BUILDING SECURITY IN. Analyzing Mobile Single Sign-On Implementations

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "BUILDING SECURITY IN. Analyzing Mobile Single Sign-On Implementations"

Transcription

1 BUILDING SECURITY IN Analyzing Mobile Single Sign-On Implementations

2 Analyzing Mobile Single Sign-On Implementations 1 Introduction Single sign-on, (SSO) is a common requirement for business-to-employee (B2E) application user authentication. As more and more organizations develop mobile applications for their employees, the need to leverage existing SSO technologies by mobile applications has arisen. This paper will focus on the architectures currently used for native mobile applications to leverage existing SSO infrastructures. These architectures cover three distinct use cases: a single identity provider, single shared identity provider session, and single sign-on with a manager. Each use case has unique characteristics and security concerns. For the purposes of this paper, SSO means an end-user authenticates once and that authentication is used by more than one application. For example, an enduser provides a valid username and password to one application and later when that end-user wants to use a second application, the second application does not force the end-user to re-enter his/her username and password. Using this strict definition, the first use case, Single Identity, is not SSO. It lets an end-user use the username and password for two applications, but not the authentication. At first glance, this approach seems undesirable as our applications are not realizing single sign-on; however, merely sharing identity may be the most desirable approach from a security and usability prospective. 2 Use Case One: Single Identity One of the predominant methods for mobile SSO integration is to authenticate end-users in each application using their enterprise username and password. As this technique has frequently been referred to as mobile SSO and is used in many application environments, it is included in this discussion. However, because the end-user must authenticate separately in each application, this architecture is properly called single identity provider, rather than single signon. The distinction is each application authenticates with the identity provider separately rather than sharing a single authentication decision. This approach provides several benefits to both security and even the end-user s experience. For an end-user, this approach gives up the convenience of a not having to reenter their username and password, but replaces it with consistent behavior across applications. End-users will know they are granting access to their data when they start an application and know the access is terminated when the application terminates. From a security perspective, true SSO use cases cannot securely share the authentication token on the mobile device. Analyzing Mobile Single Sign-On Implementations 2

3 2.1 Examining the Control Flow in a Threat Model Figure 1: Single Identity Threat Model T : SSO Token : User Credentials : Protected Resource T T : SSO Token : User Credentials : Protected Resource : Process Separation : File System Sandbox : Certificate Pinning C04 : SSL : SSO Token App One App Two : Process Separation : File System Sandbox : Certificate Pinning C04 : Application Whitelisting : SSL : SSO Token T : Malicious App T : Malicious App with Root Access T : Unauthorized Physical User TZ - 01: Mobile Device TZ - 02: App One Sandbox C04 C04 C04 C04 TA04 TZ - 03: App One Sandbox TA05 T : Malicious App T : Malicious App with Root Access T : Unauthorized Physical User C0 TZ - 01: Mobile Dev App One Web SSO Identity App Two Web App One W Service TZ - 04: Organizational Domain TZ - 04: Organizatio First examine the parts of the threat model present in all mobile SSO threat models. There are three main assets, which are parts of the system Figure 1 that need to be protected. The first asset is the SSO token,. The SSO token represents the authentication decision. Applications use the SSO token to authenticate to individual service providers. The second asset is a user s credentials,, which are only exposed to the identity provider s web page and backend. The last identified set of assets is the protected resources the service providers require user authentication to deliver,. There are five main controls, which are protections for the identified assets. The first identified control is process separation,. Operating systems implement this control to prevent running processes from accessing the memory space of other processes. The second common control is the file system sandbox,. All mobile operating systems have a form of sandboxing, which prevents applications from directly accessing other applications files. The third control present in all of our use cases is certificate pinning,. In certificate pinning, a client application verifies the server s certificate against a hard coded value. The final control is SSL, C04, which protects the assets in transit. There are five identified threat agents with a goal to compromise the identified assets. The first threat agent is a malicious app installed on the mobile device, T. The second threat agent, a malicious app with root access, is identical to the first threat agent except this application has root access on the device, T. The third threat agent is an attacker with physical access to the device (Unauthorized Physical User), T. For the purpose of this paper, the attacker is assumed to have access to the phone past the lock screen. The fourth threat agent is an attacker on a local or adjacent network (Unauthorized Network User), TA04. The final threat agent is a compromised service provider inside of the organization domain, TA05. Analyzing Mobile Single Sign-On Implementations 3

4 2.2 Concerns in a Single Identity System With the assets, threats, and controls enumerated in the previous section, one can use the threat model to generate possible attack scenarios. One attack malicious apps will attempt is to gain access to the user s SSO token and user credentials. If the client applications store this information to disk, the operating system will attempt to protect them via sandboxing. Malicious apps with root access will still be able to view these files, bypassing the file system sandbox control. Additionally with root access, a malicious app can still access the memory space of these applications, obtaining any information that has not been cleared from memory and bypassing the process separation control. A particularly dangerous attack scenario is an attacker with physical access to the device compromising the security of the application. With access to the device, an attacker would be able to view any file stored on the device. While there is no perfect solution to securing sensitive information on mobile devices where applications and users have root access, some basic steps should be taken: a. Never store user credentials to disk. b. Once an end-user has authenticated to the application, clear the user credentials from memory. c. Do not store SSO tokens to disk. Maintain SSO tokens inside of memory. The last two threat agents to address are unauthorized network users and compromised service providers. Both of these actors sit outside of the mobile device and only communicate with the device via the network interface. In most situations, these threat agents will not generate requests to the device, instead they rely on the device placing certain calls, listening, and reacting. The biggest concern from a network attacker is man in the middle attacks. To combat a majority of these attacks, systems should use web application best practices such as enforcing strict SSL. The final threat agent is a compromised service provider. If an attacker is able to compromise a service provider, users may unknowingly give this service provider their SSO token. In order to prevent network attackers and compromised service providers from impersonating application services, mobile applications should enforce certificate pinning. 3 Use Case Two: Single Shared Identity Session Another scenario to consider is broadcast native SSO, in which applications share an identity provider session bypassing the SSO token amongst themselves. In order to obtain the authentication decision, each application asks all other applications using the same identity provider if they have an SSO token from the identity provider. If no applications have established an SSO token, then the requesting application will connect to the identity provider and ask the identity provider to authenticate the user s username and password. When a second application needs an SSO token, the application will call out to the same set of applications requesting an SSO token. Since the first application has a token, the first application will send the SSO token. Unlike the previous use case, this is true SSO because the end-user does not need to enter their credentials a second time. Analyzing Mobile Single Sign-On Implementations 4

