the shifts in capacities of private security actors arising from the broad transformations in security governance outlined above. For example, the increasing market opportunities for private security provided by privatisation, outsourcing and policies of networked government have resulted in their expansion and consolidation into complex, well-financed, and technologically and organisationally sophisticated corporate structures a far cry from the night-watchman traditionally associated with private security. Equally importantly, global private security companies have acquired significant cultural and symbolic capital as recognised experts and legitimate actors in the security field, while the commodification of security as a service enables these companies to draw upon powerful market logics in the expansion and transnationalisation of their activities. Finally, the interaction between private and public security structures means that its relationship to both security professionals and policy-makers, while not without tensions, is far from oppositional, and private security can possess forms of political capital that further supplement the social capital provided by its clients. This analytic framework provides insights into the operation of transnational security governance networks in the countries examined. In Sierra Leone, a hybrid security network exists: an integrated structure of public and private, local and global security actors who combine to facilitate economic activities aimed at a global market and deemed essential to state reconstruction. The security structure represents a complex and multilayered network including global capital, transnational private security, state

10 authorities, local police and international police advisers. Yet at the same time, this network is characterised by tensions and competition. The mining companies often stress the need for private security to protect international capital and economic reconstruction in the face of inadequate security provision by public authorities, and point to the debilitating effect on further investment and development of not providing such protection. Global private security firms are seen as providing essential expertise and resources, as well as a direct accountability to investors, that public security forces are often seen to lack. They would often prefer to be armed to this end. The position of the government and its international advisors opposing the private possession of arms, by contrast, reflects not only a concern with the proliferation of arms in the post-conflict environment, but also a focus on the symbolic significance of an armed private security force. Much of the Security Sector Reform process in Sierra Leone has concentrated on constructing a Western-style security structure: an externally-focused army, an unarmed constabulary, and a small, tightly-controlled armed police component. In this light, the removal of arms from private hands has a political and symbolic significance, which goes beyond any narrow conception of security. The post-conflict situation is thus characterised by neither privatised resource enclaves, nor a monopoly of public security, but a complex and often contested set of publicprivate, global-local security networks. Instead of resource enclaves protected by armed PMCs as was the case in the 1990s, the situation is better seen as complex relationships of private-public, global-local security in hybrid forms (as at Koidu Holdings) or in a process of (often tense) negotiation (as at Sierra Rutile). In this setting, security privatisation forms part of intricate networks that also include public authorities, global capital, and international agents of development and post-conflict reconstruction. In Nigeria, the authority of private security arises not only from its role as an agent of the holders of private property, but also from its acknowledged expertise in the field of security, and from its ability to bring to bear organisational techniques and technological capabilities that state forces and local private security firms are unable or unwilling to exercise. What is more, private security plays an important role in securing not only the operations of the oil companies but also, by extension, the authority of the Federal Government which depends upon those operations.

11 The privatisation of security in Nigeria involves both the privatisation of public policing forces, and the incorporation of private security companies into public-private security networks operating alongside police, military and navy personnel. Despite its unarmed status, private security exercises a fundamental impact on the security situation through public-private, global-local networks: utilising technology, expertise, and expatriate personnel, they influence the practices of public security forces, and provide capabilities that would otherwise be absent. The networks are not without tensions. Ultimate legal authority and control over the exercise of coercion, especially at the level of lethal force, and the chains of command over public forces remains in the hands of state authorities. While private security actors can influence the capacities and even the applications of this force, they by no means control it. Both global private security and its employers are thus embedded in local political struggles, and are open to charges that they facilitate and are complicit in coercive actions that they may not necessarily control. What exists is a complex pattern of negotiation and interaction, a network in which the different nodes are mutually dependent, but not always equal. In Kenya, security privatisation is deeply politicised due to the high degree of insecurity, inequality, and social fragmentation. Despite Kenya s very high level of crime and insecurity, there is remarkably little co-operation and co-ordination of security initiatives. In part this is due to a general lack of state capacity (and perhaps also willingness), and security networks are characterised by competition and mutual suspicion, with each set of actors drawing upon different forms of capital to enhance their position. Global companies, as well as the leading Kenyan companies, use their status as security experts and their access to state-of-the-art technologies to lobby and influence the Government. Local companies, on the other hand, often possess significant social and political capital, in part from belonging to the same ethnic group as powerful politicians. Thus, the security industry association that openly boycotts the government s minimum wage not only sported a Government Minister at its launch, but also continues to sign significant government contracts. Public-private, global-local security networks in Kenya are often informal, ad-hoc and dependent on personal, rather than formalised, legal relationships. The result is a lack of policy consistency which undermines oft-stated desires to achieve greater coordination