5 3.1 Examining the Control Flow in a Threat Model Figure 2: Broadcast Native SSO Threat Model T T : SSO Token : User Credentials : Protected Resource T T T : SSO Token : User Credentials : Protected Resource : Process Separation : File System Sandbox : Certificate Pinning C04 : Application Whitelisting : SSL : SSO Token App One IPC C04 App Two : Process Isolation : File System Sandbox : Certificate Pinning C04 : Application Whitelisting : SSL : SSO Token App Clie T : Malicious App T : Malicious App with Root Access T : Unauthorized Physical User TZ - 01: Mobile Device TZ - 02: App One Sandbox TA04 TZ - 03: App One Sandbox TA05 T : Malicious App T : Malicious App with Root Access T : Unauthorized Physical User TZ - 02: App On TZ - 01: Mobile Device HT App One Web SSO Identity App Two Web App Serv Prov TZ - 04: Organizational Domain TZ - 05: Organizational Dom The change between the current and previous threat model is the inclusion of inter-process communication (IPC) between the two mobile Figure applications. 2 An additional control is application whitelisting, C04. Application whitelisting is the generic term for the ability of applications to specify which applications they are willing to communicate with via IPC. 3.2 Concerns in a Broadcast Native SSO System All of the concerns and mitigations outlined in the previous use case also apply to the broadcast native SSO environment. The addition of IPC between the components increases the attack surface of the application, resulting in the need to secure the session identifier in-transit on the device. This change opens the possibility of a malicious application that sniffs and/or injects malicious IPC requests. By sniffing IPC traffic between the various components, a malicious app may provide requesting applications with an illegitimate token, preventing them from accessing the protected resource. In addition to sniffing IPC, a malicious application may also impersonate a legitimate application by directly requesting an SSO token from previously authenticated applications. Both of these cases boil down to an issue in authentication within app-to-app communication on the device. Currently, the best platform level protection against impersonation is to use IPC whitelisting. Both Android and ios (added in ios version 5.0) implement protections allowing applications to specify which application they are communicating with. Whitelisting can work for environments with a small and stable set of applications; however, maintaining whitelists becomes very difficult when the list of applications is dynamic. Unfortunately, whitelisting is not a perfect solution and can still be bypassed on both major platforms. Analyzing Mobile Single Sign-On Implementations 5

6 The second major consideration in a broadcast environment is handling a user s SSO token being invalidated and refreshed. When this occurs, all applications which received the SSO token should be told that the token is invalid and be issued the new SSO token. This means in addition to listening for requests for the current SSO token, applications must also listen for SSO token revocation. If an application does not receive an SSO token revocation message and continues to use the invalid token, the identity provider (IdP) will require the end-user to re-authenticate. This will negatively affect the user s experience because they will have to reauthenticate even though they just authenticated in a separate application. 4 Use Case Three: Single Sign-On with a Manager Organizations have begun implementing a manager application on the mobile device that acts as an intermediary between mobile apps and identity provider. A manager lets applications request an SSO token from a single location on the mobile device, simplifying the authentication logic in other applications and resolving some of the problems identified in the native broadcast SSO use case. From a security prospective, the main benefit to this solution is the addition of a central place to enforce policies. The manager solves two problems with the native broadcast use case: complex whitelists and an inconsistent user interface experience. In the native broadcast use case, each application must have a whitelist containing every other application participating in the SSO. When an application is added or removed, the whitelist of all applications must be updated. In combination with the potential security issues, there is the added usability concern where it is possible for each application to have a dramatically different user experience for authentication. The inclusion of the manager simplifies configuration and creates a consistent end-user authentication experience. End-users always enter their username and password into the manager and not each individual application. The manager handles authentication with the identity provider. When the mobile SSO manager receives an SSO token, it is passed back to the requesting mobile application. For subsequent authentication requests, the manager returns the SSO token without prompting the end-user. The manager simplifies the whitelist because the applications participating in the SSO all talk to the manager. Analyzing Mobile Single Sign-On Implementations 6

7 4.1 Examining the Control Flow in a Threat Model Figure 3: Mobile SSO with a Manager Threat Model T T : SSO Token : User Credentials : Protected Resource T T T : Process Isolation : File System Sandbox : Certificate Pinning C04 : Application Whitelisting : SSL : SSO Token App One IPC C04 Mobile SSO Manager IPC C04 App Two T : Malicious App T : Malicious App with Root Access T : Unauthorized Physical User TZ - 02: App One Sandbox TZ - 03: App One Sandbox TZ - 04: App One Sandbox TZ - 01: Mobile Device TA04 TA05 App One SSO Identity App Two TZ - 05: Organizational Domain This model for this mobile SSO system adds a mobile SSO manager. This increases the attack surface by adding a new application and exposing Figure an 3IPC interface between the mobile SSO manager and applications wishing to perform SSO. However, in this system the user s authentication credentials are only handled by the mobile SSO manager and the SSO identity provider. Individual applications leveraging the SSO infrastructure will not process user credentials, drastically reducing the exposure of the user credentials. 4.2 Concerns in a Native SSO with a Manager In addition to all the previously examined concerns and controls, native SSO will have an additional risk in the native mobile SSO manager client. If the mobile SSO manager is not developed in house, it should be analyzed and tested to ensure it is robust enough to protect against all previously mentioned attack vectors. While not a security issue, switching applications to perform authentication may negatively impact the user experience. Users may find the change to SSO rather jarring, especially on devices with poorer performance ratings. Analyzing Mobile Single Sign-On Implementations 7

8 5 Back to Single Identity Organizations considering a new mobile single sign scheme must address the following questions: How are applications verifying the authenticity of other applications before delivering the SSO token? Is the SSO token being stored and if so is it being stored securely? If the security of one application is compromised is the integrity of all applications compromised? After analyzing each of the current solutions used today for leveraging existing infrastructure, the approach of the single identity provider becomes much more appealing. End-users will know when they are authenticated and when they need to login again when launching an application. Single identity provides a consistent end-user experience as well as significant security benefits. When introducing mobile single sign-on, the SSO token has to be shared on the mobile device. In this scenario IPCs including a secure authentication scheme between multiple applications and the app-to-app communication must be securely locked down. Another factor to consider is while a mobile device is a personal device, threats like mobile malware and device loss means the SSO token is at risk. Single sign-on s goal is to provide a convenient and secure way for end-users to authenticate. For web-based applications, existing SSO infrastructure does a great job. Native mobile applications can have convenience or security. It is one or the other because on a mobile device, the user s account can be accessed if the SSO token is intercepted or captured by malicious code on the device. For mobile applications, convenience and security can be achieved through a combination of long running application sessions with a step-up authentication scheme for sensitive or high value transactions. Analyzing Mobile Single Sign-On Implementations 8

9 About the Author Jacob Ewers is a Senior Security Consultant at Cigital, Inc. working in the mobile space as a mobile security architect and vulnerability assessor. Jacob has worked across many Fortune 500 companies in a vast number of industry verticals helping development organizations build security in their applications. Jacob is also an instructor for Cigital s Defensive Programming for Android class and is the author of numerous training courses including the Foundations of Mobile Security. About Cigital Cigital is one of the world s largest application security firms. We go beyond traditional testing services to help organizations find, fix and prevent vulnerabilities in the applications that power their business. Our holistic approach to application security offers a balance of managed services, professional services and products tailored to fit your specific needs. We don t stop when the test is over. Our experts also provide remediation guidance, program design services, and training that empower you to build and maintain secure applications. Analyzing Mobile Single Sign-On Implementations 9 Cigital Ridgetop Circle Suite 400 Dulles, VA Cigital

WHITE PAPER Usher Mobile Identity Platform

WHITE PAPER Usher Mobile Identity Platform WHITE PAPER Usher Mobile Identity Platform Security Architecture For more information, visit Usher.com info@usher.com Toll Free (US ONLY): 1 888.656.4464 Direct Dial: 703.848.8710 Table of contents Introduction

More information

BYPASSING THE ios GATEKEEPER

BYPASSING THE ios GATEKEEPER BYPASSING THE ios GATEKEEPER AVI BASHAN Technology Leader Check Point Software Technologies, Ltd. OHAD BOBROV Director, Mobile Threat Prevention Check Point Software Technologies, Ltd. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

More information

MaaS360 Mobile Enterprise Gateway

MaaS360 Mobile Enterprise Gateway MaaS360 Mobile Enterprise Gateway Administrator Guide Copyright 2013 Fiberlink Communications Corporation. All rights reserved. Information in this document is subject to change without notice. The software

More information

MaaS360 Mobile Enterprise Gateway

MaaS360 Mobile Enterprise Gateway MaaS360 Mobile Enterprise Gateway Administrator Guide Copyright 2014 Fiberlink, an IBM Company. All rights reserved. Information in this document is subject to change without notice. The software described

More information

BlackBerry 10.3 Work and Personal Corporate

BlackBerry 10.3 Work and Personal Corporate GOV.UK Guidance BlackBerry 10.3 Work and Personal Corporate Published Contents 1. Usage scenario 2. Summary of platform security 3. How the platform can best satisfy the security recommendations 4. Network

More information

BYOD Guidance: BlackBerry Secure Work Space

BYOD Guidance: BlackBerry Secure Work Space GOV.UK Guidance BYOD Guidance: BlackBerry Secure Work Space Published 17 February 2015 Contents 1. About this guidance 2. Summary of key risks 3. Secure Work Space components 4. Technical assessment 5.

More information

The Trivial Cisco IP Phones Compromise

The Trivial Cisco IP Phones Compromise Security analysis of the implications of deploying Cisco Systems SIP-based IP Phones model 7960 Ofir Arkin Founder The Sys-Security Group ofir@sys-security.com http://www.sys-security.com September 2002

More information

Introduction to SAML

Introduction to SAML Introduction to THE LEADER IN API AND CLOUD GATEWAY TECHNOLOGY Introduction to Introduction In today s world of rapidly expanding and growing software development; organizations, enterprises and governments

More information

How to Implement Enterprise SAML SSO

How to Implement Enterprise SAML SSO How to Implement Enterprise SSO THE LEADER IN API AND CLOUD GATEWAY TECHNOLOGY How to Implement Enterprise SSO Introduction Security Assertion Markup Language, or, provides numerous The advantages and

More information

Kaspersky Fraud Prevention: a Comprehensive Protection Solution for Online and Mobile Banking

Kaspersky Fraud Prevention: a Comprehensive Protection Solution for Online and Mobile Banking Kaspersky Fraud Prevention: a Comprehensive Protection Solution for Online and Mobile Banking Today s bank customers can perform most of their financial activities online. According to a global survey

More information

NCSU SSO. Case Study

NCSU SSO. Case Study NCSU SSO Case Study 2 2 NCSU Project Requirements and Goals NCSU Operating Environment Provide support for a number Apps and Programs Different vendors have their authentication databases End users must