12 and effectiveness. This in turn has important consequences for security provision, and ultimately also for social cohesion. The current lack of co-ordination and co-operation could result in a gradual privatisation of public policing, and hence an intensification and deepening of existing social inequalities. Given adequate level of co-operation between public policing and private security companies, on the other hand, private security could potentially act as a force multiplier increasing security for all sections of society. In South Africa, issues of social stratification and political significance have been central to discussions about private security since the transition to democracy. To a significant extent, however, the sector has achieved increasing legitimacy, and while not without tensions, hybrid networks now play a significant role in the provision of security in the country. The Cape Town City Improvement District (CCID) initiative is one of the most extensive examples of these public-private, global-local networks. The CCID is in effect a large-scale partnership policing effort aimed at making central Cape Town safe and secure. The CCID is organised by the Cape Town Partnership, funded by property owners in the city centre. Approximately 50% of the 15 million Rand collected is spent on security. Group4Securicor has been contracted as the main security provider, and as a result the security of downtown Cape Town has to a significant extent been devolved to the second largest security company in the world. The security force consists of a total of six patrol vehicles, ten horse mounted officers and 60 foot patrol officers providing a 24 hour presence in the city. At night, the city is patrolled by 40 officers, supported by six vehicles. There is extensive co-operation between Group4Securicor and the public police, and the CCID/Securicor branded patrol vehicles include a City Police officer. The CCID is thus a prime illustration of a public-private, global-local security network. While the increasing authority of PSCs is commonly justified and explained in terms of economic logic and efficiency, it has implications in terms of who gets secured and how. In the CCID, those who pay are able to play a powerful role in determining the security agenda and the CCID can be seen to operate exclusionary practices towards undesirable people such as beggars, street children and the homeless. Activities

13 The project organised an inter-disciplinary international conference on security privatisation in Africa. The conference was held on April 19-21, 2005, and involved 16 participants from the UK, Europe, and the US, including anthropologists, criminologists, historians, and political scientists. 11 papers were presented. A selection of these papers is scheduled for publication as a special issue of the journal International Relations in An edited volume containing the remaining papers is under development. The research has also led to the inclusion of the researchers in two international research networks. The first stems from an International Peace Academy (New York) workshop on security sector reform, held at Leeds University in December The second involves inclusion in the organising group for a new ESRC-funded research network and workshop series organised by Dr. Sarah Percy and Professor Ian Loader (University of Oxford) entitled Governing the New Economy of Security. Outputs The most important output will be the forthcoming book provisionally entitled Security Beyond the State: Private Security and Transnational Security Governance Networks. The book will be published by the end of 2008, and discussions are ongoing with major academic publishers. Thus far three scholarly outputs have been published; an article on security sector reform in Sierra Leone and Kenya, an article on the politics of security privatisation in Kenya, as well as a book chapter analysing the globalisation of private security in South Africa. In addition, a review essay on military privatisation is forthcoming in The Review of International Political Economy. Two further articles are nearing completion: a study of the authority wielded by global private security companies, as evidenced in their significant role in public-private security structures in Cape Town, will appear in the Special Issue of International Relations, guestedited by the researchers. A major theoretical article is nearing completion and will be submitted to a leading international journal. An edited collection following the conference in April 2006 is also underway, and will contain a chapter by the researchers entitled Private Security and the State in Africa.

14 The first outputs from the project were the three Country Reports on Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Kenya respectively. These have been widely distributed to members of the private security industry, government ministries in the UK and the relevant countries, as well as academics and researchers. The reports have generated considerable interest and debate and has allowed for dialogue and interaction with non-academic user groups. The reports are available on the project website: The website has received over 1000 hits to date. Impacts The most direct policy impact of the research has been in Kenya, where the project s Country Report was requested by participants in the consultative committee examining the proposed regulation of the private security sector. In addition, several members of the private security sector have requested copies of the reports, and have subsequently commented on their usefulness. Similarly, researchers and students have shown considerable interest in the material published to date. Following an interview with the Development Assistant Committee (DAC) of the OECD, several copies of the reports we requested for the purpose of developing guidelines for private security and security sector reform (SSR). The DAC is a leading agency in the area of SSR. Future Research Priorities The need for further research in this rapidly expanding area is pressing. Given the geographical spread and socio-political penetration of security privatisation, research is required into its impact in different national and regional contexts. Similarly, a focus on the links between the expansion of international business into developing countries in tandem with private security is an important issue, as is the potential emergence of global security provision contracts between transnational private security companies and their clients, especially in the resource sector.

15 References Abrahamsen, Rita and Michael C. Williams The Globalisation of Private Security and the Politics of Protection in South Africa. In J. Huysmans et. al., eds., The Politics of Protection. London: Routledge. Avant, Deborah The Market for Force. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bailey, David and Clifford Shearing The New Structure of Policing: Description, Conceptualization, and Research. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice. Bourdieu, Pierre The Logic of Practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Dupont, Benoit Security in the Age of Networks. Policing and Society 14 (1): Garland, David The Culture of Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Johnston, Les and Clifford Shearing Governing Security. London: Routledge. Kinsey, Chris Corporate Soldiers and International Security. London: Routledge. Krahmann, Elke New Threats and New Actors in International Security. London: Palgrave. Singer, Peter Corporate Warriors. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Wood, Jennifer and Benoit Dupont, eds Democracy, Society and the Governance of Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.