More information

Flexible Identity Federation

Flexible Identity Federation Flexible Identity Federation Quick start guide version 1.0.1 Publication history Date Description Revision 2015.09.23 initial release 1.0.0 2015.12.11 minor updates 1.0.1 Copyright Orange Business Services

More information

Introduction to the Mobile Access Gateway

Introduction to the Mobile Access Gateway Introduction to the Mobile Access Gateway This document provides an overview of the AirWatch Mobile Access Gateway (MAG) architecture and security and explains how to enable MAG functionality in the AirWatch

More information

Workday Mobile Security FAQ

Workday Mobile Security FAQ Workday Mobile Security FAQ Workday Mobile Security FAQ Contents The Workday Approach 2 Authentication 3 Session 3 Mobile Device Management (MDM) 3 Workday Applications 4 Web 4 Transport Security 5 Privacy

More information

The Top 5 Federated Single Sign-On Scenarios

The Top 5 Federated Single Sign-On Scenarios The Top 5 Federated Single Sign-On Scenarios Table of Contents Executive Summary... 1 The Solution: Standards-Based Federation... 2 Service Provider Initiated SSO...3 Identity Provider Initiated SSO...3

More information

Prevent Malware attacks with F5 WebSafe and MobileSafe. Alfredo Vistola Security Solution Architect, EMEA

Prevent Malware attacks with F5 WebSafe and MobileSafe. Alfredo Vistola Security Solution Architect, EMEA Prevent Malware attacks with F5 WebSafe and MobileSafe Alfredo Vistola Security Solution Architect, EMEA Malware Threat Landscape Growth and Targets % 25 Of real-world malware is caught by anti-virus Malware

More information

BEST SECURITY PRACTICES IN ONLINE BANKING PLATFORMS

BEST SECURITY PRACTICES IN ONLINE BANKING PLATFORMS BEST SECURITY PRACTICES IN ONLINE BANKING PLATFORMS TABLE OF CONTENTS BEST SECURITY PRACTICES Home banking platforms have been implemented as an ever more efficient 1 channel through for banking transactions.

More information

Mobile Payment Services- Security Risks, Trends and Countermeasures

Mobile Payment Services- Security Risks, Trends and Countermeasures Mobile Payment Services- Security Risks, Trends and Countermeasures Agenda Trends in mobile payments Security risks in mobile payments applications and devices Mitigation strategy through secure SDLC Mobile

More information

Enterprise Apps: Bypassing the Gatekeeper

Enterprise Apps: Bypassing the Gatekeeper Enterprise Apps: Bypassing the Gatekeeper By Avi Bashan and Ohad Bobrov Executive Summary The Apple App Store is a major part of the ios security paradigm, offering a central distribution process that

More information

Trust Digital Best Practices

Trust Digital Best Practices > ARMING IT AGAINST SMARTPHONE THREATS Trust Digital Best Practices April 2009 The information contained herein is subject to change at any time, and Trust Digital makes no warranties, either express or

More information

MOBILITY. Transforming the mobile device from a security liability into a business asset. pingidentity.com

MOBILITY. Transforming the mobile device from a security liability into a business asset. pingidentity.com MOBILITY Transforming the mobile device from a security liability into a business asset. pingidentity.com Table of Contents Introduction 3 Three Technologies That Securely Unleash Mobile and BYOD 4 Three

More information

The increasing popularity of mobile devices is rapidly changing how and where we

The increasing popularity of mobile devices is rapidly changing how and where we Mobile Security BACKGROUND The increasing popularity of mobile devices is rapidly changing how and where we consume business related content. Mobile workforce expectations are forcing organizations to

More information

BlackBerry Enterprise Service 10. Secure Work Space for ios and Android Version: 10.1.1. Security Note

BlackBerry Enterprise Service 10. Secure Work Space for ios and Android Version: 10.1.1. Security Note BlackBerry Enterprise Service 10 Secure Work Space for ios and Android Version: 10.1.1 Security Note Published: 2013-06-21 SWD-20130621110651069 Contents 1 About this guide...4 2 What is BlackBerry Enterprise

More information

Achieving PCI Compliance with Red Hat Enterprise Linux. June 2009

Achieving PCI Compliance with Red Hat Enterprise Linux. June 2009 Achieving PCI Compliance with Red Hat Enterprise Linux June 2009 CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...2 OVERVIEW OF PCI...3 1.1. What is PCI DSS?... 3 1.2. Who is impacted by PCI?... 3 1.3. Requirements for achieving

More information

Salesforce1 Mobile Security Guide

Salesforce1 Mobile Security Guide Salesforce1 Mobile Security Guide Version 1, 1 @salesforcedocs Last updated: December 8, 2015 Copyright 2000 2015 salesforce.com, inc. All rights reserved. Salesforce is a registered trademark of salesforce.com,

More information

Thick Client Application Security

Thick Client Application Security Thick Client Application Security Arindam Mandal (arindam.mandal@paladion.net) (http://www.paladion.net) January 2005 This paper discusses the critical vulnerabilities and corresponding risks in a two

More information

Samsung KNOX EMM Authentication Services. SDK Quick Start Guide

Samsung KNOX EMM Authentication Services. SDK Quick Start Guide Samsung KNOX EMM Authentication Services SDK Quick Start Guide June 2014 Legal notice This document and the software described in this document are furnished under and are subject to the terms of a license

More information

CA Single Sign-On Migration Guide

CA Single Sign-On Migration Guide CA Single Sign-On Migration Guide Web access management (WAM) systems have been a part of enterprises for decades. It is critical to control access and audit applications while reducing the friction for

More information

Enhancing Organizational Security Through the Use of Virtual Smart Cards

Enhancing Organizational Security Through the Use of Virtual Smart Cards Enhancing Organizational Security Through the Use of Virtual Smart Cards Today s organizations, both large and small, are faced with the challenging task of securing a seemingly borderless domain of company

More information

The Top Web Application Attacks: Are you vulnerable?

The Top Web Application Attacks: Are you vulnerable? QM07 The Top Web Application Attacks: Are you vulnerable? John Burroughs, CISSP Sr Security Architect, Watchfire Solutions jburroughs@uk.ibm.com Agenda Current State of Web Application Security Understanding

More information

A Standards-based Mobile Application IdM Architecture

A Standards-based Mobile Application IdM Architecture A Standards-based Mobile Application IdM Architecture Abstract Mobile clients are an increasingly important channel for consumers accessing Web 2.0 and enterprise employees accessing on-premise and cloud-hosted

More information

SQL Injection January 23, 2013

SQL Injection January 23, 2013 Web-based Attack: SQL Injection SQL Injection January 23, 2013 Authored By: Stephanie Reetz, SOC Analyst Contents Introduction Introduction...1 Web applications are everywhere on the Internet. Almost Overview...2

More information

The State of Mobile Application Security Application Security Made Easy

The State of Mobile Application Security Application Security Made Easy The State of Mobile Application Security 2014-2015 Application Security Made Easy The State of Mobile Application Security 2014-2015 /> Brought to you by Checkmarx and Appsec Labs Research author: James

More information

Threat Model for Mobile Applications Security & Privacy www.datatheorem.com

Threat Model for Mobile Applications Security & Privacy www.datatheorem.com Overview Mobile applications (and the devices they run on) are powerful, as they can play music, check email, read documents, purchase products, get directions, play games, watch movies, scan barcodes,

More information

Mobility, Security and Trusted Identities: It s Right In The Palm of Your Hands. Ian Wills Country Manager, Entrust Datacard

Mobility, Security and Trusted Identities: It s Right In The Palm of Your Hands. Ian Wills Country Manager, Entrust Datacard Mobility, Security and Trusted Identities: It s Right In The Palm of Your Hands Ian Wills Country Manager, Entrust Datacard WHO IS ENTRUST DATACARD? 2 Entrust DataCard Datacard Corporation. Corporation.

More information

Seven Ways to Create an Unbeatable Enterprise Mobility Strategy

Seven Ways to Create an Unbeatable Enterprise Mobility Strategy Seven Ways to Create an Unbeatable Enterprise Mobility Strategy A practical guide to what business and IT leaders need to do NOW to manage their business s mobile future By Arun Bhattacharya, CA Technologies

More information

PortWise Access Management Suite

PortWise Access Management Suite Create secure virtual access for your employees, partners and customers from any location and any device. With todays global and homogenous economy, the accuracy and responsiveness of an organization s

More information

WHITE PAPER. Smart Card Authentication for J2EE Applications Using Vintela SSO for Java (VSJ)

WHITE PAPER. Smart Card Authentication for J2EE Applications Using Vintela SSO for Java (VSJ) WHITE PAPER Smart Card Authentication for J2EE Applications Using Vintela SSO for Java (VSJ) SEPTEMBER 2004 Overview Password-based authentication is weak and smart cards offer a way to address this weakness,

More information

Google Identity Services for work

Google Identity Services for work INTRODUCING Google Identity Services for work One account. All of Google Enter your email Next Online safety made easy We all care about keeping our data safe and private. Google Identity brings a new

More information

Strengthen security with intelligent identity and access management

Strengthen security with intelligent identity and access management Strengthen security with intelligent identity and access management IBM Security solutions help safeguard user access, boost compliance and mitigate insider threats Highlights Enable business managers

More information

Where every interaction matters.

Where every interaction matters. Where every interaction matters. Peer 1 Vigilant Web Application Firewall Powered by Alert Logic The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Top Ten Web Security Risks and Countermeasures White Paper

More information

Architecture and Data Flow Overview. BlackBerry Enterprise Service 10 721-08877-123 Version: 10.2. Quick Reference

Architecture and Data Flow Overview. BlackBerry Enterprise Service 10 721-08877-123 Version: 10.2. Quick Reference Architecture and Data Flow Overview BlackBerry Enterprise Service 10 721-08877-123 Version: Quick Reference Published: 2013-11-28 SWD-20131128130321045 Contents Key components of BlackBerry Enterprise

More information

Application Security Testing. Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In)

Application Security Testing. Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) Application Security Testing Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) OWASP Top 10 Place to start for learning about application security risks. Periodically updated What is OWASP? Open Web Application

More information

Securing Office 365 with MobileIron

Securing Office 365 with MobileIron Securing Office 365 with MobileIron Introduction Office 365 is Microsoft s cloud-based productivity suite. It includes online versions of Microsoft s most popular solutions, like Exchange and SharePoint,

More information

Making Database Security an IT Security Priority

Making Database Security an IT Security Priority Sponsored by Oracle Making Database Security an IT Security Priority A SANS Whitepaper November 2009 Written by Tanya Baccam Security Strategy Overview Why a Database Security Strategy? Making Databases

More information

Network Virtualization Network Admission Control Deployment Guide

Network Virtualization Network Admission Control Deployment Guide Network Virtualization Network Admission Control Deployment Guide This document provides guidance for enterprises that want to deploy the Cisco Network Admission Control (NAC) Appliance for their campus

More information

Windows Phone 8 devices will be used remotely over 3G, 4G and non-captive Wi-Fi networks to enable a variety of remote working approaches such as

Windows Phone 8 devices will be used remotely over 3G, 4G and non-captive Wi-Fi networks to enable a variety of remote working approaches such as GOV.UK Guidance End User Devices Security Guidance: Windows Phone 8 Updated 14 October 2013 Contents 1. Usage Scenario 2. Summary of Platform Security 3. How the Platform Can Best Satisfy the Security

More information

Android Security. Device Management and Security. by Stephan Linzner & Benjamin Reimold

Android Security. Device Management and Security. by Stephan Linzner & Benjamin Reimold Android Security Device Management and Security by Stephan Linzner & Benjamin Reimold Introducing Stephan Linzner Benjamin Reimold Consultant, Software Engineer Mobile Developer Founder of Stuttgart GTUG

More information

Enterprise Mobility Management Migration Migrating from Legacy EMM to an epo Managed EMM Environment. Paul Luetje Enterprise Solutions Architect

Enterprise Mobility Management Migration Migrating from Legacy EMM to an epo Managed EMM Environment. Paul Luetje Enterprise Solutions Architect Enterprise Mobility Management Migration Migrating from Legacy EMM to an epo Managed EMM Environment Paul Luetje Enterprise Solutions Architect Table of Contents Welcome... 3 Purpose of this document...

More information

Moving Beyond User Names & Passwords Okta Inc. info@okta.com 1-888-722-7871

Moving Beyond User Names & Passwords Okta Inc. info@okta.com 1-888-722-7871 Moving Beyond User Names & Passwords An Overview of Okta s Multifactor Authentication Capability Okta Inc. 301 Brannan Street San Francisco, CA 94107 info@okta.com 1-888-722-7871 Contents 1 Moving Beyond

More information

Corporate Security Research and Assurance Services

Corporate Security Research and Assurance Services Corporate Security Research and Assurance Services We Keep Your Business In Business Obrela Security Industries mission is to provide Enterprise Information Security Intelligence and Risk Management Services

More information

Provide access control with innovative solutions from IBM.

Provide access control with innovative solutions from IBM. Security solutions To support your IT objectives Provide access control with innovative solutions from IBM. Highlights Help protect assets and information from unauthorized access and improve business

More information

Active Directory Comapatibility with ExtremeZ-IP A Technical Best Practices Whitepaper

Active Directory Comapatibility with ExtremeZ-IP A Technical Best Practices Whitepaper Active Directory Comapatibility with ExtremeZ-IP A Technical Best Practices Whitepaper About this Document The purpose of this technical paper is to discuss how ExtremeZ-IP supports Microsoft Active Directory.

More information

Active Directory Compatibility with ExtremeZ-IP

Active Directory Compatibility with ExtremeZ-IP Active Directory Compatibility with ExtremeZ-IP A Technical Best Practices White Paper Group Logic White Paper October 2010 About This Document The purpose of this technical paper is to discuss how ExtremeZ-IP

More information

ADDING STRONGER AUTHENTICATION for VPN Access Control

ADDING STRONGER AUTHENTICATION for VPN Access Control ADDING STRONGER AUTHENTICATION for VPN Access Control Adding Stronger Authentication for VPN Access Control 1 ADDING STRONGER AUTHENTICATION for VPN Access Control A VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORK (VPN) allows

More information

Getting Started with the iscan Online Data Breach Risk Intelligence Platform

Getting Started with the iscan Online Data Breach Risk Intelligence Platform Getting Started with the iscan Online Data Breach Risk Intelligence Platform 2 Table of Contents Overview... 3 Data Breach Risk Intelligence... 3 Data Breach Prevention Lifecycle Defined... 3 Choosing

More information

For more information on SQL injection, please refer to the Visa Data Security Alert, SQL Injection Attacks, available at www.visa.

For more information on SQL injection, please refer to the Visa Data Security Alert, SQL Injection Attacks, available at www.visa. Global Partner Management Notice Subject: Visa Data Security Alert Malicious Software and Internet Protocol Addresses Dated: April 10, 2009 Announcement: The protection of account information is a responsibility

More information

Taxonomic Modeling of Security Threats in Software Defined Networking

Taxonomic Modeling of Security Threats in Software Defined Networking Taxonomic Modeling of Security Threats in Software Defined Networking Recent advances in software defined networking (SDN) provide an opportunity to create flexible and secure next-generation networks.

More information

Vidder PrecisionAccess

Vidder PrecisionAccess Vidder PrecisionAccess Security Architecture February 2016 910 E HAMILTON AVENUE. SUITE 410 CAMPBELL, CA 95008 P: 408.418.0440 F: 408.706.5590 WWW.VIDDER.COM Table of Contents I. Overview... 3 II. Components...

More information

UNCLASSIFIED Version 1.0 May 2012

UNCLASSIFIED Version 1.0 May 2012 Secure By Default: Platforms Computing platforms contain vulnerabilities that can be exploited for malicious purposes. Often exploitation does not require a high degree of expertise, as tools and advice

More information

Oracle Enterprise Single Sign-on Technical Guide An Oracle White Paper June 2009

Oracle Enterprise Single Sign-on Technical Guide An Oracle White Paper June 2009 Oracle Enterprise Single Sign-on Technical Guide An Oracle White Paper June 2009 EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW Enterprises these days generally have Microsoft Windows desktop users accessing diverse enterprise applications

More information

Symantec Mobile Security

Symantec Mobile Security Advanced threat protection for mobile devices Data Sheet: Endpoint Management and Mobility Overview The combination of uncurated app stores, platform openness, and sizeable marketshare, make the Android

More information

managing SSO with shared credentials

managing SSO with shared credentials managing SSO with shared credentials Introduction to Single Sign On (SSO) All organizations, small and big alike, today have a bunch of applications that must be accessed by different employees throughout

More information

QuickBooks Online: Security & Infrastructure

QuickBooks Online: Security & Infrastructure QuickBooks Online: Security & Infrastructure May 2014 Contents Introduction: QuickBooks Online Security and Infrastructure... 3 Security of Your Data... 3 Access Control... 3 Privacy... 4 Availability...

More information

Kaspersky Fraud Prevention platform: a comprehensive solution for secure payment processing

Kaspersky Fraud Prevention platform: a comprehensive solution for secure payment processing Kaspersky Fraud Prevention platform: a comprehensive solution for secure Today s bank customers can perform most of their financial operations online. According to a global survey of Internet users conducted

More information

State of App Security

State of App Security State of App Security Recent attacks targeting mobile apps and operating systems have put an unprecedented amount of mobile business data at risk. Many enterprises are unprepared to combat the latest mobile

More information

Copyright Pivotal Software Inc, 2013-2015 1 of 10

Copyright Pivotal Software Inc, 2013-2015 1 of 10 Table of Contents Table of Contents Getting Started with Pivotal Single Sign-On Adding Users to a Single Sign-On Service Plan Administering Pivotal Single Sign-On Choosing an Application Type 1 2 5 7 10

More information

RSA SecurID Ready Implementation Guide

RSA SecurID Ready Implementation Guide RSA SecurID Ready Implementation Guide Partner Information Last Modified: December 18, 2006 Product Information Partner Name Microsoft Web Site http://www.microsoft.com/isaserver Product Name Internet

More information

Assuring Application Security: Deploying Code that Keeps Data Safe

Assuring Application Security: Deploying Code that Keeps Data Safe Assuring Application Security: Deploying Code that Keeps Data Safe Assuring Application Security: Deploying Code that Keeps Data Safe 2 Introduction There s an app for that has become the mantra of users,

More information

Media Shuttle s Defense-in- Depth Security Strategy

Media Shuttle s Defense-in- Depth Security Strategy Media Shuttle s Defense-in- Depth Security Strategy Introduction When you are in the midst of the creative flow and tedious editorial process of a big project, the security of your files as they pass among

More information

Centrify Mobile Authentication Services for Samsung KNOX

Centrify Mobile Authentication Services for Samsung KNOX Centrify Mobile Authentication Services for Samsung KNOX SDK Quick Start Guide 3 October 2013 Centrify Corporation Legal notice This document and the software described in this document are furnished under

More information

Symantec App Center. Mobile Application Management and Protection. Data Sheet: Mobile Security and Management

Symantec App Center. Mobile Application Management and Protection. Data Sheet: Mobile Security and Management Mobile Application Management and Protection Data Sheet: Mobile Security and Management Overview provides integrated mobile application and device management capabilities for enterprise IT to ensure data

More information

Top virtualization security risks and how to prevent them

Top virtualization security risks and how to prevent them E-Guide Top virtualization security risks and how to prevent them There are multiple attack avenues in virtual environments, but this tip highlights the most common threats that are likely to be experienced

More information

CA SiteMinder SSO Agents for ERP Systems

CA SiteMinder SSO Agents for ERP Systems PRODUCT SHEET: CA SITEMINDER SSO AGENTS FOR ERP SYSTEMS CA SiteMinder SSO Agents for ERP Systems CA SiteMinder SSO Agents for ERP Systems help organizations minimize sign-on requirements and increase security

More information

Tenable for CyberArk

Tenable for CyberArk HOW-TO GUIDE Tenable for CyberArk Introduction This document describes how to deploy Tenable SecurityCenter and Nessus for integration with CyberArk Enterprise Password Vault. Please email any comments

More information

BASELINE SECURITY TEST PLAN FOR EDUCATIONAL WEB AND MOBILE APPLICATIONS

BASELINE SECURITY TEST PLAN FOR EDUCATIONAL WEB AND MOBILE APPLICATIONS BASELINE SECURITY TEST PLAN FOR EDUCATIONAL WEB AND MOBILE APPLICATIONS Published by Tony Porterfield Feb 1, 2015. Overview The intent of this test plan is to evaluate a baseline set of data security practices

More information

Tenrox. Single Sign-On (SSO) Setup Guide. January, 2012. 2012 Tenrox. All rights reserved.

Tenrox. Single Sign-On (SSO) Setup Guide. January, 2012. 2012 Tenrox. All rights reserved. Tenrox Single Sign-On (SSO) Setup Guide January, 2012 2012 Tenrox. All rights reserved. About this Guide This guide provides a high-level technical overview of the Tenrox Single Sign-On (SSO) architecture,

More information

Secret Server Qualys Integration Guide

Secret Server Qualys Integration Guide Secret Server Qualys Integration Guide Table of Contents Secret Server and Qualys Cloud Platform... 2 Authenticated vs. Unauthenticated Scanning... 2 What are the Advantages?... 2 Integrating Secret Server

More information

Active Directory Compatibility with ExtremeZ-IP. A Technical Best Practices Whitepaper

Active Directory Compatibility with ExtremeZ-IP. A Technical Best Practices Whitepaper Active Directory Compatibility with ExtremeZ-IP A Technical Best Practices Whitepaper About this Document The purpose of this technical paper is to discuss how ExtremeZ-IP supports Microsoft Active Directory.

More information

WHITE PAPER SECURE, DEPLOYABLE BILATERAL (CLIENT/SERVER) AUTHENTICATION

WHITE PAPER SECURE, DEPLOYABLE BILATERAL (CLIENT/SERVER) AUTHENTICATION WHITE PAPER SECURE, DEPLOYABLE BILATERAL (CLIENT/SERVER) AUTHENTICATION SecureAuth Secure, Deployable Bilateral (Client/Server) Authentication As enterprises move their applications to the Web and mobile

More information

Improve your mobile application security with IBM Worklight

Improve your mobile application security with IBM Worklight Improve your mobile application security with IBM Worklight Contents 1 Introduction 2 IBM Worklight overview 4 Enabling mobile security with IBM Worklight 6 Integrating IBM Worklight with enterprise security

More information

SecureAuth Authentication: How SecureAuth performs what was previously impossible using X.509 certificates

SecureAuth Authentication: How SecureAuth performs what was previously impossible using X.509 certificates SecureAuth Authentication: How SecureAuth performs what was previously impossible using X.509 certificates As enterprises move their applications to the Web and mobile platforms, providing strong security

More information

KASPERSKY SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. EXPERT SERVICES. www.kaspersky.com

KASPERSKY SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. EXPERT SERVICES. www.kaspersky.com KASPERSKY SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. EXPERT SERVICES www.kaspersky.com EXPERT SERVICES Expert Services from Kaspersky Lab are exactly that the services of our in-house experts, many of them global

More information

Web Applications Access Control Single Sign On

Web Applications Access Control Single Sign On Web Applications Access Control Single Sign On Anitha Chepuru, Assocaite Professor IT Dept, G.Narayanamma Institute of Technology and Science (for women), Shaikpet, Hyderabad - 500008, Andhra Pradesh,

More information

Application Security in the Software Development Lifecycle

Application Security in the Software Development Lifecycle Application Security in the Software Development Lifecycle Issues, Challenges and Solutions www.quotium.com 1/15 Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY... 3 INTRODUCTION... 4 IMPACT OF SECURITY BREACHES TO

More information

APPLICATION SECURITY: FROM WEB TO MOBILE. DIFFERENT VECTORS AND NEW ATTACK

APPLICATION SECURITY: FROM WEB TO MOBILE. DIFFERENT VECTORS AND NEW ATTACK APPLICATION SECURITY: FROM WEB TO MOBILE. DIFFERENT VECTORS AND NEW ATTACK John T Lounsbury Vice President Professional Services, Asia Pacific INTEGRALIS Session ID: MBS-W01 Session Classification: Advanced

More information

IBX Business Network Platform Information Security Controls. 2015-02- 20 Document Classification [Public]

IBX Business Network Platform Information Security Controls. 2015-02- 20 Document Classification [Public] IBX Business Network Platform Information Security Controls 2015-02- 20 Document Classification [Public] Table of Contents 1. General 2 2. Physical Security 2 3. Network Access Control 2 4. Operating System

More information

OWA vs. MDM. Once important area to consider is the impact on security and compliance policies by users bringing their own devices (BYOD) to work.

OWA vs. MDM. Once important area to consider is the impact on security and compliance policies by users bringing their own devices (BYOD) to work. OWA vs. MDM Introduction SmartPhones and tablet devices are becoming a common fixture in the corporate environment. As feature phones are replaced with new devices such as iphone s, ipad s, and Android

More information

Frequently asked questions

Frequently asked questions Frequently asked questions For more information, visit Usher.com info@ Toll Free (US ONLY): 888.656.4464 Direct Dial: 703.848.8710 1 What is Usher? Usher is a mobile identity platform designed to provide

More information

Client Security Guide

Client Security Guide Client Security Guide NEXT GENERATION CLOUD-SECURITY www.exacttarget.com NEXT GENERATION CLOUD-SECURITY Companies across the globe are facing continuously evolving threats focused on obtaining an individual

More information

How the Barracuda Web Application Firewall Secures Your Mobile and IoT Services. Whitepaper

How the Barracuda Web Application Firewall Secures Your Mobile and IoT Services. Whitepaper How the Barracuda Web Application Firewall Secures Your Mobile and IoT Services Whitepaper Executive Summary The mobile application space has experienced an unprecedented growth in recent years, and it

More information

Mobile Security Checklist. An Easy, Achievable Plan for Security and Compliance

Mobile Security Checklist. An Easy, Achievable Plan for Security and Compliance Mobile Security Checklist An Easy, Achievable Plan for Security and Compliance Introduction Are mobile devices the weak link in your security defenses? Today, organizations are pouring millions of dollars

More information

October 2014. Application Control: The PowerBroker for Windows Difference

October 2014. Application Control: The PowerBroker for Windows Difference Application Control: The PowerBroker for Windows Difference October 2014 1 Table of Contents Introduction... 4 The Default-Deny Approach to Application Control... 4 Application Control s Dependence on

More information

VoiceTrust Whitepaper. Employee Password Reset for the Enterprise IT Helpdesk

VoiceTrust Whitepaper. Employee Password Reset for the Enterprise IT Helpdesk VoiceTrust Whitepaper Employee Password Reset for the Enterprise IT Helpdesk Table of Contents Introduction: The State of the IT Helpdesk...3 Challenge #1: Password-Related Helpdesk Costs are Out of Control...

More information

Securing Your Web Application against security vulnerabilities. Ong Khai Wei, IT Specialist, Development Tools (Rational) IBM Software Group

Securing Your Web Application against security vulnerabilities. Ong Khai Wei, IT Specialist, Development Tools (Rational) IBM Software Group Securing Your Web Application against security vulnerabilities Ong Khai Wei, IT Specialist, Development Tools (Rational) IBM Software Group Agenda Security Landscape Vulnerability Analysis Automated Vulnerability

More information

Allidm.com. SSO Introduction. Discovering IAM Solutions. Leading the IAM Training. @aidy_idm facebook/allidm

Allidm.com. SSO Introduction. Discovering IAM Solutions. Leading the IAM Training. @aidy_idm facebook/allidm Discovering IAM Solutions Leading the IAM Training @aidy_idm facebook/allidm SSO Introduction Disclaimer and Acknowledgments The contents here are created as a own personal endeavor and thus does not reflect

More information

Protect Your Business and Customers from Online Fraud

Protect Your Business and Customers from Online Fraud DATASHEET Protect Your Business and Customers from Online Fraud What s Inside 2 WebSafe 5 F5 Global Services 5 More Information Online services allow your company to have a global presence and to conveniently

More information

Appalachian Regional Commission Evaluation Report. Table of Contents. Results of Evaluation... 1. Areas for Improvement... 2

Appalachian Regional Commission Evaluation Report. Table of Contents. Results of Evaluation... 1. Areas for Improvement... 2 Report No. 13-35 September 27, 2013 Appalachian Regional Commission Table of Contents Results of Evaluation... 1 Areas for Improvement... 2 Area for Improvement 1: The agency should implement ongoing scanning

More information

10 Potential Risk Facing Your IT Department: Multi-layered Security & Network Protection. September 2011

10 Potential Risk Facing Your IT Department: Multi-layered Security & Network Protection. September 2011 10 Potential Risk Facing Your IT Department: Multi-layered Security & Network Protection September 2011 10 Potential Risks Facing Your IT Department: Multi-layered Security & Network Protection 2 It s

More information